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DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
1. M. HASSAN - 214
2. OSOP KIRAM - 17
3. N. HASSAN - 78
4. ANGNI ESRA - 1
5. IBRAHIM ALAWI - 0
a) The voting which started at 10:00 A.M. was forcibly ended at around 2:00
p.m. because of exchanges of rapid gunfiring and grenade launching between
unknown elements and the Army or PNP soldiers;
b) The voting was moved to Liangan Elementary (Arabic) School, located
about 15 kilometers away from the respective polling places;
d) Only 328 out of the 1,645 registered voters of said 5 precincts were able to vote
constituting only about 21.1%[2] and disenfranchising 78% of the registered voters
thereof; and
e) The regular members of the BEI did not report for duty and were substituted by
military personnel.[3]
In several cases,[5] the Court has ruled that the pre-conditions for
declaring a failure of election are: (1) that no voting has been held in
any precinct or precincts because of force majeure, violence or
terrorism, and (2) that the votes not cast therein suffice to affect the
results of the elections. The concurrence of these two (2) circumstances
are required to justify the calling of a special election.
Mindful of these two (2) requirements, we rule in favor of the
petitioner.
The COMELEC explained that:
Jurisprudence holds that terrorism may not as a rule be invoked to declare a failure of
elections and to disenfranchise the greater number of the electorate through the misdeeds
of only a relative few. Otherwise elections will never be carried out with the resultant
disenfranchisement of the innocent voters, for the losers will always cry fraud and
terrorism. It has been ruled that annulment of election results and consequent
disenfranchisement of voters is a very stringent one. The power to annul an election
should be exercised with the greatest care and circumspection and only in extreme cases
and under circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt and to the fullest degree of
fundamental and wanton disregard of the law. (Grand Alliance for Democracy
[GAD] vs. Comelec, 150 SCRA 665; Reyes vs.Mamba, HRET Case No. 92-022,
September 14, 1994).[6]
While we are aware of the aforesaid rule, the COMELEC can not
turn a blind eye to the fact that terrorism was so prevalent in the area,
sufficient enough to declare that no voting actually occurred on May 29,
1995 in the areas concerned.
It must be recalled that elections had to be set for the third time
because no members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) reported
for duty due to impending threats of violence in the area. This then
prompted COMELEC to deploy military men to act as substitute
members just so elections could be held; and to thwart these threats of
violence, the COMELEC Team, moreover, decided to transfer the
polling places to Liangan Elementary School which was 15 kilometers
away from the polling place. Nonetheless, voting on May 29 had to be
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting
because of threats of violence, grenade launching and gunfires. The
Memorandum and Offer of Evidence submitted by the petitioner are
quite revealing, among which are the following:
(3) EXH. C Minutes of Voting for Pct. 9, showing that 59 of the 418 registered
voters voted; voting started at 11:40 a.m. and ended at 2:25 p.m.; only 58 valid
ballots were found inside the ballot box; and the reported violence and
terrorism, which reads:
xxx
(8) EXH. H Joint Affidavit of Hassans watchers, dated June 11, 1995,
corroborating that:
That to our evaluation at the closing of the voting at 2:00 p.m. only more or less 20
percent of the registered voters in each of the five precincts have casted their votes;.[7]
x x x. Viewed from ordinary human experience and the election culture obtaining in the
locality, there can be no doubt that, the date on which special elections were to be held
after one that previously failed, was high in the agenda of concerns and interests of the
constituents involved. In Sabeniano, et al. vs. Comelec, 101 SCRA 289, 301 and
Quilala vs. Comelec, 188 SCRA 502, the Supreme Court, referring to election processes
and incidents as matters directly affecting the political fortunes of a candidate, held that it
is a matter of judicial notice that the candidates, their representatives and watchers station
or deploy themselves among the various voting and canvassing centers to watch the
proceedings from the first hour of voting until the completion of the canvassing. In
instant case, the May 27 special elections failed and were reset for May 29, 1995.
Petitioner Hassan cannot claim that the later notice was not good enough for him. He was
aware and ready for the May 27 special elections. He was just as alert and prepared for
the May 29 special elections as these are matters directly affecting his political fortunes.[8]
In fixing the date of the special election, the COMELEC should see to it that:
(1) it should be not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of the
postponement or suspension of the election or the failure to elect, and (2) it
should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended, or
which resulted in failure to elect. The first involves questions of fact. The
second must be determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances of a case.
SO ORDERED.