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G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992

Doctrine of Necessary Implications, What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed”


Lyda Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail the said benefits she filed for an application to the NIA, which denied said application and instead she was offered separation benefits equivalent to ½ month basic payment for every year of her service. The Civil Service Commission and NIA denied Chua’s application claiming that she is not qualified due to the fact that she is a co-terminous employee and non-career civil servant which does not fall under the categories of regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, which the act covers. Ms Chua contends that she is a full-time employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits provided for by the Civil Service Commission. She held a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A, a position which belongs to the Administrative Service. She served for more than 15 years.

R.A. No 6683 provides for benefits of early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified are those enumerated on Sec 2 of the Act:

Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act.

Issue; W/N Chua is entitled of the benefit under R.A. No 6683


The petitioner is qualified to receive the benefits under R.A. No. 6683.

What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project, co-terminous or contractual personnel? All are tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary.

A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees. We see no solid reason why the

latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual andemergency employees. But specifically

excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP.

It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The legislature would not have made a specific enumeration in a

statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine its terms and benefits to those expressly mentioned or casus omissus pro omisso habendus est A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. Yet adherence to these legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

The denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner’s application for early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law.

Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus.



In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) of the Province of Cebu, it appeared that the salaries and personnel-related benefits of the teachers appointed by the province for the extension classes were charged against the provincial SEF. Likewise charged to the SEF were the college scholarship grants of the province. Consequently, the COA issued Notices of Suspension to the province of Cebu, saying that disbursements for the salaries of teachers and scholarship grants are not chargeable to the provincial SEF.

G.R. No. 141386. November 29, 2001

Faced with the Notices of Suspension issued by the COA, the province of Cebu, represented by its governor, filed a petition for declaratory relief with the trial court. On December 13, 1999, the court a quo rendered a decision declaring the questioned expenses as authorized expenditures of the SEF. Declaring further, the respondent's audit findings on pages 36 and 37 in the Annual Audit Report on the Province of Cebu for the year ending December 31, 1999 as null and void.

Hence, the instant petition by the Commission on Audit on the expenses for college scholarship grants, since chargeable to the Special Education Fund (SEF) of the local government unit concerned expressly was not mentioned under R.A. NO.5447. With the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991, petitioner contends that R.A. No. 5447 was repealed, leaving Section 100 (c) of the Code to govern the disposition of the SEF, to wit:

SEC. 100. Meeting and Quorum; Budget

(c) The annual school board budget shall give priority to the following:

(1) Construction, repair, and maintenance of school buildings and other facilities of public elementary and secondary schools; (2) Establishment and maintenance of extension classes where necessary; and (3) Sports activities at the division, district, municipal, and barangay levels.


Whether or not the salaries and personnel-related benefits of public-school teachers appointed by local chief executives in connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes; as well as the expenses for college scholarship grants, may be charged to the Special Education Fund (SEF) of the local government unit concerned.


Undoubtedly, the legislature intended the SEF to answer for the compensation of teachers handling extension classes.

Under the doctrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for the establishment and maintenance of extension classes logically implies the hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course be compensated for their services.

Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis.

Verily, the services and the corresponding compensation of these teachers are necessary and indispensable to the establishment and maintenance of extension classes.

Indeed, the operation and maintenance of public schools is lodged principally with the DECS. The SEF may be expended only for the salaries and personnel-related benefits of teachers appointed by the local school boards in connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes. With respect, however, to college scholarship grants, a reading of the pertinent laws of the Local Government Code reveals that said grants are not among the projects for which the proceeds of the SEF may be appropriated.


GR No. L-5127, May 27, 1953


On February 14, 1939, Batungbakal was appointed as a cash and property examiner by the Auditor General in National Development Company. On August 24, 1945, Batungbakal was reassigned as a property examiner in the same company. However, on December 31, 1946, he was suspended from the office by the Investigation Committee. And on April 17, 1947, Batungbakal has received a notice for dismissal. It was stated in the said notice that according to the findings of the Investigation Commitee, Batungbakal has been found to have committed gross negligence in the performance of his duty to the detriment of the company.

In 1948, Honorable e La Costa, the chairman of Investigation Committee passed to the office of the President through the Department of Secretary the results of their investigation. It was found out that Batungbakal has not committed gross negligence in the performance of his duty, therefore, it was requested that Batungbakal shall be given remedy through reinstatement to his office, as well as to pay back his salaries from the dismissal up to the reinstatement.

However, it is obviously not feasilble since the former position of Batungbakal was already occupied by the present incumbet, and to dismiss the present is to remove him without cause.

On the basis of the facts above recited, Batungbakal apparently dissatisfied if not disgusted with the treatment accorded him, filed this case in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the NDC and Manuel Agregado as Auditor General.

Auditor General contends pursuant to Sec 260 of RAC:

In case of a person suspended by the Governor-General or by the President, no salary shall be paid during suspension unless so provided in the order of suspension; but upon subsequent reinstatement or exoneration of the suspended person, .any salary so withheld may be paid in whole or in part, at the discretion of the officer by whom the suspension was effected.

The provisions of section 260 of the Revised Administrative Code which authorizes payment to a suspended employee of his full salary corresponding to the whole period of his suspension upon his exoneration or reinstatement may not be applied in the instant case because, as will be noted from the facts stated in the within letter of Mr. Batungbakal, dated October 2, 1950, he was not merely suspended from office but also dismissed from the service.


Whether or not Batungbakal has the rights to reinstatement and to back salaries.

YES. Batungbakal has the right as his removal was illegal.

Article XII, section 4, of the Constitution provides that "no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." Section 694 of the Administrative Code has a similar provision. Interpreting these two laws, basic and statutory, a civil service official may not be removed from office except for cause.

This is a case of a civil service employee, suspended and later dismissed without cause as shown by the fact that after a reinvestigation he was exonerated and found guiltless of the charges of gross negligence filed against him, and was even recommended for reinstatement by the Government Committee that investigated him. In other words, his suspension and removal were illegal and in violation not only of the Administrative Code but of the Constitution itself. To remedy the evil and wrong committed, the least that could be done is to restore to him the office and post of which he had been illegally deprived, and to include in that remedy or redress payment of the salary which he should have received during this period of illegal suspension and dismissal is just and reasonable.


G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986


Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon offered to withdraw the complaint for direct assault they filed against Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement.

Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).

The lower courtfound both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.

“Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described”

ISSUE: Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.

HELD: The main issue in the resolution of this petition revolves around the meaning of the phrase "any other device or arrangement."

No, an extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.

Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads which telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users often encounter what are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such mischievous results.

It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.

Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone. The mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature.

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

Gaanan is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.


G.R. No. 87416, April 8, 1991


On October 5, 1987, Petitioner Cecilio S. De Villa was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of NCR (Makati, Branch 145) with violation of BP. 22 (Bouncing Check Law) when the accused unlawfully and feloniously draw and issue a check to Roberto Z. Lorayes to apply on account or for value a depositors trust company check No. 3371 antedated March 31, 1987 with an amount of $ 2,500.00 or equivalent to PHP 50,000.00.

The check was issued at the time the accused had no sufficient funds. At the time of presentment, the check was dishonored due to insufficient funds and despite the receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay the respondent, Lorayes, the amount of the check or to make arrangement for the payment of the check within 5 banking days after the receipt of the (Check) Notice.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the Information on the following grounds:


Respondent court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and


That no offense was committed since the check involved was payable in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and void pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency)

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied by the respondent court due to lack of merit. Under Bouncing Check Law (BP. 22), Foreign checks provided they are drawn and issued in the Philippines, Though payable outside, or made payable and dishonored in the Philippines, are within the coverage of the law. The Bouncing Checks Law is applicable to checks drawn against current accounts in foreign currency.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the court of appeals, which was however denied by the court of appeals. Hence, Petitioner elevated the issue to the Supreme Court to reverse and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.


Whether or Not a Foreign Check drawn against a Foreign account is covered by BP. 22.


Yes. The check was executed and delivered by the petitioner to private respondent in Metro Manila (Makati). However, petitioner contends and argues that the check drawn against a dollar account of a Foreign bank is not covered by BP. 22. But it will be noted that when the law does not make any exception, the court may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it.

Exception in the Statute. It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]). The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The discussion on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this view.

The Bouncing Checks Law does not distinguish the currency to which the violation extended and thus, foreign check is covered by the law. The Petition is dismissed by the court for lack of merit.



On May 18, 1995, eleven (11) suspected members of the criminal group known as the Kuratong Baleleng gang were killed along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City in an alleged shootout with the Anti-Bank Robbery Intelligence Task Group of the Philippine National Police (PNP). SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) of the PNP and who was one of the officers assigned to conduct an investigation on the incident, made a public disclosure of his findings that there was no shootout and the eleven (11) suspected members of the gang were summarily executed. This was attested by SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, also a member of the CIC.

G.R. No. 134855. July 2, 2002

The senate conducted hearings to determine the circumstances surrounding the subject incident and SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz testified before the Senate hearings. On June 2, 1995, former Senator Raul Roco, who was then the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, recommended that SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz be admitted to the government’s Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program. Accordingly, they were admitted into the said Program by the RTC.

CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP and SR. SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR, petitioners,who are among the PNP officers implicated in the alleged rubout, contend that under Sec. 3(d) for R.A. No. 6981, law enforcement officers, like SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz, are disqualified from being admitted into the witness protection program even though they may be testifying against other law enforcement officers. Petitioners pray that the decision of the RTC be reversed and set aside and instead – “ a) An injunction be issued enjoining the Department of Justice from continuing to provide the benefits accruing under the Witness Protection Program to respondents SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz; b) Order the immediate discharge of respondent SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz from WPP and for the latter to be ordered to cease and desist from accepting benefits of the WPP; and c) Order respondent officers to return whatever monetary benefits they have received from the government as a consequence of their wrongful and illegal admission into the WPP”.

Section 3. Admission into the Program. - Any person who has witnessed or has knowledge or information on the commission of a crime and has testified or is testifying or about to testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before any investigating authority, may be admitted into the Program, provided:

d) he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would be testifying against the other law enforcement officers. In such a case, only the immediate members of his family may avail themselves of the protection provided for under this Act. Section 4. Witness in Legislative Investigations. - In case of legislative investigations in aid of legislation, a witness, with his express consent, may be admitted into the Program upon the recommendation of the legislative committee where his testimony is needed when in its judgment there is pressing necessity therefor: Provided, That such recommendation is approved by the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be.

Issue: Whether or Not the SP02 witnesses are admissible to the Witness Protection program


It is basic under the law on statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. The operation of a proviso is usually and properly confined to the clause or distinct portion of the enactment which immediately precedes it or to which it pertains, and does not extend to or qualify other sections or portions of the statute, unless the legislative intent that it shall so operate is clearly disclosed.

In the present case, it is clear that the legislative intent that the proviso under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6981 does not apply to Section 4. The trial court did not err in concluding that if the framers of the law intended otherwise, they could have easily placed the same proviso of Section 3(d) or referred to it under Section 4. Hence, in the absence of a clear proviso or reference to Section 3(d), a witness in a legislative investigation whether or not he is a law enforcement officer, may be admitted into the Program subject only to the requirements provided for under Section 4. It is not disputed that the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, chaired by then Senator Raul Roco, had recommended the admission of SPO2 delos Reyes and dela Cruz into the Program and was duly indorsed by then Senate President Edgardo J. Angara.


G.R. No. 93833

September 28, 1995


A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the RTC of Quezon City alleging that the private

respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality, “contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event. The transcript on which the civil case

was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the RTC of Pasay City for violation of RA 4200, entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wiretapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication, and Other Purposes.”

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense particularly a violation of RA 4200. The trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner.

From the trial court’s Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the CA. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court’s order null and void.


W/N RA 4200 applies to taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to a conversation.


Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.

Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all parties to any private communication, to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.

The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of qualifier “any.” Consequently, as respondent CA correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this provision of RA 4200.

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.


Doctrine of Associated Words (Noscitur a Sociis)

G.R. No. L-39419 12 April 1982


Petitioner Aisporna was charged for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

Petitioner’s husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna (Rodolfo) was duly licensed by the Insurance Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros. Thru Rodolfo, a 12- month Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla with beneficiary to Ana M. Isidro for P50,000. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. Subsequently, petitioner was charged because the aforementioned policy was issued with her active participation, which is not allowed because she did not possess a certificate of authority to act as agent from the office of the Insurance Commission.

Petitioner contended that being the wife of Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, and that the policy was merely a renewal and was issued because her husband was not around when Isidro called by telephone. Instead, appellant left a note on top of her husband’s desk. The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the trial court’s decisions was affirmed by respondent appellate court, finding petitioner guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of Sec 189 of the insurance act.


without reference to the second paragraph of the same section.

Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act

RULING:NO The petition is meritorious. Petition appealed from is reversed, and accused is acquitted of the crime charged.

A perusal of the provision in question shows that the first paragraph thereof prohibits a person from acting as agent, sub-agent or

broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, while its second paragraph defines who an insurance agent is within the intent of this section and,

finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation.

The definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word “agent” mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189.

Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and second paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. More importantly the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated.

Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is also applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of the aforesaid section.

In the case at bar, the information does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro

was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It

is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and proved.

The accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.


G.R. No. L-19650, September 29, 1966


In 1960, Caltex (Philippines) conceived a promotional scheme to drum up patronage for its oil products i.e. "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest." It calls for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. Participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". No fee or consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails for the said contest, Caltex made a letter to the postal authorities to justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General, Enrico Palomar, opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions of The Postal Law i.e. Chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983, which prohibits the non-mailable matter of any information regarding "any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind".

Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing a petition for declaratory relief against the Postmaster General, praying that judgment be rendered declaring its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public. The trial court ruled that the contest does not violate the Postal Code and that the Postmaster General has no right to bar the public distribution of the contest rules by the mails. The Postmaster General appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein?

HELD: No. "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by Caltex is not a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with under the Postal Law. The term in question is used in association with the word "lottery".

"Lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance (El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio).

In the present case, the elements of prize and chance are too obvious in the disputed Caltex’s scheme. However, with regards to the third element i.e. consideration, SC found nowhere in the said rules of any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. The scheme does not only appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous distribution of property by chance. Like a lottery, a “gift enterprise” comes also within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration. The apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon are not identical, the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise" are used interchangeably; every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision.

With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.

Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", if it is not resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby. Under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.



Tomas Valenton, Jr. was found guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide committed against the person of Cesar Carandang, petitioner herein. Tomas Valenton, Jr. appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals where the case is now pending.

G.R. NO. L-8238 May 25, 1955

Petitioner herein filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover from the defendant Tomas Valenton, Jr. and his parents, damages, both actual and moral, for the bodily injuries received by him.

Defendants presented a motion to suspend the trial of the civil case, pending the termination of the criminal case against Tomas Valenton, Jr. in the Court of Appeals. The judge ruled that the trial of the civil action must await the result of the criminal case on appeal. A motion for reconsideration was submitted, but the court denied the same; hence this petition for certiorari.

Petitioner invokes Article 33 of the new Civil Code, which is as follows: “In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."

Accused was charged with and convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide, and while it was found in the criminal case that a wound was inflicted by the defendant on the body of the petitioner herein Cesar Carandang, which wound is a bodily injury, the crime committed is not physical injuries but frustrated homicide, for the reason that the infliction of the wound is attended by the intent to kill.

Issue: Whether or not the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 means physical injuries in the Revised Penal Code only, or any physical injury or bodily injury, whether inflicted with intent to kill or not.

Held:YES. NOSCITUR A SOCIIS the meaning of an unclear or ambiguous word (as in a statute or contract) should be determined by considering the words with it is associated in the context. The meaning of questionable words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by reference to the meaning or words or phrases associated with it and may be known from the accompanying words.

Respondents argue that the term "physical injuries" is used to designate a specific crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, and therefore said term should be understood in its peculiar and technical sense, in accordance with the rules statutory construction.

Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries." Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense.

Evident that the term "physical injuries" could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term "physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms.

The respondent judge committed an error in suspending the trial of the civil case, and his order to that effect is hereby revoked, and he is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of said civil case without awaiting the result of the pending criminal case.

Court ruled that physical injuries” not as one defined in RPC, but to mean bodily harm or injury such as physical injuries, frustrate homicide, or even death.

“Look at the associated words to determine meaning.” Since the words that accompany “physical injuries” in Art 33 of the NCC were used in their general sense, so too should the words physical injuries.”



The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s departure. Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.” In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.

G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012

In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature.

The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of balance. The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be members of the JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential appointees


Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of


No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional. Under verbal legis, the use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC It is undeniable from the records of the Constitutional Commission that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.


G.R. No. 169143 | February 2, 2007

FACTS: In August 1996, accused Simplicio Delantar was indicted for violating RA 7610 for selling in prostitution his putative daughter, AAA, to an Arab national and for pimping and delivering AAA, who was then 11 years of age to Congressman Jalosjos. He entered a plea of not guilty and trial proceeded in due course.

The testimony of AAA shows that appellant procured her as a child prostitute for at least two clients: the first, an Arab national named Mr. Hammond and the second, then Congressman Romeo Jalosjos. From her testimony, it could easily be gleaned that AAA did not consent to the acts of lasciviousness and the sexual intercourse.

Appellant claimed that sometime in 1983, AAA was brought to him by a certain Salvacion Buela, AAA’s real mother, who could not support her. The birth certificate indicates that AAA was born on "11 May 1985" to "Librada A. Telin" (mother) and "Simplicio R. Delantar" (father), nowhere on the face of the birth certificate can the signature of appellant be found According to appellant, Librada A. Telin is his sister and they did not get married to each other on the date indicated in the birth certificate, or impliedly at least, not ever.

The RTC found accused guilty, for two counts, of violation of RA 7610. The CA upheld the decision except that the appellate court ruled Delantar should be convicted for one count only.

SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The case reached the SC where accused appellant decried the imposition of the maximum penalty when in fact there was no showing of the qualifying circumstance of filial relationship between him and AAA.


of the higher penalty on him

Whether or not the Certificate of live birth presented by Delantar may serve as proof of filiation and justify the imposition

HELD: NO The SC held that the birth certificate of AAA, which did not containe Delantar’s signature, is prima facie evidence only of the fact of her birth and not of her relation to appellant. After all, it is undisputed that appellant is not AAA’s biological father. Section 31(c), Article XII of R.A. No. 7610 states:

(c) The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator is an ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity, or a manager or owner of an establishment which has no license to operate or its license has expired or has been revoked. (Emphasis supplied.)

Further, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated 87 Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator and the victim which will justify the imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is an "ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity." It should be noted that the words with which "guardian" is associated in the provision all denote a legal relationship. From this description we may safely deduce that the guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may be established either by being the ward’s biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian).

Appellant is neither AAA’s biological parent nor is he AAA’s adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the "guardian" contemplated by law. The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations do not obtain in appellant’s case or, for that matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or another’s property. The fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting sanctions should he betray the trust