[G.R. No.
158620 October 11, 2006] indispensable in establishing the presence of the cause or
DEL MONTE PHILIPPINES, INC. and WARFREDO C. BALANDRA,
vs. Petitioners, MARIANO SALDIVAR, NENA TIMBAL,
VIRGINIO VICERA, ALFREDO AMONCIO and NAZARIO S.
COLASTE, Respondents.
FACTS
The Associated Labor Union (ALU) is the exclusive bargaining
agent of plantation workers of petitioner Del Monte
Philippines, Inc. (Del Monte) in Bukidnon where respondent is
an employee and a member of the said union. Timbal was
charged by ALU for disloyalty to the union, particularly for
encouraging defections to a rival union.
Timbal filed an Answer before the Disloyalty Board, denying
the allegations in the complaint and the averments in Artajo’s
Affidavit. Nevertheless, the ALU Disloyalty Board concluded
that Timbal was guilty of acts or conduct inimical to the
interests of ALU. It found that the acts imputed to Timbal were
partisan activities, prohibited since the “freedom period” had
not yet commenced as of that time. Thus, the Disloyalty Board
recommended the expulsion of Timbal from membership in
ALU, and likewise her dismissal from Del Monte in accordance
with the Union Security Clause in the existing CBA between
ALU and Del Monte. The Disloyalty Board also reached the
same conclusions as to the co-employees, expressed in
separate resolutions also recommending their expulsion from
ALU. Del Monte, then, terminated Timbal noting that the
termination was upon demand of ALU pursuant to Sections 4
and 5 of Article III of the current Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
Timbal filed a complaint against Del Monte and ALU with the
NLRC-RAB for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and
damages.
ISSUE
Whether or not there is a sufficient cause for the dismissal of
a rank-and-file employee through the enforcement of a
Collective Bargaining Agreement between the employer and
the union.
HELD
The SC held that even if the dismissal of an employee is
conditioned not on the grounds for termination under the
Labor Code, but pursuant to the provisions of a CBA, it still is
necessary to observe substantive due process in order to
validate the dismissal. As applied to the Labor Code,
adherence to substantive due process is a requisite for a valid
determination that just or authorized causes existed to justify
the dismissal. As applied to the dismissals grounded on
violations of the CBA, observance of substantial due process is
causes for dismissal as provided for in the CBA.
Substantive due process, as it applies to all forms of dismissals,
encompasses the proper presentation and appreciation of
evidence to establish that cause under law exists for the
dismissal of an employee. This holds true even if the dismissal
is predicated on particular causes for dismissal established not
by the Labor Code, but by the CBA. Further, in order that any
CBA-mandated dismissal may receive the warrant of the courts
and labor tribunals, the causes for dismissal as provided for in
the CBA must satisfy to the evidentiary threshold of the NLRC
and the courts.
It is necessary to emphasize these principles since the
immutable truth under our constitutional and labor laws is that
no employee can be dismissed without cause. The Agabon case
may have tempered the procedural due process requirements
if just cause for dismissal existed, but in no way did it eliminate
the existence of a legally prescribed cause as a requisite for any
dismissal. The fact that a CBA may provide for additional
grounds for dismissal other than those established under the
Labor Code does not detract from the necessity to duly
establish the existence of such grounds before the dismissal
may be validated. And even if the employer or, in this case, the
collective bargaining agent, is satisfied that cause has been
established to warrant the dismissal, such satisfaction will be
of no consequence if, upon legal challenge, they are unable to
establish before the NLRC or the courts the presence of such
causes.
The Court sees the danger to jurisprudence and the rights of
workers in acceding to Del Monte’s position. The dismissal for
cause of employees must be justified by substantial evidence,
as appreciated by an impartial trier of facts.
The Disloyalty Board may have appreciated Piquero’s
testimony in its own finding that Timbal was guilty, yet the said
board cannot be considered as a wholly neutral or
dispassionate tribunal since it was constituted by the very
organization that stood as the offended party in the disloyalty
charge. Without impugning the integrity of ALU and the
mechanisms it has employed for the internal discipline of its
members, we nonetheless hold that in order that the dismissal
of an employee may be validated by this Court, it is necessary
that the grounds for dismissal are justified by substantial
evidence as duly appreciated by an impartial trier of facts. The
existence of Piquero’s testimony was appreciated only by the
Disloyalty Board, but not by any of the impartial tribunals
which heard Timbal’s case. The appreciation of such testimony
by the Disloyalty Board without any similar affirmation or
concurrence by the NLRC-RAB, the NLRC, or the Court of
Appeals, cannot satisfy the substantive due process
requirement as a means of upholding Timbal’s dismissal.
All told, The SC sees no error on the part of the Court of
Appeals when it held that Timbal was illegally dismissed.
Petition is denied.
CASE DIGEST: ALBERT TENG, doing business under the firm
name ALBERT TENG FISH TRADING, and EMILIA TENG-CHUA
v. ALFREDO S. PAHAGAC,EDDIE D. NIPA,ORLANDOP. LAYESE,
HERNAN Y. BADILLES and ROGER S. PAHAGAC. (G.R. No.
169704; November 17, 2010)
FACTS: Albert Teng (Petitioner) is engaged in the business of
deep sea fishing, and he employs master fishermen to facilitate
his fishing venture. These master fishermen hire the
Respondent workers as checkers of the volume of the fish
caught in every voyage. Respondents filed a complaint of
illegal dismissalthey averred that there was no employment
contract, and sometime around Sept. 2002, Teng doubted the
amounts that they were telling him regarding how much fish
were caught. By December, Teng told them their services were
terminated.
The VA dismissed the complaint because there was no
employer-employee relationship. Respondents received the
decision on June 12, 2003; They filed an MR which was denied
and they received the order on July 8, 2003. The Voluntary
Arbitrator reasoned that the Procedural Guidelines in the
Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings (1989
Procedural Guidelines) does not provide the remedy of a
motion for reconsideration to the party adversely affected by
the VAs order or decision.
Respondents appealed to the CA, which ordered Petitioner to
pay backwages and other monetary benefits. After denial of
the MR,Teng files the case before the Supreme Court
ISSUES: Is the VA's decision not subject to a motion for
reconsideration?
Is there an employer-employee relationship?
HELD: Article 262-A deleted the word"unappealable"from
Article 263. The deliberate selection of the language in the
amendatory act differing from that of the original act indicates
that the legislature intended a change in the law, and the court
should endeavor to give effect to such intent. Presumably, the
decision may still be reconsidered by the Voluntary Arbitrator
on the basis of a motion for reconsideration duly filed during
that period. The seasonable filing of a motion for
reconsideration is a mandatory requirement to forestall the
finality of such decision.
The requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted is
based on the doctrine that in providing for a remedy before an
administrative agency, every opportunity must be given to the
agency to resolve the matter and to exhaust all opportunities
for a resolution under the given remedy before bringing an
action in, or resorting to, the courts of justice.
While Teng alleged that it was the maestros who hired the
respondent workers, it was his company that issued to the
respondent workers identification cards (IDs) bearing their
names as employees and Tengs signature as the employer.
Generally, in a business establishment, IDs are issued to
identify the holder as a bona fide employee of the issuing
entity. For the 13 years that the respondent workers worked
for Teng, they received wages on a regular basis, in addition to
their shares in the fish caught.
The element of controlis present in this case. Teng not only
owned the tools and equipment, he directed how the
respondent workers were to perform their job as checkers;
they, in fact, acted as Tengs eyes and ears in every fishing
expedition.
The dismissal of an employee, which the employer must
validate, has a twofold requirement:one is substantive, the
other is procedural.Not only must the dismissal be for a just or
an authorized cause, as provided by law; the rudimentary
requirements of due process the opportunity to be heard and
to defend oneself must be observed as well. The employer has
the burden of proving that the dismissal was for a just cause;
failure to show this, as in the present case, would necessarily
mean that the dismissal was unjustified and, therefore,
illegal. DENIED.
Goya Inc vs Goya Inc Employees
FACTS:
Goya, Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the manufactur
e, importation, and wholesale of top quality food products, hi
red contractual employees from PESO Resources Developmen
t Corporation (PESO) to perform temporary and occasional se
rvices in its factory in Parang, Marikina City. This prompted re
spondent Goya, Inc. Employees Union–
FFW (Union) to request for a grievance conference on the gro
und that the contractual workers do not belong to the catego
ries of employees stipulated in the existing CBA. When the m
atter remained unresolved, the grievance was referred to the
NCMB for voluntary arbitration. They agreed to submit for res
olution the solitary issue of “whether or not the Company is g
uilty of unfair labor acts in engaging the services of PESO, a th
ird party service provider, under the existing CBA, laws, and ju
risprudence.”
VA dismissed the Union’s charge of ULP for being purely spec
ulative and for lacking in factual basis, but the Company was
directed to observe and comply with its commitment under t
he CBA. The Company immediately filed a petition for review
before the Court of Appeals (CA) under Rule 43 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside the directive to observe
and comply with the CBA commitment pertaining to the hirin
g of casual employees when necessitated by business circums
tances. Professing that such order was not covered by the sol
e issue submitted for voluntary arbitration,
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Voluntary Arbitrator can decide questions
not covered by Submission Agreement.
RULING:
Yes. First, the said ruling of the VA is interrelated and intertwi
ned with the sole issue to be resolved that is, “Whether or no
t the Company is guilty of unfair labor practice in engaging th
e services of PESO, a third party service provider, under existi
ng CBA, laws, and jurisprudence.” Both issues concern the en
gagement of PESO by the Company which is perceived as a vi
olation of the CBA and which constitutes as unfair labor practi
ce on the part of the Company.
In general, the arbitrator is expected to decide those question
s expressly stated and limited in the submission agreement. H
owever, since arbitration is the final resort for the adjudicatio
n of disputes, the arbitrator can assume that he has the powe
r to make a final settlement. Thus, assuming that the submissi
on empowers the arbitrator to decide whether an employee
was discharged for just cause, the arbitrator in this instance c
an reasonably assume that his powers extended beyond givin
g a yes-or-
no answer and included the power to reinstate him with or wi
thout back pay. Law and jurisprudence give the voluntary arbi
trator enough leeway of authority as well as adequate prerog
ative to accomplish the reason for which the law on voluntary
arbitration was created – speedy labor justice.
Tabigue et al vs International Copra Export Corporation
Tabigue et al, for failure to reach on a settlement before the
NCMB with INTERCO, request to elevate the case to voluntary
arbitration.
However, the president of the union expressed that the
petitioners were not authorized by the board of officers to
represent the union. NCMB Director
Yosores wrote petitioner and plant manager of the lack of
willingness of both parties to submit to voluntary arbitration,
which willingness is a pre-
requisite to submit the case thereto; and that under the CBA
forged by the parties, the union is an indispensable party to a
voluntary arbitration but that
since Tan informed respondent that the union had not
authorized petitioners to represent it, it would be absurd to
bring the case to voluntary arbitration.
He ruled that the demand of to submit the issues to voluntary
arbitration CAN NOT BE GRANTED. He thus advised petitioners
to avail of the
compulsory arbitration process to enforce their rights
Master Iron Labor Union vs NLRC
FACTS:
Master Iron Works Construction Corp. is engaged in the
business of steel fabrication. It signed a CBA with MILU
stipulating a “no strike, no lock-out clause” and providing for
service allowances. After signing the same, it subcontracted
outside workers to do the usual jobs of regular workers which
resulted in the reduction of working days into 10 days a month.
MILU requested the implementation of the grievance
procedure but was ignored by the corp. Upon the intervention
of the corporation’s counsel, an agreement to give back the
usual work to regular workers, insisted in doing his regular
work of cutting steel stars which resulted to his reprimand and
suspension for 3 days. Eventually, MILU filed a notice to strike
on the grounds of violation of CBA, discrimination,
unreasonable suspension of union officials and unreasonable
refusal to entertain grievance and staged a strike.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the strike was illegal.
Ruling:
No. The strike was no illegal as it was found on the ground
of ULP.
Delta Ventures Resources Inc. vs Hon. Cabato
Petitioner Dela Ventures filed a third-party claim before the
NLRC prior to the auction sale, and the Labor Arbiter issued an
order directing the suspension of the auction sale until the
merits of petitioner's claim has been resolved, But barely a
month after, the petitioner filed with the RTC a complaint for
injuction and damages with a prayer for TRO, reiterating the
same allegations in the third-party claim.
Whether or not a complaint filed at the Regional Trial Court to
quash the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter may
prosper?
No. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of
the parties but continues until the case is terminated.
Whatever irregularities attended the issuance and execution
of the writ of execution should be referred to the same
administrative tribunal who rendered the decision. This is
because any court which issued a writ of execution has the
inherent power for the advancement of justice, to correct
errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own
processes.
Petitioner should have filed its third-party claim before the
Labor Arbiter, from whom the writ of execution originated
before instituting the civil case at RTC.
Bisig ng Manggagawa sa Concrete Aggregates vs. NLRC, G.R.
No. 105090, September 16, 1993
SEPTEMBER 12, 2018
SUMMARY: Union initiated a strike. Company filed a petition
for injunction with prayer for TRO/preliminary injunction with
the NLRC. NLRC granted the same despite lack of notice to the
union.
DOCTRINE: (TRO/injunction against a strike)
Requisites before a TRO/injunction may be issued by the NLRC
to enjoin a strike (Article 218(e)):
1. That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened
and will be committed and will be continued unless
restrained but no injunction or temporary restraining
order shall be issued on account of any threat,
prohibited or unlawful act, except against the person or
persons, association or organization making the threat
or committing the prohibited or unlawful act or actually
authorizing or ratifying the same after actual
knowledge thereof;
2. That substantial and irreparable injury to complainants
property will follow;
3. That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater
injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial
of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the
granting of relief;
4. That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
 5. That the public officers charged with the duty to protect
complainants property are unable or unwilling to
furnish adequate protection.
FACTS:
The labor conflict between the parties broke out in the open
when the petitioner union struck on April 6, 1992 protesting
issues ranging from unfair labor practices and union busting
allegedly committed by the private respondent. The union
picketed the premises of the private respondent.
On April 8, 1992, Concrete Aggregates filed with the NLRC a
petition for injunction (with a prayer for TRO) to stop the strike
which it denounced as illegal. It alleged that:
 The strike is a wild-cat strike, which did not comply with
the procedural requirements for a valid strike.
 During the strike, the union impeded the ingress and
egress of persons who have lawful business with private
respondent.
The petition was set for hearing on April 13, 1992 at 3 p.m. The
union, however, claimed that it was not furnished a copy of the
petition. Allegedly, the company misrepresented its address.
On April 13, 1992, the NLRC heard the evidence of the
company alone. The ex parte hearing started at 2:30 p.m.
where testimonial and documentary evidence were
presented. Some 30 minutes later, an Ocular Inspection Report
was submitted by an unnamed NLRC representative which
states that:
 The passage was obstructed
 The business operation was completely paralyzed as no
person was noticed inside the company compound. No
persons and/or vehicles were seen entering and leaving
the premises. Ingress to and engress from the company
is presumed to be not free.
Before the day was over, the respondent NLRC (First Division)
issued a temporary restraining order against the union.
No copy of this Order was furnished the union. The union
learned of the Order only when it was posted on April 15, 1992
at the premises of the company. On April 21, 1992, it filed its
Opposition/Answer to the petition for Injunction, which
alleged:
 Public officers charged with the duty to protect the
Concrete Aggregates’ property are able and willing to
furnish adequate protection, as shown by the fact that
when the TRO was served, the police came immediately
to respond.
On April 24, 1992, the union also filed its own Petition for
Injunction to enjoin the company “from asking the aid of the
police and the military officer in escorting scabs to enter the
struck establishment.”
The records show that the case was heard on April 24 and 30,
May 4 and 5, 1992 by respondent Labor Arbiter Enrilo
Peñalosa. On April 30, 1992, the company filed a Motion for
the Immediate Issuance of Preliminary Injunction wherein it
alleged that union is still committing illegal acts. It submitted
the affidavits of non-striking employees, its personnel
managers, among others.
The union got wind of the motion only on May 4, 1992. The
next day, May 5, 1992, it opposed the motion, alleging that
they were never furnished with a copy of the original petition
for injunction because of the erroneous address indicated in
the petition.
The same day, however, the respondent NLRC issued its
disputed Order granting the company’s motion for preliminary
injunction on the ground the union was still committing illegal
acts despite the TRO issued earlier. The NLRC based its ruling
on the affidavits submitted by Concrete Aggregates.
The union then filed the instant petition for certiorari and
mandamus.
ISSUES/HELD: Did the NLRC commit grave abuse of discretion
in issuing a TRO/writ of preliminary injunction? (YES)
RATIO:
Strike has been considered the most effective weapon of labor
in protecting the rights of employees to improve the terms and
conditions of their employment. It may be that in highly
developed countries, the significance of strike as a coercive
weapon has shrunk in view of the preference for more
peaceful modes of settling labor disputes. In underdeveloped
countries, however, where the economic crunch continues to
enfeeble the already marginalized working class, the
importance of the right to strike remains undiminished as
indeed it has proved many a time as the only coercive weapon
that can correct abuses against labor. It remains as the great
equalizer.
In the case at bar, the records will show that the respondent
NLRC failed to comply with the letter and spirit of Article 218(e)
of the Labor Code in issuing its order. Article 218(e)[1] of the
Labor Code provides both the procedural and substantive
requirements which must strictly be complied with before a
temporary or permanent injunction can issue in a labor
dispute.
As applied to the case, the factual circumstances proved by the
evidence show that there was no concurrence of the five (5)
prerequisites mandated by Art. 218 (e) of the Labor Code. The
Court approved the following observations of the OSG:
 To support the claim of threats, intimidation, unlawful
and prohibited acts, etc. allegedly committed by the
union against the non-striking employees, the company
even submitted a joint affidavit signed by three
employees which alleged that they were denied entry
by the striking workers.
 However, when presented before the Labor
Arbiter, the affiants themselves controverted
the allegations in said joint-affidavit. They
innocently divulged having signed the prepared
affidavit without first reading the same.
Likewise, they admitted that they did not see or
hear the striking employees threaten the group
of “non-strikers”.
 Moreover, no less than the Assistant Manager for
Operations of the Company, testified that after the
issuance of the ex parte temporary restraining order,
 the barricade blocking the gates were removed and
people were allowed free ingress and egress.
 Furthermore, the Personnel Manager disclosed that the
public authorities charged to protect the company’s
properties were neither unwilling or unable to furnish
adequate protection. As a matter of fact, the police
regularly patrolling the area, was never requested
assistance.
 The foregoing testimonies of the senior officers of the
company are further buttressed by the admission of
one of the laborers, also presented as witness by the
company, who testified that they were not stopped
from entering the premises of the company and that
there were policement who assisted them.
Moreover, the records reveal the continuing misuse of unfair
strategies to secure ex parte temporary restraining orders
against striking employees.
 Petitioner union did not receive any copy of private
respondent’s petition for injunction. Its address as
alleged by the private respondent turned out to be
“erroneous”.
 Consequently, the petitioner was denied the right to
attend the hearing while the private respondent
enjoyed a field day presenting its evidence ex parte. On
the basis of uncontested evidence, the NLRC on the
same day temporarily enjoined the petitioner from
committing certain alleged illegal acts.
 Again, a copy of the Order was sent to the wrong
address of the petitioner. Knowledge of the Order came
to the petitioner only when its striking members read it
after it was posted at the struck areas of the private
respondent.
To be sure, the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining
order in a labor dispute is not per se prohibited. Its issuance,
however, should be characterized by care and caution for the
law requires that it be clearly justified by considerations of
extreme necessity, i.e., when the commission of unlawful acts
is causing substantial and irreparable injury to company
properties and the company is, for the moment, bereft of an
adequate remedy at law. This is as it ought to be, for
imprudently issued temporary restraining orders can break the
back of employees engaged in a legal strike. Often times, they
unduly tilt the balance of a labor warfare in favor of capital.
When that happens, the deleterious effects of a wrongfully
issued, ex parte temporary restraining order on the rights of
striking employees can no longer be repaired for they defy
simple monetization.
Moreover, experience shows that ex parte applications for
restraining orders are often based on fabricated facts and
concealed truths. A more becoming sense of fairness,
therefore, demands that such ex parte applications should be
more minutely examined by hearing officers, lest, our
constitutional policy of protecting labor becomes nothing but
a synthetic shibboleth. The immediate need to hear and
resolve these ex parte applications does not provide any
excuse to lower our vigilance in protecting labor against the
issuance of indiscriminate injunctions. Stated otherwise, it
behooves hearing officers receiving evidence in support of ex
parte injunctions against employees in strike to take a more
active stance in seeing to it that their right to social justice is in
no way violated despite their absence. This equalizing stance
was not taken in the case at bar by the public respondents.
Nor do we find baseless the allegation by petitioner that the
public respondents have neglected to resolve with reasonable
dispatch its own Petition for Injunction with prayer for a
temporary restraining order dated April 25, 1992. The petition
invoked Article 264(d) of the Labor Code 16 to enjoin the
private respondent from using the military and police
authorities to escort scabs at the struck establishment. Sadly
contrasting is the haste with which public respondent heard
and acted on a similar petition for injunction filed by the
private respondent. In the case of the private respondent, its
prayer for an ex parte temporary restraining order was heard
on April 13, 1992 and it was granted on the same day. Its
petition for preliminary injunction was filed on April 30, 1992,
and was granted on May 5, 1992. In the case of petitioner, its
petition for injunction was filed on April 24, 1992, and to date,
the records do not reveal whether the public respondent has
granted or denied the same. The disparate treatment is
inexplicable considering that the subject matters of their
petition are of similar importance to the parties and to the
public.
DISPOSITIVE: The petition for certiorari and mandamus is
granted. The Order of the NLRC is annulled and set aside. The
public respondents are likewise ordered to hear and resolve,
with deliberate speed petitioner’s petition for injunction filed
on April 30, 1992.
San Miguel Corporation vs NLRC Case Digest
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner,vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, Second Division, ILAW AT BUKLOD
NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM), respondents. G.R. No. 119293.
June 10, 2003]
Facts:
Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and respondent Ilaw
at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM), exclusive bargaining agent of
petitioner’s daily-paid rank and file employees, executed a
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) under which they
agreed to submit all disputes to grievance and arbitration
proceedings. The CBA also included a mutually enforceable no-
strike no-lockout agreement.
On April 11, 1994, IBM, through its vice-president Alfredo
Colomeda, filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) a notice of strike, against petitioner for
allegedly committing: (1) illegal dismissal of union members,
(2) illegal transfer, (3) violation of CBA, (4) contracting out of
jobs being performed by union members, (5) labor-only
contracting, (6) harassment of union officers and members,(7
) non-recognition of duly-elected union officers, and (8) other
acts of unfair labor practice.
The next day, IBM filed another notice of strike, this time
through its president Edilberto Galvez, raising similar grounds:
(1) illegal transfer, (2) labor-only contracting, (3) violation of
CBA, (4) dismissal of union officers and members, and (5) other
acts of unfair labor practice.
The Galvez group subsequently requested the NCMB to
consolidate its notice of strike with that of the Colomeda
group, to which the latter opposed, alleging Galvez’s lack of
authority in filing the same.
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Severance of Notices of
Strike with Motion to Dismiss, on the grounds that the notices
raised non-strikeable issues and that they affected four
corporations which are separate and distinct from each other.
After several conciliation meetings, NCMB Director Reynaldo
Ubaldo found that the real issues involved are non-strikeable.
Hence issued separate letter-orders to both union groups,
converting their notices of strike into preventive mediation.
While separate preventive mediation conferences were
ongoing, the Colomeda group filed with the NCMB a notice of
holding a strike vote. Petitioner opposed by filing a
Manifestation and Motion to Declare Notice of Strike Vote
Illegal, invoking the case of PAL v. Drilon, which held that no
strike could be legally declared during the pendency of
preventive mediation. NCMB Director Ubaldo in response
issued another letter to the Colomeda Group reiterating the
conversion of the notice of strike into a case of preventive
mediation and emphasizing the findings that the grounds
raised center only on an intra-union conflict.
Meanwhile, on May 23, 1994, the Galvez group filed its second
notice of strike against petitioner. Additional grounds were set
forth therein, including discrimination, coercion of employees,
illegal lockout and illegal closure. The NCMB however found
these grounds to be mere amplifications of those alleged in the
first notice that the group filed. It therefore ordered the
consolidation of the second notice with the preceding one that
was earlier reduced to preventive mediation. On the same
date, the group likewise notified the NCMB of its intention to
hold a strike vote on May 27, 1994.
The Colomeda group notified the NCMB of the results of their
strike vote, which favored the holding of a strike. In reply,
NCMB issued a letter again advising them that by virtue of the
PAL v. Drilon ruling, their notice of strike is deemed not to have
been filed, consequently invalidating any subsequent strike for
lack of compliance with the notice requirement. Despite this
and the pendency of the preventive mediation proceedings, on
June 4, 1994, IBM went on strike. The strike paralyzed the
operations of petitioner, causing it losses allegedly worth
P29.98 million in daily lost production.
Two days after the declaration of strike, petitioner filed with
public respondent NLRC an amended Petition for Injunction
with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order,
Free Ingress and Egress Order and Deputization Order. After
due hearing and ocular inspection, resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order (TRO) directing free ingress to and
egress from petitioner’s plants, without prejudice to the
union’s right to peaceful picketing and continuous hearings on
the injunction case.
To minimize further damage to itself, petitioner entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA with the respondent-
union, calling for a lifting of the picket lines and resumption of
work in exchange of “good faith talks” between the
management and the labor management committees. The
MOA, signed in the presence of Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) officials, expressly stated that cases filed
in relation to their dispute will continue and will not be
affected in any manner whatsoever by the agreement. The
picket lines ended and work was then resumed.
Respondent thereafter moved to reconsider the issuance of
the TRO, and sought to dismiss the injunction case in view of
the cessation of its picketing activities as a result of the signed
MOA. It argued that the case had become moot and academic
there being no more prohibited activities to restrain, be they
actual or threatened. Petitioner, however, opposed and
submitted copies of flyers being circulated by IBM, as proof of
the union’s alleged threat to revive the strike. The NLRC did not
rule on the opposition to the TRO and allowed it to lapse.
The NLRC issued the challenged decision, denying the petition
for injunction for lack of factual basis. It found that the
circumstances at the time did not constitute or no longer
constituted an actual or threatened commission of unlawful
acts.It likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
in its resolution.
Issue:
WON THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
FAILED TO ENFORCE, BY INJUNCTION, THE PARTIES’
RECIPROCAL OBLIGATIONS TO SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION AND
NOT TO STRIKE.
Ruling:
Article 254 of the Labor Code provides that no temporary or
permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving
or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or
other entitye xce p t as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and
264 of the Labor Code. Under the first exception, Article 218
(e) of the Labor Code expressly confers upon the NLRC the
power to “enjoin or restrain actual and threatened
commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts, or to
require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute
which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause
grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual
any decision in favor of such party x x x.” The second exception,
on the other hand, is when the labor organization or the
employer engages in any of the “prohibited activities”
enumerated in Article 264.
Pursuant to Article 218 (e), the coercive measure of injunction
may also be used to restrain an actual or threatened unlawful
strike. In the case of San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, where
the same issue of NLRC’s duty to enjoin an unlawful strike was
raised, we ruled that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the petition for injunction to restrain
the union from declaring a strike based on non-strikeable
grounds. Further, in IBM v. NLRC, we held that it is the “legal
duty and obligation” of the NLRC to enjoin a partial strike
staged in violation of the law. Failure promptly to issue an
injunction by the public respondent was likewise held therein
to be an abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, petitioner sought a permanent injunction to
enjoin the respondent’s strike. A strike is considered as the
most effective weapon in protecting the rights of the
employees to improve the terms and conditions of their
employment. However, to be valid, a strike must be pursued
within legal bounds. One of the procedural requisites that
Article 263 of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules
prescribe is the filing of a valid notice of strike with the NCMB.
Imposed for the purpose of encouraging the voluntary
settlement of disputes, this requirement has been held to be
mandatory, the lack of which shall render a strike illegal.
In the present case, NCMB converted IBM’s notices into
preventive mediation as it found that the real issues raised are
non-strikeable. Such order is in pursuance of the NCMB’s duty
to exert “all efforts at mediation and conciliation to enable the
parties to settle the dispute amicably,” and in line with the
state policy of favoring voluntary modes of settling labor
disputes. In accordance with the Implementing Rules of the
Labor Code, the said conversion has the effect of dismissing
the notices of strike filed by respondent. A case in point is PAL
v. Drilon, where we declared a strike illegal for lack of a valid
notice of strike, in view of the NCMB’s conversion of the notice
therein into a preventive mediation case.
Clearly, therefore, applying the aforecited ruling to the case at
bar, when the NCMB ordered the preventive mediation on
May 2, 1994, respondent had thereupon lost the notices of
strike it had filed. Subsequently, however, it still defiantly
proceeded with the strike while mediation was ongoing, and
notwithstanding the letter-advisories of NCMB warning it of its
lack of notice of strike. In the case of NUWHRAIN v. NLRC,
where the petitioner-union therein similarly defied a
prohibition by the NCMB, we said: Petitioners should have
complied with the prohibition to strike ordered by the NCMB
when the latter dismissed the notices of strike after finding
that the alleged acts of discrimination of the hotel were not
ULP, hence not “strikeable.” The refusal of the petitioners to
heed said proscription of the NCMB is reflective of bad faith.
Such disregard of the mediation proceedings was a blatant
violation of the Implementing Rules, which explicitly oblige the
parties to bargain collectively in good faith and prohibit them
from impeding or disrupting the proceedings.
Moreover, it bears stressing that Article 264(a) of the Labor
Code explicitly states that a declaration of strike without first
having filed the required notice is a prohibited activity, which
may be prevented through an injunction in accordance with
Article 254. Clearly, public respondent should have granted the
injunctive relief to prevent the grave damage brought about by
the unlawful strike.
Also noteworthy is public respondent’s disregard of
petitioner’s argument pointing out the union’s failure to
observe the CBA provisions on grievance and arbitration. In the
case of San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC, we ruled that the union
therein violated the mandatory provisions of the CBA when it
filed a notice of strike without availing of the remedies
prescribed therein.
As to petitioner’s allegation of violation of the no-strike
provision in the CBA, jurisprudence has enunciated that such
clauses only bar strikes which are economic in nature, but not
strikes grounded on unfair labor practices. The notices filed in
the case at bar alleged unfair labor practices, the initial
determination of which would entail fact-finding that is best
left for the labor arbiters. Nevertheless, our finding herein of
the invalidity of the notices of strike dispenses with the need
to discuss this issue.
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES VS. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION AND BIENVENIDO ARCAYOS
G.R. NO. 130866
SEPTEMBER 16, 1998
Facts: Respondent (Arcayos) was summarily dismissed by St.
Martin Funeral Homes for misappropriating funds worth Php
38,000 which was supposed to be taxes paid to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR). Alleging that the dismissal was illegal,
respondent filed a case against St. Martin Funeral Homes in the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Petitioner’s (St. Martin Funeral Homes) contention is that the
respondent is not an employee due to the lack of an employer-
employee contract. In addition, respondent is not listed on St.
Martin’s monthly payroll.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, confirming that
indeed, there was no employer-employee relationship
between the two and hence, there could be no illegal dismissal
in such a situation.
The respondent appealed to the secretary of NLRC who set
aside the decision and remanded the case to the labor arbiter.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied
by the NLRC. Now, petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court
– alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s appeal/petition for
certiorari was properly filed in the Supreme Court.
Held: No.
Historically, decisions from the NLRC were appealable to the
Secretary of Labor, whose decisions are then appealable to the
Office of the President. However, the new rules do not
anymore provide provisions regarding appellate review for
decisions rendered by the NLRC.
However in this case, the Supreme Court took it upon
themselves to review such decisions from the NLRC by virtue
of their role under the check and balance system and the
perceived intention of the legislative body who enacted the
new rules.
“It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to
scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute;
that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative
agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights
of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances
which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls
arbitrary and unjust adjudications.”
The petitioners rightfully filed a motion for reconsideration,
but the appeal or certiorari should have been filed initially to
the Court of Appeals – as consistent with the principle of
hierarchy of courts. As such, the Supreme Court remanded the
case to the Court of Appeals.
Association of Trade Unions, v. Abella [G.R. No. 100518,
January 24, 2000]
FACTS: Respondent Company is a domestic corporation
engaged in road construction projects of the government. It
engaged the services of certain workers to work on various
projects on different dates. The workers joined petitioner
union as members. Petitioner union filed a motion for
certification election with the regional office.
Respondent Company opposed stating that the workers were
project employees and not qualified to form a part of the rank
and file collective bargaining unit. The Med-Arbiter dismissed
the PCE. On appeal, the Secretary of Labor reversed the
Med_Arbiter’s decision and ordered the immediate holding of
a certification election. Later, respondent companyterminated
the employment of the workers due to the completion of its
projects or the expiration of worker’s contracts. The affected
workers claimed they were dismissed because of their union
activities; and thus staged a strike. The strike was declared
illegal and certain striker were dismissed. The NLRC modified
the decision by awarding monetary benefits to qualified
workers. Complainants herein were found to be validity
dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were validly dismissed.
HELD: Yes. Petitioners neither assail the jurisdiction of public
respondent nor attribute any grave abuse of the discretion on
the part of the labor tribunal. The petition must fail for lack of
substantial requirements under Rule 65. Also, as petitioners
are project employees, their employment was coterminous
with the completion of the project for which they had been
hired. They were informed in advance that said project or
undertaking for which they were hired and on a stated or
determinable date.
Tancinco vs. GSIS and ECC, November 16, 2001, G.R. 132916
Facts:
SPO1 Eddie G. Tancinco was shot dead by five (5) unidentified
armed men while off duty and repairing a service vehicle in
front of his house. His widow claimed for benefits. The GSIS
and ECC denied the claim for lack of proof that the death of
Tancinco was work-related.
Issue:
Whether or not Tancinco’s death was compensable.
Ruling:
Tancinco’s death was not compensable.
The Court held that the facts and circumstances surrounding
the decedent’s death failed to comply with the grounds set
forth in Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules of Employees
compensation for the injury and the resulting disability or
death be compensable, to wit:(1) The employee must have
been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;(2)
The employee must have been performing his official
functions; and (3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the
employee must have been executing an order for the
employer.
The Court held that when the decedent died, he was not doing
an act which is “basically police service in character” though he
be on active duty call or otherwise nor was he pursuing a task
ordered by his superior. He was, at the time he was killed,
repairing his vehicle at his own home. Bereft proof of
compliance with the requirements, the death was non-
compensable.
ABALOS vs. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION G.R. No. 140374
November 27, 2002 Doctrine of “strained relations”, Finality
of Judgment
JULY 9, 2018
FACTS:
A manpower audit conducted by respondent Philex revealed
that 241 of its employees were redundant. Thus, Philex
undertook a retrenchment program that resulted in the
termination of petitioners’ employment. Consequently,
petitioners filed a case for illegal dismissal against respondent.
The case was submitted for arbitration through the NCMB.
The Voluntary Arbitrator ordered the reinstatement the
Complainants and Intervenors to their former positions with
back wages without loss of seniority and privileges.
On appeal, the CA ruled that while there was indeed a valid
reason for retrenchment, the means employed were
disadvantageous, thus inequitable, to the affected workers.
Philex filed a manifestation and motion for leave to offer
separation pay to petitioners, in lieu of reinstatement, alleging
that petitioners’ positions no longer existed and that there
arose strained relations between the parties that effectively
barred reinstatement. The motion was granted by the
Arbitrator.
Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA on the ground that Arbitrator Juan Valdez acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order directing their reinstatement
became final and executory, hence Arbitrator Valdez no longer
had jurisdiction to modify the same.
RULING:
A basic tenet in our rules of procedure is that an award that is
final and executory cannot be amended or modified anymore.
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment
attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable.
It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether
the modification is attempted to be made by the court
rendering it or by the highest court of the land.
However, this rule is subject to exceptions as stated in the case
of David vs. CA, 316 SCRA 710 (1999), cited by respondent:
One exception is that where facts and/or events transpire after
a decision has become executory, which facts and/or events
present a supervening cause or reason which renders the final
and executory decision no longer enforceable. Under the law,
the court may modify or alter a judgment even after the same
has become executory whenever circumstances transpire
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, as where
certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such
modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has
become final and executory.
In Deltaventures Resources Inc. vs. Cabato, 327 SCRA 521
(2000), we held that “jurisdiction once acquired is not lost
upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is
terminated.” The power of a voluntary arbitrator to issue a writ
of execution carries with it the power to inquire into the
correctness of its execution and to consider whatever
supervening events transpire during execution. Therefore, we
are in agreement with the appellate court that a voluntary
arbitrator has jurisdiction to amend the mode of executing an
award if and when the case merits such amendment.
However, we find respondent’s reliance on the doctrine of
“strained relations” misplaced. In Mercury Drug Corporation
vs. Quijano, we stated that said doctrine is inapplicable to a
situation where the employee has no say in the operation of
the employer’s business. Petitioners herein are part of the
rank-and-file workforce; they are cooks, miners, helpers and
mechanics of the respondent.
As held also in the Mercury Drug case:
To protect labor’s security of tenure, we emphasize that the
doctrine of strained relations should be strictly applied so as
not to deprive an illegally dismissed employee of his right to
reinstatement. Every labor dispute almost always results in
strained relations and the phrase cannot be given an
overarching interpretation, otherwise an unjustly dismissed
employee can never be reinstated.
Despite our sympathy for the workers’ plight, however, we find
no legal support for their opposition to the conclusion and
findings of the voluntary arbitrator and the Court of Appeals.
Petition is DENIED.
SUNDOWNER DEVELOPMENT V. DRILON (LABOR)
FACTS: Hotel Mabuhay leased the premises belonging to
Syjuco. However, due to non-payment of rentals, a case for
ejectment was filed and Hotel Mabuhay offered to amicably
settle by surrendering the premises and to sell its assets and
property to any interested party, to which Syjuco acceded.
HELD: The absorption of the employees of Hotel Mabuhay may
not be imposed on Sundowner, who has no liability
whatsoever to the employees of Hotel Mabuhay and its
responsibility if at all, is only to consider them for re-
employment in the operation of the business in the same
premises. There can be no implied acceptance of the
employees of Hotel Mabuhay by petitioner as it is expressly
provided in the agreement that petitioner has no commitment
or duty to absorb them.
The rule is that unless expressly assumed. labor contracts such
as employment contracts and CBAs are not enforceable
against a transferee of an enterprise, labor contracts being IN
PERSONAM, thus, binding only between the parties. A labor
contract merely creates an action in personam and does not
create an real right which should be respected by third parties.
This conclusion draws its force from the right of an employer
to select his employees and to decide when to engage them as
protected under our Constitution and the same can only be
restricted by law through the exercise of police power.
As a general rule, there is no law requiring a bona fide
purchaser of assets of an on-going concern to absorb in its
employ the employees of the latter. However, although the
purchaser is not legally bound to absorb in its employ the
employees of the seller, the parties are liable to the employees
if the transaction between is clothed with bad faith.
Ludo & Luym Corp. vs Saornido, G.R. No. 140960, January 20, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner LUDO & LUYM CORPORATION is engaged in the
manufacture of coconut oil, corn starch, glucose and related products.
It operates a manufacturing plant and a wharf where raw materials and
finished products are shipped out.
LUDO engaged the arrastre services of Cresencio Lu Arrastre
Services (CLAS) for the loading and unloading of its finished products
at the wharf. Accordingly, several arrastre workers were deployed by
CLAS to perform the services needed by LUDO.
These arrastre workers were subsequently hired, on different dates,
as regular rank-and-file employees of LUDO every time the latter
needed additional manpower services. Said employees thereafter
joined respondent union, the LUDO Employees Union (LEU), which
acted as the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees.
Respondent union entered into a collective bargaining agreement with
LUDO which provides certain benefits to the employees, the amount
of which vary according to the length of service rendered by the
availing employee.

Thereafter, the union requested LUDO to include in its members’

period of service the time during which they rendered arrastre services
to LUDO through the CLAS so that they could get higher benefits.
LUDO failed to act on the request. Thus, the matter was submitted for
voluntary arbitration.

Issue:

Whether or not benefits consisting of salary increases, vacation leave

and sick leave benefits for the years 1977 to 1987 are already barred
by prescription when private respondents filed their case in January
1995;

Ruling: No.

As regards petitioner’s contention that the money claim in this case is

barred by prescription, we hold that this contention is without merit. So
is petitioner’s stance that the benefits claimed by the respondents, i.e.,
sick leave, vacation leave and 13th-month pay, had already
prescribed, considering the three-year period for the institution of
monetary claims. Such determination is a question of fact which must
be ascertained based on the evidence, both oral and documentary,
presented by the parties before the Voluntary Arbitrator. In this case,
the Voluntary Arbitrator found that prescription has not as yet set in to
bar the respondents’ claims for the monetary benefits awarded to
them. Basic is the rule that findings of fact of administrative and quasi-
judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not
only great respect but even finality. Here, the Voluntary Arbitrator
received the evidence of the parties first-hand. No compelling reason
has been shown for us to diverge from the findings of the Voluntary
Arbitrator, especially since the appellate court affirmed his findings,
that it took some time for respondent employees to ventilate their
claims because of the repeated assurances made by the petitioner that
it would review the company records and determine therefrom the
validity of the claims, without expressing a categorical denial of their
claims. As elucidated by the Voluntary Arbitrator:

The respondents had raised prescription as defense. The controlling

law, as ruled by the High Court, is:

"The cause of action accrues until the party obligated refuses xxx to
comply with his duty. Being warded off by promises, the workers not
having decided to assert [their] right[s], [their] causes of action had not
accrued" (Citation omitted.)

Since the parties had continued their negotiations even after the matter
was raised before the Grievance Procedure and the voluntary
arbitration, the respondents had not refused to comply with their duty.
They just wanted the complainants to present some proofs. The
complainant’s cause of action had not therefore accrued yet. Besides,
in the earlier voluntary arbitration case aforementioned involving
exactly the same issue and employees similarly situated as the
complainants’, the same defense was raised and dismissed by
Honorable Thelma Jordan, Voluntary Arbitrator.