ADDISON V.
FELIX (August 03, 1918) than two-thirds of their area was in the hostile and adverse
FACTS:
Petitioner Addison sold four parcels of land to Defendant spouses
Felix and Tioco located in Lucena City. Respondents paid 3K for the
purchase price and promised to pay the remaining by installment.
The contract provides that the purchasers may rescind the contract
within one year after the issuance of title on their name.
The petitioner went to Lucena for the survey designaton and
delivery of the land but only 2 parcels were designated and 2/3 of it
was in possession of a Juan Villafuerte.
The other parcels were not surveyed and designated by Addison.
Addison demanded from petitioner the payment of the first
installment but the latter contends that there was no delivery and
as such, they are entitled to get back the 3K purchase price they
gave upon the execution of the contract.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid delivery.
HELD:
The record shows that the plaintiff did not deliver the thing sold.
With respect to two of the parcels of land, he was not even able to
show them to the purchaser; and as regards the other two, more
possession of a third person.
It is true that the same article declares that the execution of a public
instruments is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the
object of the contract, but, in order that this symbolic delivery may
produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall
have had such control over the thing sold that, at the moment of
the sale, its material delivery could have been made. It is not
enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and the right
of possession. The thing sold must be placed in his control. When
there is no impediment whatever to prevent the thing sold passing
into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of the vendor,
symbolic delivery through the execution of a public instrument is
sufficient. But if there is an impediment, delivery cannot be deemed
effected.
DANGUILAN V. IAC
168 SCRA 22
FACTS:
Apolinia sought the recovery of a farm lot and house from
Danguilan. She averred that she acquired the property through sale.
Danguilan on the other hand, contends that the property is his by
virtue of a donation.
HELD:
The donation being of real property, it is void for not complying with
the requirements given by law. Donation of real property should be
in a public instrument. In this case, it wasn’t.
FELIX DANGUILAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, APOLONIA MELAD, assisted by her husband, JOSE
TAGACAY,
Facts:
• 1962 – respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner
in the CFI Cagayan for recovery of a farm lot and a residential lot
which she had purchased from Domingo Melad in 1943 and were
now being unlawfully withheld by the defendant
• Petitioner denied the allegation and averred that he was
the owner of the said lots which he had acquired them from
Domingo Melad (Melad) in 1941 and 1943.
• The case was dismissed for failure to prosecute but was
refiled in 1967.
• Respondent presented a deed of sale (1943) purportedly
signed by Melad and duly notarized which conveyed the said
properties to her for P80.
- She (respondent) said that the amount was earned by her
mother as a worker at the Tabacalera factory.
- She claimed to be the illegitimate daughter of Melad with
whom she and her mother were living when he died in 1945.
- She moved out of the farm only when in 1946, petitioner
asked permission to cultivate the land and stay therein
- She agreed on condition that he would deliver part of the
harvest to her which he did in 1958.
- The deliveries stopped so she consulted the municipal
judge. The judge advised her to file a complaint against petitioner
- Respondent’s mother was her only witness to corroborate
this testimony
• Petitioner testified that he was the husband of Isidra Melad,
Melad’s niece, whom he and his wife Juana Malupang had taken
into their home as their ward as they had no children of their own.
- Petitioner and his wife lived with the couple in their house
on the residential lot and helped Melad with the cultivation of the
farm
- Melad signed in 1941 a private instrument in which he gave
the petitioner the farm and in 1943, another private instrument in
which he also gave him the residential lot, on the understanding
that the latter would take care of the grantor and would bury him
upon his death.
- Petitioner presented three other witnesses to corroborate
this testimony and to prove that petitioner since his marriage to
Isidra, he had been living in the land and remained in possession
thereof after Melad’s death in 1945
- Two other witnesses declared that the respondent and her
mother did not live in the land of Melad
• TC based its decision mainly on the issue of possession and
ruled in favor of petitioner as the evidence of respondent are
unpersuasive and unconvincing.
• CA reversed. It stated that the petitioner’s two private
instruments were null and void because they were donations and
must be effected through a public instrument
Issue: Whether Domingo intended to donate the properties to
petitioner? – Yes but they were onerous donations
Ratio:
• The conveyances were onerous donations as the properties
were given to the petitioner in exchange for his obligation to take
care of the donee for the rest of his life and provide for his burial.
Hence, it was not covered by the rule in Article 749 of the Civil Code
requiring donations of real properties to be effected through a
public instrument.
• Petitioner did take care of Domingo Melad and later
arranged for his burial in accordance with the condition imposed by
the donor.
• Melad died when he was almost one hundred years old,
which would mean that the petitioner farmed the land practically by
himself and so provided for the donee (and his wife) during the
latter part of Domingo Melad's life. We may assume that there was
a fair exchange between the donor and the donee that made the
transaction an onerous donation.
• The private respondent argues that as there was no
equivalence between the value of the lands donated and the
services for which they were being exchanged, the two transactions
should be considered pure or gratuitous donations of real rights,
hence, they should have been effected through a public instrument
and not mere private writings. However, no evidence has been
adduced to support her contention that the values exchanged were
disproportionate or unequal.
• The deed of sale was allegedly executed when the
respondent was only three years old and the consideration was
supposedly paid by her mother, Maria Yedan from her earnings as a
wage worker in a factory. 16 This was itself a suspicious
circumstance, one may well wonder why the transfer was not made
to the mother herself, who was after all the one paying for the
lands.
• The sale was made out in favor of Apolonia Melad although
she had been using the surname Yedan her mother's surname,
before that instrument was signed and in fact even after she got
married.
• Even assuming the validity of the deed of sale, the record
shows that the private respondent did not take possession of the
disputed properties and indeed waited until 1962 to file this action
for recovery of the lands from the petitioner. If she did have
possession, she transferred the same to the petitioner in 1946, by
her own sworn admission, and moved out to another lot belonging
to her step-brother.
• In short, she failed to show that she consummated the
contract of sale by actual delivery of the properties to her and her
actual possession thereof in concept of purchaser-owner.
weak, the decision should still incline in favor of the petitioner (f the
claim of both the plaintiff and the defendant are weak, judgment
must be for the defendant, for the latter being in possession is
presumed to be the owner, and cannot be obliged to show or prove
a better right.

- Garchitorena v. Almeda - Ownership does not pass by mere

stipulation but only by delivery (Civil Code, Art. 1095; Fidelity and
Surety Co. v. Wilson, 8 Phil. 51), and the execution of a public
document does not constitute sufficient delivery where the
property involved is in the actual and adverse possession of third
persons
- Fidelity and Deposit co v. Wilson - The ownership and other
property rights are acquired and transmitted by law, by gift, by
testate or intestate succession, and, in consequence of certain
contracts, by tradition
PASAGUI V. VILLABLANCA (November 10, 1975)
FACTS:
Plaintiffs Calixto Pasagui and Fausta Mosar bought a property in
Leyte from Estaquia and Catalina Bocar for P2,800. Before they
could take possession of the property, defendant spouses Ester T.
Villablanca and Zosimo Villablanca took possession of it and
harvested from the coconut plantation thereon. Plaintiffs
demanded the return of the property but the defendants refused.

Plaintiffs filed a case in the CFI but respondents contend that the
• In case of symbolic delivery through the deed of sale (public
instrument), the vendor shall have had such control over the thing case is a forcible entry and as such, CFI has no jurisdiction.
sold that, at the moment of the sale, its material delivery could have
been made.
ISSUE:
• When there is no impediment whatever to prevent the
thing sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will WON the case is of forcible entry.
of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public
instrument is sufficient.

• It is the petitioner and not the private respondent who is in

actual possession of the litigated properties. Even if the respective
claims of the parties were both to be discarded as being inherently
HELD:
In order that an action may be considered as one for forcible entry,
it is not only necessary that the plaintiff should allege his prior
physical possession of the property but also that he was deprived of
his possession by any of the means provided in section 1, Rule 70 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
It is true that the execution of the deed of absolute sale in a public
instrument is equivalent to delivery of the land subject of the sale.
This presumptive delivery only holds true when there is no
impediment that may prevent the passing of the property from the
hands of the vendor into those of the vendee. It can be negated by
the reality that the vendees actually failed to obtain material
possession of the land subject of the sale.
Dy, Jr. v. Court of Appeals 198 SCRA 826 July 8, 1991
FACTS :
Wilfredo Dy purchased a truck and a farm tractor through LIBRA
which was also mortgaged with the latter, as a security to the loan.
Petitioner, expresses his desire to purchased his brother’s tractor in
a letter to LIBRA which also includes his intention to shoulder its
mortgaged. LIBRA approved the request. At the time that Wilfredo
Dy executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioner, the
tractor and truck were in the possession of LIBRA for his failure to
pay the amortization. When petitioner finally fulfilled its obligation
to pay the tractor, LIBRA would only release the same only if he
would also pay for the truck. In order to fulfill LIBRA’s condition,
petitioner convinced his sister to pay for the remaining truck, to
which she released a check amounting to P22,000. LIBRA however,
insisted that the check must be first cleared before it delivers the
truck and tractor.
Meanwhile, another case penned “Gelac Trading Inc vs. Wilfredo
Dy” was pending in Cebu as a case to recover for a sum of money
(P12,269.80). By a writ of execution the court in Cebu ordered to
seize and levy the tractor which was in the premise of LIBRA, it was
sold in a public auction to which it was purchased by GELAC. The
latter then sold the tractor to Antonio Gonzales.
RTC rendered in favor of petitioner. CA dismissed the case, alleging
that it still belongs to Wilfredo Dy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a consummated sale between Petitioner
and LIBRA?
HELD:
NO. The relationship between Libra and the petitioner is not one of
sale but still a mortgage. The payment of the check was actually
intended to extinguish the mortgage obligation so that the tractor
could be released to the petitioner. It was never intended nor could
it be considered as payment of the purchase price because the
relationship between Libra and the petitioner is not one of sale but
still a mortgage. The clearing or encashment of the check which
produced the effect of payment determined the full payment of the
money obligation and the release of the chattel mortgage. It was
not determinative of the consummation of the sale. The transaction
between the brothers is distinct and apart from the transaction
between Libra and the petitioner. The contention, therefore, that
the consummation of the sale depended upon the encashment of
the check is untenable.
POWER COMMERCIAL V. CA (June 20, 1997)
FACTS:
Petitioner asbestos manufacturer Power Commercial and industrial
corporation bought the property of spouses Reynaldo and Angelita
Quiambao located in Makati City.
Since there are lessees occupying the subject land, part of the deed
of sale is a warranty of respondents that will defend its title and
peaceful possession in favor of the petitioners.
ISSUE:
WON the contract is recissible due to breach of contract.
HELD:
There is no breach of contact in this case since there is no provision
in the contract that imposes the obligation to the respondents to
eject the people occupying the property.
There was also a constructive delivery because the deed of sale was
made in a public document. The contention of the petitioners that
there could be no constructive delivery because the respondents is
not in possession of the property is of no merit. What matters in a
constructive delivery is control and not possession. Control was
placed in the hands of the petitioners that is why they were able to
file an ejectment case. Prior physical delivery or possession is not
legally required and the execution of the deed of sale is deemed
equivalent to delivery.

The property is mortgage to PNP and as such, petitioners filed a

request to assume responsibility of the mortgage. Because of
petitioners failure to produce the required papers, their petition
was denied.

Petitioners allege that the contract should be rescinded because of

failure of delivery.
VILLARTA V. CA (May 29, 1987)
FACTS:
Respondent Rosalinda Cruz entrusted to petitioner Victoria Villarta
seven pieces of jewelry on November 1968. On December of the
same year, Villarta exchanges one jewelry to another and issued a
post-dated check in favor of Cruz. Cruz deposited the check but it
was dishonored for lack of funds.
An estafa case was filed against Villarta but she argued that she can
only be civilly liable because even though the check bounced, she
only gave it for a pre-existing obligation. She contends a person
cannot be imprisoned for non-payment of debt.
ISSUE:
WON the transaction is a “sale or return”
HELD:
The transaction is not a sale or return but a sale on approval or sale
on acceptance.
When Cruz gave the jewelry to Villarta on November, the clear
intention is to make the latter choose which item she wanted to
buy. There was no meeting of the minds yet at this point and hence,
it cannot be considered as delivery.
If ownership over the jewelry was not transmitted on that date,
then it could have been transmitted only in December 1968, the
date when the check was issued. In which case, it was a "sale on
approval" since ownership passed to the buyer. Vallarta, only when
she signified her approval or acceptance to the seller, Cruz, and the
price was agreed upon.
It is still criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check which is
made punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and not the non-
payment of the debt.
STA.ANA V. HERNANDEZ (January 17, 1966)
FACTS:
Spouses Jose Santa Ana, Jr. and Lourdes Sto. Domingo sold a land in
Bulacan to respondent Rosa Hernandez for P11,000 lump sum.
(there were two other previous sales to different vendees of other
portions of the land)
The boundaries of the land were stated in the deed of sale and its
approximate land area.
Petitioners-spouses caused the preparation of the subdivision plan
but Hernandez didn’t agree to the partition. As such, petitioners-
spouses filed a case alleging that Hernandez is occupying in excess
of 17000 square meter of the land sold. Hernandez claims that the
excess area is part of the land she bought.
ISSUE:
WON the excess area occupied by Hernandez is part of the land
sold.
HELD:
The sale involves a definite and identified tract, a corpus certum,
that obligated the vendors to deliver to the buyer all the land within
the boundaries, irrespective of whether its real area should be
greater or smaller than what is recited in the deed.
To hold the buyer to no more than the area recited on the deed, it
must be made clear therein that the sale was made by unit of
measure at a definite price for each unit. The sale in this case only
involves the definite boundaries but only approximate land areas.
As such, Art 1542 concerning the sale for lump sum must be
considered.
Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, and Poncio
69 SCRA 99
January 1976
FACTS:
On January 27, 1955, respondent Jose Poncio executed a private
memorandum of sale of his parcel of land with improvements
situated in San Juan, Rizal in favor of petitioner Rosario Carbonell
who knew that the said property was at that time subject to a
mortgage in favor of the Republic Savings Bank (RSB) for the sum of
P1,500.00. Four days later, Poncio, in another private
memorandum, bound himself to sell the same property for an
improved price to one Emma Infante for the sum of P2,357.52, with
the latter still assuming the existing mortgage debt in favor of the
RSB in the amount of P1,177.48. Thus, in February 2, Poncio
executed a formal registerable deed of sale in her (Infante's) favor.
So, when the first buyer Carbonell saw the seller Poncio a few days
afterwards, bringing the formal deed of sale for the latter's
signature and the balance of the agreed cash payment, she was told
that he could no longer proceed with formalizing the contract with
her (Carbonell) because he had already formalized a sales contract
in favor of Infante.
To protect her legal rights as the first buyer, Carbonell registered on
February 8, 1955 with the Register of Deeds her adverse claim as
first buyer entitled to the property. Meanwhile, Infante, the second
buyer, was able to register the sale in her favor only on February 12,
1955, so that the transfer certificate of title issued in her name
carried the duly annotated adverse claim of Carbonell as the first
buyer. The trial court declared the claim of the second buyer Infante
to be superior to that of the first buyer Carbonell, a decision which
the Court of Appeals reversed. Upon motion for reconsideration,
however, Court of Appeals annulled and set aside its first decision
and affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Who has the superior right over the subject property?
COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision and
declared the first buyer Carbonell to have the superior right over
the subject property, relying on Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
Unlike the first and third paragraphs of said Article 1544, which
accord preference to the one who first takes possession in good
faith of personal or real property, the second paragraph directs that
ownership of immovable property should be recognized in favor of
one "who in good faith first recorded" his right. Under the first and
third paragraphs, good faith must characterize the prior possession,
while under the second paragraph, good faith must characterize the
act of anterior registration.
When Carbonell bought the lot from Poncio on January 27, 1955,
she was the only buyer thereof and the title of Poncio was still in his
name solely encumbered by bank mortgage duly annotated
thereon. Carbonell was not aware - and she could not have been
aware - of any sale to Infante as there was no such sale to Infante
then. Hence, Carbonell's prior purchase of the land was made in
good faith which did not cease after Poncio told her on January 31,
1955 of his second sale of the same lot to Infante. Carbonell wanted
to meet Infante but the latter refused so to protect her legal rights,
Carbonell registered her adverse claim on February 8, 1955. Under
the circumstances, this recording of Carbonell’s adverse claim
should be deemed to have been done in good faith and should
emphasize Infante's bad faith when the latter registered her deed of
sale 4 days later.
QUIMSON vs. ROSETE G.R. No. L-2397, August 9, 1950
FACTS
The estate belonging to the deceased Dionysus Quimson was first
transferred in favor of his daughter TomasaQuimson through a deed
of conveyance, but continued in his possession and enjoyment. He
sold it to Francisco Rosete, with a repurchase agreement for the
term of five years granting to this effect the writing of sale. Since
then Rosete is the one in his possession and enjoyment, in a
peaceful and quiet manner, even after the death of Dionisio
Quimson, which occurred on June 6, 1939 until January of 1943.
Tomasa Quimson petitioned that the property should be given to
her as she is the true owner and possessor of the property.
ISSUE
What were the effects of the registration of plaintiff’s document?
Who was prior in possession?
HELD
The Court held that the execution of a public instrument is
equivalent to the delivery of the realty sold and its possession by
the vendee. Under these conditions the sale is considered
consummate and completely transfers to the vendee all of the
vendor’s rights of ownership including his real rights over the thing.
This means that after the sale of a realty by means of a public
instrument, the vendor, who resells it to another, does not transmit
anything to the second vendee and if the latter, by virtue of this
second sales, take material possession of the thing, he does it as a
mere detainer, and it would be unjust to protect this detention
against the rights to the thing lawfully acquired by the first vendee.
Hence, the Court ruled that Tomasa Quimson is the rightful owner
of the property.
CHENG V. GENATO (December 29, 1998)
FACTS:
Respondent Genato entered a contract to sell to spouses Da Jose
pertaining to his property in Bulacan. The contract made in public
document states that the spouses shall pay the down payment and
30 days after verifying the authenticity of the documents, they shall
pay the remaining purchase price.
Da Jose spouses was not able to finish verifying the documents and
as such asked for a 30 day extension. Pending the extension and
without notice to the spouses, Genato made a document for the
annulment of the contract.
Petitioner Cheng expressed interest over the property and paid 50K
check with the assurance that the contract between Genato and the
spouses Da Jose will be annulled. Da Jose spouses protested with
the annulment and persuaded Genato to continue the contract.
Genato returned the check to Cheng and hence, this petition.
HELD:
The contract between Genato and spouses Da Jose was a contract
to sell which is subject to a suspensive condition. Thus, there will be
no contract to speak of, if the obligor failed to perform the
suspensive condition which enforces a juridical relation. Obviously,
the foregoing jurisprudence cannot be made to apply to the
situation in the instant case because no default can be ascribed to
the Da Jose spouses since the 30-day extension period has not yet
expired.
Even assuming that the spouses defaulted, the contract also cannot
be validly rescinded because no notice was given to them. Thus,
Cheng's contention that the Contract to Sell between Genato and
the Da Jose spouses was rescinded or resolved due to Genato's
unilateral rescission finds no support in this case.

The contract between Genato and Cheng is a contract to sell not a

contract of sale. But But even assuming that it should be treated as
a conditional contract of sale, it did not acquire any obligatory force
since it was subject to a suspensive condition that the earlier
contract to sell between Genato and the Da Jose spouses should
first be cancelled or rescinded.

Art.1544 should apply because for not only was the contract
between herein respondents first in time; it was also registered long
before petitioner's intrusion as a second buyer (PRIMUS TEMPORE,
PORTIOR JURE). (Spouses made annotation on the title of Genato).
Since Cheng was fully aware, or could have been if he had chosen to
inquire, of the rights of the Da Jose spouses under the Contract to
Sell duly annotated on the transfer certificates of titles of Genato, it
now becomes unnecessary to further elaborate in detail the fact
that he is indeed in bad faith in entering into such agreement.