G.R. No.

182239, March 16, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HERMIE M. JACINTO,

Facts:

Appellant Hermie Jacinto was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
rape of the then 5-year-old victim. The crime was committed when appellant
was only 17; Judgment was rendered when appellant was already 25.

Issue:
Whether or not, appellant may benefit from the provisions of RA9344
regarding criminal liability of an accused who was a minor during the
commission of the crime and the suspension of sentence of one who is no
longer a minor during the pronouncement of verdict.

Held:

The Court sustained the conviction of the appellant in view of the

straightforward testimony of the victim and the inconsistencies of the
testimonies of the defense witnesses.

The Court did not exempt accused of his criminal liability although he was
only 17 during the commission of the crime since, in view of the
circumstances to which accused committed the felony, it was proved that he
acted with discernment. (Sec 6, RA 9344). There was showing that the
accused understood the consequences of his action.

Applying, the provision of RA 9346, the accused was meted with reclusion
perpetua instead of the death penalty.

As to the civil liability of accused, his minority also had no bearing to the
decision of the Court, ordering accused to pay the victim for damages.

However, the Court afforded the accused the benefit of the suspension of his
sentence provided in Section38 of RA 9344, which made no distinction to an
accused found guilty of a capital offense. The Court stated that what was
important was the intent of the Act to uphold the welfare of a child in conflict
with the law. What was to be considered was the fact that accused committed
the crime at a tender age.
The Court held that accused may be confined in an agricultural camp or any
training facility in accordance with Sec 51 of RA 9344. The case was
remanded to the court of origin to take appropriate action in accordance to
the said provision.

[G.R. No. 162052. January 13, 2005]

ALVIN JOSE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS: November 14, 1995, P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro of the Fourth Regional
Narcotics Unit received an information regarding a big time group of drug pushers
from Greenhills will deliver 100 grams of shabu at Chowking Restaurant located at
Brgy. Real, Calamba, Laguna. Police officers planned a buy-bust operation in which
they arrested Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose. The buy-bust bundle of “money bills”
and the shabu were recovered. The two were brought to Camp Vicente Lim for
investigation and the shabu was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination by P/Senior Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo who testified that the
specimen was a second or low grade methamphetamine hydrochloride.

FACTS accdg to ACCUSED:

Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose claimed that, on November 13, 1995, they were at
SM Mega Mall (sic), Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, to change money. Police Officers
proceeded to where Sonny Zarraga’s car was parked. On the way to Greenhills, one
of the men opened the gloves compartment of Sonny Zarraga’s car and saw a
substance inside the said compartment. Said person asked Sonny Zarraga if he could
come up with P1.5 Million peso for ransom in exchange of his release.

On June 10, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment convicting both accused of the
crime charged and sentencing each of them to an indeterminate penalty. Court finds
both the accused Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose guilty beyond reasonable doubt, for
violation of R.A. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, six (6) years and
one (1) day to ten (10) years. Both accused are hereby ordered to pay the fine of P2
million each and to pay the cost of suit.
ISSUE: WON the CA gravely erred in not acquitting petitioner who was only 13 y.o.
when the crime was allegedly committed by him in conspiracy with the accused
Sonny Zarraga.

RULING: The petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 22289 which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, is SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.

REASONING: The petition is meritorious.

Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years of age and
under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony. The law
applies even if such minor is charged with a crime defined and penalized by a special
penal law. In such case, it is the burden of the minor to prove his age in order for
him to be exempt from criminal liability. The reason for the exemption is that a
minor of such age is presumed lacking the mental element of a crime – the capacity
to know what is wrong as distinguished from what is right or to determine the
morality of human acts; wrong in the sense in which the term is used in moral wrong.

Robert Remiendo vs. People of the Philippines

GR 184874 (October 9, 2009)

Facts:

Petitioner, Robert Remiendo was a minor whose age is above 15

but below 18 years old when he raped a minor when the latter was
left alone in her house on or about the month of March 1997 and in
his house for the second time on or about the month of May 1997.
This case arose from the filing of two criminal informations, both
dated March 10, 2008 against the petitioner.
In violating the minor, he threatened to kick the latter if she
would shout for help and on the second time of sex congress,
threatened to kill her if she tells anyone. Petitioner was convicted of
rape but on appeal invoked a suspension of sentence pursuant to
R.A. 9344. But by the time he was convicted by the trial court and
before the case was elevated to the CA, he was already 22 years old.

Issues:

Whether petitioner is exempt from criminal liability. Whether

petitioner is entitled to a suspension of sentence under Sec. 38 and
40 of R.A. 9344?

Held:

No. Since his age is above 15 and below 18, the finding
of discernment is necessary to determine if he would be exempted
from criminal liability. In this case, his act of waiting for the victim‘s
parents to leave the house before defiling the latter and threatening
to kick her if she should shout prove that petitioner can differentiate
what is right and wrong.
Furthermore, Sec. 38 and 40, suspension of sentence, can no
longer be availed since by the time his sentence was imposed by the
trial court, he was already 22 years old. Sec 40provides that ―If the
child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age
while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether
to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution
of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain period
or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

U.S VS MARALIT
G.R NO. L - 11979 JANUARY 25, 1917 .
FACTS:

Maximo Maralit was convicted of homicide and sentenced to five (5) years
of prision correccional; to the accessories provided by law in stabbing Florentino
Luistro with a knife and cause his death. The accused was less than 15 years of age
at the time the crime was committed. The deceased was less than 16 years old.
Appellant strenuously contends that he should be acquitted on the ground of
discernment, that is, with a full understanding of the nature and consequences of
his act.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused in committing the act complained of acted with
discernment.
HELD:

The trial court taking into consideration all of the facts and circumstance
presented by the records, together with the appearance of the accused as he stood
and testified in court, drew the conclusion that he was of sufficient intelligence and
was sufficiently endowed with judgments to know that the act which he committed
was wrong and that it was likely to produce death. In pursuance of that conclusion
the court made the finding that the accused in committing the act complained of
acted with discernment.

However, that the penalty imposed is not correct. Article 85 of the Penal
Codes provides that:
In the case of minor of less that fifteen and over nine years of age, who is
found by the court to have acted with discernment, and, therefore, not being
exempt from criminal liability, a discretional penalty shall be imposed, provided
that the same shall always be less by two degrees, at least, than that prescribed by
the law for the offence committed.

Following the provisions of this article the penalty imposed should have been
two (2) years of prision correccional instead of five years. As so modified, the
judgment is affirmed.
LLAVE VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 166040, April 26, 2006

FACTS:

On September 24, 2002, Debbielyn, 7 years old accused Neil Llave, 12 years
old of raping her in a vacant house near their place. Debbielyn is a grade 2 pupil at
Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City, attending class from 12noon to
6pm. Her mother sells quail eggs at a nearby church and her father is a jeepney
driver. Neil on the other hand is an outstanding grade school student and even
received award and finished a special course in computer.

Teofisto, a witness, testified that when he came out of their house and heard
a girl crying. He rushed to the place and saw petitioner on top of Debbielyn, naked
from the waist down. Teofisto shouted at petitioner, and the latter fled from the
scene. Teofisto told Debbielyn to inform her parents about what happened. She
told her father about the incident. Her parents later reported what happened to
the police authorities.

The RTC finds the CICL [Child in Conflict with the Law] Niel Llave guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, and crediting him with the special mitigating
circumstance of minority, the Court sentences him to prision mayor minimum, Six
(6) years and One (1) day to Eight (8) years, and pay civil indemnity of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00). CA affirmed the RTC’s decision but with
modification, CA ordered Llave to pay P50, 000.00 as moral damages and P20,
000.00 as exemplary damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused Neil Llave acted with discernment in raping the
victim.

HELD:
 Yes. The trial court correctly ruled that the petitioner acted with discernment
when he had carnal knowledge of the offended party; hence, the CA cannot be
faulted for affirming the trial courts ruling.

Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person over
nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted
with discernment. The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is
complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an
essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power
necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an
illicit act. On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the
accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or
deportment not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after
and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the
minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes
the gruesome nature of the crime and the minors cunning and shrewdness.

In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged the
resisting victim behind the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure
that passersby would not be able to discover his dastardly acts. When he was
discovered by Teofisto Bucud who shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled from
the scene to escape arrest. Upon the prodding of his father and her mother, he hid
in his grandmothers house to avoid being arrested by policemen and remained
thereat until barangay tanods arrived and took him into custody.

The petitioner also testified that he had been an outstanding grade school
student and even received awards. While in Grade I, he was the best in his class in
his academic subjects. He represented his class in a quiz bee contest. At his the age
of 12, he finished a computer course.

However, Article 12 Paragraph 2 & 3 of Revised Penal Code has been

amended by Sec. 6 of RA 9344. It states that a child fifteen (15) years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability unless he/she acted with discernment.

Valcesar Estioca vs. People

GR 173876 (June 27, 2008)
Nazario., J.

Facts:
A number of persons were accused of conspiring and robbing an
elementary school. One of which is Boniao who was 14 years old at the time
of the commission of the crime. On 28 July 2001 (Saturday), at about 8:00 in
the morning, Nico, then eleven years old and a Grade VI student of Ozamiz
City Central School (OCCS), and his cousin, Mark Alforque (Mark), went to
the OCCS and cleaned the classroom of a teacher named Mrs. Myrna
Pactolin (Mrs. Pactolin). Nico saw petitioner and Bacus enter the OCCS’s
premises by climbing over the OCCS’s gate. Petitioner and Bacus then
proceeded to the classroom of another teacher, Mrs. Panal, which was
located near the OCCS’s canal. Thereupon, petitioner and Bacus destroyed
the padlock of the classroom’s door using an iron bar and entered therein.
Subsequently, petitioner and Bacus walked out of the classroom carrying a
television, a karaoke and an electric fan, and thereafter brought them to the
school gate. They went over the gate with the items and handed them over
to Boniao and Handoc who were positioned just outside the OCCS’s gate.
The items were placed inside a tricycle. After petitioner, Bacus and Boniao
boarded the tricycle, Handoc drove the same and they sped away. They were
found guilty by the lower court. When the case was appealed to the CA, RA
9344 took effect and Boniao was acquitted since he was a minor at the time
of the crime but without prejudice to his civil liability. Custody was given to
his parents.
ISSUE:
Whether RA 9344 can retroact to Boniao’s case.

HELD:
Yes, the reckoning point in considering minority is the time of the
commission of the crime. In this case Boniao is 14 years old hence exempted
from criminal liability without prejudice to his civil liability. Art 22 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws may be given retroactive effect
if they are in favor of the accused.

SIERRA vs PEOPLE
GR No. 182941
July 3, 2009

Submitted by: Arlene Costan

FACTS:
In August 2000, thirteen-year-old AAA was playing with her friend BBB
in the second floor of her famil’ys house in Palatiw, Pasig. The petitioner
arrived holding a knife and told AAA and BBB that he wanted to play with
them. The petitioner then undressed BBB and had sexual intercourse with
her. Afterwards, he turned to AAA, undressed her, and also had sexual
intercourse with her by inserting his male organ into hers. The petitioner
warned AAA not to tell anybody of what they did.
AAA subsequently disclosed the incident to Elena Gallano (her
teacher) and to Dolores Mangantula (the parent of a classmate), who both
accompanied AAA to the barangay office. AAA was later subjected to
physical examination that revealed a laceration on her hymen consistent with
her claim of sexual abuse. On the basis of the complaint and the physical
findings, the petitioner was charged with rape.
Petitioner Robert C. Sierra was only 15 years old when he raped the minors.
RTC RULING:
He was convicted of rape and was imposed a penalty of imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua and a fine.
CA RULING:
He elevated the case to CA and during the pendence of
the case, RA 9344 took effect. CA affirmed the conviction and denied
the defense of minority since it was not clearly established and proved
by the defense that Robert was 15 years old or below at the time of the
commission of the crime. Thus, it was only alleged in the testimonial of the
petitioner and his mother. Neither is the suspension of sentence available
to Robert.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sierra shall be exempt from the crime charged in lieu
of the enactment of RA 9244 during the pendency of the case.

HELD:
The duty to establish the age of the accused is not on the prosecution
but on the accused. Age can be established by birth certificate. Sec. 7
provides that in the absence of such document, age may be based from the
information of the child, testimonies of other persons, physical appearance
and other relevant evidence. Also in case of doubt, minority should be in
favor of the child. In the case at bar, minority was established by the
testimonies of the petitioner and his mother. This was not objected by the
prosecution and did not even presented contrary evidence. Thus,
minority is established.
 Moreover, the law should be given retroactive application since
this favors the accused as provided for in the Revised Penal Code – penal
laws favoring accused should be given retroactive effect. Hence the accused
is considered a minor with an age of not above 15 years old. Therefore, The
case is dismissed and the petitioner is referred to the appropriate local social

ORTEGA vs PEOPLE
GR No. 151085 August 20, 2008
Nachura.J

Submitted by: Maria Anny Yanong

FACTS:

The petitioner, Joemar Ortega, who was then 14 years old, was
charged with the crime of rape for allegedly raping AAA, who was about 8
years old. That the rape happened in 3occasions, the first one happened
sometime August 1999, when AAA’s mother left her in the care of the
petitioner’s mother, Luzviminda. That the petitioner woke up AAA and led her
in the sala and raped her. The second occasion happened the next day when
the petitioner led AAA into the bathroom and raped her there. In all the
instances, petitioner warned AAA to not tell her parents or he will spank her.
The third and last time happened in the house of AAA, where her brother
caught her and the petitioner naked waist down and having intercourse. The
brother then told the incident to his mother. MMM testified that when she
asked AAA what happened,AAA told her that petitioner inserted his fingers
and penis into her vagina. And when MMM examined the private part of her
daughter, she noticed that it was reddish and white fluid was coming out of
it. MMM called Luzviminda and confronted her about what happened.
Luzviminda then demanded that AAA should be brought to a doctor for
examination. The Rural HealthOfficer, however, did not find any indication
that AAA was molested. Subsequently, the two families reached an
amicable settlement that requires the petitioner to depart from their house
and stay with a certain priest. However, a year later, the family of AAA
charged the petitioner with 3 counts of rape, in which the petitioner plead not
guilty. The RTC ruled that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
in the crime of rape and is sentenced to reclusion temporal. The CA affirmed
the ruling of the trial court. During the pendency of the case in the SC, RA
9344 Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act was enacted that establishes a
comprehensive system to manage children in conflict with the law. At the
case at bar, because the petitioner was a minor under 15 years of age at the
commission of the crime,he can be relieved from criminal liability.

RTC RULING:
The RTC ruled that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt in
the crime of rape and is sentenced to reclusion temporal.

CA RULING:
The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court. During the pendency of the
case in the SC, RA 9344 Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act was enacted that
establishes a comprehensive system to manage children in conflict with the
law. At the case at bar, because the petitioner was a minor under 15 years
of age at the commission of the crime,he can be relieved from criminal
liability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can avail exempting circumstance

provided by the newly enacted law on minors in conflict with law.

HELD:
Yes, the petitioner can avail the exempting circumstance that will
relieve him from criminal liability because the law enacted was favorable to
the accused, and is therefore retroactive in application. The RA 9344 or the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act provides that a child under 15 years of age
in the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability, but is
subject to an intervention program. Exemption from criminal liability,
however, does not include exemption from civil liability. Section 64 of
the newly enacted law also provides that cases of children under 15 years of
age at the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the
child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officer.

Therefore, the case against Joemar Ortega is hereby DISMISSED.

Petitioner is hereby referred to the local social welfare and development
officer of the locality appropriate intervention program.

Amployo vs. People

G.R No. 157718, April 26, 2005
Facts:

Around seven (7) o’clock in the morning, the day before June 27, 1997 which
is her eight (8) birthday, Kristine Joy Mosquera, a grade III student, was
walking to school when she met by petitioner Alvin Amployo y Ebalada a.k.a.
Tikboy who was her neighbour. The Petitioner emerged from hiding a nearby
store and approached Kristine Joy, touched her head, placed his hand on
her shoulder then moved down and touch her breast several times.
Petitioner told Kristine Joy not to report to anybody what he did to her. This
was not the first time that the incident happened as petitioner had done this
several times in the past, even when Kristine Joy was still in Grade II.
However, it was only during the last incident that Kristine Joy finally told her
grandmother, who immediately talked to Gnelida Mosquera, Kristine Joy's
mother. Mrs. Mosquera conferred with Kristine Joy who narrated that the
petitioner would sometimes even insert his hand under her shirt to caress
her breast. Thereafter they reported the matter to thebarangay and the case
was referred to the DSWD then to the Police Department of Subic,
Zambales. According to the psychologist, Lucrecia Cruz, who reported that
Kristine Joy was a victim of sexual abuse and was showing unusual
behaviour as a result and feelings of insecurity, anger, anxiety and
depression. Guilt feelings were also noted. All in all, Kristine Joy appeared
on the surface to be a child with normal behaviour despite the experience,
but on a deeper level, she developed a fear of going to school as petitioner
might again be hiding in the store waiting for her.

On September22, 1999, the trial court finds the accused Alvin Amployo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Child Abuse defined under Section
5 of Republic Act 7610 and hereby sentenced him to Reclusion Temporal in
its medium period or fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
to seventeen (17) years and to pay the costs.

The Petitioner questioned the sufficiency of the evidence adduced to prove

acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
and contended that even assuming that the acts imputed to him amount to
lascivious conduct, the resultant crime is only acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC and not child abuse under Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 7610

The Court of Appeals, affirmed the decision of the trial court by dismissing
petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. The motion for reconsideration is denied.
However, the penalty is modified such that accused-appellant is sentenced
to imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.

Issue:
Whether or not the alleged act of the petitioner constitutes acts of
lasciviousness as penalized under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No.
7610

Rulings:

Yes. According to Republic Act No. 7610, Article III, Section 5 defined:
Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. The penalty of
reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed to those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse. Provided, that when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended in the Revised Penal Code, for
rape or lascivious conduct. In the case at bar, Kristine Joy, eight (8) years
old, intimidated by her neighbour, a full grown adult male, who constantly
accosted her while she was alone and on her way to school and who
consistently ordered her not to report what he had
been doing to her. Kristine Joy was cowed into silence and submission and
was traumatized in the process as reflected in the psychological report made
by psychologist, Lucrecia Cruz. It was noted that no award for moral
damages was made by both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals despite
the fact that the mental anguish suffered by Kristine Joy. Therefore, the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals modifying the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 72, finding accused-petitioner Alvin
Amployo y Ebalada alias “Tikboy” guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Republic Act No. 7610, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15)
years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as
maximum is affirmed with the modification that petitioner is ordered to pay a
fine of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) and moral damages in the
amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). No cost
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FEDERICO GENITA, JR. y CULTURA.
[G.R. No. 126171. March 11, 2004].

FACTS OF THE CASE:

On December 17, 1991, at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, while the
victims Reynaldo Timbal and Jesus Bascon were loading firewood in a truck
in Barangay Bugsukan, Butuan City, appellant who was drunk and armed
with an M-14 rifle, asked Reynaldo for a Christmas gift. Reynaldo told him to
just come back because they were still loading firewood. Appellant left the
place. Not long after, he returned and fired his gun at Jesus feet, hitting his
left leg. He immediately jumped into the truck. Appellant then went near its
bumper and fired at the tire near the chassis. Then he changed the magazine
of his gun and fired again at Jesus, this time, hitting his right leg. Reynaldo
ran away, his right hand covering his head. Appellant chased him and fired
at him, hitting his nape and right hand. After the commotion, the victims co-
workers who were able to take refuge from the cascade of bullets returned
to the scene and found the dead body of Reynaldo. Jesus was immediately
brought to the Butuan City General Hospital but died thereafter.[3]
Appellant, relying on the exempting circumstance of accident as his
defense, presented a different version. He testified that he was a member of
the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) stationed at
Bugsukan, Butuan City, hence, he was officially issued an M-14 rifle. On the
evening of December 17, 1991, while on his way to his camp, he saw a truck
parked at the right side of the road with its rear lights on. While approaching
the vehicle, somebody grasped his neck. As a consequence, he accidentally
pulled the trigger of the M-14 rifle slung on his shoulder. The weapon
automatically fired. At this instance, his assailant set him free. Immediately
he rushed to the camp and reported the incident to Sgt. Montealto who
placed the camp on alert. Appellant stayed in the camp during the entire
evening. The following morning, he learned that two persons were killed.[6]
Appellant contends that he was performing a lawful act with due care when
the victims were killed. He was then on his way to the CAFGU station to
report for duty. He had no intention to kill the victims. He accidentally pulled
the trigger of the rifle and the bullets hit the victims. Thus, he should have
been exempted from any criminal liability. Even assuming that he is liable for
the death of the victims, he contends that the trial court erred in appreciating
the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is an exculpatory weight to the exempting

circumstance of accident interposed by the accused-appellant?

HELD:
NO. The number of gunshot wounds inflicted on the victims is considered,
the shooting could not have been an accident. Nonetheless, the Solicitor
General agrees with appellant that the qualifying circumstance of treachery
was not sufficiently proven, stressing that the latter was drunk when he
approached Reynaldo. Appellant’s version that he accidentally shot the two
victims is incredible. Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12
of the Revised Penal Code. It must be stressed that in raising this defense,
appellant has the burden of the evidence and it was incumbent upon him to
establish that he was exempt from criminal liability. He must show with clear
and convincing proofs that: 1) He was performing a lawful act with due
care, 2) The injury caused was by a mere accident, and 3) he had no fault or
intention of causing the injury. Considering appellants evidence, it is clear
that the requisites of accident as an exempting circumstance were not
proven. Appellants manner of carrying his M-14 rifle negates his claim of due
care in the performance of an act, number of wounds sustained by the
victims shows that the shooting was not merely accidental and appellant
manifested an unmistakable intent to kill the victims when he reloaded his
rifle after his first unsuccessful attempt to kill them. In the instant case, it
appears from the record that the attack was not so swift so as to render the
victims off guarded. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, appellant could
not have managed to stealthily approach and suddenly fire at the
victims. Therefore the means in executing the crime cannot be considered
deliberate. Besides, Jesus had the chance to jump into the truck after he was
hit at the left leg. Reynaldo, on the other hand, was able to run away and
take cover, though unsuccessful. As a matter of fact, the other laborers who
were with the victims managed to evade the volley of bullets. It cannot be
said, therefore, that the victims were unprepared to put up a defense. The
Decision of the trial court is MODIFIED in the sense that appellant is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two crimes of homicide. He is
sentenced to suffer (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum, for each crime of homicide.

People of the Philippines Vs. MIGUEL M. MORENO

G.R. No. L-64; October 28, 1946

FACTS:
Mr. Miguel M. Moreno was at the outbreak of war a prisoner serving
sentenced in San Penal Colony Farm situated in Zamboanga City. He was
released, hired to be the Captain of SEMI Military Organization known,
KAIGUN JEUTAY, a Filipino and sponsored Japanese navy.
November 23, 1944 defendant’s soldier, when to the house of Mr.
Paciano Delos Santos and took their two single daughter.
December 1 1944 during the meeting set by the Assistant
Superintendent of the institution, the defendant serves words for prison
official the he is not afraid to cut anybody’s head.
December 2, 1944 Mr. Paciano de los Santos was taken in Fishery
Division of the colony while both arms tied at the back, ordered to kneel
down with head bend forward and cut his head.
On this matter, while seen by the witnesses, he allegedly denies the
prosecution, mentioned in courts that,” When I arrived at the place the
deceased, Mr. Ponciano de los Santos was already in place where I was
execute him, and was taken by four Japanese and several guards of San
Ramon.
Based on the proceedings, Mr. Miguel M. Moreno shown, he made it
by own incredible, contradictory and unsupported testimony relating ordered
by Japanese naval officer to kill deceased, testified by Mr. Gregorio Magalit
stated no words, written received from Major Sasaki. As figured, He
expressingly informed all to witness the event, killing Mr. Paciano de los
Santos, in front of humane, for them to know that this event made is against
the will of Mr. Miguel Moreno, for so by orders of Japanese Soldiers head
officer. As insisted for not doing so, Captain Susuki told me: That’s an order,
you have to comply with the orders.

ISSUE:
W/N Moreno be charge for Murder without proper prosecution, under
Article 3 section 1 subsection 15 and 17?

RULING:
Upon the said execution, precede by the Court, the accused Mr.
Moreno held in court without the presence of the said lawyer given the
institution to set the accused, as mentioned by Judge to let somebody be at
the accused, In the presence of Atty Villaflor, AttyJaime O’Hara, Timoteo
delos Santos, waive their rights in Court.
As mentioned the accused should be given what is right to execute as
due process of law. Under Article 3 Section 1, sub.15 and 17 Stated:
(15) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.
(17) In all criminal prosecution the accused shall be presumed to be
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf.

That there was no such order, oral or written, is clearly shown by the
defendant's own incredible, contradictory and unsupported testimony
relating to his having been ordered by the Japanese naval officer to kill the
decease.
There was no such evidence to prove for the crime committed by the
accused.
People of the Philippines v. Charlie Fieldad, Ryan Cornista and Edgar
Pimentel
G.R. No. 196005, October 1, 2014
Carpio, Acting C.J.:FACTS:
Accused-appellants Charlie Fieldad, Ryan Cornista, and Edgar Pimentel are
detention prisoners who are charged with the murder of two jail guards and
for carnapping. The RTC and the CA found petitioners guilty of the crimes
charged.
Records show that Julius Chan went to the nipa hut to ask JO2 Gamboa
regarding the time of his hearing scheduled for that day. JO2 Niturada
answered the telephone in the administration building and upon returning,
he saw Chan place an arm on the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa, who was seated,
and Chan shot the latter with a short firearm.

Meanwhile, Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the
possession of an Armalite. Cornista struck JO1 Bacolor at the back of the
head, which caused the latter to fall down. Fieldad, armed with JO2 Gamboa’s
gun, shot JO1 Bacolor twice. Florante Leal took the Armalite from JO1 Bacolor
and shot at JO2 Niturada. JO2 Niturada returned fire with his .38 caliber
handgun.

Once outside the jail compound, Fieldad, Leal, Cornista, and Pimentel
boarded a parked Tamaraw jeep belonging to Benjamin Bauzon, without the
latter’s knowledge and consent. They picked up Federico Delim (Delim) and
Chan along the way. The group then transferred to a Mazda pick-up truck.
Eventually, they abandoned the vehicle and ran towards a cane field where
they were arrested.

Appellants deny any criminal liability. Anent the crime of carnapping, they
allege that they were under the influence of uncontrollable fear from Leal,
who forced them to take the Tamaraw jeep to facilitate his flight from jail.
With regards to the crime of murder, accused-appellants allege that the
prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that
there can be no treachery in the case since the jail guards were all issued with
firearms to protect themselves from danger.

ISSUE:
Are the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
and carnapping?

HELD:
YES, the guilt of the petitioners is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant argued that there can be no treachery since “the jail guards were
all issued with firearms to protect themselves from danger and to maintain
peace and order within the compound.” This argument is untenable.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might take.

In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail officers were not afforded
any chance of defending themselves. Without warning, Fieldad and his
cohorts disabled the defenses of the jail officers. Chan held the shoulder of
JO2 Gamboa as he shot the latter. Meanwhile, Fieldad teamed-up with
Cornista to divest JO1 Bacolor of his Armalite, and to knock him down. Then
Fieldad took JO2 Gamboa’s gun and shot JO1 Bacolor. Hence, there is
treachery.

Anent the crime of carnapping, the prosecution likewise proved all the
elements of the offense in this case. The elements of the crime of carnapping
are that: (1) there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) the offender intends
to gain from the taking of the vehicle; (3) the vehicle belongs to a person
other than the offender himself; and (4) the taking is without the consent of
the owner thereof, or it was committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.

All the elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both appellants
admitted that they boarded the Tamaraw jeep and drove away in it. The
owner of the vehicle, Benjamin Bauzon, testified that he did not consent to
the taking of his vehicle by appellants.

The defense of uncontrollable fear is likewise untenable. A person invoking

uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such that it reduced
him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as
well. It is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat.

In this case, appellants had ample opportunity to escape. In the first place,
Leal was already armed when Fieldad voluntarily followed him to the place
where the Tamaraw jeep was parked. The vehicle stopped three times: to
board Delim; to board Chan; and when they stopped to transfer vehicles. The
circumstances under which appellants participated in the commission of the
carnapping would not justify in any way their claim that they acted under an
uncontrollable fear of being killed by their fellow carnapper. Rather, the
circumstances establish the fact that appellants, in their flight from jail,
consciously concurred with the other malefactors to take the Tamaraw jeep
without the consent of its owner.

Hence, with all the foregoing, the accused-appellants are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and of carnapping.