RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

CASE DIGESTS
Evidence; Deadline Friday 8AM

1. Vidallon-Magtolis vs. Salud, A.M. No. CA-05-20-P, September 9, 2005

Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J.

Complainant: Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon- Magtolis, CA (Vidallon- Magtolis)

Respondent: Cielito M. Salud, Clerk IV, CA (Salud)

Nature of the case: This is an administrative matter in the SC.

 Respondent Cielito Salud (Salud), Clerk IV, Mailing Section of the Judicial Records Division, of the CA stands
charged with the following offenses:
1. Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties;
2. Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and 

3. Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest 
in an official transaction, under Section
22, paragraphs (p), 
(t) and (u), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Civil Service Law.

FACTS:
 Melchor Lagua (Lagua) was found guilty of homicide in criminal cases before the RTC of Pasig City, Br. 163
 On appeal, the case was assigned to the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals
 Lagua, who was then detained at the Bureau of Prisons National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City, filed a
Very Urgent Petition for Bail
o Finding the petition well-taken, the appellate court issued a Resolution on October 9, 2003,
directing him to post a P200,000 bond
o Lagua’s bond was approved in a Resolution dated November 6, 2003, where the appellate court
also directed the issuance of an order of release in favor of Lagua
o The resolution was then brought to the Office of the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Maria Isabel M.
Pattugalan-Madarang (Atty. Madarang), for promulgation

 Irma Del Rosario, a Utility Worker, noticed the respondent’s unusual interest in the Lagua case
 The respondent had apparently been making inquiries whether the appellate court had already directed
the issuance of an order of release in the said case and was initially told there was none yet
 Due to his persistence, the records of the case were eventually found.

 Atty. Madarang then directed the typing of the Order of Release Upon Bond, and to notify the mailing
section that there were orders requiring personal service
 At around 4:00 p.m., the respondent then went to Atty. Madarang’s office and assisted in arranging and
stapling the papers for release
 He brought the said resolutions and other papers himself to the Mailing Section.
 On November 7, 2003, the respondent went to the National Penitentiary to serve the resolution and order
of release in the Lagua case
o The respondent left the prison compound at around 2:30 p.m.


 In the meantime, Atty. Madarang received a telephone call from a certain Melissa Melchor, who introduced
herself as Lagua’s relative.
o It was about 2:00 p.m.
 The caller asked her how much more they had to give to facilitate Lagua’s provisional liberty.
 The caller also told Atty. Madarang that they had sought the help of a certain Rhodora Valdez of the RTC of
Pasig, where the criminal case originated, but were told that they still had a balance to be given to Justice
Magtolis and Atty. Madarang through the respondent Salud
 Atty. Madarang then called the said court and asked to speak to Ms. Valdez, pretending to be Lagua’s
relative

 What transpired thereafter is contained in Atty. Madarang’s Affidavit (dated December 8, 2003):
o Upon telephone queries made with the office of the Clerk of Court of RTC Pasig, Atty. Madarang
learned that Rhodora Valdez is the incumbent Process Server of RTC, Br. 163, Pasig City, from
which the original case against accused-appellant Lagua originated
o When she called, she disguised as the relative of accused-appellant Lagua
o But Valdez did not report for work that day, according to her officemate Baby (knows as Ester)
 She added that Valdez has been waiting for Lagua’s relatives to call due to the remaining
amount to be paid, as the case will be docketed in CA en-banc
o She coordinated with Ms. Cecil Secarro, the Acting Chief of the Mailing Section, to inquire if it was
usual/normal for the latter to text her process servers on the field for an update of their deliveries,
to which Secarro answered in the affirmative
 While she was in the office, she texted Salud for his whereabouts and he replied, that he
was on his way back to Quezon City.
 That was before 4 p.m., adding that his deliveries were ok.

o Atty. Madarang got Salud’s mobile phone number from Ms. Secarro and started texting him at
about the same time Ms. Secarro did.
 She represented herself as Arlyn, Lagua’s relative.
 Most of his text messages are still stored in Atty. Madarang’s mobile phone.
o In fact, she received one text message from him while she was at the office of Justice Magtolis,
(the Chairman of the 6th Division and the ponente of C.R. No. 27423) in the late afternoon of
November 7, 2003 while reporting to her this incident.
o On November 8, 2003, Salud called her up, but she purposely did not answer him
o She personally called up the Bureau of Prisons for the exact time the Order of Release was
delivered and when accused appellant Lagua was released.
 She learned that the Order of Release was received at 9:15 A.M and
 That Lagua was released between 5-5:30 P.M. of November 7, 2003
o She was able to talk to Rhodora Valdez the following Monday, November 10, 2003, and again
introduced herself as Lagua’s relative, Arlyn and told her that she only wanted to know how much
more they had to pay for Lagua’s release
 But Valdez refused to entertain her
o On Nov. 11, 2003, she brought Salud, accompanied by Ms. Secarro to Justice Magtolis

o Out of the confrontation, they discovered that Salud did not properly serve the copies of the
Resolution and Order of Release upon the accused-appellant and his counsel
 He gave them to a certain Art, allegedly Lagua’s relative who he claimed approached him
at the Bureau of Prisons in the morning of November 7, 2003
 That he gave these documents to Art, who promised to take care of them, even before
he could deliver the copy addressed to the Director of Prisons
 He never mentioned that this Art was connected with the office of accused-appellant’s
counsel
o Several days later, Salud accompanied by Ms. Secarro, went to Atty. Madarang’s office to apologize

 On November 11, 2003, Justice Magtolis called the respondent to her office.
 When confronted, the respondent denied extorting or receiving money for Lagua’s release, or in any other
case.
  He, however, admitted serving the copies of resolution and order of release intended for Lagua and his
counsel to Art Baluran
 Justice Magtolis then called the respondent to a meeting with Clerk of Court Atty. Tessie L. Gatmaitan,
who stated that she would transfer the respondent to another office, which has nothing to do with cases
 Justice Magtolis then lodged the complaint against the respondent in a letter (dated Nov. 14, 2003)

In Respondent’s Counter-Affidavit:
 He vehemently denied the charges
 He never demanded money from Lagua’s relative
 His name had been used by someone and was, thus, a mere victim of the circumstances
 Moreover, the fact that he immediately released the CA order in question was clear proof that he had no
financial interest in the transaction.
 He also had his own version of the events that occurred that day, and
o That he was surprised when Atty. Madarang later on accused him that he used her name and the
name of Justice Magtolis to demand money from Mr. Lagua’s relative

Considering the gravity of the charges, then Acting Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia referred the matter to Atty.
Elisa B. Pilar-Longalong, Assistant Clerk of Court for investigation, report, and recommendation.

The Investigation
 Atty. Madarang affirmed the contents of her Affidavit
 Justice Magtolis testified, among others, that Atty. Madarang reported having received a telephone call
from the alleged relative of Lagua.
o She narrated that she gave the name “Arlyn” to the caller, and, thereafter, exchanged text
messages with the respondent.
o Justice Magtolis instructed Atty. Madarang to continue communicating with the respondent and,
if possible, to see it through a possible pay-off where a National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent
would be asked to assist them.
o However, the entrapment did not materialize.
 Another witness was Cristy Flores, convicted of three counts of estafa who served time at the Correctional
Institute for Women in Batangas City.
o She testified, among others, that respondent visited her in May 1999, as she had asked him to fix
her appeal bond.
o During the visit, the respondent took the pertinent documents from her.
o That she paid a total amount of P20,000 to respondent, who issued a receipt.
o Flores also narrated that she introduced another detainee to the respondent, Dalawangbayan,
whom the latter was also able to “help.”
 According to Dalawangbayan, the respondent asked for P200,000
 Atty. Salvador Quimpo, Lagua’s counsel, testified that it was Engineer Art Baluran who hired him as counsel
of the said accused
o He stated, among others, that he gave an oral authorization to Baluran to get the CA resolutions
or orders
 However, he said that he had never seen the respondent before

Respondent’s Testimony
 He testified, among others, that he has been a CA employee since 1991.
 He admitted that he knew Flores, and met her in January 1999 when he brought Gamil’s order of release in
the Batangas City Jail
 He claimed that he was waiting for the relatives of Gamil as they were the ones who would pay for his fare
home, and while waiting, he talked to the jailguard/warden
 Flores then approached him and asked him if he was from the CA
 o When the respondent answered in the affirmative, Flores replied that Justice Vasquez was her
neighbor in Biñan, Laguna.
 Respondent admitted that he was in the Correctional Institute for Women in Mandaluyong City on May 16,
1999, as he was then visiting Vilma Dalawangbayan

Investigating Officer’s (Atty. Longalong) Findings

 Found the respondent guilty as charged
 He is liable for inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of his official duties and for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he admittedly served the copies of the resolution and
order of release in the Lagua case (intended for detained appellant and his counsel) on Mr. Baluran xxx
 Also liable for having financial or material interest in an official transaction considering his undue interest
in the service of the order of release and actual release of Lagua to the point of staying almost the whole
day in the Bureau of Prisons and the aborted “deal” as can be concluded from the phone call of Melissa
Melchor to Atty. Madarang and subsequent exchange of text messages with Atty. Madarang disguising
as Lagua’s relative.

Respondent’s Claim, among others:

 That the admission of the text messages as evidence against him constitutes a violation of his right to
privacy

(Issue Relevant to Topic)

ISSUE: Whether the admission of text messages as evidence constitutes a violation of a person’s right to privacy.

RULING:
 No. The admission of text messages as evidence does not violate a person’s right to privacy.
 Text messages have been classified as “ephemeral electronic communication” under Section 1(k), Rule 2
of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and “shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to
the same or has personal knowledge thereof.”
 Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and academic, as the respondent himself,
as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of the first three messages on Atty.
Madarang’s cell phone.
 This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao.
o In that case, the Court, in finding the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct, considered text messages addressed to the complainant asking for a million pesos in
exchange for a favorable decision in a case pending before the CA.
o The Court had the occasion to state:
 … The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now
covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which provides:

“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text messages

. . . and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded
or retained.”

o Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the [said rules], “Ephemeral electronic communications shall be
proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge
thereof ….”
o In this case, complainant who was the recipient of the said messages and therefore had personal
knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import.
o Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone
from which the messages originated was hers.
 o Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had
been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages
between her and complainant.
o It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied.
o We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the
guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.

MAIN ISSUE: Should the respondent be held administratively liable for the offenses charged?

RULING:
 Yes.
 On the charge of inefficiency, the respondent is clearly administratively liable.
 After serving Lagua’s copy of the resolution and order of release to the prison Director, he should have
immediately returned to his station or served the other resolutions and documents for personal service.
 As an officer of the court, the respondent plays an essential part in the administration of justice.
 He is required to live up to the stringent standards of his office, and his conduct must, at all times, be above
reproach and suspicion.
 He must steer clear of any act, which would tend to undermine his integrity, or erode somehow the people’s
faith and trust in the courts.
 As the respondent himself admitted, he stayed on until 2:30 p.m. without any valid reason, despite the fact
that he knew he still had to serve several orders and resolutions.
 As pointed out by the Investigating Officer, “inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official
duties” is classified as a grave offense, and is punishable by suspension for 6 months and 1 day to 1 year

 Indeed, the complainant in administrative proceedings has the burden of proving the allegations in the
complaint by substantial evidence.
 In this case, the findings of investigating magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are given great weight
by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified

In Determining the Credibility and Probative Weight of the Testimony of Witness

 To determine the credibility and probative weight of the testimony of a witness, such testimony must be
considered in its entirety and not in truncated parts.
 To determine which contradicting statements of a witness is to prevail as to the truth, the other evidence
received must be considered.
 Thus, while it is true that there is no direct evidence that the respondent received any money to “facilitate”
the release of detained Lagua, the following circumstances must be taken as contrary to the respondent’s
plea of innocence:
o First, the respondent admitted that he was the sender of the first three text messages in Atty.
Madarang’s cellphone:
 “bkit, C rhodora to”
 “CNO KAMAGANAK AT ANONG PANGALAN MO” and
 “SINO K KC NAGHIWALAY N KAMI”
 As pointed out by the Investigating Officer, the respondent’s claim of “joking around”
(“nakipaglokohan”) with an unknown sender of a text message by replying thereto is
contrary to a normal person’s reaction.
 This is made even more apparent by the fact that the respondent even admitted that he
called Atty. Madarang twice, and when asked why, gave a vague answer, and, when
further questioned, even broke down in tears
o Second, the respondent’s testimony during the hearings held before Investigating Officer Atty.
Longalong is replete with inconsistencies and “loopholes.”
  He claimed that he made inquiries from other CA staff and learned that there was indeed
a deal between someone in the criminal section and a certain Rhodora of the RTC, Pasig
 He further claimed that the said parties wanted to get back at him for “immediately
serving” the release order which prevented them from demanding the balance of the deal
from Lagua’s relative.
 However, this bare claim was not corroborated by any witness
 Moreover, the respondent alleged that two anonymous callers claimed to know
something about the case against him
 The respondent’s actuation on this matter, if at all true, is again contrary to the normal
reaction of one who has been administratively charged, and wants to clear his name of
any wrongdoing.
o Respondent also admitted visiting an inmate (Vilma Dalawangbayan) at the correctional facility
eight times for no apparent reason.

 The Investigating Officer also found that the respondent was “high-strung” during his testimony, and this
finding must be accorded respect.
 Indeed, when the issue is the credibility of witnesses, the function of evaluating it is primarily lodged in
the investigating judge.
 The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of the credibility of witnesses by
trial judges in civil and criminal cases where preponderance of evidence and proof beyond reasonable
doubt, respectively, are required, applies a fortiori in administrative cases where the quantum of proof
required is only substantial evidence.
 The investigating judge is in a better position to pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses, having
personally heard them when they testified, and observed their deportment and manner of testifying

 Indeed, the Court is looked upon by people with high respect, a sacred place where litigants are heard,
rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed with.
 Misbehavior within or around the vicinity diminishes its sanctity and dignity.
 The conduct and behavior required of every court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk,
must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
 Their conduct must, at all times, be characterized by, among other things, propriety and decorum so as to
earn and keep the public’s respect and confidence in the judicial service.
 Public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline.
 Thus, a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the
performance of his official duties but in his personal and private dealings with other people.


 In this case, while there is no direct evidence to suggest that he actually extorted money to “facilitate” the
issuance of the appeal bond and release order which he himself served, the surrounding circumstances, as
well as the inconsistencies in his testimony, point towards administrative culpability.
 The respondent’s actuations fall short of the standard required of a public servant.
 He is guilty of gross or grave misconduct.
 Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction
from duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior, while “gross,” has been
defined as “out of all measure; beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused.
 Under the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, grave misconduct is punishable by dismissal from
the service even for the first offense, as it is classified as a grave offense.
 However, considering that the respondent has not been previously charged nor administratively
sanctioned, the Court finds that a penalty of suspension for one year and six months will serve the purpose
of disciplining the respondent.
 Court personnel, from the lowliest employee to the clerk of court or any position lower than that of a judge
or justice, are involved in the dispensation of justice, and parties seeking redress from the courts for
grievances look upon them as part of the Judiciary.
  They serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affect the honor
and dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s confidence in it.
 Thus, any conduct, which tends to diminish the image of the Judiciary, cannot be countenanced.

Disposition: Respondent is found guilty of inefficiency and gross misconduct xxx

2. NUEZ V. CRUZ-APAO
A.M. NO. CA-05-18-P: April 12, 2005
SYNOPSIS:
 This is an Administrative case for DISHONESTY AND GRAVE MISCONDUCT against RESPONDENT Elvira Cruz-
Apao, Executive Assistant II of the Acting Division Clerk of Court of the Fifteenth (15th) Division, Court of
Appeals (CA).
 Complaint arose out of respondent's solicitation of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from Zaldy Nuez
(Complainant) in exchange for a speedy and favorable decision of the latter's pending case in the CA.
o Complainant INITIALLY lodged a complaint with the Action Center of the Television program
Imbestigador of GMA Network, the crew of which had accompanied him to the Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Commission Special Projects Group (PAOCC-SPG) in Malacanang where he filed a
COMPLAINT FOR EXTORTION AGAINST RESPONDENT.
o This led to the conduct of an ENTRAPMENT OPERATION by elements of the Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) on 28 September 2004 at the Jollibee Restaurant, 2nd Floor,
Times Plaza Bldg., corner Taft and United Nations Avenue, Manila, the place where the supposed
hand-over of the money was going to take place.
 This prompted then CA Presiding Justice Garcia (now SC Justice) to issue OFFICE ORDER which created an
ad-hoc investigating committee, tasked among others to conduct a thorough and exhaustive investigation
of respondent's case and to recommend the proper administrative sanctions against her as the evidence
may warrant.
o Thereafter, the Committee conducted an investigation of the case and issued a RESOLUTION dated
18 October 2004 where it concluded that a prima facie case of Dishonesty and Serious Misconduct
against respondent existed.
o Thus, recommended respondent's preventive suspension for ninety (90) days pending formal
investigation of the charges against her. On 28 January 2005, the Committee submitted a Report
to the new CA Presiding Justice Brawner with its recommendation that respondent be dismissed
from service.

FACTS:
 Complainant's case referred to above had been pending with the CA for more than TWO years. Complainant
filed an illegal dismissal case against PAGCOR before CSC.
o The CSC ordered complainant's reinstatement, but a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO was
issued by the CA in favor of PAGCOR, thus complainant was not reinstated to his former job
pending adjudication of the case.
 Desiring an expeditious decision of his case, complainant sought the assistance of respondent sometime
in July 2004 after learning of the latter's employment with the CA from her sister, Magdalena David.
o During their first telephone conversation and thereafter through a series of messages they
exchanged via SMS, complainant informed respondent of the particulars of his pending case.
Allegedly, complainant thought that respondent would be able to advise him on how to achieve
an early resolution of his case.
 However, a week after their first telephone conversation, respondent allegedly told complainant that a
favorable and speedy decision of his case was attainable but the person who was to draft the decision
was in return asking for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
 o Complainant expostulated that he did not have that kind of money since he had been jobless for a
long time, to which respondent replied, "Eh, ganoon talaga ang lakaran dito, eh. Kung wala kang
pera, pasensiya na." Complainant then tried to ask for a reduction of the amount but respondent
held firm asserting that the price had been set, not by her but by the person who was going to
make the decision. Respondent even admonished complainant with the words "Wala tayo sa
palengke iho!" when the latter bargained for a lower amount.
o Complainant then asked for time to determine WON to pay the money in exchange for the
decision.
 Instead, in August of 2004, he sought the assistance of Imbestigador. The crew of the TV program
accompanied him to PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a complaint against respondent for EXTORTION.
o Thereafter, he communicated with respondent again to verify if the latter was still asking for the
money and to set up a meeting with her. Upon learning that respondent's offer of a favorable
decision in exchange for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was still standing, the plan for the
entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in cooperation with the PAOCC.
 On 24 September 2004, complainant and respondent met for the first time in person at the 2nd Floor of
Jollibee, Times Plaza Bldg., the place where the ENTRAPMENT OPERATION WAS LATER CONDUCTED.
o Siringan, a researcher of Imbestigador, accompanied complainant and posed as his sister-in-law.
During the meeting, complainant clarified from respondent that if he gave the amount of 1M he
would get a favorable decision. This was confirmed by the latter together with the assurance that
it would take about a month for the decision to come out. Respondent also explained that the
amount of 1M guaranteed a favorable decision only in the CA but did not extend to the Supreme
Court should the case be appealed later.
o When respondent was asked where the money will go, she claimed that it will go to a male
researcher whose name she refused to divulge. The researcher was allegedly a lawyer in the CA
5th Division where complainant case was pending. She also claimed that she will not get any
part of the money unless the researcher decides to give her some.
o Complainant tried once again to bargain for a lower amount during the meeting but respondent
asserted that the amount was fixed. She even explained that this was their 2nd transaction and
the reason why the amount was closed at 1M was because on a previous occasion, only 800K was
paid by the client despite the fact that the amount had been pegged at 1M. Complainant then
proposed that he pay a DP of 700K while the balance of 300K will be paid once the decision had
been released. However, respondent refused to entertain the offer, she and the researcher having
learned their lesson from their previous experience for as then, the client no longer paid the
balance of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos 500K after the decision had come out.
o Complainant brought along copies of the documents pertinent to his case during the first meeting.
After reading through them, respondent allegedly uttered, "Ah, panalo ka." The parties set the
next meeting date at lunchtime on 28 September 2004 and it was understood that the money
would be handed over by complainant to respondent then.
o On the pre-arranged meeting date, 5 PAOCTF agents, namely: Capt. Maclang as team leader, SPO1
Banay, PO1 Villena, PO1 Danny Feliciano, and PO2 delos Reyes arrived at around 11:30 AM at
Jollibee. Nuez and Siringan arrived at past noon and seated themselves at the table beside the one
occupied by the two (2) agents, Banay and Villena.
o Complainant had an unsealed long brown envelope containing ten (10) bundles of marked money
and paper money which was to be given to respondent. The envelope did not actually contain the
1M demanded by respondent, but instead contained paper money in denominations of One
Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) and One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), as
well as newspaper cut-outs. There were also ten (10) authentic One Hundred Peso (P100.00) bills
which had been previously dusted with ultra-violet powder by the PAOCTF.
 o The three other PAOCTF agents were seated a few tables away and there were also three (3) crew
members from Imbestigador at another table operating a mini DV camera that was secretly
recording the whole transaction.
 Respondent arrived at around 1:00 p.m. She appeared very nervous and suspicious during the meeting.
Ironically, she repeatedly said that complainant might entrap her, precisely like those that were shown on
Imbestigador. She thus refused to receive the money then and there. What she proposed was for
complainant and Siringan to travel with her in a taxi and drop her off at the CA where she would receive
the money.
o More irony ensued. Respondent actually said that she felt there were policemen around and she
was afraid that once she took hold of the envelope complainant proffered, she would suddenly be
arrested and handcuffed. At one point, she even said, "Ayan o, tapos na silang kumain, bakit hindi
pa sila umaalis?," referring to Banay and Villena at the next table. To allay respondent's suspicion,
the two agents stood up after a few minutes and went near the staircase where they could still see
what was going on.
o Complainant, respondent and Siringan negotiated for almost one hour. Complainant and Siringan
bargained for a lower price but respondent refused to accede.
 When respondent finally touched the unsealed envelope to look at the money inside, the PAOCTF agents
converged on her and invited her to the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters at United Nations
Avenue for questioning. Respondent became hysterical as a commotion ensued inside the restaurant.
 On the way to the WPD on board the PAOCTF vehicle, Banay asked respondent why she went to the
restaurant. The latter replied that she went there to get the 1M.
 Respondent was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the WPD where she was tested and found
positive for ultra-violet powder that was previously dusted on the money. She was later detained at the
WPD Headquarters.
 At 7pm of 28 September 2004, respondent called Atty. Gepty, her immediate superior in the CA at the
latter's house. She tearfully confessed to Atty. Gepty that "she asked for money for a case and was
entrapped by police officers and the media."
 Enraged at the news, Atty. Gepty asked why she had done such a thing to which respondent replied, "Wala
lang ma'am, sinubukan ko lang baka makalusot." Respondent claimed that she was ashamed of what she
did and repented the same. She also asked for Atty. Gepty's forgiveness and help. The latter instead
reminded respondent of the instances when she and her co-employees at the CA were exhorted during
office meetings never to commit such offenses.
o Atty. Gepty rendered a verbal report of her conversation with their division's chairman, Justice
Martin S. Villarama. She reduced the report into writing and submitted the same to then PJ Cancio
Garcia on 29 September 2004. She also later testified as to the contents of her report to the
Committee.

HEARING:
 During the hearing of this case, respondent maintained that what happened was a case of instigation and
not an entrapment. She asserted that the offer of money in exchange for a favorable decision came not
from her but from complainant.
o To support her contention, she presented witnesses who testified that it was complainant who
allegedly offered money to anyone who could help him with his pending case. She likewise claimed
that she never touched the money on 28 September 2004, rather it was Capt. Maclang who forcibly
held her hands and pressed it to the envelope containing the money. She thus asked that the
administrative case against her be dismissed.
 This Court is not persuaded by respondent's version. Based on the evidence on record, what happened was
a clear case of entrapment, and not instigation as respondent would like to claim.
 o IN ENTRAPMENT, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of ensnaring and capturing the
law-breakers in the execution of their criminal plan. On the other hand, IN INSTIGATION, the
instigator practically induces the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense, and he
himself becomes a co-principal.

ISSUE: WON RESPONDENT IS LIABLE FOR GRAVE MISCONDUCT AND VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF THE
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COURT PERSONNEL such that there was proper entrapment and was sufficiently
substantiated?
 In this case, complainant and the law enforcers resorted to entrapment precisely because respondent
demanded the amount of 1M Pesos from complainant in exchange for a favorable decision of the latter's
pending case. Complainant's narration of the incidents which led to the entrapment operation are more
in accord with the circumstances that actually transpired and are more credible than respondent's version.
 Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages from respondent
duly presented before the Committee that the latter asked for 1M pesos in exchange for a favorable
decision of the former's pending case with the CA.
o THE TEXT MESSAGES WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED BY THE COMMITTEE SINCE THE SAME ARE
NOW COVERED BY SECTION 1(K), RULE 2 OF THE RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE WHICH
PROVIDES:
o "EPHEMERAL ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION" REFERS TO TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS, TEXT
MESSAGES . . . AND OTHER ELECTRONIC FORMS OF COMMUNICATION THE EVIDENCE OF WHICH
IS NOT RECORDED OR RETAINED."
o UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 11 OF THE RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, "EPHEMERAL ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS SHALL BE PROVEN BY THE TESTIMONY OF A PERSON WHO WAS A PARTY TO
THE SAME OR WHO HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THEREOF ...."

APPLICATION:
 In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal knowledge
thereof testified on their contents and import.
o Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant's cellphone from
which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the
admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and
attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant.
o It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as
evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.
 Complainant's testimony as to the discussion between him and respondent on the latter's demand for 1M
pesos was corroborated by the testimony of a disinterested witness, Siringan, the reporter of Imbestigador
who was present when the parties met in person. Siringan was privy to the parties' actual conversation
since she accompanied complainant on both meetings held on 24 and 28 of September 2004 at Jollibee.
 RESPONDENT'S EVIDENCE was comprised by the testimony of her daughter and sister as well as an
acquaintance who merely testified on how respondent and complainant first met.
o Respondent's own testimony consisted of bare denials and self-serving claims that she did not
remember either the statements she herself made or the contents of the messages she sent.
Respondent had a very selective memory made apparent when clarificatory questions were
propounded by the Committee.
o When she was asked if she had sent the text messages contained in complainant's cellphone and
which reflected her cellphone number, respondent admitted those that were not incriminating but
claimed she did not remember those that clearly showed she was transacting with complainant.
 o Respondent would like this Court to believe that she never had any intention of committing a
crime, that the offer of a million pesos for a favorable decision came from complainant and that it
was complainant and the law enforcers who instigated the whole incident.
o Respondent thus stated that she met with complainant only to tell the latter to stop calling and
texting her, not to get the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as pre-arranged.
o THIS CLAIM OF RESPONDENT IS PREPOSTEROUS TO SAY THE LEAST. Had the offer of a million
pesos really come from complainant and had she really intended to stop the latter from corrupting
her, she could have simply refused to answer the latter's messages and calls. This she did not do.
She answered those calls and messages though she later claimed she did not remember having
sent the same messages to complainant. She could also have reported the matter to the CA
Presiding Justice, an action which respondent admitted during the hearing was the proper thing to
do under the circumstances. But this course of action she did not resort to either, allegedly because
she never expected things to end this way.
o While claiming that she was not interested in complainant's offer of a million pesos, she met with
him not only once but twice, ostensibly, to tell the latter to stop pestering her. If respondent felt
that telling complainant to stop pestering her would be more effective if she did it in person, the
same would have been accomplished with a single meeting. There was no reason for her to meet
with complainant again on 28 September 2004 unless there was really an understanding between
them that the 1M pesos will be handed over to her then. Respondent even claimed that she
became afraid of complainant when she learned that the latter had been dismissed by PAGCOR
for using illegal drugs. This notwithstanding, she still met with him on 28 September 2004.
o Anent complainant's narration of respondent's refusal to reduce the amount of 1M pesos based
on the lesson learned from a previous transaction, while admitting that she actually said the same,
respondent wants this Court to believe that she said it merely to have something to talk about. If
indeed, respondent had no intention of committing any wrongdoing, it escapes the Court why she
had to make up stories merely to test if complainant could make good on his alleged boast that he
could come up with a million pesos. It is not in accord with ordinary human experience for an
honest government employee to make up stories that would make party-litigants believe that
court decisions may be bought and sold. Time and again this Court has declared, thus:
 "Everyone in the judiciary bears a heavy burden of responsibility for the proper discharge
of his duty and it behooves everyone to steer clear of any situations in which the slightest
suspicion might be cast on his conduct. Any misbehavior on his part, whether true or only
perceived, is likely to reflect adversely on the administration of justice."
 Respondent having worked for the government for 24 yrs, nineteen (19) of which have been in the CA,
should have known very well that court employees are held to the strictest standards of honesty and
integrity. Their conduct should at all times be above suspicion. As held by this Court in a number of cases,
"The conduct or behavior of all officials of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the
Presiding Judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility."
Their conduct must, at all times be characterized by among others, strict propriety and decorum in order
to earn and maintain the respect of the public for the judiciary.
 Respondent's actuations from the time she started communicating with complainant in July 2004 until the
entrapment operation on 28 September 2004 show a lack of the moral fiber demanded from court
employees. Respondent's avowals of innocence notwithstanding, the evidence clearly show that she
solicited the amount of 1M pesos from complainant in exchange for a favorable decision. The testimony
of Atty. Gepty, the recipient of respondent's confession immediately after the entrapment operation,
unmistakably supports the finding that respondent did voluntarily engage herself in the activity she is being
accused of.
o Respondent's solicitation of money from complainant in exchange for a favorable decision violates
Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which took effect on 1 June 2004 pursuant to
 A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC. Sections 1 and 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
expressly provide:
 "SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not use their official position to secure unwarranted
benefits, privileges or exemption for themselves or for others."
 "SECTION 2. Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on
any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their
official actions." (Underscoring supplied)
 It is noteworthy that the penultimate paragraph of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel specifically
provides:
o INCORPORATION OF OTHER RULES
 "SECTION 1. All provisions of the law, Civil Service rules, and issuances of the Supreme
Court governing the conduct of public officers and employees applicable to the judiciary
are deemed incorporated into this Code."
 BY SOLICITING THE AMOUNT OF ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) FROM COMPLAINANT,
RESPONDENT COMMITTED AN ACT OF IMPROPRIETY WHICH IMMEASURABLY AFFECTS THE HONOR AND
DIGNITY OF THE JUDICIARY AND THE PEOPLE'S CONFIDENCE IN IT.

 In the recent case of ASPIRAS V. ABALOS, complainant charged respondent, an employee of the Records
Section, OCA, SC for allegedly deceiving him into giving her money in the total amount of Fifty Two
Thousand Pesos (P52,000.00) in exchange for his acquittal in a murder case on appeal before the Supreme
Court. It turned out that respondent's representation was false because complainant was subsequently
convicted of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court en banc found Esmeralda Abalos guilty of serious misconduct and ordered her dismissal
from the service. This Court aptly held thus:

o "In MIRANO V. SAAVEDRA, this Court emphatically declared that a public servant must exhibit at
all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity. The administration of justice is a sacred task,
and by the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, all those involved in it must faithfully
adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle that public office is a public trust, solemnly
enshrined in the Constitution."
 Likewise, in the grave misconduct case against DATU ALYKHAN T. AMILBANGSA of the Shari a Circuit Court,
Bengo, Tawi-Tawi, this Court stated:
o "No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from the occupant than the
judicial office. Those connected with the dispensation of justice bear a heavy burden of
responsibility. Court employees in particular, must be individuals of competence, honesty and
probity charged as they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court . . . . The High Court has
consistently held that persons involved in the administration of justice ought to live up to the
strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service. He should refrain from financial
dealings which would interfere with the efficient performance of his duties.83 The conduct
required of court personnel must always be beyond reproach."
 The following pronouncement of this Court in the case of YRASTORZA, SR. V. LATIZA, Court Aide, RTC
Branch 14 Cebu City is also worth remembering:
o "Court employees bear the burden of observing exacting standards of ethics and morality. This is
the price one pays for the honor of working in the judiciary. Those who are part of the machinery
dispensing justice from the lowliest clerk to the presiding judge must conduct themselves with
utmost decorum and propriety to maintain the public's faith and respect for the judiciary.
Improper behavior exhibits not only a paucity of professionalism at the workplace but also a great
 disrespect to the court itself. Such demeanor is a failure of circumspection demanded of every
public official and employee."

CONCLUSION:
 In view of the facts narrated above and taking into account the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the
Committee in their Report recommended that respondent be dismissed from government service for
GRAVE MISCONDUCT and violation of Sections 1 and 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.
o Finding the Committee's recommendation to be supported by more than substantial evidence and
in accord with the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the recommendation is well taken.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Elvira Cruz-Apao is found GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and
violation of SECTIONS 1 and 2 of the CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COURT PERSONNEL and is accordingly DISMISSED from
government service, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations. Her retirement and all benefits except accrued leave
credits are hereby FORFEITED.
NOTES:
During the 17 November 2004 hearing, where respondent was questioned by Justice Salazar-Fernando, the following
transpired:
Q: After reading those text messages, do you remember having made those text messages?
(Respondent)
A: Only some of these, your honors.
Justice Salazar-Fernando: Which one?
A: Sabi ko po magpunta na lang sila sa office. Yung nasa bandang unahan po, your Honors.
Q: What else?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: Tapos yung sabi ko pong pagpunta niya magdala siya ng I.D. or isama niya sa kanya si Len David.
Q: Okay, You remember having texted Zaldy Nuez on September 23, 2004 at 1309 which was around 1:09 in the
afternoon and you said "di me pwede punta na lang kayo dito sa office Thursday 4:45 p.m. Room 107 Centennial
Building.
A: Yes, your Honors.
Q: And on September 23, 2004 at 1731 which was around 5:31 in the afternoon you again texted Zaldy Nuez and
you said "Sige bukas nang tanghali sa Times Plaza, Taft Avenue, corner U.N. Avenue. Magdala ka ng I.D. para makilala
kita o isama mo si Len David.
A: Opo, your Honors.
Q: How about on September 23 at 5:05 in the afternoon when you said "Di pwede kelan mo gusto fixed price na
iyon."
A: I don't remember that, your Honors.
Q: Again on September 23 at 5:14 p.m. you said "Alam mo di ko iyon price and nagbigay noon yung gagawa. Wala
ako doon." You don't also remember this?
A: Yes, your Honors.
Q: September 27 at 1:42 p.m. "Oo naman ayusin nyo yung hindi halatang pera". You also don't rememberthat?
A: Yes Your Honors.
Q: September 27 at 1:30 in the afternoon, "Di na pwede sabi sa akin. Pinakaiusapan ko na nga ulit iyon." You
don't remember that?
A: No, your Honors.
3. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC of
Cebu, Br. 19, BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM SHIPPING, INCORPORATED, Respondents. G.R. No.
170491 April 4, 2007

Facts:
 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private respondent
Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged petitioner’s Power Barge 209 which was then
moored at the Cebu International Port.
 Petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against private respondent Bangpai for the
alleged damages caused on petitioner’s power barges. Private respondent Wallem Shipping, Inc., was
impleaded as additional defendant, contending that the latter is a ship agent of Bangpai Shipping Co.
 Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence before the
lower court consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V" together with the sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently,
private respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed their respective objections to
petitioner’s formal offer of evidence.

Court denied admission and excluded from records

 Public respondent judge denied the admission and excluding from the records petitioner’s Exhibits "A", "C",
"D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and
its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, "R" and "S" and its sub-markings:
o The Court finds merit in the objections raised and the motion to strike out filed. The record shows
that the plaintiff has been given every opportunity to present the originals of the Xerox or
photocopies of the documents it offered. It never produced the originals.
o The plaintiff attempted to justify the admission of the photocopies by contending that "the
photocopies offered are equivalent to the original of the document" on the basis of the Electronic
Evidence.
o But the Xerox copies do not constitute the electronic evidence defined in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the
Rules on Electronic Evidence. The information in those Xerox or photocopies was not received,
recorded, retrieved or produced electronically. Moreover, such electronic evidence must be
authenticated (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 5, Rules on Electronic Evidence), which the plaintiff failed to
do.
o Finally, the required Affidavit to prove the admissibility and evidentiary weight of the alleged
electronic evidence (Sec. 1, Rule 9, Ibid) was not executed, much less presented in evidence.
o The Xerox or photocopies offered should, therefore, be stricken off the record. Aside from their
being not properly identified by any competent witness, the loss of the principals thereof was not
established by any competent proof.

 Upon denial of MR, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA maintaining that
public respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying the admission of its Exhibits

CA decision
 Dismissed petitioner’s petition:
o Did not act with grave abuse of discretion
o pieces of petitioner’s documentary evidence which were denied admission by the respondent
judge were not properly identified by any competent witness. xxx said witnesses did not have
personal knowledge of and participation in the preparation and making of the pieces of
documentary evidence. xxx
o said pieces of documentary evidence were merely photocopies of purported documents or papers.
Section 3 of Rule 130 of the ROC is very explicit that, when the subject of inquiry are the contents
of documents, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original documents, except in certain
 cases and the petitioner has not shown that the non-presentation or non-production of its original
documentary pieces of evidence falls under such exceptions.
o The pieces of documentary evidence offered do not actually constitute as electronic evidence as
defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence. The petitioner has not adequately established that its
documentary evidence were electronic evidence and it has not properly authenticated such
evidence
o Lastly, the petitioner has not properly established the admissibility and evidentiary weight of said
documentary evidence.

 Hence, this petition

Issue: WON the photocopies offered as formal evidence were functional equivalent of their original based on its
inimitable interpretation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence?
Ruling: NO.

 Petitioner insists that the photocopies it presented as documentary evidence actually constitute electronic
evidence based on its own premise that an "electronic document" as defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of
the Rules on Electronic Evidence is not limited to information that is received, recorded, retrieved or
produced electronically. Rather, petitioner maintains that an "electronic document" can also refer to other
modes of written expression that is produced electronically, such as photocopies, as included in the
section’s catch-all proviso: "any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means".

 We do not agree.
 In order to shed light to the issue of WON the photocopies are indeed electronic documents as
contemplated in Republic Act No. 8792 or the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Electronic
Commerce Act, as well as the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the Court enumerated the documents offered
as evidence (NOTES)

 An "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures,

symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed
documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data
message or electronic document.

 The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document is
relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other document which is
presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an electronic document from
a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information
contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically.

Application
 A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all
of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may
be recorded or produced electronically.
 By no stretch of the imagination can a person’s signature affixed manually be considered as information
electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced.
  Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic
process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is
obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law.
 Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is
consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as
decreed in the law.

Violation of Best Evidence Rule

 Furthermore, no error can be ascribed to the court a quo in denying admission and excluding from the
records petitioner’s Exhibits
 The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best evidence rule and are
therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence.
 Before the onset of liberal rules of discovery, and modern technique of electronic copying, the best
evidence rule was designed to guard against incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered
copies and the withholding of the originals. But the modern justification for the rule has expanded from the
prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a central position in the law. The importance of
the precise terms of writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory as reliable
evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the concerns addressed
by the best evidence rule.

 Moreover, as mandated under Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

o "SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. — There can be no evidence of a
writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except
in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a public officer;
(d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a certified copy of which is made evidence by
law;
(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result
of the whole."

 When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon
proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may
prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony
of witnesses in the order stated. The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates
thereof:
o (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror
which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents;
o (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable
inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and
o (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the
document in the proper place or places.

 However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary
evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was made in accordance with the exceptions as enumerated
above

Petitioner has only itself to blame

  Finally, it perplexes this Court why petitioner continued to obdurately disregard the opportunities given by
the trial court for it to present the originals of the photocopies it presented yet comes before us now praying
that it be allowed to present the originals of the exhibits that were denied admission or in case the same
are lost, to lay the predicate for the admission of secondary evidence. Had petitioner presented the originals
of the documents to the court instead of the photocopies it obstinately offered as evidence, or at the very
least laid the predicate for the admission of said photocopies, this controversy would not have
unnecessarily been brought before the appellate court and finally to this Court for adjudication. Petitioner
has only itself to blame for the respondent judge’s denial of admission of its aforementioned documentary
evidence and consequently, the denial of its prayer to be given another opportunity to present the originals
of the documents that were denied admission nor to lay the predicate for the admission of secondary
evidence in case the same has been lost.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

Notes
1. Exhibit "A" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by a certain Jose C. Troyo, with "RECEIVED" stamped
thereon, together with a handwritten date;
2. Exhibit "C" is a photocopy of a list of estimated cost of damages of petitioner’s power barges 207 and
209 prepared by Hopewell Mobile Power Systems Corporation and manually signed by Messrs. Rex
Malaluan and Virgilio Asprer;
3. Exhibit "D" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by a certain Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr., with "RECEIVED"
stamped thereon, together with a handwritten notation of the date it was received;
4. Exhibit "E" is a photocopy of a Standard Marine Protest Form which was filled up and accomplished by
Rex Joel C. Malaluan in his own handwriting and signed by him. Portions of the Jurat were handwritten, and
manually signed by the Notary Public;
5. Exhibit "H" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr. with "RECEIVED"
stamped thereon, together with a handwritten notation of the date it was received;
6. Exhibit "I" is a photocopy of a computation of the estimated energy loss allegedly suffered by petitioner
which was manually signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr.;
7. Exhibit "J" is a photocopy of a letter containing the breakdown of the cost estimate, manually signed by
Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr., with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a handwritten notation of the
date it was received, and other handwritten notations;
8. Exhibit "K" is a photocopy of the Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum written using a manual
typewriter, signed manually by Atty. Ofelia Polo-De Los Reyes, with a handwritten notation when it was
received by the party;
9. Exhibit "L" is a photocopy of a portion of the electricity supply and operation and maintenance agreement
between petitioner and Hopewell, containing handwritten notations and every page containing three
unidentified manually placed signatures;
10. Exhibit "M" is a photocopy of the Notice of Termination with attachments addressed to Rex Joel C.
Malaluan, manually signed by Jaime S. Patinio, with a handwritten notation of the date it was received. The
sub-markings also contain manual signatures and/or handwritten notations;
11. Exhibit "N" is a photocopy of a letter of termination with attachments addressed to VIrgilio Asprer and
manually signed by Jaime S. Patino. The sub-markings contain manual signatures and/or handwritten
notations;
12. Exhibit "O" is the same photocopied document marked as Annex C;
13. Exhibit "P" is a photocopy of an incident report manually signed by Messrs. Malaluan and Bautista and
by the Notary Public, with other handwritten notations;
14. Exhibit "Q" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by Virgilio Asprer and by a Notary Public, together
with other handwritten notations.
4. Aznar vs. Citibank, N.A. (Philippines)
G.R. No. 164273. March 28, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:
 Emmanuel B. Aznar (Aznar), a known businessman in Cebu, is a holder of a Preferred Master Credit Card
(Mastercard) issued by Citibank with a credit limit of ₱150,000.00.
 As he and his wife, Zoraida, planned to take their two grandchildren, Melissa and Richard Beane, on an
Asian tour, Aznar made a total advance deposit of ₱485,000.00 with Citibank with the intention of
increasing his credit limit to ₱635,000.00.
 With the use of his Mastercard, Aznar purchased plane tickets to Kuala Lumpur for his group worth
₱237,000.00.
 On July 17, 1994, Aznar, his wife and grandchildren left Cebu for the said destination.
 Aznar claims that when he presented his Mastercard in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and
Indonesia, the same was not honored.
 And when he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to
purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for the reason that his card was blacklisted by
Citibank.
o Such dishonor forced him to buy the tickets in cash.
 He further claims that his humiliation caused by the denial of his card was aggravated when Ingtan Agency
spoke of swindlers trying to use blacklisted cards.
 Aznar and his group returned to the Philippines on August 10, 1994.
 On August 26, 1994, Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank.
o He claimed that Citibank fraudulently or with gross negligence blacklisted his Mastercard which
forced him, his wife and grandchildren to abort important tour destinations and prevented them
from buying certain items in their tour.
o He further claimed that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings,
besmirched reputation and social humiliation due to the wrongful blacklisting of his card.
 To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar presented a computer print-out, denominated
as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency
(Exh. "G") with the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi) which shows that his card in question was
"DECL OVERLIMIT" or declared over the limit
 Citibank denied the allegation that it blacklisted Aznar’s card.
o To prove that they did not blacklist Aznar’s card, Citibank’s presented the Warning Cancellation
Bulletins which contained the list of its canceled cards covering the period of Aznar’s trip.
 On May 29, 1998, Judge Marcos of the RTC Branch 20 in Cebu City dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit.
o The trial court held that as between the computer print-out presented by Aznar and the
Warning Cancellation Bulletins presented by Citibank, the latter had more weight as their due
execution and authenticity were duly established by Citibank.
o The trial court also held that even if it was shown that Aznar’s credit card was dishonored by a
merchant establishment, Citibank was not shown to have acted with malice or bad faith when
the same was dishonored.
 Aznar filed a motion for reconsideration with motion to re-raffle the case saying that Judge Marcos could
not be impartial as he himself is a holder of a Citibank credit card.

RULING OF THE LOWER COURT ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION:

 The RTC, through Judge Jesus S. De la Peña of Branch 10 of Cebu City, granted Aznar’s motion for
reconsideration and ordered that defendant is liable to pay (CHECK NOTES FOR AMOUNTS).
o He ruled that it is improbable that a man of Aznar’s stature would fabricate the computer print-
out which shows that Aznar’s Mastercard was dishonored for the reason that it was declared
over the limit;
 o Exh. "G" was printed out by Nubi in the ordinary or regular course of business in the modern
credit card industry and Nubi was not able to testify as she was in a foreign country and cannot
be reached by subpoena;
o taking judicial notice of the practice of automated teller machines (ATMs) and credit card
facilities which readily print out bank account status, Exh. "G" can be received as prima
facie evidence of the dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard;
o no rebutting evidence was presented by Citibank to prove that Aznar’s Mastercard was not
dishonored, as all it proved was that said credit card was not included in the blacklisted cards;
o when Citibank accepted the additional deposit of ₱485,000.00 from Aznar, there was an implied
novation and Citibank was obligated to increase Aznar’s credit limit and ensure that Aznar will
not encounter any embarrassing situation with the use of his Mastercard;
o Citibank’s failure to comply with its obligation constitutes gross negligence as it caused Aznar
inconvenience, mental anguish and social humiliation;
o the fine prints in the flyer of the credit card limiting the liability of the bank to ₱1,000.00 or the
actual damage proven, whichever is lower, is a contract of adhesion which must be interpreted
against Citibank.
 Citibank filed an appeal with the CA and its counsel filed an administrative case against Judge De la Peña
for grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and incompetence, claiming among others that said
judge rendered his decision without having read the transcripts.
o The administrative case was held in abeyance pending the outcome of the appeal filed by
Citibank with the CA.
RULING OF THE CA:
 The CA granted the appeal and reinstated the decision dated May 29, 1998 of the RTC of Cebu City
Branch 20.
o The CA ruled that: Aznar had no personal knowledge of the blacklisting of his card and only
presumed the same when it was dishonored in certain establishments; such dishonor is not
sufficient to prove that his card was blacklisted by Citibank;
o Exh. "G" is an electronic document which must be authenticated pursuant to Section 2, Rule 5
of the Rules on Electronic Evidence or under Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court 27 by
anyone who saw the document executed or written;
 Aznar, however, failed to prove the authenticity of Exh. "G", thus it must be excluded;
o the unrefuted testimony of Aznar that his credit card was dishonored by Ingtan Agency and
certain establishments abroad is not sufficient to justify the award of damages in his favor,
absent any showing that Citibank had anything to do with the said dishonor;
o Citibank had no absolute control over the actions of its merchant affiliates, thus it should not be
held liable for the dishonor of Aznar’s credit card by said establishments.
 Aznar filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA dismissed in its Resolution dated May 26, 2004.
 Parenthetically, the administrative case against Judge De la Peña was activated and on April 29, 2005, the
Court’s Third Division found respondent judge guilty of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and
ordered his suspension for six months.
o The Court held that Judge De la Peña erred in basing his Order on a manifestation submitted by
Aznar to support his Motion for Reconsideration, when no copy of such manifestation was
served on the adverse party and it was filed beyond office hours.
o The Court also noted that Judge De la Peña made an egregiously large award of damages in favor
of Aznar which opened himself to suspicion.
 Aznar now comes before this Court on a petition for review.
(CHECK IN NOTES THE CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES IN THE SUPREME COURT)

ISSUE: Whether or not Exhibit G was properly authenticated?

RULING:
 No, Exhibit G was not properly authenticated.
 As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cannot be considered admissible
as its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently established by petitioner.
 The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.
o It provides that whenever any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its
due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the document
executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.
 Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. "G," did not actually see the document executed or
written, neither was he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
Nubi, who handed to him said computer print-out.
 Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on August 1, 2001, and
which is being invoked by Aznar in this case, the authentication of Exh. "G" would still be found wanting.
 Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:
o Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to introduce an electronic
document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner
provided in this Rule.
o Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
 (a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed
the same;
 (b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be
authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents
were applied to the document; or
 (c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
 Aznar claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the "other evidence showing
integrity and reliability of Exh. "G" to the satisfaction of the judge."
 The Court is not convinced. Aznar’s testimony that the person from Ingtan Agency merely handed him the
computer print-out and that he thereafter asked said person to sign the same cannot be considered as
sufficient to show said print-out’s integrity and reliability.
 As correctly pointed out by Judge Marcos in his May 29, 1998 Decision, Exh. "G" does not show on its face
that it was issued by Ingtan Agency as Aznar merely mentioned in passing how he was able to secure the
print-out from the agency;
o Aznar also failed to show the specific business address of the source of the computer print-out
because while the name of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by Aznar, its business address was not
reflected in the print-out.
 Indeed, Aznar failed to demonstrate how the information reflected on the print-out was generated and
how the said information could be relied upon as true.
 In fact, Aznar to repeat, testified as follows:
o ATTY. NERI
o Q Now, paragraph 12 also states and I quote: "its entry in the "hot" list was confirmed to be
authentic"

Now, who confirmed that the blacklisting of your Preferred Citibank Mastercard was authentic?

o A Okey. When I presented this Mastercard, my card rather, at the Merchant’s store, I do not
know, they called up somebody for verification then later they told me that "your card is being
denied". So, I am not in a position to answer that. I do not know whom they called up; where
they verified. So, when it is denied that’s presumed to be blacklisted. (Emphasis supplied)
ISSUE: Whether or not the computer printout (Exhibit G) is accorded greater weight than the Warning
Cancellation Bulletins?
RULING:
 No, the computer print out is not accorded greater weight than the warning cancellation bulletins.
 Between said computer print out (Exhibit ‘G’) and the Warning Cancellation Bulletins (Exhibits ‘3’ to ‘8’
and their submarkings) the latter documents adduced by defendant are entitled to greater weight than
that said computer print out presented by plaintiff that bears on the issue of whether the plaintiff’s
preferred master card was actually placed in the ‘hot list’ or blacklisted for the following reasons:
o The first reason is that the due execution and authentication of these Warning Cancellation
Bulletins (or WCB) have been duly established and identified by defendant’s own witness,
Dennis Flores, one of the bank’s officers, who is the head of its credit card department, and,
therefore, competent to testify on the said bulletins as having been issued by the defendant
bank showing that plaintiff’s preferred master credit card was never blacklisted or placed in the
Bank’s ‘hot list’.
o But on the other hand, plaintiff’s computer print out (Exhibit ‘G’) was never authenticated or its
due execution had never been duly established.
o Thus, between a set of duly authenticated commercial documents, the Warning Cancellation
Bulletins (Exhibits ‘3’ to ‘8’ and their submarkings), presented by defendants (sic) and an
unauthenticated private document, plaintiff’s computer print out (Exhibit ‘G’), the former
deserves greater evidentiary weight supporting the findings of this Court that plaintiff’s
preferred master card (Exhibit ‘1’) had never been blacklisted at all or placed in a so-called ‘hot
list’ by defendant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the entries in Exhibit G were entries in the course of business?
RULING:
 No, the entries were not in the course of business.
 Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. – Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which
they refer, by a person deceased or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein
stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional
capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
 Under this rule, however, the following conditions are required:
o 1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;
o 2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
o 3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
o 4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether
legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
o 5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
 As correctly pointed out by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision, there appears on the computer print-
out the name of a certain "Victrina Elnado Nubi" and a signature purportedly belonging to her, and at
the left dorsal side were handwritten the words "Sorry for the delay since the records had to be retrieved.
Regards. Darryl Mario."
 It is not clear therefore if it was Nubi who encoded the information stated in the print-out and was the
one who printed the same.
 The handwritten annotation signed by a certain Darryl Mario even suggests that it was Mario who
printed the same and only handed the print-out to Nubi.
 The identity of the entrant, required by the provision above mentioned, was therefore not established.
 Neither did petitioner establish in what professional capacity did Mario or Nubi make the entries, or
whether the entries were made in the performance of their duty in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.
ISSUE: Whether or not Citibank blacklisted Aznar’s card through fraud or gross negliegence?
RULING:
 The claim of petitioner that Citibank blacklisted his card through fraud or gross negligence is likewise
effectively negated by the evidence of Citibank which was correctly upheld by the RTC and the CA, to wit:
o xxx Mr. Dennis Flores, the Head of the Credit Card Department of defendant Bank, presented
documents known as Warning Cancellation Bulletin for July 10, 17, 24, and 31, 1994 (Exhibits ‘3’,
‘3-1’ to ‘3-38’, ‘4’, ‘4-1’ to ‘4-38’ ‘5’, ‘5-1’ to ‘5-39’ and ‘6’, ‘6-1’ to ‘6-39’), for August 7, 1994
(Exhibit[s] ‘7’, ‘7-1’ to ‘7-37’), for August 8, 1994 (Exhibit[s] ‘8’, ‘8-1’ to ‘8-20’) which show that
plaintiff’s Citibank preferred mastercard was not placed in a hot list or was not blacklisted.
 The Warning Cancellation Bulletins (WCB) (Exhibits ‘3’, ‘4’, ‘5’, ‘6’, ‘7’, ‘8’ and their submarkings) which
covered the period of four (4) days in July 1994 (from July 10, 17, 24 and 31, 1994), and two (2) days in
August 1994, (August 7 and 8, 1994), when plaintiff traveled in the aforementioned Asian countries
showed that said Citibank preferred mastercard had never been placed in a ‘hot list’ or the same was
blacklisted, let alone the fact that all the credit cards which had been cancelled by the defendant bank
were all contained, reported and listed in said Warning Cancellation Bulletin which were issued and
released on a regular basis.
 These three hundred (300) Warning Cancellation Bulletins pieces of documentary proofs, all in all,
adduced by defendant pointed to the fact that said plaintiff’s credit car (sic) was not among those found
in said bulletins as having been cancelled for the period for which the said bulletins had been issued.

ISSUE: Whether or not contracts between cardholders and the credit card companies are contracts of adhesion?
RULING:
 On this point, the Court agrees with Aznar that the terms and conditions of Citibank’s Mastercard
constitute a contract of adhesion.
 It is settled that contracts between cardholders and the credit card companies are contracts of adhesion,
so-called, because their terms are prepared by only one party while the other merely affixes his signature
signifying his adhesion thereto.
 In this case, paragraph 7 of the terms and conditions states that "[Citibank is] not responsible if the Card is
not honored by any merchant affiliate for any reason x x x".
While it is true that Citibank may have no control of all the actions of its merchant affiliates, and should
not be held liable therefor, it is incorrect, however, to give it blanket freedom from liability if its card is
dishonored by any merchant affiliate for any reason.
 Such phrase renders the statement vague and as the said terms and conditions constitute a contract of
adhesion, any ambiguity in its provisions must be construed against the party who prepared the
contract, in this case Citibank.

ISSUE: Whether or not the stipulation limiting CitiBank’s liability is valid?

RULING:
 Citibank also invokes paragraph 15 of its terms and conditions which limits its liability to ₱1,000.00 or the
actual damage proven, whichever is lesser.
 Again, such stipulation cannot be considered as valid for being unconscionable as it precludes payment
of a larger amount even though damage may be clearly proven.
 This Court is not precluded from ruling out blind adherence to the terms of a contract if the attendant
facts and circumstances show that they should be ignored for being obviously too one-sided.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can award damages?
RULING:
 No, the Court cannot award damages.
 The invalidity of the terms and conditions being invoked by Citibank, notwithstanding, the Court still
cannot award damages in favor of petitioner.
 It is settled that in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he
must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff
– a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.
 The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law;
o thus there must first be a breach before damages may be awarded and the breach of such duty
should be the proximate cause of the injury.
 It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish or serious anxiety as a result of
the actuations of the other party.
 It is also required that a culpable act or omission was factually established, that proof that the wrongful
act or omission of the defendant is shown as the proximate cause of the damage sustained by the
claimant and that the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Arts.
2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code.
 In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant has acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or
in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations.
 The breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive.
 While the Court commiserates with Aznar for whatever undue embarrassment he suffered when his
credit card was dishonored by Ingtan Agency, especially when the agency’s personnel insinuated that he
could be a swindler trying to use blacklisted cards, the Court cannot grant his present petition as he failed
to show by preponderance of evidence that Citibank breached any obligation that would make it
answerable for said suffering.
 We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that private respondent suffered damages as a result of
the cancellation of his credit card. However, there is a material distinction between damages and injury.
 Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury;
and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
 Thus, there can be damage without injury to those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result
of a violation of a legal duty.
 In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy
for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.
 These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

NOTES:
Amounts that defendant is liable to pay: a) ₱10,000,000.00 as moral damages; b) ₱5,000,000.00 as exemplary
damages; c) ₱1,000,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and d) ₱200,000.00 as litigation expenses

Aznar now comes before this Court on a petition for review alleging that:
 the CA erroneously made its own factual finding that his Mastercard was not blacklisted when the matter
of blacklisting was already a non-issue in the November 25, 1998 Order of the RTC;
 the RTC found that Aznar’s Mastercard was dishonored for the reason that it was declared over the credit
limit;
 Exh. "G" cannot be excluded as it qualifies as an electronic evidence following the Rules on Electronic
Evidence which provides that print-outs are also originals for purposes of the Best Evidence Rule;
 Exh. "G" has remained complete and unaltered, apart from the signature of Nubi, thus the same is reliable
for the purpose for which it was generated;
  the RTC judge correctly credited the testimony of Aznar on the issuance of the computer print-out as
Aznar saw that it was signed by Nubi;
o said testimony constitutes the "other evidence showing the integrity and reliability of the
print-out to the satisfaction of the judge" which is required under the Rules on Electronic
Evidence;
 the trial court was also correct in finding that Citibank was grossly negligent in failing to credit the
additional deposit and make the necessary entries in its systems to prevent Aznar from encountering any
embarrassing situation with the use of his Mastercard.

Citibank, in its Comment, contends that:

 Aznar never had personal knowledge that his credit card was blacklisted as he only presumed such fact;
 the issue of dishonor on the ground that the card was declared over the limit was also never tried with
the implied consent of both parties;
 Aznar’s self-serving testimony is not sufficient to prove the integrity and reliability of Exh. "G"; Aznar did
not declare that it was Nubi who printed the document and that said document was printed in his
presence as he merely said that the print-out was provided him; there is also no annotation on Exh. "G" to
establish that it was Nubi who printed the same;
 assuming further that Exh. "G" is admissible and Aznar’s credit card was dishonored, Citibank still cannot
be held liable for damages as it only shows that Aznar’s credit card was dishonored for having been
declared over the limit;
 Aznar’s cause of action against Citibank hinged on the alleged blacklisting of his card which purportedly
caused its dishonor; dishonor alone, however, is not sufficient to award Aznar damages as he must prove
that the dishonor was caused by a grossly negligent act of Citibank;
 the award of damages in favor of Aznar was based on Article 1170 of the Civil Code, i.e., there was fraud,
negligence or delay in the performance of its obligation; there was no proof, however that Citibank
committed fraud or delay or that it contravened its obligations towards Aznar;
 the terms and conditions of the credit card cannot be considered as a contract of adhesion since Aznar
was entirely free to reject the card if he did not want the conditions stipulated therein;
 a person whose stature is such that he is expected to be more prudent with respect to his transactions
cannot later on be heard to complain for being ignorant or having been forced into merely consenting to
the contract.

5. MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssangyong Corporation

Facts:
 Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office at Binondo,
Manila, is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products
 One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong), an international trading
company with head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City,
Philippines.
 The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or
telecopy transmissions.
 Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product
order to MCC;
o If the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed
copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax.
 On April 13, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office sent, by fax, a letter addressed to Gregory
Chan, MCC Manager [also the President10 of Sanyo Seiki Stainless Steel Corporation], to
 confirm MCC's and Sanyo Seiki's order of 220 metric tons (MT) of hot rolled stainless steel
under a preferential rate of US$1,860.00 per MT.
 Chan, on behalf of the corporations, assented and affixed his signature on the conforme
portion of the letter
 On April 17, 2000, Ssangyong forwarded to MCC Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTSO40112
containing the terms and conditions of the transaction
 MCC sent back by fax to Ssangyong the invoice bearing the conformity signature of Chan
 As stated in the pro forma invoice, payment for the ordered steel products would be
made through an irrevocable letter of credit (L/C) at sight in favor of Ssangyong
 Following their usual practice, delivery of the goods was to be made after the L/C had
been opened
 In the meantime, because of its confirmed transaction with MCC, Ssangyong placed the
order with its steel manufacturer, Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation (POSCO), in South
Korea and paid the same in full.
 Because MCC could open only a partial letter of credit, the order for 220MT of steel was
split into two, one for 110MT covered by Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS0401-117 and
another for 110MT covered by ST2-POSTS0401-2, both dated April 17, 2000
 On June 20, 2000, Ssangyong, through its Manila Office, informed Sanyo Seiki and Chan,
by way of a fax transmittal, that it was ready to ship 193.597MT of stainless steel from
Korea to the Philippines.
 It requested that the opening of the L/C be facilitated.
 Chan affixed his signature on the fax transmittal and returned the same, by fax, to
Ssangyong.
 Two days later, on June 22, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office informed Sanyo Seiki, thru
Chan, that it was able to secure a US$30/MT price adjustment on the contracted price of
US$1,860.00/MT for the 200MT stainless steel, and that the goods were to be shipped in
two tranches, the first 100MT on that day and the second 100MT not later than June 27,
2000
 Ssangyong reiterated its request for the facilitation of the L/C's opening
 Ssangyong later, through its Manila Office, sent a letter, on June 26, 2000, to the Treasury
Group of Sanyo Seiki that it was looking forward to receiving the L/C details and a cable
copy thereof that day.
 Ssangyong sent a separate letter of the same date to Sanyo Seiki requesting for the
opening of the L/C covering payment of the first 100MT not later than June 28, 2000
 Similar letters were transmitted by Ssangyong Manila Office on June 27, 2000.
 On June 28, 2000, Ssangyong sent another facsimile letter to MCC stating that its principal
in Korea was already in a difficult situation because of the failure of Sanyo Seiki and MCC
to open the L/C's
 The following day, June 29, 2000, Ssangyong received, by fax, a letter signed by Chan,
requesting an extension of time to open the L/C because MCC's credit line with the bank
had been fully availed of in connection with another transaction, and MCC was waiting
for an additional credit line
 On the same date, Ssangyong replied, requesting that it be informed of the date when
the L/C would be opened, preferably at the earliest possible time, since its Steel Team 2
in Korea was having problems and Ssangyong was incurring warehousing costs
 To maintain their good business relationship and to support MCC in its financial
predicament, Ssangyong offered to negotiate with its steel manufacturer, POSCO,
another US$20/MT discount on the price of the stainless steel ordered
 28 On July 6, 2000, another follow-up letter for the opening of the L/C was sent by
Ssangyong to MCC
 However, despite Ssangyong's letters, MCC failed to open a letter of credit
 Consequently, on August 15, 2000, Ssangyong, through counsel, wrote Sanyo Seiki that if
the L/C's were not opened, Ssangyong would be compelled to cancel the contract and
hold MCC liable for damages for breach thereof amounting to US$96,132.18, inclusive of
warehouse expenses, related interests and charges
 Later, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-132 and ST2-POSTS080-233 dated August
16, 2000 were issued by Ssangyong and sent via fax to MCC.
 The invoices slightly varied the terms of the earlier pro forma invoices (ST2-POSTSO401,
ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2), in that the quantity was now officially 100MT
per invoice and the price was reduced to US$1,700.00 per MT.
 As can be gleaned from the photocopies of the said August 16, 2000 invoices submitted
to the court, they both bear the conformity signature of MCC Manager Chan.
 On August 17, 2000, MCC finally opened an L/C with PCIBank for US$170,000.00 covering
payment for 100MT of stainless steel coil under Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-2
 The goods covered by the said invoice were then shipped to and received by MCC
 MCC then faxed to Ssangyong a letter dated August 22, 2000 signed by Chan, requesting
for a price adjustment of the order stated in Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-1,
considering that the prevailing price of steel at that time was US$1,500.00/MT, and that
MCC lost a lot of money due to a recent strike
 Ssangyong rejected the request, and, on August 23, 2000, sent a demand letter to Chan
for the opening of the second and last L/C of US$170,000.00 with a warning that, if the
said L/C was not opened by MCC on August 26, 2000, Ssangyong would be constrained to
cancel the contract and hold MCC liable for US$64,066.99 (representing cost difference,
warehousing expenses, interests and charges as of August 15, 2000) and other damages
for breach.
 Chan failed to reply
 Exasperated, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to MCC, on September 11, 2000,
canceling the sales contract under ST2-POSTS0401-1 /ST2-POSTS0401-2, and demanding
payment of US$97,317.37 representing losses, warehousing expenses, interests and
charges
 Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for damages due to breach of
contract against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City.
 In its complaint, Ssangyong alleged that defendants breached their contract when they
refused to open the L/C in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT of steel
under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2
 After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that
Ssangyong failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the
civil action was based.
 RTC Ruling
o The court denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary evidence presented
had already been admitted in the December 16, 2002 Order and their admissibility
finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000.
o Considering that both testimonial and documentary evidence tended to
substantiate the material allegations in the complaint, Ssangyong's evidence
sufficed for purposes of a prima facie case.
o After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision on March 24, 2004, in favor
of Ssangyong.
 CA Ruling
o Affirmed the ruling of the trial court, but absolving Chan of any liability.
o The appellate court ruled, among others, that Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-
POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E", "E-1" and "F") were admissible
in evidence, although they were mere facsimile printouts of MCC's steel orders
 Ssangyong’s arguments before SC:
o That the CA decision is already final and executory, because MCC's motion for
reconsideration was filed beyond the reglementary period of 15 days from receipt
of a copy thereof
o That, in any case, it was a pro forma motion
o That MCC breached the contract for the purchase of the steel products when it
failed to open the required letter of credit
o That the printout copies and/or photocopies of facsimile or telecopy transmissions
were properly admitted by the trial court because they are considered original
documents under R.A. No. 8792
o That MCC is liable for actual damages and attorney's fees because of its breach,
thus, compelling Ssangyong to litigate.
o That the photocopies of these fax transmittals (specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and
ST2-POSTS0401-2) are admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the
respondent sufficiently explained the non-production of the original fax
transmittals.
 MCC’s arguments before SC:
o Contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent
Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are
inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because
the law merely admits as the best evidence the original fax transmittal
Sub Issue 1: WON the CA decision dated 15 August 2005 is already final and executory

Ruling:
 It cannot be gainsaid that in Albano v. Court of Appeals, we held that receipt of a copy of
the decision by one of several counsels on record is notice to all, and the period to appeal
commences on such date even if the other counsel has not yet received a copy of the
decision.
 In this case, when Atty. Samson received a copy of the CA decision on September 14,
2005, MCC had only fifteen (15) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration
conformably with Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, or to file a petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45.
 The period should not be reckoned from September 29, 2005 (when Castillo Zamora &
Poblador received their copy of the decision) because notice to Atty. Samson is deemed
notice to collaborating counsel
 We note, however, from the records of the CA, that it was Castillo Zamora & Poblador,
not Atty. Samson, which filed both MCC's and Chan's Brief and Reply Brief.
 Apparently, the arrangement between the two counsels was for the collaborating, not
the principal, counsel to file the appeal brief and subsequent pleadings in the CA.
 This explains why it was Castillo Zamora & Poblador which filed the motion for the
reconsideration of the CA decision, and they did so on October 5, 2005, well within the
15-day period from September 29, 2005, when they received their copy of the CA
decision.
 This could also be the reason why the CA did not find it necessary to resolve the question
of the timeliness of petitioner's motion for reconsideration, even as the CA denied the
same
 Independent of this consideration though, this Court assiduously reviewed the records
and found that strong concerns of substantial justice warrant the relaxation of this rule.

Sub-Issue 2: WON the motion for reconsideration of MCC was pro forma in nature of MCC's
because it merely restated the arguments previously raised and passed upon by the CA

Ruling:
 In this connection, suffice it to say that the mere restatement of arguments in a motion
for reconsideration does not per se result in a pro forma motion.
 In Security Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. Cuenca, we held that a motion for
reconsideration may not be necessarily pro forma even if it reiterates the arguments
earlier passed upon and rejected by the appellate court.
 A movant may raise the same arguments precisely to convince the court that its ruling
was erroneous.
 Furthermore, the pro forma rule will not apply if the arguments were not sufficiently
passed upon and answered in the decision sought to be reconsidered.
MAIN Issue: WON the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic
evidence and admissible as such

Ruling:
 NO ui
 R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document for evidentiary purposes.
 The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronic document as admissible in
evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and
related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said Rules.
 An electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to
reflect the data accurately.
 Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as
the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the
writing must foremost be an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document."
 The Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 defines electronic data message and electronic
document as follows:
o "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received or
stored by electronic, optical or similar means
o "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of
information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression,
described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
 The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792 , defines the terms as:
o "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received or
stored by electronic, optical or similar means, but not limited to, electronic data
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy. Throughout these
Rules, the term "electronic data message" shall be equivalent to and be used
interchangeably with "electronic document."
o "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of
information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression,
described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
Throughout these Rules, the term "electronic document" shall be equivalent to
and be used interchangeably with "electronic data message."
 The phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail,
telegram, telex or telecopy" in the IRR's definition of "electronic data message" is copied
from the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission
 on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), from which majority of the provisions of R.A. No.
8792 were taken.
 While Congress deleted this phrase in the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters
of the IRR reinstated it
 The deletion by Congress of the said phrase is significant and pivotal, as discussed
hereunder.
 Be that as it may, there is a slight difference between the two terms.
 While "data message" has reference to information electronically sent, stored or
transmitted, it does not necessarily mean that it will give rise to a right or extinguish an
obligation, unlike an electronic document. Evident from the law, however, is the
legislative intent to give the two terms the same construction.
 The Rules on Electronic Evidence promulgated by this Court defines the said terms in the
following manner:
o "Electronic data message" refers to information generated, sent, received or
stored by electronic, optical or similar means
o "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information,
data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however
represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by
which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes
digitally signed documents and print-out or output, readable by sight or other
means, which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic
document. For purposes of these Rules, the term "electronic document" may be
used interchangeably with "electronic data message."
 As further guide for the Court in its task of statutory construction, Section 37 of the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 provides that
o Unless otherwise expressly provided for, the interpretation of this Act shall give
due regard to its international origin and the need to promote uniformity in its
application and the observance of good faith in international trade relations.
o The generally accepted principles of international law and convention on
electronic commerce shall likewise be considered.
 Obviously, the "international origin" mentioned in this section can only refer to the
UNCITRAL Model Law, and the UNCITRAL's definition of "data message":
o "Data message" means information generated, sent, received or stored by
electronic, optical or similar means including, but not limited to, electronic data
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.
o is substantially the same as the IRR's characterization of an "electronic data
message."
 However, Congress deleted the phrase, "but not limited to, electronic data interchange
(EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy," and replaced the term "data message"
(as found in the UNCITRAL Model Law ) with "electronic data message."
  This legislative divergence from what is assumed as the term's "international origin" has
bred uncertainty and now impels the Court to make an inquiry into the true intent of the
framers of the law.
 Indeed, in the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is
to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law.
 Interestingly, when Senator Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr., the principal author of Senate Bill
1902 (the predecessor of R.A. No. 8792), sponsored the bill on second reading, he
proposed to adopt the term "data message" as formulated and defined in the UNCITRAL
Model Law.79 During the period of amendments, however, the term evolved into
"electronic data message," and the phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange
(EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy" in the UNCITRAL Model Law was
deleted
 Thus, when the Senate consequently voted to adopt the term "electronic data message,"
it was consonant with the explanation of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago that it would
not apply "to telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, unlike the United
Nations model law on electronic commerce."
 In explaining the term "electronic record" patterned after the E-Commerce Law of
Canada, Senator Defensor-Santiago had in mind the term "electronic data message."
 This term then, while maintaining part of the UNCITRAL Model Law's terminology of "data
message," has assumed a different context, this time, consonant with the term
"electronic record" in the law of Canada.
 It accounts for the addition of the word "electronic" and the deletion of the phrase "but
not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy."
 In short, not all data recorded or stored in "digital" form is covered
 A computer or similar device has to be involved in its creation or storage
 The term "similar device" does not extend to all devices that create or store data in digital
form
 Paper records that are produced directly by a computer system, such as printouts, are
themselves electronic records, being just the means of intelligible display of the contents
of the record.
 Photocopies of the printout would be paper records subject to the usual rules about
copies, but the "original" printout would be subject to the rules of admissibility of this Act
 There is no question then that when Congress formulated the term "electronic data
message," it intended the same meaning as the term "electronic record" in the Canada
law.
 This construction of the term "electronic data message," which excludes telexes or faxes,
except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law's
focus on "paperless" communications and the "functional equivalent approach" that it
espouses.
 Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, "paperless," but verily are paper-based

Application:
 Accordingly, in an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based
information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the
receiving end.
 Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Congress intended
virtual or paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to have the same legal
function as paper-based documents.
 Further, in a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to
speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are
considered as originals.
 Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic data message," which, as aforesaid, is
interchangeable with "electronic document," could not have included facsimile
transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based
facsimile copy as received.
 These two copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal effects.
 While Congress anticipated future developments in communications and computer
technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like
telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer
development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission),
when it defined the term "electronic data message."
 Clearly then, the IRR went beyond the parameters of the law when it adopted verbatim
the UNCITRAL Model Law's definition of "data message," without considering the
intention of Congress when the latter deleted the phrase "but not limited to, electronic
data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy."
 The inclusion of this phrase in the IRR offends a basic tenet in the exercise of the rule-
making power of administrative agencies.
 After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation
of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative enactment itself.
 The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its
coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature
 We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic
document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a
facsimile transmission
 Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence
 It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not
admissible as electronic evidence
 Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic
document," and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater
reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence.
 In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-
POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere photocopies of the original fax
transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the
appellate courts.
Sub-Issue 3: WON MCC should be held liable for breach?

Ruling:
 Yes
 Nevertheless, despite the pro forma invoices not being electronic evidence, this Court
finds that respondent has proven by preponderance of evidence the existence of a
perfected contract of sale
 In an action for damages due to a breach of a contract, it is essential that the claimant
proves (1) the existence of a perfected contract, (2) the breach thereof by the other
contracting party and (3) the damages which he/she sustained due to such breach.
 In general, contracts are perfected by mere consent, which is manifested by the meeting
of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the
contract.
 The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute
 They are, moreover, obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into,
provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present.
 Sale, being a consensual contract, follows the general rule that it is perfected at the
moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract
and upon the price
 From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the
provisions of the law governing the form of contracts
 The essential elements of a contract of sale are (1) consent or meeting of the minds, that
is, to transfer ownership in exchange for the price, (2) object certain which is the subject
matter of the contract, and (3) cause of the obligation which is established.
 In this case, to establish the existence of a perfected contract of sale between the parties,
respondent Ssangyong formally offered in evidence the testimonies of its witnesses and
several exhibits
 After sifting through the records, the Court found that these invoices are mere
photocopies of their original fax transmittals
 Ssangyong avers that these documents were prepared after MCC asked for the splitting
of the original order into two, so that the latter can apply for an L/C with greater facility.
It, however, failed to explain why the originals of these documents were not presented.
 To determine whether these documents are admissible in evidence, we apply the
ordinary Rules on Evidence, for as discussed above we cannot apply the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000 and the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
 Because these documents are mere photocopies, they are simply secondary evidence,
admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states, "[w]hen the
original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror,
upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad
faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated."
 Furthermore, the offeror of secondary evidence must prove the predicates thereof,
namely: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the
 proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of
destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of
evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy;
and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been
made for the document in the proper place or places. It has been held that where the
missing document is the foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is required
than where the document is only collaterally involved.
 Given these norms, we find that respondent failed to prove the existence of the original
fax transmissions of Exhibits E and F, and likewise did not sufficiently prove the loss or
destruction of the originals.
 Thus, Exhibits E and F cannot be admitted in evidence and accorded probative weight.
 It is observed, however, that respondent Ssangyong did not rely merely on Exhibits E and
F to prove the perfected contract.
 It also introduced in evidence a variety of other documents, as enumerated above,
together with the testimonies of its witnesses.
 The logical chain of events, as gleaned from the evidence of both parties, started with the
petitioner and the respondent agreeing on the sale and purchase of 220MT of stainless
steel at US$1,860.00 per MT.
 This initial contract was perfected.
 Later, as petitioner asked for several extensions to pay, adjustments in the delivery dates,
and discounts in the price as originally agreed, the parties slightly varied the terms of their
contract, without necessarily novating it, to the effect that the original order was reduced
to 200MT, split into two deliveries, and the price discounted to US$1,700 per MT.
 Petitioner, however, paid only half of its obligation and failed to open an L/C for the other
100MT.
 Notably, the conduct of both parties sufficiently established the existence of a contract
of sale, even if the writings of the parties, because of their contested admissibility, were
not as explicit in establishing a contract.
 Appropriate conduct by the parties may be sufficient to establish an agreement, and while
there may be instances where the exchange of correspondence does not disclose the
exact point at which the deal was closed, the actions of the parties may indicate that a
binding obligation has been undertaken.
 With our finding that there is a valid contract, it is crystal-clear that when petitioner did
not open the L/C for the first half of the transaction (100MT), despite numerous demands
from respondent Ssangyong, petitioner breached its contractual obligation.
 It is a well-entrenched rule that the failure of a buyer to furnish an agreed letter of credit
is a breach of the contract between buyer and seller.

Conclusion:
 Nonetheless, the Court finds that petitioner knowingly breached its contractual obligation
and obstinately refused to pay despite repeated demands from respondent.
 Petitioner even asked for several extensions of time for it to make good its obligation.
  But in spite of respondent's continuous accommodation, petitioner completely reneged
on its contractual duty.
 For such inattention and insensitivity, MCC must be held liable for nominal damages.
 Accordingly, the Court awards nominal damages of P200,000.00 to respondent
Ssangyong.

6. Ang vs CA, April 20, 2010

This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a former boyfriend sent to
the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it.

FACTS:

 Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province.
 Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004.
 When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten
pregnant, Irish broke up with him.
 Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with
him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry.
o Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and
their child.
 Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text
messages.
o Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-
8084768.
o Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.
 In the early morning in 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a
naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A).
 The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that
Rustan used.
 Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in
2003 (Exhibit B).
 After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan.
 He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened
to spread the picture he sent through the internet.
 One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun,
my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter."
 Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police.
 Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the
picture and his text messages.
o Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess and he did.
o He came in a motorcycle.
o After parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested
him.
o They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards.
o While Rustan was being questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"
 Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an expert in
information technology and computer graphics.
o He said that it was very much possible for one to lift the face of a woman from a picture and
superimpose it on the body of another woman in another picture.
  Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct irregularities:

the face was not proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color.

 In his opinion, the picture was fake and the face on it had been copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit
B. Finally, Gonzales explained how this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to a
cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.

Contention of the accused and of his wife:

 For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish and their relation lasted from October until December
of 2003.
 He claimed that after their relation ended, Irish wanted reconciliation.
 They met in December 2004 but, after he told her that his girlfriend at that time (later his wife) was
already pregnant, Irish walked out on him.
 Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at Lorentess Resort as she
needed his help in selling her cellphone.
 When he arrived at the place, two police officers approached him, seized his cellphone and the contents
of his pockets, and brought him to the police station.
 Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her identify a
prankster who was sending her malicious text messages.
 Rustan got the sender’s number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person.
 Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from
his cellphone.
 This explained, he said, why the obscene messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone
number.
 Rustan claims that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him.
 He presented six pictures of a woman whom he identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).
 Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures.
o Michelle claims that she received the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that
contained them because she was jealous and angry.
o She did not want to see anything of Irish.

The Exhibits:

 But, while the woman in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as in Exhibit A.
 Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen.
 Irish denied that she was the woman in those four pictures.
 As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the picture was fully dressed.

RTC:

 After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous
manner. The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her experience, prompting the court to
comment: "Her tears were tangible expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered in
the hands of her former sweetheart.
 The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity
borne out of human nature and experience."
 Thus, in its Decision, the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
CA:

 On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision affirming the RTC decision.
 The CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution.
 Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case.

RULING: YES

 Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document.
 Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5
of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
 But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the
first time before this Court.
 The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at
the time it was offered in evidence.
 He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.
 Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action.
 The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and
administrative proceedings.

OTHERs:

ISSUE: Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262.

RULING: YES

 The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused Rustan had a "dating
relationship" with Irish.
 Section 3(e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where the parties are romantically
involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. Thus:

(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A
casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating
relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)

 Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the offended
woman have or had sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a sexual act. He cites Webster’s
Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal meaning to the
word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make love; to make love to" as in "He romanced her."
 But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a
sexual act.
 It did not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun
"romance" to describe a couple’s relationship, i.e., "a love affair."
 R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship."
  Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship.
 Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations."
 The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child."
 The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse
taking place between those involved.
 Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the "on-and-off" variety
(away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over time and on a continuing
basis."
 But the two of them were romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October to December of
2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship of mutual trust and love.
 An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence.
 Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken
up during periods of misunderstanding.
 Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that at times, when she could not reply to Rustan’s
messages, he would get angry at her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic
relation as continuous

ISSUE: Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this case, already
constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262

RULING: YES

 Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered a form of
harassment.
 He claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a very dangerous precedent.
 But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence against women.
 This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough.
 The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly
committed would license isolated ones.
 Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her getting one
could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or psychological
distress. He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that she was already
desensitized by them.
 But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was not impressed
with their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-7).
 It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on them.
 Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent, except Exhibits 2
to 7. But her testimony did not make sense.
 She said that she did not know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the pictures.
Later, however, she said that she did not have time to delete them.
 And, if she thought that she had deleted all the pictures from the memory card, then she had no reason at
all to keep and hide such memory card. There would have been nothing to hide.
 Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained in the card, there was no reason for her to keep it for
several years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see anything connected to Irish.
 Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving credence to her testimony.1avvphi1
 Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustan’s low regard for
the alleged moral sensibilities of today’s youth.
 What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined based on the
circumstances of each case.
 Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head and face, was
clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one.
  Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she
sees herself in such a picture.
 What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in
the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation of his constitutional
rights

RULING: NO

 Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him without any warrant,
the evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible.
 But the fact is that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that
the police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest.
 The prosecution did not need such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a
photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted
owning during the pre-trial conference.
 Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish’s testimony that she received the
obscene picture and malicious text messages that the sender’s cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan
with whom she had been previously in communication.
 Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers
to summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did.
 Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove
that Rustan sent those messages.
 Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish.
 His defense was that he himself received those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing
Irish and he merely forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone.
 But Rustan never presented the cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to
him to authenticate the same.
 The RTC did not give credence to such version and neither will this Court.
 Besides, it was most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify
the sender.

In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged
beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

NOTES: Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a person against a
woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

xxxx
 Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these include any form of
harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman. Thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The crime of violence against women and
their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or
causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but
not be limited to, the following acts:

xxxx

5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against women through
harassment are:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the
woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

7. People vs. Enojas, et. al., G.R. No. 204894. March 10, 2014

Ponente: Abad, J.

Nature of the case: This case is an appeal from a decision of the CA.

Appellee: People of the Philippines

Appellants: Noel Enojas y Hingpit (Enojas), Arnold Gomez y Fabregas (Gomez), Fernando Santos y Delantar
(Santos) and Roger Jalandoni Y Ari (Jalandoni)

FACTS:
 On September 4, 2006 the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas charged appellants with murder before the RTC of
Las Piñas

 PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (PO2 Gregorio) testified that:

o At around 10:30 in the evening of August 29, 2006, he and PO2 Francisco Pangilinan (PO2
Pangilinan) were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when they spotted a
taxi that was suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop near the intersection of
BF Almanza and Alabang-Zapote Roads
o The officers approached the taxi and asked the driver, later identified as accused Enojas, for his
documents.
 o The latter complied but, having entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown
them, they asked him to come with them to the police station in their mobile car for further
questioning.

o Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and left his taxi behind.
o However, on reaching the 7-11 convenience store on the Zapote-Alabang Road, they stopped and
PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there.
o As he approached the store’s door, however, he came upon two suspected robbers and shot it
out with them.
o PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit the other who still managed to escape.
o But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death.

o On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at an armed man whom he saw running
towards Pilar Village.
o He saw another man, who came from the Jollibee outlet, run towards Alabang-Zapote Road while
firing his gun at PO2 Gregorio.
o The latter returned fire but the men were able to take a taxi and escape.
o PO2 Gregorio radioed for help and for an ambulance.
o On returning to his mobile car, he realized that accused Enojas, the taxi driver they had with
them had fled.

 P/Insp. Ferjen Torred (Torred), the Chief of Investigation Division of the Las Piñas Police, also testified that:
o He and PO2 Teoson Rosarito (PO2 Rosarito) immediately responded to PO2 Gregorio’s urgent call.
o Suspecting that accused Enojas, the taxi driver who fled, was involved in the attempted robbery,
they searched the abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that Enojas apparently left behind
o P/Ins. Torred instructed PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3 Cambi) to monitor its incoming messages.
o The police later ascertained that the suspect whom PO2 Pangilinan had killed was someone named
Reynaldo Mendoza who was armed with a .38 caliber revolver.
o The police found spent 9 mm and M-16 rifle shells at the crime scene.
o Follow-up operations at nearby provinces resulted in finding the dead body of one of the suspects,
Alex Angeles, at the Metro South Medical Center along Molino, Bacoor, Cavite.

 PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that:

o They monitored the messages in accused Enojas’ mobile phone and, posing as Enojas,
communicated with the other accused.

 The police then conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest of accused Santos and
Jalandoni.
 Subsequently, the police were also able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez.

 The prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text messages between Enojas and some
of his co-accused.
 The victim’s father, Ricardo Pangilinan, also testified that his son was at the time of his death 28 years old,
unmarried, and was receiving police pay of P8,000 to P10,000 per month xxx

Defense of the Accused: (based on the Trial Memorandum filed)

 They pointed out that they were entitled to an acquittal since they were all illegally arrested and since the
evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly identified.

RTC’s Decision:
 Found all the accused guilty of murder qualified by evident premeditation and use of armed men with the
special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms.
  It thus sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without the possibility of parole and to
indemnify the heirs of PO2 Pangilinan with P165,999 as actual damages, P50,000 as moral damages,
P25,000 as exemplary damages, and P2,080,000 as compensation for loss of earning capacity

CA’s Decision:
 Dismissed the appeal
 Affirmed in toto the conviction of the accused
 However, it found the absence of evident premeditation since the prosecution failed to prove that the
several accused planned the crime before committing it.
 Hence, this appeal.

Sub-ISSUE: Whether the Rules of Electronic Evidence is applicable to criminal actions.

Ruling:
 Yes.
 As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s earlier
Resolution (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, Re: Expansion of the Coverage of the Rules on Electronic Evidence,
September 24, 2002) – applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions.
o Rule 1, Sec. 2. Cases covered. These Rules shall apply to the criminal and civil actions and
proceeding, as well as quasi-judicial and administrative cases.

ISSUE: Whether the text messages were admissible in this case.

RULING:
 Yes. The text messages were admissible in this case.
 Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal
knowledge of them.

Application:
 Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order
to identify and entrap them.
 As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had
personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.

OTHER ISSUES:

ISSUE: Whether circumstantial evidence can provide sufficient basis for the conviction of a crime.

Ruling:
 Yes.
 The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present direct evidence that the accused Enojas,
Gomez, Santos, or Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead.
 This may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by circumstantial evidence that meets the
evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
 It has been held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(1) There is more than one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt

Application
  In this case, the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides
basis for the conviction of all the accused. Thus:
1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas as the driver of the taxicab suspiciously parked in
front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop.
o The officers were bringing him with them to the police station because of the questionable
documents he showed upon query.
o Subsequent inspection of the taxicab yielded Enojas’ mobile phone that contained messages,
which led to the entrapment and capture of the other accused who were also taxicab drivers.

2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the cab to go to the police station where he
was about to be taken for questioning, tending to show that he had something to hide.
o He certainly did not go to the police afterwards to clear up the matter and claim his taxi.
3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as one of the men he saw running away from the
scene of the shooting.
4. The text messages identified “Kua Justin” as one of those who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the shootout;
o The messages also referred to “Kua Justin” as the one who was hit in such shootout and later
died in a hospital in Bacoor, Cavite.
o These messages linked the other accused.
5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators succeeded in entrapping accused Santos,
Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were all named in the text messages.
6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by Enojas clearly made references
to the 7-11 shootout and to the wounding of “Kua Justin,” one of the gunmen, and his subsequent
death.
7. The context of the messages showed that the accused were members of an organized group of taxicab
drivers engaged in illegal activities.
8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of mobile phones with call numbers that
corresponded to the senders of the messages received on the mobile phone that accused Enojas left
in his taxicab.

Re: the Aggravating Circumstance

 The Court must, however, disagree with the CA’s ruling that the aggravating circumstances of a) aid of
armed men and b) use of unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of PO2 Pangilinan to murder.
 In “aid of armed men,” the men act as accomplices only.
 They must not be acting in the commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused,
otherwise they are to be regarded as co-principals or co- conspirators.
 The use of unlicensed firearm, on the other hand, is a special aggravating circumstance that is not among
the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as qualifying a homicide to murder.
 Consequently, the accused in this case may be held liable only for homicide, aggravated by the use of
unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.

Re: the Arrest

 The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest.
 But, assuming that this was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for
rejecting any evidence that may have been taken from them after an unauthorized search as an incident of
an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here.
 At any rate, a crime had been committed - the killing of PO2 Pangilinan - and the investigating police officers
had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed it.
 The text messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong
leads on the participation and identities of the accused.
 Indeed, the police caught them in an entrapment using this knowledge.

As to the award of damages

  The award of damages by the courts below has to be modified to conform to current jurisprudence

Disposition: Modified the CA decision.

 Finds the accused-appellants guilty of a lesser crime of homicide with the special aggravating circumstance
of use of unlicensed firearms xxx

8. BPI V. MENDOZA
G.R. No. 198799 March 20, 2017
Petition for review on certiorari for CA’s Decision which reversed and set aside the Decision4 dated May 9, 2007 of
the RTC Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, Branch 87 and consequently, dismissed the complaint filed by petitioner BPI against
respondents Mendoza and his mother, Maria Marcos vda. de Mendoza (Maria; collectively, respondents).
FACTS:
 A Complaint for Sum of Money with Application for Writ of Attachment was filed by BPI against
RESPONDENTS before the RTC, alleging that:
o on April 8, 1997, respondents: (a) opened a foreign currency savings account with Account No.
0584-0007-08 (US savings account) at BPI-Gapan Branch and deposited therein the total amount
of US$l6,264.00, broken down as follows: US$100.00 in cash and US$16,164.00 in US Treasury
Check with No. 3149-09693369 payable to "Ma. Marcos Vda. de Mendoza" (subject check); and
(b) placed the amount of US$2,000.00 in a time deposit account.
o After the lapse of the thirty (30) day clearing period on May 9 and 13, 1997, RESPONDENTS
WITHDREW the amount of US$16,244.00 from the US savings account, leaving only US$20.00 for
bank charges.
o However, on June 26, 1997, BPI received a notice from its correspondent bank, Bankers Trust
Company New York (Bankers Trust), that the subject check was dishonored due to "amount
altered", as evidenced by (1) an electronic mail (e-mail) advice from Bankers Trust, and (2) a
photocopy of the subject check with a notation "endorsement cancelled" by Bankers Trust as the
original copy of the subject check was allegedly confiscated by the government of the US
o This prompted BPI to inform respondents of such dishonor and to demand reimbursement.
o BPI then claimed that: (a) on July 18, 1997, respondents allowed BPI to apply the proceeds of their
time deposit account in the amount ofUS$2,015.00 to their outstanding obligation; (b) upon the
exhaustion of the said time deposit account, Amado gave BPI a promissory note dated September
8, 1997 containing his promise to pay BPI-Gapan Branch the amount of ₱l,000.00 monthly; and (c)
when respondents failed to fulfill their obligation despite repeated demands, BPI was constrained
to give a final demand letter to respondents on November 27, 1997.
 FOR THEIR PART, WHILE RESPONDENTS ADMITTED the withdrawals and exchanged the same with BPI at
the rate of ₱26.l59 per dollar, they did not receive the amount of ₱582,140.00 from the proceeds.
o Respondents then maintained that Amado only affixed his signature in the letter dated July 18,
1997 in order to acknowledge its receipt, but not to give his consent to the application of the
proceeds of their time deposit account to their purported obligations to BPI.
o According to Amado, he would have been willing to pay BPI, if only the latter presented proper
and authenticated proof of the dishonor of the subject check. However, since the bank failed to
do so, Amado argued that BPI had no cause of action against him and his mother, Maria.

RTC ruled in BPI's favor, and accordingly, ordered respondents to pay and found that:
o BPI duly notified respondents of the dishonor of the subject check, thus, creating an obligation on the part
of the respondents to return the proceeds that they had already withdrawn; and (b) Amado unmistakably
acknowledged the same by executing a promissory note dated September 8, 1997 promising to pay BPI-
Gapan Branch the amount of ₱l,000.00 monthly in connection with such obligation. In this regard, the RTC
opined that since respondents withdrew the money prior to the dishonor and that BPI allowed such
 withdrawal by mistake, it is only proper that respondents return the proceeds of the same pursuant to the
principle of solutio indebiti under Article 2154 of the Civil Code.
 Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA.

CA ruled and reversed and set aside the RTC's ruling, and consequently, dismissed BPI's complaint for lack of merit.
It held that:
o BPI failed to prove the dishonor of the subject check, since: (a) the presentation of a mere photocopy of
the subject check is in violation of the Best Evidence Rule; and (b) the e-mail advice from Bankers Trust was
not properly authenticated in accordance with the Rules on Electronic Evidence as the person who sent the
e-mail advice was neither identified nor presented in court. As such, the CA ordered the dismissal of the
complaint due to BPI's failure to prove its claim against respondents.
 BPI filed MR, but was denied.
 Hence, this petition

ISSUE: whether or not the CA correctly dismissed BPI's complaint for sum of money against respondents.
RULING: YES.
 AFTER A JUDICIOUS REVIEW OF THE RECORDS, INCLUDING A RE-EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PARTIES, THE COURT IS INCLINED TO SUSTAIN THE FINDINGS OF THE RTC OVER THAT
OF THE CA, AS WILL BE EXPLAINED HEREUNDER.
o It is settled that in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance
of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon
the weakness of the defendant's.
o Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term 'greater weight of evidence' or
'greater weight of credible evidence.' Succinctly put, it only requires that evidence be greater or
more convincing than the opposing evidence.

Application in this case:

 Records evince that BPI was able to satisfactorily prove by preponderance of evidence the existence of
respondents' obligation in its favor. Verily, Amado acknowledged its existence and expressed his conformity
thereto when he voluntarily: (a) affixed his signature in the letters dated June 27, 199733 and July 18,
1997,34 where he acknowledged the dishonor of the subject check, and subsequently, allowed BPI to apply
the proceeds of their US time deposit account to partially offset their obligation to the bank; and (b)
executed a Promissory Note35 dated September 8, 1997 wherein he undertook to pay BPI in installments
of ₱l,000.00 per month until the remaining balance of his obligation is fully paid.
 On the other hand, aside from his bare testimony, Amado did not present any corroborative evidence to
support his claim that his performance of the aforesaid voluntary acts was subject to BPI's presentment of
the proper and authenticated proof of the dishonored subject check. Amado's unsubstantiated testimony
is self-serving at the most, and hence, cannot be relied upon.
 In fact, the RTC did not lend any credence to Amado's testimony in resolving this case. In this regard, it
should be borne in mind that the "findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great
weight, as the trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and has the unique
opportunity to observe the witness firsthand and note his demeanor, conduct and attitude under gruelling
examination. Absent any showing that the trial court's calibration of credibility was flawed, the appellate
court is bound by its assessment," as in this case.
 Overall, assessing the pieces of evidence presented by BPI as opposed to the self-serving allegations of
respondents, the weight of evidence clearly preponderates in favor of the former. Otherwise stated, BPI
has proven by the required quantum of proof, i.e., preponderance of evidence, respondents' obligation
towards it, and as such, respondents must be made to fulfill the same.
  In any event, the CA erred in concluding that BPI failed to prove the dishonor of the subject check by merely
presenting: (a) a photocopy thereof with its dorsal portion stamped "ENDORSEMENT CANCELLED" by
Bankers Trust; and (b) a print-out of the e-mail advice from Bankers Trust stating that the subject check was
returned unpaid because the amount was altered.

Subject Check
 ANENT THE SUBJECT CHECK, WHILE THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court states that generally, the original copy of the document must be presented whenever the content
of the document is under inquiry, the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as "when the original has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror."
 In order to fall under the aforesaid exception, it is crucial that the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due
execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in
court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original
can be attributed.

Application in this case:

 In this case, BPI sufficiently complied with the foregoing requisities. First, the existence or due execution of
the subject check was admitted by both parties. Second, the reason for the non-presentation of the original
copy of the subject check was justifiable as it was confiscated by the US government for being an altered
check. The subject check, being a US Treasury Warrant, is not an ordinary check, and practically speaking,
the same could not be easily obtained. Lastly, absent any proof to the contrary and for the reasons already
stated, no bad faith can be attributed to BPI for its failure to present the original of the subject check. Thus,
applying the exception to the Best Evidence Rule, the presentation of the photocopy of the subject check
as secondary evidence was permissible.

E-mail advice not properly authenticated with Rules on Electronic Evidence, was corroborative evidence
 As to the e-mail advice, while it may not have been properly authenticated in accordance with the Rules
on Electronic Evidence, the same was merely corroborative evidence, and thus, its admissibility or
inadmissibility should not diminish the probative value of the other evidence proving respondents'
obligation towards BPI, namely: (a) Amado's voluntary acts of conforming to BPI's letters dated June 27,
1997 and July 18, 1997 and executing the promissory note to answer for such obligation; and (b) the
photocopy of the subject check, which presentation was justified as falling under the afore-discussed
exception to the Best Evidence Rule.
 As such, their probative value remains.
 Besides, it should be pointed out that respondents did not proffer any objection to the evidence presented
by BPI, as shown by their failure to file their comment or opposition to the latter's formal offer of
evidence.43 It is well-settled that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may validly be
considered by the court in arriving at its judgment, as what the RTC did in this case, since it was in a better
position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during the trial.

CONCLUSION
 In sum, considering that BPI had proven its cause of action by preponderance of evidence, the Court finds
the CA to have erred in dismissing BPI's complaint against respondents. Accordingly, the RTC ruling must be
reinstated, subject to modification in the award of interest imposed on the adjudged amount.
o To recount, respondents were ordered by the RTC to pay BPI the amount of ₱369,600.51
representing the peso equivalent of the amounts withdrawn by respondents less the amounts
already recovered by BPI, plus legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum reckoned from
the time the money was withdrawn,45 thus, implying that such amount was a loan or a
forbearance of money.
 o However, records reveal that BPI's payment of the proceeds of the subject check was due to a
mistaken notion that such check was cleared, when in fact, it was dishonored due to an alteration
in the amount indicated therein. Such payment on the part of BPI to respondents was clearly made
by mistake, giving rise to the quasi-contractual obligation of solutio indebiti under Article 2154 in
relation to Article 2163 of the Civil Code.
o Not being a loan or forbearance of money, an interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be
imposed on the amount to be refunded and on the damages and attorney's fees awarded, if any,
computed from the time of demand until its satisfaction.48 Consequently, respondents must
return to BPI the aforesaid amount, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the date of extrajudicial demand - or on June 27, 1997, the date when BPI informed
respondents of the dishonor of the subject check and demanded the return of its proceeds - until
fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 4, 2011 and the Resolution dated August 26,
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91704 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May
9, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, Branch 87 in Civil Case No. 1913 is REINSTATED with
MODIFICATION, adjusting the interest imposed on the amount ordered to be returned, i.e., ₱369,600.51, to six
percent (6%) per annum reckoned from the date of extrajudicial demand on June 27, 1997, until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
NOTES:
 As a general rule, the Court's jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is limited to the review of pure questions of law. Otherwise stated, a Rule 45 petition does not allow
the review of questions of fact because the Court is not a trier of facts.
o Case law provides that "there is a 'question of law' when the doubt or difference arises as to what
the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a 'question of fact'
when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
o The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of 'law' or 'fact' is not the appellation
given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the
issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is
one of fact."
o Where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn
from these facts are correct is a question of law.
o However, if the question posed requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the
existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue
is factual.
 Notably, however, the foregoing general rule admits of several exceptions, such as where the factual
findings of the RTC and the CA are conflicting or contradictory, WHICH IS EVIDENT IN THIS CASE.
 As such, the Court is constrained to make its own factual findings in order to resolve the issue presented
before it.
 To recapitulate, the RTC declared that BPI was able to sufficiently establish by preponderance of evidence
that respondents were duly notified of the dishonor of the subject check, rendering them liable to refund
what they had withdrawn from BPI.
o Pertinently, it hinged its ruling on the pieces of evidence presented during the trial, namely: the e-
mail printout advice from Bankers Trust informing BPI that the subject check was dishonored, the
BPI letters dated June 27, 1997 and July 18, 1997 addressed to respondents, and the subject
promissory note voluntarily executed by Amado.
o On the contrary, the CA held that respondents were not liable to BPI for its failure to competently
prove the fact of the subject check's dishonor and its subsequent confiscation by the US
government. In this relation, the CA deemed that the printout of the e-mail advice is inadmissible
in evidence for lack of proper authentication pursuant to the Rules on Electronic Evidence.