Alawi vs.

Alauya
268 SCRA 639

FACTS:
Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4 th Judicial Shari’a District
in Marawi City. A complaint was filed against him by Sophia Alawi with the Supreme
Court seeking his dismissal from the service. Alawi’s complaint is anchored on Alauya’s
“malicious and libelous charges” resulting in undue injury to her honor and reputation,
contained in letters sent to E.B. Villarosa and Company and Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation. In his letter to the Asst. Clerk of Court, Atty. Marasigan, Alauya signed his
name with the prefix “Atty.”

ISSUE:
As an officer of the Shari’a court, is Alauya entitled to use the title “Attorney”?

HELD:
With regards to Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney”, this Court had already the
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members
of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before the Shari’a courts. While one
who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar may both be considered “counselors”. In the sense that they give counsel
or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney”. The title of “attorney”
is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who
are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, “counselor” or “counselor-at-law”,
because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly
similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment.
His disinclination to use the title of “counselor” does not warrant his use of the title of
attorney.
In re: Garcia
2 SCRA 985

FACTS:
A Filipino citizen who had finished the law course in Spain and thereafter allowed
to practice the profession in said country, filed a petition to practice the law in the
Philippines without passing the required bar examinations provided for in Section 1 of
Rule 127 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Can Arturo E. Garcia be admitted to practice law in the Philippines without
passing the Bar?

Held:
After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny the petition on the following
grounds:
(1) The provisions of the Treaty on Academic degrees and the Exercise of
Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State
can not be invoked by applicant. Under Article II thereof;
“The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have
obtained recognition of the validity of their academic degrees by virtue of
the stipulations of this Treaty, can practice their professions within the
territory of the Other. x x x.”
from which it could clearly be discerned that said Treaty was intended to
govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the
citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines.
Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the
Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not
entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in
the Philippines.

(2) Article I of the treaty, in its pertinent part provides:

“The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degrees
or diplomas to practice the liberal professions in either of the
Contracting States, issued by competent national authorities, shall
be deemed competent to exercise said professions in the territory
of the Other, subject to the laws and regulations of the latter. x.x.x”

It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked

by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the
contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal
profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2, 9, and
16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone can
practice the legal profession in the Philippines he must first successfully pass
the required bar examinations; and

(3) The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the

Philippines and the Spanish State could not have been intended to modify the
laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach
upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. xxx (Sec. 5, Art. VIII,
1987 Phil. Constitution)
Philippine Lawyer’s Association vs. Agrava
G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

FACTS:
A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May
27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for
June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to
practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office.

The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinations and is
licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good
standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the
respondent Director’s holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his
jurisdiction and is in violation of the law. The respondent, in reply, maintains the
prosecution of patent cases “ does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but
includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of
actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the
examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the
long time he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right has been questioned
formally.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and
the prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of
law.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance
before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other
persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or
the enforcement of their rights in patent cases.
Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the interpretation and
application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be
established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but
also embraces all other matters connected with the law and any work involving the
determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore,
the law provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or
decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office
involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then
logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board
of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
Cayetano vs Monsod
201 SCRA 210

FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino
to the positionof chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in
Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections.

However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the

Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent possesses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

HELD:
In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges
and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment
and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the
foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any
activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not possess the required qualification of
having engage in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty.
Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the
position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
People vs Villanueva
14 SCRA 111

FACTS:
On Sept. 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio
Villanueva with crime of Malicious Mischief, before the Justice of the Peace Court of
said Municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de oficio, but later on
replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by
City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private-
prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice.

Counsel for the accused presented a “Motion in inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as
Private prosecutor in this case, “this time invoking sec. 32, Rule 127, now sec. 35, Rule
138, Revised Rules, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Fule violate sec. 32 of Rule 127 now Sec. 35, Rule 138,
revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.

HELD:
The Court holds that the appearance of Attorney Fule did not constitute private
practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than
isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts
of the same kind. The word private practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services. It has never been refuted that City
Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate supervisor, the Secretary of
Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
In re: Edillon
AC 1928 Dec. 19, 1980

FACTS:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the
Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the
name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions
of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP,
payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his

constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to
maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay
the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support
of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP
By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a member of the IBP may be compelled to pay membership fees
and the non-compliance therewith may result to the member’s disbarment?

HELD:
The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a
member of as distinguished from bar associations in which membership is
merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual
fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual
dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration
does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the
meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
The Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of the regulatory
program – the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The
right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable
as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of
the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.
Bongalonta vs Castillo
240 SCRA310

FACTS:
Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of
the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting
interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment
which complainant might obtain. The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel.
She also filed, a separate civil action, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary
attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and
registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the
Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.

During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed a civil case for
collection of a sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional
Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by
Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their
failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and evidence ex parte was received
against them followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A
writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously attached by
complainant was levied upon.

It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned
cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the
same PTR and the same IBP receipt number. Thus, complainant concluded that the
civil case filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to
frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant might obtain in the
civil case he filed. After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with
the following findings and recommendations:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP
Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.The complaint against
Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility?

HELD:
The Court agreed with the foregoing findings and recommendations. The practice
of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment
of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor.
Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental
duty to satisfy that expectation, for this reason, he is required to swear to do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a

falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense
in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Petition for authority to continue use of the firm name “Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez & Castillo”
July 30, 1979

FACTS:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died
on May 5, 1975 and by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on
February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their
firms, the names of partners who had passed away.

Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former
partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that
no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. They also contend that no local
custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a professional
firm’s name; there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater
Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the
individual members of the firm

ISSUE:
Whether or not the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the
name of the partners who already passed away in the name of the firm?

HELD:
No. In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation,
the SC said: The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of
the relations between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the
canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote
degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly
advised to drop the names of the deceased partners from their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create
undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer
without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another
able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm’s reputation
established by deceased partners.

The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or
association for a particular purpose. It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of
carrying on trade or business or of holding property.” Thus, it has been stated that “the
use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.

We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements
requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as
a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of
adjudication as a juridical custom.