1. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
appellee, vs. FRANCISCO DE LOS SANTOS,
defendant-appellant.G.R. No. L-1975 December
21, 1950 87 Phil. 721
Facts:
Francisco de los Santos was charged with
treason. He contends that he did not participate in
the killings of Castro de la Vega and there is no
evidence that he took part in the killing of the other
three persons.
Issue:
Can the appellant be held guilty of
treason?
Decision:
Yes. His participation in the apprehension,
investigation and torture of the victims, makes him
responsible for the acts of his companions. There is
evidence sufficient in law for a finding that there was
conspiracy, common purpose and concerted action
by and between the appellant and his companions
which render each and every one of the participants
in the unlawful acts perpetrated, no matter how
minor or insignificant be his part, responsible for all
such acts.
3. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS.JOSE
FERNANDO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.[
G.R. No. L-1138, December 17, 1947 ] 79 Phil. 719
Facts:
Fernando was found guilty of the crime of
treason. He claimed that he was forced into the
service of the Kempei-tai, the Japanese military
police organization.
Issue:
Can the appellant be held guilty of
treason?
Decision:
Yes. It is incredible that, while appellant
was undergoing detention and maltreatment for his
alleged connection with the resistance movement,
the Japanese should, without much ceremony, upon
appellant's show of willingness to abide by their
order to serve them, release him, provide him with
firearms, and put under his charge a group of
Filipino informers in the service of the Kempei-tai. To
place appellant in such a responsible position, full of
opportunity and means either of helping the
Japanese or sabotaging their military efforts,
appellant must beforehand have shown them strong
evidence of adherence and loyalty for the Japanese
to trust him.
4.
PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS.SUSANO PEREZ
(ALIAS KID PEREZ), DEFENDANT AND
APPELLANT.[ G.R. No. L-856, April 18, 1949 ] 83
Phil. 314
Facts:
Perez furnished women for immoral
purposes to the enemies. He was convicted of
treason.
Issue:
Can Perez be held guilty of treason?
Decision:
No. The law of treason does not proscribe
all kinds of social, business and political intercourse
between the belligerent occupants of the invaded
country and its inhabitants. What aid and comfort
constitute treason must depend upon their nature;
degree and purpose. As a general rule, to be
treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to
the enemies must be to render assistance to them
as enemies and not merely as individuals, and, in
addition, be directly in furtherance of the enemies'
hostile designs. Sexual and social relations with the
Japanese did not directly and materially tend to
improve their war efforts or to weaken the power of
the United States.
5. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS.FRANCISCO M.
ABAD (ALIAS PAQUITO), DEFENDANT AND
APPELLANT.[ G.R. No. L-430, July 30, 1947 ] 78
Phil. 766
Facts:
Francisco Abad was found guilty on three
counts of the complex crime of treason with
homicide. The information charged appellant of the
crime of treason by giving aid and comfort to the
Empire of Japan and the Japanese Imperial Forces.
The first question raised by appellant is that the
lower court erred in finding the accused guilty on the
first count, notwithstanding the fact that only one
witness testified to the overt act alleged therein.
Issue:
Is the appellant correct?
Decision:
Yes. The two-witness rule must be
adhered to as to each and every one of all the
external manifestations of the overt act in issue.
Although both overt acts are inter-related, it would
be too much to strain the imagination if they should
be identified as a single act or even as different
manifestations, phases, or stages of the same overt
act. Although both acts may logically be presumed to
have answered the same purpose, the singleness of
purpose is not enough to make one of two acts.
8. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE, VS.EMILIANO CATANTAN Y
TAYONG, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.[ G.R. No.
118075, September 05, 1997 ] 344 Phil. 315
Facts:
Catantan was found guilty with violation of
Presidential Decree No. 532 otherwise known as the
Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of 1974. He
contends that the trial court erred in convicting him
of piracy as the facts proved only constitute grave
coercion. He further argues that in order that piracy
may be committed it is essential that there be an
attack on or seizure of a vessel.
Issue:
Is the contention of Catantan correct?
Decision:
No. Under the definition of piracy in PD
No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in
Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls
squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may
be true that victims were compelled to go elsewhere
other than their place of destination, such
compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing
their boat. The testimony of one of the victims shows
that the appellant actually seized the vessel through
force and intimidation.
11. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE, VS. JAIME RODRIGUEZ ALIAS
JIMMY ALIAS WILFRED DE LARA Y MEDRANO
AND RICO LOPEZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS. [
G.R. No. 60100, March 20, 1985 ] 220 Phil. 162
Facts:
Appellants were convicted of the crime of
piracy and were sentenced to suffer the extreme
penalty of death. They contend that the trial court
erred in imposing the death penalty despite their
plea of guilty.
Issue:
Is the contention of the appellants correct?
Decision:
No. Presidential Decree No. 532 amending
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that
if rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result
or on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders
abandoned the victims without means of saving
themselves, or when the seizure is accomplished by
firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory
penalty of death shall be imposed. Further, Article 63
of the same Code provides that in all cases in which
the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall
be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating
or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed.