AVERROES

and the
Metaphysics
of Causation

BARRY S. KOGAN
 Therefore, if a lo""r of truth finds
a theory reprehensible and does not
find plausible premises which rem()W!
its reprehensible character, he muSt
not at once belie"" that the theory
is false, but must inquire how he who
puts it forward has arrived at it,
must employ much time in learning this,
and follow the systematic order corre·
sponding to the nature of the topic.
And if this is necessary in other sciences
than metaphysics, how much the more will
this hold for metaphysics, since that
science is so remote from the sciences
built on common sense.

A""rroes, Tahilfut al· Tahilfut

- - -----------------
 Averroes
and the Metaphysics
of Causation

Barry S. Kogan
\" '

--;'
_"5
State University of New York Press
 To my parents
Published by Edith and Frederick Kogan
State University of New York Press, Albany •0J;l~ C'~:l l"l.,XDn1
o 1985 State University of New York ".ArId .r " .. ; ' :
All rights reserved ... the glory of children is their parents."
Printed in the United States of America Prol:erbs 17:6
No part of this book may be used or reproduced
in any manner whatsoeVer without written permission
except in the case of brief quotations embodied in
critical articles and reviews.
For infOmlation, address State University of New York Press,
State University Plaza, Albany, N.Y. 12246

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Kogan, Barry S.
Averroes and the metaphysics of causation.

Bibliography.
Includes index.
I. Averroes, 1125-1198. 2. Causation. I. Title.
B749Z7I<59 1985 122'.092'4 85-2585
ISBN ().887()6.(l63-3
ISBN ().88706-065-X (pbk.)

10 9 8 7 6 5
 CONTENTS

Preface ix

1. Introduction: Averroes and the Theory of Causal Efficacy 1

2. Averroes on the Logic of Agents and Acts 17

The Literary Character of the Tahatut Debates, 17
The Context and Structure of Averroes'
Criteriological Analysis, 25
Agents and Agency, 27
Acts and Effects, 46

3. Averroes on Necessary Connection: Causes, Effects,

and the Missing Link 71
Necessary Connection and the Problem of the
Miraculous, 71
Empirical Evidence and the Case for Causal
Efficacy, 86
Metaphysics and the Case for Causal Efficacy, 100
Nature vs. the Habitual Course of Events, 135
Malleable Natures vs. Stable Natures, 142

4. Spheres, Cycles, and Celestial Intelligences: The

Celestial Links in the Causal Chain 165
The Sphere System and the Problem of Continuous
Change, 165
Celestial Animation and the "Kinetic" Code, ISO
 PREFACE

5. Divine Causation and the Doctrine of Eternal

Creation 203
The World as an Eternal Creation, 203 This book examines the common but philosophically contrO\\ersiai view
Eternal Creation by Will or Intellect? 221 that causes are efficacious entities that produce their effects ami can
Causal Knowing and the Theory of Emanation, 229 be Imown to do so. It is a view which A~rroes defends at some length,
Did Averroes Subscribe to the Theory of and his defense of it provides the focus of our in~tigation. Although
Emanation? 248
contro~rsy about causal efficacy is typically associated in the English-
speaking world with David Hume's famous critique of the theory, an
Conclusion 255 important but less well-lmown phase of the debate took place O~r sev-
eral ~.Eerations between theologians and philosophers in medieval Islam .
Notes 267 .Averroes1summarized and ewluated their discussions pro and con in a
series of exchanges between "the philosophers" (notably Avicenna),
Bibliography 313 al-Ghazali, and himself in his Tahiifut al-Tahafut, and to a lesser extent
in his commentaries on the works of Aristotle. Quite apart from its
Index 329 historical -wlue, A~rroes' discussion represents an unusually percep-
tM! and sustained analysis of the issue in many of its aspects. His pre-
sentation is also admirably fair, since it dispenses with "straw men"
and allows each of the participants both to expound his views and to
defend them in detail against objection. Beyond this, by progressi~ly
clarifying what is at stake in accepting or rejecting the theory of causal
efficacy, A~rroes de~lops a nO\\e1 exposition and defense of the the-
ory as well. On all these counts, his contribution to the history of the
causal contr~rsy is a substantial one.
In tracing the main lines of the debate my purpose has been to
determine how the wrious participants explain causal relations, to iden-

ix
x PREFACE
tily and appraise the grounds on which they affirm or deny necessary
causal connections, and to show what ontological commitments their
respective philosophical and theological positions presuppose. I also
hope it will become clear as the argument unfolds that these medieval
discussions of causation often anticipate their modem counterparts with
remarkable insight. Indeed, from the standpoint of both their content
and their conceptual rigor, they still have much to contribute to our
own understanding of causation.
In the course of completing this study, I have benefited from the
comments and suggestions of many teachers, colleagues, and friends,
and I am pleased to record here my sincere thanks for their help.
My initial interest in the subject of natural causation was sparked
by my teacher, Professor Alvin Reines, from whose thought-provoking
discussions I profited greatly. I am very grateful for the stimulus and
guidance he provided. To my late teacher, Professor Samuel Sandmel, I
owe a special debt of gratitude for his early interest and encourage-
ment of my work, his consistent support of this project, and his friendship.
The impetus for this particular study, however, grew out of subsequent
discussions with my dissertation committee at the University of Toronto
in 1973. Professors Armand Maurer and Edward Synan first proposed
that I consider the Averroistic tradition as a worthwhile source for phil-
osophic investigation. Thereafter, they provided me with much wise
counsel in interpreting and presenting the Latill..sources of Averroes'
works. Their advice and encouragement -are deeply appreciated. PrOfeSSor
Michael Marmura originally called my attention to the significance of
the causal question in medieval Islam and suggested that Averroes' views
in particular merited a detailed analysis. Later, in directing my studies
in the history of Islamic philosophy as well as in Arabic, he gave
unstintingly of his time, energy, and library, and provided me with valua-
ble guidance at every stage of my work. Were it not for him, this book
would have remained only possible in itself.
The late Professor George F. Hourani was kind enough to read the
original manuscript with great care and to offer numerous suggestions
for its improvement. Both his keen observations and his warm encour-
agement have helped me greatly in preparing my findings for publication.
At various stages in the revision I profited from comments on indi-
vidual sections of the work made by Professors Alfred Ivry, Michael
Meyer, and Tamar Rudavsky. Their interest as well as their insights are
sincerely appreciated. I would also like to thank several very dear friends
for their help along the way. Dr. Melvyn Iscove and Happy Iscove con-
Preface xi
tributed a great deal to my understanding of causal efficacy over the
years in the course of many discussions. Beyond this, their counsel and
warm friendship did much to ease the burdens of writing. Rabbi Stephen
Franklin and Karen Franklin also provided invaluable aid at various stages
of preparing the manuscript for publication. Their friendship and "agency"
on my behalf have been most helpful.
The research for this work was funded in part by grants received
from the S. H. and Helen R Scheuer Fellowship of the Hebrew Union
College, the Danforth Foundation, the Open Fellowships Program of the
University of Toronto, the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture,
Rabbi W. Gunther Plaut, and the Presidents' Research Fund of the
Hebrew Union College. I would like to express my sincere appreciation
to all of these institutions, and particularly to President Alfred Gottschalk
of the Hebrew Union College, for their generous support and interest.
Thanks are due to Caravan Books for permission to reprint my
article on "The Philosophers, al-Ghazillf, and Averroes on Necessary
Connection and the Problem of the Miraculous" from lslamie Philoso-
phy and Mysticism, edited by Parviz Morewedge; to Harvard University
Press for permission to reprint two diagrams from Thomas Kuhn's The
Copernican Revolution; and to the editors of Mediaeval Studies for per-
mission to reprint passages from my article on "Averroes and the Theory
of Emanation."
I am especially grateful to Mrs. Miriam November for her excellent
work in typing the final manuscript To know her is to understand causal
efficacy in action. I would also like to express warm thanks to my student,
Susan Warshell, for her kindness and assistance in preparing the index.
Two are indeed better than one.
Most of all, I want to thank my wife, Stephanie, whose devotion
and support first enabled me to undertake this study and whose loving
encouragement sustained me in completing it. Her intelligence, insight,
and good judgment lie between the lines of every page. To her and to
my children, Avi and Elana, who shared their father with this project for
so long, lowe a debt of gratitude that words admittedly cannot begin
to express.
Barry Kogan
Cincinnati, Ohio, November, 1983
lI"Q~n
 Chapter One

Introduction: Averroes and the

TheOlY of Causal Efficacy

I
Among the many theories designed to clarify the nature of causation,
the idea of causal efficacy is probably the oldest. From the pre-Socratics
to the present, it has found continuous expression in philosophic and
scientific writing, and it is still regularly described as the traditional
view of causation. But apart from considerations of age, the idea of
causal efficacy has also had a very controversial career in the history
of philosophy, and for that reason it continues to be a subject of
considerable interest. Estimates of the theory have varied greatly, from
Aristotle's claim that all scientific knowing consists in the capacity to
identify the causes of things, I to Bertrand Russell's view that the word
"cause" imolves so many misleading associations as to warrant its com-
plete exclusion from philosophical discourse.2 Most contemporary dis-
cussions of causal efficacy take place between these two poles. While
they reflect modem developments in the natural and social sciences,
they also raise many of the same issues and arguments associated with
earlier stages of the debate. This suggests that retrospective inquiries
into the history of the issue may have a value which goes beyond that
of merely satisfying historical curiosity. They may also help to clarify
the issues at stake and perhaps even help to re-orient the discussion
itself.
 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
2
One of the most illuminating phases of this controversy about cau-
sation has received comparatively little attention, namely, the debates
about causal efficacy in medieval Islam. Although generated by largely
theological concerns, these debates were by no means purely theologi-
cal either in content or form. In fact, they display a remarkable degree
of philosophical sophistication on all sides of the issue. By the end of
the twelfth century, they were ably summed up and advanced by Ibn
Rushd or Averroes (1126-1198), "the great commentator" on the Aristo-
telian corpus, and subsequently made their way along with his com-
mentaries into the Latin West. Despite the passage of time, Averroes'
detailed analysis of the opposing positions still represents one of the
most extensive and penetrating discussions of causation in the literature.
That alone would make it worth studying. But beyond this, his own
rather novel defense of causal efficacy seems especially deserving of
attention now with the growing philosophic interest in causation and
the notion of natural necessity.
In general terms, the doctrine at issueissimply stated.Par!:.icular
causes produce their effects ancLcarLbe. jqJQy;Il to do2.o. Concomitantly,
the occurrence and character of these effects can be explained in terms of
the causes which produce them. What is central to this conception of
causation is the notion of production. Causes do not merely precede or
accompany their effects; they generate them, bring them about, or oth-
erwise make them happen. They do so, moreover, through their inher-
ent power or capacity to produce these effects. Accordingly, causes are
to be understood as dynamic entities which are in some sense intrinsi-
cally active and capable of expressing this dynamism externally so as
to exert influence upon things. It is precisely this aspect of causes which
explains the occurrence of their effects. . produce their effects suggests that the dynamism of an efficient cause
I Closely associated with this view is the idea that what ultimately
counts as a cause is any particular entity or substance that can mean-
ingfully be called an agent. This is not to say, of course, that one can-
not speak of events, processes, or states of alfairs as causes. We can
and regularly do speak of them in this way. It indicates only. that for
such designations to be complete, they must bear an essenlial refer-
ence to some dynamiC entity or agent, since events as such are not
intrinsically dynamic. Their claim to causal status consists rather in
releasing or expressing the dynamism of things which are.
To say further that causes produce effects which are in some sense
"their own" means only that certain kinds of causes have certain kinds
of effects, but not others. While a cause may be able to generate a
The Theory of Causal Efficacy 3
considerable range of effects, owing to the dhersity of circumstances
in which it operates, the range is not infinite either in principle or in
fact. For what the cause is fundamentally determines both what it can
do and what it actually does. The factor which limits the outcome in
this way is thought to be internal to the cause itself, namely, its specific
character or nature. In short, the effect produced must conform to the
specific nature of the cause. It is this feature of causal efficacy which
explains the character of the effect and which subsequently allows us
to formulate generalizations about cause/effect relations that express
universal laws.
There is; however, another "must" which is implicit in the notion
of causal efficacy, namely, the idea of necessary causal connection. To
assert that there are necessary connections between causes and their
effects is to claim that once_an efficient cause exists, all things being
equal, its characteristic effect must occur. This means not only that the
effect does occur as a matter of fact, but that it cannot fail to do so
because it is necessitated or compelled to occur by the very natur~
and power of the cause. In this way, a necessary link, bond, or connec-
tion is said to exist between causes and their effects, although the exact
nature of this link still requires clarification. Conversely, if the antici-
pated effect does not in fact occur, this is not understood to mean that
there is no such thing as necessary causal connection. It indicates instead
that not all things were equal as had been supposed. The cause, for
example, may have been absent, misdescribed, or impeded by the effi-
cacy of other causes.
Causation, according to this view, further implies that causes are
always in some sense prior to their effects. Thus, to say that causes
both proceeds from the cause as its point of departure and impinges
upon something external to it such that a change occurs. In this respect,
the cause is ontologically prior to the change produced as its origina-
tive source. It must "be there" if the effect is to occur at all. Similarly,
causes are thought to necessitate the occurrence of their effects whereas
effects are not thought to necessitate the occurrence of their ~auses. If
they were assumed to do so, the basic thesis of causal efficacy-that
particular causes produce their effects-would either be false or seri-
ously deficient. In fact, however, the most we do say is that effects
presuppose their causes. They do not necessitate them, because the
direction of necessitation assumes the priority of causes to their effects.
Again, causes may either precede or coexist with their effects in time,
4 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
but effects are not understood to precede their causes in time. To sup-
pose that they could precede their causes and yet still be produced by
them would mean that production unfolds regressively rather than
progressively. Indeed, such a notion of "backwards causation" entails
the equally unusual assumption that causes may affect and thereby
alter what we ordinarily take to be entirely unalterable, namely, the
past. Here again the notion of causal efficacy seems to require that
causes be either temporally prior to or at least concomitant with their
effects.
Finally, the idea of causal efficacy suggests that causes can be known
to produce their effects as well as to explain them. This means first of
,' all that causal efficacy is not only a familiar feature of reality but that
there is nothing irremediably occult or mysterious about it. The evi-
dence which warrants belief in it begins with our ordinary and immedi-
ate experience. Although there are admittedly differences about the
extent and regularity of experience required to identify cause/effect
relations as such, causal efficacy itself consists in the behavior of things
both as we find them in the world and as we investigate them scientifi-
cally. Beyond this, reflection on the meaning and logical implications of
our conception of particulars gives such empirical evidence additional
support, since our idea of what a thing is, is a function of what it does
or undergoes. lf particular causes did not produce specific effects, we
would be unable even to identify particulars, much less distinguish one
kind from another. Certainly, we could say nothing about how they
functioned or interacted with one another or how they could do so
under specified conditions. This feature of specificity associated with
causal efficacy in turn accounts for the explanatory role of causes in
telling us why they l)ave the effects they do. For by knowing the spe-
cific natures of things and thus what they can do and undergo, we can
state the kinds of changes they generate and the relevant circumstances
under which they occur. When confronted with such changes, we are
thus in a position to explain why they occurred by correlating specific
effects not simply with the occurrence of a prior event, or even with
generalizations about many such events, but with the specific nature of
the powertul entity or entities which produced them. In that way, causal
sequences are distinguished from purely accidental ones, which explain
nothing, however regular they may be (e.g., day following night); and
scientific laws take the place of enumerative generalizations, which at
best explain onfy how events occur, but not why.
This, in brief,.is what the idea of causal efficacy represents. Not-
The Theory of Causal Efficacy 5
withstanding its antiquity and "common sense" character, hCJWe\e', and
perhaps even because of them, the whole conception has often been
dismissed as pre-reflecti~, empirically un~rifiable, and mysterious. A
long tradition of such criticism can be traced from Sextus Empiricus,
among the ancients, through the Ash'arite theologians of Islam, William
of Ockham, and Nicholas of Autrecourt, among the medievals, to Male-
b~anch~, Berkeley, and Hume among the modems. Most contemporary
diSCUSSions of causation reflect this tradition. Accordingly, they pre-
sent only a brief sketch of the theory and focus instead on the growing
literature of philosophic criticism directed against it, usually giving pride
of place to Hume and his successors. Unfortunately, howe~r, we find
few attempts to respond to this criticism by de~loping a more ade-
quate account of the original doctrine, and the few that there are rece~
little attention.
This is precisely where the significance of A~rroes' discussion of
causal efficacy lies. It not only displays an intimate knowledge of the
ancient and early medieval accounts of causal efficacy and of the most
important objections to them, but it offers a penetrati~ and systematic
critique of the criticism as well. What is more, AVerroes,goes on to
reformulate the doctrine and to fit it into an ~raIl metaphysical theory.
While he obviously draws upon an arsenal of Aristotelian terms and
categories, he nonetheless elaborates, refines, and reworks these m';t;;:
rials in n~l ways so as to meet the opposition directly. In this sense
he emerges as a percepti~ and original thinker in his own right and
not merely as an able, if ~r-enthusiastic interpreter of Aristotie, which is
the more widely held view. To be sure, the structure of his discussion
remains largely exegetical, as we shall see, but its critical and recon-
structi~ bent is evident from beginning to end.
II
A~rroes' concern with problems of causation pervades his Tahiifut
al-Tahiifut (The Incoherence of "The Incoherence. .. "),3 written some-
time betw,:,:!! 1180 <Uld 1185. But his fullest and most explicit treatment
of cauSitI'effi'cacy appearsiiltl1e ThTrd'~nd seventeenthDis~u~sio~s
which"are'demted. to- questions about Divine agency and necessru;
causahconnections- respecti~ly;- Taken as a whole, his Tahlifut repre-
sents one of the classic documents in the historic conflict between
Islamic theology (kallim) and philosophy (falsafah). A~rroes designed
6 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
"
, --------~-­
it as a philosophical rejoinder to the work of Abu Hamid' al-GhazalD (d.
1111), the great jurist and Ash'arite theologian, who nearly a century
earlier brought the conflict to a new peak of intensity with the publica-
tion of a full-scale critique of the Islamic philosophers (falasifah). That
work, entitled the TahOfut al-Falasifah (The Incoherence of the Philos-
ophers), had systematically attacked some twenty doctrines of al-Farabf
(d. 950) and Ibn Sfna or Avicenna (d. 1037), but it aimed beyond them
in order to discredit the whole Peripatetic tradition in metaphysics and
to ilesser extent in natural science as well.4
. Here, a brief word is in order ahout the circumstances behind the
writing of both al-GhazaIr's critique and Averroes' rejoinder, and particu-
larly about the respective aims and methods of each work. In the intro-
duction to his TahOfut, al-GhazaIr signaled his alarm at the growth of a
class of people who regarded themselves as intellectually superior to
ordinary Muslims, but who had effectively abandoned both the falth
and practice of Islam. Partly because of their upbringing and partly
because they had stumbled into sophistical doubts, these people turned
to speculative inquiries and came to be, in al-GhazaIr's opinion, inordi-
nately impressed by what they had heard of the ancient philosophers.
Indeed they sought to emulate the ancients not only in their intellec-
tual pursuits but also in their reputed hostility to religion. In this
al-Ghazillr believed that they had erred seriously and in fact only
succeeded in exchanging truth based on authority for falsehood based
on authority. Consequently, he resolved to go to the root of the prob-
lem and refute the ancient philosophers themselves.s
Toward this end, he enunciated several specific goals. He sought
first to present an accurate account of their doctrines and especially
those of Aristotle, who had come to be regarded as the philosopher par
excellence, "the first teacher." BeJ:ause Aristotle's writings were already
available in various translation£,.al-Gh1lZ3Ir indicated that he would con-
fine himself to the summaries and interpretations of those writings given
by al-Farabf andAvicenna~since_hex"nsic!eredthem the most reliable
in transmitting_and.determining..Aristotle:s.. exacLmeaning. But clearly
his principal aim was to show that when subjected to serious scrutiny,
the doctrines of the philosophers simply collapsed, owing to the inco-
herence of their fundamental beliefs and especially the inconsistency
of their claims about Divine things.'
The method al-GhazaIf adopted was to summarize the arguments
of his philosophic opponents as cogently as possible and then to sub-
ject them to careful analysis and critique. In the interest of fairness, he
The Theory of Causal Efficacy 7
even devised additional responses to his own arguments, which the
falasifah themselves, in his view, might have presented, and then he
answered these as well. After relentlessly exposing the weak points in
their positions, he concluded on issue after issue that their doctrines
were either self-contradictory or undemonstrated. At the very least he
maintained, they had neither the logical clarity nor the mathematical
certainty which the philosophers claimed for them, and therefore ought
to be rejected. By thus assuming a predominantly critical stance,
al-GhazaIf was able to attack the philosophers without having to defend
any particular viewpoint of his own. This was very much in keeping
with his original intent, for he had declared at the outset that "I only
enter into argument with them as one who demands and denies, not as
one who claims and affirms.'"
Beyond philosophic critique, however, he also sought legal cen-
sure against the views of the falasifah. For he concluded his TahOfut
with the charge that three of their doctrines-regarding the eternity of
the world, God's knowledge of particulars, and bodily resurrection-
represented outright unbelief in the teachings of Islam, while the
remaining ones were at least heretical innovations. Thus anyone who
accepted these opinions could be branded an infidel and made liable to
capital Punishment since both charges were legally actionable in Islamic
law: All. this is not to say that al-Ghazalf's general position was purely
antI-philosophic. This is certainly not the case, once his admiration for
Avicenna's logic and his insightful adaptation of it to the needs of Islamic
theology are taken into account. Nevertheless, his acute criticisms and
strictures against the "metaphysical" assumptions of the Islamic Aristoteli-
ans posed a serious challenge to philosophy which could not be ignored.
In responding to that challenge" AveITOe!; tried both to rebut
al-GhazaIr's claims and to show that the presuppositions underlying his
arguments were in most cases seriously flawed. He addressed himself
first to the le.gal charges against the philosophers in a vigorous legal
defense of phtlosophy, the Fa$l al-Maqal or The Decisive Treatise Deter-
mining the Nature of the Connection between Religion and Philosophy."
Th.ere h<; ru:~ed in generaf terms that the study of philosophy, far from -
bemg prohibited by the religious law, was actuafly commanded by'it, .
but ortly for those capable,of engagiflg in it. Still, it was the TahOfut '
al-Tahafut that presented his strictly philosophical defense of philoso-
phy and, as the title indicates, his direct and detailed rejoinder to
al-Ghazalf's TahOfuI.
Unlike al-GhazaIf, Averroes did not include an introduction to his
 8 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
work in which he outlined his concerns and aims in writing it. In this
respect, the reader must infer from Averroes' individual arguments just
what he sought to accomplish. Three main objectives soon become
evident. Averroes wanted to show, first of all, that al-GhaziiIr's criticisms
were not nearly as effective as he had supposed and that for the most
part they were dialectical in nature. Hence, all that could be said for
the premises of his arguments was that they were plausible, not self-
evident, while the arguments themselves were more often than not
fallacious. In addition to this, he wanted to make clear that when
al-Ghazall's criticisms of the fallIsifah were valid, they succeeded only
in refuting certain doctrin~ of al-Farabi and Avicenna alone, but not
necessarily those of Aristo!le. To that extent, both of these "modem
philosophers of Islam" had departed from the genuine teaching of the
ancients, and al-GhazaIf was simply mistaken about their reliability as
interpreters of the Peripatetic tradition in all its aspects. Thus, even
when his shaIts were on target, it was not the one at which he had
originally aimed Finally, we should note that quite frequently Averroes
refers to al-Ghaziilf's claim in the introduction to his Tahafut, that he
does not attack the fallIsifah from the standpoint of any positive doc-
trine of his own. Averroes insists that on the contrary, behind al-Ghazalr's
4
arguments there lies a very recogriizable doctrine-"Ash aritetheology,
and its spread into North Africa and Muslim Spain seems to have
caused him serious concern. In that respect it is likely that one of
Averroes' overall goals in writing the Tahafu(was to check. if not over-
come entirely, the growing influence of Ash'arism in th~ _Muslim West."
With these as his objectives, he undertook to reproduce most of
~ J,the contents of the first Tahafut and then to append hi~ ?wn comm.ents
I ito each unit of argument. This usually included a cntIcal analysIs of
al-GhazaIr's claims, both on behalf of the philosophers and for himself,
but just as frequently a judicious rejection of certain positions of the
fallIsifah as being without foundation in Aristotle, or otherwise unsatis-
factory. The result is a three-tiered text representing, as it were, a philo-
sophic dialogue across the generations carried on by their respective
spokesmen. The first tier summarizes the positions of al-Farabf and
,_ especially Avicenna on causal efficacy in its various.~pects. The sec-
ond presents al-GhazaIr's critique of their original-positions as well as
their probable fall-back positions, while the third offers Averroes' analy-
sis of the various arguments, his reformulations of the main issues, and
his suggestions for their resolution. It is this ongoing "give and take"
that provides us with an excellent opportunity to observe Averroes work-
The Theory of Causal Efficacy 9
ing out his own ideas vis-iI-vis those of his predecessors.
Still his arguments are not without their ambiguities, as we shall
see, and resolving them is no simple task. Certainly one useful method
for making headway here is to let a clear statement by Averroes on a
given subject in one part of the Tahafut illuminate an obscure state-
ment on the same subject in another part. Because Averroes deals with
problems of causation in a variety of different contexts in the Tahafut
this turns out to be a very helpful procedure. But it also necessitat~
that at times, where ambiguities exist, the careful reader will move
backward or forward in the text to identify those passages that can
resolve the dilficulty. Even so, if we were to rely upon the Tahafut debates
alone, our prospects for success would still be unduly limited. But,
fortunately, Averroes himself supplies a useful hermeneutic suggestion.
He advises readers of his Tahafut to consult the demonstrative books of
the ancient philosophers, notably those of Aristotle, in order to under-
stand and verify what Averroes says on his own behalf. While we can-
not of course expect the Stagirite to serve as a commentator on Averroes
given the variety of interpretations his writings received in the Middl~
Ages, we can reasonably expect Averroes' comments on Aristotle's works
to clarify some of the unresolved issues in the Tahafut and also to
provide at least a contextual perspective for interpreting his arguments
there. Consequently, we shall also have recourse to the commentaries
whenever necessary for both these purposes, and, of course, as a con-
trol on our own interpretation of his remarks on causal efficacy.
Since the facts of Averroes' life also provide useful clues for clarify-
ing his teaching and its context, they should be noted here as well.1O
Abu al-Walid MuJ:Iammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Rushd, who came
~o be kn~ in the Latin West as Averroes: was born in 1126 (520 AH.)
In AlmoraVld Cordova, a city justly renowned for its encouragement of
scientific and philosophical studies. Both his father and grandfather
had distinguished careers as jurists; indeed, the latter served jOintly as
qlItfi and imam of the Great Mosque at Cordova. Averroes' early educa-
tion concentrated chiefly on Islamic legal studies, although he is reported
to have had greater interest in the principles of legal science than in
the science of tradition as such. In conjunction with these disciplines
h: als? studi~d Ash'arite kailim and medicine. Exactly when he began
hiS philosophical education and with what curriculum is not clear. His
principal biographers are silent on the subject. We know only that he
pursued the philosophical sciences withAM Ja'far Harlin al-TajaIr, who
was his teacher in medicine. ll
10 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
The relative tranquility of Averroes' early years came to an end,
however, in 1148 when the A1moravid rulers of Cordova and other cities
of Andalusia were overthrown by the armies of the A1mohads under the
inspiration of MuJ:!arnmad ibn Tumart (d. 1130). The upheavals which
these invasions caused probably contributed to Averroes' eventual depar-
ture from the city, for we mow that by 1153 he had settled in Marrakush.
Averroes' commentary on Aristotle's De Caelo indicates that he spent
at least part of his time there engaged in astronomical observation. 12
Indeed, these researches may have been ones to which he later refers
when he speaks of his early hope to establish an astronomy based on
the principles of Aristotelian physics as distinguished from the mathe-
matical astronomy of Ptolemy.13 In any case, it was sometime later dur-
ing his stay in Marrakush that Averroes met Abu BaIrr ibn Tufayl (d.
1185), the famous philosopher and court physician of the A1mohad caliph
Abu Ya'qUb Yusuf (d. 1184). By now, the A1mohad rulers had estab-
lished a policy of encouraging philosophical and scientific studies, and
numerous talents and luminaries in virtually all disciplines were to be
found at court. It was through Ibn Tufayl's good offices that Averroes
was himself introduced to the caliph, probably in 1168 or 1169. The
historian al-Marrakushf pres~rves an account of this meeting, which
Averroes related to one of his pupils. Although it is brief, the account
provides a valuable insight into the circumstances under which philo-
sophic discussion was then thought to be possible.
When I entered into the presence of the Prince of the Believers, Abu
Ya'qiib, I found him alone with Abii Bakr ibn Tulayl. Abu Ya'qiib began
praising me, mentioning my family and my ancestors, and graciously
including in his description things beyond my real merits. The lirst
thing the Prince 01 the Believers said to me after asking me my name,
my father's name, and my lineage, was, "What is their opinion about
the heavens?" relerring to the philosophers. "Are they eternal or
created?" Reticence and lear took hold of me, and I began to make up
some excuse and to deny being occupied with the science 01 philosophy,
inasmuch as I was unaware 01 what Ibn Tufayl had decided with him.
The Prince 01 the Believers, however, perceived my lear and reticence
and turned to Ibn Tulayl. He began to speak with him about the question
which he had asked me, and he mentioned what Aristotle, Plato, and
all the philosophers had said about it. Along with this, he presented
the objections 01 the people 01 Islam regarding it. I thus saw in him a
copious memol}' which I would not have expected even in one of those
who are occupied with this matter full time. Thus he continued his
The Theory of Causal Efficacy
II
expositim until eventually I spoke, and he came to know what I thought
about that subject. For when I departed, he presented me with a mone-
tary gift, a robe of high honor, and a mount.14
That the .caliph ~nderstood Averroes' anxiety about publicly discuss-
~ng a philosophical tOPIC believed to be in conflict with the teach-
Ings .of Islam IS clear, a~d it may well be that the reward Averroes
re~elved :vas ~s mu~h In return for his circumspection as for his
phll?sophlcal IngenUIty. He was certainly given ample opportunity
to dIsplay both qualities again.
~e meeyng with t?e caliph produced two results. Averroes was
appOInted qacfi of SeVille and also invited to prepare a series of
epltom~s and commentaries on Aristotle's works. For the caliph had
complaIned to Ibn 1\.tfayl of the difficulties he had encountered with
the ArabIC texts of ~istotle and suggested that a series of exegetical
works would make It much easier for people to grasp their meaning.
~en Ibn Tu~aYI protested that his age and court duties precluded
hiS undertaking the project, Avenoes was asked to do so and he
accepted the invitation.1S Thus began the series of paraphr~ses and
commentaries for which Averroe&hascome to be sofamous. For the
n:
next o years h~ attend.ed to both his administrative dutieS in Seville
and hiS new phIlosophical project. The latter task, however, was
hampered ~omewhat because he was separated from his books, which
remaIned In Cordova. When he returned to his native city in 1171
presumably to take up a new appointment there as qacfi,16 he wa~
able to p~oceed much more rapidly. It was also during the latter
part of thiS decade that he began his independent treatises on phi-
losophy and theology, of which the Tahafut al-TahaFut is clearly the
magnum opus.
':Vhen Ibn Tufayl resigned as court physician in 1182, due to ad-
VancIng age, Averroe~ was recalled to Mam;:kush and named his suc-
cesso~. The~e he continued to serve with favor both under the auspices
of Abu Ya'qub Y- uf dI
Y , _ us ,an ater under his son and successor, Abu Yusuf
aqub ~~. 11~)..Nevertheless, court life was not without its personal
~nd pohtlcal mtngu~, and Averroes came to suffer on their account
ear the end. of hiS hfe. In 1195, he incurred the caliph's displeasure
and was bam~hed to Lucena, a small town on the approach to Cor-
dova, along With other intellectuals attached to the Court A1t
. b f
P ear~ng . . er ap-
e ore a tnbunal of notables in Cordova, his teachings were
~~bhdy co?demn~d and copies of his ,,"orks, 'llong wi&otherscien-
tlhc. and philosophical text.5, ",ere burned. An edict was subsequently
 AVERROfS AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
The Theory of Causal Efficacy 13
12
issued throughout Andalusia and Marrakush, ordering the same fate the larger conflict between the partisans of philosophy and theology
for all books considered hannful to religion and prohibiting the study for fawr at the Almohad court.
of philosophy and the sciences generally, except for medicine, as- Despite the se=ity of A\I'!rroes' ordeal, it was shortli\l'!d. He was
soon able to return to Marrakush, and the decrees against his works
tronomy, and arithmetic.
What brought about this tum of events is not entirely clear, and and the study of philosophy seem to ha\l'! been rescinded not long
the chroniclers have offered various explanations for it. Some have after his arrival. He was e\l'!n summoned back to the service of his
suggested that in his relationship with the caliph, Averroes behaved patron, and by most accounts he remained at court without further
with undue familiarity and at times even indiscretion. Thus he is said incident until his death in December 1198. 19
to have aroused Abu Ynsuf Ya'qUb's resentment by addressing him
with such words as, "Listen here, brother. .." or, in another account,
m
for alluding negatively to his appearance by saying that he had seen
the giraffe in the garden of the King of the Berbers,17 Admittedly, the
Having now outlined the background of the Tahlifut debates on
accuracy of these reports is difficult to determine. Even if they are
causation, it is appropriate to say something about the structure
accurate, they do not explain why so many other intellectuals were
a.nd direction of our inquiry. The chapters that follow offer an exposi-
punished with Averroes or why the caliph changed his attitude to
tIOn and analysis of A\I'!rroes' theory of causal efficacy. They focus
philosophy and its proponents generally. Another body of explanations,
mainly on Discussions Three and Se\enteen of the Tahlifut al-Tahlifut
since as we noted earlier, these discussions jointly constitute th~
however, emphasizes that Averroes' disgrace was primarily the result
of religious and political ferment within the Almohad domains. Dur-
centerpiece of his account. But while we shall concentrate on these
ing this period, Malikite legal scholars and_c9nservative theologians,
two discussions, we shall not confine oursel\l'!S to them. Other pas-
who enjoyed a wid~ following among the masses, gained increasing
sages from elsewhere in the Tahlifut and the commentaries will like-
influence with the caliph, and he evidently felt it necessary or pru-
wise be incorporated into our account insofar as they help to clarify
dent to give in to their demands by having Averroes removed from
A\I'!~oes' meaning in the main text or provide supplementary infor-
office and the study of philosophy proscribed. The fact that Abu Ynsuf
matIOn on related topics.
Ya'qUb began a major military campaign against the Spanish Chris-
. Na~ra1ly, in the course of examining A\I'!rroes' causal theory, cer-
tians in 1195 further suggests that his change of policy toward philoso-
tam baSIC questions arose about its character, justification, and O\er-
phy and its proponents was the political price he had to pay for
all adequacy. The task of each of the ensuing chapters is to answer
winning the support of the 'ulama'. Thus we find two reports in which
them. Accordingly, the order of our presentation follows from the
opponents of Averroes denounce him to the caliph for alleged acts of
need to ~ddress these questions in a systematic way. We neither pre-
impiety. One charges him with saying," .. .it is clear that the planet
sent nor mtend to present a running commentary on the text as such.
Venus is one of the gods," while another accuses him of denying the
For e\l'!n though exegesis plays a \l'!ry important role in our discussion
veracity of a Qur'anic story relating the miraculous destruction of
IS our interest is primarily philosophical rather than exegetical. '
the people of f'\d. Allegedly, he denied that such a people ever existed.
. With these considerations in mind, we can now raise a number
The first charge probably misrepresents Averroes as stating in
o~ Impor:ant and programmatic questions. Gi\l'!n the historical and
his own name what he only reports about others in his commentary
bIOgraphical background outlined abO\e, and especially A\I'!rroes' cir-
on the De Caelo. The second seems more plausible given Averroes'
cumspection about philosophical subjects related to religion we shall
sympathy for allegorical interpretations of scripture. Still, the public want to ~etermine first of all to what extent the literary ch~racter of
denial of a Qur'anic teaching is strikingly at odds with his reputation
the Tah~fut debates on causal efficacy reflects his general caution.
for caution in such matters. At most we can say that whatever the Are:theomter.changescbe.tw~t:\..l.heJalit$i(ah,.. akGhaza][,-andA\I'!rroes
immediate occasion for Averroes' dismissal and humiliation, it seems
entlr~!I!UgbJ;,;,!QCllard-GaSes-of-exposition.and ·critique,.or..do.they
clear that the overall sequence of events which led to it was part of
14 AVERROES AND TIlE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
contain hidden assumptions and recondite-observations about theo-
logical topics" that significantly determine the character of the argu-
ment?·1f the latter turns out to be true, what special problems does
this pose for the interpretation of Averroes;and how are these prob-
lems to be resolved?
Turning second to the problem of causal efficacy itself, our ini-
tial concern will be to clarify Averroes' use of causal language vis-a-
vis that of his philosophic predecessors and his theological opponents.
What counts as a cause for them, and what counts as an effect? What
are the distinctive characteristics of each, and what paradigms are
used to illustrate and explain their operation? Again, how do each of
the participants in the debate characterize the relations of cause and
effect to one another? In answering these questions we shall examine
closely the criteriological analysis given in the first part of Discus-
sion Three.
Third, we shall focus on the problem of necessary connections
in nature, taken up in the Seventeenth Discussion, and Averroes'
grounds for supposing that causes are in fact efficacious. What pre-
cj~y"is£necessary,_connection? Is. it something' distinguishable-from
the"activity.. of"causes producing their- characteristic effects? What
kinds>QL,~vic!ence seem compellirtgto Averioes for esfablishing that
sbch'connectiomt"'e'Xist?- Again, what ontological commitments does
he make-in-hiS'"account-orcausal"efficacy and necessary connection
vis-d-vis 'those··of-the-Islamic philosophers and <iJ:GliazaJI,imdhow
do iliey-arrive-at_their_various-conclusions-aboutwhat there is?
Fourth, we shall try to determine what, for Averroes, explains the
regularity and continuity of observed causal processes. Why do cer-
tain powers and dispositions in things go together, while others do
not? What factors sustain the operation of ordinary cause/effect rela-
tions over time? And how are complex life processes to be accounted
for within his theory? Consideration of these questions will take us
into the domains of celestial mechanics and cosmology in order to
identify what Averroes regarded as the celestial links in the causal
chain. Here we shall turn to a variety of additional discussions, both
inside and outside the TahlIfut in order to clarify his views.
Fifth, we shall move beyond the realm of physics and consider
the difficult and controversial question of Divine causation, which
makes up the bulk of Discussion Three. In analyzing that source as
well as others, we shall want to know just how Averroes conceived of
God as the Agent and Maker of the universe. What sense, if any, is to
The Theory of Causal Efficacy 15
be made of his theory of eternal creation? Is Divine agency exercised
primarily through God's will or His intellect or some combination of
both? How are we to understand A'I'2rroes' claim that God's act of
knowing is itself causal? And, finally, did A'I'2rroes subscribe to the
philosophers' theory of emanation as an explanatory paradigm for
Divine causation?
Throughout our discussion we shall be concerned of course with
the question of internal coherence in A'I'2rroes' treatment of causal
efficacy. For example, we shall want to know whether his analysis is
coherent within each of the contexts in which he takes up causal
efficacy, namely, in sub lunar physics, celestial mechanics, and theology.
Is his O'I'2rall account coherent when all three contexts are taken
together? In other words, we want to know whether or not A'I'2rroes
has a root notion of causation which is applicable to all three domains
in the same sense or in different senses.
Our final concern, by way of evaluation, is to examine how suc-
cessfully A'I'2rroes' doctrine of causal efficacy meets the classical objec-
tions against the notion of necessary connections in nature. Specifi-
cally we shall try to see whether he has any convincing empirical
evidence to offer in support of causal necessity to counter the often
repeated claim that no such causal bond is e'l'2r actually obser'l'2d.
We must ask too if he presents any good reasons to suppose that the
notion of power is not a mysterious figment of the imagination or a
mere habit of mind. If we can ne'l'2r know from a thing's properties
just how it will beha'l'2, on what basis can A'I'2rroes speak of how
things must act? Lastly, does he ha'1'2 any grounds for alfirming neces-
sary causal connections at all, when it has been repeatedly shown
that the affirmation of the cause and the denial of the effect invol'1'2
no contradiction? What"""r else may be said for or against his doctrine,
its philosophical adequacy depends fundamentally on whether or not it
can meet and resol'1'2 these objections.
If, in the end, a coherent and convincing account emerges, or at
least the rudiments of one, we shall ha'1'2 ample grounds for viewing
A'I'2rroes' contribution to Western philosophy, not only in terms of
his long respected exegetical skills, but in terms of his own philo-
sophic originality as well. In addition, we shall ha'1'2 a new perspec-
ti'1'2 for interpreting A'I'2rroes' more well-known and contrO'l'2rsial the-
ories in other areas. But most important of all, in the process of
answering these questions, we shall ha'1'2 mO'l'2d beyond reporting
what A'I'2rroes said to the far more interesting task of understanding
what he meant and why he belie'l'2d it was true.
 Chapter Two

Averroes on the Logic of

Agents and Acts

The Literary Character of the Tahafut Debates

Averroes opens the Tahiifut af-Tahafut in a decidedly modest way. He

tells us that he intends to evaluate the validity and persuasiveness of
al-Ghazalf's claims in the Tahiifut af-Faliisifah and to show, more
specifically, that most of them fall short of being demonstrative and
certain.' Averroes commits himself to nothing more than this, not
even to a counter-exposition of his own views, as we might have
expected. Officially at least his work is presented as a purely critical
study.
Yet even a preliminary reading of the Tahiifut shows that it
abounds in extended references to views of Aristotle and the "ancients"
which Averroes often endorses as demonstrative. If we are to regard
the work as purely critical, therefore, it is puzzling to find so many
expository and speculative passages in it. More puzzling still is the
way in which Averroes presents these views. To state them unam-
biguously by reproducing the demonstrative arguments he claims for
them, contrasting his conclusions with those of al-GhazalI, and then
underscoring the contrasts would presumably have been the most
effective way to refute his opponent and vindicate the fafasifah. Yet
Averroes shies away from this. His presentations are often ambiguous.
He only alludes to demonstrations; and he often mutes the contrasts

17
18 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
between al-GhazaIi's positions and his own by remarks and formula-
tions that seem quite contradictory. In the work of a philosopher
known for his skills in exposition and exegesis, we may well wonder
why this is so.
To answer this question, it is helpful to begin by considering the
character of the audience Averroes was addressing in the TahlIfut
al-Tahiifut. For as he indicates in his discussion of Divine attributes,
the character and circumstances of his audience played a significant
role in his choice of how to proceed. In the course of his argument
there, Averroes draws an analogy between discussing certain kinds
of theoretical questions and taking either helpful or harmful nourish-
ment. Certain matters, he suggests, are like poison for some people
and like real nourishment for others. To the untutored masses, dis-
cussion of these matters may have lethal results in the sense that
exposure to them tends to undermine religious faith and generate
intense factional strife within the body politic. But to the philosopher,
skilled in the methods of argument and demonstration, these sarne
discussions are indispensable prerequisites for intellectual nourish-
ment and growth. Accordingly, if anyone gives such material to those
for whom it is really poison or if he withholds it from those for whom
it is really nourishment, he does them severe harm and deserves full
punishment in return. Developing his point further, he adds that,
...When the wicked and ignorant transgress and bring poison to the
man for whom it is really poison as if it were nourishment, then there
is need of a physician who through his science will exert himself to
heal that man. For this reason we have allowed ourselves to discuss
this problem [the Divine attributes] in such a book as this, and in any
other case we should not regard this as permissible to us; on the
contrary, it would be one of the greatest crimes, or a deed of the greatest
wickedness on earth [i.e., to speak openly about these matters if mali-
cious or ignorant people had not done harm in the first place], and the
punishment of the wicked is a fact well known in the Holy Law. And
since it is impossible to avoid discussion of this problem, let us treat it
in such a way as is possible in this place for those who do not possess
the preparation and mental tralning needed belore entering upon specu-
lation about it.'
Apparently Averroes is alluding here to the kinds of questions discussed
by al-Ghazalf in the Tahiifut al-Faliisifah. They represent the theoreti-
cal questions of metaphysics and natural science, and they certainly
include problems about Divine attributes. To the untutored masses,
who lack the natural disposition, steadfastness, and leisure for acquir-
ing scientific knowledge, the opinions treated in such discussions
On the Logic of Agents and Acts 19
represent poison. They are harmful, because discussion of such views
destroys popular belief in things Divine. It is therefore the duty of
such people to confine their attention to the simple words of the
Qur'lin and avoid consideration of these opinions altogether.
Those, h<JWe\er, who ha\e the requisite disposition, steadfastness,
and leisure, will find that such opinions constitute their \ery suste-
nance and life. To A\erroes, these individuals represent philosophers-
to-be, and insofar as they are competent to acquire scientific knowl-
edge by mastery of demonstrati\e procedures, they ha\e a positi\e
obligation to consult the works of the philosophers and to disc~r
the truth for themsel'.eS.3 To depri\e them of this nourishment, by
restricting access to and discussion of such works, produces results
e..ery bit as lethal for philosophers-to-be as exposure to theoretical
questions produces for the masses. Thus, A\erroes reser\eS special
censure for those per..erse and ignorant men who either dispense
poison to the masses or withhold nourishment from the philosophers,
or worst of all, who do both at once.
There is little doubt that he is referring here to al-GhazalI.
al-Ghazall had discussed these theoretical questions openly and
unsystematically in his Tahlifut and other works and, by charging the
philosophers with unbelief, called for suppression of their heresies.
In particular, A\erroes emphasizes that he had grossly misrepresented
the science of metaphysics and thereby denied many the possibility
of attaining happiness.' For just these reasons, A\erroes called upon
the imams of the Muslims
to forbid those of his [al-GhazaJi's] books which contain learned mat-
ter to all sa\e the learned, just as they ought to forbid demonstrati\e
books to those who are not capable of understanding them .... On the
other hand, their total prohibition obstructs the purpose to which the
Law summons, because it is a wrong to the best class of people and
the best class of beingss
This, then, is the legal and political remedy he proposes in response
to al-Ghazall's twofold offense.
But once the harm has been done, A\erroes feels compelled to
~dertake the physician's role in order to de..elop another remedy-an
mtellectual prescription in keeping with his skill. That is to say he
?ow considers it impossible not to speak about theoretical questi~ns,
If only to correct al-Ghazall's misrepresentations. But in doing so, he
~abors under ~ self-imposed restriction. Exposure to the genuine opin-
IOns of the philosophers is potentially as harmful to the mass of men
as exposure to distortions of their views. Anyone who mentions truths

20 AVERROES AND TIlE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
of this sort where they should not be mentioned transgresses, just as
one who withholds them from those to whom they should be men-
tioned.6 As a result, Averroes allows that what he will sayan these
subjects will be carefully suited, first, to what is possible in such a
place and "in such a book as this" and, second, to what the character
and training of his readers requires. What kind of book does he mean
then, and to whom is it addressed?
To take up the latter question first, it is obvious from all Averroes
has said that (1) the audience he wishes to address is familiar, at
least in a general way, with the opinions discussed by al-GhazaIi in
the Tahlifut al-Falasifah; (2) this audience is diversified with regard
to intellectual gifts, capacity for sustained and systematic investigation,
and available leisure; (3) it lacks competence in those sciences pre-
requisite to the study of metaphysical questions; and (4) his prospec-
tive readers labor under certain misconceptions about philosophy
and its demonstrative character, which Averroes feels a need to cor-
rect by means of his own Tahlifut. What emerges from this characteriza-
tion of Averroes' audience is that he is not writing for his fellow
philosophers. For however serious the theoretical disagreements
between philosophers may have been, it is most unlikely that Averroes
would presume to describe colleagues as untrained in logic, mathe-
matics, or natural science, or as being mistaken about the demon-
strability of the views of the "ancients." Once it is clear that Averroes'
Tahlifut was not directed to "the men of demonstration," we are in a
considerably better position to understand the character of the work
and the style in which it was written as well as the purposes his
difficult, often ambiguous, style is designed to fulfill.
As we have seen, Averroes refers to the Tahi'lfut as "such a book
as this" and thereby draws attention to the fact that it belongs to a
special literary genre. It is not an ordinary work which seeks to con-
vey information as directly as possible. For conveying information is
at most only one of two aims espoused by the author. At the end of
the work, he mentions them both: " .. .if it were not an obligation to
seek the truth for those who are entitled to it-and they are, as Galen
says, one in a thousand-and to prevent from discussion those who
have no claim to it, I would not have treated all this.'" Averroes states
in this final paragraph what the perceptive reader must have grasped
long before-that he has sought both to reveal and conceal the truth
at the same time, but with respect to two different kinds of readers.
If this is the case, there is little wonder that Averroes should
On the Logic of Agents and Acts 21
characterize the Tahiifut al-Tahiifut as simply a critical evaluation of
al-Ghazali's Tahiifut. He would hardly want to call public attention to
a more accurate statement of the unvarnished teachings of the
philosophers! This twofold aim likewise explains his surprisingly mod-
est introduction to a concise, systematic presentation of Aristotle's
views on natural science and metaphysics in the Third Discussion,
where he characterizes the material to follow as a summary of "some
commendable items and known premises, e""n though they are not
demonstrati""."8 A program of concealment, balanced against judi-
cious assertions of the truth, would obviously rule out the use of
demonstrati"" syllogisms to establish certain propositions conclushely
and in detail. Consistent with this requirement, A""rroes acknowl-
edges in one discussion that "...all this is the theory of the philoso-
phers on this problem, and in the way we have stated it here with its
proofs, it is a persuasi"" not a demonstrati"" statement. It is for you
to inquire about these questions in the places where they are treated
in the books of demonstration...."9 Thus, as a result of his desire to
do no more than help the 1000r of knowledge find the truth rather
than provide it for him outright, A""rroes exhorts his readers, as we
would expect, to study the sciences of both the philosophers and
their opponents, confident in the knowledge that those unsuited to
such pursuits would quickly tire of them,IO while those prepared for
such in'-"Stigations would ultimately disco.er the truth for themsel\es.
To facilitate this dual aim, A""rroes employed various methods of
concealment and disclosure.
We know that A""rroes was heir to and familiar with a long tradi-
tion of exoteric/esoteric writing by philosophers. II In such writings,
these thinkers sought, like A""rroes, to communicate certain truths
to a small group of individuals competent to deal with them, while at
the same time refraining from any O\ert challenge to the generally
accepted opinions of the multitude. To achie\e this end, they employed
a number of specific techniques. These inwl""d alluding to certain
doctrines only symbolically; scattering or suppressing the premises
of an argument; dealing with subjects outside their proper context;
sp~king enigmatically to call attention to significant points; trans-
posmg words and letters; deliberately using equiwcal terms' intro-
ducing contra~ictory premises by which to d.i\ert the reader; em~laying
extreme brevIty to state the truth; refraining from drawing obvious
conclusions, i.e., silence; and attributing one's own views to presti-
gious forebears. In view of A""rroes' stated program of writing the
22 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
Tahatut within this tradition of concealment and disclosure, it is surely
appropriate to try to understand the peculiarities in his discussions
of causation in the light of these well-known techniques.
Whatever his own preferred methods may have been, there IS
little basis for doubting that, in addition to his aim of writing a criti-
cal response to al-Ghazali, Averroes also sought to produce an eso-
teric exposition of demonstrative truths in the framework of an oth.er-
wise exoteric book. Here his aim was evidently to show that the genume
teachings of the philosophers on all of the issues raised b~ ~-Ghazalf
are in harmony with the words and intentions of the religiOUS law.
Some, of course, might question this harmony, but only demonstra-
tive men, that is, individuals familiar with the methods of demon-
stration, were in a position to see its justification.
.. .Anyone amongst the two opposing parties [the ~ahirites, who
rejected arguments from analogy in questions of religious law
and the People of Analogy, who accepted them] who inquir~ alter
these questions must either belong to the followers of proof, I.e., the
rationalists, or not; in the former case he will speak about them and
base his statements on demonstration, he will know that thiS way of
discussion is limited to the followers of proof, and he will know the
places in which the Holy Law gives to the people who possess .this kind
. of knowledge a hint about the conclusions to which demonstration leads;
in the latter case he will be either a believer or an unbelIever, If he IS a
believer he will know that to discuss those questions openly is forbid-
den by the Holy Law, and if he is an unbeliever, it is not difficult for the
followers of proof to refute him with the stringe~t proofs they P?ssess.
The rationalist must act in this way in every relIgIOn, but espeCially m
our Divine Revelation, which although it is silent on certain intellectual
problems nevertheless hints at the conclusi~ns. about them to which
demonstration leads, without, however, mentlonmg these problems m
its instruction of the masses.l2
For those competent to understand, scripture alludes to the very same
conclusions to which strict demonstrations lead and even employs
special methods of concealment when it addresses ~tself to ~~ .untu-
tored masses. Those who believe otherwise are either UnInItiated,
incompetent, or unbelievers. From explicit statements su~ as ~is
and numerous Qur'anic citations adduced in conjunction With philo-
sophic doctrines, we may characterize Averroes' third and final. ~im
in the Tahatut as an attempt to show the harmony between religion
and philosophy on theoretical grounds. The Tahatu: may th:refore
be understood as Averroes' theoretical defense of philosophy, Just as
the Fa$l al-Maq111 was his legal defense of philosophy.
On the Logic of Agents and Acts 23
Once it is established that a writer such as A~rroes subscribes
to an esoteric doctrine, s~al objections against any proposed state-
. ment of the doctrine immediately present themsehes. In the first place,
if this teaching is really meant to be a secret, no text or treatise
directed by the author to a popular audience could be used either to
confirm or refute the doctrine. Such works may perhaps be more or
less misleading about what A~rroes, the man, really belie~d, but
they cannot express his genuine views, because ex hypothesi the lat-
ter are a secret, and a secret made public, as e~ryone knows, is no
longer a secret.
. Secondly, e~n if we direct the inquiry not to what A~rroes, the
man, belie~, but to what his statements and arguments meant, his
methods of concealment would effecti~ly preclude our disc~ring
what the secret teaching really was. For how does one choose after
all, which of two contradictory statements by an author exp~esses
his meaning, or which of s~ral interpretations of a symbol or an
equimcal term is the "right' one? Repetition of an opinion is no guaran-
tee that an esoteric writer held it. It may indicate the opposite.
More~r, a search for the most sub~rsi~ doctrines which he men-
tions simply begs the question. For the author may surely mention
and e~n attack certain sub~rsi~ positions which are not his at all.
In effect, this body of objections assumes that there are no adequate
criteria for deciphering an esoteric doctrine e~n when it has been
committed to writing.
. Last~y, e~n if a judicious in~tigation of texts re~ls a body of
VIews which are coherent with one another, consistent with the author's
unusual use of language, and, of course, more or less heterodox vis-a-vis
the beliefs of the masses, how can we be certain that this theory is
the doctrine the author tried to express? Perhaps it is nothing more
than the outcome of a modern exercise in "pe~rse ingenuity." As
George F. Hourani has obse~, "Any conclusions about the secret
~eaning of a piece of writing and any reconstruction of its composi-
tion must from the nature of the case be accepted with caution more
especi"!ly since the challenge of disc~ing and deciphering a s~et is
~ttractl,~ to scholars."l3 The basis for caution here is surely that the
secret once re~led, may ~ry well be the interpreter's secret, and
not the author's.
Now none of these difficulties strikes me as fatal to the task of
i?terp~eting a d~ument such as A~rroes' Tahllfut. The first objec-
tion falls, because It confuses the secret teaching with particular beliefs,
24 AVERROES AND TIlE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
that is, unexpressed private opinions, that Averroes allegedly held, as
opposed to identifying it with propositions expressed in his works
which only demonstrative men could understand. By assigning the
task of deciphering the doctrine to psychological investigation rather
than philosophical analysis, it guarantees that the project will fail.
For alas, Averroes is no longer with us, and he has taken his beliefs,
secrets and all, with him. But the historian of philosophy is not a
psychologist, nor is his task to record or relate thoughts; it is rather
to interpret the meaning of what a philosopher has said. 14 Since the
Tahafut tells us, within the limits of transcription and translation,
what Averroes said, it is from this foundation that the task of interpreta-
tion must begin. Moreover, as we have seen from the text itself, the
opinions Averroes sought to conceal were not meant to be hidden
from absolutely everyone. Demonstrative men and philosophers-to-be
are clearly the intended recipients of the secret doctrine, and they
are repeatedly pronounced competent to decipher it.
The second objection asks, as we have noted, for an independent
criterion by which the publicly prohibited teaching could be identi-
fied and corroborated. The Tahafut itself, of course, cannot be eJq)ected
to provide this standard, inasmuch as it is the primary vehicle of
concealment. To have identified the opinions in question clearly and
openly would have defeated Averroes' purpose in concealing them.
Thus, the point of the objection is well taken, but it falters on the
assumption that no such criterion exists. It does exist, and Averroes
tells us what it is: "... the proper place to discuss these questions is
in demonstrative books. "15 These, of course, are first and foremost
the works of Aristotle on which Averroes had devoted so many years
in writing his own exhaustive commentaries. Consequently, whenever
the various devices of esoteric writing leave Averroes' meaning on a
theoretical question in doubt, the standard both for resolving the
doubt and interpreting the language which expresses it, will be
Averroes' own comments on the relevant issue in his commentaries.
Inasmuch as this is the procedure Averroes himself recommends, we
shall follow it wherever necessary in interpreting his remarks.
The final objection asks whether we have the right to be sure
that an interpretation of Averroes' doctrine accurately presents Averroes'
doctrine. This question, of course, is hardly confined to problems in
understanding Averroes in particular, or even esoteric/exoteric writ-
ers in general. It is an epistemological question which applies to any
historical or exegetical inquiry. As such, it deserves far more exten-
On the Logic of Agents and Acts 25
si"" comment than I can demte to it here. But I can at least respond
by arguing that the right to be sure of the accuracy of an interpreta-
tion is an "earned," not a "natural" right. It is earned by the clearest
possible exposition and analysis of the relevant evidence that is in
keeping with the author's most characteristic views. It is retained
morea<.er only as long as one knows of no other interpretation which
is more evident in its capacity to resol"" the same issues. "What can
fai~ly be claimed," as Prof. Hourani has put it, "is that the interpre-
ta~lOn ... ma.kes sense and is :onsistent with the rest of his thought. lf
thIS be so, It can stand untIl a better hypothesis is worked OUt."16
With the goal of de""loping just such an interpretation of A""rroes'
doctrine of causation and agency, we tum now to his discussion of
the proper use of these notions.
The Context and Structure of Averroes' Criteriological Analysis
One of the most important contra<.ersies between the theologians
~d philos?phers of medieval Islam stemmed from their di""rgent
mterpretatlOns of the language of the Qur'an, particularly when it
speaks of God in causal terms such as Creator and Agent. Both the
philosophers and al-Ghazalf agreed that God is properly designated
by these terms, but they disagreed sharply a<.er what these and related
terms mean t.
The main elements of their disagreement were presented in the
Third Discussion of al-Ghaziill's Tahiifut, which takes up the philoso-
phers' assertion that God is the Agent and Maker of the world and that
the world is His product and act. When A'-"'IToes later reproduced virtu-
ally all of the original discussion in the Tahiifut al-Tahiifut he added
both his own criticisms of the opposing positions as well a~ cautious
attempts to explain how the philosophers were to be understood
While ~e pr?blem is manifestly theological in character, ~any
0: the conSIderatIOns advanced in the individual debates bear quite
dl~ectly on the meaning of causal language and the nature of causal
ef.hcacy: We find, particularly in the first two debates in the Third
DISCUSSIon, a fairly rigorous attempt at conceptual analysis in which
each of the parties to the discussion attempts to map out the logical
geography of his own central concepts and terms of reference as well
as those of his opponents. The search for standards, criteria, norms,
rules, paradigms, and procedures for verification thus figures prom-
26 AVERROES AND THE MITAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
On the Logic of Agents and Acts
27
inently in each debate, This search, moreover, distinguishes the ini-
tial sections of the Third Discussion as an essentially criteriological
~e P~rti~ip~nts present their respective definitions of what an a
IS by mdlcatmg the defining characteristics of agents d/ gent
study, As such, these sections are of considerable value in delineat- and b ' , an Or causes
y exammmg the range of entities to which the d f' 't'
ing the respective positions of the philosophers, al-Ghazall and In th e second part, '
thiS analysis is carried on b e 101 Ions apply ' '
Averroes, and it is logical that we should tum to them first. 'f' ,
cl assl IcatlOns of agents in relation to ca y means of logical
db' ,
The problem with which the discussion is concerned can be stated th uses, an y exammmg briefl
e use of causal language in everyday life, y
briefly as follows, Both al-Farabl and Avicenna had defended the Aristo- The second debate in tum is concerned with h
telian view that the world is eternal. By this they meant that the as effects, It, too, consists of two parts, The first ~e:lnat~: of aC,ts
~e~: of theirdlodgiCal and temporal relations to agent:, ~e :~~~~~
world always has existed and always will exist, because it is the nec-
essary effect of God, the eternal First Cause, Since this eternal First n uces an ISCusses a famous anal d' ,
Cause is a "creator" by His very essence or nature, the world, con- al relation of agents and acts and 0?y e,almg With the tempor-
ceived as His creation, is necessarily co-eternal with Him, Properly "temporal", relations between God a::~~o~:~, applicability to the
speaking, in their view, it eternally emanates from Him, This position
The third debate, which is the longest of the th
of the philosophers implied that the Deity neither could nor did in analyzes five fundamental objections to the th ree, presen~s and
fact miraculously and freely create the universe as it now exists out also includes two lengthy excurses b Av eory of ema~~tlOn, It
of nothing at some particular point in the past. By maintaining this principles of the Peripatetics and hi y , erro~~, ~ummanzmg the
view, of course, they were placing themselves directly at odds with theOlogy, For t h e ' s major cntlclsms of Ash'arite
the powerful Ash'arite theologians, who held precisely the opposite two debates, since ::ec~n~u,r maIO co~c,ern is with only the first
view: that creation was indeed voluntary, miraculous, and ex nihilo, which the philosopher; al_GhalI~ :he expliCit and implicit criteria by
Serious as this step was in itself, however, from the Ash'arite effects, agents and acts: aza Tand Averroes, speak of causes and
standpoint, the philosophers went still further by claiming that their
view was consistent, and, indeed, identical with the real meaning of AGENTs AND AGENCY
Qur'anic statements that God was the Creator and Agent of the
universe, and the latter His creation and act. It is precisely this claim The Philosophers' Conception of Ag

~~~~~: !~:~!~s:;;a~e;~ ~~~ttaine~~;~~e~~~~' ~~i~:~i~~o:

which al-Ghazall brands as a fraud (talbis, illusio) at the outset of
the discussion, In affirming or denying this charge, all the parties to
the debate are forced to state the standards by which they take up cause Given th ' , (rna luI, causaturn) arises from a
their respective positions and the considerations which prompt their folIo~s from H7~ ~ncePtlon of causation, this means that the world
y a necessary connection (blZil an d --
choice of standards, Thus, many an otherwise hidden assumption in consecutione necessaria)17 which God ' m. ,arunyan,
other discussions of the Tahafut finds its explicit affirmation here, The relation involved is e I' 'u cannot be Imagmed to sever.
From a structural standpoint the Third Discussion is composed between a man and h' hXPd ICI Y compared to that which holds
IS s a ow and the d '
of three debates:-hf thefitst, al-GhazalI attempts to show that the each agent produces its effect in a f sun an ItS rays, whereby
philosophers' claim that God is the Agent and Maker-of the world pIes are applied to God's relati con muous w.ay, When these exam-
and the world His act; is inconceivable from the standpoint of the for the philosophers the t' on to the world, It becomes clear that
, , en Ire world ema t '
agent: In the seCOrict, he tries to'establish the same conclusion from Hlm,ls Here, an additional conse , n a es or proceeds from
the standpoint orthe act. In the third; he seeks to reduce the philoso- the effect which follows cont' quelnce IS left unstated, namely, that
muous y and neces 'I f
phers' position to-complete"absurdity by exposing internal contra- na I Cause is itself eternal Still th h'l san y rom an eter-
dictions-in the relation which-they assert between the Divine Agent g:st that the world, or an; effe~t fO: ~~tOSOPher~ do not wish, t~ sug-
and His'!lct;.jn short-,.theirtheoIY of emanation, Simply because it is characterized a matter, IS n,ecessary 10 Itself
The initial debate itself consists of two parts, In the first of these, acterized as necessary in its lf : necessary, Deity alone is char-
e Or necessary of existence" • W h'l
Ie
28 AVERROES AND THEMITAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
only that which has no necessary existence in itself, but which exists
through another entity as its cause, is properly speaking an object of
action (maffIl, actum), that is, an effect. The cause of its existence is
designated as an agent regardless of whether it acts by nature or
voluntarily. Stated formally, an agent is the cause of existence of any
entity which is not a necessary existent in itself.19
This exceedingly brief characterization of the philosophers' con-
ception of agency by al-Ghazali reveals that he is primarily inter-
ested in their theory of essential, efficient causation. From this and
other statements of the theory by Avicenna, it becomes clear that
agents and efficient causes are not distinguished as such. Agents may
act voluntarily or by nature, but neither mode of action specifies just
what it is to be an agent. What does distinguish an agent is the fact
that it produces the existence of its effect as such, and not merely
one of the forms of motion or change studied by natural scientists,
although it can do that too. In the sphere of natural philosophy the
operation of agents or efficient causes is understood to express itself
only in producing motion. In metaphysics, however, an agent is stud-
ied insofar as it manifests itself in producing being, that is, the exist-
ence of an effect entirely distinct from the agent which produces it.'"
This activity occurs only insofar as the efficient cause or agent exists in
a state of actuality and its effect is, in itself, possible. Once these
conditions are fulfilled, the cause or agent exists in a state of whole-
ness or plenitude C'alajumlah. concursus), from which "it necessarily
follows that the other has existence from the existence which it [the
cause] has essentially."21 In other words, when the cause is fully actual
and "filled with being" in super-abundance, it must overflow and
thereby produce another existent, distinct from itself, which was only
possible prior to its act. Here, the philosophers' characteristic refer-
ences to plenitude, overflow, and emanation in their account of agency
introduce the notions of necessity and possibility which lie at the
foundation of their theory, and especially that of Avicenna.
Before coming into existence, both agents and their effects are
said to be merely "possible in themselves." After coming into being,
they are said to be "necessary through another," that is, through an
agent or efficient cause, while remaining "possible in themselves." In
addition, the fact of their coming into existence, as we have seen, is
described in terms of their "following necessarily" from prior causes,
being "necessarily connected" with them, Or being "necessary conse-
quences" of them. What is meant by these notions?
On the Logic of Agents and Acts 29
That which is called "possible in itself" or the possible existent
(al-mumkin fi dhfItihi) is something which can be supposed to exist
or not to exist without involving any impossibility such as a self-
contradiction. As such, it is purely contingent.22 But while it allows
for both its existence and its non-existence, it entails neither. Indeed
"'the possible of existence' is that which has no entailment of an;
kind." For prior to existence, the possible in itself has no existence
whatever, not even the attenuated kind of existence associated with
the domain of pure or neutral essences. lf it had a prior existence of
thi.s sort, Avicenn~ argues, it would have no need for any subsequent
eXlstence.23 But If something possible in itself should enter into
existence: it does so only through the agency of an external cause
"which makes its existence outweigh its non-existence."24
Once a possible is made to exist, it is said to be "necessary of
existence," (wiijib al-wujfId), but with a qualification. It is necessary
through something other than itself (al-wajib bi-ghayrihi), the cause
or agent. To suppose the non-existence of what exists in this sense is
impossible, according to Avicenna, and not merely false. For the nec-
essary of existence entails existence. To illustrate this point, he offers
two examples which he evidently regards as essentially similar.
... what is necessary of existence but not by itself [i.e., any entity
other than God, who IS necessary of existence by Himself] is such that
If something other than it were postulated it would become necessary
of eXistence. A:- .examples, 4 is necessary of existence not by itself but
on ~e suppOSitIOn of 2+2, and burning is necessary of existence not
by Itself but ~n the supposition of contact on the part of a naturally
aclive force With a naturally passive force,l mean one which burns and
[one which] is burned."
Thus, Avicenna holds that relations between ideas and between mat-
ters of fact like cause and effect exhibit one and the same kind of
n~cessity, although it has both logical and ontological manifestations.
GIVen a particular set of premises or causal conditions, one conse-
quence must invariably result, and the outcome can never be falsified.
The bond between cause and effect as actual existents turns out to
be one of entailment.26
~th this in mind Avicenna argues that when the proper causal
condltlOn~ obtain and no impediment intervenes, an agent not only
produces Its proper effect, but the two are logically coexistent with
ont; anoth~r. This is to say that the relationship between them is
reCiprocal In the sense that the existence of one can be inferred
from the existence of the other. Such a claim applies especially to
30 AVFAAOES AND 1HEMETAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
cases in which the cause is unique in relation to its effect, that is, it
alone produces that particular effect. This seems to be the meaning
of al-Ghazalr's statement on behalf of the philosophers that the rela-
tion between God and the world as cause and effect cannot be severed
or separated. The existence of the world presupposes an efficient
cause or Agent, while the existence of an efficient cause as such
necessitates the existence of its proper effect. However, when the same
effect can be produced by any of several efficient causes or agents,
the relation is no longer reciprocal, for no single cause can be invari-
ably inferred from the effect. The reciprocity relation is not restored
until one element, common to the variety of possible causes, is iden-
tified and treated as the proximate cause or agent."
This same reciprocity relationship between cause and effect may
also be interrupted by the intervention of various impediments.
Nevertheless, for AvicelH1a, such exceptions to the unique and invaria-
ble character of causal necessity are largely restricted to a single
domain, the realm of generation and corruption. For here the vari-
ability attendant on the material natures of things results in fre-
quent intersections between lines of causal influence so that the effi-
cacy of some natural causes may be impeded by that of others, while
non-natural causes, such as the human deliberative faculty, do not
invariably produce one kind of effect in any case.28 Still, each of these
instances represents for Avicenna the exception that proves the rule,
for even the impediment impedes in keeping with its essential nature
under appropriate causal conditions, while the deliberations and
choices of human beings are likewise consistent with their own natures.
For al-Ghazalf, however, these counter-instances represent something
quite different: a fundamental flaw in the philosophers' conception
of agents and in their entire doctrine of essential necessary causation.
al-Ghazii {['s Conception of Agents and Agency. al-Ghazalr's response
amounts to a demurrer on criteriological grounds. The philosophers,
in his opinion, are unclear about the primary meaning of the term
"agent." An agent (fii'il, agens) is not simply the cause of existence
for something merely possible in itself. Rather, an agent is someone
who wills or wishes to perform an act, wills the action by choice, and
has knowledge of the object willed. In other words, the agent mani-
fests four defining characteristics: (1) an act proceeds from him or
may be attributed to him; (2) he wills, wishes, or desires the act; (3)
he does so by choice or deliberation; (4) he has knowledge of the
particular action or object willed. In another formulation of the same
On the Logic of Agents and Acts 31
criteria, he takes the further step of declaring that "from the stand-
point of the agent, the case is such that it is impossible for him not to
be willing, choosing, and cognizant of the thing which he wills.''29
The philosophers' confusion in calling every efficient cause an
agent, and every effect an act lies in this: such an identification pre-
cludes our saying that an inanimate object has no act (ti'/, operatio).
In fact, however, this claim is easily made, and the statement that
action is characteristic of animate beings only is both well-known
and true.30 Thus, the paradigm case of an agent for al-GhazaIr is a
living person, and more specifically, it would seem, a human being,
who performs some action voluntarily. Similarly, the paradigm case
of an act would be a person's voluntary behavior. Unless one under-
stands this, al-GhazaIr implies, he will not be able to use such words
properly and precisely. Indeed, the resultant errors can be quite
serious. For if the philosophers' criteria and paradigms are applied
to God and His relation to the world, the result is that God can no
longer be regarded as an agent with the aforementioned attributes.
He is comparable rather to an inanimate, natural cause. And al-Ghazalf
himself charges that the philosophers' view asserts that God desires
and wills nothing and, by implication, that He has no real act, since
whatever does proceed from Him is said to follow by necessity.
Consequently, he insists that when Avicenna calls inanimate things
such as natural tendencies, inclinations, and other such phenomena
"agents," he does so only metaphorically or derivatively from the
example of voluntary human agents.31 While this usage may be com-
monplace, the philosophers are mistaken to think it is literally correct.
al-GhazaIr's criteria for agents are carefully chosen both for what
they include and what they exclude. In three of the four criteria he
challenges the identification of agent with essential efficient causes.
The true agent wills his act, while efficient causes are said to operate
by the necessity of their natures. For al-GhazaIr, moreover, the will is
a quality (Jifah, attributum) whose character involves differentiating
between things and choosing one thing from what is exactly similar
to it, without any external factor determining the choice.32 The phi-
losophers deny this altogether, claiming that the actions of both vol-
untary and natural efficient causes are always determined at least in
part by some external factor. al-Ghazalr's conception of an autono-
mous will thus allows him to argue that God could indeed have cre-
ated the world at a specific point in the past, despite the fact that all
points of time are exactly similar, because His will neither requires
32 AVFRROFS AND THEMETAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
nor allows for determination ab extra. He simply began to create at
the particular point which he willed. This same definition is extended
to human agents as well, when al-Ghazalf suggests that a hungry man
confronted by two exactly similar dates will not stand back and starve,
because of his philosophical scruples. By exercising his autonomous
will, he will surely choose one date first and eat. Thus, no true agent
can lack will according to al-GhazalL
Unlike the case of will, no explicit definition of choice is presented,
but it is evident from the context that choice involves at least the
psychological facts of deliberating or weighing alternatives and
selecting one by the exercise of will. To choose is to limit the alterna-
tives to one. Again, it is implied, the philosophers go astray. For the
natural causes they call agents cannot choose between alternative
acts.
Choice, moreover, cannot be exercised unless a third criterion is
satisfied. The agent must be cognizant of the alternatives before him.
This implies that he must know the particular options and/or objects
from which he chooses what he wishes. Here also al-Ghazalr presents
a requirement for all genuine agents, which not all whom the philoso-
phers name as agents can satisfy. Surely natural efficient causes can-
not meet this test. They are inanimate. More important, it seems that
Deity cannot fulfill it either. For in the philosophers' view. the most
that can be said positively about God's knowledge of the many particu-
lars in a given species is that He knows them "in a universal way,"
not as particulars per se. While this doctrine is not without obscurities,
what it asserts basically is that God's conceptual knowledge of particu-
lars extends only to entities which are the sole members of their
species and to those events which are attributable to such entities
exclusively, that is, the entities and events of the celestial domain.
God has no knowledge whatever of transient particulars in the realm
of generation and corruption.33 Consequently, by al-GhazalI's unquali-
fied criterion of knowing, which he applies without differentiation, it
seems, both to human agents and God, the God of the philosophers
is no agent.
Finally, the act is said to proceed from the agent. This criterion
stipulates that the genuine agent is the source, origin, and tenninus
a quo of his acts. Accordingly, any verifiable claim of agency requires
an essential reference to an agent. Taken by itself, the philosophers
and al-Ghazalf seem to have no quarrel about this condition. Indeed,
both use the same expression for the relation of the act to its agent.
On the Logic of Agents and Acts 33
It "proceeds" Or "emanates" (ya¥iuru, emanat) from him as its source.
If there is any dispute here, and we shall later see tha t there is it
~once~ns the extension or denotation of the term "agent," not 'its
mtenslOn or connotation. al-Ghazalf and the philosophers have radi-
cally opposed views as to how many true agents there really are.
What they do not dispute is that acts derive from or flow from their
agents.
~e !o~r criteria which al-Ghazalf submits are obviously meant
to be Individually necessary and collectively sufficient for the identi-
~icat.ion of agents. But are they? Any attempt to answer this question
mevltably focuses our attention on an elementary fact. One may have
~owledge. of ~arious courses of action, choose one of them, fervently
Will or deSire ItS occurrence, and even have conclusive evidence that
it does occur or proceed from the supposed agent, but this is not to
sa~ ~at he has made it happen. It may have happened by pure
cOIncidence, or perhaps because someone or something else made it
happen. In short, all four criteria could be satisfied without the agents
having acted at all.
Willing a particular state of affairs to occur, after all, does not
make it so, not even if we know precisely what it is we wish and have
e~cl~ded other alternatives. What is curiously and characteristically
ml~mg from al-GhazalI's account of agents is any reference to power,
efficacy, or ma~ing things happen. He does not speak of agents,
generally, as dOIng, performing or producing anything. Rather, acts
proceed from them or are referable to them. Concomitantly, he refrains
from calling the will, seemingly the most dynamic element in his
criteri~logy of agents, a faculty or power as connoted by the Arabic
term quwah, from qawiya, "to be powerful," "vigorous," or "have influ-
ence over." Instead, he calls it a quality or attribute. Only in the case
of God does he mention power in terms of determining things to
OCcur.
.. :11.'e world exists, in th~ way.it exists, in its time, with its qualities,
and m Its spac.e, by the Dlvme Will and will is a quality which has the
ch~racter of differentiating one thing from another, and if it had not
thiS charac~er, power in itself would suffice [to differentiate between
exactly. Similar points in time so as to create the universe.] But, since
power IS equally related to the contraries and a differentiating princi.
pIe IS needed to differentiate one thing from a similar, it is said that
the Eternal POssesses besides His power a quality which can differenti-
ate betwee~ tw~ similar~.34 (emphasis added)
Clearly the Will differentiates, while power enacts. This added factor
 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
34
of power, so obvious in al-Ghazalr's treatment of Divine age~cy, is
altogether missing from his account of agents in gene:~l. The dIscrep-
ancy should not be overlooked, since it bears slgmflcantly on the
question of who counts as a genuine agent. .
Averroes' Conception of Agents and Agency. Respondmg to the
philosophers' and al-Ghaziili's conflicting accounts of agency, Ave~oes
criticizes both views. Still, his remarks leave no doubt that he differs
with al-Ghaza li far more than with the philosophers. In the first place,
the proposition that an agent can only be one who wil~s, choos~,
and knows that which he wills is not self-evident, a malor defect If
one aims at demonstrative truth.35 Furthermore, it cannot be recog-
nized as a definition of the Maker of the universe without a demon-
stration. Otherwise, it would be correct to apply a judgment ~bout
what is observed in the empirical realm. to what is _h~?den .I~ ~e
Divine realm. In fact, the philosophers relect al-Ghazah s deitmtlOn
whereby willing, choosing, and knowing have the same meaning for
both observable agents and God.
Confining himself to observable agents, Averroes argues that w~
see various things which act and exert influence. These may be claSSI-
fied as belonging to one of two kinds .
... One which performs exclusively one thing and thi~ essentially, for
instance warmth which causes heat and coldness whIch causes cold;
and this kind is called by the phil6sophers natural agents. The seco~d
kind of agents are those that perform a certain act at one tIme and Its
opposite at another; these, acting only out of Imowledge and dehbe~
ation, are called by the philosophers voluntary and selective agents.
Properly speaking, God does not act in either of ~ese ways, because
unlike all other observed, empirical agents, He IS not generable or
corruptible, but eternal. Hence the name "agent," as ordin~~ily
understood, cannot be applied indifferently to both the empmcal
and the Divine. But it does not follow for Averroes, that what cannot
be said with the same meaning about two radically different c~ses,
cannot therefore be meaningfully said. To deny that God acts as either
a natural or voluntary agent acts is not to deny that God acts. a~ all.
Consequently, al-Ghazalfs definition of agency fails, becau.se. It IS at
once too narrow and too broad. It is too narrow, becaus: It Ig~ores
the efficacy which we observe natural causes to exert m ~rdl~ary
experience. It is too broad, because it applies the same cnten~ of
agency to radically incommensurable beings-transient human bemgs
and the Deity. As a result, it is totally false.
On the Logic of Agents and Acts 35
To remedy these defects, Averroes presents a definition of his
own. Noting that agents are one of the four kinds of causes to which
the philosophers subscribe, he states that "an agent is what causes
some other thing to pass from potency to actuality and from non-
existence to existence; this actualization occurs sometimes from delib-
eration and choice, sometimes by nature ...."'7
This definition differs from al-Ghazall's in several important
respects. (I) It takes natural as well as voluntary efficient causes
into account, because both are observed to exert influence on things.
(2) It is formulated in such a way that it can be applied to Deity
without specifically comparing Him to empirical agents. Averroes does
not present voluntary and natural efficient causes as exhausting the
ways in which things might be caused to pass from potency to act,
and from non-being to being. Other modes of genuine agency, such
as Divine agency, are thus admissible in this context. (3) Averroes'
definition makes explicit reference to potency and act, whereby the
agent is said to exert influence, and to draw something from one
state to another. All agents so conceived have the power to make
things happen. They can initiate changes of various sorts and can
bring things into being.38 They are, in this respect, much more than
mer~ loci from which acts are said to proceed, as al-Ghazali suggested.
For If acts proceed from the agents Averroes describes, it is only
because they themselves produce such acts.
This new definition also differs in important ways from that
pre~ented in the name of the philosophers. (I) In the first place, it
omits any reference to the modal categories of possibility and neces-
sity. While Avicenna allowed that one of the meanings of possibility,
as he used the term, was identical with "what is in potentiality," he
nonetheless noted that this was peripheral to his interests in meta-
physics.39 (2) Averroes does not restrict agents or efficient causes to
t?e production of existence as such. He speaks rather of the transi-
tIOn from potency to act, which applies to all cases of motion or
~ange for an Aristotelian, and only then does he refer to the transi-
tion from non-being to being, that is, generation and corruption, which
even transient efficient causes can bring about. Thus, for Averroes
what all agents produce is motion or change, whether this effect i~
manifest in change of place, quality, or quantity, or in new substances
altogether. Avicenna had sought to distinguish his account of agency
from t?at of t?e natura.l s,:ientists, who, he claims, identified agents
exclUSively With the pnnclples of motion and even went so far as to
 On the Logic of Agents and Acts 37
AVFRROES AND THEMEfAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
36
fro~ ~eir effects, Avicenna's notion of a single kind f .
argue that generation and corruption are motions. While he does which IS equaJly expressible
. in both log'lca I and causa I relations
o. necessity
breaks
not deny that agents cause motions, his main point is that in meta-
necessa~i1;~~~;n~~~
down. Th e conclUSIOns of sound and vard ..
physics, what agents properly cause is existence, as his definition attached to their premises, and IS true, remain
stipulates. (3) Finally, Averroes makes no mention of necessary con- they are contained, as the philosophers would say in ththem, be~use
nection in his definition, and he denies outright that the world ema- The argument amounts to an unfold in ..' ose premises.
nates or proceeds from God by a necessary connection like the one But if an effect is detached from it ~1?r.denvatlOn of the conclusion.
by which a shadow proceeds from a man, or beams proceed from stiII called necessary its occur s e IClent cause, even though it is
. , r e n c e cannot be t d
the sun, or downward motion proceeds from the nature of the stone. unfoldmg of what was contained in the c . cons ;ue as an
All these comparisons are based upon the notion that an action is overflow, nor is the efficacy of the .a
ause . .IS not, In short, an
not separate (or separable) from its agent, and he regards this view other account of necessary conne~~i~:t ~s°th°ted Ifn Its plen.itude. Some
An .. ere ore reqUired
as quite false. An agent qua agent is by common consent separated .examInatlOn of Averroes' attem . .
(munfa~l, separatur) from its act." present an alternative account properl ~t Ito resolve the Issue and
What does Averroes mean by separation in this context? Perhaps What can be said at this 'uncture y e on~s to the next chapter.
he means numerical distinctness or non-identity, for it is generally standard of separation b;tw ' however, IS that he applies the
accepted that agent and act are two separate entities. But according hypothesi if all agents een agent and act universally. Thus ex
, are separate from their acts d G .
to this interpretation there is no disagreement between him and the agent, then He too is separate fro H' an od IS an
philosophers. Avicenna too insists on separation so conceived, since his meaning is evidently that G ~. IS act, namely the world. Here,
the bestowal of existence is by definition directed toward something material. In other words God' 0 .IS separate from the world qua
, IS an Incorporeal agent
distinct from the agent. lf there is a real difference of opinion, then, Averroes' use 01 the term "se ara ... . .
an absolute way. Both God and p ..te IS thus eqUivocal, but not in
it is not about non-identity.
Another sense of separation, however, is suggested by the philo- detached from their acts. But :~~t;ICal a~~nts are separate. that is,
sophers' three examples of necessary connection, which clarifies the separate as is God th empIrIcal agents are causally
, , ey are not also in I .
point at issue. In all three cases, the act or effect is directly attached separate from matter as God' th h corporea, that IS, totally
, IS oug t to be
to the agent and quite literally proceeds from it. The shadow extends Beyond this, his overall criticism 01 th h:
directly from the man to the darkened surface on which it is cast. of separability leaves the im ressio th e p Ilosophers on the issue
Light rays proceed likewise all the way from the sun to the surface aJ-GhazaJI's view Wh'lle the p . n at Averroes has moved toward
. re IS more tha utI"
on which they are reflected. Again, the natural downward motion of that he in fact bel'leved . n s IClent evidence to show
In necessary con f b
the stone is entirely attached to the stone so long as it moves as a effects, there is also every nec Ions etween causes and
result of its own weight. Thus, Averroes' assertion that agents and underplay his disagreement ~~oa~ ~ su~~ect that he also wished to
acts are really separated means, at the very least, that they are Averroes' comments on separabiIi- azah a~ much as possible. Thus,
fold aim of alerting thoughtful h'l ty ar~ deSigned to achieve his two-
detached or detachable from one another. He denies that they are
linked by any mysterious ontological bond which derives from the while concealing the extent oid.1
osophlcal readers to his true opinion
former and ultimately constitutes the latter. What he is calling into most prominent theologians of II~greetmhent b;~een himself and the
Th "'h'1 am, e Ash antes
question is apparently Avicenna's model for necessary and essential e n I osophers on the Conce tual An . .
efficient causation -the plenitude/overflow model, whereby the over- Following upon their characterizatio 1 alYSls of Agents and Causes.
flow is directly attached to the overflowing source as its cause. As a ~e existence of something else whi~ an agent as that which causes
means of explaining how agents produce their effects, the model is Itself, the philosophers proceed to I h~s no necessary existence in
inappropriate; it is metaphorical at best.
twocoIIectivelyexhaustiveandmut~a~~Slfy ~ge.nts as a genus having
A further consequence of this denial, which Averroes does not causes and natural causes Th th I !'exc uSlvespecies-voluntary
. e eo ogIans, they claim, have no basis
discuss in this context, deserves mention. If agents are really detached
 AVERROES AND TIlE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
On the Logic of Agents and Acts 39
38
the Deity as an animate and volunta b· ..
for challenging this division of the concept, since it is exactly similar their own view. Linguistic conside ~ emg, which IS contrary to
to their own legal classification of acts into those performed with an case for including natural causes ~a~n~, therefore, advance their
4l
instrument and those performed without an instrument. The cor- weaken their case for identifying Gmd e arger class of agents, but
_ a as a non-voluntary
rectness of both classifications is evident from language. aI-Gnazan on the Conceptual AnalYS1S. f agent.
The expression "an act which occurs by nature" involves no self- sistent with
. his criteria for agents I Gh ~ Agents and
,a - azalf denies th t Causes. Con-
contradiction, since the phrase "by nature" does not exclude the whatever IS an agent, and every effect . . a every cause
notion of act, any more than "performed with an instrument" excludes we could not say, as is commo . adn .act. For If thiS were the case,
o n m 0' mary usage th t· .
it. On the contrary, "by nature" merely specifies and explains the th mgs have no acts whereas animate th. , a mammate
kind of act involved. Similarly, the expression, "an act which occurs happens that inanimate objects are calle~ngs do ~a~e acts. When it
voluntarily" is not redundant; it merely specifies the kind of action aphorical usage. I~ reality, acting tend. a?:nts, I: I~ only by a met-
involved, in the same way that "performed without an instrument" pertain only to living beings 43 C mg, strlVmg, wdhng, and desiring
sian of agents into natural a~d onlsequentl , the philosophers' divi-
y
specifies it. To stipulate, therefore, that willing, choosing, and know-
ing are presupposed by any legitimate definition of acts is to disre- " I.. vo untary species slmpl ·11
... t IS as If one were to sa th , . . ,. YWi not do.
gard the facts of ordinary Arabic usage by ruling out of court a subdivided into willing accom ~ at wllhng IS a genus which is
thoroughly intelligible and commonly used expression, "natural act." and willing without knowle/g:n~~d~~ kn~wledg~ of the ~bj~ct willed,
This is a serious error, since what the word "agent" means can because will necessarily ·Impl· kn 10bJect wdled. This IS wrong
. . les ow edge and I·k . '
be known only from language, and language reveals that agents are sanly Implies will....... ' I eWlse act neces-
always divisible into the voluntary and non-voluntary. Thus when fire . The point surely is that the characteri· .
burns wood, it acts no less truly than a man acts when he cuts the tams appear in the definition of all of it stlcs.whlch the genus con-
wood. Each one performs its proper act: burning, cutting, etc. Ordi- of agents by al-Ghaza\i's standard sh s specl~ .. Hence all species
nary Arabic provides many additional examples of other non-voluntary knowing with respect to their acts Ob o~ld be wlllmg, choosing, and
causes which act, and none of them uses "act" improperly or by mistakenly call a "natur I t". . vlOusly, what the philosophers
" a ac IS excluded Th· I .
metaphor. Thus, the philosophers conclude that God is truly an agent, phrase natural act" is self d. . IS exp ams why the
and the world is His act. Inasmuch as He is the cause of every existent, claims. It includes qua t-contra ICtOry, despite the philosophers'
ac precisely tho h . .
albeit in the same way that the sun is necessarily the cause of light, 42
excludes qua natural. Only the fre u s: c ar~ctenstlcs which it
He is a genuine agent. If He did not exist, neither would the world. used in ordinary discourse d. q ency With which the metaphor is
The philosophers' twofold classification of agents is quite clear. the expression "voluntary act~,S?~IS:S the contradiction. Conversely,
What they do not state, but nevertheless imply, is that God acts as a useful in excluding possible co~/n . eed redun?ant, but linguistically
natural cause. This is especially clear from their analogies. An out- usage. If the philosophers fail to uSlOn~ resultmg from metaphorical
right admission here, of course, would have confirmed al-Ghaziili's for the philosophers, not for th:~~~rslZe the fact, so much the worse
criticisms. Hence they avoid such expressions in discussing Divine What then is the basis of the met· h .
causation and merely refer to this species of agency as not being ral causes are called agents? al-Gh ~f- oncal usage by which natu-
voluntary. This tendency will prompt Averroes' own criticism that the nature is in a certain way a c aza I answers only briefly. "Since
ause and the [ I .
philosophers deny God has a will. Secondly, the entire justification cause, nature is called an age t ~o untary] agent IS also a
for the philosophers' classification of agents is identified as ordinary ~sence, that natural causes an~ a;e~:Phor~CallY."45 He suggests, in
linguistic usage. Consistent with this view, they cite many examples Wishes to qualify even this assertl.o IS are oth causes, although he
from Arabic to support their claim. But while ordinary usage is, gen- ~turl a causes are causes ani ... nUMubfu . rrner are concerned.
erally speaking, a strong consideration in favor of their account of mod ) th . Y m a certam way" (b· .
o at IS, derivatively. Voluntary a l-wa;h ma, a/iquo
agency, it proves to be a double-edged sword. For the same linguistic real causes in al-Ghazalf's esti t. cgents t~us emerge as the only
paradigms which allow natural causes to be classified as agents depict ma IOn. oncomltantly, only voluntary
 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
40
acts are really acts, for on both psychological and linguistic grounds
we relate acts ultimately to voluntary beings.
Given the choice of attributing a particular event to a voluntary
agent or to a non-voluntary one, the mind always attributes action to
the voluntary agent, and customary usage confirms this. Consequen~y,
if someone casts man into a fire and the man dies, it is he who kills
the victim, not the fire. The fire is the man's killer only in a metaphori-
cal sense. The philosophers nonetheless persist in taking the meta-
phorical meaning of agents and acts as the literal meaning, and a~ a
result they deny in fact, if not in words, that God is endowed With
will and choice. In short, they deny He is an agent. By thus depriving
words of their ordinary sense, they disclose the flaw in their reli-
gious belief. They are opposed to Islam and should have the integr~ty
to declare outright that God is not really an agent so as not to deceive
other Muslims."
The most striking feature of al-Ghaziilf's account of agency, thus
far, is his suggestion that voluntary agents are causes in an unquali-
fied sense while natural causes are not. lf there are any individuals
to whom efficacy may legitimately be ascribed, he suggests, they must
be voluntary agents, that is, persons who exhibit the qualities of willing,
choosing, and knowing. Natural causes, on the other hand, serve only
as means or instruments for the exercise of such efficacy as the exam-
ple of the fire and the murdered man illustrates. This view bears
more than a superficial resemblance to the contemporary theory that
natural causes are like "manipulatory techniques" or "handles"
employed by voluntary agents, such as ourselves, to bring about effects
of certain kinds.47 For on this analysis, natural causes, unlike volun-
tary agents, can never be sufficient conditions for the occurrence of
particular effects. Whatever capacity they have to produce an effect
or bring about a result is derived from a voluntary agent.
There are, however, a number of rather serious objections to
al-Ghaziilf's theory. First, it fails as an attempt to explain what agency
itself is because it surreptitiously introduces the language of natu-
ral cau~tion into the account. But if the efficacy of natural causes is
derived and that of voluntary agents is primary, it is quite illegiti-
mate to characterize the primary by reference to the derived. Yet this
is just what occurs. The agent in the example .is ~ k.iller, but not
merely because he wished to kill a man, chose hiS VICtim,. and kn~w
precisely what circumstances would suit his purpose. He IS so deSig-
nated because he "caused," "produced" or "brought about" the other
On the Logic of Agents and Acts 4l
man's death. But in this respect, he is no more primary, efficacious,
or capable of initiating chains of events as a voluntary agent than
various other inanimate causes such as explosions or bolts of light-
ning which could bring about the same result In other words will
knowledge, and choice are not sufficient to bring about an ~ffec~
unless power is also assumed. But voluntary agents have no greater
claim to power as such than natural causes do. It would seem then
that al-Ghaziilf must either regard both voluntary agency and natural
causati?n as being on equal footing so far as efficacy is concerned,
or he Will have to deny the reality of one if he is to save the primacy
of the other. He was aware of the dilemma, and, as we shall see,
chose the second alternative.
The second objection is that we often observe natural causes
producing certain effects, although there is no empirical evidence of
any agent employing these causes as manipulative techniques or levers.
Natural phenomena such as eclipses, tides, thunderstorms, and earth-
quakes are but a few examples of such causes. Now when there is no
concrete evidence that any agent manipulates natural causes as
instruments, there is likewise no obvious basis for claiming that these
causes depend on some agent for their efficacy or even that the alleged
agent really exists.4S In sum, the absence of any observable agent
counts strongly against the theory as it has been developed thus far.
But al-Ghaziilf is prepared to retain the theory by arguing that
the effects of "natural" causes lack only an observable agent capable
of pe?orming such operations. They do not lack, however, a real agent,
who IS unobservable. While this is hardly a plausible alternative for
most modern philosophers, it was nevertheless quite acceptable to
al-Ghaziilf's philosophic opponents, since they, no less than he,
regarded God as the immaterial, and, hence, unobservable first cause
of everything. Thus the theory was still viable for them if the exist-
ence of an unobservable agent or agents could be established.
Third and finally, it is simply untrue that the mind when con-
fronted with a fact that can be explained by reference to ~ voluntary
and to a non-voluntary cause, invariably adopts the former. The choice
depends largely on the context and purposes involved in the inquiry.
Thus, when asked for "the cause of death" of the murder victim in
al-GhaziiIr's illustration, a physician might refer to asphyxiation and
da~age to body tissue, while the prosecutor might be expected to
pomt at the defendant. Contrary to al-GhazaIr's claim, there is nei-
~er a me.ntal nor a linguistic predilection as such for voluntary causes
m such circumstances.
42 AVERROES AND THEMIITAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
On the Logic ofAgents and Acts
43
Averroes on the Conceptual Ana Iys is of Agents and Causes. Respon- because of their existence in
ding to the classifications of agents presented by philosophers and speak of natural and volunt rerum natura that we are entitled to
al-Ghaml!, Averroes places himself unequivocally on the side of the Again, there is a real b:~sar~:ts and 0t;'~rs as genuine agents.51
former, but for very different reasons from those offered in the name agents into their various spec'ies re~oes View, for the division of
of the philosophers. " ...That the term 'agent' seems like a genus for distinguish natural and volunt ,nso ar as we are concerned, to
that which acts by choice and deliberation and for that which acts h 'ch ' ary agents, the former p
w I IS observably more stable than that of ossess an act
by nature, this is true and is proved by our definition of the term (I) the natural agent does not chan 't the latter on two accounts:
'agent'. "49 Here, the justification for treating "agent" as a genus in continuous, Constant manner V I ge I s act, and (2) it acts in a
O
relation to voluntary and non-voluntary agents is ascribed, surpris- tend to produce contrary act; at d~~!~ry a~ents, on the other hand,
ingly enough, to Averroes' own definition. It is clearly a large claim, change their activities and act in a n~nt tlm:s, whereby they both
But it is also perfectly consistent with Averroes' belief that his own clear, therefore, that for both the d f' .n:contInUOUS manner.S2 It is
analysis of the term is a real definition, an account of the real essence linguisti.; considerations play virtu lIe ImtlO~ ~nd division of agents,
possessed by every agent. Hence he argues that "what actualizes Ultimately, it is not language which ~;;;~:o e In Av~rroe:' arguments,
another thing, that is, acts upon it, is not called an agent simply by but the things themselves. our claSSIfication of things,
metaphor, but in reality, for the definition of 'agent' is appropriate to II Averroes' account of efficient .
it."so Thus, the division of agents into voluntary and natural agents the philosophers' Views, he is in lund causes ~Iffers somewhat from
represents the division of a true genus, not that of an equivocal term, of al-Ghamlr. Thus he ch II amenia I disagreement with those
, , , a enges once aga' th ' ,
since that which actualizes another thing can as easily be a non- manlmate objects lack any act tilTh In e proposItion that
voluntary "natural" cause as a voluntary one. tary acts, but not all action . a a, ey lack only rational, volun-
If it is a real definition of agents that Averroes claims to give,
, Inasmuch as they h
own to actualize things like themselves ave POwers of their
then, what is it about things in the world that the definition purport- to act. They are therefore a Ie 'f and draw them from potency
edly expresses? We find that both inanimate and animate things have Moreover "agen~" I'S not ' ,gl Imate species of the genus agent
, an eqUivocal term '. ,.
powers to bring forth other existents like themselves by drawing them hence there are no grounds for ar uin as It IS used ,by t;he ancients;
from potency to act. They exercise these powers comp letely, however, ral causes is metaphorical The re! ~ t~~t ItS applIcatIOn to natu-
only to the extent that the objects actualized in this fashion are the same sense both to vOI~nt d deflmtlon of the term applies in
endowed with dispositions to be so actualized, Thus, for example, Averroes likewise rejects :~: _n~tural causes existing in reality,
fire has the power to change anything that is warm and dry into acting and with it what h e t zaII s analogy between willing and
another fiery substance like itself. It does so by bringing that sub- that one can will without kno lood regards as an absurd conclusion_
stance's own dispositional properties from potency to act. Whatever he allows, is not part of th we geofthewill d b'
d f' , , e 0 ject. For knowledge
h e e ImtlOn of an t h '
lacks such properties in the first place or, having them, is not in a s own, One thing may certainly a t r ac , as e has already
state of readiness for "receiving the act of the fire" cannot be made out knOWing it or willing to do so~ ua Ize another in Some way with-
into a fire like the first, . As for the question of ascribin ' .
Similarly, he argues that no one really doubts that the bodies of VIs-iI-vis natural agents wh 'th g, actions pnmarily to voluntary
, ere el ens po 'bl A
animate beings are also endowed with powers which assimilate food we do not ascribe acts to th . SSI e, verroes argues that
to new body tissue and govern their bodily movements. Were those only to their first mover. Th~SIni~truments_,,::?ich perform them, but
powers to be withdrawn, the animal in question would perish, It is ?erer is the first mover and a ' al-Ghaza~1 s ,lIlu~tration, the mur-
because of this governance that we speak of the animal being alive; in if the victim had been burned ~~~~~d~~ fire IS hiS instrument. But
its absence we call it dead, In sum, the real basis for Averroes' defini- man, then the fire itself is the f t out any action by another
tion of agents is the particular arrangements of powers and disposi- so really and not just metaPhori~~1 n;ver that .~lle~ him, and it did
tions possessed by inanimate and animate beings, and it is only a special case to all others, al-Gha;; nY gene~ahzIng Improperly from
secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter. 53 commits the fallacy of a dicta
 44 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
Lastly, Averroes takes note of the fact that al-ChazalI's arguments
coincide with those of the Ash'arite theologians, who deny both that
fire is an agent and that man is the author of his acts in the sense
that either exerts influence on existing things.54 In effect, he chal-
lenges the myth of al-Ghazalr's metaphysical neutrality and attempts
to show wherever possible that his opponent is in fact a spokesman
for the doctrine of occasionalism. Causal efficacy for al-Ghazali, he
is suggesting, resides exclusively in God.
Averroes' analysis of the classes of agents and the criteria for
distinguishing between them introduces at least three controversial
notions: real definition, the existence of powers and dispositions,
and the fixity of natural acts. For the moment, we need only indicate
the main difficulties involved in each of them, while reserving a full
discussion of their import for Averroes' theory until later.
Real definitions purport to be accounts not of words but of things,
or more precisely accounts exhibiting their essential nature. But once
we have defined the meaning of a term which is used to denote things, it
may be asked, what would it be to define the things so denoted?
Having defined the term "agent," nothing further is stated if we try
to define things called agents. And if something else is stated, the
definition of the term must either be incomplete or false, since the
alleged definition of the thing differs from that of the ter~.lf, o~ ~he
other hand, what is meant is a statement of the essential defImng
characteristics of the thing, we again seem to turn back to ordinary
linguistic usage. For we can state the essential characteristics of the
thing only if we know first which ones are ordinarily mentioned w~e~
people identify or speak about it. Thus, Averroes' attempt at real defIm-
tion seems, in the final analysis, unable to resolve disagreements about
agents.
The notion that things possess powers and dispositions, moreover,
is regarded by many a hard-headed empiricist as even more dubious
than that of real definition. For despite persistent attempts to express
what things are by reference to them, powers remain curiously opaque
and definitions based on them appear quite uninformative. Thus, unlike
the mock medical examiners in Moliere's Le Malade Imaginaire, few
today would pass a candidate who explains that opium induces sleep
because it has a soporific power whose effect is to dull the senses.
Such an explanation is vacuous, because it is redundant. It tells us in
I
effect that things act as they do, because their constituent powers
f
behave in the same way, as if they were miniature agents themselves.
On the Logic of Agents and Acts 45
Then, too, Averroes is rather unclear about the relation between
these powers and dispositions and the things which have them. Is the
concrete particular to which they belong different from the powers
themselves? If so, there is no obvious connection between what the
agent or efficient cause is, and what these powers presumably do. If
they should exert any causal efficacy at all, it would appear to be
quite incidental and extraneous to the kind of thing which has such
powers. It does not act; they do. If, however, the individual in ques-
tion is identical with the sum of its powers and dispositions, then
the relation of the individual and the powers to each other is obvi-
ously analytic and necessary, but trivial. What we end up with is an
aggregate, a collection of powers with no evident reason why they
should hang together as they do and produce the results which they
do. Why should they not operate independently of each other, or
even contrary to each other? This Averroes has not even begun to
explain.
Lastly, it may be asked why he should even have recourse to such
an o~s~ure notion. It seems possible prima facie to translate fully all
asc~lptlOns of powers and dispositions to things into strictly obser-
~atlOnallanguage, having the logical form of contrary to fact condi-
tionals: Thus: if something of kind P were subjected to an object or
operatIOn Q In the presence of condition R, behavior of the kind S
would r~sult, as past observations have revealed. On this analysis of
su.cc.esslve events, dispositional predicates seem quite superfluous. If
thiS IS the case, Averroes' recourse to the theory is misguided' if not
he will have to show why not. ' ,
. The third and final point of controversy centers on the proposi-
ti~n that natural acts are fixed and unchanging. Averroes' belief in
thiS pro~o~i.tion represents at least one of his reasons for affirming
the. p.O~Slblhty of real definitions. We can have cognitively reliable
definitIOns of things in nature only if their distinctive acts do not
change. If they did change, our knowledge would be unreliable and
thu~, n~t ~ow!edge at all. What accounts for this alleged fixi~ of
actIOn, I~ hiS view and follOwing Aristotle, is simply the eternal and
~nchangIng character of natural species-a theory rather intimately
tied to the doctrine of the world's eternity. But despite the impor-
~anc: ~ve?,oes attached ~o the thesis that acts are fixed and unchang-
Ing, It IS Simply false as IS the assumption on which it rests. For it is
always possible in principle to affirm the occurrence of an efficient
 AVERROES AND 1llEMEfAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
46
cause and to deny without contradiction the occurrence of its cus-
tomary act or effect. In short, nothing precludes the possibility of
change in nature and thus change in the behavior of things.
One might also argue that the assumption that species are
immutable turns out to be equally false on empirical grounds. The
overwhelming weight of biological evidence points to the evolution of
all extant living species, while discoveries in the physical sciences
record both the breakdown and transmutation of various elements
and isotopes. Consequently, the fixity thesis proves to be unte~able.
Whether its demise is also fatal to Averroes' defense of causal efhcacy,
however, is a separate question which remains to be seen.
ACTS AND EFFECTS
The second part of the Third Discussion focuses our attention
on the Divine act. The term "act" as it appears in this context has at
least two distinct senses. It can be understood variously as God's
activity of causing, creating, or producing the world, and as the effect,
outcome, or product of this activity, namely the world itself, in much
the same way that we speak of a physician's healing of his patient, an
activity, and the healing which his treatment brings about, an out-
come or product. The formulation of al-Ghaza [j's charge against the
philosophers involves the second of the two senses. He denies that
the world can be regarded as a genuine act or creation of God accord-
ing to their principles.
In this phase of the debate, we are inclined to expect that the
treatment of acts will have much the same character as the debate
on agents-a presentation of definitions, real or stipulative, logical
classifications, and appeals to ordinary Arabic or "the things them-
selves" for justification. However, since all the participants tacitly hold
that the meaning of "act" is conceptually dependent on that of "agent,"
which has already been discussed, only the initial paragraphs are
devoted to the question of definition. Proceeding then from the fact
that all acts involve an essential reference to their agents, regardless
of which conception of agent is used, it is quite natural for the de~ate
to shift quickly to an analysis of the relevant aspects of the relatIOn-
ship between them. . pnor to which it did not exist, for if it had, something would have
Two aspects are examined: the existential status of acts m rela-
tion to their agents and the temporal relationship between acts and
their agents. Broadly stated, the various positions developed in the
On the Logic of Agents and Acts 47
debate have the aim, in the first instance, of attacking or defending
the proposition that everything which is properly called an act is
created ex nihilo. In the second, the aim is to attack or defend the
proposition that everything which is properly called an act has a
temporal beginning, that is, that it came to be at a point in time
prior to which it did not exist.
The Islamic philosophers, as we have seen, defined an act as that
which has no necessary existence in itself, but which exists through
another,55 By itself, the definition takes no clear position on whether
such acts or effects must be created ex nihilo or have a temporal
beginning. It states only that (I) an act, or effect, is not self-existent;
(2) it bears'an essential reference to another entity, which is its agent
or cause; and (3) insofar as it exists, it is necessitated by this other
entity.
The philosophers, however, also hold that the definition fully
applies to the world itself taken as a whole. They argue, first, that the
world and everything it contains is possible in itself.56 As such no
!mpossibility follows from conceiving it not to exist. Clearly, the~, it
IS not self-existent. Second, if it exists, which is in fact the case, it
does so because of a relation it has to some other existent which
"determines" it to exist. Third, it is therefore possible in itself and
necessary through another. Since it is unacceptable for possibles of
this sort to continue into an infinite chain of co-existing causes and
~ffects or in a circle, they must culminate in something necessary in
Itself. This is the First Existent, which is by nature uncaused and
it~elf U:e c~use of the existence of all other things.57 Finally, because
~IS Bemg IS an eternal agent in its very essence, the world, which is
Its effect, is eternal also.58
Two consequences follow from this description of the world. It
was n?t creat~d ex nihilo, that is, miraculously out of nothing, because
the~e IS no pomt at which an eternal agent does not act, no point at
wh~ch He. does not exist together with His effect, and no point at
which He I~ con.fronted with mere nothingness qua agent. To suggest
otherwise ImplIes that God is not or was not always and by nature
an agent. The second consequence is that the world could not have
had a temporal beginning. It could not, in other words, have been
cr~ated at a point in the past finitely distant from the present and
ha? to determine the agent to create the world at that particular
pomt and no other. But ex hypothesi, there was nothing to distin-

AVERROFS AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
48
guish one point from another and surely nothing to determine, direct,
or incline God to choose it. It is just this notion of the world as the
essential, necessary, and eternal effect of Deity which prompted
al-Ghazalf to brand the philosophers' conceptions of agent and act
fraudulent and misleading.
In response to their claim, al-Ghazalr argues that they have
overlooked a fundamental condition regarding acts, namely, that the
expression "act" is properly used only for that which is created entirely
new or originated. Indeed, the regular meaning of act is to bring
something forth from privation to existence by creating it entirely
new, and this cannot conceivably be applied to anything eternal. Since
the philosophers insist, however, that the world is eternal and not
created entirely new, it can hardly be considered His effect, for the
eternal simply cannot be brought into being or created fully new as
effects can. From the context, it is clear that al-GhazalI's definition is
meant to apply both to activities and to the products of such activities.
His choice of terms indicates further that the privation he has in
mind is absolute nothingness and that what is originated has a tem-
poral beginning before which it did not exist.
Averroes in turn considers al-Ghazall's criticism imprecise. His
assertion that the eternal cannot be created entirely new would hold
true, if it were the case that the world existed eternally through itself. It
would even be correct to say that the world had no agent at all on
this assumption. But Averroes sees no reason to accept it in the first
place. If, however, the world is considered eternal in the sense of
being eternally moved, no problem should arise. For he tells us that
every movement is invariably composed of parts, and these parts arise
fully new in succession. The world so conceived is in a state of eter-
nal or continuous origination (al-!)udilth al-dfI 'im, innovatio continua); it
is "eternal" in the sense that it has neither a beginning nor an end,
and an example of "origination" in the sense that its successive move-
ments arise anew without having existed before. Indeed, he claims
further that whatever may be characterized as an eternal creation
has a greater claim to be called a creation than something having
the character of a limited creation. Thus, if the choice of names were
up to Averroes, he would prefer that the world be characterized as
something originated rather than as something eternal. What moti-
vated the philosophers to speak of it as eternal was only their wish
to take precautions against being identified with the view that the
59
world was created from something, in time, and after privation.
On the Logic of Agents and Ads 49
Averroes' comments are plainly offered as a defense of the phil-
osophers, but the defense itself is decidedly ambiguous. For while he
is clear in his insistence that the world has neither a beginning nor
an end, it seems peculiar for him to maintain, as al-Ghazalf does
that it is also a creation properly so called. Both would deny, it i~
true, that the world was created from some primeval chaos or form-
less matter at a point in the past. But for al-Ghazall, the world was
created from nothing whatever. Is this also Averroes' view? It is not
immediately clear. By linking creation to the successive movements
of ~e world, moreove.r, Averroes seems to have missed the point
entIr.el~. For the world IS surely distinguishable from its movements,
and It IS the world's creation that is in question here. Thus, we arrive
at ~ quandry. If Averroes wishes to defend the philosophers, it is
unlikely that he agrees with al-Ghazall; but if the world itself was not
created at a point in the past, it seems pointless for him to call it a
creation, still less a creation in the "truest" sense.
Again, when he suggests that the world was not created "in time"
he appears to support the philosophers. But as it happens, this is
also al-Ghazall's view, since time for him is itself something created
and ther.efore could not have existed before the creation of the universe.
Rather, It had to be created together with the universe.60 Averroes too
~inks time is coeval with the universe, but this is because he believes
It to. be th~ numerable aspect of movement, which presupposes a
mo~Ile subject. And as we have seen, he denies a beginning to both,
while al-GhazaII holds just the opposite. How then does the world's
non-creation "in time" help to clarify the notion of the world as a
creation, albeit an eternal one? Here too Averroes is obscure.
Lastly, Averroes endorses the view that the world was not cre-
ated "af~':.r privatio~"; but, so stated, this is also a position taken by
al-Ghazah, who demes that nothingness precedes creation in a tem-
poral way despite his affirmation of creation ex nihilo.61 It is like
saying that 'There was no time before which the universe did not
exist." It could mean that there was no time (or anything else for
that matter) before God created the world ex nihilo; and it could
also mean that there was no time when the universe did not exist.
Only the fir~t interpretation is coherent with al-Ghazall's arguments;
the second IS really that of the philosophers. Averroes' conception of
the world as an eternal creation of Deity plainly rules out the temporal
p~ecede~ce ?f privation or nothingness. But while we might expect
him to dismiSS creation ex nihilo in defense of the philosophers, he
50 AVERROFS AND THEME:rAPHYSfCS OF CAUSATION
refrains at this point from doing so.62 Once again ambiguity prevails,
and it suggests that Averroes' literary legerdemain here mayverywell
reflect his two-fold aim of disclosing certain elements of his view to
those who are prepared to grasp it and concealing others from those
who are not.
But important as all these questions are for clarifying Averroes'
views on Divine causation, his systematically ambiguous account of
eternal creation cannot be fully reconstructed here without an
extended analysis of both natural causation and celestial mechanics
first, and this will follow in due course. For the time being. however,
we would like to limit ourselves to the purely criteriological question
of why Averroes thinks that continuity and discontinuity in the dura-
tion of causal efficacy should be a standard for defining and classify-
ing agents and acts. Taking his example, we would like to know why
he regards an eternal, continuous creation as more truly an act of
Divine creation than a temporally limited one. For it is by no means
obvious from the text why continuity and duration should have any
bearing at all on the definition of acts.
The basis for Averroes' view probably lies outside of the Tahafut
debates in a distinction which Aristotle draws between two kinds of
acts: one construed as an actualization or activity (energeia) and
another construed as a motion or movement (kinesis).63 According to
this distinction, acts which have limits or terminal points do not them-
selves constitute the goals for which one acts. Rather, such actions
are directed toward ends or goals at which the action eventually ter-
minates and which do not exist while the action is taking place. When
this end point has been reached, and only then, the act is complete.
Before then, it is invariably incomplete. Actions of this kind would
include, for example, learning a poem, constructing a house, and
walking to a particular place. Thus while we are learning a poem, we
as yet lack full knowledge of it. But when we have this knowledge we
are no longer learning the poem. Aristotle calls this group of actions
kineseis. But strictly speaking, he is inclined to deny th.at they are
really actions. At least they are not perfect actions.
By contrast, there are acts which have no limits or terminal points
in the sense that their ends are already present within themselves
whenever they exist. Such actions'are complete whenever they occur.
They are best exemplified by such activities as seeing, thinking, and
living, for these are truly actions, according to Aristotle, and perfect
ones at that. Thus, when we see, for example, we are fully engaged in
On the Logic of Agents and Acts 51
seeing at every point in the action and not just when we are about to
avert our glance. Again we may continue seeing something long after
we have initially seen it. There are two characteristics by which all
such perfect acts may be identified: (I) that the activity presently
occurring entails its having occurred ('We see and have seen" or
'We are thinking and have been thinking"), and (2) that the activity
must go on continuously through time with no predetermined limit
to the interval it may occupy. Thus, these criteria stipulate that a true
act is fully present at any period of its existence and not subject to
dura tiona I limits in and of themselves ....
It is with these considerations in mind that Averroes marshals
his arguments for regarding the world as God's act or product and
more specifically as an eternal creation. But clearly, Averroes under-
stands the energeia/ kinesis distinction to mean that if the world is
properly called God's act, it would have to be a perfect act or energeia.
In that case, it would have no beginning, since any moment of its
presently existing entails its having previously existed. Likewise, it
would have no end, since a perfect act has no end outside itself in
which it could terminate. Whatever the merits of this interpretation
as an explanation of Aristotle's original point, it nevertheless shows
just how Averroes could regard the world, qua continuous creation,
as being "more truly" an act than a limited creation. Accordingly, we
shall call this measure of genuine and perfect action the "continuity
criterion."
The prominence which Averroes gives to this criterion in his analy-
sis of acts suggests that we can classify both acts and agents by
reference to it. Indeed, in the classification which follows we can
easily see why Averroes was inclined to share the philosophers' view'"
that God is the Agent and Maker of an eternal world.
Agents
I. God is essentially self-existent, eternal, and continuously able
to bring the world's movements from potency to act. Since His
agency is commensurate with His essence, its exercise is there-
fore continuous, eternal, and invariably efficacious as well. Such
an agent is a true and perfect agent.
2. Natural agents are neither self-existent nor eternal. But they
can nevertheless bring their effects from potency to act con-
~-
52 AVERROFS AND TIlE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
tinuously and invariably, unless impeded,so long as they exist.
Since their agency is commensurate with their specific natures,
they are continuously and invariably efficacious always or for
the most part. As such they are true but imperfect agents.
3. Voluntary agents are neither self-existent, eternal, nor capa-
ble of continuous action. Rather, they can bring their effects
from potency to act only in a non-continuous and variable
manner, even if not impeded, and within the limits of their actual
existence and desires. Their agency is commensurate with their
natures. Hence it is neither eternal, continuous, nor efficacious
always or for the most part. While such agents are true agents,
they are the least perfect agents.
Acts
1. The world is brought from potency to act through its contin-
uous motions, each of which entails a prior motion. Since these
motions have no limit in either the past or the future, the world
is continuously, eternally, and necessarily moved as long as it
exists actually. It is therefore a true and perfect effect or act.
2. Natural acts are brought from potency to act continuously
and without changing, unless impeded, within the time limits
of their causes' existence. They are temporal, but necessarily
stable. Therefore, they are true but imperfect effects.
3. Voluntary acts are brought from potency to act neither
continuously nor without change even when unimpeded. Such
acts occur within the time limits of the agents' actual exist-
ence and desire. These acts are temporal but not necessar-
ily stable. They are therefore truly effects, but they are the
least perfect effects.
We can now see why Averroes' definition of agency taken together
with his continuity criterion for agents and acts makes it inconsis-
tent to deny the philosophers' central thesis regarding God as the
Agent of the world. God emerges as the Agent par excellence, while
the world enjoys similar status vis-a.-vis all other acts. This clearly
rules out a temporal beginning for the world. For if God had created
the world at a point in the past, His activity would hardly have been .
continuous and unchanging. Such an activity would have rendered
Him, in short, an imperfect agent. Similarly, if the world had had a
On the Logic of Agents and AdS 53
temporal beginning, its existence would not have entailed any prior
existence and, again, it would have been an imperfect act. So the
philosophers' theory, by the standard Averroes uses to interpret it,
turns out to be not only consistent with what he regards as demon-
strative truth, but religiously far less objectionable than the view
defended by al-Ghazali.
The Philosophers on the Relations Between Acts and Agents. The
philosophers maintain that something created or originated (al-lJadith,
innova!io) is not to be defined as something which begins to exist
after its non-existence. For if this is what an act is, a contradiction
arises: (I) All agents produce acts; that is, effects and activities both
proceed from and are connected with their agents. (2) No agent pro-
duces non-existence; that is, non-existence neither proceeds from
nor has any connection with an agent. (3) No agent produces acts,
since nothing containing non-existence in its definition proceeds from
an agent. To establish this view they offer four arguments, each of
which focuses on the "connective" aspect of production as an appar-
ent abbreviation for production itself.
First, previous non-existence by itself is not dependent on or
connected with the agent as such, because an agent exercises no
influence at a.Il on non-existence, much less non-existence which pre-
cedes the act of exercising influence. Second, it is false to claim that
the agent is connected with both the present existent and its previ-
ous non-existence taken independently, for non-existence neither has
nor needs an agent. Third, it remains possible that the existent is
connected with and dependent upon the agent only insofar as it exists.
What proceeds from the agent is pure existence and nothing else,
and the existent has no further relation to the agent than that of
existence. If the existence thus bestowed is continuous, the relation
is also continuous; and if the relation is continuous, then that being
to which it is related ("the Necessary of Existence") is the noblest
and the most enduring in terms of influence, since non-existence
does not derive from an agent at any time. A fourth and final possibility
is mentioned as an afterthought. It suggests that the agent is linked
to a special kind of entity whose present existence is inextricably
linked to its previous non-existence. This, however, is dismissed for
the same reason as the second possibility. Previous non-existence
cannot be the act of any agent.56
These arguments offered by the philosophers are concerned for
the most part with acts understood as effects or products, not as
54 AVERROFS AND 11lEMETAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
activities. Ostensibly, they are designed only to establish that crea-
tion after privation is inconceivable and that non-existence in no
way derives from an agent. According to this interpretation, terms
such as "after" and "previous" have only a temporal connotation.
But in fact, these arguments go somewhat further. They deny not
only temporal creation for acts, but creation ex nihilo as well. For
the latter doctrine, if it asserts anything, asserts a connection between
Deity and the non-existent. Whether He creates out of it or in creating,
overcomes it, He evidently has influence with respect to it. But this is
precisely what the philosophers reject when they maintain that the
agent has no connection whatever with the non-existent. This goes
beyond the assertion that non-existence does not proceed from an
agent. It asserts that there is no conceivable relation of efficacy that
an agent could bear toward it qua agent. Instead, the only relation
which enables the agent to act, create, or produce in a sense mean-
ingful to the philosophers is the agent/patient relationship, where
the former bestows and the latter receives. On this model. the agent
is never confronted qua agent with pure nothingness. He is instead
confronted with a bearer of possible existence, upon which he is
said to bestow existence. For as Avicenna's definition of agents
stipulates, an agent always bestows existence upon some other thing, a
recipient. And the recipient is inevitably something, not nothing.
The philosophers turn next to the temporal relation between
agents and their acts. Whatever is newly brought into being exists as
an act only at the time when it exists, not when it does not exist.
Now an act or effect exists only when its agent brings it into existence,
and the agent, for its part, is only an agent, strictly speaking, when
the existence of the act or effect is actually proceeding from it.
What this means for the philosophers is that the agent, the activ-
ity of bringing something into being, and the effect brought into being,
all exist at the same time. No one of them is temporally prior to the
others. Once the temporal relationship between agents and acts is
understood in this way, it is easier to see why the philosophers could
go on to argue that there was nothing incompatible about the world's
being both eternal and an act or creation of God. It could be described
as an act only as long as it was actually being produced. Since the
philosophers assumed that God's productive activity is an expres-
sion of His eternal nature, it too must be eternal, and so the world
must be eternal as well. Thus the existence of the world is bound to
its Agent in such a way that if this bond (irtibii(, alligatio) continues,
On the Logic of Agents and Acts 55
the world's existence will continue, whereas its cessation would .r<,~ult
in the world ceasing to exist. This is why the world, unl~ke a bUll?l~g
produced by an ordinary builder, cannot endure on Its o.wn, If ~ts
Creator does not exist or act. It is totally dependent on Deity for Its
entire existence, and it exists only as long as its Creator is active."
The philosophers' assertion that simultaneity characterizes the
temporal relationship between agents and acts cannot, of course, be
conceded as it stands. Many an efficient cause temporally precedes
its effect in existence, while many an effect persists long after its
cause has perished. But the brief reference in the argument to build-
ings and builders indicates that the philosophers are aware of the
objection. They do not make this claim about all efficient causes and
effects. They are referring exclusively to essential or necessary causes
as opposed to accidental or contingent causes. .
Avicenna distinguishes between these two orders of causatIOn
in several ways. (1) Only in the case of essential causes does the
effect proceed from the essence of its cause, that is, from what it is.
This is not the case for accidental causes, whose effects may proceed
from non-essential features of the cause. (2) Essential causes always
exist simultaneously with their effects, while accidental causes tem-
porally precede them. (3) Essential causes, since they are co-existent,
can exist only in a finite series. Accidental causes are successive and
can therefore follow one another in an infinite series. (4) Essential
causes do not necessarily require matter in order to exercise causal
efficacy, while accidental agents must have matter upon which to act.
(5) Essential causes, finally, are truly causes. They necessitate the
existence of their effects without delay unless impeded. Accidental
causes are only supporting and preparatory causes. They do not neces-
sitate existence as such, but act through movements of various sorts
to enable essential causes to produce the effect.68
Thus, only when both the essential efficient cause and the recipi-
ent of its action exist and all other causal conditions have been
prepared, does the effect occur by necessity. When these disti~ctions
are applied to the temporal relation between God and the UnIverse,
the result is once again that both must co-exist without beginning or
end. For if God were temporally prior to the existence of the world,
He would not be a true agent nor the world a genuine act.
But the simultaneity relationship, if true, raises a still more seri-
ous difficulty. If both the agent and its act are temporally co-existent,
there appears to be no basis for calling the one an agent and the
56 AVERROES AND THEMITAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
other its act. Neither one seems to have a better claim than the other
to be the agent or cause of existence. But this, according to Avicenna, is
not the case. Even if the true agent is not temporally prior to its act,
it is nevertheless ontologically prior to its act. He illustrates the dis-
tinction with a common example: ''The mind is not at all repelled
when we say 'When Zaid moves his hand, the key [he was holding]
moved, or we may say 'Zaid moved his hand, and the key moved.' But
the mind is repelled when we say 'When the key moved, Zaid moved
his hand: even though we should say 'When the key moved, we knew
that Zaid moved his hand.' "69
The reason why we assign priority to one of the two simultane-
ous movements and posteriority to the other,lies in the fact that we
suppose that one of them does not occur through the other, but only
with it. This is what we call the cause. In the case of the other
movement, we suppose that it not only occurs with the first, but through
it, and thus we call it the effect.70 The key point is that the distinc-
tion Avicenna makes here between movements occurring with others
and movements occurring through or by virtue of others is ultimately
an ontological one, even though his justification relies heavily on
epistemic considerations about what we suppose to be the case. For
Avicenna, then, the efficient cause is both necessary and sufficient
for the existence of its effect, and this holds true whether we are
referring to the movement of the hand and the key or the eternal
existence of God and the universe. It is in this sense that he under-
stands the cause to be ontologically prior to the effect. Qua sufficient, it
necessitates the existence of the effect; qua necessary, the effect ceases
to exist, if it ceases to exist. On this analysis, the effect has no inde-
pendent existence of its own whatever.
The suggestion that Deity is both necessary and sufficient for
the existence of the universe is designed to underscore two elements
of Avicenna's doctrine: (1) God is the unique cause of the universe;
(2) the existence of the universe is entirely dependent upon this cause.
But there remains some reason for doubt as to whether it is possible
for one and the same thing or condition to be both necessary and
sufficient. A necessary condition for a particular effect is one in whose
absence that effect does not occur. H the effect does occur, it may be
inferred that the condition necessary for its existence is present. (If
not C, then not E. If E, then C.) A sufficient condition for a particular'
effect is one in whose presence the effect must invariably occur. If
the effect does not occur, it may be inferred that no such sufficient
On the Logic of Agents and Acts 57
condition is present. (If C, then E. If not E, then not C.) It is immedi-
ately evident that the defining characteristics of necessary and suffi-
cient conditions are opposite in each case. Precisely those characteris-
tics which make one condition necessary exclude its being sufficient
as well. Thus inferences from effect to cause only disclose a neces-
sary condition, while inferences from cause to effect give us only the
sufficient condition. It would seem then that one and the same thing
could not be necessary and sufficient for the existence of a particu-
lar effect, and that inferences cannot be made in both directions,
from effect to cause and from cause to effect. (C if and only if E).71
There is, however, another analysis by which we can speak both
of a condition being necessary and sufficient and of reciprocal infer-
ences between cause and effect. This is to identify the cause with the
sufficient condition and the sufficient condition with the totality of
necessary conditions. Such a condition by its very inclusiveness must
be the unique cause of its effect, but this same inclusiveness requires
that the cause be complex. It is an aggregate of other conditions and
consequently neither simple nor homogeneous. But Avicenna's Nec-
essary of Existence is repeatedly characterized as simple in all respects.
Thus, it appears that the only analysis on which Deity could be both
necessary and sufficient for the existence of the universe, excludes
the very conception of Deity which Avicenna has in mind.
It is conceivable, of course, that Avicenna might reply to this by
arguing that the relation of God to the world as a whole is unique
and that this relation is also known by a unique argument-the
cosmological argument from contingency and necessity. The conclu-
sion of the argument, assuming it is valid, establishes the existence
of a Necessary Being, that is, a Being which requires no external
cause to account for its existence. As such, its existence derives from
its essence alone and is indeed identical with it. Since this Being is
shown to be the necessary and necessitating cause of all else, and
since the principle of parsimony requires only one such Being, it
alone would be the single necessary and sufficient cause of existence.
In our view this hypothetical rejoinder still fails to remove the
difficulty. Granting Avicenna's claim that he proves a single neces-
sary and sufficient cause for the universe, it is still one thing to estab-
lish a single cause and quite another to establish a simple one, that
is, one that is internally homogeneous in all respects. Certainly the
cosmological argument is notoriously vague about the character of
the Necessary Being. The most that it shows about its nature is its
58 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
necessity. To claim that this means it is uncaused and that, being
uncaused, it also lacks internal fonnal causes goes beyond the bounds
of the original argument. For the cosmological argument rules out
only external, efficient causes for it, nothing more. Simplicity remains
to be proved, and that, for Avicenna, is as important as proving God's
sufficiency. Our point is that he cannot prove both. As we shall see
below, Averroes does not have this problem.
al-Ghaziili on the Relation Between Acts and Agents. al-Ghazall's
remarks on the relation between agent and acts are very brief. He
reiterates without argument his view that an act is an entirely new
creation which comes out of non-existence into being and focuses
his main effort on clarifying the temporal relation.
An act is connected with and dependent upon an agent only
from the standpoint of it being created entirely new, that is, its com-
ing into existence. The emphasis here is on the coming into existence,
understood as a gerund. The temporal connection between agent and
act obtains only at the moment of this coming into being, not before,
and as we shall see, not after.
This is the basis for his twofold claim that the act is not depend-
ent on the agent from the standpoint of being preceded by non-
existence or from the standpoint of its merely existing once it has
been created. Before the act existed, the agent had no temporal rela-
tion with it, because there was no second term for the relation.
Similarly, al-GhazalT suggests that after it has come into existence,
the agent likewise has no temporal relation with it. But why? One
might suppose that it is because the moment of its coming into being
has passed, and it endures afterward on its own. But in fact, al-Ghaza:1l
maintains the opposite of this. Once the effect has come into being it
does not endure at all, for any length of time. It ceases to endure, he
says, because (1) the agent is not connected with the effect for a
second moment after it comes to be,12 and because (2) the agent,
subsequent to every act of creation, produces a new fact or, better,
the renewal of a fact (tajaddud, innovatum), namely the renewed non-
existence of its effect.13 The reason, therefore, for the absence of a
connection between agent and act after the emergence of the latter,
is explained by the fact that the agent annihilates the original act in
the second moment of its existence. So once again, there is no sec-
ond term for the relation. What appears to us to be the subsequent
existence of the same effect really amounts to a series of continuous
creations, annihilations, and renewals of its existence ex nihilo, until
On the Logic of Agents and Acts 59
it is finally eliminated at the agent's wish. All this, of course, assumes
the appearance of continuity in the successive objects created. Still,
such continuity is merely an appearance, a kind of perceptual illu-
sion masking ontological discontinuity. al-Ghazalf thus allows for
simultaneity in the temporal relations between agent and act, but
with the radical difference that an individual act is simultaneous
with its agent in only a momentary sense. The continuous existence
of the agent implies nothing whatever about the continuous exist-
ence of the act.
al-Ghazall also goes on to grant that prior non-existence is not
constitutive of what an act is, and so he has no quarrel with the
philosophers when they argue that the agent should not be thought
of as producing "prior non-existence" either independent of or together
with his act. But he nonetheless insists that prior non-existence is a
necessary though extrinsic condition for an act to be produced by
an agent, because any existent not preceded by non-existence is con-
tinuous and everlasting. Given al-Ghazalf's conception of acts, such
an existent is not really an effect or act at all.
Viewing the temporal relation between agent and act in this way,
it becomes increasingly clear that the acts described byal-GhazalT
are hardly those of human agents. We do not ordinarily think of our-
selves as creating anything out of nothing, and still less, as continu-
ously creating and annihilating our acts. Indeed, there is not the
slightest reason, based on our own experience, for us to think so. But
if such acts are not likely to belong to human agents, despite the fact
that they are described as willing, knowing, and choosing, the impli-
cation is that they belong to God exclusively. al-Ghazall does not say
this explicitly, but the context suggests it. So does the addition of
power (qudrah, posse) to the other characteristics al-Ghazall requires
for an agent. Indeed, the Arabic term he uses here is nonnally reserved
for the Deity alone, especially in conservative theological circles. He
speaks of qudrah instead of qiiwah, and although they can both be
translated as power, only the former connotes decisive power, deter-
mination, or omnipotence. As the criteriological discussions proceed,
therefore, we come to see more and more of the metaphysical assump-
tions underlying the arguments presented.
Lastly, al-Ghazalf seems to have caught himself in a logical diffi-
culty of which he is evidently unaware. He denies that the agent pro-
duces "prior non-existence"; it is only an external condition of his
producing anything. But in an earlier debate, as we have also noted,
60 AVERROES AND TIlE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
he asserts that the agent annihilates a thing by creating a new state
of affairs: its renewed non-existence. In other words, the agent does
produce subsequent non-existence. This is surely a remarkable feat
even for al-Ghazalf's Divine Agent, for unless temporal relations make
one kind of non-existence essentially different from another, it turns
out not only that Deity produces non-existence after all, but that He
both does and does not.
Averroes on the Relation Between Acts and Agents. Averroes' dis-
cussion of the relation between agents and acts is largely a refine-
ment of that offered by the philosophers, but a significant one
nonetheless, for he presents in it two important criticisms of Avicenna.
On the question of the act's ontological status vis-a-vis its agent, he
regards Avicenna's position as plainly sophistical. By suggesting that
the agent can only be related either to present existence or to prior
non-existence, he omits one of the alternatives that a complete divi-
sion of cases would have to mention, namely, present potential
existence. Avicenna's argument wrongly implies that the activity of
creating something entirely new (i1!dath, innovatio) is nothing other
than a connection of the act, understood as product, with existence
as such. So stated, it makes no difference whether this existence is
preceded by non-existence or not, because the existence of which he
speaks is simply unqualified. But the fact of the matter, Averroes argues,
is that the agent's activity is only connected with an existence-which-is-
in-a-state-of-non-existence, namely, potential existence. 74
Averroes thus rejects both of Avicenna's alternatives and their
various combinations. The agent is not connected with non-existence
per se, because it is not an act at all. It is nothing at all. By the same
token, the agent is not connected with actual existence either, for
whatever has reached its full reality or utmost perfection no longer
requires either the activity of bringing it into existence or anyone to
perform it. It is already a complete existent and able to endure in its
own right. Only potential existence remains to resolve the dilemma,
and as a kind of existence which is conjoined with non-existence or
privation, it can only be found when that which is created actually
arises, that is, when it is in the process of becoming actual. Averroes,
in this respect, is consistent with the Peripatetic treatment of the
distinction between essence and existence. To him, the former con-
notes the real as potential, not the Platonic Form or an existentially
neutral essence. The latter existence, on the other hand, connotes
the real as actualized in all or most respects. For Averroes. the world
exists, to be sure, but it is never fully actualized.
On the Logic of Agents and Acts 61
This is the only way in which Averroes thinks G.od can be the
Agent of the world and the world His act or effect. SlOce an agent,
while exercising its act, cannot be connected with a f~lly actualized
existent (which no longer requires an agent) or With pure non-
existence (which has no agent), Averroes contends that the world's
existence must be perpetually linked with non-existence or privation, if
it is still to have an agent.
Averroes is also critical of Avicenna 's treatment of the simultaneity
relation between agent and act. He does not deny that the two are
simultaneous. He questions only the suggestion that the act's exist-
ence is bound to the agent so completely that if this bond continues,
existence likewise continues, while if it ceases, so does existence. If
this is true, Averroes maintains, the only conclusion to be drawn
from the argument is that the world belongs to the category of relation,
not to the category of substance.
Two considerations bring him to this conclusion. (1) The act,
according to Avicenna, is totally dependent upon the eternal agent
insofar as the former exists. (2) The act is said to exist without any
defect at all and likewise without potentiality. It is, in short. a fully
actualized existent. Now the only kind of existent which is entirely
dependent for its being upon something external, even when it is
fully actualized, is a relation. Avicenna's account of the world as an
act plainly corresponds point for point with this description. By
holding, therefore, that the world essentially and primarily consists
in being an effect, he removes it altogether from the category of
substance, all of whose members can stand apart on their own when
actualized, and ascribes it to the category of relation whose mem-
bers can never stand apart. If, on the other hand, being an act or
effect is only an accidental feature of the world and not expressive of
its essence, that is, if the world is a substance, its existence does not
necessarily vanish if the relation between creating agent and the effect
is removed. Since Averroes maintains that the world is in fact a
substance, he argues that the world, taken as a whole, does not exist
on account of this relation, but it exists on account of its substance
and the relation is only accidental to it.75 In sum, he dismisses the
philosophers' position as being misleading at best and false at worst.
Acts produced by agents can be substances and not merely relations.
When Averroes turns to al-Ghaza]['s criticisms of Avicenna, on
the other hand, he begins his comment by saying, "All this is true,"
leading one to expect virtually complete agreement with his position.
But it turns out that what he agreed with in al-GhazalT's remarks
62 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
looks more like a reflection of his own position than al-Ghazalf's.
Thus he supports the observation that the agent's activity is con-
nected with the act or product only insofar as it is being moved, that
is, moving from potential existence to actual existence.
al-Ghazalf, however, had not expressed his point in just that way.
His stipulation was "only at the moment of its being created entirely
new," that is, ex nihilo, and only Averroes identifies this with being
moved. Averroes likewise approves of al-GhazaIr's observation that
non-existence or privation is one of the conditions for movement by a
mover, and reiterates his criticism of Avicenna on the ontological
status of acts. But here too, he alters the point of al-Ghazali's state-
ment, for the privation to which the latter referred is absolute privation,
utter non-existence, while Averroes is speaking of the relative priva-
tion which characterizes potential existents as such.76 Non-being, too, is
said in many ways, as Averroes knew very well.
The one area of disagreement which he allows himself to men-
tion has to do with the seemingly unimportant point of the duration
of the world's existence. According to the philosophers, there are
certain things whose essential specific differences consist in their
being-in-motion.77 Since these things must always be in motion in
order to be, and because motion itself can have no beginning (Averroes'
suppressed premise), these things must be eternally coming into being
"anew." What these things are and how they come into being are
questions that properly belong to an analysis of Divine causation.
What is clear at this stage, however, is that Averroes regards all such
existents as created entirely new, by being brought from potentiality
to actuality. Thus each is an act according to Averroes' definition.
What is more, they are more truly acts if they come into being
continuously, that is, eternally, than if they arise at only one time in
the remote past. If he can likewise show that the totality of these
things comprises the world, and that the world itself is an act, he will
have successfully argued the philosophers' case without recourse to
what he considers their erroneous assumptions.
Despite Averroes' criticism of the philosophers and his apparent
endorsement of al-Ghazalr, it is clear nevertheless that he retains the
agent/patient model of creating anew and rejects the notion of crea-
tion ex nihilo. This is surely the fundamental point of agreement
between all the philosophers of Islam with the exception of al-Kindf.
It is the potential existent qua existent on which the Averroian agent
acts, and what is more, that existent is a potential substance, and
not a relation.
On the Logic of Agents and Ads 63
Still, in developing his own conception of the agent/act relation-
ship, it is also clear that Averroes once again writes with the twofold
aim of clarifying and concealing. By introducing the notion of poten-
tial existence, he brings a genuine and fundamental doctrine of
Aristotle's to the fore and invites his readers to examine its impli-
cations. At the same time, by cha~acterizing potentiality as "existence
conjoined with non-existence," Averroes cultivates the impression that
even genuine acts must hover on the edge of non-being. For they are
connected with privation both before their existence is actualized
and even aiterward, since they carry with them the potential for their
own corruption, change of place, size, and quality. The same twofold
aim is achieved in his treatment of privation.
Students of Aristotle would thus recognize a key element of
Aristotle's account of change; others would presumably see nothing
but a reaffirmation of al-Ghaziili's position, especially if they are less
equipped to analyze arguments than to identify stock phrases.
Finally, we find the same systematic ambiguity in his very brief
remarks on creation. While a full-scale analysis of Averroes' theory of
creation must be postponed to Chapter Five, we can note here that
he repeatedly associates creation with the natural processes of
movement. At the same time, however, he takes care to describe it in
terms acceptable to his readers' religious sensitivities. If we ask which
view expresses the "real" meaning of the text, the answer will depend
on which audience is addressed. There is one group of readers which
is to be shielded from demonstrative truths as such. For them, the
real meaning of the text must accord with the apparent teachings of
lslam- and they are surely the followers of al-GhazalL For the much
smaller group who are competent to deal with demonstrative argument,
the real meaning is that which conforms with the demonstrative books,
that is, the works of Aristotle. The question of which was the real
meaning for Averroes, if it can be resolved at all, seems best answered
by remembering which of the two classes of readers he describes he
belonged to himself.
The Philosophers' Analogy for the Agent!Act Relation. The philoso-
phers, as we have seen, argue that the temporal relation between
true agents and their acts is one of simultaneity. This has the conse-
quence that if the agent is temporal, its act is temporal and, conversely,
if the agent is eternal, its act is likewise eternal. To reinforce this
point in a graphic way, the philosophers present the famous analogy
of a moving hand in a bowl of water and suggest it as a parallel for
God's eternal activity of creating the universe. Both in the philosophers'
 64 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
development of the analogy and in al-GhazaJrs and Averroes' com-
ments on it, the image of the hand moving the water illustrates their
conceptions of time sequence very succinctly. It also provides a com-
mo~ ?asis for summarizing the essential features of their respective
positrons.
The philosophers argue that it is impossible for the act or effect
of an agent to be either prior to or posterior to the agent in a tempor-
al way. We need only consider a hand moving in a bowl of water to
substantiate this. For from observation, it is evident that the water
moves simultaneously with (rna'a, cum) the hand and neither before
nor after it.
If we should suppose that the water moves only after the hand
does, it follows that the water remains, together with the hand, in
one and the same place before the water subsequently moves aside.'"
This is observably false; the hand and the water cannot be in exactly
the same place at the same time.
If, however, we should suppose that the water moves before the
hand, the movement of the water will be independent of the hand's
movement despite its allegedly being an effect of the hand's movement.
We have already seen that non-separability is one of the characteris-
tic features of Avicenna's conception of cause/effect relations in the
essential or.der.. If we s?ould grant that either temporal or ontologi-
cal separatIOn IS possIble, we seem to have no basis in reality for
calling the motion of the hand the cause or agent of the water's
motion. Causes would no longer be prior to their effects, but subse-
quent to them. Indeed, it would be equally plausible to call the move-
ment of the water the cause of the hand's movement, and that is
plainly absurd in this example.
There is no other alternative then but to conclude that the water
moves simultaneously with the hand, and that if the hand moves
eternally, the water, which is the effect of the hand's motion, does
also. By this model, God's eternal activity in creating would corre-
spond to the hand's motion, while the entire range of celestial and
sub lunar motions would correspond to that of the water in the
philosophers' analogy. Thus, while both God and the world are eternal
God is nonetheless the Agent and Maker of the world. And all that i;
mean~ by calli~g the world an act is nothing more than its being an
effect In a contInuous relation of dependence with respect to God.J9
Qua Agent, He is ontologically prior to the world, temporally simultane-
ous with it, inseparable from it, and the ultimate origin of its existence.
'. . On the Logic of Agents and Acts 65
al-GhaziIu on the Water/Hand Analogy. Responding to the phil-
osophers' arguments, al-Ghazali dismisses the water/hand analogy
as largely beside the point because it cannot apply to both the Divine
and human realms. It is true that in the realm of human agents, when
an act is temporal and therefore has both a beginning and an end,
simultaneity may accurately express the temporal relation between
agents and acts. But when one argues that an act can be eternal just
as the agent can be, and therefore without beginning or end, he has
conveniently forgotten or suppressed the definition of an act as that
which comes to be out of nothing at some point in the past. This
notion of an eternal or unoriginated act can only be a metaphorical
usage. The necessary condition for it to be an act is that it must not
have been in existence in any way before it came to be. The proposed
eternal act of the philosophers, however, had to be in existence always,
without beginning or end, so as to be the act of an eternal Agent,
who is an Agent by the necessity of His nature.
Given al-Ghaza If's certainty about his own definition of an act,
the theory of the philosophers must obviously be rejected, or, if allowed
at all, regarded as a mere metaphor. The only case in which an effect
and its cause could be regarded as eternal is that in which we say
that eternal knowledge is the cause for there being eternal knowing,
in short, a relation of logical entailment. But this is not an issue in
the discussion of agents and acts.so Clearly, al-Ghaza Ii is here distin-
guishing between two notions which Avicenna chose to identify-logical
necessity, which for al-Ghaza Ii is invariant and eternal, and causal
necessity, which for al-Ghazalf is neither-and in rejecting their
identification, he in fact rejects the notion that agents act in a logi-
cally necessary manner altogether, as Avicenna maintained.
The philosophers, moreover, are equally mistaken if they believe
that the water has been moved by nothing more than a hand. The
hand does not move the water, because it has no act as such. It is
rather the person to whom the hand belongs who moves the water,
and if he does so voluntarily, he is the agent of this movement.
All such voluntary acts are new acts. They proceed out of noth-
ing at some point in time. Since it is a voluntary agent who moves the
water, every part of his movement of the water proceeds from noth-
ing and vanishes into nothing only to be replaced by a new act as
long as he wishes to move the water. If this voluntary agent should be
able to move the water eternally into the future, he may do so, but
this will never constitute an eternal act. The reason is that in order
66 AVERROES AND 11-IEMETAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
for him to have moved the water at all, his activity as well as its effect
must have arisen out of nothing as a completely new act at some
point in the past, and therefore it could never have extended eter-
nally into the past. At some point, then, both the activity and the
outcome had to have a beginning, no matter how long they continue.
To be consistent with what are obviously Ash'arite presupposi-
tions, al-Ghazalr finally admits that the motion of the water is not
strictly speaking even the act of the man whose hand moves the water. It
is the act of God who moves the man. But even if this act were extended
eternally into the future, by instantaneous re-creations of momen-
tary entities and events, it would still be an act, because it would
have arisen from nothing and at a specific point in the past. God is
now conceived as the sale Agent to whom causal efficacy may be
ascribed. He is ontologically prior to the world and temporally
co-existent with any act He creates. He is able to create momentary
events and configurations of atomic particulars completely ex nihilo,
just as He is able to destroy them or refrain from re-creating them at
will. He is separable as an agent from the existence of His act, which
is to say that He does not act by necessity at a11.8 !
Averroes on the Water/HandAna[ogy. Averroes, in responding to
the philosophers, indicates general agreement with their analogy of
the hand moving in water. What he specifically accepts is the proposi-
tion that the eternally moving hand is related to the eternally moved
water as God, the eternal Mover, is related to the world as His eter-
nally moved act. But here he hastens to emphasize that the analogy
applies only to moving existents. It is not true for either the kind of
existent which is now at rest with respect to its creator or for "the
existent which is by nature neither in motion nor at rest, assuming
that something of this sort may be said to exist.''82 An existent at
rest, for example, could be a material thing already brought from
potential to actual existence and capable of motion, but in fact
unmoved. By Averroes' criteria for an act, it is no longer being acted
upon, since it is no longer being moved, although it once was. The
most likely reference for existents which are neither moving nor at
rest is the series of celestial Intelligences associated with the various
spheres. Because they are free of matter, they are not really capable
of being moved or, strictly speaking, being at rest. Therefore, they
cannot be God's act, if we retain the water/hand analogy as origi-
nally presented. It is this omission which Averroes regards as the
principal defect of the analogy. Since he does not grant that immaterial,
On the Logic of Agents and Acts 67
immobile Intelligences are uncreated, and therefore not acts of the
Divine Agent, Averroes' criticism clearly underscores the need for an
alternative explanation.
He likewise rejects a terminological concession which al-Ghazalf
puts in the mouth of the philosophers, in which they allow that all
they meant by calling the world God's eternal act was that it was
continuously related to Him as a consequence to its logical ground.
Such an admission on their part was possible for two reasons. The
philosophers, as we have seen, had a single conception of necessity,
of which both logical and causal relations were considered expressions.
Moreover, the only sense in which al-Ghazali granted that a "cause"
and its "effect" can both be eternal is that expressed by the relation
of logical entailment. Even though he considered this sense of simul-
taneity irrelevant to the discussion, the crucial point is that the phi-
losophers did not. Hence, they refused to quibble about words and
made what in their view was only a harmless concession.
To Averroes, the concession is quite fatal. For it means that the
philosophers have abandoned their original statement that God is
the Agent and Maker of the world and the latter is His act. He argues,
in essence, that they cannot assert a relation of logical entailment
holding between God and the world and at the same time claim that
He is an agent and the world is His act. He is distinguishing, in short,
between logical necessity on the one hand, and causal necessity, as
applied to efficient causes, on the other. What justifies this crucial
distinction for Averroes is the fact that an effect necessarily follows
from its cause only insofar as it is a formal or final cause; but it does
not necessarily follow from its efficient cause, since the efficient cause
or agent often exists without the existence of its effect.83 That is, it
may be fully in act and yet not produce its proper effect. Cause and
effect are, in principle, separable, and Averroes recognizes no less
than al-Ghazalf-and Hume centuries later-that one may assert the
"cause" and deny the "effect" without contradiction. The difference
between them lies, as we shall see, in the explanation why this is so.
The kind of necessary connection which Averroes endorses here
is the relation between existence and act understood as activity, not
as product.S< Thus he suggests it is true that the act of every existent
is necessarily connected with its existence unless something exter-
nal to its nature, whether substance or accident, impedes its act,
that is, existence. Moreover, it makes no difference whether the act is
voluntary or natural. The connection is necessary unless impeded.
68 AVERROES AND THEMITAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION On the Logic of Agents and Ads 69

Just what this conception of necessity implies is something we must experience. Different metaphysical standpoints are clearly at issue.
still determine, but what we have seen thus far of Averroes' criticism In such circumstances, it is useful to recall that the criteria by which
of the philosophers suggests that he does not have logical necessity definitions are constructed and usages prescribed are not discovered,
between agents and their products in mind. as it were, pre-labeled in the world. The problem is not one of simply
Still, it is this very connection between existence and act which pointing out something unseen by another. On the contrary, criteria
prompts him to chide the Ash'arite theologians and indirectly al- are selected, rather than discovered, and selections, of course, are
Ghazali for adding error to confusion by insisting that the eternal often influenced by other factors beside what is available to one's
existence of God is divided, as it were, in two. For they hold that He metaphysical vision. If we cannot hope to find a resolution for the
did not act eternally in the past, prior to the creation of the world, outstanding differences between the philosophers, al-Ghaziili, and
even though He existed before it, whereas from creation on, He has Averroes regarding agents and acts, we can at least attempt to account
acted and may indeed continue to act eternally into the future. Fail- for the kinds of considerations which influenced the selection of their
ing to recognize, as the philosophers do, that existence and being-in- metaphysical standpoints.
act (acting fully in accordance with one's nature) are identical, the In what follows, we shall concentrate on two in particular. The
theologians assert that one and the same Deity both existed and did first is that their respective accounts of causal efficacy differ, because
not act in the past. To the philosophers, it is quite self-contradictory their aims in explaining it also differ. In short, the parties to the
for God to be an eternal existent, but not to be fully in act and, debate do not share the same project. The second is that their cri-
therefore, acting throughout eternity, simply because to exist is pre- teria for agents and acts differ because their views on what there is
cisely what it is to be in act, and to be in act is precisely what it is to and particularly on what is ontologically basic are equally at odds.
be an active agent. For this reason, the philosophers have no alterna- Both of these considerations become clear in the Seventeenth Discus-
tive but to argue that the world has an Agent who acts eternally by sion of Averroes' Tahafut, which takes up the problem of necessary
moving it. Their key assumption, of course, which is hardly hidden connection.
even if not explicitly stated, is that God is an essential and necessitat-
ing efficient cause who is rather unlike a person in His attributes of
agency.as
What these conclusions reveal is a fundamental disagreement
between the philosophers, including Averroes, and al-Ghaziili regard-
ing the meaning of terms like "agent," "efficient cause," "act," "pro-
duction," and "creation," and the range of things they properly signify.
While significant differences also exist between Averroes and the
philosophers, they are not nearly as basic or as extensive at this
point. Disputes of this type within the same linguistic community
can of COurse be based upon simple misunderstandings, but, if this
is the case, a clarification of the senses which the parties to such a
dispute give to their terms usually resolves the issue easily enough.
Obviously, both careful presentation and analysis of the relevant cri-
teria in Discussion Three have achieved no such resolution, despite
the participants' periodic and mutual accusations of misunderstanding.
This is why we have called the disagreement fundamental. It can-
not be resolved by clarifying the meaning of terms. Nor can it be
settled by pointing to the same examples within a shared domain of
 Chapter Three

Averroes on Necessary Connection:

Causes, Effects, and the Missing Link

Necessary Connection and the Problem of the Miraculous

The Seventeenth Discussion of Averroes' Tahafutexamines the rela-

tion between efficient causes and their effects. At the same time,
however, it reveals both the fundamental point at issue between the
philosophers, al-Ghazan, and Averroes regarding causal efficacy and
the basis for their divergent approaches to it. At the close of his own
preface to the discussion, al-Ghazall states this point rather succinctly.
'We must occupy ourselves with this question [namely, causal effi-
cacy] in order to be able to assert the existence of miracles and for
still another reason, namely, to give effective support to the doctrine
on which the Muslims base their belief that God can do anything."!
To al-Ghazall the affirmation of causal efficacy plainly entails a
corresponding denial of miracles and Divine omnipotence, whereas
a denial of causal efficacy at least allows for, although it does not
entail, an affirmation of miracles and Divine omnipotence. The phi-
losophers and Averroes affirm causal efficacy, while al-Ghazall for
the most part denies it. But does it thereby follow that the philoso-
phers and Averroes deny miracles and Divine omnipotence? It is this
question which we must now answer in delineating both their respec-
tive projects and ontological commitments.

71
72 AVERROES AND TIlE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
Given the conjunctive form of al-Ghazall's initial observation it
is natural to begin by determining the precise scope of his claim
against the philosophers. Does he want to assert simply that there
are miracles, or that Deity is omnipotent with respect to all things,
or both taken together?
In fact, neither the philosophers nor Averroes deny that there
have been instances of miracles in the past. What they do reject is
the notion that God is absolutely omnipotent in the sense that He
can sever the relation between causes and their effects. Because both
the philosophers and Averroes regard this relationship as necessary,
albeit in substantially different ways, they regard direct intervention
on the part of God as being quite impossible. Indeed, toward the end
of the debate, even al-Ghazall backs away from the radical view that
God has absolute power with respect to all things and lists several
kinds of logical impossibilities which not even God can affect.2 But
whether the philosophers' and Averroes' denial of absolute omnipo-
tence entails a denial of miracles as well remains an open question.
It depends of course on how they define miracles or, in the absence
of a definition, what they cite as characteristic examples.
In general, their responses to the problem show that the partici-
pants have three different intellectual projects. While the philosophers
deny Divine omnipotence and assert necessary causal connections,
they nonetheless wish to identify at least certain kinds of miracles as
extraordinary instances of natural causation. By so doing, they hope
to insure the possibility of scientific knowledge, which in their opin-
ion properly pertains to the causes of things. Their aim is essentially
epistemological.
al-Ghazali, of course, affirms omnipotence and denies necessary
connections between causes and effects. In view of his treatment of
agency, this commits him either to the view that every existent is
miraculously created ex nihilo with an instantaneous temporal begin-
ning or to the view that the miracles are only extraordinarv moment-
creations of God, not His ordinary, recurrent creations. whichever it
may be, al-Ghazall's intention is clearly to lend support to a source
of knowledge he already has, namely, scripture, which affirms the
omnipotence of God. In the final analysis, his project is theological.
Averroes, for this part, agrees with the philosophers that the Deity
is not omnipotent and that the relations between causes and their
effects are necessary, although in different senses. But he insists that
the existence of miracles simply must not be doubted. For doing so
On Necessary Connection 73
compromises the principles by which moral virtue, itself a prerequi-
site of theoretical knowledge, is attained. Thus he attempts to sepa-
rate his defense of necessary connection from the issue of miracles
altogether, sharing thereby the philosophers' aim of insuring the pos-
sibility of scientific knowledge, but now from a practical as well as a
theoretical standpoint. Accordingly, his separation of these issues
reveals two distinct projects as well. The first is evident in the discus-
sion of miracles. It is to protect the philosopher in his pursuit of
knowledge from unwarranted interference by society and conversely
to protect society from unwarranted assault on its moral and politi-
cal foundations by philosophers. Broadly speaking, Averroes' aim here
may be called pOlitical. In defending causal necessity, however, it
becomes clear that Averroes has much more in mind than this. He
also wants to secure theoretically the foundation on which the very
existence of things rests: the identification of being and act. This sec-
ond project is ultimately an ontological one.
Each of the three participants undertakes to outline his project
in broad terms in the preface to Discussions Seventeen through Twenty
on "The Natural Sciences." Specifically, the preface states the phil-
osophers' position on necessary connection, prognostication, pro-
phecy, and miracles, followed by al-Ghazall's brief criticism of their
views and Averroes' evaluation of both positions. Then follow several
vigorous exchanges on natural causation as such. The first of these
takes up the assertion that the proximate cause alone is sufficient to
produce its customary effect. Here, the doctrine of necessary connec-
tion is attacked and defended on logical, epistemological, and meta-
physical grounds. The second examines the suggestion that besides
the proximate cause, another external principle or set of principles
is necessary for the effect to occur. The debate here is largely con-
cerned with the modality of its activity. The third and final section
presents a revised theory of miracles and the scope of Divine omni-
potence, which is based upon what appears to be a qualified accept-
ance of specific natures by al-GhazalL This doctrine is examined both
by the philosophers and Averroes, and ultimately rejected. As in the
preceding chapter, I shall attempt first to outline the position of the
philosophers, then that of al-Ghazall, and finally that of Averroes
toward both his philosophic and theological counterparts in the
discussion.
The Philosophers on Miracles. The philosophers' conception of
miracles is entirely determined by their assertion that the connec-
r'.
74 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
tion observed to exist between causes and effects is one of conse-
quenc~ by necessity ?r inseparability. As this notion is then analyzed,
two dl~tmct propositIOns emerge. (I) There is no real capability
(maqdur, posse) or possibility (imkan, possibilitas) for the cause to
e~i.st without the effect, and (2) there is no real capability or possi-
bility for the effect to exist without the cause.3
The first proposition claims that (a) causes have effects and that
(b) caUSes necessitate their effects, bringing them into existence with-
out fail. The second proposition asserts in turn that (a) effects have
causes and (b) the effects must have causes. But it does not suggest
that effects necessitate their causes or bring them into existence with-
out fail. Interestingly, an occasionalist like al-Ghazalf could accept
the second proposition if it were clear that the cause which any given
effect m~st have is God. A Humean could likewise accept it, on the
assumptIOn that the cause which any effect must have is a prior event
that IS regularly conjoined with it. But neither could accept the first
proposition as Avicen~a, the chief representative of the philosophers,
does. What prompts him to link the two propositions together is his
view that the relation between causes and their effects is character-
ized by r~ciprocity or mutual entailment. On this analysis, we find
once ~gam that causal necessity is presented as but another variety
of logical necessity, namely, that which Avicenna claims to find in
:he dom~in ?f pa~ticular existents and events. What is more, any
m:erruplI~n m thiS relation is impossible ex hypothesi, since any-
thmg that IS "necessary of existence" is defined as something which
cannot be supposed not to exist without the occurrence of an im-
~oss~bility.Any miracle, therefore, which is conceived as an interrup-
tIOn m the course of nature is thus ruled out of court a priori.
When confronted with narratives from the Qur'an telling, for
example, of Moses' staff being changed into a serpent, or the resur-
rection of the dead, or the splitting of the moon to herald the final
Judgme~t: the philosophers either resort to allegory or question the
authenticity of the text itself. Thus they interpret the miracle of the
staff as an indication that the demonstrations in Moses' hands were
s~fficient to refute the views of the impious magicians. The resurrec-
tIOn connotes the end of ignorance, which is likened to death. The
cle~va?e of the moon is something they are said to deny outright. In
their View, only three kinds of miracles can occur, and' these are not
so much interruptions of the course of nature as they are extraordi-
nary extensions of it.' All three involve the unusual psychic powers
of prophets.
On Necessary Connection 75
The first is imaginative revelation involving the prognostication
of concrete events in the future. According to this theory, of which
Avicenna is clearly the author,S forms, including the causal patterns
of nature, emanate from the celestial Intelligences upon the souls of
their respective spheres. Inasmuch as these celestial souls are asso-
ciated with matter as a particularizing element and likewise have the
power of producing representations qua souls, they are able to repre-
sent the particular concatenations of causes and effects which bring
about concrete events in the future. In short, they represent future
events in their particularity.
Those passages of the Qur'fin which speak of such events being
inscribed on the Indelible Tablet by a Pen, should therefore be taken
to refer to the souls of the spheres and the separate Intelligences
respectively. Now when the imaginative faculty of certain individuals
achieves exceptional power over the five external senses, so as not to
be distracted by them, they become suitably disposed to receive an
emanation of these same representations from the celestial souls.
Metaphorically, they are said to observe the Indelible Tablet, since
they can reveal the future in prophetic discourse. This, for the phil-
osophers, is a miraculous occurrence. The miracle does not consist
in an interruption in the course of nature, for there is none. It is to
be found rather in the extraordinary power and receptive capacity of
the prophet's imagination"
The second kind of miracle countenanced by philosophers, that
is, Avicenna and his followers, is intellectual revelation, which they
explain as extraordinary acumen. They observe that just as some
individuals cannot solve theoretical problems in even very lengthy
periods of time, certain others display such a prodigious power of
conjecture (qflwat al-hads, fortis estimativa) or intellectual acuteness
that they can formulate demonstrative proofs to answer problems of
this sort in the shortest possible time. With no more than the middle
term of a syllogism or perhaps the major and the minor only, they
can reconstruct the proof, and, indeed, derive others from it in rapid
succession.
Insight for such persons requires only the slightest hint. They
require no human teacher to acquire their marvelous and compre-
hensive knowledge of the intelligible world. Learning by themselves,
therefore, they progressively discover the links between the celestial
and terrestrial realms and in this respect apparently go on to know
all of the intelligibles or at least the majority of them. Still, they do
 76 AVERROES AND TIlE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
not acquire their Imowledge entirely on their own, since fully actual-
ized intellects do not exist essentially even in such extraordinary
men as these. Rather, it comes to them by emanative overflow from
another Intelligence in which actual Imowledge does exist essentially.
This is the universal Active Intelligence, which gives forms to all beings
in the sublunar sphere. While the prophet needs no human teacher,
his prophecy obviously demands a Divine one.'
The third and final class of miracles according to the philoso-
phers consists of those occurrences which apparently violate neces-
sary causal connections in nature but are in fact only rare and extraor-
dinary instances of them. These include such prophetic acts as
summoning storms, bringing down thunderbolts, and producing earth-
quakes to punish the wicked. Admittedly, it is hard to see how these
phenomena could be explained as natural events. Yet, the philosophers'
account is once again presented within the framework of their psy_
chology.
The human soul is not impressed upon the body of man as its
form, but is a substance in its own right associated with the body.
The soul, moreover, is so constituted that it has both an impulse and
a desire to regulate the activities of the body, while the body and its
faculties are created to be governed by the soul. If it is possible for
the soul to govern the members of the body with which it is associated,
despite its essentially separate character, the philosophers reason
that it should be equally possible for it to affect the behavior of
other material bodies from which it is also separate. All that is required
is "an effective psychological faculty" that is developed to a sufficiently
high degree. When this level has been attained, all these aforemen-
tioned wonders occur without any apparent physical cause, but only
when matter is properly disposed. Clearly, however, natural causes
which are not apparent and to which the soul of the prophet is caus-
ally related represent the means by which the event ultimately takes
place. Once again, the miraculous character of the event lies in the
extraordinary psychokinetic powers of the prophet, not in the absence
or disruption of real causal connections, whether they be manifest
or hidden."
This account of miracles presented by the philosophers draws
upon two distinct theories of causation. One of these, as several schol-
ars have noted, is the Stoic conception of "sympathy." The other is
the Neo-Platonic theory of emanation. What is not immediately evident,
however, is that the two theories are essentially incompatible.
On Necessary Connection 77
According to the doctrine of natural sympathy, everything in the
world is interrelated with everything else. These reciprocal connec-
tions existing between the world's parts derive from the fact that it is
an organic whole in an entirely literal sense. The world is represented
as a living creature, animated by a soul which unites and pervades
all things in it. The Stoic doctrine further characterizes these inter-
connections as causal, so that the operation of causal efficacy through-
out the universe is in principle unrestricted. Causal "chains," such as
they are, may proceed along vertical, horizontal, and altogether oblique
paths in a criss-cross pattern, and in view of the world's animation,
the links need not be physical or mechanical in all cases. Causal
determinism in such a theory is absolute. Indeed, it is, properly
speaking, a fatalistic account. Avicenna's conception of animated
spheres endowed with particular representations of all concatena-
tions of causes, the notion of "indelibility" associated with the celes-
tial Tablet, that is, these souls, and his theory of psychokinesis, all
reflect this Stoic doctrine of sympathy.
The second theory, that of emanation, asserts causal interrelations,
to be sure, but they are not universal. It is not claimed that every-
thing is causally related to everything else. While causal connections
can be established over considerable distances, and may even exist
between things of entirely different orders, the fundamental pattern
of causal efficacy exists in vertical chains only. The higher, more
powerful, and more real entities overflow and thereby produce or
otherwise affect things which are lower, less powerful, and less real.
Causal chains mayor may not intersect by chance. But it is not
suggested that all events, including these random intersections, could
not have been otherwise or that their occurrence was known in advance
by any of the hypostases. When Avicenna suggests therefore that imagi-
native and intellectual prophecy are an overflow from the celestial
realm, that the prophet's soul is holy and akin to the Divine, thereby
having power over bodies in virtue of its higher rank, or that the
miracle may not occur if matter is not properly disposed, we can
identify characteristic elements of the theory of emanation.
The problem is that Avicenna's account of miracles is largely a
conflation of the two theories rather than a synthesis. As such, it
involves several serious inconsistencies. Either there are chance occur-
rences or there are not. If there are, then clearly delineable causal
sequences or chains intersect at some one point. But for that very
reason, they cannot intersect at all points or be causally interrelated
78 AVERROES AND 1HEMETAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
at all points. Yet this is what the theol)' of sympathy asserts. Secondly,
it is difficult to see how the notion of causal chains makes sense in a
theol)' where evetything is causally related to evetything else. Instead of
identifiable lines of efficacy and influence, which can be initiated,
diverted, or impeded, we have what has been called a block universe,
where the identification of causal chains seems purely arbitral)'. Par-
ticular effects are neither initiated, impeded, nor altered by particu-
lar causes, nor are they attributable to them. They are produced
rather by the previous state of the universe as a whole, all of which is
supposedly recorded in the celestial souls.
This raises a third difficulty. It would seem that knowledge, con-
ceived as a capacity to identify and explain things by their causes, is
impossible-for ordinal)' men, for prophets, and even for the celestial
souls themselves. For if Avicenna seriously accepts the Stoic thesis
that evetything is causally related to evetything else, what the knower
must know, whoever he may be, is nothing less than the interrela-
tions of evetything in the universe past, present, and future. These
are surely infinite in number at any given moment and unquestiona-
bly so, given the philosophers' belief in the eternity of the universe.
Thus, whatever the merits of the philosophers' account as an attempt
to explain miracles within the framework of natural causation, it never-
theless founders by incorporating antithetical assumptions in its
formulation.
al-Ghazali on Miracles. To the philosophers' account of miracles,
al-Ghazalf offers, surprisingly enough, a qualified endorsement. He
allows that "we do not deny anything that they have mentioned and
that such things happen to prophets; we are only opposed to their
limiting themselves to this.''9 On the face of it, al-GhazaIr appears to
have completely reversed himself on the issue. Yet the reversal is more
apparent than real, for he has already denied the key assumption of
Avicenna's account-the existence of inseparable, necessal)' connec-
tions between causes and their effects. Moreover, immediately after
his assessment of the philosophers' account, he declares his inten-
tion is to affirm the OCcurrence of miracles without qualification and
thereby to give additional support to the doctrine of Divine omni-
potence.
In point of fact, al-Gham If has conceded vel)' little. What remains
of the original theol)' is really quite harmless. Thus, for example,
even al-Ghazali's occasionalist interpretation of agency allows for God
to act through intermediaries to achieve his purpose, whether these
On Necessary Connection 79
be angels, prophets, or ordinal)' persons. They are simply instru-
ments of the Divine will, not agents in their own right.
He likewise finds the notion of complete and irreversible deter-
minism quite compatible with his Ash'arite theological presupposi-
tions. All that exists at any moment, he has argued, is created ex
nihilo by the Deity and determined in all respects by Him. Nothing,
moreover, which is determined by God is alterable, for al-Ghaza Ii agrees
with the philosophers that the Divine will is eternal and unchanging.'o
Whatsoever He has willed must occur just as He willed it from eternity.
Finally, among the particular events in the philosophers' account
of miracles, which are known and determined by the celestial souls,
is the prophet's own prophecy and whatever miraculous activities he
performs. In the absence of any genuine agency or causal efficacy on
the part of the prophet, both his extra ordinal)' mental endowments
and their concomitant achievements are referred to the realm of Divine
activity and not to nature. Here again, there should be little wonder
that al-Ghazalf can accept this account. It is, given his understanding
of it, a mirror-image of his own view.
Averroes on Miracles. Averroes' treatment of miracles is not so
much a systematic exposition or analysis as it is a set of passing
remarks, and even these are exceptionally brief, ambiguous, and
scattered. Both their form and content have prompted the charge
that Averroes failed "to fathom the problem of miracle to its depths"
by not providing a metaphysical framework to account for both the
heterogeneous and extra ordinal)' character of Divine agency. Not only
does he refrain from enlightening the credulous in this regard, he
does nothing to convert the skeptic. Most serious of all, it appears
that what Averroes does say about miracles reduces them to the level
of magic or sorcel)'." In view of these criticisms, one is left with the
impression that Averroes has offered no theoretical account of mira-
cles in the Tahafut and that his few observations on the issue empty
the categol)' of religious significance.
Are these criticisms valid? Has Averroes failed to do what he set
out to do? Are his remarks on miracles devoid of religious import for
him and other Muslims? In the analysis to follow, I shall attempt to
show that Averroes did have a general view of miracles, but one which
he tried to conceal. Such an aim would account for the apparent
deficiency in his treatment of the subject. Similarly, I want to argue
that Averroes did in fact carl)' out the project he set for himself, but
that it was neither to enlighten the credulous nor to convert the skeptic.

80 AVERROFS AND TIlEMETAPflYSICS OF CAUSATION
If anything, he tried to reinforce the former's credulity and enlighten
the latter's skepticism regarding the nature and the function of
miracles. To take him to task for not undertaking a different project
would thus be beside the point. Finally, I hope to make clear pre-
cisely what religious significance Averroes saw in his conception of
miracles and likewise in his way of presenting that conception.
Averroes' account of miraculous events is prefaced by the obser-
vation that the ancient philosophers, on whose behalf he speaks,
deliberately refrained from making any statement about miracles.
They did so despite their awareness that such occurrences were well-
known all over the ancient world. The reason for their silence lay in
their conviction that miracles and belief in them are among the fun-
damental principles establishing religious laws. l2
Now the aim of all such laws is to enable men to attain a life of
virtue. Since a virtuous life is in itself an absolute prerequisite for
studying the theoretical sciences, Averroes argues that one must not
engage in a theoretical investigation of the principles which cause
virtue, before dne is competent to do so, that is, before one has
attained virtue and acquired the intellectual training necessary for
this kind of study. Even after both have been acquired, when the phi-
losopher may be entitled to investigate the subject, he is still obliged
to acknowledge these principles without qualification. "Of religious
principles it must be said that they are divine things which surpass
human understanding, but must be acknowledged although their
causes are unknown."13 Averroes, not surprisingly, follows his own
principle when he himself maintains that the occurrence of miracles
cannot be doubted and that their modality is something Divine which
human apprehension cannot attain. I4 He does so, however, as a mat-
ter of practical, not theoretical, necessity.
These prefatory remarks show that while the philosopher must
refrain from making statements about miracles, in view of their sta-
tus as fundamental principles of the law and even of his own discipline,
he is not prohibited from having views on the subject. Moreover, while
he may not investigate such principles before attaining virtue, noth-
ing is said to prevent his investigating them afterward. At one point
Averroes even allows that a trained thinker might be able to explain
one of the principles of religion, that is, to disclose its causes. But if
this is the case, he is duty bound not to reveal it, lest he undermine
the law.IS More important for our analysis, however, is the way in
which he characterizes miracles. They are Divine things which con-
On Necessary Connection 81
tribute to the attainment of virtue. They are beyond the capacity of
intellect to understand. Finally, they have causes of which we are
ignorant.
Had he dropped the subject here, as by rights he shoul~ have
done, we would hardly have much material for a theory of mIracles.
Indeed, the criticism leveled against him would have .been ~orrect.
But Averroes goes on and expressly indicates that he IS sensItIve to
those who would not be satisfied with his passing over the matter In
silence. Thus, in the context of evaluating Avicenna's position, he
proceeds to say more about miracles, but systematically introduces
ambiguity into his remarks when he would have surely preferred to
say nothing at all. Since he is obliged to conceal his views, even though
the philosophers and al-GhazalI had revealed theirs, Averroes can allow
himself no more than a compromise-to conceal and reveal them at
the same time. His procedure on miracles then is simply a special
case of his method in the Tahiifut as a whole. He may very well have
fathomed the problem and come to a conclusion, but he was not at
liberty to take all of his readers with him.
Averroes' first step is to dissociate himself from the obviously
naturalistic account of the philosophers. Thus he immediately casts
doubt upon it by suggesting, characteristically, that only Avicenna
maintains it. His rejection of the theory is confirmed when he goes
on to argue that even if the facts of the case were verified and it were
possible for a body to be altered by what is neither a body nor a
power within it, that is, the prophet's soul, without absurdity, the
cause mentioned by Avicenna would only be a possible explanation.
In short, it is neither a probable nor a conclusive one as far as Averroes
is concerned.
But why not? Averroes' answer, as we shall see, indicates not
only his differences with Avicenna, but, taken with his other remarks
about miracles, also expresses the main elements of his own view.
... Not everything which in its nature is possible can be done by man,
for what is possible to man is well known. Most thmgs whIch are
possible in themselves are impossible for man, and what is true of
the prophet, that he can interrupt the ordinary course of nat~re, IS
impossible for man, but possible in itself; and because of thiS one
need not assume that things logically impossible are possible for the
prophets, and if you observe those miracles whose existence is c.on-
firmed, you will find that they are of this kind. The c1ea~est. of mIra-
cles is the Venerable Book of Allah, the existence of which IS not an
interruption of the course of nature assumed by tradition, like the
 82 AVERROES AND lHEMETAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
changing of a rod into a serpent, but its miraculous nature is estab-
lished by way of perception and consideration for every man who has
been or will be till the day of resurrection. And so this miracle is far
superior to all others. I6
The defect in Avicenna's analysis of miracles is that he ascribes
them entirely to the extraordinary powers of the prophet's soul.
Averroes, on the other hand, maintains that while the events ascribed
to prophets are logically possible, physically possible, but nonethe-
less outside the usual course of nature, they are still impossible for
men to bring about. For what man qua man is capable of doing is
alreadY well established. The "truth" is that such extraordinary acts
of interrupting nature are possible only for prophets.
This is unusual. What Avicenna ascribes to the soul of the
prophet as a human being, Averroes apparently ascribes to the
prophet as a superhuman being. Now if Averroes' point is simply
that prophets are not like ordinary men, he hardly differs in this
respect from his predecessor. Yet he has indicated just the opposite
by criticizing Avicenna. If we take his criticism seriouslY, Averroes
apparently means that prophets are not men at all, since miracles
are possible for them but not for men! But this is surely an astonishing
conclusion and, indeed, one which Sunni orthodoxy itself does not
require. Is there any basis for supposing that this was his view?
No textual evidence appears elsewhere in the Tahafut, to my
knowledge, to support this supposition. But there is at least one
passage in his short commentary on the Parva Naturalia in which he
considers a related case, namely, whether a human being could fully
grasp the theoretical sciences without training. Any individual who
could do this, he suggests, would be more than a man. It seems
clear that the case Averroes has in mind here is Avicenna's account
of the miracle of intellectual prophecy. But his estimate of the likeli-
hood of such a case ever occurring is decidedly negative.
It is therefore impossible that a theoretical art be fully acquired
by a person, by God, unless a person assumes that we have here a
species of man that can comprehend the theoretical sciences without
training. Now this species, if indeed it existed, would be called "man"
only equivocally, but actually it would be closer to the angels than to
man. Now it will be seen that this is impossible... .J7
It is impossible for reasons that bear directly on the problem of
necessary causal connection. For if the theoretical sciences could
be fully grasped both with and without training, the relationship
between possessing such knowledge and the natural causes which
On Necessary Connection 83
produce it would not be necessary. He regards this characterization
of the cause/effect relation as entirely false. But if one were to go
ahead anyway and assume that such knowledge could be acquired
without training by a superhuman figure, its acquisition in this way
would also be superfluous, since such knowledge has already been
acquired in a more perfect way through careful observation, exam-
ination, and inference based on our experience of causes and their
effects.
Averroes' apparent suggestion in the Tahilfut that prophets might
be more than human and his denial in the Parva Naturalia that there
are angelic men capable of grasping the sciences without training,
that is, miraculously, thus seem to be contradictory. But we can
determine which view Averroes endorsed from several important
considerations. First, the suggestion in the Tahilfut is not one that
Averroes explicitly stated. It is merely an inference which not all of
his readers would have taken the trouble either to notice or to
question. In addition, it involves a far more dubious thesis than
Avicenna's view, which Averroes had already criticized as unverified.
Again, because the Epitome of the Parva Naturalia represents an expla-
nation of material Averroes characterizes as scientific, there is little
reason to question it by reference to a mere implication in the
Tahilfut. Lastly, we should recall that Averroes informs his readers
quite explicitly that the learned are obliged to acknowledge the mir-
acles of the prophets as necessary principles for the attainment of
virtue. It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that he accepts
this obligation himself in the Tahafut, even to the point of suppressing
an obviously false premise: that prophets are not members of the
human species. Thus the peculiarity we have observed in his account
is really a device for concealment, and it arises, in our view, because
of Averroes' need to affirm the principles of the religious law while
stating the truth as unobtrusively as possible.
What then is the truth about miracles which he wished to
conceal? It appears to be that miracles, insofar as their existence
can be verified, are purely spontaneous natural events in the sense
which Aristotle describes in Book II of the Physics. From all that
Averroes has said regarding such occurrences, it is clear he thinks
that (I) they are logically possible; (2) they are also physically
possible, but disruptive of ordinary natural sequences; (3) they are
impossible for men to perform-even, we may add, men who are
prophets; (4) they are caused; (5) their causes are unknown to us,
 84 AVERROES AND TIlE MITAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
although a phi~osopher could conceivably discover them; (6) they
may serve partIcular ends insofar as they are principles of the laws
for example, enabling men, through belief in the law, to achieve virtue:
These same features are matched virtually point for point with the
Stagirite's account of spontaneous events.
Such events plainly occur, for men are familiar with events which
happen neither always nor for the most part. To occur at all, they
must be logically possible and physically possible. Aristotle speaks
of them, moreover, as being contrary to nature which acts in the
same way always or for the most part. Spontaneous events, unlike
chance events, are not brought about by moral agents, although they
may happen to them. They do, however, possess external causes.
Since the number of possible causes is nonetheless infinite or
indefinite, they are, practically speaking, unknowable. Lastly, events
of this kind may still be "for the sake of something," since they
"include whatever may be done as a result of thought or of nature."lB
Whichever occurrences can be verified as possessing these char-
acteristics qualify as miracles for Averroes, if the end they serve is
to establish religious laws. l9 If this is the case, they must be acknowl-
~dged a~ Divine. But the "truest" miracle, in his view, is the Qar'lm
Itself. It IS such a miracle precisely because it does not violate the
course of nature. Here Averroes is not speaking for the miraculousness
of the Qar'an in terms of its flawless Arabic style, as traditional
mterpreters do. His point is rather that the Qar'an can be shown to
enable men to attain virtue and happiness in all generations in the
most effective way. If anything, it assists in realizing the specific
natures of men by means of the religious regimen and images of
reward it presents to men. Compared to the Qar'an, therefore, all
other miracles or spontaneous natural events which impress the mas-
ses with the tr~th of the prophet's message are distinctly inferior,
for they are neither repeatable nor do they impress all men. This, in
essence, is Averroes' theory of miracles.
From this analysis, it is clear that Averroes did not regard mira-
cles as heterogeneous and freely chosen incursions of the Divine
will into the domain of natural causation. Given the radical diver-
g~nce ?etween this view and the apparent meaning of the Qar'an,
his project would hardly be to enlighten the ordinary believer. Indeed,
by constantly emphasizing the obligation of the philosophers to pass
over th~ ~ubject in silence, it is clear that he feIt such enlightenment
was positIvely dangerous for the mass of the faithful. Its chief result,
85
On Necessary Connection
as he had himself observed, would be to deprive them of their belief
without providing anything in its place which they would be equipped
to grasp.'"
What then of Averroes' implicit obligation to convert the skeptic?
If the skeptic were a genuine philosopher, Averroes suggests that he
would readily acknowledge that the miracles which constitute the
foundations for the religious laws were "Divine things" and beyond
the grasp of human minds. His conversion, of course, would be to
an appreciation of their practical significance for a social order
founded upon a religious law, not to a theoretical affirmation of
direct Divine intervention in the course of nature. If, on the other
hand, the skeptic were to persist publicly in his questioning or out-
right denial of the scriptural accounts of miracles, Averroes main-
tains tfJat he is no longer a skeptic to be considered susceptible, in
principle at least, to conversion. He is, on the contrary, a perverse
and heretical figure, and the ultimate penalty Averroes reserves for
him is execution. Such a man, in his view, simply undermines the
foundations of society. He further impairs the social means by which
all its members are led to virtue and happiness in accordance with
their capacities. Clearly, then, whatever the intrinsic limitations of
Averroes' views in the Tahafat, he does not fail to carry out the
project he set for himself.
Does he then reduce miraculous events to the status of magic
or sorcery? It has been suggested that Averroes does just that by
emptying miracles of their supernatural content. Allegedly, once this
course is adopted, "we are left with nothing but an extraordinary
phenomenon which is incapable of insertion into the natural pro-
cesses, and at the same time is without special theological relevance.
But this is the very definition of magic and sorcery."21
Taking this definition as it stands, however, the only criterion
which it shares with Averroes' conception of miracles, as we have
understood it, is their status as extraordinary phenomena. Ex hypo-
thesi, they are inserted into the order of natural processes, for spon-
taneous events have natural causes. They arise from the intersec-
tion of causal sequences at unexpected points. By the same token,
they are hardly without theological significance for Averroes. Such
events, as he has repeatedly stressed, are the principles on which
religion is based, on which both the learned and the masses are
brought to virtue and salvation, and on which any theoretical under-
standing of God as the Artificer of the universe is rendered possible.22

86 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
To be sure, we would be more inclined to think of Averroes' theological
enterprise as a philosophical rather than a dogmatic one. Still there
seems to be no reason to claim that his novel theory of miracles
was without special theological relevance to those in his milieu who
were equipped to understand and appreciate it. A philosophical theol-
ogy is a theology nonetheless.
Empirical Evidence and the Case for
Causal Efficacy
From their respective accounts of miraculous events, it is clear
that the philosophers, al-Ghazalf, and Averroes had very different
aims in examining the notion of necessary connection. Since the
philosophers' overriding aim was to defend the proposition that there
are necessary connections in nature and thereby protect what they
regarded as scientific Imowledge (a deductively organized body of
causal statements), they insisted that an entailment relation existed
between cause and effect. For only stich a relation could serve, in
their view, as a proper foundation in re for the logical relations
holding between propositions in demonstrative syllogisms. Thus,
where miracles were concerned, only those which could be explained
by reference to necessary cause-effect relations were admissible.
All others were quietly rejected or relegated to the domain of allegory.
By contrast, al-GhazalI saw his task as one of defending the
proposition that God is omnipotent. To him, this represented both a
statement of truth verified by the miracles related in scripture and
a practical presupposition of Islam as a revealed religion. Conse-
quently, he regarded philosophic doctrines such as necessary con-
nection, which challenged the veracity of traditionally accepted mira-
cles as being either false or, at the very least, undemonstrated. In
his critique of necessary connection, al-Ghazal! tried to show both
the non-demonstrability and falsity of the theory.
Averroes' project is admittedly more complex. Although he sup-
ported the philosophers' attempt to ground scientific Imowledge in
the operation of causes and effects, he nevertheless treated their
emanative account of causal efficacy with the critical eye of a strict
Aristotelian. Conversely, he undertook to reinforce belief in miracles
as both a foundation of the law and as a practical prerequisite for
achieving intellectual excellence, while at the same time making no
On Necessary Connection 87
compromise whatever with his oWTI conception of causal eff~ca,?"
While the general outlines of that conception have emerged In his
discussion of agents and acts, its distinctive character appears most
clearly in his defense of necessary connection, particularly against
the backdrop of Avicenna's and al-Ghazall's treatment of the Issue.
What is more, their respective discussions of the problem enable us
to make considerable headway in uncovering the ontological pre-
suppositions of their causal views.
The philosophers asserted the existence of necessary connec-
tions between efficient causes and their effects on both empirical
and logical grounds. Yet in mentioning their position in the introduc-
tion to the Seventeenth Discussion, neither al-Ghazall nor Averroes
makes any direct reference to their arguments. It is simply stated
that "the first point [of disagreement between al-Ghazalf and the
philosophers regarding the natural sciences] is their a~sertion t.hat
this connexion observed between causes and effects IS of logical
necessity and that the existence of the cause without the effect or
the effect without the cause is not within the realm of the contin-
gent and possible."23 Still, the mention of observed connections alludes
to the empirical basis for the philosophers' claim, while the asser-
tion that causal connections are logically necessary and insepara-
ble suggests that there are also certain logical grounds advanced
by Avicenna in support of this position. In order to appreciate fully
both the force of al-Ghazalr's criticisms of the doctrine and the nov-
elty of Averroes' reformulation and defense of it, it is worthwhile at
this juncture to examine precisely how Avicenna presented his own
case for necessary connections in nature, even though the text omits
reference to it. We tum first to his empirical argument.
In his examination of the various ways by which one may arrive
at premises for use in demonstrative arguments, Avicenna distinguish-
es between induction (al-istiqrii') and tested experience (al-tajribah).24
Our concern here is with the latter. When tested experiences are
repeated many times such that one entity or event is regularly accom-
panied by another, it becomes clear that the association is not purely
coincidental, for the coincidental does not occur always or for the
most part. What these cases of regular association do represent is a
kind of demonstration (bayiin) that such a uniformity is the result
of a necessity inherent in specific natures. Avicenna illustrates his
point by explaining the purgative powers of scammony.
A tested experience is exemplified by our judgment that scam-
 88 AVERROES AND TIlEMEI'APHYSICS OF CAUSATION
mony p.urges ?ile. For when this [observed association] is repeated
m~n~ times. It no longer belongs to the category of what occurs
cOincidentally. The mind then judges that it is of the nature of scam-
mony to purge bile, and it acquiesces in it. Thus, purging bile is a
necessary aCCident of scammony. .. and [scammony] necessitates it
[the effect of purging bile] by some proximate power within it or
property in it, or a relation connected with it. It becomes correct' [to
conclude] through thiS kind of demonstration that there is a cause in
scam.mony by nature and associated with it, which purges bile."
~~Icenna's argument is illuminating in several respects. The
empirical basis for the notion of necessary connection is here attrib-
~ted to the observation of regular association of things andlor events
In nature. But it is important to note that Avicenna does not claim
that we perceive necessary connections as such. If this were the case
there. would presumably be no need to witness repeated associations:
One Instance would suffice. But in fact he requires a considerable
number, for without many instances of uniform association. we would
not be entitled to make a judgment about causal necessity at all.
Thus, the apprehension of necessity is not a matter of perceiving
but of ma~?g judgments about what we repeatedly perceive.
. Repetltl?n, moreover, is neither an arbitrary nor a merely psycho-
I?glcal reqUirement in establishing the necessity of causal connec-
tIOns for Avicenna. While it may also add to one's confidence in
causal statements, it is nonetheless a clear epistemic reauirement.
If ':the necessary" is distinguished from "the coincident~I" as that
which occurs always or for the most part as opposed to what occurs
rarely or occasionally, there must be many instances of association
be~ore we can say they Occur always or for the most part. In short,
AVlcen~a's conception of causal necessity is tied by definition to
the notIOn of regularity and uniform sequences of individuals or
events.
Lastly, while Avicenna is certainly prepared to admit the notion
of powers into explanations of observed causal regularities, he is
ra~er vague and even uncertain about their precise role. This is
eVI.dently why ~e entertains the notion of proximate powers, prop-
erties, an.d relatIOns with equal facility in explaining how scammony
purges bile. Indeed, he even suggests that the cause is something in
~nd associated with the nature of scammony, not the scammony
Itself. ~t most, causal efficacy is a necessary accident belonging to
a partrcular substance, and it manifests itself only when the nature
of the latter is "whole" (!<lhlh ai-tab), that is, not defective or, in the
On Necessary Connedion 89
customary emanative idiom, full. On the basis of his empirical argu-
ment for necessary connections, Avicenna is committed to a basic
ontology of substances, accidents, and the real relations which hold
between them. Causal efficacy, as a necessary accident of substances,
constitutes just such a relation.'6
al-Ghazali's rejoinder to this conception of necessary connec-
tion is brief and on the Whole quite devastating. He confines himself
to the commonly observed example of fire burning a piece of cotton.
What do we observe? According to the philosophers, we obserye a
natural agent which cannot refrain from doing what it is naturally
constituted to do, when brought into contact with a receptive sub-
'stratum. The fire burns the cotton through the necessity of its nature,
while the cotton receives its act of burning. Moreover, at this stage
of the argument, the fire is alleged to be the exclusive agent of the
burning.
But in fact, al-Ghazalr maintains, we see no such thing. The fire
is, first of all, an inanimate object and, thus, no agent. As such it has
' no action for us to see. Secondly, we perceive no connection what-
ever between the presence of fire and the burning and blackening of
the cotton. "Observation indicates that the one occurs with the other
('indahu, cum eo); it does not indicate that it occurs through it (bi-hi,
ex eo). "27 What we perceive at any given moment is simply the con-
junction or association of two distinct events; but we do not observe
any real relation, connection, or ontological tie that binds the
so-called cause to its so-called effect. Lastly, a natural cause can
hardly be the exclusive agent of a particular effect, even if for the
sake of argument causal efficacy were granted. External factors other
than the particular entity singled out as the cause would certainly
be required, and even the philosophers must acknowledge this fact.
What al-GhazalI has in mind, of course, is that God is the unseen
and ultimate agent of the burning. Either with or without the inter-
mediation of angels, it is He who brings about the blackening of the
cotton and the decomposition of its parts.
al-GhazalI's observation here is not without irony, since his reply
to the empirical argument for causal efficacy is to argue, in effect,
that the only genuine example of such efficacy, God, is altogether
hidden from experience. To the extent that students of nature explain
events by reference to the immediate evidence of sense experience,
they confuse incidental factors, which only accompany events, with
that which actually determines them.
 90 AVFRROES AND llIEMEfAPHYSICS OF CAUSAT'ON
This, moreover, seems to be the point of a rather puzzling anal-
ogy offered by al-Ghazalf to show that the so-called proximate cause
does not suffice to bring about its proper effect. He invites us to
consider a man, congenitally blind, whose eyes are covered by an
opaque membrane and who has no familiarity with the distinction
between day and night, either by direct perception or through
acquired mastery of language. If the membrane were removed
al-Ghaza Ii argues, he would conclude that the sights he beheld wer~
caused by the action of his eyelids opening. Further, by supposing
that his power of seeing remains sound, that visible objects remain
present, and that the impeding membrane does not interfere again,
he will not doubt that he will go on seeing. When night falls, however,
thi~ sa~e man will realize that it was the action of the sun's light
whIch In fact caused him to see by impressing sensible forms upon
his eyes. For nightfall represents the cessation of the sun's action
an interruption in its customruy illuminative act.
The philosophers, al-Ghazalf suggests, share the views of the
newly-sighted blind man about the causes of seeing. Like him, they
explain events by reference to immediately observable natural causes,
with specific natures and properties, which endure through time.
Again, they suppose that the operations of these causes will go on
and on, like the man's vision, unless some immediate impediment
arises. What they fail to realize is that even this regularity of opera-
tion is entirely dependent upon the continued action of an Agent
whom they barely consider, in view of His remoteness. Were this
action to be interrupted by the miraculous removal of light, for
example, the absence of any efficacious connection between open-
ing one's eyes and seeing things would be perfectly obvious even to
the philosophers. For, according to their very own premises, there is
no escaping the fact that there must be an efficient cause beyond
observable connections of "cause" and "effect."
The fact remains, however, that by introducing the image of the
sun, the same analogy can also be used to defend the philosophers'
conception of natural causation, for the sun is a natural agent. This
fact has contributed to the difficulty in interpreting what al-Ghazali
meant. In view of the remarks which precede it, however, there is
little reason to believe that al-Ghazalf was "covertly" sharing the
philosophers' own view. His point is essentially that genuine causal
efficacy is not to be found in the so-called natural causes immedi-
ately evident to the senses as the philosophers have maintained.
On Necessary Connection 91
Their hold on existence is much too brief and precarious to allow
for this. Hence, an external agent is required to "save the phenomena."
Plainly, al-Ghazali has chosen to answer Avicenna on the latter's
own ground by skilfully exposing the internal weaknesses of Avi-
cenna's empirical argument. Insofar as it asserts necessary connec-
tion as a judgment inferred from repeated associations of "cause"
and "effect," and not evident in direct perception, the argument is
not strictly empirical. If all we directly perceive is regular associa-
tion rather than causal efficacy or necessity, then nothing requires
us to conclude that the association is logically necessary by virtue
of specific natures which account for this regularity. It is quite suffi-
cient and perhaps even closer to the observed facts to claim nothing
more than a customary or habitual sequence which may be inter-
rupted at any time. This, of course, is precisely the claim that
al-Ghazalf wishes to make.'s
' By repudiating the notion of a link or connection in re between
what are habitually called "cause" and "effect," al-Ghazalf leaves us
with two fundamentally distinct entities or events. We see only the
fire and the burnt cotton, but there is no tertium quid between them
to be designated as causality, necessary connection, power, efficacy,
or the like. Yet this conclusion, in itself, does not appear sufficient
to rule out the possibility of causal efficacy, since there may be
other models of causal efficacy for which numerical discreteness is
no problem and which can easily dispense with the tertium quid
that binds. What makes al-Ghazal!'s argument so effective, however,
is the hidden premise discussed in the previous chapter-namely,
that what we ordinarily call agents and acts are created ex nihilo
and do not persist in being for a second moment of time. Here the
discreteness is temporal and radical. When "cause" and "effect,"
"agent" and "act" are thus reduced to ephemeral configurations of
accidental qualities supported by equally ephemer'l! atoms, efficacy is
completely ruled out.
The explanation for this is twofold. For al-Ghazalf, power as
such resides only in God, not in or between the recurrent, momen-
tary creations which constitute the world. Since these transient atoms
and accidents are inert and inactive, there is no reason to think
that their character changes in this respect merely by entering into
more complex patterns and relationships. Their relationships as well
as their existence are determined entirely ab extra.
Secondly, the fact that these atoms and accidents have no dura-
tion beyond the moment of their creation ex nihilo suggests that
92 AVERROES AND n;.METAPHYSICS OF CAUSA....ON
causes do not exist long enough to produce effects. Mutatis mutandis,
the same can be said about effects. Like the configurations imprinted
on the frames of a strip of film, "agents" and "acts" may display any
number of relationships to one another, excluding, however, that of
causal efficacy. What appears to us as agents doing various things
is in fact the consecutive sequence of individual frames.
Nor do cases of simultaneity between "cause" and "effect" raise
any particular difficulty here, as far as al-GhazalT is concerned. They
remain just as inert as before, but now they are located within a
single frame occurring at a given moment. Even here, the limits of
the cinematic analogy should be borne in mind. For al-GhazaIT, there
is no real connection of film, so to speak, either between frames or
within them. In either case, activity, power, efficacy, influence, and
surely necessary connections drop out of the picture. They are inco-
herent with al-Ghazalf's ontology of discrete, time-slice configura-
tions of atoms and accidents. Thus, where the philosophers pro-
posed the continuity criterion as a standard of genuine agency,
al-Ghazalf imposes, as it were, a discontinuity criterion with the
not-unexpected result of establishing non-agency, or at least, only a
bogus efficacy between so-called causes and their effects.
Given this classic critique of necessary causal connection, what
is Averroes' response to it? Put negatively, it is to argue that a denial of
efficient causes, "which are observed in sensible things," constitutes
sophistry.29 To repudiate essential and necessary connections between
efficient causes and effects involves either a verbal denial of what is
evident to the mind or a case of confusion. Stated positively, his
point is simply that we in fact perceive causes producing their effects
all the time. Whether the causes we observe are sufficient in them-
selves to produce these effects is, of course, another question entirely,
which calls for investigation in its own right. But for Averroes there
can be no serious doubt that we observe some things acting upon
others or producing others.
Now on the face of it, one could claim, somewhat ungenerously,
that Averroes offers no response at all to al-GhazalT's penetrating
critique. At most, he appears to give a dogmatic restatement of
Avicenna's main thesis. At least one noted scholar has understood
the Commentator in this way. Thus Professor Fakhry observes that
"the appeal to sense-experience .. .is of no avail, since the opponent
might always urge, in the manner of al-GhazaIf, that sense-experi-
ence attests merely that the effect occurs with (ma'ahu) the cause
On Necessary Connection 93
rather than through it (bi-hi); and this would leave undetermined
the question of the internal relationship between the cause and the
effect, for sense-experience cannot avowedly go beyond an external
relationship of contiguity or succession.''30 According to this inter-
pretation, it appears that Averroes never quite saw the point of
al-Ghazal1's objection.
This, however, would be rather unusual for a thinker with Aver-
roes' exegetical abilities. What is still more puzzling about this
interpretation is the fact that Averroes should find it necessary to
stress our direct perception of efficient causes and their effects
repeatedly. As early as the Third Discussion, he notes that occa-
sionalist assumptions "contradict the evidence of the senses that
things act upon other things." In the Seventeenth Discussion, he makes
the same point at least four more times.3I By reiterating this claim,
Averroes indicates that he understood quite well not only the point
of al-GhazaIT's critique, but the assumptions on which it was based.
As such, his claim deserves to be taken as a serious response, brief
as it is, and its contents should be unpacked accordingly.
In contrast to Avicenna's argument, Averroes makes no refer-
ence to the need for repeated instances of observed association
between cause and effect, before we are entitled to make judgments
about necessary connection. His claim is simply that we perceive at
least some things acting on others. Since he makes this assertion in
defending necessary causal connection, its meaning is at once clear
and also controversial: we perceive necessary connections, at least
sometimes, directly. We do not infer them from uniform sequences
of things and events as Avicenna asserted and al-Ghazalf implicitly
denied. Causal necessity for Averroes is thus neither obscure nor
mysterious. We observe it time and again, because it is directly
evident, even when we are witnessing a given cause and its effect for
the very first time. k
By the same token, however, he does 'not suggest that what we
observe is an ontological link or bond between cause and effect,
corresponding to Avicenna's overflow, influence, or emanation, that
is, something which could be characterized as a connection differ-
ent from both the cause and its effect. Averroes mentions no such
thing. What we see is a cause of a specific kind producing an effect
of a specific kind. Thus the proper locus for causal necessity or
efficacy is not between cause and effect but within each.
But this conclusion on its own will not do. If there is no tertium
94 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
quid called necessity or causal efficacy between cause and effect, as
al-Ghazalf himself insists, how does Averroes hope to show there is
a connection from within, much less a necessary one? He appears
to conceive of connections in a very peculiar way. What is more,
al-GhazaIr has already shown that in the absence of such a link,
cause and effect are absolutely discrete and inert entities, so that
one merely OCCurs with the other, but not through it. Whence the
efficacy?
Here, Averroes' insistence that we see some things acting on
others as efficient causes reveals a radical disparity between what
he and al-GhazaIr see as causes and effects. While Averroes grants
that they are numerically discrete, as perception itself would indicate,
he emphatically denies that causes and effects are inert. He like-
wise rejects the proposition that they are discrete and momentary
configurations of atoms and accidents. When fire burns cotton, we
do not perceive successive, momentary appearances of brightness,
heat, and reddish-yellow color patches which are spatially contigu-
ous to still other successive, momentary configurations of softness,
fuzziness, white and black color patches accompanied by occasional
sounds of crackling. What we identify in observation and can re-
identify through time is a continuous activity of one thing on another.
Similarly, we perceive neither the creation of inactive entities ex
nihilo, nor their recurrent creations after being annihilated instan-
taneously. But we do observe the particulars in question persisting
and changing through time. It is therefore al-GhazaIr's argument
against observed causal connection which is not strictly empirical,
for it is based upon presuppositions which cannot be confirmed by
experience.
Recalling Averroes' analysis of agents and acts, we can better
grasp the force of his own counterclaim. He argues that we in fact
perceive powerful, particular substances enduring through time and
acting on other things which are manifestly disposed to undergo
such action. Thus, to cite al-GhazaIr's examples, the fire, as some-
thing endowed with distinctive powers of its own, consumes the
cotton. Similarly, the executioner decapitates the prisoner. The bub-
bly brew quenches our thirst. The feast satiates our hunger, and a
little dose of scammony relieves us when we have over-indulged
ourselves. In all such cases, when the requisite causal conditions
are fulfilled, that is, when powers and dispositions are properly
matched, there can be no delay between the action of the cause
On Necessary Connection 95
and the appearance of its effect. Their occurrence, as our ordinary
experience amply attests, is simultaneous, and usually continuous
in time as well.32
Clearly, then, the point of Averroes' response is that we directly
observe causal necessity in nature again and again, not as an abstract
phenomenon, but as a concrete one. It consists in powerful particu-
lar substances doing specific things, regardless of whether these
effects appear as substantive, qualitative, quantitative, or local
changes. The aspect of necessity, at this stage of Averroes' argument, is
perhaps best rendered as necessitation, or making something hap-
pen by virtue of specific powers to do so. It is certainly not a matter
of logical entailment or emanative unfolding. There is nothing
stretching like a bridge from cause to effect by which some mysteri-
ous "efficacy" can make its way across. There is rather the impact
of agent on patient.
Finally, it emerges that the much-misunderstood notion of connec-
tion is not some third entity besides the cause and the effect which
lies between them. It is rather a correlation of one to the other sig-
nifying a certain fitting together of active powers on the part of the
cause with the passive powers of the thing affected. It is this correla-
tion or congruity, which Averroes understands by the more familiar
notion of necessary connection. In sum, Averroes' empirical defense
of necessary causal connection is bound to an ontology of substances
and accidents, with the distinctive feature that he conceives of sub-
stances as dynamic entities possessed of powers and dispositions.
The question remains, however, as to whether Averroes' defense
is credible. Even if it is conceded that his formulation of the argu-
ment differs significantly from that of the philosophers, his claim
seems to run up against some serious difficulties. (I) Many a mod-
ern critic would object in the first place that he is obviously making
physical-object statements when all he is lItrictly entitled to make,
on the basis of what he immediately observes, are sense-datum
statements. Whatever difficulties al-GhazaIr may have with his recur-
rent atoms and accidents, Averroes makes the transition from sense
impressions to the objects which reputedly cause them with alarm-
ing facility.
(2) Furthermore, if Averroes' claim is universal, such that we
are supposed to witness all causes producing their effects, it is
patently false. If, on the other hand, he is suggesting that we can
only observe some causes produce their effects, the point seems
 96 AVERROES AND nlEMETAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
relatively trivial on its own merits even if our obse rva t'IOns were
corre,:t .. After all, we Can hardly justify a universal claim about what
all efficient causes are (powerful particulars) or how they op t
( neces~an' y, 1' era e
given the congruity of active and passive powers) on
the baSIS of such meager observations.
(~) Lastly, the continuity criterion of agency which Averroes
sub~IlIts as preferable to al-Ghazali's theory of discrete atoms and
~ccidents seems quite inadequate to the facts, since our observa-
t~on~ ?f s:rcalle.d causes and effects frequently reveal marked discon-
tmUltI~S m their relations. Thus, the fire may touch the cotton for
some time before the latter burns at all, and if it does burn, it often
burns u~evenly. Similarly, flood waters tend to wash away topsoil
not con~muously, layer by layer, but in chunks and pieces often dis-
propo~Ionate to the surge of the stream. Other examples could surel
be ~Ished. The point is that Averroes' notion of continuous action i~
often, If not usually, untrue.
While none of these difficulties are taken up in the Tahiifut an
attempt to answer them can be useful, nevertheless, to the e~ent
that it clarifies what Averroes designed his empirical defense to
establish. (I) :nus, with regard to the first objection, when he speaks
of o~ observmg ?r perceiving necessary connections, there is no
questIon that he IS making physical-object statements about fire
cotton, scammony, swords and the like, rather than sense-datum'
stateme~t~ about their constituent qualities. The distinction, of
course, IS Important because only the latter seem to be immedi-
ate.l~ appre.hended, whereas the former are rather like inferred
entIties. While we can misdescribe a set of sense qualities immedi-
at~ly appr:hended, we presumably cannot be mistaken about their
eXistence masmuch as they are directly evident as percepts. With
physical ?bjects on the other hand, we can both misdescribe them
a.nd be mistaken ~bout their existence, not to speak of their puta-
tIve powers and dispositions. There is, it would be argued, a differ-
en~~ between sensing, as a basic cognitive phenomenon, and per-
celvmg, as a derivative one.
But while Averroes is admittedly thinking in a non-sense-datum
frame of reference, he is not suggesting that we can never be mis-
taken .in our perception of powerful particulars or their operations.
~or IS .always possible. His point is rather that for us to have any
ImpressIOns at all, even erroneous ones, we must ourselves be acted
upon directly by powerful entities capable of producing such impres-
On Necessary Connection 97
sions. That is why even al-Ghaza II requires a deus ex machina to
produce them in the perceiver.33 For if we perceive or sense any-
thing at all, the very impressions we have immediately convey the
efficacy of some forcefully active being, whether it be God alone or
the reputedly inert atoms and accidental qualities He creates, or
simply sense data as such. Precisely because this efficacy is the
product of the perceived object's specific powers and our own dispo-
sitions to be affected, we can in principle correct perceptual error
by a fuller investigation of both. If ordinarily observable entities
were totally inert and inefficacious, whether at the level of physical
objects or of sense data, we would not even so much as apprehend
them. For they could not affect us nor could we constitute them. In
short, we would not be able to perceive things as such. In this respect,
the Commentator is faithful to his mentor. "... Evidently knowledge
and perception and opinion and understanding have always some-
thing else as their object and themselves only by the way." This
"something else" is for Averroes, insofar as it is apprehended at all,
a cause of our knowing.34
(2) What then can be said for the scope of Averroes' assertion?
Does he think that we perceive all efficient causes producing their
effects or not? The rejoinder to the second difficulty, mentioned above,
is surely that he makes no such claim. Not once in the various pas-
sages where he asserts this observed causal connection does he
suggest that the universal quantifier is appropriate. Indeed, such a
qualification would vitiate his distinction between the essential and
accidental orders of causation inasmuch as the latter is distinguished
from the former by the relation of temporal succession as opposed
to coexistence." If it is possible to have extended "accidental"
sequences of causes and effects operative in the sublunar world,
and Averroes assuredly thinks that it is, then it is quite possible to
have observable effects without any realistic possibility of observ-
ing their causes, whether these be proximate or ultimate. The sub-
terranean causes of volcanic eruptions would illustrate this in the
case of proximate causes, while the existence of fossils makes the
same point for remote causes.
But if Averroes is prepared to grant that we observe only some
causes actually producing their proper effects, it does not thereby
follow that this fact is either trivial or uninformative. For we are
still able to proceed from observed effects to their unobserved causes
 98 AVERROES AND TIlE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
by constructing models of the natures of these causes and hypothe-
ses regarding their specific operations, commensurate with their
powers to produce observed effects, and then to seek empirical con-
firmation for such hypotheses. The most flagrant error committed
by the theologians, and al-GhazalT in particular, consists in their
negating just this possibility by casting doubt on the efficacy of
those causes whose natures are observable and known. Thus Averroes
argues,
...If the theologians had doubts about the efficient causes which are
perceived to cause each other, because there are also effects whose
cause is not perceived, this is illogical. Those things whose causes
are not perceived are still unknown and must be investigated, pre-
Cisely because their causes are not perceived; and since everything
whose causes are not perceived is still unknown by nature and must
be investigated, it follows necessarily that what is not unknown has
causes which are perceived. The man who reasons like the theolo-
gians does not distinguish between what is self-evident and what is
unknown, and everything al-Ghaziili says in this passage is sophistical."
In the hands of the natural scientist, Averroes suggests that even a
little knowledge can be a very informative thing, if by this it is meant
that at least sometimes we observe causes to bring about their effects.
:-"'h il.e nothing requires him to claim more than this at any stage of
mqUlry, the very possibility of the inquiry, for Averroes, demands
that he claim nothing less.
(3) Finally, in regard to the third objection, the discontinuities
in acting and being acted upon which characterize the very particu-
lars which Averroes regards as efficacious have not escaped his notice.
But neither does he take them as counter-examples to his continu-
ity criterion of acting. He readily allows that examples of causal
discontinuity are found in cases of motion between contrary states.
The explanation lies in the natures of the causes as principles of
both motion and rest, and of the things they act upon. Averroes
argues that causal efficacy depends upon an initial correspondence
of determinate powers and dispositions. However, once the efficient
cause has begun to act-an instantaneous occurrence in Averroes'
view-it alters the initial congruity relation between the determi-
nate powers and dispositions, and thereby introduces intermediate
moments of rest, unevenness, and variation into the process. Thus,
following upon an initial change of size, place, or quality, it is not
~nco~mon to have intervening periods of either brief or long dura-
tIOn Without observable change. It is during these intervals that the
On Necessary Connedion 99
cause and that on which it acts are again suitably disposed for sub-
sequent changes. The efficacy of powerful particulars, therefore, like
water eroding a rock, plants piercing through stones, cold air freez-
ing water, or teams of workmen hauling a ship, is real and observa-
ble enough, but it proceeds by jolts, bumps, fits, and starts precisely
because the determinate powers and dispositions of all such partic-
ulars are restructured as the change proceeds.37
Were it not for such a relationship between these powers and
dispositions in things, Averroes thinks there would be no adequate
explanation for the observed fact that change is not absolutely
continuous. Thus, in opposition to those who posit a universal flux-
whether of indistinguishable, flowing events or atoms and accidents
created ex nihil038-he argues:
...The first part [of a change] which comes to be in ae/u by way of
alteration is determinate, and the altering agent is itself determinate.
Now if the first part which comes to be by way of change were not
determinate and the changing agent itself were not, then everything
would be in continuous change just as they imagine, and it would
happen that there would be no [state ofj rest at all between two sensi-
ble changes. Then he [Aristotle] said that [the change] is often sudden,
as in the case of freezing; that is to say, the first part of motions
which come to be in adu, whether change in place or in quantity,
comes about suddenly, that is, in an instant, not in time, and if this
were not the case, then there would be change prior to the change
and no new change would have come into existence at all."
Now since we constantly observe new changes occurring, the proc-
ess by which different changes or different phases of the same change
commence must therefore be sudden and in keeping with the requi-
site powers of the agent and dispositions of the patient.
The continuity criterion therefore remains in force, not in the
sense that all agents are continuously efficacious or all patients
continuously undergoing action. Clearly this is not the case. Rather,
it enables us to see that there are degrees of causal activity and of
passivity. Some causes approximate the standard of continuous effi-
cacy more closely than others. The same holds true for continuous
passivity. To the extent that sub lunar causes of change between
contraries are subject to intervals of quiescence, interruption, or re-
direction, in contrast with causes of circular celestial motions, they
are deficient as causes. But even deficient, "part-time" causes deserve
the name "cause," and the standard by reference to which it is con-
ferred remains, for Averroes, the criterion of continuous efficacy.
 On Necessary Connection
Metaphysics and the Case for Causal EffIcacy
Averroes introduces his defense of necessary connection on meta-
physical grounds, just as he began his empirical arguments, by cit-
ing in full the relevant text of al-GhazaIr. But once again the basis
for the philosophers' position is absent. al-GhazaIr had furnished no
explicit grounds for their belief, and Averroes, it seems, felt no com-
punction to reproduce their arguments for them. One is left with
the impression, in fact, that the entire doctrine was accepted rather
uncritically by the philosophers without being subjected to serious
conceptual analysis.
This, however, was by no means the case. Long before al-GhazaIr
undertook his systematic critique, the philosophers had encountered
serious criticism of the doctrine of necessary causal connection and,
indeed, of the whole notion of essential efficient causation to which
it belonged. These attacks prompted them to develop arguments and
explanations of their own which went beyond those inherited from
the classic philosophical tradition. While their arguments seem to
have been largely ad hoc responses to objections, they nonetheless
indicq.te a genuinely reflective attempt to expound and defend the
notion of causal efficacy. al-Ghazal['s omission of such argumentation,
therefore, does not mean there ~as none to include. It shows only
that his aims in Discussion Seventeen Were almost exclusively critical.
One of the objections against essential efficient causation is
reproduced by Avicenna in his "Chapter on the Prior and the
Posterior" in the Metaphysics of the Shifa '. The objection is directed
against his claim that an essential efficient cause must be regarded
as prior to its effect even though they are temporally co-existent.4o
Specifically, it attacks the proposition that the cause is ontoIogically
prior to its effect so that the latter depends upon it for existence
and is necessitated by it.
Someone may say: If each one of two things is such that if one exists,
the other exists, and if one is removed, the other is removed, then one
is not the cause and the other is not the effect. since neither one of
them has a greater claim in relation to the 'other such that it would
be the cause with respect to existence."1
The critic is clearly taking Avicenna at his word on the criteria of
simultaneity and reciprocity in the implication of existence, which
he has asserted to exist between essential efficient causes and
effects.42 But the critic uses them to deny that the so-called cause is
100 On Necessary Connection 101
ontologically prior to the effect. Neither one can have a grea~er claim
on existence than the other, if they both arise together and disappear
together. Why? Their simultaneity conno~~ tempora! co-existenc~,
rather than priority of one to the other. Similarly, their mutual recI-
procity connotes only an ontological association, so that wherever
they are found, they are found together. But this hardly justifi:s any
concept of ontological priority. While the opponent here IS not
identified, the character of his objection, as others have noted,
strongly suggests that we are dealing with an occasionalist. For in
attacking the notion of ontological priority which is both nec.essa,?,
and necessitating, he clearly indicates his rejection of essential effi-
cient causation itself.43
Avicenna responds with a conceptual analysis of the various
ways in which the "if," mentioned in the objection, may be unde~sta.oo.
The obvious aim behind this procedure is to answer the objectIOn
itself by clarifying the precise sense in which the co-existent cause
is prior to the effect. In this way, he hopes to show that the ideal of
ontological priority and its application to the understanding of cau-
sation is indeed viable.
To this end Avicenna distinguishes between three senses in which
the co-existence of cause and effect can be understood. Thus, we
may be referring (1) to a particular cause and its effect in reality, or
(2) to a particular cause and its effect in the mind, or (3) to the
indications presented to the mind of their concrete existence in
reality or in the mind.
To take the last first, Avicenna argues that if the existence of
either cause or effect in reality presents itself to the mind, the mind
attests to or makes a necessary inference to the existence of the
other, although the other may not be known or "in the mind" until
long afterward. Speaking in psychological terms, his point is that in
thinking of one we must ultimately think about the other, although
Avicenna offers no reason why we should do so.
Again, if either the cause or the effect exists in the mind, it is
necessary that the other likewise attain existence in the mind. Here,
he is concerned not with our psychological awareness of causeS
and effects, but rather with our understanding what they are by
means of universal concepts. To know what a given effect is, he
suggests, is to know necessarily what causes it to occur. The con-
verse holds true for our knowledge of the cause.
Significantly, however, when Avicenna takes up the ontological
 102 AVERROES AND 1llEMETAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION On Necessary Connection 103

aspects of cause-effect co-existence, no such interchangeability tated causation for one of the two, so that it is [argued that] "one of
obtains. It is simply untrue that the existence of either cause Or them does not have a greater claim on causation than the other
effect in reality brings about or produces its counterpart. This holds because, in terms of conjunction, they are on a par." Rather the n:o
of them differ because we suppose in the case of one of them t~at Its
only for the cause. Thus he argues,
existence does not necessarily occur through the other, b~t With ~e
...We say: One of them is such that if it occurs, the occurrence of the other, while in the case of the second we suppos~ ~at J~st as. Its
other follows necessarily from it, after its own possibility-this is [of existence occurs with the existence of the other, It h~ewls.e eXls~
course] the cause. As for the effect, its Occurrence does not necessi~ through the other. Thus the question should be resolved In thIS way.
tate the cause's occurring as a result of it. On the contrary, the cause Can Avicenna's reply be accepted? If his aim were merely to
would have already occurred so that the effect did occur."
uncover an ambiguity in the original question, we could easily answer
What happens,however, if we relinquish the condition of temporal
in the affirmative, since no distinction is made there regarding the
simultaneity? Again Avicenna argues it cannot be true that the exist-
context of cause-effect co-existence.47 But the objection itself, as we
ence of either the cause or the effect necessitates that its counter-
have seen, was designed to criticize and reject the notion of an onto-
part should have already existed in reality. This cannot apply to the
logical priority which is both necessary and neces~itating. I? his
cause. If it did, there would be nothing amiss in claiming that given
concluding observations, cited above, Avicenna obVIously beheves
the existence of the cause, the effect must already have come into
he is addressing just this issue. He returns to the original perplexity
existence spontaneously, antecedent to and independent of its "own"
and recommends his account as the proper method for resolving it.
cause, which is absurd. Coming into or attaining existence on this
But despite his conviction here, the analysis fails. He neither shows
model is t'lntamount to mere conjunction. By contrast, however, we
precisely what considerations count for this notion of ontological
would expect Avicenna to argue that this analysis applies to the
priority, unless it be to state that "we suppose" essential efficient
effect whereby once the effect exists, it is necessary on that very
causation to exist, nor does he point out the unacceptable conse-
account that the cause should already have existed. But he rejects
quences which would follow from denying it. Indeed, Avicenna ends
this alternative as well. Even if the cause were fully existent, this
up explaining the kind of ontological priority at issue by introd~:­
would in no way be necessary as a result of the effect's coming into
ing the notion of essential efficient causation, when he had OrigI-
existence; and the same wou~ hold if the cause had already come
nally sought to explain the latter notion in terms of the former. The
into existence at some prior point in time, since "it is impossible for
argument, in short, is circular.
a thing which has already occurred to have its existence necessi-
Quite apart from the merits of the reply, however, two additional
tated by the occurrence of something that is still expected to be
realized."" features of Avicenna's analysis should be noted. His defense of
ontological priority as necessary and necessitating depicts causes
It is in this respect, then, that the cause is ontologically prior to
and effects as essentially discrete and rather static entities, which
the effect. It is necessary for the existence of the effect, and its own
are related in various ways depending upon the sense and context
existence neceSsarily results in that of the effect. Much the same
assigned to each. There is nothing intrinsically active about th~ cause
set of arguments applies to the removal of cause and effect from
which is necessary for a given effect and is that from whIch the
existence. The removal of the effect is dependent upon and necessi-
effect necessarily follows. Like two links in a chain, we may say that
tated by the removal of the cause, but not vice versa. At most one
they are connected, but, to all appearances, the links do not do
could conclude from the removal of the effect that the cause has
necessarily ceased to exist first. anything.
Again Avicenna does not indicate clearly whether he regar~s
From these considerations, Avicenna draws his conclusion as
follows: causes primarily as substances or as events or equally as both. HIS
examples tend to include both. In the previous chapter we showed
Let us return to the point where we drew this distinction, for we
say in regard to the state of perplexity [which prompted the ques- his preference for causes as substantive agents, but here the clearest
tion] that it is not the conjunction [of cause and effect] which necessi-
 104 AVERROES AND TIlE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
iIlustr~ti?n he gives of a cause and its effect in discussing ontologi-
cal PrIorIty-.that of the movement of someone's hand in turning a
~ey-can easIly b: unde.rst~o~ to depict the cause as an event, that
I~, movement. TIus ambIguIty IS not insignificant, since it lends addi-
tIOnal plausibility to those ,:ho regard causes and effects strictly as
events, notably the theologians. And if they can be events, why not
merely ephemeral events in an ontology of such events?
Once ~ain ~-GhazaIf skilfully explOited precisely these ele-
ments of AVlcenna s account for his own advantage. As the text h
h' . s~
IS aIm was twofold. He attempted to prove that even on the philo-
sop~ers' own assumptions, their arguments for necessary causal con-
nection do not warrant the conclusions which have been drawn fro
the~. Fo~, o~~e Avicenna has allowed that cause and effect are real~
d.lstm:t m~lv~duals, al-GhazalT is able to show that it is always pos-
Sible m. p~mclple to affirm the former and deny the latter without
cont:adictlOn-a consequence which profoundly weakens Avicenna's
~e~ls that causal ?ec~sity and logical necessity are essentially
sun.llar. To make thiS pomt successfully is, for al-Ghazalr at least, to
fulf~ll a second and equally important aim, namely, to unmask the
notIon of ~ecessa~ cau~al connection for what he thought it really
was-a phIlosophical chImera which has no foundation in reality48
Thus he argues,
According to us the connection between what is usually believed
to be a .ca~se and what is. believed to be an effect is not a necessary
connexlOn, e~ch of two thIngs has ItS own individuality and is not the
other, and neither the affirmation nor the negation, neither the exist-
ence ?or th", non-existence of the QIle is implied in the affirmation,
n.egatlOn, eXistence and non-existence of the other-e.g., the satisfac-
tIOn of th~rst ?oes not Imply drinking, nor satiety eating, nor burning
contact w~th fire, nor h~ht sunrise, nor decapitation death, nor recov-
ery the drInking of mediCIne: nor evacuation the taking of a purgative,
and so on for all the empIrical connexions existing in medicine
astron?my: the sciences, the crafts, and the professions. For th~
conn":"lon In thes.e things is based on a prior power of God to create
them l~ a.successlve order, though not because this cannexion is nec-
essary In Itself and .cannot be disjoined-on the contrary, it is in God's
power to cr~te salI",ty Without eating, and death without decapitation,
a~d to let hfe persist notwithstanding the decapitation, and so on
With respect to all connexions.49
al-Gh~zalj's ,formulation of the critique, on the whole, closely
follows AVlcenna s own presuppositions. Thus he assumes cause and
effect to be logically distinct or non-identical. Similarly, he does not
On Necessary Connection 105
assume that causation is constitutive of the essence of the various
things called causes. At most it would be something extraneous but
added to them, not unlike Avicenna's view that causation is a prop-
erty or essential accident. That is why al-GhazaIr can speak of one
not implying the other either by way of affirmation or denial. Thirdly,
he treats both causes and effects as events, for in all of the exam-
ples he offers, al-Ghazall employs verbal nouns connoting activities
or events, but not agents or substances. Here, of course, he seizes on
only one aspect of Avicenna's treatment of causes and effects, pass-
ing over in silence the notion of efficient causes as substances. Lastly,
al-Ghazali is prepared to grant that causes and effects can occur
side by side, which evidently means simultaneously in this context.
We might expect Avicenna to object that al-Ghazali commits
the same error as his original opponent, mentioned above, by arguing
that for any two things which are logically distinct, neither one can
be said to necessitate the occurrence of the other. But this would
be to miss the point, since al-Ghazali is not confusing causes with
effects in any of the senses Avicenna has distinguished. He is show-
ing that even in the case of what we normally call the cause, in
reality it cannot be true that it necessitates the effect. There is no
. contradiction in positing the existence of such a cause, which remains
what it is exclusive of its alleged "causation" and denying the exist-
ence of the effect usually connected with it. Nor is al-GhazalT sug-
gesting that his predecessor was somehow unaware of the simple
fact that not everything we ordinarily call a cause has its proper
effect in accordance with our expectations. The philosopher knew
this just as surely as the theologian. al-Ghazall's point is rather that
Avicenna failed to appreciate the implications of that fact for his
conception of necessary causal connection.
What al-Ghazali has done is to explode the notion that causal
necessity, as the philosophers understood it, and logical necessity
are different sides of the same coin. Affirmation of the cause. as our
experience amply shows, does not entail the affirmation of the effect.
Exceptions are always possible and, in fact, often occur; whereas, in
logical constructions, the affirmation of a given set of premises most
certainly entails the affirmation of the conclusion. By affirmation
and negation we suspect al-Ghazalr does not mean the psychologi-
cal procedure of drawing a conclusion. For that, like the causal
relation, is time-bound and subject to all sorts of intervening variables.
Rather, it is the atemporal syntactic and logical relationships between
 106 AVERROES AND 11lEMETAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
certain conc~pts and ~ropositions that he has in mind. So long as
the same logical functIOns are involved, their relations are invaria-
ble and without exception. They are necessary in the sense that
they cannot be otherwise. But the same cannot be said of cause-
effect relati~ns, for wh.ile there are surely no external impediments
to a conclusIOn folloWIng from its premises, there are often impedi-
ments to the efficacy of particular causes. While the logical relation
between premises and conclusion cannot alter from one moment to
the next ~nd leave us with the same argument, there is no basis for
~uch ~onflde~ce where cause-effect relations are concerned. Changes
In theIr rela~lOns are always possible, since changes in nature are
alway~ p~ssI.ble. ~erefore, contrary to Avicenna's belief, logical
necessI.ty IS simply Incommensurable with what he took to be causal
necesSIty.
Still, we may ask whethe~ al-Ghazalf also succeeded in proving
that there can be no such thIng as causal necessity. The answer is
n~t i.mmed~atelY evident, although he seems to have no doubt that
thIS IS precl~ely t.he result of his critique, for he moves immediately
to an occaslOnahst account of causation. What enables him to do
so, of course, is his own conception of causes and effects as discrete
powerless, and impenetrable events, whose only connection is on~
of assoc~ation imposed ab extra. Whether or not some non-Avicennian
~onceptl?n of causal necessity must be sought hangs on the viabil-
Ity of t~I~, con~~ption of causes and effects. Averroes' response to
al-Ghazah s CritIque, as we shall see, undertakes to show that it is
not viable at all.
. Proce.eding from his empirical elaim that we often observe par-
ticular. U:Ings a<;ting upon others, Averroes attempts to show just
why thiS IS and, Indeed, must be the case. But instead of embarking
on ~ conceptual analysis oUhe alleged relations between such
pa.rtlculars, he turns in characteristically direct fashion right to the
thIngs themsel~es. The key to understanding why things are said to
?ave causal ~fhcacy and why that efficacy is called necessary lies
In under~tandIng what a concrete, particular thing is. In this respect,
Averroes defense of necessary connection carries us beyond the
the~ry of essential efficient causation, which it seeks to validate.
For It goes on to disclose the ontological foundations on which the
theo~ ~s built-Averro,:s' conception of being, the relation of being
to actI~Ity, ~nd the speCial sense in which his understanding of causal
necessity differs from that of the philosophers. Once again, his argu-
On Necessary Connection 107
ment begins with a challenge to al-GhazaIr and the Ash'arite theolo-
gians generally.
And further, what do the theologians say about the essential
causes, the understanding of which alone can make what exists
understood? For it is self-evident that things have essences and attri-
butes which determine the specific acts of each existent and through
which the essences, names, and definitions of things differ. If each
existent did not have its specific act, it would not have its specific
nature; and if it did not have its specific nature, it would not have a
specific name nor a definition, and all things would be one [and the
same] thing and not one [and the same] thing. For it might be asked
whether this one thing has one specnic act or one specific susceptibility
to action or not. Now if it had a specific act, then there would indeed
exist specific acts proceeding from specific natures. If it does not have
[at least] one specific act of its own, then the one would not be one.
But if the nature of the one is denied, the nature of what exists is de-
nied, and the consequence of the denial of what exists is nothingness.SO
Averroes' argument is generally understood as an attempt to
deduce the causal efficacy of things from the concept of being as
self-identical in the manner of a strict demonstration.51 It thus
assumes two allegedly self-evident premises: (1) the principle of iden-
tity according to which each individual being is what it is, and (2)
the proposition that beings have specific natures and properties
which determine their distinctive operations or acts. By negating
the causal principle implicit in the second premise, Averroes pro-
duces a contradiction whereby nothing can be said to be what it is,
since things stripped of their specific acts and thus of their natures
and definitions as well become indistinguishable and unknowable.
Such a denial of causation entails, in short, a denial of knowledge,
and that denial undermines the most secure item of knowledge availa-
ble to us-the principle of identity itself. As Professor Fakhry put it,
... the negation of the causal principle violates this very law of iden-
tity inasmuch as it runs counter to the law of necessary concomi-
tance between the knowledge of Being and its causal operation....
Being, as we have seen, utters itself in causality, otherwise its nature
would remain hidden; that is, it would remain utterly unknowable
and impervious to human consciousness.52
While this interpretation is surely correct in its broad outline,
it is incomplete and thus raises more questions than it answers.
The result is to leave the argument open to some very elementary
but damaging criticisms which one would have expected Averroes
to anticipate and foreclose. A critical reader, for example. would
hardly fail to ask what justifies Averroes in claiming at the very
 108 AVERROESAND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
outset that it is self-evident that things have essences and attributes
which determine their specific acts. If this assertion were self-evident,
the subsequent argument would presumably be superfluous, whereas,
if the argument is not superfluous- why, after all, would he bother
to formulate it if it were?-the claim hardly deserves such exalted
epistemological status as the Commentator apparently accords to
it.
Moreover, Averroes appears to be guilty of begging the question
as well, both in the initial assertion and in the argument that follows,
by speaking of things being differentiated by their specific acts or
operations. After all, once acts have been introduced into the pic-
ture in this apparently harmless way, it requires little effort to find
causal efficacy following closely behind.
Then again, an alternative, Ghazalian account of self-identity is
perfectly conceivable. Things can be differentiated from one another
by virtue of their different and thoroughly inefficacious qualities or
attributes. Since there is no need to refer to acts at all, in order to
differentiate things, causation and self-identity can remain entirely
distinct notions. Denying the former poses no challenge to the latter.
Further, in response to the supposed elimination of all knowl-
edge which is presented as the key consequence of denying causation,
the Ghazalian can surely argue that we never in fact have the episte-
mic grasp on things that the philosophers mistakenly suggest we
have. The real definitions which they seek are elusive will-o'-the-
wisps, since we know only the contingent connections between
atomistic phenomena which may always change. The philosophers,
it seems, would do better to make their peace with these concomi-
tances rather than devise real essences to stabilize and explain a
world which is solely of their own m¥ing. Distasteful as it might be
to them, it is entirely possible that b~ing really does remain hidden.
Finally, even if it were granted that Averroes' argument estab-
lished the truth of causal efficacy so that at least one being "utters
itself' in activity, why should it be claimed that this occurs always
or for the most part in the same way? There seems to be no obvious
reason why this agent or efficient cause should not act arbitrarily
any way it pleased. Nor is it evident why any more than one such
agent should be conceded. Clearly, this line of argument leads to
the omnipotent Divine Agent of Ash'arite theology, who acts by the
mere fiat of His absolute will. But even if one did not pursue it to
On Necessary Connection 109
that point, the catalogue of difficulties we have listed would indi-
cate at the very least that the conventional interpretation of Averroes'
defense of causal necessity leaves his efforts severely compromised.
A more thorough investigation of the argument itself and a number
of the allusions to it throughout the TahlIfut and the commentaries,
however, reveals that Averroes was not nearly as vulnerable as he ap-
pears and that on these issues, he is perhaps his own best interpreter.
Averroes prefaces his argument, as we have seen, with the sug-
gestion that knowledge of essential causes is indispensible for the
understanding of being or what exists. This gives the impression
that his chief, if not exclusive, concern is with the knowledge of
being. For knowing being consists in apprehending the causes of
existing things, a view quite obviously expressing Aristotle's own
that "we suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowl-
edge of a thing as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in
which the sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause on
which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and no other, and
further, that the fact could not be other than it is."53
Still the argument as a whole shows that the problem of knowl-
edge is not uppermost on Averroes' agenda. If it were, he would
have concluded it by producing a contradiction between the episte-
mic opacity implied in all things being one and the fact that we do
have knowledge of things as being many via their causes, in the
form of names, definitions, and specific relations between them. But
that is not his conclusion. It is rather that a denial of causation
strictly applied reduces all things to one being and that one being
to non-being! Clearly, more is at stake here for Averroes than the
possibility of knowledge. The issue ultimately comes down to whether
anything may exist at all, once causal efficacy and necessity are
denied. For if Averroes is right, the price of their denial is not merely
that being would remain hidden, it is rather that being could not
be. At this point the question naturally arises as to what grounds
Averroes has for this view. Put differently, what is it about being,
for Averroes, that makes an understanding of causes necessary for
understanding it?
The question focuses not on causation itself, but on those fea-
tures of being which can be adequately explained only if causation
is taken into account. Being therefore is the starting point or princi-
ple at which the inquiry must begin. But to be a principle at all, it
 110 AVERROFS AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
must be a principle of some thing or things which are also beings.
Hence one aspect of being which Averroes uses to underscore the
significance of causation is the fact that it is manifold and diverse.
Whatever else may be said of being, it is surely true that we appre-
hend many different kinds of beings with distinctive characteristics
of their own. And this is especially obvious in natural things existing
outside the mind.
The term "existence" is used in two senses: the first synonymous with
the true, when we ask, for instance, if something exists or not, or
whether a certain thing has such and such a quality or not. The sec-
ond sense stands in relation to the existing things as their genus, in
the way that the existent is divided into the ten categories, and into
substance and accident.54
Where being signifies something in this second, generic sense, it
signifies each one of the ten categories or ways of being mu/tip/idter,
thus allOwing for further diversification within each of the categories.
The basis for this diversity among existing things, as we shall see,
is their distinctive causal powers.
The second feature of being, now taken in its diversity, is that
we apprehend beings variously in motion or at rest, that is, chang-
ing or remaining the same. Insofar as one speaks as a student of the
natural world, it is clear from "the induction of natural things" that
either all or some things are mobile at some time.55 Thus, those
who argue, on the one hand, that all things are at rest, and those
who maintain, on the other, that all things are constantly in motion,
both allow mere opinion to triumph over sense experience. But "true
conclusions [in the natural sciences] are made evident only from
premises, namely, premises derived from sense experience, and there
is no confirmation of true statements here unless it be the case that
it [the confirming statement] agrees with the things sensed, and not
the other way around."S6 Hence, motion and rest emerge as princi-
ples of at least certain kinds of being, and here as well, Averroes
will argue that we grasp these principl'iS properly only in the light
of causal efficacy.
Thirdly, both the structural diversity of beings and their static/
kinetic features can be explained by reference to still other principles,
understood as originative sources of both, that is, their natures.
That natural things are precisely those things which possess such a
source of motion and rest by which they change and cease to change,
and by which they are generated and corrupted, is something
Averroes regards as absolutely clear. Consequently, since motion is
On Necessary Connection III
a principle in the study of such beings, "whoever denies motion,
denies natural things as well." Elsewhere in his comment, Averroes
expresses this formula in a still more radical fashion. He suggests
that if one casts doubt on the principle [of motion], he casts doubt
on "all things." Again, the explanatory function of natures is rooted
in their causal efficacy. They explain only insofar as they are causes
and principles.$'
This brings us to the problem of self-evidence versus the use of
argument to ground these principles. In his Long ~o:nmentary on :he
Physics, Averroes classifies all of these ~ee propositIOns about ~emg
as self-evident principles of natural sClence.58 As such, he beheves
that they are not dependent upon metaphysical arguments and pos-
tulates to establish their truth.59 That consists rather in their ade-
quacy as descriptions of the facts, however general in form. Since
they cannot be deduced from prior premises, and still less to the
satisfaction of everyone, they are either grasped on their own or
not at all. It is essentially this same point which he makes in the
Tahiifut argument by saying it is self-evident that things have
essences and attributes which determine the acts proper to any
being. Again, Averroes is not suggesting that these notions are either
universally understood or conceded, but that as starting points, they
are either seen or not seen.
This, of course, leaves open the possibility that some men may
not apprehend these principl\!s at all. Even self-evident principles
may be challenged and denied. But the mere fact that this occurs,
Averroes insists, in no way undermines their self-evidence for those
who are endowed with sound understanding.GO Indeed, those who
do not base their view on mere prejudice and passion, but investi-
gate such matters in terms of the requisite signs and conditions by
which knowledge is distinguished from opinion, will find that their
conviction remains entirely unshaken.
However, it is properly the work of the metaphysician or dialecti-
cian to refute objections once these principles have been questioned.
For the natural scientist is not expected to defend the principles of
his own science, but to use them in expanding the frontiers of knowl-
edge in his discipline.61 Clearly, then, it is in his capacity as meta-
physician that Averroes, following Aristotle, und~rtakes. to a~s:v~r
all those who denied the diversity, mobility, staSIS, and mtelhglbll-
ity of being, whether they were among the ancient Eleatics and
Heracleitians or among his theologically-committed contemporaries.

112 AVERROFS AND TIlEMETAPHYSrCS OF CAUSATION
Thus he argues,
.. He who says that being is one and immobile denies the princi-
ples of knowledge. For [the fact] that beings are many and mobile is
one of the principles of knowledge in this science [natural science].
However, that natural beings have originative sources, which are the
cause of motion and rest in them is a principle of knowledge and of
being. Therefore, the same principle is customarily used for both. And
here, he [Aristotle] has expounded on the method whereby one who
says that being is one denies a principle of being and of knowledge,
and he has passed over in silence the method whereby it occurs to
him who says that being is one to deny the principles of knowledge
[alone], and this is plurality and motion." (emphasis added)
What all these passages show is that the starting point of Averroes'
defense of causal efficacy lies in the diversity, mobility/immobility,
and intelligibility of being. He considers these aspects of being evident
in themselves and the propositions which describe them self-evidently
true, that is, not derivable from prior propositions. What is self-
evident, as Averroes understands it, may always be denied or
misconstrued. Hence argument in support of such principles is not
superfluous. But, on the other hand, the fact that supporting consid-
erations may be brought forward, does not render self-evident prin-
ciples either less certain or intrinsically obscure. Such considera-
tions are only designed to refute challenges, not to prove or demon-
strate the principles themselves. Lastly, it emerges that Averroes'
concern with causation in both the Tahiifut and the commentaries
goes beyond the epistemological issue to its ontological ground. He
is talking about the principles of natural things not only as foci of
lmowability, but as the foci of being itself, and in both respects those
principles are causes.
This brings us precisely to the point at issue. Even if it is con-
ceded that we apprehend things as members of diverse kinds, as
either moving or at rest, and even as being both explainable and
existent by reference to certain principles, whether we call them
"natures," "essences," or even "atoms and accidents," there seems
to be no obvious reason for supposing llIat these principles actively
determine anything or produce effects or make things happen. Thus,
when Averroes speaks of the substances and attributes of things
determining their actions or operations, he is importing more into
his argument than he is entitled to, namely, an intrinsic dynamism
whereby things are efficacious in the first place. Hence the charge
that he begs the question.
On Necessary Connection 113
It is true, of course, that Averroes sees the principles at issue,
the spedfic natures of things, as intrinsically dynamic, but it would
be mistaken to suppose that he does so in an unreflective way. lf he
seems to beg the question here, it is not because he has no justifica-
tion to offer for his assumption, but because it strikes him as too
obvious to reiterate. This conviction arises from the view that being
and actuality are mutually implied by one another. For anything to
be or to exist, it must be actual. But it must actually be a thing of a
specific kind-a fire, a flower, a puzzled philosopher, or what have
you. And for anything to be actual, it must act, interact, or at least
have the power to act in some specific way. To be sure, a particular
entity may both be and be at rest, but it can never be and at the
same time be totally inert, powerless or inefficacious in relation to
all other beings around it, for such a thing cannot, properly speaking,
even be said to be. Having no specific act or capacity to act, "it"
likewise has no way to be actual, in short, to exist.63
Proceeding from the principle that being is manifold and diverse
and thus subject to specific divisions, Averroes elaborates on this
intimate bond between being and acting.
The summary of what we have said here is that the existent can
be divided either into essential differences or into relative conditions
or into accidents additional to its essence; out of the division into
essential differences there must necessarily result a plurality of acts
which arise out of the existent, but out of the division into relational
and accidental dispositions no such plurality of different acts results."
Here the most fundamental division is that which proceeds by sub-
stantial or essential differences. In other words, it is simply the divi-
sion of a genus into its various species. As an illustration, he speaks
of dividing the genus animal into rational and irrational animals,
then into walking, swimming, and flying animals and so forth. But
the central point is that only in this type of division do we have a
multiplicity or differentiation of acts arising as well. To be an actual,
that is, existent, member of a particular kind, is to act in a char-
acteristic way or to have the power to do so. For Averroes, as for his
master Aristotle, the key maxim of ontology seems to be that "being
is as being does." Wherever there are different beings, there are
inevitably different actualities and different acts. Where there is the
same particular being or kind of being, there is likewise the same
act or kind of act.
This relationship between being and act, moreover, is not con-
tingent but necessary. "As for the fact that the act of every existent
 114 AVERROES AND THEMETAPHYSfCS OF CAUSATION
must be conjoined with its existence this is true, unless something
OCcurs to this existent which lies outside its nature, or one or another
accident occurs to it, and it is immaterial whether this act be natu.
ral or voluntary."65 Insofar as the individual acts of a particular
being are subject to impediments from outside its nature, the neces-
sity in question is causal and not logical. The entity we speak of, an
x let us say, will be an actual existent of a specific kind, X, and yet
not perform its act without exception, since it can still be checked
or overpowered, given the kind of thing it is. But insofar as the
particular is considered strictly in terms of its own nature, and not
in terms of factors extraneous to what it is, the necessity involved
is indeed logical. Things of kind X perform acts of the type 0, because
to be an X is to do 0. What does not or cannot do 0, assuming
nothing interferes, is not an X, or if it was, it is no longer one.56
Indeed, Averroes makes it quite clear that this is one of the major
criteria indicating that a physical change has taken place.
...The empirical agent changes one quality in the existent into another;
it does not change absolute non-existence into existence-no, it brings
the existent into a form and an intelligible quality through which this
existent becomes another existent instead of this, different from it in
substance, definition, name, and act.51
Thus, a change in act, barring external impediments, emerges
as a crucial mark, indeed, the crucial mark, of a change in nature.
When such a change occurs, we are no longer confronted with the
same old particular now inexplicably behaving in a peculiar fashion,
but with a new particular entirely. If it were otherwise, so that spe.
cific act and actuality were not correlated in this way, a buzzing,
blooming confusion of things popping into existence from nowhere
would be the result.
. . An existent comes to be through an existent, not through a non.
existent, and therefore the non-existent cannot come to be by itself;
and if it is true that the mover of the privation and the transposer of
its potency into act transposes it only through the actuality it possesses
itself, of necessity the actuality it possesses must be of the same kind
as the act it transposes. If any effect whatever could proceed from
any agent whatever, it would not be impossible that the effects should
be actualized by themselves without aq,agent.68
Causal efficacy then is rooted for Averroes in the very struc.
ture of actuality or being. It is neither absent from the world we
experience each day as al·Ghazalf would have it, nor is it in any
way extraneous or accidental to the natures of things as Avicenna
On Necessary Connection 115
maintained. This explains how Averroes could claim that things are
differentiated by their operations and acts. For thmgs to be what
they are, they must act as things of that sort do, always ?r. for t~e
most part. Actuality thus becomes the counterpart ?f actl~I~. It IS
t only that we know what a thing is by virtue of Its actiVity, but
00
that it exists and is what it is by virtue of that a~tlvlty. .. Id
n e: d '
given this insight, it is !ittl: w~nder ~hat the techmcal expressl.on
used by Averroes and IslamiC Arlstotehans generally for act.ual ~st.
ence is bi-aUi'/, for literally translated it means that somethmg exIS~S
"in the act." In metaphysics as in literature, "to be or not to be" IS
inevitably a matter of what to do or not to do.
If this account succeeds in making Averroes' argument some·
what easier to understand, one might still object that it does noth·
ing to show why his conception of being as act and his differenti~.
tion of beings by their specific acts is preferable to al·GhazalT s
atomistic account of existence and self·identity. Why would Averroes
suppose that these conceptions, as expressed in his defense. would
decisively undermine al·Ghazalf's position? ..
The answer, I believe, lies in what he regards as the deCISive
mark of the real. If, for anything to be actual, it must act, interact or
at least have the capacity to act in some specific way, then the
criterion of reality, in the final analysis, is power. It is specific~lIy
the power to act or to be acted upon in that way, a ~uggestIOn
which goes back at least to Plato's Sophis.t, where the E1ea~lc .Stranger
proposes it as a revised criterion of reality for the matenahsts.
I suggest that anything has real being, that is :0 constituted as
to possess any sort of power either to affect anythmg else or to be
affected, in however small a degree, by the most fTl.sw.m~cant agent,
though it be only once. I am proposing as a mark to dlstmgUlsh real
things, that they are nothing but power." (emphasIs added) .
Viewed from this perspective, even the atoms and aCCidents of
Ash'arite theology, insofar as they are real, have ?ower an~ efficacy.
At the very least, they manifest themselves to ~s .m perceptl?n. They
make a discernible difference. Without this mmlmum reqUirement,
al·GhazalT has no ontology at all, nor does his omnipotent Creator
leave anything behind in the wake of His activity.
Now what is rendered here as "power" is simply the substan·
tive of the verb "to be able" (dynesthai, posse, qawiya) taken both in
the sense of exercising force and being susceptible to its exercise.
The concept, however, has several other facets which should be
 116 AVERROFSAND lHEMETAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
spelled out. (1) Things are constituted in certain ways so as to have
pow~r an? thus reality. Conversely, not being constituted in a given
way Implies lack of power and reality. (2) Powers are relational
~thout being relations. We can speak of things having powers onl;
If they ~an actively affe:t something or passively undergo action by
somethmg. (3) To ascnbe a power to something is to claim that it
can manifest both certain static properties, features, or characteris-
t~cs and a certain dynamic behavior in relation to other things over
time. (4) The powers of a thing are known only by its effects. As
such, they disclose and specify the nature of the entity which has
them. (5) Finally, real things are, in the most fundamental sense
their powers. Whatever can be characterized as powerful in thes~
ways is ipso !aCi? real ~s well. Conversely, what justifies us in saying
that somethmg IS a bemg or is real is that it makes some discerni-
ble difference in what there is. That is the barest power required
for existence.
Plato, of course, never explicitly committed himself to this view
which we shall call the dynamis theory of reality. As he makes th~
Eleatic Stranger point out later in the dialogue, the "Friends of the
Forms" would object that "a power of acting or being acted upon
belongs to Becoming, but neither of these powers is compatible with
real Being."70 But as is well-known, the dynamis theory enjoyed wide
c~rency among the Greek physicists generally, including medical
thmkers like Hippocrates, and not least of all Aristotle himself.
The Stagirit.e refined the concept considerably in Metaphysics
e :1-5 and agam m """2, defending it against various objections in the
fonner and summarizing his conclusions in the latter. Thus he defines
power (dynamis) in its primary sense as "an originative source of
change in an~ther thing or in the thing itself qua other," while noting
at the same time that dynamis and energeia have a wider extension
than instances of change alone.7I Now a given particular possesses
any number of powers which may become manifest under the impact
of co~s!raint, craft~manship, or accident, but these are not of pri-
mary mterest to ArIstotle. His concern is with the smaller group of
powers present in things in virtue of their essence. These are the
necessary constituents, so to speak, for ttat sort of particular to be
what it is.
Of these powers some will be active, in accordance with the
first part of the definition, while others will be passive or resistant
corresponding to the second. But, in addition, there will be another
On Necessary Connection 117
kind of power altogether, whose activity is quite independent of
other things either as initiators or recipients of change. This power
is a genuine principle, for it exercises its characteristic activity on
the thing which possesses it at the very core of its being, regulating
both its internal development and external behavior. So conceived,
it is the thing's physis or nature taken in the most intimate sense,
for as Aristotle defines it, it is "a principle of motion and rest in
respect of place, growth and decrease, or alteration." What is more,
it is constantly operative. It acts willy-nilly so long as the thing
possessing it exists. When such an entity is not in its natural state
or place, its nature functions as an innate urge (horme) toward
change, but when it is in its proper state or place, this power is an
impulse (horme) toward stability.'2
From this it is clear that a certain opposition exists between
the notion of powers which are dependent on external factors for
their characteristic operations, and natures which act quite inde-
pendently of them. Yet in another respect, Aristotle suggests that
there is no opposition between them. For now a thing's nature, more
broadly conceived, appears as the sum total of its essential powers
organized so as to constitute it as the kind of being it is.
Nature means the essence of natural objects, as with those who
say the nature is the primary mode of composition . ... By an extension
of meaning from this sense of "nature" every essence in general has
come to be called a "nature," because the nature of a thing is one
kind of essence. From what has been said, then, it is plain that nature
in the primary and strict sense is the essence of things which have in
themselves as such [that is, qua themselves] a source of movement."
(emphasis added)
Properly speaking then, the nature is the ousia of the particular or
its true being. It is also said to be the primary mode of composition.
But specifically a composition of what? To this question the answer
seems quite clear. If the particular has an originative source of change
qua itself plus additional sources of change which function only in
relation to other things external to itself [that is, active and passive
powers], the reasonable conclusion is that the nature composes and
organizes that which the thing has, namely, its reflexive and rela-
tional powers. Thus, actual existents tum out to be configurations
of different powers, capable of performing specific acts. They are, in
short, powerful particulars, and the knowledge we have of them
derives from our observation of the specific jobs they do.
It is precisely this conception of particulars which Averroes
 118
AVEJlROESAND _METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
On Necessary Connection 119
employs in the Seventeenth Discussion f th To
Aristotle, who developed and e r t d ? e ahafut. But unlike or essences of things having an originative source of change, and
site for a theory of natural s . xp Ica e It as a necessary prerequi- since powers are defined as originative sources of change, whether
the more immediate task ~:~c~ aSd~ whole, Averroes adapts it to reflexive or relational, the generative role of the form is rooted in
dynamic character of being. e en 109 causal efficacy and the its being a configuration of powers, or more properly, a union of
the innate urge plus the active powers proper to that being. Hence
Thus he speaks of natural things havi ng .
ers appropriate to the kind of entities th aCtlV~nd passive pow- its generative character is explained by the intrinsic dynamism of
to Aristotle's dynameis. Concomitantl ey are. ' ..ese correspond its active powers.
a prinCiple ·th· th y, natural entIties also possess On the other hand, the form is a limiting factor whose opera-
WI 10 emselves by which th h tions must for that reason be specific rather than amorphous. This
change, primarily and per se th t . .th ey c ange and cease to
movers. This is f ' a. IS, WI out recourse to. external explains why things manifest definite, repeatable behavior patterns
,0 course, the nature or ph . wh' h .
ines in the Physics Still 't' . ySIS IC Ar,stotle exam- over time. They have specific forms. In this sense, we can say that
ers and princi les 'of I IS Important to note here that these pow- the form of X specifies the activity of X. In tum, an activity which
somehow act i~depen:~~~eo~r~:o:n~f;n~h\~~~: ~n :v ?
right hic conforms to a given internal structure likewise serves to indicate
cacy emerges entirely in accordance with th . ~m. TheIr effI- the presence of that structure. The form is able to do this insofar as
in relation to one another In th. e orgamzatlon they have it expresses the particular configuration of powers and dispositions
not mere aggregates Rath' th IS respect, powerful particulars are which makes up the composite so that the composite acts in its
the constitu . er, ey are structured ensembles in which characteristic ways. This specificity in both the form of the compos-
ships so as ;;~~~;:~: ::;d ~sPositi~n~ cohere in specific relation- ite and its behavior patterns, as we shall see, is also what makes
· I
the pa rt ICU e c aractenstlc behavior associated WI·th naming and definition possible. Thus, whether we speak of a thing's
ar.
nature or its act, both depend for their very existence and identity
For this to be possible, certain .
in the sense that they t k powers must be pnor to others on at least two factors: (a) the particular range or selection of pow-
specific ways. a e over and harness others to function in ers which the thing has, and (b) the particular arrangement they
have in .relation to one another. Together they make up the bare
For the philosophers had seen th t .
t
posed of matter and form and th ;:very se~slble existent is com· minimum of what we may call Averroian substances.
whi0 the existent become~ eXiste:t an~ ~~~ii~s ~ ~ntity th~ough Still it could be argued that our account so far merely reifies
desIgnated by the name and deli . . e arm whIch IS the capacities of things, which are aspects of their behavior, into
ceeds from the form in eve existen~'tlOn, .and that the specific act pro-
existence of the forms . ryth . ' and It IS thIS act which shows the constituents of their being. Matter and form alone, on this objection,
substances, there are acti~~ 07e eXIstent. For they had found that in count as constituents whereas powers and dispositions would not.
and passive potencies, eith:r p;~~~' tartlcular to every single existent, But however plausible this view might appear in itself, Averroes
cannot be passive by reason of the u or or com~~n, a~d that a thing draws no hard and fast distinction between matter and form. on the
is the opposite of passivity a d same thing as illS actIVe; for activity one hand, and powers and dispositions on the other. Powers, he
and it is only their substr~tunm ~~osltes do not admit each other, insists, really exist in the composite, and they are intimately bound
(emphasis added) hlch admIts them successively."
up with matter and form. As such, they are not to be confused with
Of the two components which mal<. . specific properties or aspects of a thing manifest in its behavior.
and form, it is the latter which f .~~ up senSIble particulars, matter
unc An active power is that which is a principle of change in another
act. The question is how? On th Ionhs as the source of the specific thing qua other, not in itself [qua itself] since it is self-evident that
. e one and th f .
mechanism. It generates the activity db' ' ~ arm IS a generative nothing acts on itself [qua itself] ... and, therefore, a passive power is
it has the power to do so As h an nngs It to the fore, because that which receives change in itself from another thing, since it is
. we ave already seen Ave also self-evident that nothing is acted upon by itself [qua itself]. Now
t hat specific operations are the b . f d' ,rroes states
f aSls or Istinguishing th tu when Aristotle described active power, which exists by way of form,
th
O

a lOgs. Since natures taken in th . e na res and passive power, which exists by way of maller, he said "But a dispo-
, elr proper sense, are the forms
 120 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
sition is a power..." [Metaphysics lX:1, 104&13J, and he meant by a
power, a form, that is, that form is not acted upon essentially qua form
by the primary agent of change Oust as active powers are not acted
upon qua themselvesJ but rather [thatJ it is acted upon accidentally
Oust as active powers are acted upon only accidentally, not qua them-
selvesJ .... Moreover, those powers are not spoken of equivocally,
because all of them have the definition of the primary power. He
means that when one has reflected on those powers in each genus
one sees that they are related to the primary power. For in [the defini-
tion of) every passive power, the definition of the power of prime matter
is included, and similarly, in the definition of every active power the
definition of the act of the First Form is included, which is the definition
of the First Form separate from matter.75 (emphasis added)
Short of explicitly identifying active powers with form and pas-
sive powers with matter, Averroes leaves little doubt that they are
so closely correlated that (I) they virtually behave in the same
ways, and that (2) in the definition of the one, the other is invaria-
bly included. Clearly then the composite as a unity of matter and
form is by that very fact a unity of active and passive powers as
well. To know such entities fully would be to discover both their
dynamic components and the structure of their unity.
This same point explains why Averroes would reject the pro-
posal that ascriptions of powers and dispositions could be adequately
translated into strictly observational language having the form of
counterfactual conditionals, as we have mentioned in the previous
chapter. For substances have their distinctive natures, powers, and
dispositions even when the relevant conditions stipulated in coun-
terfactuals do not obtain. Poison is lethal, even when no one is
drinking it, and a tempered scimitar can be melted down even when
the blacksmith is out to lunch. In contexts where the nature is under-
stood as a reflexive power, no specific conditions are even neces-
sary to trigger its behavior. It acts willy-nilly, and the compUlsion is
entirely its own.
We are now in a position to understand why Averroes had such
confidence in the possibility of scientific knowledge through real
definition. Systematic observation of things interacting with one
another directly discloses both what they can do and what they can
undergo. Believing as he did that these acti'lities arise only in accord-
ance with the natures or real essences of the things which have
them, the scientist can arrive at reliable knowledge by working out
a conception of just which powers are required to account for this
behavior and then devising models of how they must be related for
On Necessary Connection 121
the entities observed to behave as they do and under the condi-
tions they do. Those features of the structure deemed absolute~y
essential for the identification of this real essence, a.re expresse? m
the definition. It is thus a formula of what kind of thmg the partIcu-
lar is, or a real definition, not because it expresses all the power-
ontent of the essence or nature-clearly it does not-but because
~t expresses the bare minimum which distinguishes it from nearly
similar beings and which persists through change. .
This conception of nature or essence, however, faces some Impor-
tant difficulties beyond the standard criticisms of al-Ghamlf. For
even if we grant that the effects of a substance are necessarily linked
with its specific nature, what is distinctive and identifiable about
this nature is its defining qualities, and it seems that these are too
limited to account for its full range of effects. Thus it does not carry
us very far in causal explanation to say that fire must burn becaus.e
it is a burning substance. Fire also gives light, it is red or yellow, It
flickers it changes from and into smoke, and it dissolves what it
burns. The connection between these acts and burning is known
inductively and generalized under laws, but it is not at all clear
how these acts are necessary consequences of the essential nature
of fire, that is, burning or making something hot.
On the other hand, we might suggest that a nature or essence
embraces more than its defining qualities and that it is really identical
with all of its normal specific qualities. Then, for example, we could
explain how fire illuminates by noting that it gives Ii.gh.t as a neces-
sary consequence of its being a lighting substance: SImIlar e~lan~­
tions would apply to all of its other effects. But thIS suggestIOn WIll
not do either because it abolishes the Aristotelian distinction between
essence and accident altogether. Any supposedly accidental change
would in fact turn out to be an essential change. In addition, it
would create total confusion in naming, since anything which gives
light would also have to be called fire. Not lea~t of all, i.t. fails t?
show any necessary connection between the vanous speCIfic qualI-
ties which are now all on a par as "essential" qualities. Together,
they constitute a collection, not a configuration or complex.
Averroes, to my knowledge, does not deal explicitly with this
set of issues. But a solution consistent with his line of argument is
not hard to identify. Thus, as an Aristotelian, he consistently main-
tains the distinction between essence and accident as well as between
substantial and accidental change. Consequently, a thing's nature
 122 AVERROF.S AND lHEMIITAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
or e:~nce could not be identical with all of its normal specific
qual~t~es. It would represent instead only a limited ensemble of such
~alItles, or more correctly, of powers and dispositions. Hence, only if
It we~e to lose one of these powers or gain another one of a differ-
ent kin?, could we speak of an essential change having occurred.
O~erwlse, we speak of accidental changes in which there is neither
gam nor loss of powers as such but only changes in how they mani-
fest themselves in different circumstances.
. Recognizing this distinction between essence and accident like-
wise prevents confusion in both naming and definition. For even
t~ough si~i1ar effects, such as illumination, can be produced by
different kinds of power ensembles, real definitions inevitably focus
on .u~e distinctive features of these ensembles rather than the simi-
lantles be.twee? their effects. Accordingly, just because something
produces lIght, It ?oes not follow that it must be called fire, unless it
also has the particular powers and dispositions which characterize
~e nature of fire. On this analysis then, fire is not simplv a collec-
tIOn of specific qualities, all of which are on a par. It is ;n ordered
ense~ble. or configuration of powers and dispositions, which Peri-
patetics lIke Averroes were best equipped to express in qualitative
~erms and hiera~chi:al classification schemes and which we express
m largely quantitative terms through the periodic table and chemi-
cal formuli.
. Still, if natures. a.re not i~~ntical with the totality of their prop-
erties, can the defmmg qualIties alone explain the full range of a
thing's effects? Averroes, I suspect, would have to answer that they
canno~ for the simple reason that they do not generate the full range
of th~lr eff~cts entirel~ on their o~. They do so only in congruity
relatIOns With o~er thmgs. Even With this qualification, however, a
complete analYSIS of the defining characteristics of the substance
woul~ explain far ~ore than is customarily assumed. Thus, fire is
not simply a burmng substance. Rather, it is a substance whose
nature is comprised of the hot and the dry. Thus, it emits light in
the :orm ?f a flame because it heats and thereby excites charged
p~rtlcles m the surrounding medium of air. Its coloration varies
With the intensity of its heat in interaction with the nature of its
fuel and the distance of the flame's different p~rts from the source
of co~bustion. It. flickers when the movement of air partially dissi-
pates ItS heat. It IS changed into smoke when moisture counteracts
the combustion process by restricting the supply of Oxygen and lower-
The Theory of Causal Efficacy 123
ing the temperature below the requisite threshhold. In :um, thou~h
fire was a far simpler substance for Averroes than It IS for us, ItS
manifold effects can be causally, but not logically, inferred from the
different congruity relations it has with the things it acts upon. For
it does not simply act upon things which are otherwise inert; it
interacts with other powerful particulars, which in that respect are
like itself.
It is important to note here that this notion of real definition as
expressing the minimum distinctive power-mntent of a thing's nature
in no way precludes recourse to nominal definitions when the scien-
tist or ordinary observer has other purposes in mind than identifi-
cation and re-identification. But nominal definitions on this analy-
sis are parasitic on real ones. We may surely classify man, for
example, as a featherless biped or fire as a luminescent gas within
the framework of certain kinds of inquiry, but unless the real defini-
tion is assumed, the same features might well be adduced for entirely
disparate entities having radically different natures, that is, genera-
tive mechanisms. All kinds of comparisons between things are
possible, to be sure, but Averroes clearly regards some comparisons
as naturally more significant than others. These are the ones which
disclose the essential natures of things, the structure of their core
ousiae, and lead as a result to real definitions.1'
Averroes' aim in definition therefore is not to show how terms
are or might be used, for such an enterprise strikes him as inevita-
bly inconclusive. When, in the Third Discussion, the philosophers
began to define agents and acts along these lines, he abruptly
dismissed their observations as dialectical.77 What he sought instead
was a single conceptual analysis of all things said to act. To define
things therefore is to state in the briefest way what they are in vir-
tue of what they do. To define terms on the other hand would be to
state what certain linguistic entities are and how they function, not
to analyze the structure and behavior of what they denote.
Once it is clear that Averroes is not interested in defining terms
per se, it should be equally clear that he is not simply looking for
the characteristics ordinarily taken as essential to agents in com-
mon usage. For his point is that one cannot decide on the basis of
ordinary usage which uses are literal and which, if any, are meta-
phorical. Here one either chooses essential characteristics arbitrarily,
giving stipulative definitions which mayor may not be illuminating
in regard to things, or one selects them by reference to a standard.
 124 AVERROES AND lHEMETAPHYSICS OF CAlliATiON
Averroes' position is that the proper standard for talk about the
world is to be found in the things themselves, and so he sees no
cause for embarrassment in proposing real definitions for them. For in
principle these can always be corrected and complet~d if further
observation or a more sophisticated analysis of powerfully active
things proves the original formula to be defective. In specific cases,
real definitions may fail to be adequate, for we have no reason to
suppose all of being is entirely manifest to us. But neither is it
completely hidden. The diverse character of things is clear, and to
the extent this is so, genuine knowledge of their natures is possible.
Hence, for Averroes there is abiding value in real definition as a
method of attaining systematic knowledge, because it expresses facts
about the world itself and not merely about how we think and speak
about the world.
These, in sum, are the kinds of considerations which enable
Averroes to claim it as self-evident that things have essences and
attributes which determine their specific acts and that these acts,
in turn, enable us to distinguish the natures, names, and definitions
of things from one another. Once it has been conceded that power
is the mark of the real and that actual existents are powerful partic-
ulars of specific kinds, his claim ceases to be so patently question-
begging, although it will surely remain controversial. By keeping
these points consistently in mind, both the force and logic of what
fOllows in his argument become increasingly clear.
Averroes now proceeds to argue that if individual things lacked
specific activities by which they could be identified, they would like-
wise be without the specific natures which generate them. His war-
rant for this claim is that all such acts represent the "exteriorization"
of the powers and dispositions in things which cohere in specific
ways and constitute the generative mechanism or nature of that
particular. Now because to be a power or organized set of powers
is, in the final analysis, to perform some identifiable operation, the
elimination of the act is a prima facie indication that the nature or
generative mechanism is also lacking.
Averroes explains this further in his Long Commentary on the
Physics, in the course of discussing how natures belong to the class
of causes which act for an end. Aristotle had observed that "as things
are done, so they are by nature such as to be, and as they are by
nature such as to be, so they are done, if there is no impediment."7s
This statement prompts the following explaQiltion.
On Necessary Connection 125
Aristotle said that it is necessary that something should ad, etc. .. .since
'something performs some action [we say that] just as it p~rforms th.at
action, so was it naturally constituted to perf~rm that actlO~1 that IS,
its nature requires that action. Now once he established what he mtended,
he began to explain, also from this point that [such] an a.ctlOn IS natu-
rally constituted to exist for the m?,t part. ..smce that which performs
some action was naturally conslituted to perform It only on the con-
dition that it was constituted to perform that actIOn either always or
for the most part. This will be the case, insofar as it is not impe~ed
by something else. Consequently, it follows from thiS that somethmg
constituted by nature acts, unless impeded by something else. 79
(emphasis added)
It is an open question, of course, whether this is an accurate repre-
sentation of Aristotle's meaning. But Averroes, it is clear, saw his
point as justifying the necessary correlation of natures and acts.
Natures, as principles of movement, are neither inert nor powerless.
They are constituted to act, and not just to act in any way at all, but
in specific ways. When the actions they perform occur always or for
the most part, they are by definition necessary acts and effe~ts.
That is why stars necessarily emit light rather than milk, why fIre
burns cotton and not asbestos, and why medicines heal rather than
harm. Each is constituted to produce its own specific act.
Now if both the distinctive acts and natures of things were alto-
gether lacking, there would be no basis in reali~ for names and
definitions either. This does not mean that Averroes fmds some myste-
rious connection between the names we give to things and their
intrinsic natures. He would have surely dismissed this view as Plato
had in the Cratylus. The point is rather that there would no l~nger
be any essential differences between "acts" and "natures" to be ~Ic.'<ed
out by our conventional expressions of reference and descnptIOn.
Names cannot refer if there is nothing specific for them to refer to.
The same applies mutatis mutandis to real definitions. If there are
no longer formal structures of reflexive and relational powers con-
stituting and disclosing the ousiae of individual particula~s,80 ~e?
there can be no distinctive content in things to formulate m defIm-
tions. Neither for that matter can there be anyone left to engage in
the activity of defining and knowing them! The result is ~at all ~ings
in losing specific natures and identities become an undIfferentiated
unity, and, as we shall see, a unity which is less like the cha~geless
but identifiable One of Parmenides than like the ever-changmg flux
attributed to Heracleitus.sl For just as one cannot rightly say of the
 126 AVERROES AND TIlEMETAPH'lSICS OF CAUSATION
former that it is not, Averroes will argue regarding the latter that
one cannot even say that it is.
His exact statement of this in the Tahilfut is that "all things
would be one and the same thing and not one and the same thing.''82
The contradictory formula with which he closes here is what tells
in favor of a "Heracleitean" interpretation. For in the unending suc-
cession of evanescent atoms and accidents which is the Ash'arite
flux, nothing persists long enough to be identified much less to pro-
duce or act upon anything else. Nothing is sufficiently stable to be
"what it is" without the immediate qualification that it is now some-
thing new. Such all-pervasive change requires that neither acts,
natures, properties, nor accidents can maintain their distinctness
vis-a-vis One another. Though there may be different names for the
apparently stable things in the world, there are no separate and
stable essences to be named, for all things are essentially one thing-
the flux.
.u
they [the Heracleiteans] intend by what they say that all things
havmg dIverse names are the same according to definition, to the
point that the meaning of such names as "man," "horse," and "ass" is
just like the meaning of such names as "garment" and "tunic" [i.e.,
different names for what is in essence the same] then it will Occur to
them to say what Heracleitus, the sophist, said, namely, that contraries
are the same .... And when the meanings of the names of contrary and
opposed things are the same, as for example "wine" and "undiluted
wine" signify the same thing and "garment" and "tunic" likewise, then
the being appropriate to "good" and "bad," which are contraries, will
be one being as well. This may be found, moreover, not only in regard
to "good" and "bad," which are contraries, but in regard to "good"
a~d "not good," which are contradictories, to the point where being
WIll be not-bemg ...and so, when they propose that opposites which
signify being and not-being are the same, they then propose that that
which is, is not. In this way, they strip beings of their essences, since
they say that they are one.83
It is small wonder then that Averroes' very first comment on al-
GhazalI's critique of causal efficacy was to dismiss the argument as
sophistical. The reason now is obvious. He saw it as are-statement
of the position ascribed to Heracleitus, whom he quite evidently
regarded as a sophist, the kind of thinker who dissolves all distinc-
tions into nothing.
By contrast, no such denunciation appears in connection with
Parmenides' position on the unity of what is.84 To be sure, he
-
consigned most of what Averroes regarded as real to the status of
On Necessary Connection 127
mere names and human constructions belonging to the way of
seeming, but Parmenides at least recognized the mutual implica-
tion of being and unity. That is why he consistently spoke as though
that which is and its being were one and the same thing, even to
the point of suppressing a separate grammatical subject for
sonu, the "(what) is" of his poem. Moreover, by arguing that
being is indivisible and thus incapable of having different kinds or
degrees of being C" .. .it is all alike; nor is there more h:re and less
there"), he further reinforced the idea of its absolute umty and com-
plete actuality.
To Averroes, this was crucial. Given his conception of actual
existence as a function of power being exercised, it is quite natural
to find him appropriating Parmenides' conclusions and then asking
whether this unity to which all things have been reduced has either
a specific activity or receptivity to action of its own. II it does, then
the unity, which is all that exists at this stage of the argument, must
have a single, albeit simple, nature corresponding to its single act
or susceptibility to action. This, surely, is consistent with its self-
identity and complete actuality.
What is more, on the principle that "one and the same nature
would necessarily have one and the same motion" and its corollary
that "more than one nature would necessarily have more than One
motion," which Averroes draws from Aristotle's De Caeio,85 it would
follow that a plurality of observed motions, that is, specific acts,
indicates a plurality of natures. This is precisely the conclusion which
Averroes draws. II this unity has "a specific act, then there would
indeed exist specific acts proceeding from specific natures."&; II, in
short, Averroes is given a self-identical Parmenidian One to work
with, then, on the basis of empirical observation and his dynamic
conception of being as act, he is prepared to bring us back to the
world of the many.
The Ghazalian critique of causal necessity, on the other hand,
does not even leave us with the One, for it relies on a metaphysics
which, if consistently applied, denies specific acts and therefore spe-
cific natures to every being whatever. Once things are thus stripped
of their essential natures, which are the very basis of their self-
identity, knowability, and being, not even the undifferentiated unity
of all things can escape with a nature of its own. In short, not even
the One can be one. Moreover, because Averroes holds with Aris-
totle that "everything which is an existent is one and [conversely]
 128 AVffiROES AND '!HE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
ev~rything which is one is an existent ... and it is necessary that
unIty and existence signify one and the same nature, not two differing
nat ures ...,"87 th e uI'
tlmate consequence of denying the One its form
an? nature is that what is not one, that is, self-identical. does not
eXist at all. Non-being necessarily follows, exactly as Averroes
suggested in his comment on the Heracleitean flux-"They Suppose
that that which is, is not."
This final outcome is indeed ironic, if we recall that the main
objective of the Ghazalian arguments had been to vindicate the con-
ception. of an omnipotent and unfettered Creator-God, bringing the
:n orld. mto being entirely out of nothing. Now, contrary to his
mtentlOn, the opposite has been shown. Without actual and effica-
cious creatures, there is no creation, and without creation, there is
~o basis ~or speaking of a Creator-God. In sum, the attempt to estab-
lIsh creatIOn out of nothing ends by dissolving creation into nothing.
~ we turn now to the conception of necessary connection implied
by thiS defense of causal efficacy, we can see again that for Averroes
it is neither an independent force, external to events, which holds'
them together in regular sequences nor a mysterious link which
proceeds from the cause and binds it to the effect. It is neither of
these because Averroes does not treat necessity as a substantive
term. Instead, he casts it into an adverbial framework so that causal
?ecessity i.s the way in which powerful particulars of specific kinds
mteract With one another. Because things have their own specific
natures and thus powers and dispositions to behave in some ways
but not others, they must necessarily produce certain kinds of effects
and undergo certain kinds of changes under appropriate conditions
Otherw~se, .these particulars would not be the kinds of things the;
are, which IS patently self-inconsistent.
Again this. can be seen by analyzing the case of fire burning
so~e combust!ble substance. Both entities have distinctive configu-
ratIOns of active powers and passive powers. Fire, being hot by
nature, ca~ communicate its heat to certain other things to the point
of consummg them. Concomitantly, it can be extinguished by water
or the withdrawal of oxygen. Cotton, on the other hand, is fibrous
and absorbent, yet it is also combustible when dry. Now when the
respective powers of the fire's flammability and the cotton's com-
bustibility are mutually congruous or correlated with each other
burning must occur, as Averroes explicitly argues. ' have just analyzed is the basis for the first explanation. If all things
Because certain active powers are in the agent, it is necessary
On Necessary Connedion 129
that the agent will not do anything until it and that which is acted
upon are together, that is, in one place ....
When the agent approaches that which is acted upon and there
is no external impediment present, it is absolutely necessary that the
agent act and the patient undergo the action, as for example, when
fire approaches something combustible and there is no impediment
present preventing it from burning, it necessarily consumes the com-
bustible object."
Thus, the causal necessity of which Averroes speaks is a modali ty
of the agent/patient relationship, which originates in the very natures
and powers of those entities for which the relationship can take
place. So long as they are what they are, they must act as they do.
This raises an important problem for Averroes. Once acts or
effects are linked in this intimate way to the specific natures of
things, it would seem that whenever we have things with the requi-
site natures, their acts must always occur, without fail. The neces-
sity involved would thus be absolute. Yet we have already seen
Averroes state repeatedly that where efficient causes are concerned, it
often happens that the cause exists but the effect does not occur.
Necessity here is obviously less than absolute, and Averroes appears
to have gotten himself into a dilemma. The first horn implies that it
would be contradictory to have C, the cause, but not E, the effect.
The second implies that it is perfectly possible to have C and not E
at least sometimes.
Part of the solution surely lies in the fact that Averroes con-
ceives of natural necessity in terms of what occurs always or for
the most part. It is therefore to be distinguished from logical neces-
sity which he treats as "that which cannot be otherwise." But this
alone will not do, since it "disposes" of the issue by definitory fiat.
We still have to explain what it is about causal necessity which
warrants Averroes' adding the qualification "for the most part" in
the first place. Any adequate response to this question would have
to explain, at least in general terms, how or under what kinds of
circumstances it is possible to have C but not E. Averroes in fact
provides just enough material in both his commentaries and the
Tahiifut to present the outline of a response.
He offers three explanations to account for causes failing to
produce their characteristic effects: (a) change in nature, (b) incon-
gruity, and (c) deficiency in action. The metaphysical argument we
ceased to manifest their distinctive acts, they could no longer be
 130 AVERROESAND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
said to have their specific natures. By subalternation, it follows that
if any given particular fails to produce its characteristic effect, we
have prima facie evidence for concluding that it does not have the
specific nature to do so. In other words, the cause is not the kind of
thing we thought it was. Either we have been mistaken about its
identity or its nature has changed.
Thus, a fire which only flickers brightly but produces no heat is
no fire. It is perhaps a reflection of fire in a mirror or an imitation
fire produced by colored lights, but that is all. Again, scammony
which no longer purges bile is either de-natured scammony or
another substance, but it is not the kind of thing physicians pre-
scribe to relieve patients. Similarly, a sword which cannot decapi-
tate a man, even with the most severe blows, is not a sword. What-
ever else it may be, it is not the instrument by which the headsman
plies his trade. The cause in each of these cases, by failing to pro-
duce its effect, reveals itself as only a fictive "cause."
The second explanation is simply an absence of congruity
between the active powers of the agent and the passive powers of
the objects acted upon. In modern idiom, we would say that not all
of the appropriate causal conditions obtain, and thus the effect does
not occur. We thus find Averroes suggesting that the question of
wh~ther effects proceed from their causes by absolute necessity, by
choIce, only for the most part, or by some combination of these
alternatives, remains a matter for theoretical investigation. The rea-
son for this lies in the multiplicity of relations which must obtain
before the congruity relation takes effect,
.. .since one single action-and-passivity [relation] between two
existent things occurs only through one relation out of an infinite
number, and it happens often that one relation hinders another. There-
fore it is not absolutely certain that fire acts when it is brought near
a sensitive body, for surely it is not improbable that there should be
s?mething which stan?s in such a relation to the sensitive thing as to
hmder the actIon of fire, as IS asserted of talc and other things. But
one need not deny fire its burning power so long as fire keeps its
name and definition."
In short, the cause can be genuine rather than fictive and suffer no
intrinsic change, but fail to act nonetheless. For its action in individ-
ual circumstances is subject to any number of extrinsic causal con-
ditions or relations which would fail to satisfy the congruity require-
ment for causal efficacy. Fire does not cease to be fire if it does not
consume ceramic tile or burn wood in the absence of air. Nor does
On Necessary ConnecHon 131
a poison cease to be deadly just because the antidote was admini-
stered in the nick of time. In other circumstances, ~e powers ?f
these entities would be all too obvious, for the fact IS that the CIr-
cumstances in which the effect does take place occur often enough
for us to know what a particular cause can do, and therefore what
kind of thing it is. . ,
Finally, in his Long Commentary on the PhYSiCS, Averroes gIves ~
third explanation of why certain causes can be said to produce theIr
effects only for the most part. The nature of the cause may be such
that its act will be deficient in the minority of cases ..The co~text
indicates that the deficiency is intrinsic to the cause and ~s assO:lated
with its active and passive powers. Averroes had been taking AVlcenna
to task for distinguishing effects which occur in most cases fr?m
those which occur by necessity by arguing that the former are SIm-
ply impeded while the latter obviously are not. If Avicenna's criter-
ion of distinction were correct, he notes, then all things ~ould ~e
naturally necessary, since every individual would necessarIly act m
accordance with its nature unless prevented from doing so ab extra.
This is precisely what Averroes wishes to deny. Consequently, he
maintains that the issue of whether an impediment can overpower
the cause and prevent it from acting depends upon the inner constitu-
tion of the cause.
On the contrary, that which occurs in the majority Of. cases. is
something whose nature possesses a possibility for its actIon bemg
deficient in the minority of cases, and therefore an external ImpedI-
ment exists in that case. But because that which occurs by necessIty
does not have this [deficiency] in its nature, it likewise has no exter-
nal impediment. Consequently, if that which occurs for the most part
were to have no external impediment, it would then be the case .that
the [aforementioned] possibility in it would be superfluo.us. Agam, If
that which is necessary had an impediment, then the ImpedIment
would be superfluous; and nature does nothing superfluous ..Thus,
since things which occur are said with respect to both the e~flclent
cause and the recipient [of its efficacy], these matters should be inVestI-
gated fully.'" (emphasis added) .
The power of an impediment to prevent a partIcular .from act-
ing is thus dependent on a prior deficiency in the putatIve cause
and not the other way around. In contrast to Avicenna, therefore,
Averroes does not assume that every particular of a given kind will
necessarily give rise to its characteristic ~ffect, :xcludi.ng external
interference. Rather, particulars may retam theIr speCIfIc natures,
but at the same time lack the requisite strength or sufficiency of
 132 AVERROES AND lHEMETAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
power to perform their specific acts in virtue of some constitutional
defect. Because of this intrinsic deficiency, virtually any impediment
can overpower the cause.
. C~nsequentl~, the task which Averroes assigns to the natural
sCientist-and thiS clearly reveals his empirical bent-is to investi-
gate fully both the intrinsic nature of the agent and that of the
p~tie?t to isolate and account for these defects and not just to com-
~i1e lists of possibl: impeding relations. Again scientific investiga-
lion for Averroes WIll focus on the generative mechanisms in things
rather tha~ c~usal relations between them. But the inquiry will n~
longer be limited to a purely structural analysis of the nature of X-
it will also include quantitative exploration into the relative suffi~
ciency or deficiency of the powers by virtue of which individual X's
behave as they do.
This last point enables us to see how Averroes distinguished
natural or causal necessity from logical necessity. The former per-
tains to th~ natures or real essences of Concrete things, the latter
to the entailment relations between universal concepts or notions.
Natu~es, as Averroes' metaphysical argument has shown, must have
c:rtam sta?le and invariant structural features if they are to be the
k!nds of thmgs they are. This includes, first of all, a specific selec-
tIOn of powers and dispositions. These selections, moreover, are
not mere aggregates, but unified and organized ensembles consti-
tuted to behave in specific ways under specific conditions. It is this
structural or formal aspect of particulars which serves as the basis
for our universal concepts and the invariant relations which hold
between them.
BY the sa.me token: however, the essential natures of things
have a dynamiC and variable aspect as well, which derives from the
fact that t?ey ~re comprised of innate impulses, active and passive
~owers. It IS thl~ aspect of essential natures which allows for quantita-
~Ive measures m terms of more and less. That is why we can speak
m ~eneral of P?,:"ers and dispositions being weak or strong, feeble
or mtense, deficient or sufficient, and can even assign numerical
measure~ to rank these evaluations. The co-existence of both these
a~pects .m substances, viewed as powerful particulars, is what
differentiates causal necessity from logical necessity.
We. say the effect of C is naturally necessary if C, in having the
nature It does, also has sufficient power to produce E. On the other
hand, we say X is logically necessary with respect to Y if the rela-
•
On Necessary Connection 133
tion between them cannot be otherwise. Now only the structural
aspect of C requires that it should always produce ~ i~ ~ way si~i­
lar to that of logical necessity. But the power-variability of C, m
terms of degrees of more and less, requires only that it produc~ E
for the most part and this is the crucial difference. Natural necessity,
therefore, is not a self-contradictory notion which both allows for
and excludes the possibility of C and not E. Neither is it an illegiti-
mate projection of logical necessity into the domain of nature. Rather,
for Averroes, it is a real but bi-valent feature of any particular existent
which we can identify as powerful.
It is evident from the foregoing analysis that our interpretation
of Averroes' metaphysical argument is predicated on the twin notions
of being as act and power as the mark of the real. While Averroes
alludes to both notions in the Tahiifut, it remains a curious fact that
neither is explicitly mentioned in the metaphysical argument itself-
precisely where we should expect to find them. ~owhere in t?is
carefully argued defense of causal efficacy does he diSCUSS the notion
of power. Thus, one might object that our whole account remains
ungrounded, a plausible hypothesis perhaps, but not conclusively
verified.
The objection, it must be conceded, is valid so long as we are
looking for a discussion of powers in the context of causation. If,
however, we reverse the relation and look for a defense of causa-
tion as part of an analysis of power, Averroes is more than obliging.
For in his Long Commentary on Metaphysics 1X:3, in which Aristotle
refutes the Megarian arguments against power and potentiality,
Averroes reproduces virtually in full, the metaphysical argument of
Discussion Seventeen and the problem motivating its formulation.
His comments present an excellent summary for our main points.
"Now among people such as the Megarians, there are those that
say that power exists only in conjunction with the act. .." etc. [Meta-
physics ])(;3, J046b29J, that is, some people deny the exJstence of potency
that temporally precedes that to which it is. potential and say th~t
potency and that to which it is potential exist Simultaneously, whence It
follows that there is no potency at all. . _This statement is now adopted
by the Ash'arite theologians among the people of our religion and it
is a statement contrary to the nature of man as regards both his
beliefs and his labors."
Here the ancient Megarian denial that potentiality is prior to act is
identified by Averroes with the contemporary denial by at least some
theologians that things in the natural world are powerful. The
 134 AVERROES AND 1HEMETAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
consequence~, in his view, are quite devastating for both theoreti-
cal and practlcallmowledge.
. . What is t~ be understOOd when we say that something does
no~ have potene}' '~ simply thiS: that it does not have a potency toward
be~ng .... Th~s, It IS no small thing they wish to deny, because this
eXlstenc.e wh~ch IS 10 potency is, as it were, at the half-way point of
what existS !Impliciter. Those who deny potency, deny prime matter,
an~ all motions, generalIon, and corruption, as well as all the crafts
Which operate by means of reflection and the wish which acts so as
to remove what IS harmful and acquire what is helpful."
If there is no such thing as genuine power to affect something
or to be affected, not only do the "enduring things" of physical sci-
ence cea~e to endure, but change itself, as a transition from potency
to act~ahty, cannot occur. There is at most a kind of mock change,
whe~em momen~ary appearances simply pass in review. Such a world
a~mlts of no efficacy, no activity, and no capacity to alter things by
skill or any other means. It is a shadow world, which in lacking
power or potency lacks real being as well. It is, in short the world
of the occasionalist hypothesis. '
"...Th~re is absolutely nothing whatever that does not have its own
power: [MetaphYSIcs IX:3, 1047a24-26] He means: it is evident that
there IS no actIOn [denvmg] from anything whatever which does not
ha~e a potency with respect to that act. ... Contem~oraries of ours
c1all~ ~at the acts of all existents have one Agent [who acts] without
medIatIOn,. namely, Go~ .. For the~ it follows that no existing thing
may have ItS own speCIfIc act wh,ch God impressed upon it. And if
eXIstents do not have acts that specify them, they will not have
essen.ces ~roper to themselves .either, because acts differ only through
the dlver~l:>, of essences. And If essences are eliminated, then names
and defIOItlO?S are likewise eliminated, and that which exists come
to be on~ thmg. This opinion [of the Ash'arite theologians] is alto~
gether alIen to. the natur~ of man .... And so if anything is moved or
m?ves [somethmg else], nses or raises something else, has existed or
wIll eXIst, then only that which has the power to do so may be
charactemed 10 anyone of these ways. That is to say that s tho
. I 'd ' orne 109
IS on y sa.' to mo~e ~r be moved when it has the power to do so.
SImIlarly If somethmg IS said to rise or raise something else, this is
t:"e ?nly 10 case It ha.s the power of riSing or raising [another], and
lIkewIse. When somethmg IS characterized as existing or as causing
[somethmg] to eXIst. ... And agam, when it is said of a thing that it
does not exist or does not bring something else into existence we
only say this about it because it does not have the power to do S~.93
. Wh~t our analysis of Averroes' metaphysical argument shows,
m sum, IS that he was arrayed against a formidable set of opponents.
On Necessary Connection 135
Behind the criticisms of causal efficacy leveled by al-GhazalI lay
the doctrines of the ancient Atomists, Heradeiteans, and Megarians .
The Atomists of both that time and of his own had rendered the
world a discontinuous aggregate, no more real than the void. But
more important, they avoided the real problems of scientific expla-
nation by lazily neglecting the question of motion-whence and how it
is to belong to things.'" It did not occur to them that what things
are is also a matter of the movements they produce, quite apart
from the shape, position and configurations of their parts. The
"Heradeiteans" by contrast had argued for a world of unremitting
change, in which nothing remained the same for even two moments
in time. But where such radical instability could prevail, the coinci-
dence of opposite qualities seemed to Averroes to be an inevitable
result, to the point where a thing could both be and not be in the
same way and at the same time. The Megarians, for their part, col-
lapsed the notions of power and potentiality into that of the actu-
ally existent, with the result that change seemed impossible and
agents of change mere fictions. For change, taken as the actualiza-
tion of the potential qua potential, obviously required a non-actual
point oi departure. But this was precisely the point of departure
which the Megarians chose to deny.
Among the ancients, each of these three positions had repre-
sented an independent response to specific philosophical issues.
Whatever their differences, their proponents shared a common devo-
tion to the philosophic enterprise. By Averroes' day, however, these
independent positions had coalesced and reappeared in a new form,
like a ghostly chorus speaking with a single voice through the mouth
of al-GhazalI. Indeed, this ancient voice now carried the added weight
of religious authority in its pronouncements. Its idiom was the lan-
guage of Ash'arite theology, and its outlook distinctly hostile to
philosophy. From this perspective, Averroes' metaphysical defense
of causal efficacy can be seen as a daring move. It was his most
vigorous and incisive attempt to lay this ghost to rest once and for
all.
Nature vs. the Habitual Course of Events
Just as al-GhazalI's critique of causal efficacy left Averroes with
the problem of explaining how it was possible to posit an efficient
 136 AVERROf.S AND lHEMETAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
cause an~ deny its effect withi? a framework of natural necessity,
Averroes defense of causal efficacy raises a comparable problem
for al-~aza]['s position. How can al-Ghazalf's theory of created atoms
and accidents account for the observed regularity of events in natur ?
In short, wh~t is his explanation for the "regular concomitance" ~f
C. and E? Given the transience which characterizes the elements of
his punctIform ontology, there seems to be no internal cement, to
use Hume's phrase, by which the universe is held together.
, al-GhazaJr, to be sure, does not deal with this problem directly
but ~e elements of a solution are scattered throughout his Tahafu;
al-Falaslfah. He speaks, as we have seen at the outset of Discussion
Seventeen, of the connection between what is believed by habit to
~e the cause and its effect and goes on to deny a necessary connec-
tIon between them. His terminology suggests that we as observers
are in the habit of regarding certain events as the natural causes of
others. Elsewhere, however, he describes the ordinary succession of
events in nature as proceeding in accordance with the habit elidah,
consuetudo) or established custom of the Divine will.95 In these
passages, the habit in question clearly characterizes God's volun-
~ary activity, which for al-Ghaza If never ceases or changes, although
Its effects do so constantly. Between these two poles al-Ghazalr
leaves the impression that the atoms and accidents, i~ their vari-
ous stages of succession and re-arrangement, also have a kind of
habitual association in their own right. But this conclusion derives
solel'y.from the peculiarities of al-Ghaialf's idiom and not from any
expliCit argument to this effect. In general, however, the picture he
p~esents is tha~ .of a contingent regularity which can be applied
Wlt~ .equal faCIlity both to human judgments and to the Divine
activity.
. This view is confirmed by a brief but important discussion in
which al-?ha~1f attempt.s to refute the philosophers' charge that
the occasIOn~hst c~nceptIOn of causation envisages a totally disor-
derly world In WhiCh, so to speak, anything goes, regardless of
whet?er the observer may be aware of this fact or not. They argue
that If al-Ghazall's view is correct, a host of absurdities follow. A
man may leave a book in his library and later return to find it had
been. turned into a young servant-boy or some other creature, since
GO.d IS. all-~owerful, and there are no naturally necessary relation-
ships In things to obviate such changes. Or a man might continue
to see thoroughly placid and prosaic scenes before him, when in
On Necessary ConnecHon 137
fact he is in the presence of wild beasts, raging fires, or armed ene-
mies advancing to kill him, for God might choose not to create in
this naive observer the requisite sight to apprehend the danger.
To these and other such objections, al-Ghazalf's first response
is to argue as follows:
But the answer is to say: If it were true that the existence of the
possible implied that there could not be created in man any knowl-
edge of the non-occurrence of a possible, all these consequences would
follow necessarily. But we are not at a loss over any of the examples
which you have brought forward. For God has created in us the knowl-
edge that He will not do all these possible things, and we only pro-
fess that these things are not necessary, but that they are possible
and mayor may not happen, and protracted habit time after time
fixes their occurrence in our minds according to the past habit in a
fixed impression .... And if God interrupts the habitual course by
causing this unusual event to happen this knowledge of the habitual
is at the time of the interruption removed from their hearts and He
no longer creates it. There is, therefore, no objection to admitting
that a thing may be possible for God, but that He had the previous
knowledge that although He might have done so He would not carry
it out during a certain time, and that He has created in us the knowl-
edge that He would not do it during that time. And so there is nothing
in this talk but sheer vilification."
Contrary to the philosophers' catalogue of absurdities, aI-Ghazall
argues that we may indeed know that many logically possible occur-
rences simply will not occur, since God creates this knowledge within
us, at the same time that He creates the regular sequences of events
that we observe in the world. There are thus two parallel creative
activities performed by God-one which pertains to the concrete
existents of the physical universe and their ''behavior,'' and another
which pertains to the mental "acts" by which men are said to grasp
the world. Not only does the habitual course of things in nature
derive directly from the Deity's creative act, but the habitual course of
our own judgments and our "unshakable impressions" do so as well.
The key point is that they are not caused by the sequences of events
or by the particulars themselves. When God disrupts the orderly
course of nature on this analysis, He likewise disrupts the orderly
course of our knowledge and expectation. The result is that our
"knowledge" that certain possible events will not occur disappears
with the occurrence of the miracle itself and is not re-created,
evidently, until after the disruption is complete.
Presumably, al-Ghazall takes this step not only to fend off the
 138 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
philosophers' objections to his occasionalism, but to show how
observers of extraordinary events can identify them as miracle
For it simply ",:ill not do to have them witness such impressiv:
P?e?omena, while at the same time leaving them with the firm con-
~lctIon that such things simply cannot happen. This Imowledge, as
~t w:re, must bo,: out of the picture. But quite apart from problems
In his use of habit, al-Ghazall's explanation suffers on two independ-
ent counts.
In the first place, such Imowledge evidently does not disappear
from the heart of everyone. Otherwise, the philosophers and assorted
doubters of every gen.erat,i~n would not remain as skeptical as they
do about the theologians Interpretation of miracles. Worse still is
the pr?blem which al-Ghazalf's analysis poses for those who are
potentially credulous. If the Imowledge or conviction that certain
e~ents,. which are logically possible, are nonetheless physically impos-
sl.ble dlsa?pears from the heart, what is to prevent the witness from
disregarding the event altogether? Its very miraculousness stems in
part at least from the contrast it presents to the established and
ord:rly cou~se of natur~, a contrast which is explained in terms of
G~d s supenor power VIs-iI-vIs those powers attributed to natural
things. Wh:n. Imowledge of this contrast drops out, the miracle
becomes tnvlal and proves nothing, because, in effect, it will not
e~e.n be noticed. It becomes a mere fluke, not a decisive display of
DIVine power.
. Pr:su~ably, .al-GhazaIr would respond to both cases by arguing
In Qur anlc fashIOn that God sealed the hearts of the unbelievers
and opened the hearts of the believers, and that this very fact is the
ult.imate sign of ~is power. But such an argument, alas, can satisfy
neither the. unbehevers nor even all the believers, unless of course
all .the ?ehevers I?ust likewise be Ash'arites. For one may indeed
behev~ In the r:ahty. of miracles, without conceding either the met-
aphYSical or eplstemlc occasionalism of al-GhazalI's reply.
Setting a,:Ide these problems, however, it is fairly clear that
when al-Ghazalr. speaks of habit, he is referring primarily to the
etern~l and continUOUS activity of God. In a secondary sense, he is
refernng to the punc~if~rm data of our mental life, which regularly
succeed each other In Instantaneous time sequences and which
~ough generally. coherent, nonetheless allow for significant lapse~
In. accordance ';Ith the Divine will. It is evidently in accordance
With the regulanty and coherence of our impressions that we form
On Necessary Connection 139
judgments about the orderly character of the world, the nature of
the possible and the impossible, and the like. Still, habit may also
refer to the ordered succession of atoms and accidents in the physi-
cal world, whereby they are re-created in regular and stable pat-
terns or are re-arranged so that similar configurations arise under
similar circumstances.
Averroes examines each one of these conceptions of habit and
finds it wanting. Thus, he rejects the ascription of habit to God,
since a habit is "a custom which the agent acquires and from which
a frequent repetition of his act follows."97 Within the framework of
our analysis, this means that the inherent powers of the agent are
so disposed and structured by means of training that a new set of
relations is established between them whereby the agent is actu-
ally able to perform repeatedly a new act which was previously
only a potentiality. The ascription of a habit implicitly ascribes
change to the one who has it, since in the first place it is an acquired
characteristic and in the second it allows for alteration in its very
definition. Averroes underscores this same point in his Middle Com-
mentary on Aristotle's Categories 9a4-13.
Aristotle states: In Greek it is clear that the name "habit" desig-
nates characteristics that are longer established and harder to remove.
Unless a person is quite firm in knowledge he is not said to have a
habit, but rather a good or poor disposition for knowledge. In a cer-
tain sense habits are also dispositions, but dispositions are not habits.
Further, habits first are dispositions and then later become habits."
(emphasis added)
Because of this implicit ascription of change and thereby potential-
ity to God, Averroes dismisses al-Ghazalf's primary meaning of habit
as contrary to the explicit teaching of the Qur'an. "You shall not
find any alteration in the established way of God nor shall you find
any change in the established custom of God.''99 Of course, there is
no doubt that Averroes is taking habit here in its strictly Aristote-
lian sense, and al-Ghazalf would probably have rejected it. Never-
theless, the point remains that al-GhazalI, or at least his followers,
are left with the burden of proof in proposing a viable conception
of habit.
If the notion of habit is now referred to concrete existents,
whereby similar configurations and behavior patterns emerge under
similar circumstances, Averroes counters by showing the proper and
limited range of existents to which it can apply. "If they mean a
habit in existing things, habit can only exist in the animated."loo
 140
AVERROESANDTIlEMETAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
Here a~ain he follows the Stagirite and reiterates the same point he
made rn the ~om~entary on the Categories, "as has been said, this
genu~ of q.uahty [I.e. ha~itl contains the characteristics that are pres-
ent eIther rn the soul or rn what possesses soul insofar as it possesses
1"101 B f h
sou. . ut, or t e sake of argument, we might further suppose
th~t habIt belongs to inanimate beings as well, that is, to all other
eXIstents. On this assumption, what al-Ghazal! calls habit is really a
nature t~ which Averroes adds, "...and this is not denied, namely,
tha~ a thI~g should have a nature which determined it either neces-
sarIly or rn most cases."I02 Averroes' agreement with this view
ho,:"ever, is ironic, for he has radically altered the notion of habi;
whI~ may be ~scribed to things. For in al-GhazalI's treatment, habit,
that IS, regulanty and repetition, characterized the manifestations of
what w.e o~dinarily think of as concrete particulars, but it had no
~ete~~rnat~ve role within them. But the habit which Averroes here
Id~ntlfles WIth nature, on the other hand, is clearly an intrinsic deter-
mrnant of both appearance and operation. It is, in short, a real
~sence, form,. and generative mechanism. Still, the fact that Averroes
rntroduces
.. H·thIS shift does not mean he misunderstood al-Ghaza-I-'IS
poslt~on. IS Purpose rather is twofold: to minimize the apparent
~on.thc~ betwe~n them as much as possible, while at the same time
I~dlcatrng to hl~ readers t.he greater explanatory power implicit in
hiS own on~ologIcal commitments vis-a.-vis those of al-Ghazalf.
. The third al~ernative i~ to take habit as describing the way in
WhICh human berngs make judgments about existents. Once habit is
referred t~ us, however, it turns out to be nothing more than "an
act. of the .rntellect, which is determined by its nature and through
whl~ the rntellect becomes intellect."I03 The philosophers, of course,
r~adlly ass~n~, b:caus~ from their point of view this is precisely the
kind ~f actlvI.ty rn which the intellect by nature engages. That is
wh~t ItS pa~tIcular powers and dispositions enable it to do. But
a.garn there IS a shift. Habit is no longer an association of succes-
~Ive mental states, discrete in themselves and produced by Deity. It
~s now a faculty or constellation of powers which has activities of
ItS ?wn. To be sure, even the philosophers held that intellect is
r~d~call! potential in relation to all things, but it nonetheless has a
dIstrnCtIve act by which intelligible objects may come to reside in
i~. And signif!ca~tly enough, Averroes designated this act or perfec-
tIO~ of the mrnd rn apprehending intelligibles as the 'aql bi-al-malakah
or mtellectus m habitu, 10< the disposed or habituated intellect. Once
..
- On Necessary Connection 141
··t 1 seems th a t Averroes has appropriated al-Ghazal! for his
agaIn,
own purposes. ,
Still he does not hesitate to point out precisely why al-Ghazalf s
view is defective vis-ii-vis that of the philosophers. The term "habit"
is an ambiguous expression.I os Even when it is properly analyzed,
however, what it connotes is a positive or conventi~nal act, .as v:hen
we say that a particular individual is in the habit of actrng rn a
particular way. This means that ~e will do so for the ~ost part, b~t
not always, since an altogether different, even OPPOSlt~, act .on h~s
part is always possible. If all existents were conventIOnal rn thIS
sense Averroes concludes, there would be no wisdom in things.
Indeed we could not even infer that the Creator is wise.
what enables Averroes to draw this conclusion is the fact that
convention, so conceived, dispenses with the stable structures of
things by which they both act necessarily, that is, always or for the
most part, and by which they can be known. Once these structures
are eliminated no matter how often the same "acts" happen to recur,
there is no I~nger a fixed standard in things to determine their
behavior or their specific identities. At any given moment, they are
capable of performing contrary acts and, as such, they are a.mena-
ble to entirely variable identifications. Since knowledge or wisdom,
however, as distinguished from mere opinion, depends on just such
a fixed standard in its object, the absence of this standard leaves
no basis in things for asserting either their intelligible structure or
the wisdom of their Creator. Whether they display mostly regular
or mostly erratic behavior, on this view, is beside the point. What-
ever happens, happens arbitrarily. .
Averroes underscores the role of these stable structures rn knowl-
edge when he criticizes al-Ghazalf's attempt to reconcile habitu~1
knowledge with the occurrence of miracles. The touchstone of .hls
argument is Aristotle's correspondence theory of truth. Genurne
claims to knowledge, he contends, must always give us knowledge
of a thing as it really is. On this assumption, however, it cannot be
true that God continually creates in us the knowledge that the ever-
present possibility of a miracle will oc:ur o~ly at sp:cial times.
This is because "the knowledge created rn us IS always rn conform-
ity with the nature of the real thing"l06 which we know, that is, with
its stable, formal structure. Thus, if we were to have knowledge of
unrealized miraculous possibilities, there would have to be some
condition (~al, dispositio) in the things themselves corresponding
 142 AVERROESAND THEMITAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
to Our knowledge. Indeed, the condition in question would be both
intrinsic to the thing and constitutive of it. Such a condition, therefore,
is nothing more than what the theologians call "habit" and the phi-
losophers call "nature."
It is clear that the kind of miraculous possibility which would
arise from such conditions looks suspiciously like the spontaneous,
natural events which Averroes calls miraculous, and these would
surely have been unacceptable from al-Ghazali's standpoint. Yet
Averroes ends the argument here, without anticipating al-GhazalI's
obvious objection. But if Averroes is silent, the logic of his position
is nonetheless quite apparent. al-Ghazalf would have to deny that
there was any such determinative condition or nature intrinsic to
things. Detached in this way from both God and other existents in
the world, however, these miraculous possibilities cease to be real
possibilities altogether. Instead, they turn out to be mere figments
of the imagination. Therefore, contrary to al-Ghazall's initial suppo-
sition, God does not create in us the knowledge that these possibili-
ties will be realized, because there is nothing in either the natural
or Divine orders corresponding to this "knowledge." In short, there
is no such knowledge to be implanted within us.
Malleable Natures vs. Stable Natures
Both al-Ghazall's critique of necessary causal connection and
Averroes' reply to it, as analyzed thus far, proceed on the assump-
tion that causal efficacy belongs exclusively to observable things.
al-Ghazall indicates this relatively early in the discussion, when he
argues that if there is no logically necessary entailment relation
between two distinct things, there can likewise be no causally nec-
essary relation between them by which one brings about the exist-
ence or non-existence of the other. As his examples show, the causes
and effects al-Ghazall has in mind are concrete observable events,
which are both distinct in the sense required and do not entail one
another. When he proceeds to analyze the paradigm case of fire
and the burning of cotton, however, he makes the hitherto hidden
assumption explicit and reports in the name of the philosophers
that "...our opponent claims that the agent of the burning is the
fire exclusively." Moreover, the fire is presented as an agent by nature
rather than by choice. As such, it must act in accordance with its
On Necessary Connection 143
nat ure whenever it is brought into contact with a receptive sub-
. 107
stratum thus establishing the necessary connectIOn.
As ;"e have seen, al-Ghazall denies that we observe any such
nnection between the fire and the burning cotton. The c?rrect
~~lanation of the situation, he insists, is not to be found m the
relation between these so-called causes an~ effect~ at all. Rath~r,
"the agent of the burning is God, through HIS creatl~g ~e black In
the cotton and the disconnexion of its parts, and It IS GOd. who
de the cotton burn and made it ashes, either through the mter-
ma .
mediation of angels or WIthOUt .mterme d'la t'IOn. "lOS . .
The force of this explanation is to direct the dIscussIOn beyond
the domain of observed concomitances and to consi~er the role .of
unobserved entities as the genuine causes of events In n~t~re. Stili,
such a transition is made only with difficulty, as al-~hazah s exa~-
Ie of the blind man who acquires vision shows. For If a man w~o IS
~OngenitallY blind suddenly gains complete vision and sees vano~s
kinds of things for the first time, he concludes th~t the .cause of hIS
newly gained vision was simply the opening of hIS eyehds. The fact
that the conjunction of the two events is both directly observable
and repeatable lends additional weight to his ~nterpr~tation. Ne~er­
theless, the explanation is incorrect, as he WIll reahz~ whe~ mght
falls. The true cause of his seeing, al-Ghazall suggests, IS the h?ht of
the sun, a celestial cause or principle, and not the events proxImate
to the effect.
al-Ghaza If plainly thinks that most people and perhaps most
philosophers too are inclined to regard immediate ~bservables as
the genuine causes. But in dOi.ng so, the~ are as mlstake~ as ~he
man in the example, who imagmes the pnmary cause of hIS seem~
is the opening of his eyes. For if observable events are both logI-
cally discrete and metaphysically powerless, the most they can do
is to succeed one another. They are hardly sufficient to pro~u:e
their usual effects alone. To the extent, therefore, that al-Ghazah s
arguments undermine "the blind man's illusion:: he lays the ground-
work for the second position ascribed to the phIlosophers. .
According to the new position of the philosophers, causal effI-
cacy per se is limited to unobserved celestial principles, notably the
separate Intelligences which Aristotle propose~ to accou~t for ~e
diverse movements of the celestial bodies, whIle the vanous mIx-
tures and movements of material things only dispose the substra-
tum to receive their influence. In the context of al-GhazaWs example,
 144
AVERROES AND THEMITAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION On Necessary Connection 145

these philosophers would ascribe the act· . must be burned due to the causal action of a celestial principle,
forms of things on the eye to just h of Im~ressmg the visible
Forms (wahib al-S/Jwa~ dator r. suc a)n Intelligence, the Giver of which gives the fire the form and properties it has.
beings. The radi~ce ;f th orthmarum or to a plurality of such The chief consequence of this position, whatever its differences
e sun, e sound co tit . from the first, is once again the implicit rejection of miracles.
and the existence of visible ob' t ns ution of the eye
. lec s, on the othe h d ' al-GhazaIr illustrates this by taking a famous example from the
accessorIes. Significantly, al-Ghaza!" r an ,are merely
espouse this theory as "the tru hI. refers to the philosophers who Qur'an, the case of Abraham thrown into a blazing inferno. Given
lous among them who establis: ~~ osophers," .th~t is, the meticu- the nature of flesh and bone, on the one hand, and of fire, on the
understand why. They ascribe all e t~th, a.nd It IS not difficult to other, a prophet who is cast into a fiery furnace cannot escape
incineration. If the philosophers are confronted with testimony of
principle, which is at least semi-di~i nume effl:acy t? an unobserved
demonstrative Imowledge for their ne, .a.nd stIli claIm the mantle of Abraham's deliverance from this untidy fate, they suggest only two
explanations as being possible. Either heat is removed from the fire
ity between their view and al_Gha!~_~ltlOn. ~e os.tensible similar-
al-Ghazalf to enlist them in f r I s on thIS pomt thus enables or Abraham's essence is changed into some fire-resistant substance.
concludes his initial descript;:nuo;~ ~e ~irst the0D:" That is why he
But in fact they hold that neither one nor the other is really possible.
This denial and the notion of possibility which underlies it serves
the claim of those who profess th ~I~.vle~ by saYIng, 'This refutes
bread the agent of satiety m d' . a Ihre IS the agent of burning, as the fulcrum for the remainder of the discussion. In the present
on ."109 ' e Icme t e agent of health , a nd so context, it is clear that when the philosophers entertain two alterna-
tive explanations and subsequently reject both, they are dealing
The second theory of the philoso h with two different conceptions of possibility as well. Otherwise, they
the fundamental issues from the ~ ers, however: only transfers
meta-level, as al-GhaziiJf surely ~bJect-level, as It were, to the would be guilty of a glaring contradiction.
tion of their view the f re~ognIzed. In a more extensive exposi- The first of these may be described as a priori or logical possi-
to this shift. ' re ore, he lIsts three major points which attest bility and pertains to the logical relations between ideas. Thus hypo-
thetical states of affairs in which heat is removed from fire or a
First, the celestial principles act b . man is turned into stone or asbestos are possible, because both
not by deliberation and ch' As y necessIty of their natures
olce. a result th . ' events are conceptually coherent. Given either explicit or implicit
same questions about genuine ag , ey are subject to the
Second,lI(ese principles exer:7: ::: ~e so-aJl!ed natural causes.
definitions of the terms involved, basic logical principles, and noth-
ing further, no contradiction necessarily follows from either de-
of an emanation or overflow who h' elr cau~1 mfluence by means
scription. It is in this sense that the philosophers admit the two
in its own right. This re-introdu~~s ~enow des~gnated as a principle
between cause and effect. mysterIous ontological bond alternatives as possible.
The second reference to possibility, however, is physical or
~ird, the dispositional characteristics nomological. It implies, in addition to the aforementioned criteria,
celestIal influence are allegedl d' . of matter for receiving
. y con Ihoned by th b that the possible state of affairs must also be coherent with the
? f our ordmary experience. In this s e 0 served causes
mert, since they retain a cert . ense, observable causes are not formal conditions of actual experience"' or what are now called
minimal. am measure of efficacy, however the laws of nature. It is in this latter sense that the philosophers
deny both the miracle of the fiery furnace and the explanation which
On all these assumptions then th . they had entertained regarding it.
burning of cotton remains ess r 'II e phIlosophers' account of the
to ask, "If this is true a d en la y unchanged, leading al-Ghazalf Clearly the philosophers have at least a working notion of the
, n we assume a f th distinction between conceptual and physical possibility which Kant
has, and two similar pieces of cott . Ire at has the quality it
how can it be imagined that onion m the same contact with it, later did so much to clarify. His own formulation of the relation
burned, as there is here no I y one and not the other will be between the two notions is worth noting as a guideline for what
vo untary act?"110
•
"-ch
Cd
on ems
. h ort follows.
 146 AVERROES AND lHEMETAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
A concept is always possible if it is not self-contradictory. This is
the logical criterion of possibility, and through it objects are distin-
guished from the nihil negativum. But it may nonetheless be an empty
concept, unless the objective reality of the synthesis through which
the concept is generated has been specifically proved; and such proof. ..
rests on the principles of possible experience, and not on the princi-
ple of analysis (the law of contradiction). This is a warning against
arguing directly from the logical possibility of concepts to the real
possibility of things. II '
The question now arises as to whether al-Ghaza If too recognized
this distinction. The answer is by no means clear-cut. For he offers
not one, but two responses to the philosophers' new rejection of
miracles, and they are inconsistent responses at that. In the first, he
reiterates and even develops his occasionalist assumptions to cover a
new range of cases. This would indicate that he regards the logi-
cally possible and the physically possible as co-extensive categories,
for God can still create anything that is not logically impossible.
Thus, nature imposes no limits. In the second response, however,
he gives a qualified endorsement to the notion of specific natures
in things, and by placing certain natural limits on what things can
do and on what the Deity can do with them, he appears to grant the
distinction between real or physical possibility and logical possibility.
Thus, in the first reply, when al-Ghazalf makes his opponent
charge that the occasionalist position entails a host of reprehensi-
ble impossibilities (mu~rJ!at shantah, inconuenientia),113 ranging from
a denial of our ability to distinguish reality from illusion to the
assertion of radical instability in the natures of things, he responds
with the occasionalist epistemology analyzed in the previous section.
This now extends his original assumptions to account for human
knowledge as Well as "natural" causation. His aim, of course, is to
show that none of the absurd consequences suggested by the philoso-
phers are necessarily implied by his own assumptions. For an omnipo-
tent God, who constantly renews the work of creation, can produce
reliable knowledge 'and regular "causal" sequences just as surely as
He can produce miracles. The only limit to what God can create in
either the mental or the extra-mental world is the logically impos5ible.
In other words, what is physically and epistemologically possi' )Ie is
directly determined by God and not by the nature of things. For the
philosophers therefore to dismiss this position by pOinting to absurd
situations which it in no way implies amounts to sheer vilification
(tashnl' ma~¢. inconueniens absolutum).114 In al-GhazalI's opinion, their
On Necessary Connection 147
arguments turn out to be rhetorical debunking rather than philo-
sophic critique. . d th
Still, he recognizes that his initial reply leaves. u~~nswele ~
estion of whether there is real or physical POSSibilIty as the ~hl­
:0 hers understand it. What is more, this reply al.lows th:m to ,sl~e-
~ the debate altogether by focusing their attention on hiS Ash a~lte
~suPPositions and avoiding the question of how record~d m~ra­
Pies might be objectively possible. By arguing that occaslOnalIsm
~estroyS self-identity and knowledge, ~e phi~o~ophers w~re thus
free t 0 assu me all the while that essential effiCient causatIOn
I h' pre-_
cluded the possibility of miracles as supernatural events. n I~ sec
nd reply therefore al-Ghazali undertakes (1) to show the falSity of
~iS assumption and (2) to establish that the P?i1oso.phers' account
of natural causation can accommodate genume miracles no less
effectively than occasionalist metaphysics can ac~omm?date regu-
lar sequences in nature. But this new course requires him to gr~nt
several of the philosophers' key assumptions whi~h he had earlIer
rejected. It is here that he appears to grant the difference between
logical and physical possibility. ., I
al-Ghaziili introduces his revised position by connectmg It clear y
with the preceding attack.
The second answer-and in it is to be found deliverance from
these vilifications-is for us to concede that in fire ~~~ IS c~at~h~
nature which burns two similar pieces of cotton w I are rou
into contact with it and does not differentiate between the~, w~en
they are alike in every respect. But still we regard It as pOSSible t at
. .... .'15 f hi .
a prop he t should be thrown into the fire and not burn
CI I al-Ghaziili wants to escape from a distortion 0 s VIews
and notearfrom
y any supposed absurdity.
. To thoIS en dhow
, en acknowl-
.
edges precisely what he had earlier refuted. He concedes that thl~gs
have specific natures from which their acts proceed by necessity
and that they act similarly under similar circums~an<:es. The ontol-
o of ephemeral atoms and accident~ is thus. JettIsoned for the
p~ent as is the contention that only livmg, sentIent, and vol~ntary
beings can act. What al-GhazaH does not retract, however, I~ ~~
belief that God is an omnipotent being and that He acts voluntan~y.
For their part, the philosophers do not challenge these assumptIons
either, at least not openly. .. r
Whatever his personal evaluation of this new pOSItIon, al-Ghaza I
explores in detail at least four ways in which it still allows for
 148 AVERROES AND '!HE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
On Necessary Connection 149
miracles. (1) God may impede the activity of certain natural causes
· 0 f the dead or the conversion of. a
I . the resurrec t Ion
by using other natural means for His own PUrposes. (2) The capac- for e~amp e, 10 be considered physically possible. For agam,
ity of prime or common matter to receive any form allows for the staff mto a se~nt: can . I will and accelerate the natural processes
rapid acceleration of natural processes so that, when an otherwise God can exercls:' HIS ~pecla ki d change into things of another.
by which matenal thm : of o;~o :ave rejected these kinds of mira-
g
slow process is rendered instantaneous, the event qualifies as a
miracle. (3) Miracles can also emanate from the celestial principles, in The philosophers, there ore, ble basis for doing so, unless of
It gether have no reasona tt
accordance with necessity, when in specific cases, "the order of the cles a 0 .'. d that God has the power to direct rna er
good," that is, the benefits which arise from authenticating a prophet's course they lIkeWise eny . kl than is usual. If such
credentials, weighs in its favor. (4) Lastly, the generally uniform through these successive phases more. qUithC y I then al-Ghazall
. ur in a shorter tune an usua ,
dispositions in things to accept different forms are nonetheless sub- transfOrmatiOn~ ~n oc~e parodies Avicenna's account of prophet.ic
ject to causal influences which are in principle unknowable. There concludes-an ere .. d' ower to perform them 10
is consequently no sound basis for concluding, as the philosophers intuition-it must.sure~y be w~~:r~~y ~~oduce a miracle instanta-
the shortest possible time an
do, that extraordinary variations in these dispositions are impossible.
(I) The impediment theory supposes that the usual regularities neously for His prophet. . onnection with miracles,
we find in the world proceed in accordance with God's eternal will. (3) Having mentioned :ai:~;~~ :'I~ed the providential inter-
Unlike the occasionalist position, this does not require God to play al-Ghazall focu~ next on be anted that prophets are able to
a re-creative role vis-a.-vis every cause and effect. They now endure pretation of mIracles. It may gr . ch ununoning
be d th powers of ordmary men su as s
through time for different periods and may have their own acts. perform feats yon e k ' f their capacity to do so is ulti-
When a miracle occurs, it is to be explained as a voluntary interven- storms, hun:icanes, ~ ~a~~~~aa:;:ls. But these events occur only
tion of the Deity in the natural order whereby He co-opts the pow- mately ascnbed to . 0 f the prophet is wholly directed to them,
ers and dispositions of things to act in accordance with His special (a) when the attentIOn 0 . _ I kha r' ofdo bonum
will at that particular moment. God does not suspend ordinary causal and (b) when the order of the go~d (m:;amd a - th/P~SSib;liiy of a
. th The first critenon exc lu es
sequences; rather, He introduces one causal sequence to counter- tale) reqUlr~s em. .dental relation to the miracle associated
act another. This resembles Averroes' esoteric account of miracles prophet havmg only an acci I being at the right place at the right
to the extent that the event per se is the outcome of a rare intersec- with his name, such .as mere ~ t ch miracles appear only when
tion of causal chains. It differs from it, however, in that only one of time The second stipulates a su bl" h ent of
the two causal chains is traceable to the eternal ordination of things, the ~erification of a prophet's credenti~s ~nd ~~:: ~~n: mira-
unfolding, as it were, de potentia Dei ordinata. The other is connected, the religious law specifically depend on el.' oc . . Ie . God or His
'bl . th mselves and theIr prmclp -
however inexplicably, with His "special" will and proceeds de potentia cles are POSSI e In e '11 ' t from Him if the need weighs
Dei absoluta. Thus, when the prophet is cast into the fiery furnace, angels-is benevolent, they WI emana e I Gh -I~ I'Inks the appear-
in favor of theIr. eXls
. t ence .117 Because .a .- azad I d utility on the
he may indeed be saved, if God creates either an external impedi-
ment to the fire which confines its heat to itself or a protective ance of dmira~e~:or:~~~~t!~~~a~~e;~~I~e~e~au:: on the ~the~, it
garment for the prophet which functions like talc, as a heat-resistant one han , an . these partICular SltU-
substance. Thus what the philosophers had dismissed is, according appears that the Dei~ is requiredh~~ r~~~~~~ts outward similarity
to this analysis, even physically possible, given the assumption of at ions before He assists the prop. ovidential theory is
an omnipotent God. to the philosophers' account, therefore, th~ P~e miracle occurs as
(2) The acceleration interpretation is predicated on the assump- not strictly necessitarian, because hefreGa~a~~ a j'ustifiable need of
tion that all matter is prime in the sense of being a universal I t esponse on the part 0 0 -1-'
a vo un
which Heary r
is aware. .• the G
UnlIke o d 0 f the philosophers, al-Ghaza I s
"receptacle." If the basic stuff of the universe is primordially malleable
and receptive of any form, then the intergeneric changes implied,
Dei~~; :!If~:~~~:~~':.:~~~~:~ommodates miracles to a system of
 150 AVERROES AND TIlEMETAPfIl'SlCS OF CAUSATION
nat.ural .causatio? proposes that our Imowledge of the causes
whIch ?Is~ose things to receive different forms is severely limited.
1?e prinCIples and causes in question are the changing configura_
tIOns of the stars and the different relative positions of the heav-
enly bodies generaliy.JJ8 While it is agreed that forms do not ema-
nate from the~e principles arbitrarily or haphazardly, but only in
accordance WIth the receptivity of the substratum, the very com-
plexity of their configurations leaves it quite possible that they may
contain wonderful and marvelous powers beyond our ken. Those
familiar with the. ta~ismanic arts presumably have some inkling of
how t?ese celestIal Influences can combine with properly disposed
materIals to. produce extraordinary results. But whether these pow-
ers are partJaliy Imown or not, al-GhazaiI takes the philosophers to
task for dogmaticaliy ruling out the possibility of such miraculous
~ombinations. Both our Imowledge of science's wonders and our
Ign~rance of celestial realm indicate the opposite. Hence, extra-
ordl~ary effects may issue from these celestial causes, and they
may Justly be calied miraculous as well.
Each of these accounts can of course be criticized on its own.
Thus among the problems which beset the impediment account is
the question of how an incorporeaf Deity is able to intervene in the
causal !nteractions of corporeal entities. To claim that an omnipo-
~ent Deity ca~ do all things-including things of this type-does noth-
Ing to explain how the intervention occurs, and, in that' sense
al-Gha~Ir:s observations explain nothing at all. This question, of
course, IS Itself a form of the mind-body problem, one of the thorni-
est issues in philosophy. And while the larger issue has not been
"solved," there is nonetheless no lack of explanations to account
~or ~e. interrelationships of mind and body. This is precisely what
IS missing from al-Ghazalf's presentation.
Th.e .acceleration theory for its part plays havoc with the principle
of ~ufhclen~ reason. If it is possible for ali substances to change
their forms Instantaneously, given the universal receptivity of their
substrata, why is it that only'some substances do so and rarely at
:n
~at? ere seems to be no sufficient reason for the differentiation
In their behavior. If it is asserted that God is the sufficient reason
for accelerations, what accounts for the "retardation" in ali others?
If God is n:ade to account for the slower processes of change a~
weli, the differences between the occasionalist theory of miracle
and al-GhazaiI's revised account virtualiy disappear.
On Necessary Connection 151
The "providential" analysis ultimately falis into circularity. For
it holds that if a miracle occurs, only a genuine prophet performs it.
But the test of a genuine prophet and the validity of his credentials
to establish a religious law depend on his performing miracles. The
religious law is therefore presupposed as a criterion by which to
judge both prophets and miracles. Without the religious law, there
seems to be little rational justification for regarding either proph-
ets or miracles as genuine, and ultimately, for accepting the reli-
gious law itself. .
Finaliy, the fourth view presented by al-GhazaiI seems to diS-
pense with the notion of miraculous intervention altogether. For it
ascribes the occurrence of miracles to purely mechanical factors,
that is, the configurations of astral bodies, and not to the will of
God, as assumed in the first three theories. If God has any role at
ali, it is evidently as the Creator of the heavens, but His efficacy
apparently extends no further.
But whatever the merits of the four theories, al-GhazaiI makes
it clear that the basic issue is still whether miraculous events are
possible or impossible and in what sense. He therefore makes his
opponents demand clarification about what he regards as the defi-
nition of the impossible. In formulating this demand, the philoso-
phers specificaliy refer to al-GhazaiI's earlier criticism of necessary
causal connection, but with one significant difference to be noted
below.
...Now what according to you is the limit of the impossible? If the
impossible includes nothing but the simultaneous affirmation and nega-
tion of the same thing, then say that of two things the one is not the
other, and that the existence of the one does not demand the eXIst-
ence of the other. 1l9
The point of the objections here is easily missed. Evidently, the phi-
losophers as depicted here understood al-GhazaiI to hold that if
any two things are formaliy non-identical, then eo ipso neither one
implies or in any way determines the other. As the subsequent exam-
ples indicate, the "things" in question may be either real or logical
subjects. In either case, they are radically discrete and independent.
Each thing is just what it is and nothing else. Since this description
applies to concepts no less than concrete particulars, it appears to
the philosophers that al-GhazaiI denies even the logicaliy neces-
sary relations between ideas on which logical possibility and impossi-
bility depend. It appears therefore that any notion can be combined
 152
AVERROFSAND 1HEMETAPHYsICS OF CAUSATION
with or dissociated from any other notion given the whims of
al-GhazaJr's omnipotent God. I'" Categorical distinctions would thus
be collapsed so that will, for example, might be created without
knowledge of what is willed, blackness changed into whiteness, and
corpses made to engage in scholarly pursuits-all of which are plainly
absurd.
?~vi~uSly,. the philosophers have taken al-Ghazalr's two separate
qualIflca~lOn~ In ~e critique of necessary connection-non-identity
an~ non-ImplicatIOn-and related them as premise and conclusion.
TIus. was not al-GhazalI's own procedure, however, and so the body
of hIS reply attempts to show that his critique of causation pre-
served logical relations intact. He prefaces his response with a careful
explanation of what he means by impossibility and what he consid-
ers the range of the concept to be, and in analyzing particular cases
he goes on to indicate, albeit obliquely, which of his two account;
of miracle reflects his own opinion. Thus he states,
The answer t? this i.s to say .that the impossible cannot be done by
God, and the ImpossIble consIsts in the simultaneous affirmation and
negation of a thing, or the affirmation of the more particular with the
negabon of the more general, or the affirmation of two things with
the ne~ation of one of them, and what does not refer to this is not
ImpossIble and what is not impossible can be done.12I
The notion of impossibility presented here is clearly concep-
tual or a priori. "Affirmation" (ithbiit, affirmatio) and "negation" (nary,
negatlO), the terms which introduce each of the three sub-classe;
~re 10~i:~1 in ?oth t.heir origin and function. Concomitantly, th~
ImpossIbIlity eVIdent In each sub-class is one of formal contradiction.
~egardless of whether the "things" to which al-Ghaza II refers are
Id~as, P:opositions, particulars or states of affairs, it is the jOint
affl.rmat.lOn and negation of anyone of them or of its components
whIch ~I~lds the emp~ result. Thus in contrast to the philosophers'
sUPpOsItIOns about hIm, al-GhazalI plainly accepts the notions of
conceptual inclusion and logical implication. For him, therefore there
are. ~ome things that God <;.annot do, not because His po~er is
defiCIent, n?r because the natures of things prevent it, but because
these ~utalIve objects of God's power are formally incoherent. They
can neIther be nor be meaningfully thought about.
. It .is significant, moreover, that al-GhazalI expressly limits the
IntensIOn of the concept of impossibility to the three sub-classes he
mentions. This permits him to classify any conceptually coherent
On Necessary Connection 153
notion as possible simpliciter. His point appears to be that. logical
and real possibility are entirely co-extenslve so that ~O~Ing pre-
vents departures from the norm either in the charactenslIc behav-
ior of things, in their "causal" inter-relations, or in the na~al ~rde: as
whole but the threat of conceptual incoherence. By ImplIcatIOn,
a , . II
he is denying the view that certain occurrences a:e physI~a y
impossible in the sense that the specific nature~ an~ In~errelat.lOns
obtaining among things render them so. For thIS vIew IS precIsely
what separates al-Ghazalr, who rejects it, from the philosophers,
who accept it. It is unacceptable to him moreover, because it places
extemallimits upon God's omnipotence, whereas no such limits are
imposed by either the metaphysics of atoms and acc!dents or the
malleable natures of al-Ghazalr's second theory of mIracles. Thus,
insofar as al-Ghazalf confines himself to a purely logical concep-
tion of impossibility, both theories of miracle, it would seem, remain
possible in re no less than in in intellectu. God can perform His extraor-
dinary feats as it were in either way. .
This general statement on impossibility does not commIt al-
GhazalI to register a preference between the two views of mi~acl~.
But his analysis of the philosophers' illustrations .of. absurd~ty. In
occasionalism points progressively toward the ongInal Ash ante
position. In the first place, al-Ghaza II consistently. avoids attrib~tin~
the source of the impossibility to the physical entaIlments of a thIng s
identity, that is, its powers, nature, matter or form, even when such
an account is plainly called for. Instead, the problem posed by each
example is always traced to a violation of a logical principle. Thus,
he agrees that black and white cannot be changed into one ano~er
or in any way be identified with one another, because the negatIOn
of one color in a substratum is plainly "understood from" the affir-
mation of the other. Similarly, one person cannot be in two places
at the same time because "we understand" by his being in one place
that he is not in the other. Again, there can be no will without
knowledge, since will is "understood" to be a seeking after some-
thing known. 12'
•
One might, of course, characterize these examples as In~tances
of synthetic a priori propositions, rather than purely analytIC ones,
and argue that al-Ghazalf no longer regards logical self-contradiction
as the only basis for absurdity, since his examples show that he
deliberately accepts a de facto permanence 0 f 0 blects · . na t ure. 123
In
This, however, would be a somewhat anachronistic construction,
 154 AVERROES AND 'lHEMITAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
155
On Necessary Connection

lor al-Ghazalr registers no distinction between logically sell-contra- . e might object, contrary to our thesis, that
dictory propositions and synthetic a priori ones anywhere in the mto a serpent. In ~um, on . trod d his second theory 01 miracle.
Discussion. On the other hand, he is fully aware 01 the philosophers' al-Ghazali has obvIously re-m th~c:ccount too is entirely compati-
distinction between the ranges covered respectively by logical and But despite appeara~ces,. I I Gh zaIT himself has formu-
·th Ash'arite occaslOnahsm as a - a .
physical impossibility, and in the end he vigorously rejects it as we ble WI. . the Second Discussion of his Tahafut, he reports m
have seen. It would also be highly unusual lor him to give a strictly FO~
lated It. I: e Ash'arite sect that only the accidents pass ~way b~
logical account 01 impossibility in his general statement and then the na~e ~ ~hile the substances in which they inhere persIst untIl
proceed to illustrate it by examples which deliberately undermine themse. ve ch' to deprive them of the features necessary for
its applicability. the DeIty ooses It' I
. . t nce 124 The substances in question are clear y rna. ena ,
Lastly, it seems that this interpretation conluses al-Ghazalf's th~r ~ncti~n
;:XIS as discrete substrata for successions of aCCIdents.
use 01 physical examples, drawn Irom sense experience, with his ~iS iSe~reciSelY what al-Ghazall claims for matter in our present
explanation of them. Nowhere in his analysis does he suggest that
passage I-Gh T's
. .
the reason why certain situations are impossible is that physical Wh~t settles the question conclusively in our vIew IS a.aza I d
objects have their own identities which exclude opposite identities. . t f how a corpse is made to SIt up an
On the contrary, the loundation lor the impossibilities cited by the plainly occasionahst accoun 0 d ' t While this is con-
. learned volumes in a well-ordere scnp.
philosophers has to do with what we understand by the things
described. Specifically, it consists in a basic inconsistency between
the conceptual necessities implied by our understanding of the terms
~~ to~eh:~~%~t~~~~:~fs~~~~~~;~~~i~~:oOv~:~~~)n~:~::
inec~tu:;e ~lls
referred to a being who age~t,
and chooses them. The
involved. Certain affirmations violate the implicit definitions or mean- g t . G d Himself who can create movement m
as we would expec ,IS 0 , t ove
ing postulates which govern our thinking and use of language, and tures either with or without an awareness of the power 0 m .
for al-GhazaIr this holds true quite apart from anything that might
be said about the so-called specific natures of things, however mal-
~":t is more, His efficacy is not confined to regu~~~ se~~en~l~s of
movements alone, for al-Ghazali argues now as he I ~ngma .
leable they might be in the hands of an omnipotent Deity.
Now, when we observe other ,?ovements than o~~ a~w:;";,:~~~
Thus, by scrupulously limiting his account of impossibility to l
well-ordered movements, we a\:a;;:e~o;~~~!:tOkinds ~I knowledge
the logical domain, al-Ghazall reopens the door to the occasionalist them and God creates In us a h' hone 01 the two
thesis with which he started. And by avoiding any reference to limi- thro~gh the habitual course olkneventsi~~~Og~g~h: i~POSSibility 01 the
classes 01 pOSSIbIlIty becomes own,
tations of the possible imposed by the natures of the things, even
where we would expect at least some allusion to them, he leaves second class is not proved thereby.!25 01 movement
Here again God creates not only the sequences ,
the revised theory of miracles floating in logical limbo-neither
damned as impossible nor affirmed as true. but our very knowledge of those sequences. So long as these con-
If this is the case, what then can be said lor al-GhazalI's expla- sist of well-ordered motions, we can gras~ what is commonl~ :~~~
nation 01 why diflerent genera cannot be transformed into one stood. as PhYS~al poss.i~I:7 :~: ~:e:!~:!~:;e:rt :y~!~~~~ course
another? His account is plainly physical and parallels Aristotle's
edge ~~ ~~~o~e~:~~:ne the range of even physical pos:ibility fO.r
as su -1- Th t' defined by logical criteria alone. Accordmgly, 10~1-
own. Matter is described as an enduring substratum 01 forms, while
change is treated as a succession,of different forms coming to be in al-Ghaza I. a IS h be to the hablt-
matter. The reason why substances (that is, material objects lor cally possible events, however co?traryd t a~~u~:Yor impossible by
al-Ghazalf) cannot be transformed into accidents nor vice versa is ual course of nature, cannot be lud.ge . 'bTty 01 their
that there is no common material substratum for both, whereas a reference to it. The sole standard for ludgmg the POSSI 1111 d
occurrence lies in what God can do, not in what He usua y oes.
common substratum does exist lor the various kinds of substantial
lorms, as in the case of blood changing into sperm and wood changing
 156
AVERROf.S AND TIlE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
On Necessary Connection 157
Thus it appears that al-Ghazlil
revised his theory of miracle alon f has c~m~ f~1I circle. While he to minimize the conflict between the theologians and the philoso-
this revised theory as "possible"
philosophers on their own t ' B
hrn~turahstJc hnes and advanced
S aim was basically to answer the
phers as much as possible. For in Averroes' estimation, these gener-
ally proved to be highly detrimental to the philosophic enterprise
. erms. ut once he
Issue of possibility and impossibility I Gh :"~s pressed on the and even social stability. Inasmuch as al-Ghazalr's tactical shift pro-
h
Ash'arite presuppositions from which a -t azii.h returned to the vided him with an opportunity to underscore points of agreement
the beginning, the operations of both . e s arted. In the end, as in between philosophers and theologians, he seized it without hesitation.
sively from God. mm d and nature derive exclu- What is more, once al-GhazalI had adopted the basic thesis of
What is Averroes' response to t h · · . the philosophers on causal efficacy, whatever his purpose may have
he recognize al-Ghazlilf's ai . f IS new Ime of argument? Does been in doing so, it was surely to Averroes' advantage to present
his subtle method of b kims m ormulating the revised theory or this shift as arising from conviction. For this would have signified
interpret the theory an~c w~~t a:a .~om .it? U not, how does he
y that his colleagues, the philosophers, had in effect won the argu-
accept or reject it? And f II honsl.eratlOns lead him either to ment and persuaded one of the most acute and perceptive of the
a
tions relate to the theo 17 y, lOW, If at all, do these considera_ Ash'arites that their position was untenable.
part of the Discussion? ry 0 causa efficacy he presented in the first Similarly, nothing would have been gained by suggesting that
Averroes suggest; first of all th -- al-Ghazalf returned to occasionalism after all, for the debate and
nized the absurdity of denying;h a\~I-Ghazlill had finally recog- all its repercussions would have surely continued unabated. If this
through which they perform s
entangled him in utterly
.tt t mgs have specific natures
peci IC acts. Because this denial had
procedure is scandalous by the common standards of historical schol-
arship and even philosophic accuracy, Averroes evidently consid-
proposition which he hadrepu~ant consequences, he conceded this ered it justifiable on other grounds. Clearly he was sensitive to the
, preViously denied B t· religious and political strictures placed upon philosophic inquiry in
"transferred the denial" to two th . l26 . u m the process, he
that a thing can have th o ..er pomts. Thus al-Ghazalf asserts a way that is perhaps foreign to us today. That awareness looms
ence the things it custo::r~~e:1;~c~~a;acteriStiCS and ~et not influ- behind every page of his Tahiifut.lt is likely, therefore, that he thought
sess heat, but not burn someth. b or ~xample, a fire can pos- it more a service to the truth to stress al-Ghazalf's agreement with
though the object's nature· t ~g brought mto contact with it even the philosophers than to expose and recite needlessly the extent of
Secondly, he argues that thlse 0 e .f~mfed under such cirt:umstances. their disagreement.
. speci IC orms belong· t . Attempts at harmonization continue with Averroes' analysis of
eXistent do not possess specific matter mg 0 any given
Thus far Averroes accurat I . what is acceptable in al-Ghazalf's new position. This consists of three
all that follows however h . e Y rep:es~nts his opponent's view. In points. First, he acknowledges that ''because of external causes the
may not reall; have ch~n;;~v~ no .m1lcation at all that al-Ghazlilr procession of actions from agents may not be necessary,"127 for talc
returned to his original positio sl mm or that i: ~~ did, he soon may indeed prevent the burning of cotton or other combustible
depicted as having made a d .n: nstead, al-Ghazah IS consistently objects. Averroes' explanation here coincides with al-Ghazalf's in
eClSlve retreat to ·d the sense that an impediment can overcome the operation of natu-
sequences rather than a tact" I . avol repugnant con-
fication of the philosophe IThca. ~Ithdrawal to escape from the vili- ral necessity, but, unlike al-Ghazalf, he says nothing about the source
. rs. IS mterpretation is I· .
best It expresses a partial truth and . ~uzz mg, smce at of the impediment or the circumstances under which it might arise,
ture of al-Ghazali's argu t b . at worst It distorts the struc- so as not to accentuate their disagreement. The same motivation is
men y Its omis . Wh apparently at work in his bald assertion that the acts of agents are
Averroes present it? _ SlOns. y then does
It is always possible of Course th th not necessary, for, without further qualification, this expresses the
fused on the matter and s1m I m. ' at e. Commen~a~or was con- keystone of al-Ghazalf's entire position and the antithesis of Averroes'
view of his generally acute p Y I~e~ th~ pomt. But thiS IS unlikely in own. This is an obvious oversimplication even by Averroes' own
nuances of Ash'· A exege Ica skills and familiarity with the standards.
ansm. more probable explanation is that he wished
 158 AVERROES AND TIlEMETAeHYSICS OF CAUSATION
. Secondly, all agree that matter is a necessary condition of mate-
nal thmgs._~e theologians do not contest this, because it conforms
to al-GhazalI. s account of what is possible and impossible. Since
one c~n~o.t Simultaneously affirm the whole of something and deny
a. par 0 It, ~atter mus.t be a condition of what is plainly recog_
mzed ~s mat.enal. The philosophers also accept it on logical grounds,
but With a view to the problem of definition. Things are constituted
of tw~ characteristics, one general and the other specific, corre-
spo~dl~~ to th~ components of a definition. In their view, there is
no sl~lflcant difference between negating existents themselves and
negatmg one of these two attributes. Man will no more remain if we
take away his condition of animality than if we remove his condi-
tion of rationality. In the absence of a necessary condition the con-
ditioned cannot exist. '
The third and final point held in common is that existents shar-
ing in the same matter are such that their matter sometimes receives
on~ ~f two con~~ary fo~ms and at other times receives the opposite.
This IS exemplIfied chiefly by the substantial transformation of the
elements, whereby the same matter may variously take on the forms
of fire (hot and dry), air (hot and wet), water (cold and wet), and
ea~h (cold and dry). What both assume, of course, is that different
eXistents may share the same matter and that change in the case of
such ~ntities r~ally amounts to a simple exchange of form. The only
qu.estlOn tha.t IS left open at this point has to do with the range of
eXistents which meet this description.'28
If the areas of agreement are so basic, wherein lies the diver-
gence? Averroes' answer suggests that it consists only in certain
details. But how all-important those details are for the positions of
both men emerges only on analysis. Thus, while the theologians
and philosophers concur on the role of matter as a condition, they
seem to part company on just how many such conditions are included
in th~ constitution of a particular. The former deny that general
qualItIes, such as disposition, warmth, and moisture can function
!ike ~pecific qual.it~es, as."material" conditions of concrete particulars:
m thiS case, of lIvmg thmgs. There is only one material substratum
The philosophers, on the other hand, affirm that general qualiti~
can play this role. Indeed, they set up an analogy between warmth
and moisture as conditions of life, and life as a condition of ration-
ality. On each side of the analogy, the first term is related to the
second as the more general to the more particular, without which
On Necessary Connection 159
the particular cannot be meaningfully affirmed. Th~s withou.t life,
there is no person to be qualified as rational, and wlth?ut mo~sture
and heat, nothing to be qualified as living. The pomt at I.ssue,
however, is made to appear merely quantitative-how many Items
can operate as matter- and for that reason it hardly seems very
serious. .
In fact there is a radical difference between the conceptIons of
matter employed by the theologians and the philosophers. The major-
ity of the theologians, including al-Ghazalf, envisage matter excl~­
sively as a substratum for form. But only one such substratum IS
required in order to account for change. For a single c.ommon sub-
stratum is sufficient to receive any number of compatible forms of
varying generality and particularity, in succession. It is the absence
of just such a substratum, common to both accident and substance
as well as other categories, that explains al-Ghazalr's denial that
transformation of one genus into another lies within God's power.
Taking blackness and power as examples, he argues that the former
simply cannot be transformed into the latter. For without a com-
mon substratum, if the black no longer remains when power appears,
it is not because the black was transformed. It simply doesn't exist
any more, whereas something else does. If it continues to exist al?ng
with power, again there is no transformation, only a new relat.lOn.
And if the black remains as it was and power does not come mto
existence, obviously no change has occurred at all. For real trans-
formation to occur, a single common substratum is the sine qua
non. l29
The philosophers, on the other hand, are using "matter" in a
much broader and almost irridescent sense. Its meaning shifts in dif-
ferent contexts, although it retains a single primary function. Matter
serves as a constituent out of which things are made or come to be.l 30
In a logical context, rationality comes to be out of animality, a con-
clusion out of its premises, words out of language, letters out of words,
and so on. In the physical domain, on the other hand, a living creature
comes to be out of a suitable moist and heated combination of ele-
ments a man out of a certain kind of living seed, a house out of
bricks: Averroes' evident tendency to shift from one context to an-
other does not indicate a conceptual confusion on his part as much
as it shows that he regards matter as an essentially analogical notion,
which cuts across categories of being and scientific disciplines alike.
 160 AVERROES AND 1HEMETAPHYSICS OF CAusATION
!t is the more general constituent out of which something specific
IS made.
On this analysis, moreover, it turns out that what serves as
matter ~s not only cont~-relative but also position-relative. A thing's
matter IS whatever functIOns as the more general condition or con-
stituent for something else which specifies it, whether the former
be a concept, an argument, the physical stuff on which craftsmen
wor~ or the whOll~ undetermined substratum of all change. Still,
nothmg precludes thIS condition serving as a specifying factor vis-a-vis
yet another more general condition to which it is related. Thus
using Averroes' analogy, what is animal assumes the role of matte;
in relation to what is human and the role of form in relation to the
c?n~tituent .organic and inorganic mixtures belonging to both.
SImIlarly, bncks are the matter out of which houses are made but
in relation to clay, bricks stand as form. The material condition
~ereby. fills a dual role as that which both specifies and is speci-
fIed untIl, of course, we reach either prime matter or concrete par-
ticular substance.
The significance of this analogical conception of matter in the
debate with al-GhazaII, is that it establishes a hierarchy of ..n:atters"
and "forms" which, in their totality, are constitutive of the identities
of things. This does not mean that any given particular has several
natures rather than one. It indicates rather that the elements which
~omprise any given physical particular contain various configura-
tIons of powers, both active and passive, which correspond to form'
and matter respectively. All these powers are subordinated. to an
overall form or structural principle which fixes the distinctive iden-
tity of that particular as well as its activity. On this hierarchical
model of how particulars are constituted, all such configurations of
powers and their attendant properties count equally in its make-up.'31
None can be dispensed with lest the particular lose one of the bases
for its s~ecific nature and identity. Thus, when the theologians deny
that mOIsture and warmth are "material," that is, constituent condi-
tions. of life in ge~:rable and corruptible entities, they are ultimately
denYIng the speCIfIc nature of living creatures as well. As a result
all the absurdities which fOllow from their denial of specific nature~
fOllow equally from their simplistic conception of matter.
. Similar considerations apply to shape, quantity, quality, and
tI~e of generation. Confining _ourselves to a single example, the
phIlosophers consider certain kinds of shapes to be among the con-
On Necessary Connection 161
ditions of life for specific kinds of creatures. For as one of the aspects
of a thing's form, that is, its spatial structure, shap.e is directly C?r:e-
lated with its characteristic functions. It determInes what a hVIng
organism can and cannot do no less than its material constitution.
While Averroes confines himself to biological examples, the sam.e
principle would presumably apply to non-living spatio-temporal entI-
ties as well. Anatomy, so to speak, is destiny even for Averroes.
If this were not the case, he supposes, it would be possible for
an animal to have a specific shape devoid of any function whatever.
Its spatial structure, in short, would not equip it to act in acc~rd­
ance with its nature. On the other hand, it would also be pOSSIble
for an entity to possess a specific nature, but have no shape distinc-
tive to itself. Averroes clearly regards both alternatives as absurd.
The first supposes that an entity could have its specific nature or
form without performing its specific act, and this ultimately negates
its very being. The second alternative completely sunders one aspect
of a thing's structure, its shape, from the ultimate source o~ ~Il its
determinations, the form. In separating the form from a legItImate
aspect of itself, it renders the notion of form as a single structural
principle of being largely nugatory. Thus, recalling al-GhazalI's schol-
arly corpse, Averroes observes,
...For the philosophers the hand is the organ of the intellect, and by
means of it man performs his rational acts, like writing and carryIng
on of the other arts; now if intelligence were possible in the inorg~nic,. it
would be possible that intellect might exist without performmg .ltS
function, and it would be as if warmth could exist without warmmg
the things that are normally warmed by it. l32
From the perspective of Averroes' metaphysical argument for causal
efficacy, obviously, neither is possible. .
For the philosophers, therefore, specific natures determIne not
only the definition and characteristic behavior of thin?s, but also
the kinds of accidental properties they may have. And whIle Averroes
concedes that there is a certain latitude in these features as regards
degree (for example, size, weight, time req~isite f~r genera~ion),
they are nonetheless Inextricably bound up WIth the Internal hIerar-
chy of forms and matters, powers and dispositions which ~onsti~ute
the entity. The result is that contrary even to al-GhaziilI s ~evIsed
account, certain combinations of forms and types of behaVIOr are
precluded, because they are incompatible with the natures of the
things to which they are ascribed.
 162
AVERROES AND 1HEMETAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
Just as the theologians fail to re-cognize the structural hierar-
chy of matter fform within the natures of things, they likewise mis-
construe the developmental hierarchy which characterizes change.
By supposing that matter can receive any form, despite its being
the specific matter of a particular thing, the theologians conclude
that it is generally possible for instantaneous changes to occur. This
makes the intermediate stages of development superfluous, in prin-
ciple if not in fact, and accordingly dispensable. Thus in keeping
with their understanding of man's creation from clay, they maintain
that "the soul of man can inhere in earth without the intermediar_
ies which are known by experience," for soil qua matter can receive
any form which the Deity chooses to put in it, including that of a
fUlly-formed man.l33
Averroes questions this hypothesis as being both inconsistent
with our experience and theologically dubious. Our experience indi-
cates that certain things with which we are familiar do not receive
their ultimate form unless they have acquired other intermediary
forms. To this fact Averroes sees no plausible exceptions. Taking up
the theologians' example of man's creation, therefore, he argues
that an animal is produced only after plants are composed out of
mixtures of elements, eaten by other animals for nourishment, and
subsequently assimilated into blood and sperm. None of these stages
is dispensable, since each one is a necessary pre-condition for the
emergence of what fOllows it. The nature of each element in the
process is thus reconstituted as its powers and dispositions are
supplemented, recombined, and re-aligned with the causal powers
of other elements in the process. Similarly, changes of this kind
could not occur instantaneously, since the congruity relation between
powers and dispositions must be successively re-established at each
stage. All this continues at its own pace until the cycle begins again,
whence it is clear that the process is endless both in the past and
in the future. Averroes' reference in the text to the pre-existing ani-
mal which consumes the plant attests to this very point.
More striking, however, is his claim that this is precisely the
doctrine taught by the Qur'an. For when its account of man's crea-
tion is examined in full, he suggests, the same hierarchy of develop-
ment appears, as well as evidence of its cyclical character.
We created man from an extraction of clay.
Then We set him, a drop, in aIeceptacle secure.
Then We created from the drop a clot,
On Necessary Connection 163
Then We created from the clot a tissue,
Then We created from the tissue bones,
Then We garmented the bones in flesh;
Thereafter We produced him as another creature.
So blessed be God, the best of creators!l" .
If as the theologians claim, it were poSSible for ~ substa~ce to be
'd d W'lthOUt the intermediaries usually reqUired for ItS devel-
pro uce . f 'th
en "wisdom would consist in the creatIon 0 man WI -
opmen t , th d . ch ay
ch intermediaries, and a creator who create In su a. w
Id be the best and most powerful of creators. "135 Bu t exper lence
out su
~~:s Qur'a~ p~ov~
that creation does not occur in this way, and the
that only a God who creates by means of causal inte~me~Ianes IS
"the best of creators." The final irony is that the theologIans account
is rendered theologically suspect!
When it comes at long last to selecting between the two pos-
itions-that of the theologians and that of the ph.ilos~phers-Ave~roes
dmits that each side claims self-evidence for ItS VIew, and. n~Ither
~as app.ea~ances, ~IS ~ot
a conclusive proof. But despite initial IS
an invitation to skepticism. It is rather an admISSIon that fIrst ~nn­
ciples are at stake, and these as we have seen .are ~ot stnctly
demonstrable. They can be established only by dralectIc.al m~ans
and by their capacity to account for all of th: phenomena In a gIven
domain. By these criteria, Averroes leaves lIttle doubt as to WhICh
position "men of truth and evidence" must choose: The theologIcal
view in its unrestrained attempt to ascribe ommpotence to God,
culm'inates in denying the necessary correlation~ to be found In
things, correlations "between condition and condItIOned, between a
thing and its definition, between a thing and ItS cause, and between
a thing and its sign."I36 It makes all things possib~e for ~od, In sho.rt,
by destroying the structural and developmental hIerarchIes ~at eXist
in things. And this is ultimately to destroy their distinct beIng and
knowability as well. .
The philosophers' account, on the other hand, recogn.lZed tha:
existents are divided into opposites and correlates (mutaqa~[/at UXI-lia
mutanasiMt, opposita et convenientia) which are so constItute? that
the former cannot be combined nor the latter separated wltho~t
destroying the essential natures of the existents themselves. Th~s
stability in the natures and operations ?f things insures both therr
continued being and knowability. Its ultlmat: groun~, for Averroes,
lies in the unalterable wisdom of God itself. The eXIstence of such
 164
AVERROESAND THE METAPHYsICS OF CAUSATION

wisdom in the etem I· t I l ·

ity."I37 a In e ect IS tlie cause of its existence in real-
Just what Averroes mea b tho b
cacy of OI·V· .d ns y IS 0 scure reference to the effl·
me WIS om and p . I h . - Chapter Four
stable characteristics of the p:;~~:e:nd ~w It can ac~ount for the
un~lear. To explain it adequately requires ~~~e:~fd~~~~~:~:ains
~a. tenn: the ~ynamics of celestial causation and its origin ing~n- Spheres, Cycles, and Separate
Ivme mmd. It IS to these issues that we now t urn. e
Intelligences:
The Celestial Links in the
Causal Chain

The Sphere System and the Problem of Continuous Change

The effect of Averroes' defense of causal efficacy thus far has been
not only to show the incoherent consequences implied by an ontol-
ogy of atoms and accidents, but to provide a framework for explaining
the reality and intelligibility of change. His positive program began
by reconfinning what we perceive in everyday experience-that cer-
tain particulars act on others so as to alter either their total iden-
tity or some aspect of it or to generate new particulars altogether.
This required that both the persons and objects capable of such
action persist through varying intervals of time. And while they
assuredly take on different appearances, sizes, and shapes during
these intervals, we can nonetheless identify them without signifi-
cant difficulty, because they exhibit a certain stability of structure
and continuity of behavior, despite the many changes to which they
are subject. But as we have also seen, Averroes was less interested
in confirming these familiar facts than in explaining them. And this
is where his defense made the most headway.

165
 166 AVERROES AND TIlEMITAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
His key contention in that defense has been that things both
persist and change in the ways they do, because they have essen-
tial natures which are properly their own. Under analysis, these
natures emerged as hierarchies of active and passive powers or
what we may now call simply powers and dispositions. It is the
distinctive selection and arrangement of these powers, included in
the structure of an entity, that allows us to explain why different
individuals belong to the same or different natural kinds. And this
in turn facilitates further classifications of natural kinds themselves
into more encompassing hierarchies of genera and species.
Since the theory holds that these Structures express the possi-
ble combinations of powers and dispositions in rerum natura, it fol-
lows that they also set continuing limits upon both the kinds of
effects particulars may produce and the changes they can undergo.
That is why natural agents can have only one specific act according
to Averroes, whereas voluntary agents may alternatively produce
contrary acts. What may appear to us as the diversity of effects
deriving from one natural agent is in fact a diversity which derives
from the variety of things acted upon and the specific circumstances
of the congruity relation. Still, if we restrict the analysis to individ-
ual causes, only those effects which lie within an entity's power
configuration are possible. What lies beyond that range is impossi-
ble so far as real things are concerned. In the same way, the essen-
tial natures of things impose relatively stable patterns and limits
upon the processes of change themselves. For we observe that
changes occur in certain ways and not others, upon the fulfillment
of certain conditions and not in their absence.
The theory of essential natures also helped to explain the real-
ity and intelligibility of change in still another way-by showing
how such changes are repeated in individuals of the same kind.
For observation confirmed for Averroes that the action of certair.
kinds of particulars on others regularly brings the latter to the point
of acting in the same way as the former. This is what prompted the
philosophers to hold that the form of a proximate agent and its
effect are one and the same- either in species or in genus-the
same in species as a man generates another man or as a horse
generates another horse, and the same in genus as a mule is gener-
ated from a horse and a donkey.' This identity or at least general
similarity of Structure in the behavior of powerful particulars, allows
,
Celestial Links in the Causal Chain 167
rocesses of change to go on, qUI·te nI eally r , from generation
. . . .to
peneration. For in producing its effect, by vi.rtue of ItS Intnnslc
gdynamIsm,
. th e cau se reproduces its own specifIC character as well.
. h
Once all this is allowed, however, it surely remains to ask w at
accounts for the continuity of such changes and the structural st~­
bility which ordinarily characterizes them. Why, after all, shouldn,t
there be changes in nature, and many of them at that? Why shou~dn;
these processes break down as often as they come to completIOn.
The concluding paragraph of the Seventeenth D~scussion offers what I
believe is a general but admittedly enigmatIc response to these
questions. . .
. . .Existents are divided into opposItes and co.rrelates, and If the
latter could be separated, the former might be umted, but OPPOSlt~S
are not united and correlates therefore cannot be separated. And thIS
is the wisdom of God and God's course in created things, and you will
never find in God's course any alteration. And It IS thro~gh the ~er­
ception of this wisdom that the intellect of man becomes mtellect.
How are we to understand this explanation? At the very least
the opposites and correlates to which Averroes refers would have
to signify the properties of particular obje~s, irresp~ctive of whether
these properties are classified as essential or a~cldental. Some of
these are plainly incompatible. Others are compatible or even mutu-
ally inter-dependent. By extension they can also b~ understood as
individual powers and dispositions Which, for their part, mayor
may not cohere in the specific natures of things so as to produce
specific effects. . .
The remaining question, however, IS what relatIOn holds between
these compatible and incompatible powers, on the one h~nd, and
God's wisdom and customary course, on the other. If we Interpret
Averroes to mean that the former are identical with the l~tter, then
God's wisdom and customary course refer not to the DeIty, as we
might expect, but to His effects, the natural order in its totality. ThIs
reading is made plausible by Averroes' qualification that bot~ the
wisdom and customary course he has in mind are "in created things"
and his assertion that the human mind is actualized through knowl-
edge of them. We should note too that Averroes goes on to sugg~t
that it is the unalterability of God's wisdom and customary course .In
things which explains the stability and continuity of change, that IS,
why opposites cannot be conjoined or correlates sep~rated: Our Im-
mediate impression therefore would be that this alone IS suffICIent for
 168 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
both the structural and developmental hierarchies we have traced
in things.
But such an interpretation merely begs the question. One does
not explain the continuity and stabillty of change by pointing to the
"unalterability" of the process itself, even if it is under the title of
God's wisdom and customary course, since this supposed "unalter~
ability" is just what needs to be explained.
At most, such a procedure traces recurrent patterns of causes
and effects ad infinitum, without ever arriving at an ultimate cause
for their recurrence.3 Short of this, it avoids the question altogether
by means of verbal legerdemain. What is required, rather, is an
account of why the powers and dispositions of things hold together
at all. Why do these configurations take just the forms that they do?
What enables them to sustain their operations over time? What condi-
tions are necessary for them to reproduce themselves in new par-
ticulars?
All of these questions are in order so long as it is conceivable
for the existing ensembles of powers and dispositions to come apart
or for the whole system to grind to a halt. Indeed, Averroes himself
entertains just these possibilities, when he suggests that if the power
which unifies the totality of things were lacking, the parts of the
whole would disconnect themselves and not endure for even the
twinkling of an eye.' Therefore, if some ultimate cause is to be sought
for the perceived continuity and stability of things, it cannot be
found in the things themselves, whatever their description may be.
Another alternative would be to read God's wisdom and unal-
terable course as referring to the Deity rather than the effect ascribed
to Him. Both expressions would then be treated as roughly equiva-
lent to the content of the Divine mind in relation to created things.
Since that content is understood to be both stable and continuous
by virtue of God's own eternity, this interpretation gains plausibility. It
is even further strengthened by the fact that the required explana-
tion is located in what is generally understood to be the ultimate
Cause, thus eliminating the problems of circularity and infinite regress
alike. But whatever its apparent merit, the interpretation must also
fail for reasons of which Averroes was very much aware. For if one
regards the Deity as an agent and argues that the form of what an
agent brings into being must be specifically or generically the same
as that of the agent, it would be inconsistent, if not impossible, for
the eternal and unalterable wisdom of God to produce temporal
Celestial Links in the Causal Chain 169
and changeable beings, however stable .and contin."o~s they might
b e. In short , the effect of Divine wisdom IS necessarIly mcommensu-
rable with the data to be explained.S • • •
To resolve this dilemma, Averroes found It necessary to dISll~-
. h between the eternal wisdom of God, on the one hand, and HIS
~~srse in created things, on the other. In effect, he restric:ted the
explanatory role of the former to the stable structures of.thm~s.qua
tructures-to the forms which organize powers and dISpOSIll?nS
~nto specific natures and thereby determine their modes. ~f actIOn.
The wisdom of God, as the primary instance of all specIfic forms,
Id thus determine the form of all other instances. In the same
wou l'th
y God's unalterable custom or sunnah was made to exp am e
;~n~inuity and ongoing character of change. But the su~nah :ould
assume this role only if it too were to be expres~ed m a sl~gle
principle or primary instance, characterized by contmuous phYSIcal
change, and specifically by a kind of change that would allow for
generation and corruption. . .
In this framework, the wisdom of God was easIly deslgna.ted as
a principle, but the primary instan~e of the ~ivine s~nnah s~lll had
to be identified. Averroes, in argumg for thIS solutIOn, uillmately
identified it with the outermost sphere of heaven; and thereby .he
carried his analysis of causal efficacy into the realm of celestIal
phenomena.
Underscoring this distinction, Averroes holds that,
. .. the man who divides existents into separate exi~tents [i.7"
being which is separate from matter and the accidents whIch pertam
to matter, that of the separate Intelligences] and mat~rlal, senSIble
existents makes the principles to which the senSIble eXIstent ascends
different from the principles to which the intelligible exIstent ascends,
for he regards as the principles of sensible existents matter and. form,
and he makes some of these existents the agents of others, tIll the
heavenly body is reached, and he. make~ th.e intelligible .substances
ascend to a first principle, WhICh IS a princIple to them I? one way
analogous to a formal cause, in another analogous to a !mal cause,
and in a third way analogous to an efficient cause: All thIS has been
proved in the books of the philosophers...and thIS IS the theory of
Aristotle.'
The form of Averroes' explanation makes his choice of the out-
ermost sphere seem entirely arbitra~. Yet this .is mi~leading, for he
has a ready justification. What establishes the Idenllty of the he~v­
enly body as the source of both continuous motion and gener~tIO~
and decay was in both cases common sense and sense perceptIOn.
 170 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
Once the spherical shape of the earth had been established, it was
but a short step to account for the observed motions of the stars
~nd other h.eavenly bO.dies across the va'!lt of the sky by postulat-
mg a celestial sphere, mdeed, a concentric system of such spheres
whose .movements carried the stars and planets around the earth
as .thelr common. center. In his account of this system. Averroes
pl~mlY f?"oWS ArIstotle and specifically the astronomical views of
ArIstotle s contemporary, Callipus.
The daily movement. of the outer sphere from East to West every
twenty-four hours was vIewed as a common movement in which all
the remaining spheres shared equally. They too rotated in such a
fashion that the sun, moon, and planets crossed the skies roughly
once every twenty-four hours. The other considerably slower move-
ments of the inner spheres, however, were deemed unique to them-
selves. Thus each planetary sphere was thought to turn at its own
speed and on its own axis from West to East along the ecliptic, the
app.arent pa~h of the sun through the fixed stars, taking various
per~~ds of tIme to traverse the zodiac and return to its original
pos.ltIon. Taken together, the motions of all the celestial bodies were
belIeved to cause the variations of winds, tides, and other climate-
l?gical phenomena which, in general terms, explained the opera-
t~on of natural causes of all kinds on earth. It was as remote effi-
cI~nt .causes, therefore, that the heavens came to be regarded as
pnnclples of both the changeable sensible bodies and the continu-
ous species of the sub lunar world.
B.ut how precisely was this causal nexus to be established? And
how, mdeed, could it be made to account for the endless varieties
of sub lunar change in both the inanimate and animate domains? In
the ~ahiifut ~t least, Averroes gives no systematic reply to these
~uestlOns. StIll, he does fill out the original conception sufficiently
m s~veral contexts within the book for a general description to be
posslbl:. :nus, when he asserts the unique role of celestial motion
m medlatmg between the efficacy of temporal particulars and that
of God, he explains in part how it is able to do so.
.. .If there were a moment in which nothing was moved at all there
would be no possibility of an origination of movement. The 'nexus
between temporal existence and eternal can only take place without
a change affecting the First through that movement which is partly
eternal, partly temporal. And the thing moved by this movement is
wha~ AVlcenna calls 'the existence necessary through another: and
thIS necessary through another' must be a body everlastingly moved,
171
Celestial Links in the Causal Chain
and in this way it is possible that the essentially tempor~ and cor-
ruptible should exist in dependence on the eternal, and thiS. through
approach to something [at certain times] and throug? rece~lOn fro,?
it [at other times]. as you observe it happen to transitory eXistents In
relation to the heavenly bodies. And since this moved body is neces-
sary in its substance, possible in it local movement, it is nec~ssary
that the process should terminate in an absolutely necessary eXlstent
in which there is no potency at all, either in its substance, or locally,
or in any of the other forms of movement.s
The first datum of experience, which Averroes has stressed again
and again, is that we observe things changing, moving, and acting
on one another. But however obvious this is, it is conceivable that
what we now observe might not always have been the case, for
there is nothing intrinsically inconsistent in the idea that at one
time all things taken collectively were at rest. But supposing this
were so and seeing at the same time the varieties of movement
presently occurring, one would have to suppose that at some time
there must have been a beginning to movement. It is this ostensibly
reasonable supposition that Averroes like Aristotle considers im-
possible. For the beginning of movement, taken as an actuality of
some potential qua potential, would itself be a movement. But given
this conception of movement, this "first movement" would require
still another movement to actualize it and so on until we are caught
in a vicious regress. The point, as Averroes succinctly states. is that
if there were once no movement, there would be no way of originat-
ing it, since the only thing qualified to originate it would be, con-
trary to our assumption, a prior movement.
The conclusion is that movement is continuous and eternal.
But since the movements we observe belong to particular things
which, taken distributively, are sometimes moving and sometimes
not, we would also have to say that in a certain sense movement
had finite parts. Now recalling Averroes' earlier assumption that
the effects of efficient causes are either specifically or generically
similar to their causes, the efficient cause of the various sublunar
movements would likewise have to be an eternal and continuous
motion which at the same time could be said to have finite parts.
The movement of the celestial sphere qualifies on both counts. It is
partly eternal and partly temporal.
In what way is it eternal? The heavenly sphere is called "neces-
sary in its substance" and by this Averroes means that it is eternal
and incorruptible. Unlike the sensible substances which are only
 172
AVERROfS AND THEMIITAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
Celestial Links in the Causal Chain 173
possible in themselves, owing to tbeir composition from matter and
tbe "revolution" of tbe sun around tbe earth, in
form, tbe sphere is not composite in tbis way. Its corporeal charac- and in tb e secon d , I g tbe same
conjunction witb tbe otber planetary movements a on
ter is rooted not in matter, which in its real manifestations always
takes tbe form of tbe elements or some composite of tbem, but in a patb. wed from a fixed point in tbe middle latitudes of nortber~
fiftb element, tbe etber. This was understood to be absolutely sim- Vietb and in relation to tbe fixed stars, tbe sun rIses and se~s
ple and tbus incorruptible. Since the only specific act of such bod- tbe he~:y
at a position roughly one degree removed from POSI- ~e
ies is circular motion, assuming of course tbat tbe act were always
being exercised, tbe movement of the celestial sphere also turns
~:~s of tbe previous morning and evening [see figure 1].9 This course
out to be formally continuous. That is to say, tbere is no particular
point on tbe sphere or, more correctly, in its place, from which its o
o
movement begins or at which it ends. Circular motion, strictly
speaking, has no contraries from which to begin or at which to end, •
o
as do the movements of all sublunary bodies. Thus, in terms of botb o
o o .0
its substance and its activity, tbe celestial sphere is eternal and L...
TAURUS

continuously mobile. In tbese respects, too, it is generically similar ..............J...

.l.PttIL 2Z

o
•
to the wisdom of God, being both eternal in substance and, for rea- .......... "AT I

....... ...,
...... I
sons to be analyzed below, continuous in its act. That is why Averroes .......... YATI

characterizes it as being connected witb eternal existence. •o

............ ...... "UI'
I
Celestial motion is temporal, on tbe otber hand, and is a cause
of generation and corruption overall, because its movement is divisi- •
ARIE S ......................
ble into parts. There are in effect diverse motions corresponding to • 1"-"'~
YAY Z~
tbe different spheres, for tbese, as noted, move at different speeds, * •
on different axes, and to a large extent, in different directions. Inso-
far as a variety of distinct movements can be distinguished, one
can properly speak of celestial movements having beginnings and •
endings. The sense Averroes has in mind seems clear enough. Revo- figure 1
lutions around tbe earth are begun and completed, solstices and
equinoxes arrived at and left behind, phases of the moon initiated
and concluded, and the interchange of positions among tbe heav-
enly bodies establishes new, but temporary causal configurations
~~~~::td~~~~~~~:I~p:~no~a:t~~I~i~:~~~~~~u~~~~ ~f :~:~~;~~
tbe com lete path traced by tbe sun annually tbroug e IX
of their own. The continuity of tbese movements, therefore, pro- stars e~erges
[see figure 2]. The highest point reached bit,tbe sun
duces whatever continuity sublunar change displays, while tbeir '. ath a ain viewed from the same point on tbe ear ,~orre­
finiteness and temporality are responsible for tbe generation and
destruction of sublunar particulars. ~no~~: ~o the ~ummer
solstice (55), when tbe sun is highest In tbe
p d ky; tbe lowest point to tbe winter solstice (WS); and tbe
This twofold character of celestial motion and its effects has its
foremost example in what Averroes somewhat obscurely calls "pri-
=n p~rn:s
riding on the equator of tbe stellar sphere, to thed~et~nal
.
and autumnal equinoxes (VE , AE) . Since tbis continuous yet
. IS inC-
mary motion" or "approach and retreat," two processes which operate . . of tbe sun accounts for the annual changes In ~eas~ns,
in different ways and have different temporal characteristics. Using
tbe model of a multi-sphered geocentric universe, what he is in fact
~~:rr:~~o:gain closely following Aristotle, cites it in conJunctlo~
with tbe' primary motion of tbe outermost sphere as the cause a
describing is the daily motion of the stellar sphere, in the first case,
generation and corruption.
 174
AVERROES AND 1HEMErAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION Celestial Links in the Causal Chain 175

mixing and restructuring the elements in accordance with their own

w respective forms or structures, It is the succession of approaches
and retreats which produce the observed variations of heat and
cold, dryness and moisture, that make this intermixing possible, In
essence, these celestial motions unsettle the system, They bring ele-
mentary powers into proximity with one another so as to facilitate
the clashing and bonding, repelling and cohering which establishes
the congruity relation and with it the rise of new structures and
new particulars,ll
The continuous movement of the celestial bodies, therefore,
s keeps the process of intermixture itself continuous, while changes
10 ) Ib)
in their positions bring about the specific recombinations of pow-
figure 2 ers and dispositions necessary for both the generation and preser-
vation of sublunar existents, This process even includes the gener-
The cause, therefore of the continu'ty f ' ation of elements themselves, since Averroes claims that "[a]s to
corruption is primary m~tio Th I 0 pnmary generation and
corruption is the fact that:;;e ~ cause,; however, of g~neration and the differences which arise primarily in the sub lunar world in the
along that [inclined] circle [i e. ~ ars/~ the planets are in motion elements, as for instance the difference between fire and earth, and
dispositions with reference t~ 'exi~t~C I~C] whereby they have diverse in short the opposites, they are based on the differentiation of mat-
they approach and sometimes ng mgs, Inasmuch as sometimes ter and on their varying distances from their movers, which are the
action is diverse It is necessa they retreat on account of which their
rupts by becomi~g more distal~i\~~e~ore, that if it[this cause] cor- heavenly bodies,"12 Matter, therefore, is first differentiated by the
~ng, for contraries are the cause~ otc~nt~~~~e~~~eratlOn by approach- powers and dispositions it has, but what determines which of these
In Its broad outline, as the Commentator was' , it has at any given time is the variation in celestial movements,
explanation accords nice I w' quick to pomt out, the If it is granted that the physical character of celestial causation
bodies on terrestrial crealt~es,lth the observed effects of celestial accords well with the existence and behavior of inanimate bodies,
What is perhaps most tr'k' b the question remains whether the peculiarities of celestial motion
it is entirely physical. Cons~st~~~~~th°~:st~:e:~~~~to~oc~:~~ ~;t can likewise account for the emergence of living creatures, Initially
at least, this seems implausible, For it is not at all clear how even
~:CYth:s :~t:~fs~~eiOnnt OOff forceful!y active things on other enti~ieI~ complex combinations of the elementary powers to heat, cool,
SUCcessIve congruity I ' moisten, and dry could yield the fundamentally different powers
applies essentially th re at IOns, Averroes
effect on the subluna; ~~~model to celestial phenomena and their which characterize living things, particularly in terms of sentience
The general pattern is obvious wh ' , and intelligence, This becomes especially problematic when Averroes
concerned Whl'le the f I ere mamma te bodies are consistently contrasts natural acts, which are invariant in character,
, our e ements out of h'ch bl
are made would tend to se k th ' W I su unar substances with voluntary acts which admit of contrary effects, How could
to themselves the t e e , " own natural places if left entirely complexes of "natural" powers produce any being capable of con-
that they are 'neve~oi~s f:nctt mleOfttlOt n th°f the clelestial spheres assures trary acts? In spite of such considerations, however, Averroes makes
, 0 emse ves Thus ' t d f the sweeping claim that celestial motion is "the principle of all
statIc sub lunar world characterI'zed by succeSSIve ' , 'homogms ea 0 a
sph ere~ of pure elementary bodies-with earth at eneous movements" and that "through its intermediation, not only move-
above It, then air, and finally fire-we observe th,e center, water ments, but life is distributed to all beings,"13 (emphasis added)
in which powerful particulars, living and non_I~~n~I:~:t~~n~~:~;;
How is this to be understood? Averroes says little in the Tahafut
to elaborate on his claim, But he does offer a relatively detailed
 176
AVERROES AND TIlE MIITAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
~xplanat~on. i? the Long Commentary on Metaphysics X11:3, 1070a27-8
as~d, sl?nIfIcantly enough, on the theory of powers develo ed
earher.. HIs concern here is to show that e ff"IClen t causes properlyp
conceIVed, do not produce or transfer forms' out of their' own I:>-
sU
stance. onto other particulars, but rather draw these forms fro
~otentJal state in the patient to full actuality. He states tho h m a
In a most tell" "Th IS, owever,
. I?g way. e meaning of 'relations and forms existin
In the generatl~e causes of living creatures' is that they draw forJ;
the [othe:] r;,~~tl~n.s and .forms which exist in matter from potentiality
to actu~hty. LIVIng thIngs, clearly, are not to be taken as simples
even With res~ect t~ ~eir own specific forms. They are composit~
structures, haVIng WIthIn themselves both internal relations and for-
~al substructures. What then are these relations and forms rela-
tIOns and forms of? '
Usi?g the. example of seeds, Averroes explains unequivocally
that he IS talkIng about powers.
And so, the powe~s which exist in seeds and which produce animate
thlng~ ~e not ammate m actuality, but only in potentiality, just as it
IS ~J ~t a .house which eXIsts in the soul of the builder is a house
whIch eXIsts In potentiality, not actuality. For that reason Aristotle
~ke~ed these powers [belonging to animate things] to artificially pro-
uctlve powers, and he says in The Book on Animals [De Generatione
AmmallU"! 11:3, 737a!O] that those powers are divine, since they have
the capacIty to gIve hfe, and they are also similar to the powers which
are called "mtelligent" inasmuch as they are conducive to an end 15
What the forms of living creatures organize and what their i~ternal
relatl~ns rela.te are thus the powers and dispositions characteristic
of their species. And since, as we have seen, the forms of thin s
depend on both the particular selection of powers they organize !s
well as the various relations which obtain between them, it seems
reas~nable to conclude that the powers of living things are not
:estncted to combinations of the elementary powers only. That would
Ignore the selection factor.
~f this is correct, there would be no need to account for the
manIfold capacities of living creatures within a narrow material
framew~:k. Ra~er,. such characteristic abilities of animate beings
as nutntlOn, dlg:s:lOn, reproduction, and irritability, not to speak
:n
of the ore sophlstJ~ted powers of intelligent creatures, would stand
on thel: own as candidates for inclusion in the structure of a sublu-
nar eXistent. They would require ensembles of the elementary
powers, of course, as necessary conditions of their own operation,
,
Celestial Links in the Causal Chain 177
but that is all. Their presence or absence in the nature of an entity
would determine whether the entity as a whole were animate or
inanimate. Concomitantly, the particular manner in which they were
related would determine the species of the creature and whether it
was actually or only potentially a living member of that species.
Just as the building materials must have a certain structure and
arrangement before they constitute an actual house and offer shelter,
the powers and dispositions of characteristic living creatures must
be disposed in specific ways before they can "give life" to the crea-
ture which has them and enable them to perform their specific acts.
Still, it is hardly obvious how the motions of the celestial spheres
affect the combinations of powers and dispositions that create life.
Aware of this gap, Averroes tries to explain the connection between
them.
The seeds to which he has alluded above only produce life
through the heat (al-lJararah, calor) present in them. This heat is
not identical with the pure element of fire, nor is it a direct derivative,
since these produce only warming, drying, and hardening in their
effects, as opposed to the shape and structure needed for living
things. In fact, the heat of elementary fire does not generate life at
all. It even corrupts living things. Consequently, Averroes likens this
heat found in seeds to artificially produced or synthetic heat (al-
lJararah al-~nllfyah, calor artificialis) which can be measured out
for specific operations.
...This heat has a form through which a measure is necessarily
maintained in it. This fonn is not animate in actuality, but in potenti-
ality and is what Aristotle likens to art and intelligence. He therefore
calls this heat "vital heat," but he does not say that it is "living heat."
This heat, having the form [in question], exists in the seeds which are
generated [both] from that which possesses seeds [being already alive]
and from the sun, whence Aristotle says that man is generated from
man and from the sun. This heat, moreover, is generated in the earth
and water from the heat of the sun which is combined with the heat
of the other stars. Therefore, the sun and other stars are the principles
of the life of any living thing in nature."
Heat, therefore, plays the decisive role establishing the causal nexus
between the celestial movements and the emergence of life. Still, it
is clear that Averroes does not conceive of its transfer and efficacy
in any crude sense. He is quick to stress in this context that soul or
the life principle does not come into existence ready-made from
celestial movements along the ecliptic. It comes into being rather
 178
AVERROES AND 1l-lEMIITAPHi'SICS OF CAUSATION
in stages through the progressive configuration of certain powers
necessary for life. These are forged together by the heat of the
"efficient power,"I' in seeds or, as the case may be, in decayed
materIal, and by the temperature variations produced by the su
and stars. These configurations, in turn, are possible because of th~
eXistence of measures or determinations in the heat itself.
. Therefore, the heat units generated by the heat units of the stars
which generate each individual species of the animals ...[are suchj
that the measure existing in each unit of heat among them derives
only from the rates of the movements of the stars and their positions
With respect to one another in terms of approach and retreat. ls
~resumably these measures or determinations both curb the destruc.
tIve cap~city ordinarily associated with heat and render it specifi.
cally SUitable for the propagation of life. Their ultimate Source
however, is not the celestial motions themselves, since even thei;
measures and determinations still have to be accounted for. The
so~rce of both i~ the Divine intellective art (af-mihnah af.ilahiyah
af· aq/iyah, ars dIVma mtellectuafis) which, as we shall see. turns out
to be the wisdom or mind of God.
For this animate power is similar to art and is included within the
genus of the nature of the heaven. Moreover, that which generates it
IS of ~ecesslty somethmg separate or immaterial, since it would appear
that It acts on what is other than itself without using any corporeal
Illstrument. And It was already made clear in the De Anima that a
thing of this kind is called 'intellect.'~
The significance of Averroes' account of celestial causation in
explaining the continuity of both inanimate and animate change is
at once apparent when it is compared with that of Avicenna. The
fo~m~r is e~sentially phYSical and, though not exclusively so, mech.
ams~lc. Its Immediate explanatory principle is a celestial body in
motion. The latter is essentially spiritual and vitalistic and its
immediate explanatory principle is a separate Intelligence i~mersed
in thought.
Keenly aware of their divergence on this matter, Averroes him.
self cont:a.sts the two views, although he takes care to identify his
o,,:n POSitIOn merely as being one held by other philosophers.
AVlcenna, he suggests, knew of the physical account but rejected it
in favor of the view that the bestower of forms and SOUls was a
s~parate Intelli~ence alone. He did so because he thought it impos.
sl~le for an ammated body to serve this function, since all such
bemgs act through the intermediation of the body, and body qua
,
Celestial Links in the Causal Chain 179
body cannot produce any substantial forms, whether animate or
inanimate. At most, bodies can produce only the elementary pow·
ers in other bodies. Hence the need for a separate substance to be
the Giver of substantial forms. . .
Since Averroes, on the other hand, introduces the notion of Vital
heat, as distinct from the elementary heat of fir~, and ~reats it a.s ~
property of bodies, it becomes possible for ce:tam bodies to exhibit
this kind of heat in their structure and behavIOr. It seems clear that
he has animate bodies in mind, and, as such, they are perfectly able
to produce more than elementary warmth, cold, moisture, and dry·
ness in other bodies. Thus, he contends,
Some philosophers, however, maintain the contrary of this [afore·
mentioned view of Avicenna], namely, that what produces forms In
bodies are other bodies having forms similar to them either specifi-
cally or generically. Those similar specifically a~e the living bodies
that produce other living bodies, such as we see III the case of some
animals begetting others, while those similar generically are not gen·
erated from male and female. Rather it is the celestial bodies which,
in their view, give life to them, since they are alive. 20 (emphasis added)
The capacity of the heavenly bodies to communicate varying
measures of heat to potentially living things and to inanimate things
is thus traced to the animate character of the heavens themselves.
They too are living bodies and in that sense comparable to th.e
earth·bound creatures which produce the heat of seeds. If the simi·
larity between the heavens and sublunar animals is not immedi·
ately obvious, Averroes will readily grant that the similarity is not
one between like species. But he does believe that the resemblance
is sufficient to suggest at least a generic likeness. This is the intui·
tion which evidently underlies his comprehensive claim that "...every
movement, every progression or regression of the stars, has a? influ·
ence on sublunary existence, so that, if these movements differed,
the sublunary world would become disorganized.''21 The heavens
are in a state of dynamic equilibrium with all parts of the sub lunar
world. What the whole does affects the constituent parts. What the
parts do determines whether and in what way the whole exists.
Inasmuch as the spheres and their stars are bodies, they are able to
affect bodies. To the extent they are animate, they generate life, and
insofar as they move continuously, they assure the cyclical continuity
of sublunar change.
 180 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
Celestial Animation and the "Kinetic" Code
The theolY of celestial animation to which Averroes here appeals
has long been considered obsolete both as a principle of scientific
explanation and as an element in philosophical cosmologies. Ever
since the Cartesian revolution introduced purely mechanical mod-
els to account for natural phenomena, biological paradigms have
largely fallen out of favor. Indeed, once plants and animals could
be regarde~ as automata and the human body as a moving machine,
there was little chance for the heavens to escape mechanization. As
a result, the conception of the universe as a great animal or organ-
ism has come to appear quite foreign, if not utterly fantastic, until
velY recently.22 This makes it all the more necessalY to examine
:v hy Av,:rroes thought the analogy fitting, quite apart from tracing
Its role In the explanation of celestial causation. For while he may
have inherited the doctrine from the ancients, he certainly appreci-
ated its controversial character, and therefore he sought to furnish
his own justification for employing it.
Averroes' treatment of the issue is twofold. He offers a number
of dialectical and even rhetorical arguments on behalf of celestial
animation in the Third Discussion and appends a proof text from
the Qur'an to each one. It is only in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Discussions that he expresses in more rigorous terms his reasons
for holding that the heavens are alive. The clear impression left by
this organization is that the more extensive informal arguments
presented first are designed for novices and potential philosophers
as an introduction to the doctrine. While his arguments are not
meant to be demonstrative, they are nonetheless consistent with
his position. The subsequent analyses, on the other hand, are offered
in rebuttal to specific criticisms of al-Ghazali and, as such, repre-
sent Averroes' carefully considered views. They go as far as Averroes
is likely to go, outside of the commentaries, in explaining why he
thought the doctrine was worthy of belief.
All of Averroes' arguments are based upon essentially functional
rather than structural criteria. Consistent with his defense of causal
efficacy, it is the specific act which facilitates identification of the
specific nature-even in the case of the celestial spheres. The gen-
eral procedure then is to note some resemblance between thelbehav-
ior of intelligent sublunar animals and that of the spheres and to
argue that if the former are alive, the latter must be alive also.
Celestial Links in the Causal Chain 181
He finds teleological behavior in living creatures to b~ the mo~t
important consideration in favor of this view. For behaVIOr t.hat IS
both well-defined or measured, on the one hand, and purposive on
the other, is characteristically rational; and as Averroes h~~ argued
before, rationality presupposes life as a necessalY condl~IOn. The
investigatiOlj\of animals, of course, reveals just such behaVIOr. ~ore
specifically, all or most of their movements are order~? to a SIngle
end-the determinate activity expressed by the speCIfIc nature or
form. Now when both eidos and te/os coincide structurally we say
that the creature's characteristic activity is rational in principle.
When that coincidence is also a temporal fact, the action is "perfect-
ed" as well. For the form orders and articulates what the powers
and dispositions are to be, and the end expresses this in what the
creature actually does. But life is again the precondition.
One might object, to be sure, that even inanimat.e natures so~e­
times behave in well-defined and seemingly purposIve ways, whIch
is true enough. Nevertheless, Averroes sees an importa~t di.fferen~e,
which becomes a second consideration in support of hIS vIew. LIV-
ing creatures are constituted to i,nitiate t~is kind .of ac~ivit: on th~ir
own and to continue it without InterruptIOn untIl extInctIOn, whIle
the inanimate natures are not. But to the extent that even inani-
mate natures incessantly move, Aristotle and Averroes both speak
of them too as permeated by motion as though by "a sort of life.''23
Beginning therefore from the premise that what .we call "a.live"
and "knowing" moves (1) on its own account, (2).In determ~nate
movements, (3) toward determinate ends, and (4) WIth. dete~Inate
effects, Averroes argues that sense experience shows In detaIl that
the heavens satisfy all these criteria.
That from their movements there follow well-defined acts from
which this sublunary world, its animals, vegetables, and mmer.als
receive their subsistence and conservation, is evident from observatIOn,
for, were it not that the sun in its ecliptic approaches the sublunary
world and recedes from it, there would not be the four season~, and
without the four seasons there would be no plants and no ammals,
and the orderly origination of elements out of each other necessary
for the conservation of their existence would not take place. For
instance when the sun recedes towards the south the air in the north
become; cold and rains occur and the production of the watery ele-
ment increases, whereas in the south the production of the airy ele-
ment becomes greater; whereas in summer, when ,the sun ~pproaches
our zenith, the opposite takes place. Those actIOns which the sun
 182 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
exercises everlastingly through its varying distance from the differ-
ent existents which always occupy one and the same place are also
found in the moon and all the stars which have oblique spheres, and
they prod~ce the four seasons through their circular movements, and
th~ most Important of all these movements, in its necessity for the
existence and conservation of the creation, is the highest circular
movement whicb produces day and night."
From these initial observations, Averroes develops the analogy
more fully. Thus, if insignificant and even vile creatures on earth
can possess life and perception to direct their own behavior one
will be still more convinced that the heavens are alive in virt~e of
~eir superior size, abundance of stars, and observed capacity to
mfluence sublunar phenomena. Again, when rational sublunar crea-
tures influence the affairs of other creatures in an orderly way, but
have no need to do so on their own behalf, we observe that this is
done in response to commands. Since the celestial bodies exhibit
providential activity in generating and conserving sublunar existents,
one comes to recognize that the celestial bodies are likewise "order-
ed" to do so and are, therefore, alive and rational.
Continuity of action provides yet another point of similarity. If
good servants obey their masters without interruption in fulfilling
tasks that offer no immediate benefit for themselves, then surely
the eternity of all the celestial movements indicates that the spheres
are alive, obedient, and directed by a ruler. Indeed, he su!!gests that
the subordination of their activities to one another eve~ confirms
this. :or just as a chain of command exists in any army, with offi-
cers m charge of ever-larger bodies of troops until we arrive at the
commander-in-chief, a comparable chain exists in the heavens, with
the seven planets submitting to the direction of their individual
"commanders," and ultimately to that of the supreme Commander
of the stellar sphere and its universal daily movement.25 On all these
functional grounds then, the heavens as Averroes saw them were
alive and sentient.
From here, structural analogies were perhaps irresistible, no
matter how outlandish, for it is but a short step to interpret the
planetary motions as specialized movements of the animal's mem-
bers, and the diurnal movement of the outermost sphere as its gen-
eral movement in "space. "26 Averroes, in fact, goes so far as to sug-
gest that the axes of the various spheres constitute organs of loco-
motion with each having the peculiar ability to move in opposite
directions, like a left foot which can also do the work of the right27
Celestial Links in the Causal Chain 183
Thanks to this unique economy, the heavens, it seems, can never
trip over their own feet.
All of these analogies are taken from the Aristotelian COrpUS.28
While Averroes leaves no doubt that he regards them as apposite,
the fact that he ttfuds to speak in psychological rather than logical
terms in presenting them, suggests that he was well aware of their
logical inadequacy. A point-by-point critique hardly seems to be called
for. The more important objection, rather, is that it is equally if not
much more plausible to regard the heavens as inanimate and to
explain their movements as simple manifestations of natural behav-
ior. As such, they would do the same work but require neither
knowledge, will, nor choice. al-GhazalI in fact takes the philosophers
to task on just this score by arguing that nothing precludes the
heavens having a specially created attribute, comparable to the attri-
butes of the elements, by which their movement is carried on.
Similarly, it is entirely possible that they move without seeking some
particular goal or place as rational beings do, for movement itself
could serve as the telos.29
Averroes, for his part, seriously considered this basic objection,
but rejected it as incompatible with his position. Even if his underlying
metaphysics of movement would later prove disastrous for scien-
tific explanation, his responses to al-GhazalI at least clarify the real
logic of his position. Thus, he begins with the notion of natural place.
Inanimate natures do not move by themselves in space unless they
have been removed from their natural places. Since things which
move in a circle have no proper place toward which their move-
ments carry them, their movements can hardly be characterized as
occurring "by nature," that is, inanimate nature. The only convinc-
ing alternative, in his view, was that the heavens must be moved by
animate principles or souls.
And the true assumption of the philosophers is that through the
circular movement the thing moved is not in search of a place, but
only seeks the circular movement itself, and that things whicb behave
in this way have of necessity as their mover a soul and not nature.
Movement, that is to say, has existence only in the intellect [Le., in
this context, as a universal object of Imowledge in a separate Intelli-
gence], since outside the soul there exists only the thing moved and
in it there is only a particular movement without any lasting existence.
But what is moved toward movement insofar as it is movement [i.e.,
the sphere] must of necessity desire this movement, and what desires
movement must of necessity conceive of it30
 184 AVERROES AND 1lIEMITAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
In the same way, the continuous character of celestial motion
also counted against the mechanistic model. For the natures of inani-
mate particulars were taken to be intermittently at rest or in motion
depending on whether or not they were in their natural places
impeded in moving toward them. Static/kinetic variability was intrin-
sic to the very concept of nature, since natures were defined as
principles of both motion and rest. If natural movements, therefore,
by definition could never be continuous or eternal, neither could
continuous movements be strictly natural. The alternative explana-
tion for Averroes was to construe ceaseless activity as the essential
mark of the living, and that is precisely the explanation he chose.
What is more, on this analysis, the heavens turn out to be not only
alive but the primary instance of all animate bodies.
.. .The perfection of an animal, insofar as it is an animal, is
movement; in this sublunary world rest Occurs to the transitory ani-
mal only by accident, tbat is through tbe necessity of matter, for lassi-
tude and fatigue touch tbe animal only because it is in matter. The
whole life and perfection of tbose animals which are not affected by
tIredness and languor must of necessity lie in their movement; and
their assimilation to their Creator consists in this, that by their move-
ment tbey impart life to what exists in tbis sublunary world."
Thus created only for movement, that is, for exercising their spe-
cific act so as to be fully in act, the heavens are accorded life as an
essential attribute. Indeed, recalling the imagery of the master/slave
relation, Averroes observes that they have obedience in the very
nature of their being. In this sense, Averroes identifies' the souls of
the spheres with the natures of the spheres.32
Lastly, Averroes refers back to his original distinction between
voluntary and natural agents, but now as a basis for characterizing
celestial movements. Only voluntary agents, it will be recalled, can
produce contrary acts, whereas natural agents perform only a sin-
gle act. Since the celestial bodies move with two contrary move-
ments at the same time, the easterly motion of the planetary spheres
and the westerly motion each day of the sphere of fixed stars,
Averroes concludes that this movement cannot derive from an inani-
mate nature. "For that which moves by nature moves in one move-
ment alone.''33 The heavens therefore must be alive and moved by
the "voluntary" action of souls.
By treating the sphere-system as a sort of all-encompassing
animal, Averroes in effect identifies it as a powerful particular. Its
specific act is circular motion, and all its powers and dispositions
,
Celestial Links in the Causal Chain 185
are evidently arranged to make that motion continuous. The locus
of its efficacy, however, lies within its own constitution, rather than
without for as an all-encompassing body, no physical entity lies
0; outside' its confines on which it might act. The congruity relation
too is presefl.t, and it is successively re-established between the
heavens, as agent, and sub lunar particulars or clusters of them, as
patients. Each new configuration of the stars, the .planet~, the sun
and moon establishes concomitant causal connectIOns WIth terres-
trial things. Still, the similarity which Averroes believes to obtain
between efficient causes and their effects applies here only in the
most general way. It is necessarily generic rather than specific, since
the heavens belong to the essential and not the accidental order of
causes, and are remote ones at that.
Thus in the domain of inanimate bodies, the permanence of the
celestial bodies, both in substance and continuous motion, has its
generic correlate in the elements constantly changing into one
another through changes in meteorological conditions. In this way,
the rotary activity of the spheres both causes and is expressed in
the cyclical transformation of the four elements into one another.34
Living things in turn reproduce their own kind in generational
cycles. If the individuals of each species are neither continuous in
their existence nor in their activity, they nonetheless imitate the
ceaseless activity of the spheres by renewing the Iife-cycle in their
offspring.
Similarly, even political leaders attempt to order the individu-
als of their communities so as to maintain the body politic in exist-
ence and actively attain those ends for its citizens for which it is
uniquely suited. Their proper aim is to imitate the heaven's stable
capacity to "bestow" and nurture life. Their successes and failures
in achieving it, on the other hand, make up the cyclical pattern in
which even human history unfolds for Averroes. Celestial causation,
therefore must reflect itself in the sublunar realm in the continuous,
orderly a'ctivity of all kinds of powerful particulars so long as this is
possible for them, because continuous orderly activity is the spe-
cific act of the animate heavens themselves.35
Once the heavens are construed as a living, powerful particu-
lar and therefore self-moving in virtue of their animation, the attempt
to give a causal account of the continuity of motion would seem to
have reached its end. A self-moving creature, by definition, initiates
its own activity, and that is that. Further reference to efficient causes
 186 AVERROES AND lHE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
would be either superfluous or destructive to the assumotion that
the particular is self-moved. . .
Were the analysis to stop here, Averroes would very likely hav~'
dismissed it as a non-account by reason of incompleteness and worse
stil~, circ.ularity. For why should the celestial animal turn endlessly:
?n Its aJos? No other amma~ performs its specific act endlessly. Again,
If the sphere-system conslJtutes a powerful particular, it does not
differ in that respect from sub lunar particulars. But since the whole
analysis began by asking what explains the continuity of changes
among powerful particulars, reference to a celestial particular hardly
provides a very satisfactory answer. Only the scale of the oarticular
has changed; the question remains. . containing it. As such, it is a finite power and liable to cease its
Averroes is sensitive to this line of argument and, in effect,
employs it himself to carry the analysis to what he regards as its
necessary conclusion. If the analogy between the celestial animal
and its terrestrial counterparts were pressed, a reasonable conclu-
sion would be that it too possessed a soul or life principle as a part
of its own constitution. Specifically, this "part" would be the form
of the animal, and it would function as the internal, efficient cause
of the creature's specific acts. Moreover, because of its being situ-
ated "in" the body, it would likewise be moved incidentally by the
body's own motion and as a result of its own efficacy. All of these
characteristics would indicate that the soul or life principle in ques-
tion was a power within the body of heaven. But this, it turns out, is
precisely what the cause of celestial movement cannot be, if that
movement is truly endless. As Averroes puts it, "anything influenc-
ing continuous movement of this sort is neither a body n~r a power
in a body."36
What is the issue at stake? In essence, it is that neither a finite
nor an infinite power, once it is situated in a body, can produce the
continuous orderly motion of the heaven. Averroes alludes to the
problem figuratively when he suggests that if the celestial bodies
existed just by themselves, as eternal entities having neither cause
nor creator, they might refuse to serve their commanders or diso-
bey them, and these commanders might in turn refuse to obey the
First Commander. The key to the analogy lies in the meaning of
obedience. Averroes indicates somewhat later that obedience is tanta-
mount to movement. If there were no external causes for the vari-
ous celestial movements, but only internal ones, that is to say, pow-
ers within the body of heaven, celestial motion would eventually
187
Celestial Links in the Causal Chain
stop. Like disobedient servants the spheres would at some point
tire of their labors and cease to move even though they could con-
tinue to exist on their own. The explanation for this cessation of
activity is that all such powers are finite with respect to action.37
In the ct1se of material bodies, internal constitutive powers are
divisible with the division of the body. In that sense, they are finite
and thus generable and corruptible.3S In the case of the celestial
spheres, which consist not of matter, but of the incorruptible fifth
element, there is no prospect of corruptibility, but there remains
the problem of lassitude and stasis. For the power within the spheres
is still bounded by the determinate dimensions and fixed surfaces
activity, leaving the sphere at rest and the otherwise continuous
patterns of sub lunar change discontinued and in disarray.
But even if the sphere had an unlimited capacity to perform its
specific act, now, per contra, taking the power in the body of heaven
to be infinite, it would still be impossible to save the celestial
phenomena. For Averroes holds that the degree of power associated
with each sphere is proportional to its magnitude and that the speed
of its rotation is commensurate with its power. Thus, the heavens
would have to be infinitely large and turn at infinite speed to have
this power at alI.39
Quite apart from the fact that the astronomers of his day
believed the heavens were of limited dimensions and moved at less
than infinite velocity, the very notions of an actually infinite magni-
tude and of a motion which occurred "in no time" were ruled out as
impossible on Aristotle's assumptions. In no way then could Averroes
see the cause of continuous celestial motion as a power in a body.
The cause would have to be a different kind of particular altogeth-
er-a fully active power or ensemble of powers which could exist
independently of the celestial spheres. It would have to be located
neither in space nor time and yet operate, as it were, in association
with the spheres. To Averroes, only such powers could be infinite in
the required sense and thus end the regress to other causes. These
he identified with the separate Forms or Intelligences of the sphere
system.
The foundation for this identification was laid in Averroes' brief
"history of philosophy" in the Third Discussion,'o and completed in
his arguments for an all-knowing Creator and Cause of the universe
in the Tenth and Eleventh Discussions. Once the philosophers had
 188 AVERROESAND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
agreed that the celestial movements were causal principles for sub-
lunar particulars, Averroes suggests that they examined the spheres
more closely and observed that they did not come into being in the
same way that generable and corruptible entities- did. The latter
came into existence through the direct efficacy of other sublunar
c~uses-out of constituent materials having both active and pas-
SIve powers by means of external causes set in contact with them
in time and in space. In terms of both theIr natures and their activi-
ties they were merely possible, since apart from their causes, they
might never have existed.
They found that the heavens, on the other hand, did not appear
to be generated from new materials, nor cast in their present struc-
ture by the successive buffetings, jolts, and bondings of elements_
Observation had pronounced their structure and behavior unchanged
over millenia, and so as far as their substance was concerned, they
were deemed eternal and incorruptible. In this sense, Averroes calls
them necessary in themselves. But since their distinctive activity
was circular motion, which qua motion, had its contrary in rest,
even if qua circular it had neither beginning nor ending, they were
deemed possible with respect to movement. Cessation of movement,
therefore, was not to be ruled out unless it could be shown that a
necessary, that is, eternal, Existent or set of existents, devoid of
both possibility and passivity, served as the movers ot tj1e spheres.
Averroes believed Aristotle had shown just this in the Eighth Book
of the Physics and, in a remarkably concise passage, he summarized
the argument in response to both Avicenna's metaphysical proof
and al-Ghazalf's criticisms of it. In criticism of the former, he wishes
to show that no proof will work unless it is based on premises drawn
from the physical sciences, and in response to the latter. he wants
to show that a proof constructed in that fashion can succeed in
demonstrating that the world has a mover or agent.
Thus he argues that for the philosophers, meaning here Aris-
totle and his followers, every sensible existent is a composite of
matter and form and that it is through the form that an existent
comes to be an existent. For the form is what structures and organ-
izes the active powers that are proper to every individual existent
as well as the passive powers which are either proper to given indi-
viduals or common to all. Accordingly, the form is designated by
the name and definition of the particular, since its own structure is
the foundation for whatever specificity its act displays. In the same
Celestial Links in the Causal Chain 189
way, its existence is indicated by the appearance of th: act, since
the "content" structured by the form is the power-selectIOn belong-
ing to that existent.
Averroes further relates how the philosophers discovered that
things caffnot be passive in the same respect that they are active,
since activity is the opposite of passivity. As such, opposites cannot
admit or receive one another, though they can succeed one another
in a common substratum. This mutual exclusiveness in the basic
constituents of things evidently leads Averroes to speak of sensible
existents as being composed of two "substances" -one which is the
act or actuality and the other which is the potency. In effect the
configuration of active powers is here set against that of passive
powers to create a new dichotomy of actuality/potentiality, corre-
sponding to that of form and matter.
But note the qualification. Each one is now called a substance.
The clear implication is that in some sense, yet to be indicated,
each substance can stand on its own. It can have an independent
existence, even if in sensible existents neither one in fact exists
apart from the other.
Where sensible particulars are concerned, the substance in act
represents the perfection of the substance in potentiality, so that
the former is, in the final analysis, the end or culmination of the
latter's comi(lg. into existence. There is no longer any distinction
between them. For while the selection and arrangement of powers
would be the same in both the potential substance and its actual
counterpart, it is only in the actual substance that the selection
and arrangement has in fact come about. That is why it represents
the end or completion of the potential substance's coming to be.
But regardless of whether sub lunar particulars have been made actual
or not, Averroes suggests that in their bodily substance they are
only "possible of existence." They are, after all, composites of mat-
ter and form. Apart from their causes, they might never have existed,
and even with their causes they must surely cease to be.
When the philosophers further examined all the various forms
of existents, Averroes goes on, they found that whatever comes to
be an existent among these substances necessarily leads up by a
series of essential causes to a particular substance in act which is
devoid of matter. This substance is necessarily active rather than
passive, and is not subject to weakness, weariness, or corruption.
What is more, he adds tellingly that these attributes characterize

190 AVERROES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
the sub~tance in question only because it is the perfection of sub-
~tance In potency, and not because it is pure act. The substance
Intended, of course, is that of the celestial spheres which, as we
have seen, Averroes describes as continuously active (like the nature
of an animal), not subject to exhaustion (since they are neither
heavy nor light), but not a pure act (since their movement could
cease.) Any given sphere, then, is only "nec.essary of existence" in
its bodily substance; but in terms of local movement in place, it is
no better off than any other possible existents.
Hence, there is a need for another kind of substance, the kind
which he earlier designated as "actuality" and capable of being
separate. By invoking his conception of causes as powerful and
forcefully active particulars, Averroes then indicates why he thinks
such a cause must exist.
.. .since the substance i.n potency only goes forth into act through
a substance In act, the senes of substances which are at the same
time both active and passive must terminate in a substance which is
pure act: and the series must terminate in that substance. And proof
of the eXlstenc: of this sub~tance. in so far as it is a mover and agent,
through essential and particular premises, can be found in the eighth
book of Aristotle's Physics.' 1
The essence of Averroes' argument is an extrapolation from our
ordinary experience. We observe that it is forcefully active exist-
ents which produce new particulars and new states of affairs. They
do so be:ause they h~ve the requisite power and character to change
other thmgs susceptible to their action. But since for Averroes all
~uch. changes involve a certain passivity in the recipient, whether
m bemg acted upon or being simply inactive, no single active/passive
particular or combination of them, whether it is the celestial sphere
alone or the sphere and all it contains, can assure the continuity of
all ~orldly change. For this, only a completely active particular
suffices, and this is the immaterial mover or efficient cause of the
Physics.
Its immateriality turns out to be merely the other side of its
pure activity, since passive powers, as we have already seen, consti-
tute what we know of a thing's material nature, its capacity to be
acted upon, influenced, and shaped. Active powers, on the other
ha~d, ~re associated with the form.42 A particular that is purely
~ctlve m the sense required, therefore, will have no passive disposi-
tIOns whatever and thus no matter. Again, because it is form alone
it would be in Averroes' words "necessary of existence through it~
,
Celestial Links in the Causal Chain 191
own substance," for as he has insisted repeatedly in this and other
passages, form is the entity through which an existent exists. A pure
form therefore must be completely actualized, fully active and, of
course, existent.
If it is .rtked what this separate form is the form or structure of,
supposing that it is utterly devoid of matter, the answer would have
to be that it is the form or structure of its own active powers,
arranged in their various relationships and hierarchies and imitated
by sensible existents." While much more remains to be said on the
nature of this Mover and the mode of its efficacy, it seems fairly
clear at this point that Averroes did not conceive of separate form
or substance as a disembodied and inert universal awaiting a phi-
losopher to contemplate it. Rather the Mover to which Averroes
here refers is a powerful particular in the fullest sense and, indeed,
the prime analogate of all others.
In this connection, it is worth examining, however briefly, why
the assumption that there must be a First Cause to end the regress
has been the subject of such intense philosophic controversy. Usu-
ally it is argued that this assumption is inconsistent with the causal
principle with which it is most often associated-that every existent
must have a cause-and thus vitiates the entire argument. It should
be noted, first of all, that Averroes does not in fact defend the causal
principle in this form. If he did, there could have been no uncaused
cause, and it would have been astonishing if he did not see the
problem.
He did, however, hold the principle omne quod movelur ab alio
movelur, and the aliud in question did not necessarily have to be
moved or be in motion. Averroes is working with a much broader
conception of "cause" than his contemporary critics. For him a cause
could be unmoved as either a form, an end, or a constituent, if
some responsibility could be assigned to it in explaining the nature
of the effect under examination.
Thus, there need be no inconsistency in limiting the range of
the causal principle qua causal. It would however be inconsistent to
limit the range of the principle of sufficient reason (that is, that
everything has or is susceptible to explanation) which is more
recognizably a principle of explanation than it is of change. For we
can always ask what reason there is for the existence of a First
Cause, without having to insist that even a First Cause must have a
cause. The problem arises then, because, for Aristotle and Averroes,
 192 AVERROES AND TIlE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
explanation properly speaking was causal. The causal principle, even
in its Peripatetic version, tended to be confused with the principle
of sufficient reason. That is why the usual response to the question
of why a First Cause, was that, aside from the requirements of
theology, infinite regresses of causes do not explain anything. They
are in principle less lmowable than the things to be explained, and
hence have little to contribute. They ar~ also somewhat arbitrary
constructions, since causal chains are nowhere near as linear as
commonly supposed."
If we consider further the results of Averroes' argument, we can
see how his account of separate form or substance also explains
why it should have the nature of a soul or intellect. Forms which
produce movement can be classified on a scale whose termini are
actuality and activity on the one side and potentiality and passivity
on the other. As before, the characteristic correlate of activity is
form and that of passivity is body or matter. Judging by this stand-
ard the philosophers found that the form most devoid of matter in
comparison with all others of this class is the soul and especially
the intellect.45 That is because the forms of things we perceive are
apprehended by the soul only insofar as they are free from matter.
Their intelligible structure is admittedly present in the mind, but
their material components are not. Consequently,
...when they investigated the perceiving forms amongst the forms
of the soul and found that they were free from matter, they under-
stood that the cause of perception consists in freedom from matter,
and since they discovered that the intellect is without passivity, they
understood that the reason why one form is inorganic and another
perceptive consists in the fact that when it is the perfection of a
potency it is inorganic or not percipient, and when it is pure perfec-
tion with which no potency is mixed it is intellect. ... Through argu-
ments of this kind they came to realize that what has no passivity
whatever is intellect and not body, for what is passive is body which
exists in matter according to them.46
This unusual conception of immateriality as the distinguishing
factor of perception and intellection is rooted of COurse in Aristotle's
doctrine of the lmower's being, in a certain way, all the things he
lmoWS.47 Leaving aside the many obscurities which attend the doc-
trine, its basic thesis is that lmowledge consists in the lmower's
complete appropriation of the intelligible content of the lmown, which
is of COurse its form or structure. This appropriation, in fact, is car-
ried to the point of identity. The lmower is what he lmows. In con-
Celestial Links in the Causal Chain 193
trast to physical changes, the structure of the lmown object does
not depart from it to be replaced by another form. It remains with
the material constituents it organizes. But neither does it alter the
physical condition of the lmower. From beginning to end the appro-
priation is'tnderstood to be an immaterial taking-in. Hence there
turns out to be no difference between the content of the lmower's
thinking, that of his lmowledge, and that of its object, except for the
latter's being in matter as its form or substance. Thus, the immaterial-
ity of the form that is lmown, taken in its identity with the lmower's
soul or intellect, suggests to Averroes that the nature of an absolutely
immaterial substance or set of substances must likewise be soul
and especially intellect. As he describes it, the philosophers con-
cluded that these absolutely separate existents were pure intellects,
"for if what is separated from another is already intellect, how much
better suited to be intellect will something be that is absolutely
separate [from matter]."48
Still, on first glance it seems peculiar that intellect should be
characterized as entirely active when Aristotle and Averroes both
distinguish between active and passive intellect. [De Anima III:S,
430al0-2S] This distinction, however, applies to abstractive cogni-
tion only. It attempts to clarify the relation between taking the
intelligible content of something ab extra into oneself and being the
recipient of that content. For inasmuch as this perceptual or intelli-
gible content comes from without, one is in a certain sense passive
and receptive to it, even though the appropriation is active. But if
the activity of thinking involves no taking-in ab extra, there is like-
wise no passivity. All intelligible content must lie within the intel-
lect already.
But does this not also preclude the activity of appropriation? It
does indeed. But it nevertheless allows the kind of thinking on thought
which Aristotle speaks of in the Metaphysics. Instead of the activity
of appropriation or abstraction, there is reflection and bending back
upon what is already present, and this is no less an activity than
the appropriation.
Averroes' treatment of the celestial movers has two important
results. The first is to minimize if not obliterate the distinction
between soul and intellect. Like al-Farab! before him, but in sharp
contrast to Avicenna, he uses the terms nafs (anima) and 'aq/
(intellectus) interchangeably in their relation to the spheres, and he
 194 AVERROES AND TIlEMIITAPHYSICS OF CAusATION
consistently reiterates that they are separate from body and mate-
riality. Both are said to move the spheres as efficient causes, although
the manner in which this occurs remains to be explained. and both
are cited by Averroes to account for celestial animatiofr. Where he
does distinguish between them, intellect appears only as a higher
activity of the soul, but not as an altogether different entity.
The second result is that Averroes does not regard the souls of
the spheres as internal causes of motion acting in response to the
separate Intelligences as external causes. The souls, as movers of
the spheres, are wholly distinct from them, not in a spatial sense
but in the sense of being separate in existence.
One [Le., opponent, such as Avicenna] should not say that the
forms by which the celestial bodies are moved are different from
those toward which they are moved and that those which are said
not to be in matter at all and which lack position are those forms
toward which they [the celestial spheres] are moved, since in that
case, those [forms] by which they are moved are forms in matters
and are divisible by their division. For if this were so, then those
forms would exist in their subjects and be moved by the motion of
their subjects. And if something moved is moved essentially, it will be
divisible essentially ahd if it is moved accidentally, it will be divisible
accidentally.49
In short, if these souls were internal movers, they would be depend-
ent on the spheres for existence and unity and reduced to the level
of finite powers within bodies, unable to move the spheres continu-
ously. Thus, even though Averroes sometimes speaks of the souls
as being in the spheres, the clear thrust of his argument is that they
only exist in association with the spheres and not in them as parts.
There is, in sum, no organic unity of soul and body in the animated
sphere-system. At most there is a functional congruity between two
eternal entities operating in tandem. It is this relationship which
justifies speaking of the heavens as if they were an animal or as
being similar to an animal.
Although Averroes presents his argument for separate movers
in terms of a single cause corresponding to the outermost sphere of
heaven, the fact that he supposes a concentric system of such spheres
suggests the argument is really designed to establish a class of such
causes. Their exact number corresponds to the number of spheres
postulated to explain the various celestial movements. Because the
spheres are concentric, their mover-Intelligences can be differenti-
ated, figuratively speaking, according to place. For even though they
Celestial Links in the Causal Chain 195
are devoid of matter, their causal association wi! particular spheres
establishes a kind of spatial order among them. .
With the mover of the outermost sphere designated as pnme,
they are all either prior or posterior to one ~no~er ~o that the
of a lar""'r more encompassing sphere IS pnor m order to
mover 6'- , . I' • I" ent is
that of a smaller sphere beneath it. This spatia arrangem
f ther characterized as a hierarchy of value, whereby those mov-
ur loser to the First are prior in nobility to those further away.
ers
Here,c however, the assignment of pnonty . . has more t 0 d0 WI'th the
degree of power required to move each spher~ and the more com-
rehensive causation associated with successively larger spheres,
;han with the accident of "proximity" to the First Mover alo.ne: In
case more than one such mover is required to produce dlstmc-
any , Th e questIOn . .IS, what is
f e movements of the several spheres.sl
;eir causal relation to the spheres they are said to move and to each
other?
Clearly, the causal connection between m?ver and sphere does
not involve successive impacts, buffetings, or Jolts. For there can be
no physical contact between the immaterial Intelli?ences or Soul~
and the heavenly bodies, insofar as they belong to different ontolo~l­
cal categories in the Aristotelian cosmology. Consequently, the famil-
iar model of efficient causation, which Averroes. has e~ployed
throughout, has to be jettisoned. The powe~l partlc;ulars mvolved
simply display no physically describable congruity relations. .
In their place, Averroes suggests what might be called a c;ongrulty
of function. The function of the spheres is to move contmuously.
They have "obedience," as we have. seen, in .their. very nature. But
in that respect they have a potentialIty m their bem~, at least so far
as motion is concerned. The function of the Intelligences on the
other hand is to be fully actualized and active in the process of
thinking. In that respect, they possess no potentiality whatev~r. Pr:-
sumably then the functional congruity between them CO~SIStS m
the spheres' moving in response to the activity of the Intelligen~es.
But this does not take us very far, because the natural questl~n
here is surely why a potentially mobile sphere should operate m
tandem with an actually thinking Intelligence. Why should there be
a congruity of function at all? What emerges is a metaphysical gap
between the inherent potentiality of the spheres to move and the
full actuality of the Intelligences in thinking .. It is a gap that must be
bridged if the celestial motion is to be explamed.
 196 AVERROES AND 'IllE MIITAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
It is mediated in part by what Averroes regards as an innate
ten?ency of anything having a potentiality to seek its own actuali-
zatIOn. Insofar as the specific perfection and activity of an animal is
movement, Averroes speaks of the spheres desiring, loving, and seeking
aft~r ~he actu~lity of ~e Intelligences.52 But even this is not enough,
for It IS not saId th.at thIngS s:'~k actuality and activity in general. They
seek only that whIch IS specIfIcally their own to attain. This gives at
least a partial indication of what it is the Intelligences think in their
ceaseless contemplation.
Movement, that is to say, has existence [as an actual and com-
plete paradigm) only in the intellect, since outside the soul there is
only the thing moved, and in it there is only a particular movement
:mthout an~ lasting existence. But what is moved toward movement
m so far as It IS movement, must of necessity desire this movement. ...53
In Averroes' plainly metaphorical language, the spheres seek to realize
not only the unqualified actuality and activity of the Intelligences
but the specific paradigms contemplated by them-the patterns oi
eternal circular movement.
. But these patterns, it turns out, are even more specific than
thIS, for Averroes states in another context that "the objects of
thought of those [celestial] intellects are the forms of the existents
and of the order which exists in the world."S< [f he thought these
existents included the spheres themselves and the characteristics of their
own movement, which seems reasonable enough, we may further con-
clude that each Intelligence contains as it were the structural, kinetic,
and developmental codes for the behavior of both its corresponding
sphere and that of all the existents which it embraces. These patterns
,,:,ould determine, for example, the loci of the sphere's axis, the direc-
tIOn and velocity of its rotations, and of course the causal role it
plays in relation to the world of generation and corruption.
~ite his view that the celestial Intelligences contemplate the
paradIgms of the natural order, Averroes twice indicates. in rather
guarded fashion, that this order is neither as obvious nor as well-
understood as we might wish.
Thus, he admits that it is difficult even for those who investi-
gate the existents and seek knowledge of the First Principle to ascer-
tain this order. The most that human knowledge can attain is a
general picture base~ on only plausible assumptions. Again, he argues
that none of the phIlosophers doubts that there is a final cause in
second intention (that is, in second order concepts, or concepts
197
Celestial Links in the Causal Chain
about concepts rather than concepts about things themselves) which
is a necessary condition for the existence of sublunar particulars
and which explains why every movement, progression, or retrogres-
sion of the celestial bodies affects sublunar existents. But many of
these caus~s have not even been identified, much less understood
in detail.55
What Averroes is evidently alluding to is the problem posed by
scientific astronomy for the Aristotelian philosophy of nature. [n essence,
the difficulty was that Artistole's theory of circular movement and
homocentric spheres failed to "save" or account for all the phenom-
ena recorded by astronomers, whereas Ptolemy's essentially mathe-
matical and kinematic theories could.
To give but one illustration, a complex scheme of assigning
four or five spheres to individual planets succeeded in explaining
the retrograde movement of the planets. But the theory of homo-
centric spheres consistently failed to explain both the variations in
brightness of the planets in their courses and the fact that the curves
of the observed retrogradations were not identical, as would have
been the case on the sphere model. The Ptolemaic theory. which
employed eccentric circles and epicycles to explain these phenomena,
was far more successful in that respect. But for Averroes, this was
not properly speaking a scientific account, because its central mod-
els violated fundamental tenets of the Aristotelian account of nature.
Thus, in an extended analysis of the problems relating to celes-
tial movement, Averroes complains,
... Ptolemy forgot about what compelled the ancients to assume
gyrational movement [i.e., the complex, "figure eight" movement pro-
duced by the combined revolutions of at least two and usually more
spheres], namely, the impossibility of an epicyclic sphere and of an
eccentric sphere. And so, since people supposed that this astronomy
was simpler and easier for [calculating the] recurrence of the celes-
tial movements, i.e., those established in Ptolemy's book today. peo-
ple abandoned the astronomy of the ancients, so that knowledge of it
faded way. What Aristotle said about this subject is [therefore] not
understood today on account of these people.
Consequently, it is necessary that an investigation be made from
the very beginning regarding this ancient astronomy, for it is the gen-
uine astronomy which is true to natural principles. It is based, in my
opinion, upon the movement of one and the same sphere around one
and the same center and two or more different axes, depending on
whatever conforms to the phenomena. For it is possible that accelera-
tion and deceleration, progression and retrogression as well as the
 198 AVERROES AND 1HEME:fAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
other ~ovements for which Ptolemy was unable to devise a true astro-
nomical account, happen to the planetary bodies by way of move-
ments like these. Similarly, it is possible that [some pattern ofj approach
and retreat will manifest itself to someone, like what occurs with regard
to. the moon. I? my youth, I .had entertained the hope of completing
thiS investigatIOn. But In thiS myoId age, I have given up hope of
doin~ so, inasmuch as various obstacles prevented me from doing it
prevIOusly. But perhaps this discourse will be the stimulus which moti-
vates someone to investigate these things. For the science of astron-
omy in this our time is such that there is not a thing in it that [really]
eXists. Rather, the astronomy which exists in our time is an astron-
omy that conforms to computation, not to existence.56
In effect, the true astronomy which confonns to existence is what
the celestial Intelligences think, and the contents of this kinetic code
clearly remain to be discovered.
Continuing with this analysis, we can also see why each of the
various celestial Intelligences was regarded as specifically different
from every other. Each Intelligence contains, and indeed is cogni-
tionally identical with, the specific patterns which govern the activi-
ties of its sphere. Since the Intelligences differ in accordance with
the functional characteristics of their respective spheres, each one
is unique and also different in species from every other. But they
are not unique on an equal plane, as species are within a genus. For
inasmuch as each sphere is contained by another until the outer-
most sphere is reached, the complex of patterns in every Intelli-
gence is progressively comprehended by the Intelligence of the next
highest sphere. Their relation to one another therefore is necessar-
ily hierarchical and differentiated per prius et posterius, since each
Intelligence possesses both its own distinctive forms and those of
all things posterior to it. In this way, Averroes' conception of the
celestial Intelligences accords well with Aristotle's description of
the human intellect as a form of forms.57 Both are cognitively identi-
fied with the intelligible structures of the existents they know. Yet each
is a separate or at least separable form. The main difference between
them is that the human intellect is subject to the efficient causation of
the things it knows acting upon it ab extra. In that respect, it has a
passive dimension. The celestial Intelligences, however, can have
no such passivity, and accordingly the structures and interrelations
between existents cannot come to them ab extra by efficient causa-
tion. If they belong to the Intelligences at all, they must do so
essentially, simply because of what these separate entitles are. In
Celestial Links in the Causal Chain 199
sum, Averroes allows that there are innate ideas-not in the human
mind, but in the minds of the movers of the heavens.
Still the question remains as to what sense, if any, can be made
of the notion that the heavens move by desire. In the Tahaful,
Averrt'ks seems to leave us with no more than a metaphor to explain
the continuity of celestial movement, and it is a problematic one at
that. For if we understand desire in a celestial animal as an emo-
tive state or passion in the Intelligence and sphere taken together
and comparable to that found in terrestrial animals, then the souls
of the heavens can no longer be "separate." They would have to be
powers within bodies, just as the souls of terrestrial animals are
powers within bodies. But this will not do, since all such composite
creatures are corruptible as well.
Another way to understand this desire, however, would be as a
state characterizing the separate Souls/Intelligences by themselves,
thereby excluding the spheres. But if this is what Averroes meant, it
hardly makes much sense to speak as he does of the spheres desiring,
loving, seeking, or obeying some paradigm of movement itself. Only
the Intelligences would be capable of this, while the spheres, taken
by themselves, would remain quite inert, not to speak of lifeless.
This leaves the mind/body problem of the celestial substances in
an even more unsatisfactory state.
The outlines of a position, but to be sure no more than that,
appear in various parts of Averroes' "demonstrative books," his com-
mentaries on Aristotle and special treatises. Throughout he sug-
gests that he is using desire in a special sense. In the Long Commen-
tary on Metaphysics Lambda, for example, he distinguishes between
desire as found in terrestrial animals and that of the spheres.
...The case with regard to those principles which exist in [association
with] the celestial bodies is as follows: it is evident that the object of
desire in regard to them is the very same as the object of thought.
For the object of desire only differs from the object of thought in us,
owing to the distinction [in us] between the faculty by which we appre-
hend the object of desire and the faculty by which we apprehend the
object of thought. That is to say that the object of desire is apprehended
by sense experience and is identical with what is pleasant, whereas
the object of thought [is apprehended] by the intellect and is identi-
cal with one's seeing that its [the intellect's] activity is good [I.e., that
!mowing any intelligible object is good in itself]. Now inasmuch as the
celestial bodies do not perceive by means of sense experience, because
sense experience in animals is only for the purpose of self-preservation,
200
AVERROES AND lHEMETAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
the object of desire in their case is not distinct from the object thought .
. . .From here, all appearances show that these celestial bodies are ani-
mated and that, of the faculties of the soul, they possess only intellect
and the desiderative power. i.e.} which moves in place. This may be
shown from what I shall say now, namely, that what moves these
celestial bodies has been proved to be non-material and, indeed, a sep-
arate form in Book Vllf of the Physics. Moreover, in the De Anima it
has been proved that separate forms are intellects....58 (emphasis
added)
Desire in the spheres then has nothing to do with sensation. If the
spheres are incorruptible, they have no need of faculties to insure
their preservation. Still, this is only a negative point. At most it
confirms that the Souls or Intelligences of the spheres are not pow-
ers within the body of heaven, which is not new. Averroes. however,
goes somewhat further when he suggests that the animated spheres
do have two of the powers ordinarily associated with soul-intellect
and desire. Both the phrasing of this statement and the evidence
cited to justify it indicate that of the two powers, the Intelligences
are not really in the spheres but that desire is. The Intelligences
remain separate forms, as Averroes has argued before, but now he
adds that the second power is a desiderative power which moves in
place. Such movement is, of course, circular movement, and a power
can only "move in place" if it is in a moving body. Thus when a
sphere is said to possess desire, a power of the sphere is meant and
not a power of the Soul or Intelligence associated with it.
Still, if this is the case, it would appear that the movement of
the spheres could not be continuous. For within Averroes' concep-
tual scheme at least, such a power must be finite with respect to
action. The problem, however, turns out to be illusory, because it
assumes that the spheres have no other movers than their desidera-
tive powers alone. Only if this were true would celestial motion
eventually come to a halt. But this is not in fact the case. Observa-
tion confirms the continuous revolutions of the spheres for Averroes,
and his search for causes requires eternally active causes to move
them. Properly speaking, then, the movers of the spheres are the
separate Intelligences which can now be understood as operating
in congruity with the desiderative powers in each sphere. These
powers are never exhausted, because the spheres qua other are
intrinsically incorruptible and because they are continuously acti-
vated by the separate Intelligences. Together they move the heav-
Celestial Links in the Causal Chain 201
ens so as to attain as fully as possible the timeless pattern of move-
ment which the Intelligences contemplate.
Every animated thing is moved towar~ its loved objec~ through a
desire existing in it, and every body [of thIS sort] IS ~f h~lted power.
Thus it is evident that if the power of desire were In thIS body qua
no
alone [I.e., other power would be assumed], it would be character-
ized by finite movement. But it is plain that it acquires continuous
movement through a mover with respect to which movement is
completed. From this it was shown that the condition of this ~ove­
ment is a separate Intelligence and that the heavens move only inSO-
far as they understand themselves.59
Desire, in sum, is neither an emotion nor any other mental state as far
as the Souls of the spheres are concerned, however much Averroes'
choice of terms may suggest otherwise. While obscurities remain,
desire nonetheless emerges as the bodily power present in each
sphere that makes it seek after movement itself. This power is not a
forcefully active particular in its own right. It would be in fact mis-
leading to regard it as the efficient cause of the sphere's movement.
It is rather an auxiliary dynamic in the sphere's behavior which is
ultimately dependent upon the Intelligence for its efficacy.
Given this analysis, we can now see the main lines of Averroes'
explanation of both the continuity of sublunar change and the devel-
opmental sequences in which it unfolds. In his view, all instances of
sublunar change can be related to the movements of the celestial
spheres as efficient causes of generation and corruption. Their own
activity, in turn, remains continuous, because of a functional con-
gruity between their desiderative capacities to move and the actual-
ized patterns of structure and behavior contemplated by the sepa-
rate Intelligences. That congruity exists, insofar as movement is
concerned, because the spheres seek to attain both the actuality
and activity of the Intelligences as their end. Kinesis imitates noesis.
In the final analysis, then, it appears that continuous change is the
product of final causation.
 200 AVERROE>; AND 1HE METAPffi~ICS OF CAUSATION
the object of desire in their case is not distinct from the object thought
.. .From here, all appearances show that these celestial bodies are anI-
mated and that, of the faculties of the SOU4 they possess only intellect
and the desiderative power, ie., which moves in place. This may be
shown from what [ shall say now, namely, that what moves these
celestial bodies has been proved to be non-material and, indeed, a sep-
arate form in Book VIII of the Physics. Moreover, in the De Anima it
has been proved that separate forms are intellects....58 (emphasis
added)
Desire in the spheres then has nothing to do with sensation. If the
spheres are incorruptible, they have no need of faculties to insure
their preservation. Still, this is only a .nega tive point. At most it
confirms that the Souls or Intelligences of the spheres are not pow-
ers within the body of heaven, which is not new. Averroes. however,
goes somewhat further when he suggests that the animated spheres
do have two of the powers ordinarily associated with soul-intellect
and desire. Both the phrasing of this statement and the evidence
cited to justify it indicate that of the two powers, the Intelligences
are not really in the spheres but that desire is. The Intelligences
remain separate forms, as Averroes has argued before, but now he
adds that the second power is a desiderative power which moves in
place. Such movement is, of course, circular movement, and a power
can only "move in place" if it is in a moving body. Thus when a
sphere is said to possess desire, a power of the sphere is meant and
not a power of the Soul or Intelligence associated with it.
Still, if this is the case, it would appear that the movement of
the spheres could not be continuous. For within Averroes' concep-
tual scheme at least, such a power must be finite with respect to
action. The problem, however, turns out to be illusory, because it
assumes that the spheres have no other movers than their desidera-
tive powers alone. Only if this were true would celestial motion
eventually come to a halt. But this is not in fact the case. Observa-
tion confirms the continuous revolutions of the spheres for Averroes,
and his search for causes requires eternally active causes to move
them. Properly speaking, then, the movers of the spheres are the
separate Intelligences which can now be understood as operating
in congruity with the desiderative powers in each sphere. These
powers are never exhausted, because the spheres qua other are
intrinsically incorruptible and because they are continuously acti-
vated by the separate Intelligences. Together they move the heav-
201
Celestial Links in the Causal Chain
ens so as to attain as fully as possible the timeless pattern of move-
ment which the Intelligences contemplate.
Every animated thing is moved towar~ its lov~d obj.ec~ through a
desire existing in it, and every body [of thiS sort] IS ~f hm.'ted power.
Thus it is evident that if the power of deSIre were 10 thiS body qua
alone [[e., no other power would be assumed], it would be character-
ized by finite movement. But it is plain that it ac~uires continuo~s
movement through a mover with respect to which movement IS
completed. From this it was shown that the condition of this ~ove­
ment is a separate Intelligence and that the heavens move only 1OSO-
far as they understand themselves.59
Desire, in sum, is neither an emotion nor any other mental state as far
as the Souls of the spheres are concerned, however much Averroes'
choice of terms may suggest otherwise. While obscurities remain,
desire nonetheless emerges as the bodily power present in each
sphere that makes it seek after movement itself. This power is not a
forcefully active particular in its own right. It would be in fact mis-
leading to regard it as the efficient cause of the sphere's movement.
It is rather an auxiliary dynamic in the sphere's behavior which is
ultimately dependent upon the Intelligence for its efficacy.
Given this analysis, we can now see the main lines of Averroes'
explanation of both the continuity of sub lunar change and the devel-
opmental sequences in which it unfolds. In his view, all instances of
sub lunar change can be related to the movements of the celestial
spheres as efficient causes of generation and corruption. Their own
activity, in turn, remains continuous, because of a functional con-
gruity between their desiderative capacities to move and the actual-
ized patterns of structure. and behavior contemplated by the sepa-
rate Intelligences. That congruity exists, insofar as movement is
concerned, because the spheres seek to attain both the actuality
and activity of the Intelligences as their end. Kinesis imitates noesis.
In the final analysis, then, it appears that continuous change is the
product of final causation.
 Chapter Five

DIVine Causation and the Doctrine

of Eternal Creation

The World as an Eternal Creation

Averroes' defense of causal efficacy, as we have seen thus far, is

based on his general conception of change as a structured, continu-
ous process grounded in the specific natures of powerful particulars.
It is at the same time a conception which accords well with his
efforts to demonstrate the eternity of the universe as the arena in
which continuous change takes place.
A major problem of interpretation arises, however, when Averroes
goes on to claim that the universe is also created and that Divine
causation is productive of existence. For as the Tahafut debates
have repeatedly shown, the notion of an eternal world is presented
by al-GhazaU as the very antithesis of a Divinely created one. Thus,
to conceive of the world as an eternal creation is at least peculiar
and on the face of it quite inconsistent. Despite this, Averroes artic-
ulates a doctrine of eternal creation several times and gives every
indication that he regarded it as not only consistent, but as the
most appropriate way to characterize the universe.
The question then is how the doctrine is to be understood. If it
represents Averroes' considered view, what can be said for its internal
coherence? Does it hold together or is it a mere verbal construction, a
deceptive tissue of names? If there is a consistent theory to be found

203
 204 AVERROFS AND THE METAPHYSICS OF CAusATION
in his various presentations, why does Averroes think it more ade-
quate than those of his predecessors in philosophy and theology?
Does he, in sum, have an argument to offer in support of it?
With these questions in mind, Our aim will be to present and
analyze the doctrine of eternal creation as a serious attempt to
work out the implications of his defense of causal efficacy. We shall
then trace, in turn, its relation to Averroes' discussion of God's knowl-
edge and volition, God's causal knowing, and briefly to the theory
of emanation as an explanatory model of Divine activity.
Most interpreters of Averroes on "eternal creation" have treated
his doctrine as an attempt to reconcile the claims of the philoso-
phers with those of al-Ghazalr. If in fact he sought a genuine synthe-
sis between their positions, the scholarly consensus is that it eludes
him completely. Some, like Michel Allard, argue that Averroes dis-
plays "a paradoxical attitude, which affirms creation fiom the one
side and seems to deny it from another."1 In his view, the entire
project collapses in patent inconSistency.
Others who are equally sensitive to this problem avoid the incon-
sistency by collapsing Averroes' doctrine into one of the two antitheti-
cal positions it supposedly seeks to reconcile. Simon Van den Bergh
thus leans toward the occasionalist interpretation. "...If the relation
between the eternal God and the eternal movement of the world could
be regarded as a causal relation, no prior movement could be consid-
ered the cause of a posterior movement, and sequences such as the
eternal sequence of fathers and sons would not form a causal series.
God would not be a first cause but the Only Cause of everything.''2
Majid Fakhry on the other hand understands Averroes to espouse essen-
tially the same view as al-FarabI and Avicenna: God is the "Pure Act
from which all Being and Activity emanate." As their source is eternal,
the universe must accordingly be eternal also-not as something un-
caused or eternal per se, but as the Deity's "continuous production.''3
In view of this conflicting range of interpretations the auestion of
what Averroes meant by eternal creation and what so~rces", if any, he
sought to reconcile by recourse to the doctrine remains open. If we are
to make any headway in understanding and evaluating it, a close exami-
nation of the texts in which it is formulated is surely called for. Here, as
elsewhere, it seems best to let Averroes state the case for himself.
As we noted earlier, the doctrine appears in the Third Discussion
of the Tahi'ifut, which examines the claim that God is the Agent and
Maker of the world and the world is His act. Averroes presents it in
The Doctrine of Eternol Creation 205
response to al-Ghazalr's restriction of the meaning of "act" to
temporally originated things which, as he de~in.ed the.m' ~re ~rought
from non-existence into existence at a defImte pomt m time. By
that criteri~, the world could not be both eternal and God's act,
since what exists eternally cannot be originated by an agent at some
point in time. Averroes replies to this argument by identifying ~nd
rejecting a hidden assumption on which it rests and by sugges~mg
that the world should be understood, rather, as an eternal creatIOn.
I say: If the world were by itself eternal and existent (not in"? far as
it is moved, for each movement is composed of parts which are
originated), then, indeed, the world. ,,:ould not have an agent at .al.1.
But if it is eternal in the sense that It IS an eternal [process of] ongl-
nation and that its origination has neither beginning ~or end, then
certainly that which conveys the meaning of eternal.orIgmatlOn has
a greater right to be called "creation" than that w~lch c?nveys ~e
meaning of limited creation. In this way th~ world I~ God s creatIOn
and the name "origination" is even more SUitable for It than the word
"eternity." The philosophers only call the world eternal t? sa/~guard
themselves against [being identified with those who believe m] the
kind of creation which is from something, in time, and after a state of
non-existence.4
For Averroes, al-Ghazalr's criticism of the philosophers misses
the mark. Not only does he confuse two distinct senses of "eternal,"
he also ascribes this confused notion to his opponents. He supposes
that they take the term "eternal" as applied ~o the world ~o. desig-
nate not only that it is (I) unlimited in duratIOn, but that .It I~ also
(2) ontologically self-sufficient. In fact, this misreprese.nts ~elr view. A
world that satisfied condition (I) would be everlastmg With respect
to both past and future, but what makes it so is left wholly unidenti-
fied. If the world were eternal in this sense only, one could argue
that somehow an external agent eternally makes it so, that is, causes
it to exist at every point in time. On this assumption, that which
makes the world eternal could be identified with that which causes
it to be.
A world that satisfied condition (2), on the other hand. would
not only be everlasting with respect to past and future, but wo~ld
also be entirely independent of any external cause or agent making
it so. Its eternal existence would be rooted simply in what it wa~.
While it could be said to exist at every moment, that is, eternally, It
could not properly be described as "made to exist." In view Of. this
difference, Averroes' point is that the philosophers are committed
only to the first and not to the second assumption.
 206 AVERROES AND lHE MITAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
Still, what interests him primarily is not the various senses in
which "eternity" and "eternal" might be understood, but rather the
real characteristics of the universe which allow it to be described
as eternal. This is why his operative contrast is between a world
w~ich is etern~lly existent in itself and a world which is eternally
eXIstent by bemg moved. The question therefore of what Averroes
means by asserting that the world is an eternal creation turns largely
on what he regards as the proper description or characterization of
"the world." And it is this notion which calls for explication first.
The world might be taken simply as everything that there is.
Under this description, it would be both eternal and self-sufficient
for with no extra-cosmic causes to be had-all being included in th~
world ex hypothesi-it could not be brought into being by anything,
nor for that matter destroyed by anything. If such a world existed
it would oWe nothing to anyone or anything. To call it ~n eternal
creation therefore would be a misnomer.
An alternative might be that the world does not comprise every-
thing that there is, but that it is simply an individual substance
perhaps even .one among others. But under this description too:
whether there IS one world or many, it turns out that the world can
'.
still be both eternal and self-sufficient. For it is the peculiar mark of
any substance that it is not present in a subject, by which Aristotle
and his followers meant that it is capable of existing apart and
entirely on its own.s In view of Averroes' emphatic denial that an'
eternal universe is eo ipso ontologically self-sufficient, we may take
him as rejecting both of these world-descriptions. The world, as he
conceives it, is neither identical with everything that there is nor is
it strictly speaking a substance. What is it then?
The only clue Averroes presents in his initial formulation of the
eternal-creation theory is that the world is something moved and
that every movement is composed of temporally originated parts.
What he means by this obscure suggestion emerges in two other
passages in which he attempts to summarize the philosophers' con-
ception of the world.
According to one of these passages, they held that there are exist-
ents whose specific substantial differences Cfu~lihO. al-jawhanyah,
quorum differentiae substantiales) consist in movement.6 By this he
means that the distinctive potentialities which characterize them at-
tain their completed actuality not in the form of a finished product but
in the form of a process or succession of movements. Typical exam~les
The Doclrine of Eternal Creation 207
would be wind, thunder, and lightning. For each of them to be the kind
of thing it is, it must be capable of doing and undergoing what it is
constituted to do and undergo. But for anyone of them to exist actually,
"to be in act," it I~ust also do its job. If wind is to exist, air must be in
motion. If the air is motionless, it remains air, of course, but there is no
wind. Similarly for thunder to exist, hot and cold layers of air must
be in motion and in fact collide. Were these layers to be static, the
air would remain and even have different temperature levels, but
there would be no sound and no thunder. Averroes is sufficiently struck
by the continuous patterns of change in sensible particulars to make
the larger claim that the heavenly spheres as well as all sublunar
bodies also belong to this class of existents.
To take the case of the spheres first, Averroes is suggesting
that if the fifth element which constitutes each of the spheres is to
have its distinctive nature, it must be capable of moving in a circle.
But for a celestial body actually to exist, it must really move in just
that fashion. Actual being is once again a matter of doing. While
Averroes readily allows that the spheres might come to rest under
certain circumstances, as we have already seen, the consequence of
their doing so is corruption as spheres per se. To be sure, they would
i
not simply pop out of existence, but in place of an ever-moving
celestial animal, only an inert shell would remain. Averroes makes
this point quite clearly in the De Substantia Orbis.
If movement were to come to a standstill, the Prime Mover woold
be unable to cause it [Le., the sphere] to acquire continuous move-
ment beyond [the point of its] corruption, inasmuch as its movement
would be corruptible [in principle]. Now if its movement were to have
been corrupted, it would itself have been corrupted through rest and
[likewise] all entities whose existence consists in movement would have
been corrupted. Praised then be the God who exercises providence
over this world by the creation of this mobile body which is charac-
terized by finite motion in accordance with one part and infinite motion
in accordance with the other.' (emphasis added)
The heavens, therefore, exist only on account of their circular
movement, which may be characterized in two ways. Their motion
is finite insofar as it has identifiable parts, whereas it is infinite
insofar as it is continuous.s
What then can be said of the sensible particulars of the sublunar
world? Why should Averroes suppose that they too have motion as
their specific difference? The supposition is plausible enough perhaps
for certain meterological and biological phenomena, but it seemsdiffi-
208 AVERROFS AND TIlE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
cult to take Averroes very seriously when he applies it to such charac-
teristic particulars as the four elements, mineral compounds, artifacts,
and even plants. Merely to point out, by way of justification, that all
these particulars may move or be moved under certain circumstances
seems beside the point. For how is this essential to what they are?
Averroes, however, turns out to be entirely serious about this claim,
regardless of its initial oddness. Forwhen it is recalled that the identity
of any concrete particular eonsists in its specific nature, it is not hard
to see where his train of thought is leading. A specific nature, as an
intrinsic organizing principle in things, determines the characteristic
patterns of movement and rest, that is, behavior, which they can
manifest. If a particular body, therefore, were to lack this mechanism,
or for that matter any aspect of it, such as the motion<iifferentiating
factor alone (assuming that it could somehow be sePllrated out), it
would likewise lack its identity as a particular. It would cease to be,
both actually and potentially, the kind of thing it was to be. The
reason then why sublunar bodies no less than celestial bodies are
"differentiated" by motion is that they all have specific natures which
presuppose movement as a differentiating factor.
In the second passage dealing with the philosophers' concep-
tion of the world, Averroes focuses upon its character as a complex
whole. Composite existence, he maintains, is of two kinds. The first
is such that both the parts and the whole may be construed as
independent existents in their own right or, as he puts it, "composition
is something additional to the existence of the [things] composed.''9
What he has in mind is plainly an aggregate or collection of indi-
viduals. The second kind of composition, however, is specifically
compared to that of matter and form. Here the parts exist as real
parts only because there is a whole which comprises them. The
parts, in other words, are naturally posterior to their composition
and "effects" of it. Having made this distinction, he then drives home
the point of making it. The parts of the world are of the latter kind.
Their existence consists only in and through the composition itself,
and whoever or whatever brings such a composition about is the
efficient cause of these parts.
The question is, what parts of the world does he have in mind?
Other than to point out the similarity of their relation to the matter/
form relation, Averroes never identifies them in the Tahafut. But in
his Long Commentary on Metaphysics XII, in a passage which deals
at length with the problem of creation, he is more forthcoming.
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 209
The third opinion [regarding agents and creation] is that of
Aristotle. It is that an agent only produces a composite of matter and
form, and this only comes about by his moving matter and transforming
it, untilj$ [matter] proceeds from what was in it potentially to the
same form in act. . _But the agent in Aristotle's view does not com-
pose two things really, but draws forth what was in a potential state
to actuality. Thus, as it were, he conjoins potency and actuality, i.e.,
"matter" and "form."lo
Here the relevant "parts" of the world are those individuals or states
of affairs which can be characterized as potential and actual. Their
composition consists in the process of transforming the former into
the latter through movement. But neither "part" can be said to exist,
properly speaking, unless that transformation has occurred. Potential
individuals and states of affairs do not actually exist, while their
actual counterparts only exist after the "composition," that is,
transformation, has taken place.
When applied to the celestial spheres by themselves, this com-
position of parts simply refers to the transition from potential to
actual movements, and, as we have seen, it is precisely this continu-
ous movement which enables the spheres to be actually what they
are constituted to be. Among sublunar particulars on the other hand,
this composition holds between form and matter in the strict sense.
In the framework of generation and corruption, it produces new
individual substances, namely, powerful particUlars, while in the non-
substantial change frameworks, it leaves us with new states of affairs.
Through these various compositions, then, the parts of the universe
and the whole which they comprise have their existence.
Ultimately, the successive stages of these compositions are
identical with the continuous relationships of functional congruity
between the activity of the spheres and the particulars of the sublu-
nar world. There is no need to retrace those connections here. The
essential point is that once the mobile sphere system is understood
in terms of its inter-relations with sublunar particulars, the result-
ant complex or system constitutes what Averroes calls the world.
The accent, clearly, is on the dynamism of this complex. This is
why, when Averroes sums up his account of the world in the form of
a "definition," he states that the substance of the world is or con-
sists in being-in-motion. 1I
Such a world is not simply an aggregate of particular things,
since that leaves the dynamic features of mobility and interaction
unexplained. But neither is it to be identified with everything that
 210 AVERROESAND 1lIEME:I'APHYSICS OF CAusATION
is the case or with the totality of states of affairs, since Averroes
consistently restricts himself to corporeal entities and their inter-
relations. The most adequate interpretation would be that the WOrld,
for Averroes, is everything that is mobile.
If this is what the world is, why then does he suppose that it
must be an eternal creation? Averroes devotes tully half of the Tahafut
to various aspects of this questipn. Given the extent of his treatment,
even a general summary of his views must lie beyond the scope of
our own discussion.l' We can, however, briefly identify several of
the considerations Averroes regarded as most convincing and note
his acknowledgment that these arguments, at least as they appear
in the Tahafut, are dialectical rather than demonstrative. although
he thinks them not less preferable on that account to those of the
theologians. 13
The first is that the world is an essentially mobile existent. Taken
as a whole, it has no temporal origin whatever. For if it were assumed
per contra to come into existence, it would have to have existed
before its existence, because coming into existence or temporal origi-
nation on this view is a movement, and movement by necessity
occurs only in that which is moved and therefore already exists.
Here we can see Averroes reworking Aristotle's argument for
the eternity of motion to cohere with his own conception of the
world as essentially qualified by movement and change. His point
is not merely that a prior movement would be necessary to explain
both the hypothetical absence of movement (as the cause of rest)
and the process of setting things in motion (as the cause of new
movement), although he accepts both of these conditions. It is rather
that the very notion of coming into existence presupposes some-
thing which is moved. And, for Averroes, it should be clear that this
something is a world essentially in motion. The only kind of origina-
tion he is prepared to countenance, in sum, is that which signifies
successive states either in or of a moving, dynamically interacting
world-system.
The second consideration is that whatever comes into exist-
ence has the possibility of doing so before it actually comes to be.
But any such possibility is a necessary concomitant of the moving
existent itself, in this case the world, so that if the world were
assumed to come into existence, it would nonetheless exist prior to
its existence, if only to play host to the possibility of its existing.
Again, Averroes works with the same conception of the world
The [)octrine ofEternal Creation 211
as an essentially moving entity. But here his argument for its eter-
nity is not even dialectical, as he supposes. It is sophistical. It rests
upon a confusion of possibility and potentiality and the mistaken
assum]1!ion that possibilities cannot exist unattached. Since they
are supposed to inhere in a substratum, as the potentialities asso-
ciated with matter do, the existence of the universe is presupposed
at every moment. While the argument is invalid, it is stilI worth
noting that when Averroes must choose a substratum for this possi-
bility of coming to be, he does not select matter as such, but a
mobile universe. Coming to be, in his view, requires far more than
some inert stuff and a mover. It requires rather the interaction of
powerful particulars, with a full range of dynamic characteristics in
virtue of which they are what they are. It is only in that relation
that Averroes sees new existence emerging.
The last major consideration weighing in favor of an eternal
creation is essentially theological: God must perform the best act.
The best act, as our analysis has previously shown, is a continuous
or eternal one. It is an energeia rather than a kinesis. This means
that its existence at any moment entails that it has existed, and,
what is more, its existence is such that it cannot carry within itself
any predetermined limit. Its continuation requires only the contin-
ued existence and activity of its agent. Thus, to be the act or crea-
tion of a perfect Deity, the world must be eternal, for only an imper-
fect or deficient Deity would produce a finite act, that is, a non-eternal
world.!'
Quite apart from the unanswered theological question of why a
perfect act is determined solely by the criteria of God's continuous
existence, Averroes' argument raises one interesting problem. If the
world consists of being continually in motion, it would follow that
its movement does have temporal limits and does not go continuously
on through time. This, after all, is what distinguishes kinesis from
energeia. Yet Averroes obviously wants to argue that the world has
the temporal attributes of energeia, that it moves continuously. How
then can one and the same universe be qualified by the attributes
of both?
Part of the answer lies no doubt in .his distinction between the
parts of the world's movement and the totality of its movement.
The former would have the characteristics of kinesis, the latter of
energeia. Yet there is something more important at stake here than
this neat distinction can resolve. It is what Averroes means by saying
 212 AVERR0&5 AND 1HEMETAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
the su~tance of the universe is something continually in motion, for
~ genuIne account of a thing's substance does not become entangled
In matters of aspect like part and whole.
The resolution lies in Aristotle's original definition of motion in
Physics 1I/:l.15 Both energeia and kinesis, as they give rise to our
problem, ~al\ under this definition. In its broadest sense, motion is
the actuality (entelecheia) of the movable insofar as it is movable. It
is an actuality, not an actualization. The latter is a process, to be
sure, but one which eventually comes to an end. It has a predeter-
mined limit-the point at which the actualization is comolete. It is
the kinesis which contrasts with energeia. But motion as a~tuality is
the end or goal of a certain limited potentiality to move or come to
be, and in this sense, it is an energeia. For when that which has the
capacity to move or come to be attains this actuality, it does so
simply by moving, not by becoming something else as a result of
moving. In this way, it contains its fulfillment within itself.
What the definition indicates, therefore, is that there are some
things whose potentialities attain their completed actuality not in
the fo~m of a product, but in the form of an ongoing process, an
unfoldIng sequence of occurrences. Motion, properly speaking, is
on~ of these things, and whatever has it as a differentiating factor
of Its own substance, has actual existence only insofar as it moves.
The energeia/kinesis distinction thus ceases to pose a problem, be-
cause the distinction is possible only by reference to the more encom-
passing sense of motion, taken up in Physics 11/. This is the motion
?f whi.ch the world consists, and since it is an entelecheia or actuality,
Its eXIstence can be continuous, providing nothing external inter-
feres with the efficacy of its mover.
All of these considerations support the thesis that the world is
eternal. Why then call it a creation and claim that the term "creation"
or "origination" (~udfIth, innovatio) is more appropriate to charac-
terize it than the term "eternity" (qidam, antiqui/as)? The answer
lies once again in Averroes' conception of the world as essentially
qualified by motion.
Wedded as he is to the Aristotelian definition of motion just
analyzed, Averroes maintains that every moved entity stands in need
of a mover as long as its movement continues.I6 In powerful particu-
lars taken singly, this mover corresponds to the form or nature under-
stood as a configuration of active powers, whereas that which is
moved is the matter taken as an ensemble of passive powers. Clearly,
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 213
without the form, there could be no patterns of development or
change. The mover must be constantly present.
In the various modes of interaction which obtain between such
particulars, tliie same principle applies. For obviously there can be
no succession of congruity relations between the active powers of
the cause and the passive powers of what it affects, if one of the
tennini of these relations is absent. Again the moving or efficient
cause must be at work.
Averroes is no less emphatic when the particular under analy-
sis is the world, conceived as an entity whose very substance is to
be in motion.
...The existence of the world always has been and always will be
linked together with non-existence, as is the case with movement,
which is always in need of a mover. And the acknowledged philoso-
phers believe that such is the case with the celestial world in its
relation to the Creator, and a fortiori with the sublunary world. Here
lies the difference between the created and the artificial, for the artifi-
cial product, once produced, is not tied up with non-existence which
would be in need of an agent for the continued sustenance of the
product. 17
But a created effect is one like motion. It is constantly linked with
non-existence in the sense of potential corruption. To exist at all, to
be the actuality of the movable, insofar as it is movable, it requires
both the continuous actuality and efficacy of a mover. Without these,
it ceases to be an actuality and thus an existent. The overriding
justification, therefore, for calling the world a creation is its com-
plete ontological dependence upon Deity as its mover.
That Averroes did not regard this view as designed merely for
popular consumption, given the multiple aims of Tahl'Ifut, is evident
from his De Substantia Orbis. For in this purely theoretical work,
clearly designed for philosophically-trained professionals, we find
the same position repeated and even worked out in greater detail.
Motion, in fact, is necessary with regard to continuation [of exist-
ence] and it has been demonstrated from all these things that the
Giver of continuous motion is the Giver of the motion of heaven,
because if it [the Giver of continuous motion] did not exist, motion
would have been destroyed, and if this were the case with motion,
the heavens also [would have been destroyed]. For the heavens exist
on account of their motion, and if the motion of heaven were destroyed,
the motion of inferior entities would have been destroyed, and thus
the world [itself would have been destroyed]. From this it is verified
that the Giver of continuous motion is the Giver of existence to all
other beings."
 214 AVERROfSAND TIlEMETAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
The ?"eative activity o~ Deity is thus limited to one thing-inducing
contmuous movement m the celestial spheres. And even though all
things may be described as ontologicaIIy dependent upon Him, this
dependence is mediated by other causes, just as His own action is
mediated by the movement of the spheres, in other words, by the
natural and necessary processes of causation in the world-system.
Another element in Averroes' conception of the world as a crea-
tion is the fact that for him it is pre-eminently a world of particulars.
Apart from the individuals which comprise it, "the world" has no
existential status. The significance of this otherwise banal observa-
tion is that it is precisely concrete particulars which he treats as
the genuine instances of lJudilth or innovatio, creation. 19 Thus, there
may be no temporal beginning of the world in its totality, but there
are constantly new beginnings for particulars. Eacll movement of
the spheres has parts, and the parts truly come to be. Because they
do, the world not only moves, it too comes into existence. Again,
the world may be taken as an ongoing composition, a complex whole,
having neither beginning nor end, but a composition has parts, and
the peculiar feature of the complex he calls the world is that its
parts come into being only through the composition itself. Hence it
is not surprising that whenever he speaks of coming into being or
creation, his language invariably refers to particulars.
For Averroes to say therefore that the world is an eternal
creation, and avoid entangling himself thereby in patent inconsist-
encies, creation must be taken in the distributive rather than the
i
collective sense. This means that there was no point in the past at
I
which we could say the whole world was created, at least not to the
exclusion of other points both before and after when it was also
created. What is and continues to be created is the individual parts
of which the world is comprised- powerful particulars, their inter-
relations and new states of affairs. In sum, creation is not a unique
event for Averroes and certainly not one that had an identifiable
beginning. It is rather a continuous process unfolding at all times,
which is identical with the generation of individuals. Such a pro-
Cess may be called "creation," because it gives rise to new entities
that never existed and also because it is ultimately the effect of a
knowing Mind rather than mindless nature. As G. C. Field has ably
put it, in the context of another philosopher's account of the same
problem, "Creation is the general feature of each event in a continu-
ous process, not a particular act applying to the whole.''20
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 215
If this, in broad outline, is what Averroes understood the object
of Divine activity in an eternal creation to be, a crucial question
remains- does this eternal creation occur ex nihilo? Aside from the
claim that ip4act the world is always temporally prior to the emer-
gence of individuals, does the Deity also req~ire some S?rt of pr:-
existent stuff out of which to create new parl1culars? Or IS He suffI-
cient by Himself to produce everything that may be said to be?
The question has become a crux of scholarship, because, despite
all of Averroes' attacks on Islamic occasionalism and his vigorous
defense of natural causation, many of his remarks appear to indi-
cate that he did subscribe to creation ex nihilo. Indeed, some like
Majid Fakhry understand him to have anticipated Aquinas in treating
the questions of creation ex nihilo and the eternity or temporal ori-
gin of the universe as two mutually exclusive issues, and to have
made a genuine concession to revealed religion by conceiving of an
eternal creation out of nothing. Others, like Michel Allard and Simon
Van den Bergh conclude that he only succeeds in contradicting
himself.21 Before any evaluation of Averroes' success or failure can
be made, however, two items must be established: (1) what the
evidence for his view one way or the other really is, and (2) what
the evidence, taken as a whole, means.
In favor of the view that eternal creation occurs ex nihilo, there
is Averroes' repeated claim that the world as such is a creation
(hudilth, ilJdiith, innovatio). Even when he goes on to distinguish
b~tween an eternal creation and a limited creation, he emphasizes
that the term "creation" is a more appropriate characterization than
the term "eternity." He likewise speaks of the world as being one of
the created things, not one of the artificial things. Clearly, if the
latter come to be out of pre-existent materials, the former, by
contrast must come to be without recourse to any material. Again,
Averroe:: insists that when the philosophers speak of the world as
eternal, they do not mean that it subsists through any eternal
constituents, only that it subsists through motion, which, he has
argued, comes to be. Similarly, he denies that the heavens have
come to be in the same way that sublunar existents have; only the
latter come into existence out of something, through the act of
something, by means of something, in time and in space, in short,
by generation. The former could not be generated, lest there be an
infinite number of other heavens to be generated and to generate
others. In all these descriptions of the world, the language is char-
 216 AVERROES AND 1HE MErAPIIYSICS OF CAusATION
~cteristically that of creation as it is understood in the Qur?m, that
IS, an act performed ex nihilo.'l2 So, at least, the proponents of a
creation ex nihilo interpretation of Averroes argue.
They find additional confirmation for their position in his state-
ments about efficient causes in general and about Deity as such a
~use.in Parti~ular. An agent or efficient cause, it will be remembered,
IS defmed as 'what causes some other thing to pass from potency
to actuality and from non-existence [al-'adam, privatione] to exist-
ence [al-wujfId, esse]. ''23 The explicit reference here to non-existence
and existence is taken to be distinct from, rather than explicative
of, potency and act. Agents produce effects in two ways, not one.
When God is subsequently characterized as an efficient cause, the
reference to potency and act is even dropped. He is described sim-
ply as "drawing the Universe from non-existence to existence and
conserving it."24 Again, the apparent implication is an ex nihilo
creation. Not only does Averroes find this implication entirely com-
patible with the eternity of the universe, he even claims, on this
interpretation, that this is what the ancient philosophers meant all
along. 'The philosophers' theory, indeed, is that the world has an
agent, acting from eternity and everlastingly, converting the world
eternally from non-being into being."25
The evidence thus far weighs heavily in favor of the ex nihilo
interpretation. But if one examines carefully what Averroes himself
~ys by way of interpreting it, a rather different picture emerges.
FIrstly, he notes that ex nihilo production cannot be observed by
empirical means. Consequently, whoever maintains that all bodies
are produced in this manner, would have to furnish a demonstra-
tion to warrant it.26 But not even the theologians claim to establish
their view by demonstrative means. Their strongest positive case is
based on exegesis of the religious law. Averroes, in turn, nowhere
furnishes or claims to furnish any demonstration for creation ex
nihilo. On the contrary, he attacks it vigorously.
A second consideration derives from his analysis of the rele-
vant terms. In the Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, Averroes
distinguishes between three senses in which "the non-existent" is
understood. There is first the non-existent simpliciter. This he char-
acterizes as absolute privation. It has no existence of any kind, nor
is it even thinkable. Second, there is the non-existent which is in
matter. It represents onfy a privation of forms. Last, there is some-
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 217
thing which exists in potency. Such a thing is called non-existent
only because it is not an actual existent.27 ••
Averroes' observation that the absolutely non-exJstent IS not
even thinkabl&casts further doubt upon the ex nihilo interpretation,
since it would hardly be possible to produce a demonstration for
something which cannot be thought. Equally interesting, however,
is the use which Averroes immediately makes of this threefold dis-
tinction in the same comment. He notes that what exists seems to
come not from what exists, but from what does not exist. From which
kind of non-existent then do existents come to be? He answers in
favor of the non-existent as potential, as non-actual being, and adds
the following qualification: it is not the case that any existent what-
ever comes to be from any potency whatever. Rather, every single
existent comes to be only from that which is in potentiality to it, in
short, from its own specific potentiality. It was only because some
of the ancients lacked the concept of proper or specific potentiality,
that they could maintain that anything whatever might come to be
from anything whatever.
Significantly enough, in the Tahafut Averroes follows exactly
this pattern in explaining how any agent, including the Deity, may
be connected with non-existence. "...The act of the agent is only
connected with existence in a state of non-existence, i.e., existence
in potentiality, and it is not connected with actual existence, in so
far as it is actual, nor with non-existence in so far as it is non-
existent.''2! Contrary to the ex nihilo interpretation, which elsewhere in
the Tahafut he plainly dismisses as too repugnant to be granted,29
the Deity does not draw things from complete non-existence into
existence, but only from relative non-existence toward full actuality.
Clearly, then, all the references to 'adam and wujfId in Averroes'
remarks on agents are merely explicative of the references to potency
and act. They signify no independent and miraculous mode of agency
whatever.
In the same way, Averroes' treatment of specific potentiality in
the Long Commentary is taken up in the Tahlifut, and employed there
to attack al-GhazalI's position on causation and the way in which
he supposed God to be the principle of the universe.
His assertion, however, that life can proceed from the lifeless
and !mowledge from what does not possess !mowledge, and that the
dignity of the First consists only in its being the principle of the
universe, is false. For if life could proceed from the lifeless, then the
 218 AVERROfS AND 'mE MEJ'APHYSICS OF CAUSATION
existent mlght proceed from the non-existent, and then anything what-
ever might proceed from anything whatever, and there would he no
congruity between causes and effects, either in the genus predicated
analogically or in the species.3D
The meaning of ex nihilo creativity for Averroes is clear. A meta-
physics which allows the Deity to create absolutely everything, that
is, ex nihilo, implies that natural causation is dissolved in principle.
In such a universe, specific potentialities to act and to be acted
upon are reduced to a shambles and congruity relations to mere
happen-stance. This is plainly not the kind of orderly, stable uni-
verse which Averroes carefully developed in his theory of eternal
creation.
Again, if it is true that the constituents out of which this mobile
world of particulars is made are not eternal existents, it does not
thereby follow that there are no constituents at all. There are
constituents, and they are the potentialities and privations which
inhere in matter, potential movements of the spheres, potential
configurations of powers and dispositions, potential particulars, and
states of affairs. This indeed is the kernel of his position, and Averroes
expresses it SUCcinctly when he states that "for this reason it is said
that all relations and forms exist potentially in prime matter and
actually in the First Mover, in a certain way like the existence of an
artifact actually in the soul of the craftsman.''31 Given the strong
evidence against the ex nihilo interpretation of eternal creation,
therefore, we may justifiably reject that view. Still, we are left with
the question of how to understand Averroes' many explicit refer-
ences to creation and producing being from non-being.
One could argue, of course, that his use of creationist language
must be dismissed as a pure deception foisted on his readers. But
this would be an overly one-sided assessment. Even in his rigorous
and straightforward exegesis of Aristotle, we find him pointing out
what he regards as both real similarities and differences between
the position of the Stagirite and the proponents of creation ex nihilo,
and the similarities are the same as those we find in the TaMfut.
Thus, after summarizing Aristotle's view of how an agent brings things
into being by moving matter and drawing the forms present in it
potentially into full actuality, Averroes immediately compares it with
the creation ex nihilo account. "It is also similar to creation insofar
as that which was in potency comes to be in act, but it differs from
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 219
creation in that it [the agent] does not form out of what is not
form.''32{ emphasis added)
Again, when he discusses Aristotle's distinction between gener~­
f on ana corruption and the other forms of change, he notes that In
~e former the particular subject either comes to be ?r cease~ to be
entirely. There is no middle ground betw~en its beIng and ItS not
beIn. g That is why any such change is saId to be between contra-
. . b t't
dictories. In other forms of change, the subject remaInS, .u I assumes
one of a range of characteristics opposite to the one .It had before
the change. Here there is a middle ground. The subject ?o~s not
cease to be altogether, but only ceases to b~ all it was. ThIS IS why.
such changes are said to be between contranes. . .
Given this analysis and Averroes' understandIng of creatIOn as
Iicable to the whole world only in terms of new individuals taken
~e TahiJ.f~t
:;:Iy, we can now see why he would claim in that an
agent really brings new individuals from non-beIng t? beIng. Th~t,
after all, is precisely what generation as a subst~ntl~1 change IS.
"There are three [kinds of change]: change from bel~ In~O conn:ary
being, from being into non-being, and from non-beIng .Int~ bel?g.
And by non-being I understand not-be~ng-in-actuality: whi~ IS .relng
in potentiality and, universally, the [kind of] no~-~eIng W.hI~'33IS the
distinctive property of prime matter, not unqualIfIed nullIty.
There is therefore no deception on this issue at least as Averr~
sees it for his view is the same in the TaMfut as it appears t.o be In
the co:Umentaries, and he has stated all its salient features In both
sources. One need only bring the disparate elements of the theory
together. . .
A final question remains. If the theory of eternal creatIOn ~aIn­
tains that the world has an Agent who eternally converts particular
potentialities into actual existents, how did th: the~~ c?om: about?
Put differently, what was the circumstance of It~ ongIn. It IS surely
not an obvious reading of the genuine AristotelIan cO,?us, nor even
of the Neo-Platonized version available to the medlevals. By the
e token it hardly conforms to the doctrine of creation taught
:,mthe Isl~ic theologians. Was it originally designed then to recon-
cile the two? .
Our information is meager, but 'Averroes supplIes two clues.
The first we saw in his initial formulation of the theory. Th:re he
observed that the philosophers only spoke of an eternal creatIOn as
 220 AYERROES AND TIlE ME:I'APHYsICS OF CArnATION
a precautionary m~sure against proponents of a competing view,
~an;tely that the UnIverse came into being (I) from something, (2)
In tune, and (3) after not being." These criteria, however, hardly
match those of the Islamic occasionalists. Creation from something
would alone disqualify it, and as we have seen, al-Ghazlilr likewise
dismisses the idea of a successionless duration preceding the exist-
ence of the universe, so that time too might be created. Whose posi-
tion then is meant?
It turns out in the end to have been that ascribed to the Platon-
ists. For they maintained, according to a widely-held view in the
Middle Ages, that the world, or at least the present world-order
came into ~eing through the agency of a Divine craftsman, workin~
on somethIng, at a point in the past, prior to which there was no
world-order. The agent was the Demiurge. His material was the dis-
orderly motion in the Receptacle of becoming, itself something as
r~ and eternal as the Forms although unlike them in being intrin-
SICally characterless. Finally, his act was an event in time since
time existed along with the disorderly motion if only as a ~nd of
bare succession.35
Averroes tells us that the Platonists regarded their master's view
as an account of creation involving belief in a genuine Creator. Now
however c~ntroversial that interpretation might have been by later
standards, It nonetheless led the Platonists to attack Aristotle's teach-
ing on the eternity of the universe as implying that there was no
Creator. "It was therefore necessary," Averroes concludes "for the
Aristotelians to defend him with arguments which estab'lish that
Aristotle did indeed believe that the world has a creator and an
agent.''36 Th~ doctrine originated, in short, as a defense of Aristotle,
whose teachIngs had come under serious attack.
In Averroes' day, of course, it was no longer the Platonists who
were attacking the Stagirite, but the Ash'arite theologians; nor was'
the controversy confined to academic philosophers. It now had impor-
tant social and religious ramifications. Still the issue was in many
",:ays the same and so were the criticisms. By pointing to the ori-
gInS of the doctrine in his own response to al-GhazalL it seems
probable that Averroes resurrected the theory from sources availa-
ble to him and pressed it into service for precisely the same rea-
sons ~s the earlier Peripatetics. His aim was to defend Aristotle by
bluntIn~ ~e attacks made against him, not to do violence to him by
harmOnIZIng or reconciling two positions he knew full well to be
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 221
irreconcilable. If, therefore, the version of the doctrine we have ~~­
ined thus far seems far closer in spirit to the teaching of the Stagmte
than to that of either the Qur'an or the scholastic theologians of
Islam, tfiis should be no cause for surprise. It is precisely the kind
of response a penetrating and faithful interpreter of Aristotle would
be expected to offer on behalf of his embattled master.
Eternal Creation by WIll or Intellect?
We have now seen Averroes make at least three major efforts
to refute al-GhazalJ's charge that the philosophers denied God was
the Agent and Maker of the universe and that the world was His acl
The first was his criteriological discussion of agents and acts. The
second was his account of celestial causation, and the last was his
theory of eternal creation. A consistent impression emerges from
all three rejoinders-that Averroes in fact regarded the universe as
the product of an intelligent, creative Agent and not as the work of
a purely natural cause or a concatenation of such causes.
He believed he could justifiably describe this Agent as intelligent,
because only a substance entirely separate from matter and its limita-
tions could eternally move the spheres. To be such a substance or
form, by the standards of Aristotle's De Anima, was at the same
time to be a knowing mind.3' It could be called creative, moreover,
because the ultimate effects of its activity are new individuals which
never existed in the past. Lastly, he called this Being an agent,
because its unique activity as an Intelligence culminates in drawing
forth potential existents into full actuality by movement and com-
position.
What is missing from this description, however, is any refer-
ence to the Divine will, and the omission is surely crucial. For if
Averroes denies volition to God, whether overtly by argument or
covertly by silence, he has opted for a theory of necessary creation
regardless of whether he calls it naturally necessary or not. But if,
on the other hand, he unequivocally affirms volition, he pronounces
the creative act, whether it is from nothing or from prior potential-
ities, whether it is temporal or eternal, to be essentially free. Here
at last is the crux of the controversy on Divine causation and creation.
For understandable reasons this issue was the focal point of
al-Ghazlilrs attack upon the philosophers. While he raised no clear
 222 AVERROES AND TIlEMIITAPHYSICS Of' CAUSATION
objections to co~ceiving of the Deity as an Intelligence separate
fro~ ~atter, .h~ Vl~orous.ly re~udiated any suggestion that all aspects
~f DIVIne actIVIty, IncludIng HIs will, couId be absorbed in the cOgni-
tIve aspect. of the Godhead. As we have seen, unless an agent was
endowed WIth /mowledge, will, and choice, he was no genuine agent
by al-GhazalI's standards. Thus, even when the philosophers are
repor~ed to aclmowledge that God has a will, but add that it is a
negatIve attribute signifying that He is not unaware of or opposed
to what emanates from Him,38 al-Ghazalr dismisses their view. It is
at ~est metaphorical. At worst, it is a deception to disguise their
belIef. that God acts by the necessity of His nature. The immediate
questIOn before us, therefore, is whether Averroes supposed God to
b~ a voluntary agent, and if so in what way. More specifically, how
dId he construe the relation between intellect and will in Divine
causation?39
. . First. and perhaps most strikingly, he frequently mentions the
Dlvl~e '."'111 (a!-iradah, vo!untas) throughout the Tahafut and repeat-
edly InsIsts that the philosophers do not deny that God wills.'" Second
he ~ssigns to the will of God a function which appears to dille;
notIceably from that of the intellect, thus giving prima facie evi-
d~nc~ that he did not regard will as a purely negative attribute as
di? h~s predecessors. In a characteristic passage, Averroes outlines
thIS vIew.
The philosophers, however, do not deny the will of God. nor do
the7 adrmt that He has a human will, for the human will implies a
defICIency In ~e willer a:'d a being affected by the object willed, and
whe? .the o~Ject IS attaIned, the deficiency is completed and the
pa~lVlty, whl~ is called will, ceases. The philosophers only attribute
a Wlll to God In the sense that the acts which proceed from Him
proceed through knowledge, and everything which proceeds through
knowledge and wi~dom proceeds through the will of the agent, not,
however, ?ecessanly and naturally, since the nature of knowledge
does. not Imply (as he falsely affinns of the philosophers) the pro-
ceedIng of the act. For if the nature of knowledge did imply this; then,
when We say tI.'at God knows the opposites, it would be necessary
that the opposItes should proceed from Him together, and this is
absurd The fact that only one of the opposites proceeds from Him shows
that .th~"'. is a?other attribute present besides knowledge, namely will,
and It IS In thIS way that the affirmation of will in the First [Cause]
~ust be unde~stood according to the philosophers. For God, accord-
Ing to the phIlosophers, necessarily knows and wills through His
knowledge." (emphasis added)
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 223
Averroes here outlines several elements of what he regards as
a proper conception of the Divine will. The will is not to be con-
strued as either a deficiency or passivity in God, which can be brought
to completion or satisfied. It is rather a perfection and presumably
has an active role to play in detennining which events actually occur.
It is also intimately related to, and even dependent on. God's
lmowledge, meaning here the content of what He lmows. The will
indeed appears to be a kind of selective capacity in the Deity. If this
is so, its proper function would be to pick out of the various oppos-
ing states of affairs which might exist in the world and which together
comprise the content of God's lmowledge, that particular state or
"act" which ultimately occurs. This brings us to a more important
point.
The activity of the will in this interpretation is apparently
autonomous. For it is described as differentiating between possible,
but contrary states of affairs so that only one actually occurs. What
reinforces the impression of autonomy is the implied assumption
that these contraries are equally possible and equally well-lmown
by God. It is their equivalence on these counts which enables
Averroes to postulate per impossible that if acts proceeded neces-
sarily from the /mowledge of their character and possibility alone,
then two opposing acts lmown by God would have to occur together.
What makes their joint occurrence impossible, of course, is the fact
that they are contraries, for this fact entails their mutual cancellation.
Nevertheless, the suggestion that the actual occurrence of one of
the two contraries derives from God's will differentiating between
them must immediately arouse suspicion, since that is virtually the
same function which al-GhazaIr assigned to the will in the Discus-
sion on the eternity of the universe. The point at issue in that Dis-
cussion was whether or not the Divine 'will could distinguish and
choose between logically similar states of affairs, such as discrete
"moments" prior to the existence of the universe in order to pick
out a particular moment for creation. al-GhazaIr had argued that
the Divine will was indeed capable of making choices without
preference, while Averroes joined the philosophers in denying that
this is possible for a rational agent. For such an agent always chooses
for good reasons which necessarily distinguish the option chosen
from the one rejected, In effect, Averroes maintained that there is
never any real equivalence between similars.
 224 AVEllROES AND THE MErAP!m;ICS OF CAusAnON
... Each of two individuals is different from the other bv reason
of a quality exclusive to it. U, therefore, we assume that the ~Il atta-
ches itself to that special character of one of them, then it can be
imagined that the will attaches to the one rather than the other because
of the element of difference existing in both.42(emphasis added)
The will, in sum, can perform its selective function only in the pres.
ence of external differentiating features, and these can never be a
matter of indifference to the willer. Contrary states of affairs may
be equally possible in themselves and equally well-known to God,
but they can never be equivalent so far as the willer is concerned.
Consequently, the assumption of absolute autonomy in the Divine
will must be dropped.
Given this conclusion, we can now see how it bears directly on
the meaning of our original passage. It indicates that the contrary
possibilities are not equivalent in status at all, and hence the actual
occurrence of anyone of them need not be ascribed to any volitional
effort on God's part, autonomous or otherwise. Averroes confirms
this in a more detailed analysis of the meaning he gives to will,
which casts it in an altogether different light.
Therefore according to the philosophers the meaning of "will" in
God is nothing but that every act proceeds from Him through knowl-
edge, and knowledge insofar as it is knowledge is the knowledge of
opposites, either of which can proceed from Him. And the Knower is
called excellent by [virtue of] the fact that there always proceeds from
Him the better of the opposites to the exclusion of the worse. Therefore
the philosophers say that three attributes are most appropriate to
the Creator, namely that He has knowledge, excellence, and power."
(emphasis added)
Any assignment of autonomous selection to the will is here pre-
empted, because, for Averroes, opposed states of affairs are never
equivalent in value. There is inevitably a value hierarchy which atta-
ches to them, so that only the better of two alternate possibilities
may in fact arise. When Averroes contends here as he did before
that either possibility may proceed from God, the explanation for
their supposed equivalence is simply that both alternatives are
logically possible. Nothing in their conceptual structure as such pre-
vents their actualization. But they are not both real possibilities,
nor would they be equally likely to occur if they were. "If the oppo-
sites in existents were in a condition of equilibrium, both in them-
selves and through their efficient causes, it would follow either that
they would not exist and not be annihilated or that they would
exist and would be annihilated at the same time."'" The opposites
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 225
Averroes has in mind here would appear to be real contraries or
potentialities in view of his explicit reference to existents in this
context. His point is simply that equivalence between such oppo-
sites is ultirn'!l.tely impossible, because, if it were possible, they would
exist permanently in suspension when in fact the best potentiality
must be realized or they would be realized together and thus be
annihilated.
Moreover, the selective capacity of what he has so far called
the will is severely restricted. For what ultimately determines the
actual occurrence of any given state of affairs is less an individual
act of choice than an impersonal teleological ranking of what God
knows, namely: which of two contrary states of affairs is the more
compatible with Divine excellence and the best world-order. Such a
principle operates without variation and precisely because God is
what He is. In short, it operates by a kind of necessity. which
reappears in the nature of things.
For the differentiation which the philosophers infer is different
from that which the Ash'arites intend, for the Ash'arites understand
by "differentiation" the distinguishing of one thing either from a simi-
lar one or from an opposite one without this being determined by
any wisdom in the thing itself which makes it necessary to differenti-
ate one of the two opposite things. The philosophers, on the other
hand, understand here by the differentiating principle only that which is
determined by the wisdom in the product itself, namely, the final cause,
for according to them there is no quantity or quality in any being
that has not an end based on wisdom, an end which must either be a
necessity in the nature of the act of this being or exist in it [Le. in the
entity itself], based on the principle of superiority.";
This teleological factor explains why Averroes does not trace
the occurrence of the better alternative to the Divine will. as we
would expect, but to the attribute of excellence instead. For he is
quite sensitive to the fact that will, as it is ordinarily understood,
implies some conception of a lack in the willer, which signifies in
turn that what he wills is not always the case. Our notion of will
further implies coming to terms with obstacles, choosing alterna-
tive courses of action, and making new efforts to bring about particu-
lar results.
Clearly, none of these characteristics is compatible with either
the completeness, eternity, or effortlessness which Averroes ascribes
to the Deity, or for that matter with the invariant teleological order
he claims to find in the world. "How," he asks, "could an eternal will
 226 AVERROfS AND lHEMITAPHYSICS OF CAusATION
be ima~ined which should be the cause of some act occurring with-
o~t an Increas~ of th~ desire at the time of the act, or how could a
WIll and a desIre be Imagined which would be before durl'ng
f th . , , an
a ter e act In the same state without any change occurring to
them.?"46The answer to b oth questions,
. obviously, is that one cannot
Hence, the only viable alternative for Averroes is to treat "will" a
. I
an eqUlvoca term and to indicate, as unobtrusively as possible th
kind of attribute which accords best with the eternal nature of 'Go~
and the excellence he finds in existing states of affairs. Little wonder
therefore, that when he speaks of the three most distinctive attri:
butes of God in this passage, and the tiIree attributes which consti-
tute man in another, he lists Imowledge, power, and excellence in
regard to the Deity, but Imowledge, power, and will in regard to
man. In God, the teleological hierarchy of possible states of affairs
takes the place of the will in man.47
The test of this interpretation would be to see if Averroes uses
teleolOgical c:nteria in exp.laining the actual occurrence of any given
state of affaIrs, and particularly those which would otherwise be
matters of indifference to a God who wills by selection in either the
Ghazalian or the ordinary sense. It turns out that this is just what
he does.
Creation Whenever the God of Averroes is confronted with the
?ypoth~tical case of whether or not the world should be brought
Into .exlstence, .and .both alternatives are understood as logically
pOSSIble, He bnngs It straightaway into existence. And He does so
eternally as well, because existence is, in his estimation, at all times
preferable to non-existence.48 To claim that the Deity eternally wills
or .m.ooses the exis.tence of the universe may be required by the
r~I.lglOus law, b~t. gIven what Averroes has said about the intelligi-
bIlIty of such wIllIng, it would be more accurate to say that there is
really no choice at all. God simply performs the best act by virtue
of what He is, in short, because He must.
Sublunar and Celestial Mechanics. The teleological option is like-
wise used to explain the behavior of elementary bodies and the
celestial spheres. Here the distinction between better and worse is
not obvious at all. For in both cases, it would appear that their
characteristic behavior patterns are purely contingent and could
surely have been otherwise without any impainnent in the teleologi-
cal order of the universe. Fire and earth, for example, could very
well be conceived to move downward and upward rather than vice
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 227
versa. In the same way, the polar points of the spheres, which estab-
lish the axes of their rotation, could have been different from what
d they were, and so for that matter could the speed~ and directions of
their movijment. All this might have occurred WIthout any change
in the excellence of the total world-system.
But Averroes counters here as elsewhere by denying any such
s
equivalence. Given the existence of fire and earth, they must have
specific natures or fonns which distinguish th~m from one anoth~r
and determine the character and, in part, the CIrcumstances of theIr
movement. To ask why fire moves upward or earth moves down-
ward amounts to asking why fire acts like fire and earth like earth.
The question is pointless, because " ...no other reason can be
assigned for the variation in the movements than the variation in
the directions of the things moved, and the variation in their direc-
tions depends on the variation of their natures; i.e., some are nobler
than others. "49 (emphasis added) Here the difference between natures
plainly goes beyond the dimension of structure. It is traced further
to a hierarchy of value. But if there is no other differentiating cause
• I
for actual existents than structure and teleological rank, there is
I
,
hardly any selective act by a Divine Will, eternal or otherwise.
In the same context, the peculiarities of celestial movement
are explained in a similar way by recognizing that each sphere is a
distinct species of living creature. The direction of its movement
constitutes the specific difference of that species, while the polar
points of its axis are its organs of locomotion. To argue that the
direction of a sphere's movement or the placement of its polar points
might have been different is as ridiculous to Averroes as the sugges-
tion that the physical structure and behavior of a terrestrial animal
might have been entirely different, without affecting its status as a
member of its species. For both their physical structures and spe-
cific acts are externalizations of their natures, while their natures
unalterably reflect the principle of what is most excellent.
Lest there be any lingering doubt about whether God's detenni-
nation of the best entails any process of comparison and selection
by a will, Averroes removes it when he twice suggests that every-
thing he has explained about this topic in the TahlIfut is merely
provisional. For conclusive proof, a demonstrative man will look to
the proper place, which quite obviously will be the works of Aristotle.lll
There he will find, particularly in the account of the First Unmoved
 228 AVERROFS AND 1lIEMIITAPH'IS/cs OF CAUSATION The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 229

Mover in Metaphysics Lamlxia no ref corning] Is a consequence of the eternal knowledge, lor knowledge
tives or willing only the best't erence a~ all. to grading alterna- qua knowledge can only refer to something which has an actualized

~~~f~: ~~~~~~n:~e:~ :~o~~Ei, ~~ ::~~~~:-i:a!=~i~~~~ nature. The Knowledge of the Creator is the reason why this nature
becomes actual in the existent which is attached to it ... .And it is the
tive as opposed to negative e~tities 'N~e asse~?lage of all posi- knowledg.tl'of the existence of this [particular] nature which causes
totle ventures to characterize !hi . h.1 surprisIngly, when Aris- the actualization of one of the opposites.52
.. s P losopher-God h d Here the maxim that knowledge is power is apparently pushed to
H1m as thInking C .) , e escnbes
nev:~e:~ ~~~~~~!~~eC;:~~~~~a~~ p~werful
dynanyn.), but Cecilei
the extreme of an identity statement. The mere act of knowing makes
things happen in reality. Is this a kind of magical thinking? Or is it
desc~tl~n ~v:,:oes I:te~rt,
would appropriate centuries the same perhaps the mode of contemplative production used by al-FarabI
spite InitIal suggestions to the contr . . and Avicenna to explain emanation? Just what sense can be made
clear distinction in the Tahafut be . ary, then, there IS no
relate to God If th tween Intellect and will as they of this causal mode of knowing and how it relates to the theory of
cient to produce ;:~:~a~f la~Wledge qua knowledge is not suffi- emanation as a model of causal efficacy must now be made clear.
ranking of what He kn . ac or states of affairs, at least the
cient to do so ows, I~pell~d ?y His noetic activity, is suffi-
noth. . Thus, Averroes periodIC references to the will signify Causal Knowing and the Theoty of Emanation
:g more than the replication of this ranking in rerum nat
verroes, of course, never tells us wh th . ura. The view that God's own specific act is an act of knowing stands
tions among the natures of !hi d Y ~ teleologIcal grada- plainly at the center of Averroes' account of eternal creation. It is
of knowled ngs a not constitute part of the nature
some bee ge quha knowledge. His silence here is all the more trouble- the efficacy of this intellectual act, in tum, which is supposed to
ause e does not clearl eli h
tmgu. • esplain both the structure and continuity of all other causal relations,
of intelligible content and the y s IS between the notion whether these involve the generation of new particulars or simply
speaks about knowledge. It arrangement of that content when he .
truth val d .. may be that he was less sure of the new states of affairs among existing particulars. However, for a con-
fact s-ugg:t: cogmtive certainty of such rankings than he has in ception so unambiguously crucial to Averroes' whole project, the
fundamentals of the theory reveal surprisingly inconsistent asser-
But it is also possible that his refer tions about both the nature of the mind which knows and brings
edge are likewise equivocal so that .te.nces Itofknowledge qua knowl- things into being and the manner of its doing so.
as such produces no imm d: I IS .on y or us that knowledge Thus, in contrast to the Avicennian view, Averroes contends
certain gradations of val~e I~~e ~:;; ~artl.cular results or absolutely
embraces not only the na~es of
ble order· and it embraces th
ili:
t
might be argue~, knowledge
. ngs, but also therr best possi-
that intellect is not a negative attribute of God, but rather the most
appropriate expression for His essence. This is what distinguishes
, em In such a way as to b . b Him from all other things. Yet he argues later that God is reaJly the
actual states of affairs In his last tat rIng a out totality of all the existents of which He is the agent. Indeed, not
will and kno I d · s ement on the relations between
only is He the totality, He is· nothing but the harmony and order
to assign th:o:c~~;;;roes se~ms to articulate just this view and
which exist in all beings.53 The question is, of course, how can the
knowledge alone. of partlcu/ar events and natures to God's
Deity be both?
The same congruity exists betwee God' kn We are told further that this Deus sive intellectus of Averroes
existents, although God's knowledg f n. s . owle.dge and the thinks only His own essence.54 Still, He is also said to have as His
these existents are the cons e 0 extstents IS their cause, and
fore conform to God's kn equence of .God's knowledge, and there- object both the forms and arrangement of the many existents which
coming reaches the pro;:';~· If, ~or mstance, ~o:"ledge of Zaid's constitute our own objects of understanding. Are there then an infinfty
reason why the actual ha e. o~g a commumcatIon of God, the of objects which God knows or only one?
nothing but the fact that ~~ ::t!~s o~o~gru0ctuallyus
with t."e kno."'ledge is
ea exIstent [I.e., Zaid's
 230 AVERROFS AND TIlE METAPHYSICS Of' CAusATION
Again, Divine knowledge is supposed to be entirely unchangeable.
But if it is knowledge of generable and corruptible existents, how
could it be unchangeable?55 Accuracy and correspondence with the
facts would require that its content and structure vary with every
alteration in its objects. Averroes, it would appear, cannot have it
both ways. Nonetheless, he insists on both.
He also maintains that the Deity is the most simple of existents.
But this most simple of existents presumably contains all of the
celestial Intelligences and sublunar particulars in a nobler and more
perfect manner of being than is theirs in reality-a rather difficult
logical task for a simple Divinity, and surely no less difficult an
interpretive task for a reader of the TahMut.55
What Averroes offers as an explanation for all these anomalies
turns out to be an anomaly in itself. He asserts that God's activity is
intellectual and consists in understanding real objects. But the most
distinctive feature of this activity is that it is the cause of every
object it understands.57 It brings the object into being and even oper-
ates upon it. Now even for a committed Peripatetic, a cognitive act
normally originates in the object known, which impresses itself upon
the mind. Averroes would have us believe, on the other hand, that
for God such an act originates in the Deity, culminates in the object,
and yet remains a genuinely cognitive act. Can this be knowing in
any meaningful sense? It is plainly hard to see how.
Convinced for his part, however, that it is, Averroes resolutely
goes on to claim, finally, that God knows neither individuals nor
universals, but that of the two, God's knowledge is more like that of
the individual than of the universal.58 How such comparisons are
possible once the basis for making them has been removed is hardly
obvious. But this apparently does not trouble Averroes, who even
goes so far as to claim that there are proofs for all his statements.
It appears then that the keystone of his doctrine on Divine cau-
sation amounts to a budget of paradoxes. Both its content and con-
struction are so manifestly peculiar that even Averroes' learned
translator, Simon Van den Bergh, has commented that the theory
".. .makes the term 'knowledge' as applied to God, not only incompre-
hensible but meaningless."S9 Given the fundamentals of the doctrine
as they stand, it is perhaps hard to disagree.
Still the possibility should not be foreclosed that there is more
to this puzzling theory than meets even the critical eye on first
glance. Surely, it is hard to believe that Averroes would have based
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 231
his entire carefully-argued defense of causal efficacy on what is
plainly a dubious, not to say absurd, metaphysical foundation ..To
suppose that he was unaware of the glaring inconsistencies whIch
are so e~ent to us strains credulity further still. The whole ana-
lytic bent of the Tahafut argues to the contrary. Moreove~, Averroes
. associates the doctrine with some of the best known phIlosophers,
and maintains that there are definite proofs for it, although he him-
self furnishes none.GO This suggests that he regarded the theory as
philosophically viable and that the key to its interpretation was to
be found in available philosophical literature. What is more, the
very absence of rigorous supportive argumentation calls to mind
Averroes' repeated observation that the Tahllfut was not designed
as a demonstrative book. Part of what he meant by this, as we have
seen, is that at least some of his views had to be concealed from
the majority of his readers, although in such a way that they could
be pieced together by the philosophically literate. Is it not possible
then that the theory of causal knowing is just such a doctrine, and
that its peculiar inconsistencies stem less from its content than from
the requirements of presenting it? Averroes furnishes much evidence
to show that this is the case.
After his observation that God is identical with the totality of
existents, he cautions that those who know this to be true must
never let it be written down for the general public, much less made
an obligatory religious belief. In fact, Averroes adds that a conse-
quence of this requirement was that the doctrine is not even taught
by the Divine law-a remark that is plainly double-edged.61 It sug-
gests not only that scripture keeps silent on an issue that requires
silence, but that in the final analysis Averroes knew his views on
causal knowing had no scriptural warrant. To divulge them to the
philosophically uninitiated would simply nullify the meaning of Divin-
ity and leave nothing comprehensible in its place. Thus, he says
that the philosopher is forbidden to teach the doctrine openly to
anyone who has no way of arriving at certainty about it, "for he
would be like his murderer," although he may not withhold it from
those to whom it should be taught and for the same reason.62
Now one way of both concealing and disclosing such a teach-
ing would be to present it in a highly paradoxical fashion so that
the unqualified would either fail to understand it or simply dismiss
it as nonsense. The philosophically trained, on the other hand, would
have little difficulty recognizing the relevant fragments of a famil-
232 AVERROFS AND 1HE METAPHYSICS OF CAusATION
iar position and interpreting the exoteric formulation accordingly.
It seems clear that this is what Averroes expected for his account of
causallrnowing.
What then are the philosophical underpinnings of the theory
and how do they function? They amount to four in all. The first is
the view that form is a principle of both actuality and activity. The
second is Aristotle's conception of lrnowing as a way of being the
object lrnown. The third is the view that intellectual cognition, as
opposed to other forms of consciousness, is primarily directed toward
actual existents, and fourth is the view that a perfect activity or
energeia is intrinsically desirable.
The interpretation of form as a principle of both actuality and
activity, as we have seen, derives from the identification of form as
a configuration of powers. If to be is to have the power to act or be
acted upon in specific ways, then any structure or ensemble of powers
must be said to be and to be actual. Insofar as the configuration is
predominantly one of active rather than passive powers, Averroes
describes it as form, something both actual and active vis-a-vis matter.
Moreover, form that is absolutely devoid of passive powers and
thus of any material feature of being will be actual and active to
the maximum extent. It will be a powerful particular in the fullest
sense.
Here the account of separate forms as maximally active con-
verges with Aristotle's analysis of cognition as a way of being. For
once the mind is understood as "a form of forms," whose lrnowing
activity consists in an identity relation between the mind and the
immaterial forms of things which it thinks, the separate forms will
clearly function as Intelligences. For each one is a form, and in
being separate from matter, it will be fully active as well. Each one
is also identical with at least one form in an immaterial way-itself.
The fulfillment of both conditions is sufficient to make such forms
not only intelligible but Intelligences.63
Knowing, in turn, must be directed primarily toward actual exist-
ents of a determinate character, because on the Aristotelian model
of lrnowing as an interpenetration of the mind and the world, the
absence of actual objects to be lrnown rules out the possibility of
actual lrnowing as well. If there is nothing actual or determinate
capable of securing its position in the mind, albeit immaterially,
the mind itself is not actual nor does it possess determinate content.
In short, it does not lrnow or think. Conversely, whenever we are
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 233
justified in saying that the mind lrnows, it is only b,:cause what the
mind contains conforms with and refers back to thmgs as they are
in reality.54 .
Finally,~he continuous character of thought as an. energew
implies that it has no end or goal outside. it~elf. Inst~~, It rna?, be
said to contain its own end or be an end m Itself. This IS precisely
what it is to be an entelecheia or perfection and, as such, the contin-
uous cognitive activity of the separate Intelligences is rendered
intrinsically desirable. It is an end to be sought for its own sake.65
Having identified these four conceptions, we can now explain
how the various elements in Averroes' theory of causallrnowing are
related and what his esoteric teaching probably was.
In the first place, the apparent inconsistency of claiming that
God is both a fully actualized Intelligence and the totality of exist-
ents in their teleological order vanishes in the light of the Aristote-
lian analysis of cognition. For if God is essentially and pre-eminently
an actualized Intelligence, and any intellect which actually lrnows is
cognitionally identical with all the things it lrnows, then the Deity
too must be cognitionally identical with everything He lrnows. Quite
literally, He is the totality of what He lrnows, since the whole rea~ity
of a separate Intelligence consists in cognitional identity or lrnowmg.
For such a being, there is no other kind of self-identity. Thus, Averroes,
who unreservedly accepted Aristotle's account of lrnowing, argues,
...The intellect is nothing but the perception of the order and arrange-
ment of existing things .... But if the natures of existing things .follow
the law of the intellect and our intellect is inadequate to perceive the
natures of existent things, there must necessarily exist a knowledge
of the arrangement and order which is the cause ?f the an:a~gement,
order and wisdom which exist in every single bemg, and It IS neces-
sary that this intellect should be the harmony whi~ is the cause of
the harmony which exists in the existents... and thIS order and har-
mony are received by the active powers which possess order ~nd
harmony and exist in all beings and are called natures by the phIlo-
sophers.56
However, even if this shows Averroes' reliance on a cognitional-
identity analysis of lrnowing, it is hardly satisfactory for explai~ing
why God's lrnowledge should be of the natures and order of thmgs
other than Himself. Indeed, Averroes' conception of Deity seems much
closer to the Nous of Plotinus, for whom lrnowing is producing, than
the self-thinking God of Aristotle. Leaving aside for the moment the
question of whether Divine lrnowledge of "others" entails abstrac-
234 AVERROFS AND TIlE MITAPHYSICS OF CAusAnON
tion and possession of universal notions, there are two considera-
tions that impel Averroes to this view.
The first is his understanding of Aristotle's suggestion that "the
soul is in a way all existing things" and "a form of forms," compara-
ble to the hand as a tool of toolS.61 In both observations, the Stagirite
was of course referring to the human soul or mind. The way in
which it is all existing things, clearly, is that it can come to know all
things that are knowable in principle. It is cognitionally identical
with them, but potentially, not actually. In the same way that a
hand is presumably equipped to grasp all kinds of tools and to use
them for the agent's purpose, the mind is a form equipped to grasp
the internal structure of knowable objects and to use them as instru-
ments of knowing.
But to develop the analogy further, human knowers generally
use one tool at a time, and certainly not all possible tools at once.
We know different things step by step, but never all the knowables
together. A fully actualized Intelligence, however, would know all
the existents actually and grasp the totality of their forms and interre-
lations together. Moreover, an intellect performing in this way at
all times would in fact no longer be a human intellect, but a sepa-
rate Intelligence. Nevertheless, the content of its knowledge would
be all the same objects which human minds can know only partially
and at intervals, since the act of knowing as such refers primarily
to actual existents.68
The second consideration derives from his analysis of the cos-
mic functions of the separate Intelligences of which Deity is the
highest Because each Intelligence is associated with one of the con-
centric spheres as its mover, some of them may be thought of as
containing others, albeit immaterially, analogous to the way in which
the outer spheres contain the inner ones spatially. If this contain-
ment relation is construed as an alternative way of expressing
cognitional identity, then the separate Intelligences will think the
forms of the existents precisely because they contain them in an
immaterial mode. God in tum will be the single Intelligence com-
prehending the entire system and relating all patterns by which the
various celestial motions collaborate in a single harmonious activity,
the order of the world-system. This is exactly the line of argument
Averroes develops when he contends in both the Tahatut and the
Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, that there are different degrees
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 235
in the forms of the sensible existents-beginning with their exist-
ence in matter, then in the human intellect, in the separate Intelli-
gences, which have different degrees o~ super.iority. in their own
right, and Khally in the mind of God. Their relatIOnship to the over-
all pattern contained in God's knowledge is specifically that of the
many subordinate arts (al-¥lniYi' al-kathirah) to a single primary
art (~na'ah wlIf)idah ra7sah) on which they depend, so that "the
substance of everything under the First Principle depends on the
way in which it thinks the forms, order, and arrangement which
exist in the First Intelligence."&! In the Long Commentary on the Meta-
physics, Averroes explains that various quanta of heat generated by
the celestial motions can maintain particular species in existence
only because they have specific measures derived from the quanti-
tative features of these movements such as speed and the angle of
approach toward and retreat from the sun. These measures, in turn,
derive from the Divine intellectual art which is similar to the pat-
tern of one principal art under which there are various other arts.
Later, in commenting upon the character of Divine knowledge
as understood in the myths of the ancients, Averroes articulates the
containment relationship exlicitly.
Certain teachings were handed down by those who were very ancient
which are today regarded as enigmas, namely, that the celestial bod-
ies are gods and that they encompass all things which :xist in n.at~re.
...These enigmas consist in their saying that these bodIes are SImIlar
[in their ways] to the ways of animals. By this means, it ?i,:es an
indication of the celestial forms, which they would say are slmllar to
the forms in the sublunar world, Uust as they would say] that the
forms which exist in the sublunar world obey those others, as the
astrologers say. Then Aristotle says, "And they say other things ,:onse-
quent on and similar to these things ..." There are other emgmas
which deviate from and do not agree with what has been demon-
strated regarding these principles, even by means of farfetched alle-
gorical interpretation ... But if someone should mterpret their diS·
course in such a way that they mean by the gods the first substances
which are the principles of the celestial bodies, then this interpretation
will be true, and the myth will conform to reality.'''' (emphasis added)
God is thus identified with the hierarchy of existents, not in all
respects, as a pantheist would suppose, but in cognition alone. More
specifically, He is the totality of their forms but only because He,
unlike the world, has no material dimension.
 236 AVERROES AND 1HE METAPHysics OF CAusATION
This analysis likewise disposes of the paradox that God thinks
on.ly His own essence, but knows the forms and arrangements of the
existents as :veil. For if the essence of the Deity is to be an eternally
a.ctual In~ellI~nce, and if in knowing, God and the forms are cogni-
tlOnally IdentIcal, then He will think the forms in the very act of
thinking His own essence.?1
In this respect, Averroes develops a distinction which Aristotle
had drawn between two stages of the human knowing process in De
An.m~a 1lI:4. The first stage is based upon the analogy between per-
ceIVIng and knowing. Both are processes in which the soul is acted
upon by something knowable. Also, in both cases, the soul must be
capable of receiving the form of the object sensed or thought. ".. .It
must be potentially identical in character with its object without
being the object. Mind must be related to what is thin~ble and
sense to what is sensible.'''' The fact that Aristotle describes both
processes in terms of being acted upon, so that a relation between
subject. and. object must be established in each case, suggests that
he has m mmd here a kind of incipient cognition, a process of com-
ing to know vis-O.-vis actual knowing.
The second stage, however, is that of actual knowing, which is
to say that cognitional identity fully obtains between the knower
and the known. Although a certain kind of potentiality still attaches
to this state, for example, to cease knowing, to be distracted, or to
forget, the key point is that Aristotle suggests the mind can now
think itself.
Once .the mind has become each set of its possible objects, as a
man of scl:nce has, when this phrase is used of one who is actually a
man. of scle.n~~ (~is h.appens when it is able to exercise the power
o~ hiS own InitIatIve), ItS condition is still one of potentiality but in a
different sense from the potentiality which preceded the acquisition
of knowledge by learning or discovery: the mind is then able to think
itself.13
':ere knowing is no longer a process of coming to be; it is rather a
kin~ of being. Again, the mind is no longer passive, but either fully
actIV': or a~ least able to act on its own initiative. But most importmt,
at thIS pomt the mind can think itself independently of external
objects precisely because it is cognitionally identical with them.
Averroes for his part sees an essential similarity between this
seco~d stage of human cognition and the activity of the separate
IntellIgences, and he notes it in his comment on the passage. Still,
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 237
he adds a significant difference. In actual cognition, both human
and Divine knowers think themselves, but human knowers do so
incidentally, while God and the celestial Intelligences do so essen-
tially. "
Aristotle said, "And the mind is then able to think through itself."
. That is, when the intellect is in this state it will then think itself in
accordance with the fact that it is none other than the forms of things,
insofar as it draws them forth from matter. Therefore, as it were, it thinks
itself in an accidental way, as Alexander says, that is, inasmuch as it
happens that the objects of thought corresponding to things are
[identical with] it, i.e., its essence. Now this is in contrast to the situa-
tion which holds in regard to the separate forms, for when their object
of thought is not different from them in the sense intended by their
, being the objects of thought of that very Intelligence, they think them-
,
l selves in an essential way for that reason, not accidentally. And this is
found to be the case in a still more perfect way in regard to the First
Intelligence, because it will think nothing outside itself." (emphasis
added)
For Averroes, of course~ there can be no equivalent in Divine cogni-
tion to the first stage of knowing described by Aristotle. The very
immateriality of a separate Intelligence precludes its being acted
upon or coming to be anything at all. Neither for that matter can
there be any potentiality in his knowing such as Aristotle allows
even in the second stage. But with that qualification aside, Averroes'
account of God's self-knowledge in the Tahiifut corresponds quite
closely with the actualized cognition described in the De Anima.
We say: The objection that the First Principle if it can think only
its own essence, must be ignorant of everything it has created, would
only be a valid inference if the way it thinks its essence were to exclude
all [other] existents absolutely. But the philosophers mean only that
the manner in which it thinks its own essence is the existents in their
noblest mode of existence, and that it is the intellect which is the cause of
the existents; and that it is not an intellect because it thinks the
existents, in so far as they are the cause of its thinking, as is the case
with our intellect.75 (emphasis added)
Divine self-thinking thus embraces all the existents in the way a
philosopher/scientist would ideally think them. It is an exercise in
theoretical science par excellence, but without the passivity and strain
which inevitably attend all human thought.76 This is the kind of
awareness which underlies Aristotle's suggestion that God is always in
that good state in which we sometimes are, a point with which
Averroes fully concurs. It is the most desirable kind of existence,
not only because it has achieved its own end, but also because it
 238
AVERROFS AND THE MITAPHYsICS OF CAusATION
possesses the forms and thus the ends of every other existent as
well.
":'hat then can be said of Averroes' claim for Divine simplicity?
Here It see~s th~t even the theory of cognitional identity cannot
r~move the mconslstency of asserting a Deity who is both intrinsically
sl~ple and the totality of different things He knows. This is cer-
tal~ly the c~se if simplicity means internal homogeneity or undiffer_
~ntJated ~~Ity. ~or A~i.cenna had espoused precisely this interpreta_
tIOn of ?Ivme SImplICIty and tied to it the causal axiom that from
one ~ntJty only one effect may proceed. In doing so, however, he
le~ hImself vulnerable to al-GhazaIr's devastating critique of eman-
atIOn. F~r once the theory was subjected to careful scrutiny, it offered
no consIstent explanation of how a manifold universe could derive
from an essentially undifferentiated cause. But apart from this con-
sideration there is an even more fundamental reason why Averroes
could not have intended this meaning in his own use of the term.
The :eason is tha.t one arrives at an absolutely undifferentiated unity
~reclsely by denYIng necessary causal connections, as Averroes shows
~n the Seventeenth Discussion. Yet the assertion of Divine simplic-
Ity as an element in his doctrine of causal knowing is clearly intended
to affirm. and ultimat~ly ~ound all manifestations of causal efficacy.
The obvIOUS conclUSIOn IS that this reading of Divine simplicity is
poorly suited to be the keystone of a causal theory based on the
differentiation of specific natures and specific acts. Averroes con-
firms this supposition.
The second question is whether its knowledge is multiplied
t!'ro~gh the J?1~ality ?f its O~jects known .... The answer to this ques-
tIOn IS that It IS not Impossible that there should exist in the First
Knowledge, ~o~thst.anding.its unity, a distinction between the objects
known; and It IS not Impossible, according to the philosophers that it
should know a thing, different from itself, and its own essence, through
a kno~ledge. which differs in such a way that there should exist a
plurality of [Items ?f] knowledg,:,. The only thing which is absolutely
Impossible according to them IS that the First Intellect should be
perfe~ted through the intelligible and caused [to think] by it, and if
the .Flrst Intellect thought things different from itself in the way we
do, It would be an effect of the existent known, not its cause and it
has been definitely proved that it is the cause of the existent.,,'
The reasoning is clear. The Divine mind cannot be intrinSically sim-
ple at the price of dissolving the differences between the various
objects it knows or for that matter between its own specific nature
and those same objects. That would destroy knowledge altogether.
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 239
For if knowledge is referred primarily toward actual existents and
these are both actual and distinct by virtue of their forms, they
must remain distinct even for the Deity. But if that is his view, how
is Div1te simplicity to be understood?
For Averroes, simplicity is an equivocal term. Accordingly, its
meaning will differ in different contexts, although it nonetheless
has a primary signification to which all the others are referred. This
is the absence of composition by matter and form. "Everything that
is simple is not in maUer."7B Consequently, to claim that the Deity is
simple is to claim that as a separate Intelligence, He has no mate-
rial aspect whatever. This precludes God from having not only a
body, but more importantly, any passive power and thus any capac-
ity for change, dependency, or periodic inactivity. Stated positively,
the Divine mind is simple in the sense that it is a self-sufficient,
stable, and continuously active Intelligence.79
Averroes offers perhaps his clearest statement of this meaning
in the Long Commentary on Metaphysics XII in a comment on Aristotle's
discussion of whether the object of God's thinking is composite.
(Metaphysics XII:9, I075a5-11) Taken as the focal reference for all
other uses of the term, his explanation here clarifies considerably
the various ways in which Averroes treats Divine simplicity in the
TahlIfut.
Aristotle said: "Everything which does not have elements is not
divisible as the human intellect [sometimes is]." It is likely that he
means id the case of everything pertaining to intellects that the object
thought by an intellect has no elements, i.e., the intellect and the
object thought are one and the same, so that there cannot possibly
be division in it, as for example, is possible in the human intellect.
For the cause of division within the human intellect is that the object
thought is in a certain sense other than the intellect. That means that
if the intellect and the object thought by it were unified in all respects,
then it would not follow that there would be any objects thought by
it, since the cause of multiplicity [in objects of thought] is the differ-
ence between the intellect and what is thought by it. ...
Now we see that the human intellect is free of matter in its own
right, and even though it is not absolutely free, the intellect ~nd. the
object thought by it come to be one thing [in the act of thinking] ..
When this is the case and there is something absolutely free of matter,
then the object thought and the intellect which thinks it are absolutely
identical.
.. in the same way it is necessary that the First Intelligence be sim-
ple and absolutely one . .. And because it does not think of anything

240 AvrnROES AND 1lIE METAPHYSICS OF CAusATION
externa.1 to it~lf. in~smuch as it is simple. its thinking is its essence,
so~ethmg whIch neIther change of time nor weariness affect at all
as IS [by contrast] the case with our intellect. [t is necessary moreover'
that the situation is similar for the rest of the separate Intelligences'
excep~ that the First is simpler than they. Therefore, it is absolutel~
one WIthout any multiplicity at all, either on account of a difference
betw.een .the intel.lect and the object thought or on account of the
multIplIc~ty of objects thought. If the intelligible objects existing in
th.at one mtellect were to remain many, then they would not be united
wIth ItS essence and its essence would be different from them 80
(emphasis added) . inunaterial projection of God's thoughts, thus making it .a se~ence
Matter is responsible for multiplicity, because it introduces other-
ness and difference into the act of Imowing. Whenever the mind and
its object are different, the mind does not fully grasp or understand
what it thinks. Cognitional identity is either absent or incomplete,
and, as a result, the mind is potential in relation to what may be
Imown .. Th~ only way.to overcome this deficiency in both Imowing
and beIng IS for the mInd to come to be that object in an immaterial
mode. This means that it must be affected by the object and must in
turn exert successive efforts to attain cognitional identity with it.
On both counts the Imowing process is rendered discontinuous.
Because these are the very same characteristics which Averroes
dismisses as inappropriate to God when he explicates Divine sim-
plici~ in the TahlIfut, it is clear that for him the notion signifies
nothIng more than ?od's unimpeded and uninterrupted act of thinking
the forms of the eXistents. It is in this sense only that simplicity can
be affirmed of a mind that is cognitionally identical with many objects
at once. And it is by this activity that He is said to bring them into
being. . likewise a genuine agent, his conception of effrClent causatIon seems
But here is the crux of the matter. What is causal about such
~owing? Even if it is granted that Divine and human Imowing differ
In the ways we have examined, why would cognitional identity with
the forms and harmonious arrangements of things, however com-
prehensive and continuous it might be, ever bring anything into
exis.tence? The ve.ry suggestion that it does seems as absurd as sup-
pOSIng that sustaIned and detailed thinking about a map will pro-
duce the corresponding landscape. The most that thinking could
generate would presumably be a clear concept of the landscape,
and that turns out to be the same as thinking it in the first place at
least on the identity model of Imowing. ' This should not be surprising, of course, since even his defense of
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 241
Averroes however would dismiss the analogy as mistaken. For
the theory of causal ~owing cannot pr~s~e ~a~ we ?~in with-
out a physical world and that God, in ~~nking I.ts.Intelhgrble parts
and structure, mysteriously generates It Into beIn~. The w?ole doc-
tr·ne of eternal creation precludes this interpretatIOn. BesIdes, pro-
d~dion of this sort really amounts to a form of cr.eation ~ ni~ilo. It
gives no explanation whatever of ho",: the ma~erIal ~onstitutI~n of
the world could derive from a totally Immaterial DeIty. But neI~er
does causal Imowing mean that the world is somehow an ongoIng
of moments in the mental life of the Deity. Such congeries of Ideas
more closely resemble al-GhazIDf's universe of ephemeral atoms and
accidents than Averroes's world of powerful, interacting particulars.
Rather the world of moving spheres and concrete individuals is
presup~osed throughout, as the doctrine of et:rnal c~e.ation would
require, and this is precisely what enables God s cognItIve act to be
causally efficacious. The question is how. .. , .
The essence of the doctrine is the propOSItIOn that God s Intel-
lect and the intelligibles, it thinks are the cause of the forms of the
existents. In certain cases, Averroes alters the claim somewhat and
suggests that God's Imowledge or Imowing is the cause of the exist-
ents themselves or of the order, arrangement, and wisdom which
exist in things.81 The interchangeability of intellect, intelligibles, and
act of Imowing, on the one hand, and forms of existents, ~ange.men~,
and simply existents on the other, provides at least. prlTT,;a faCie eV.I-
dence that the mode of causation Averroes has In mInd here IS
ultimately formal and final. While he never f~i~s to add ~at God is
plainly derivative. . . .
An excellent example of this causal PriOrity appears In the fol-
lowing exposition of God's causallmowing:
The first possesses a quiddity that exists ab~olutely, .an~ all o~e.r
existents receive their quiddity only through It, and thiS FlTst PrmcI-
pie is the [one] existent which knows existents absolutely, because
existents become existent and intelligible only through the ~owl­
edge this principle has of i:self; .f~r .s.ince thi~ First Principle IS the
cause of the existence and mtellIll1bllIty of exiStents, and smce they
exist through their quiddities and ar~ inte.lli.gi?~e throusI:' its kno,,:l~e,
it is the cause of the existence and mteiligibility of thelT qUlddltles.
causal efficacy in the sublunar realm is based on the premise that
 242 AVERROfS AND 1HE MITAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
the forms. or s~ecific natures of things determine their specific acts.
In the Thrrd DIScussion, Averroes gives even stronger confirmation
of this view.
.. 1t is evident according to the philosophers that he who bestows
on the immaterial existents their end is identical with him who bestows
on them their existence, for according to them form and end are identi-
cal in this kind of existent, and he who bestows on these existents
their end gives them their form and he who bestows [on them] their
form i~ ~eir agent. And the~ef~re it is clear that the First Principle is
the prrnclple of all these prmclples, and that He is an agent, a form
and an end. And as to His relation to the sensible existents, He is-sinc~
He bestows on them the unity which causes their plurality and the
unification of their plurality- the cause of all of them, being their
agent, form and end, and all the existents seek their end by their
mov~ment towards Him, and this movement by which they seek their
end IS the movement for the sake of which they were created, and in
so f~r as this con~ems all existents, this movement exists by nature,
and III so far as thIS concerns men, it is vo1untary.83
. While the analysis of Divine causation offered here is excep-
tIOnally compact, the line of argument is clear. The context pre-
sumes that God's specific act is as we have described. It is to know.
To know actually is to be an intellect in act, and to be an intellect
in act, for the Deity at least, is not only to be the highest of the
separate Intelligences, but to embrace cognitionally all the particu-
lar ends at which all things aim. But at the same time, this is just
what it is for Him to be both a final and a formal cause.
Thus, in knowing all of the forms and patterns thought by the
other separate Intelligences but especially their complete teleologi-
cal order, God provides the Intelligences not only with objects of
knowledge but also with a map or kinetic code of their own functions.
In short, He provides them with their respective ends. Without this
teleological arrangement of forms, they could not be actualized as
Intelligences, which is to say, that they could not be. But by think-
ing their ends, God is the final cause of their being. The order of
natural priority, moreover, is significant. He who gives the existents
their end gives them their form, and He who gives them their form
is their agent.
When Averroes turns to God's causal status in relation to sensi-
ble substances, he characterizes it as a giving of unity, and specifi-
cally a unity which links together an unidentified plurality. By itself
all this would be hopelessly obscure, were it not for Averroes' previ-
ous discussion of eternal creation and the way in which it is carried
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 243
out. For in that context, giving unity consists in bringing together
whatever corresponds to matter and form. This is the linking of the
unidentified plurality. As he goes on to explain in the Long Commen-
tary on the Metaphysics, this amounts to draw~ng :o~.ething from a
potential state to full actuality. Simply stated, It SIgnifIes mo~ement
or"change, and Averroes confirms this in our passage by notmg that
all existents seek their end by movement toward Him, that is, toward
complete activity.
Now the most conspicuous examples of such movement, as we
have seen, are the circular movements of the spheres. They move
eternally in their various ways, according to Averroes, precisely
because God thinks the patterns of their specific natures and acts.
He thereby presents them with an intrinsically desirable paradigm
of activity which is functionally congruous with their own "desider-
ative" powers to be moved. It is in this sense that His act of know-
ing causes their actual being. It induces the movement in which
their existence consists, but it does so as a formal and final cause.
The model likewise applies to the sensible particulars of the
sublunar world, in which new individuals constantly come into being
through the movements of both the celestial bodies and sublunar
substances. As such, it explains how God can know generable and
corruptible existents without undergoing change. For the movements
by which they seek their ends, as Averroes notes above, are those
on account of which they are created. In other words, their coming
into being ultimately occurs on account of final causation, and the
final cause of all movement is the continuous and unchanging act
of the Divine mind knowing the forms and ends of things in their
best arrangement. Beyond this no special act of contemplative pro-
duction seems necessary to explain how the active powers of things
successively receive their structure and harmony or why they fol-
low "the law of the intellect." They and the various efficient causes
which produce them simply seek their ends, either by nature or
volition. God, in turn, "knows them into being" without undergoing
change by being cognitionally identical with the ends at which their
efficient causes aim.
. Finally, this analysis of causal knowing indicates what Averroes
means in saying that God's knowledge is neither of universals nor
particulars, but is nevertheless more like knowledge of the latter
than the former. For in human cognition both kinds of knowledge
consist in an abstractive process, which requires that the forms of
 244 AVERROfS AND TIlE MErAPHYSICS OF CAusATION
particular objects be received ab extra. The knower must be caused
to know, and therefore, he must at some point be a potential knower.
But a~ an intelligence separate from all materiality and already identi-
cal WIth all of the forms and ends of things, God can never be a
potential knower. His knowledge, therefore, unlike that of human
beings, will have neither universals nor particulars as objects.
. The philosophical basis for his subsequent and admittedly puz-
zlmg comparison of Divine knowledge to knowledge of particulars
is twofold. First, in the Aristotelian noetic, knowledge of universals
carries an additional dimension of potentiality vis-a.-vis that of
p~iculars: While both presuppose a state of cognitional identity
WIth a partIcular form, the intelligible structure of this or that thing,
. only knowledge of universals signifies that the particular form actu-
ally known can be taken to characterize an indefinite number of
such individuals. It can be used for purposes of identification again
and again, universally. In this sense, then, the universal concept is
a kind of capacity to re-apply a particular act of knowing to similar
ca.ses as they arise. To the extent that knowing universals implies
thIS added element of capacity and potentiality, it is less adequate
as a description of Divine knowledge than knOwing particulars, which
always connotes actual knowing.84
The second reason derives from the special sense in which
A~erroes unde~stands causal knowing. By His cognitional identity
WIth the paradIgms of all specific natures in their best order, God
not only determines what the intelligible structures and causal rela-
tions of things can be, He also sets in motion the purely natural
processes that generate particular individuals and states of affairs.
All this is accomplished insofar as God is a final cause. The ultimate
~ff~c~s or objects of His knowledge, therefore, will inevitably be
mdlvlduals, because only individuals can be meaningfully under-
stood to seek after or move toward an end. This is why Averroes
can conclude his discussion of causal knowledge by saying, "And he
who has understood this understands the Divine words: 'Nor shall
there escape from it [God's knowledge] the weight of an atom either
in the heavens or in the earth.' ''85 God "knows" even the lowly atom, if
to know it is to be identical with its formal and final cause.
If our. understanding of Averroes on causal knOwing is correct,
the doctrme turns out to be a rather ingenious device for both
concealing and hinting at his identification of God with the Unmoved
Mover of Aristotle. To be sure, several of its features indicate that
245
The [)odrine of Etf!17lai Creation
Averroes' God bears a distinct resemblance to ~e. Plotini~n N?us,
who likewise thinks the intelligibles by being cognltlonally Id~ntlcal
with them. Still, Averroes found sufficient textual ~ounds I~ the
genuine works of Aristotle to present the interpretatIOn as faIthful
to ~ views of the Stagirite. Certainly, the dominant fe~tures of the
theory are Aristotelian-God is the highest of the Intelhgenc~~, and
properly described as such. He is totally uncaused and. uncondItioned.
His specific act is continuous thought capable of movmg the spheres.
His causation is pre-eminently final. .
But if this helps to locate his theory in the historical contmuum,
we must also note several inadequacies which seriously compro-
mise its ability to function as a philosophically viable account of
causal efficacy. .. .
The first, of course, is the notion of final causatIOn Itself, whIch
to the modern reader has a most unlamiliar ring. Why a separate
form or Intelligence should move anything at all re~ains o?scure.
To argue that it does so, because it is intrinsically de:'lrable, I~ores
the fact that whether something is desirable or not IS esse~tlal.ly.a
normative question rather than a purely factual one. WhIle ~t ~s
true that normative questions are intimately rel~~ed to what. IS m
fact the case, I believe it is also clear that desirablhty as ~uch IS not
some obvious and inherent characteristic in things whIch can be
identified and sought after as a matter of fact. It reflects rather a
ranking of values and goals on the part of those who desire or r~flect
on desire, and not even Averroes suggests that the spheres dehber-
ate on such things.
Admittedly the sharp distinction between facts and values or
between "is" and "ought" implied in this criticism is a modern on~.
It continues to be a subject of philosophic controversy and, as It
stands would not have been acceptable to medieval Aristotelians.
in all ~robability, they would have argued against it al?ng so~e­
thing like the following lines: what is desira~le for any glve~ thmg
depends upon its specific nature. in general, It wou.ld be ~q~lvalent
to the constitution and behavior the thing would ~Isplay m ItS ~lly
developed state. Whatever their specific natures ~mght be, al~ thmgs
aim at their various developed states, and it IS these whIch are
properly called desirable. For animate beings, this ~,:,oun~s .to ~av­
ing a mature constitution which 'perf~rms its spe~lhc actlvl~ m. a
satisfying way. For inanimate bemgs, It probably mvo~ve.s bemg m
one's natural place and/or performing one's characterIstIc act. The
 246 AVERROES AND TIlE METAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
main point for these Aristotelians, however, is that these are all
facts, not merely values associated with facts. My point, on the other
hand, is that it is entirely legitimate to question whether all of the
aforementioned claims are factual, for example, that there is a sin-
gle fully developed state at which things in a particular group aim,
that this state is desirable, etc. Moreover, if these alleged facts turn
out to be covert statements of value, it remains an open question
whether what they assert ought to be desired, either by men or by
celestial Intelligences.86
If, on the other hand, we set aside the question of final causa-
tion and suppose the Intelligences move things as configurations of
active powers which are functionally congruous with the passive
powers of the spheres and their contents to desire movement, then
Averroes seems to have become entangled in a category mistake.
For passive powers are capacities to be acted upon, while desiring
and moving in response to desire seem to be active rather than
passive powers.
Secondly, Averroes assigns two meanings to the word "know"
in the doctrine of causal knowing and seems to shift between them
at will in developing the theory. One is the notion of cognitional
identity with intelligible objects. This is at least consistent with the
attempt to explain a recognizable doxastic attitude or epistemic
state. But the second meaning, actualizing particular potentialities
as a final cause, has no recognizable connection with a doxastic
attitude. To claim that it really signifies God's act of knowing the
forms of things and that this is a final cause, merely begs the question.
For why should that actualize particular potentialities which are
presumably external to itself any more than a philosopher's reflec-
tion? Clearly, the only capacities brought to fulfillment by such activ-
ity are the thinker's Own. Thus when the theory of causal knowing is
recognizably epistemic, it is not causal, and when it is causal, it is
not epistemic.
Finally there appears to be a serious difficulty with regard to
the content of God's knowledge, once it is identified with the forms
of the existents and their harmonious order. For if we represent
this content as a kind of non-pictorial map of what there is, it seems
entirely reasonable to suppose that God's own causal relation with
the world would be included in the map. This is surely implied in
Averroes' conception of God as a separate form with His own spe-
cific act. It is also implied in his arguing for functional congruity
and harmonious order between God's contemplative activity and
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 247
the production of actual existents. But if God's causal relation to
the world is included in the map, then the fact that the relation
originates in God's contemplating the content of His know/edge entails
that this map will necessarily include a second map that repro-
du~s the content of God's knowledge in its causal relation with the
world a second time. And here again, insofar as that causal relation
originates in God's contemplating the content of His knowledge, there
will be a third map depicting this causal relation a third time, and
so on ad infinitum.s7 The result is that if God's knowledge is to be
truly comprehensive, it must embrace an infinite number of objects
and relations in an infinite number of maps. But this is precisely
where the problem arises, because contrary to our initial assumption,
it turns out that God's knowledge is not and cannot be comprehen-
sive on the Averroian model. For while there is an infinity of objects
and relations to be known, Averroes' own assumptions require that
God qua knowing form is necessarily finite.
To be sure, the idea seems strange initially, and it is hard to
imagine Averroes granting it. In fact, we might well expect him to
argue in reply that we have merely confused the human intellect
with the Divine intellect. Still, our conclusion seems inescapable,
not on the basis of any alleged comparison of the human intellect
with the Divine, but on the basis of Averroes' Aristotelian assump-
tion that the Deity is a separate Intelligence. For a separate Intelli-
gence is simply an impassive, immaterial form, and any form, sepa-
rate or otherwise, is finite and delimited qua form.88 On Averroes'
assumptions, then, God as a separate and delimited form must be
cognitionally identical with an infinite number of knowable objects,
and this seems to be quite impossible. In the end, therefore, the
theory by which God knows all things and causes them to be by
turning inward on Himself in thought proves unsatisfactory, because it
requires a finite Deity to do what is by rights the work of an infinite
one.
It is conceivable, of course, that Averroes' theory of causal know-
ing might be salvaged if our interpretation of it were revised. Instead
of linking it to the activity of a finite Intelligence on the Aristotelian
model, we might construe causal knowing as an inexhaustible
"overflow" of forms from an infinite self-thinking Deity. There are
certainly enough references to emanation in his earlier exegetical
writings as well as the Tahllfut to make this hypothesis plausible.
But in order to assess its viability as an alternative, whatever the
248 AvrnROfS AND TIlE ME:rAPHYsICS OF CAusATION
difficulties in the Aristotelian view, we shall have to consider briefly
what Averroes understood by emanation and whether he believed
in it as an adequate model of causal efficacy.
Did Averroes Snbscrlbe to the Theory of Emanatlon?89
Averroes' most extensive treatment of the theory of emanation
appears in the second half of the Third Discussion of the Tahafut,
although shorter but equally illuminating references to it can be
found in the Seventeenth Discussion as well as in his commentaries
on the Aristotelian corpus. Characteristically, the theory is associated
with Avicenna's largely Neo-Platonic account of how God is the Agent
and Maker of the universe. That account was designed to resolve
the problem of how the Deity, as a unique, simple, and incorporeal
being, was able to produce and maintain the materia] world in all
its manifold complexity. On the assumption that God's action had
to be consistent with His simple nature, as the notion of efficient
causation requires, it was clear that the multiplicity which charac-
terizes the world could hardly have derived from His direct action.
For the product of God's direct action would also have to be unique
and simple. Consequently the theory proposed that the multiplicity
of the material world derived indirectly from God, through the media-
tion of a continuous series of individuals of various kinds, proceed-
ing from other causally prior and simpler individuals.
As it stands, this claim has several important features which
can serve as criteria for clarifying Averroes' own position. Surely
the most distinctive of these is the conception of causation as a
kind of procession ($Udfo; proventio), overflow (faye!, proventus), or
necessary consequence (/uziIm, secutus). This implies that the actu-
ality of anything that can serve as a cause consists in a certain
plenitude of being. When it has more than enough being for itself, it
expresses itself actively by overflowing. This activity, in turn, is neces-
sarily outgoing and communicative of itself. It not only belongs to
the cause, but also extends outward from it in a continuous fashion,
like light extending from the sun or a shadow proceeding from an
opaque body.90 This continuous emanation functions as the ontologi-
cal tie that binds cause and effect.
The Avicennian version of the theory further develops the
assumption that an action must be consistent with the essential
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 249
nature of its cause and stipulates what may be called "the rule of
uniqueness." This requires that there be a one-to-one correspo?d-
ence between cause and effect. Thus, "from the one only one thlOg
may proceed."'" When the one in question is God, this means that
H<'!! has only a single specific act, just as natural causes do, and
accordingly a single effect.
The single effect in this case is the first Intelligence (al- 'aql
al-awwa~ intellectus primus) which is clearly to be distinguished from
its cause, the First Principle (al-mabda' al-awwal, primum princip-
ium). Since only the first Intelligence gives rise to th~ :ubse~~nt
spheres, souls, and separate Intelligences by its cognitive actlvl~,
it turns out that God neither moves nor presides over any celestial
body within this cosmological scheme. He is radically transcendent.92
Beyond this, the theory of emanation depicts God's causation
as vertical and unidirectional. It extends outwards and, from a geo-
centric perspective, downward to the sublunar world. This makes
God the terminus a quo of emanation and material things in the
sublunar world its terminus ad quem.93
Finally, at the lower end of the scheme of celestial Intelligences,
we find that the tenth or Active Intelligence is identified as the
immediate source of the specific forms bestowed on things beneath
the sphere of the moon. This means that it does not preside over
the lunar sphere as its mover and does not properly belong to the
celestial domain.94
Given these criteria, there is clear evidence that in the decade
prior to his completing the Tahafut, Averroes acc~pted.virtu.ally the
entire account outlined by Avicenna. If we examlOe hiS EpItome of
Aristotle's Metaphysics, probably written between 1174 and 1178, we
find Averroes arguing that the One, in contrast to the other sepa-
rate substances or Intelligences, is absolutely simple, unable to con-
template any multiplicity either internal or external .to its~lf, and
the cause of the unity of other substances. The modahty of ItS cau-
sation is neatly expressed in the rule of uniqueness that from what
is one, insofar as it is one, only one thing proceeds. The terminol-
ogy he uses to express this causation is consistently that of proces-
sion and necessary consequence. Also, Averroes clearly distinguishes
the First Principle from the first Intelligence, even though he recog-
nizes that for Aristotle the mover of the stellar sphere is "the noblest
of these movers" and "the first cause of those [others]." Indeed, the
reason for the distinction underscores further his commitment to
250 AVERROfSAND lHEMITAPHYsICS OF CAUSATION
the emanative model: more than one fonn proceeds from the mover
of th~ ~ellar sphere, indicating that its essence has parts that require
a unIfying cause, whereas from that which is one and simple as
such, only one entity necessarily proceeds. Having no parts, the
One must be God, the true cause of all things. Also, when he speaks
of the direction of causation in the celestial scheme of causes and
effects, he consistently describes the series as descending rather
than ascending. He thereby expresses a typical Neo-Platonic con-
cern to derive the many from the One, rather than an Aristotelian
one of relating the many to the one, as a formal and final cause.
Finally, the Active Intelligence in Averroes' Epitome functions
in much the same way as in the standard account of the falli.sifah
bestowing forms on the various species of sublunar existents fro~
outside the physical order. His only divergence from that account is
his identification of the Active Intelligence with the mover of the
lunar sphere. But this particular exception does little more than
accentuate Averroes' acceptance of the emanative theory in general.
Indeed, even when his comments signal recognition of difficulties in
the doctrine, he nevertheless tries to defend it against objections,
and he expresses considerable confidence in the force of his replies.95
However, by the time Averroes completed the Tahiifut some-
time after 1180, his attitude toward the theory had changed con-
siderably. In the wake of al-Ghazali's detailed refutation of the the-
ory in general and the rule of uniqueness in particular, we frequently
find Averroes in the unusual position of agreeing with his opponent.
Typically, his response to al-Ghaz:;:II's basic criticisms (that is, that
the rule of uniqueness was violated in one way or another at every
level of the emanative hierarchy and that the whole notion of con-
templation producing real entities was absurd) was to concede the
specific point at issue, but also to insist that the ancient philosophers,
as opposed to their modem Islamic counterparts, never committed
any such error. Despite these concessions, however, he continued
to employ emanative terminology throughout the work. It is not
surprising therefore that scholars have been divided about whether
Averroes gave up the theory altogether or merely modified it in
accordance with al-Ghaza:li's objections.96 In order for us to deter-
mine what, if anything, remains of the doctrine, it would be useful
to apply the same criteria by which the theory was originally defined.
The most striking difference is that in the Tahafut Averroes
denies that the rule of uniqueness applies to all instances of causal
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 251
efficacy. Indeed, it is absolutely mistaken when used as a model of
Divine and celestial causation, because it surreptitiously introduces
multiplicity into the scheme of causes, and because it presupposes
a similarity between observable and unobservable agents that sim-
Vi' does not exist. Averroes plainly assigns greater weight to the
second of the two reasons and argues that anyone who presumes
such a similarity is "utterly thoughtless, profoundly mistaken and
in complete error.''97
When he turns to the distinction al-Farabf and Avicenna drew
between the First Principle and the first Intelligence and their claim
that the latter's contemplation of both the former and itself begins
to generate the diversity of the world-order, Averroes dismisses the
entire conception as an error. "This, however, is a mistake accord-
ing to philosophical teaching, for thinkers and thought are one identi-
cal thing in the human intellect and this is still more true in the
case of the separate intellects.''98 His point seems to be that if the
first Intelligence, which moves the outermost sphere, contemplates
the First Principle, it must be cognitionally identical with it, and
since there is no material or other factor to distinguish them inso-
far as they are immaterial, they must be entirely identical. Lest it
be thought that they differ in terms of function, Averroes forecloses
even that possibility in his Long Commentary on the Metaphysics.
For there he cites Aristotle's view that if there were substances that
did not move others, their activity would be superfluous.99 In sum,
by the time he completed the Tahiifut, he rejected the distinction he
previously accepted, for he now identified God as the mover of the
outermost sphere. This would remain his considered view.
This change in his thinking is likewise reflected in the way
Averroes treats the direction of causation, even though, as we noted,
he continues to use emanative terminology. Following al-GhazalI's
summary of the emanative scheme, for example, Averroes says that
the entire account amounts to a falsehood fabricated against the
philosophers by al-Farabf, Avicenna, and others. In its place he rec-
ommends "the true theory of the ancient philosophers," namely that
"the principles of the celestial bodies, which are immaterial existents,
are the movers of these celestial bodies, and that the celestial bod-
ies move toward them in obedience and out of 10ve."IOO The effect
of this shift by Averroes is to replace the Neo-Platonic model of
downward efficient causation with the Aristotelian model of formal
causation as a principle of order and final causation as a principle
 252
AVERROES AND 1l1E METAPflYSlCS OF CAUSATION
of movement. In an important sense, causation so conceived now
moves upward rather than downward. For both God and the sepa-
rate Intelligences function chiefly as patterns of cosmic order and
~ctivity: which other entities can approximate or "measure up to"
m varymg degrees. Here the effect becomes in a certain way a
termmus a quo of such causation, since God is its terminus ad quem.
Moreover, even when Averroes continues to speak of "procession"
his paradigm for explaining it is formal and final causation such
that causes and effects "ascend" toward their goal. Thus, for example,
he explains the original intent of the ancients regarding the direc-
tion of this causation as follows: . As for the custom current among the people of our time [Le., the
. ~d the philosophers only assert that, although all these ruling .
prmclples proceed from the FIrst Principle, it is only some of them
that do so directly, whereas others, ascending gradually from the lower
world to the higher, proceed mediately. For they discovered that cer-
tain parts of heaven exist for the sake of the movements of other
parts, and they related them in each instance to a first principle till
they finally arrived at the absolutely First Prindple. 101 (emphasis added)
It would appear then that Averroes retains the terminology of ema-
nation in the Tahafut largely as a metaphor. For real explanation,
he looks beyond the fallIsifah, to Aristotle's account of formal and
final causation.
The last criterion for determining Averroes' attitude toward the
theory of emanation lies in the causal role he assigns to the Active
intelligence. While he had argued in the Epitome that only the exist-
ence of the Active Intelligence as a proximate Giver of forms could
adequately account for the universal intelligible characteristics of
particulars, he seems far less confident about that view in the TahlIfut.
At least twice he indicates that there is a disagreement among phi-
losophers regarding the nature of such a cause; for some it is the
heavenly sphere alone, that is, the totality of physical causes, while
for others it is an immaterial existent beside the sphere, namely
the bestower of forms. Still, at one point he does register his own
opinion, and it marks a significant departure from his previous view.
... The forms in the sublunary world are acquired from the heav-
enly bodies and also from each other, indifferently, whether they are
forms of the elements which are in imperishable prime matter or
form.s of bodies composed out of elements, and, indeed the composi-
lIon ill thIS sublunary world arises out of the heavenly bodies. 102 (emphasis
added) . lesser exte~t. It is in this way that the God of Averroes may be said
Here again the evidence indicates that Averroes jettisons a keyele-.
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 253
ment in the emanative account of cauSation. The ~e intelligenc~,
once a metaphysical keystone in accounting for phYSIcal change, IS
·103
now omitted from the structure 0 f exp1anatIOn. .
Perhaps the best summary of the position Averroes begms to
articul~e in the Tahlifut can be found in the Long Commentary on
the Metaphysics, which is generally regarded as a la~e work. ~ere,
in his comments on Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, he dIgresses bnefly
to evaluate the emanative doctrine of the falusifah, and to indicate
as unambiguously as possible how Divine causation ought to be
understood.
falZIsifah] in saying that such and such a mover. has proceeded from
such and such a mover or has emanated from It or has necessarily
followed from it or some such expression, it shows a misunderstand-
ing about these separate principles. For all of these expr~sions are
included among the characteristics of agents taken .at first gla~ce,
but not in reality, because, as we have stated preVIOUSly, nothmg
proceeds from an agent unless it be the act ~f dr.awing forth. that
which is in potentiality to actuality. But here [I.e., m the domam of
celestial Intelligences or movers] there is no potentiality, and ther<:-
fore [with respect to God] there is no Agent there, but only an Intelli-
gence and an object of thought, something which perfects and some-
thing perfected by it, as is the case with certain arts that are ~erf~,,?
by others. That is [possible] because some of them take their princI-
ples from others, and all of these may be traced. back in what. they do
to taking all of their own principles from the UnIversal art which com·
prehends them. Therefore, we see that the knowledge which is most
appropriate to the First includes first philosophy [metaphysics] ....'01
In the end the emanative model is rejected because it misconstrues
even the nature of efficient causation. What initially appeared to be
an overflow of something from the cause to that on which it acts,
turns out under scrutiny to be nothing more than an actualization
of the inherent capacities of what is acted upon. That actualization
is ultimately made possible by a single universal art-the intelligi-
ble content thought by the First Unmoved Mover. While it is true
that arts as such are not really agents and therefore do not "perform"
tasks, they can nevertheless guide or direct the activity of .agents.
They do so by providing agents with standards a~d paradIgms of
what an action can produce and how the operatIOn can best be
carried out which the agents in tum approximate to a greater or
to make things happen. He is the Agent and Maker of the world
 254 AVERROfSAND TIlEMETAPHYsICS OF CAusATION 255
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation
insofar as He draws things forth fr GhazalI's Tahl'Ifut al-Fa/l'Isifah. For the latter's persistent critique of
ner in which He does . th om potency to act; but the man-
so IS at of a formal and final cause every aspect of the doctrine would surely have added to the doubts
.We can now conclude that in the Tahafut A . . Averroes already recognized regarding it in the Epitome and forced
retamed nor even modified the theo 0 . ve~oes neIther
ingful sense. Judging by every one o(th f f~man~tIO? many mean-
him to re-evaluate whether the Aristotelian account of Divine causa-
the theory, it is clear that he rejected ~t
causation. If emanative tenninology. t.ll. a m.
1::crIteria that id~~tify
0del
of effIcIent
... tion suffered from the same faults as that of al-Farabl and Avicenna.
Certainly the Tahl'Ifut displays a persistent attempt to disengage
. ISSI musemtheT.hafu· the views of the fonner from the latter. If this is correct, it suggests
remams . largely
. as a survival of hI·S earI
Ier. VIew
. or perha t, It that Averroes was not always the pure and convinced Aristotelian
mere lInguIstic convention, much like the Engr h d ". aps as a that many have supposed, but something of a philosophical "convert";
It has no technical or explanatory force at all. IS wor mfluence."
and what convinced him to convert, ironically enough, was not so
t To ask therefore, as we did initially, whether Averroes subs ·b much the teaching of Aristotle by itself but the attacks of his impla-
F~rthe theory of e:nanation is really to ask an incomplete que~~oe;; cable opponent, al-Ghaml!.
v:
e must specIfy the point in his career to which th
applIes. Before 1174 there is more
..
e questIOn
By taking this step toward Aristotle, Averroes was undoubtedly
Epitome of the Metaphysics to show th~:~ea.d~qU~te evid<;nce in his
able to give a far more compelling account of natural causation
emanative model But by th t· h m ee subscribed to the than his predecessors had done. Indeed, he was also able to avoid
. e Ime e completed th 7' h ' . many of the internal inconsistencies that beset their theories of
some time after 1180 h h d ch .. e ,a a,ut m or
, e a anged hIS VIew com I t I Divine and celestial causation as well. Still, in rejecting the theory
though he did not entirely alter his wa of . . . p e. e y, even
emanation with I· Y expressmg It. He replaced of emanation and its conception of an infinite God, Averroes also
. a p amly formal and finalistic conception of Di . compromised his own account of Divine causation. For as our dis-
ca~satIOn, and as the Long Commentary on the Meta h . vme cussion of causal knowing has shown, even the eternal and uninter-
thIS would remain his considered view p YS'CS attests,
rupted self-thinking of Averroes' philosopher-God cannot embrace
We can only speculate as to wh~t prompted tho ch cognitionally the infinity of causal relations that make up the world
Averroes' part· h. IS ange on
intellectual de~:~~~~e:t.P~~~~~~:i=: .information a~out hi~ own He is said to produce. There are limits, it seems, to what a philoso-

:r~:~r;~ ~ee ~~:;~yOf his growing fa~::i:i~~i~~~n;.~::o~~~:~

pher can know, even when the philosopher is God Himself.

~~~:~~h~eEPitome 0;t~ev~~::;1;~~~r~fh~:t~l~a!~~!~:e~i::~ Conclusion

. ~eory of emanatIOn. NeIther is it likely that his espo I
of emanatIOn m the Ep·t
both the Tahafut a d u: d.
o;e an hIS subsequent rejection of it in
usa At first glance, our examination of Averroes' doctrine of causal effi-
cacy appears to have yielded a largely negative result. For the Tahl'Ifut
philosophical or P~Iitica~ a;~d~~~:e~~?u:-eflects ~difference in debates do not present a single, systematic exposition and defense
intended for different audiences. For even U::~g~Ol were really of causation in all of its ramifications. Rather, Averroes' treatment
master of esoteric writing, we should remember verroes was a of the issues assumes the form of a running commentary on al-
the Epitome as a technical work of philosophical ~:tghe. presented GhazaU's critique of philosophy in the Tahafut al-FaLasifah. As such,
popular comm t B esIS, not as a it is often diffuse and at times ambiguous as well.
.Tahafut for a m:~ha~·de; r:~~~~tipe::~ !:I~gh.~e designed. ~e But as we have seen, the literary character of his response was
ISSUes both reli iou I .. WI more sensItIve deliberate. Recognizing the sensitive theological context in which
aband~ned the :octr~ y anfd polItI?all~, he nevertheless effectively
. me 0 emanatIOn m that work.Ios the relevant problems were raised, Averroes designed the Tahafut
A more plaUSIble explanation is his probable reaction to al- al-Tahafut primarily for "philosophers-to-be," with a view toward
preparing them to studY strictly "scientific" or demonstrative works.
 256 AVERROES AND lllEM£I'APHYsICS OF CAUSATION The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 257

But the Tahlifut itself, he 0 nl . one genuine Agent, but nowhere mentions it in his general remarks
such a work As a res It Ape Y admits, was not intended to
. u , :verroes' twofold th d on agents.
certaIn elements of his p ' f . me 0 of OI!;cI()siI,c The chief point at issue in these respective definitions of agents,
tions, requires constant ~~I lon, While concealing their full . however, is whether sensible particulars of any kind have specifiC
e erence to the work of "th
the standard by which h . hed . e ancients" ~tures by virtue of which they can necessitate or compel certain
This methodological r e .WlS his own claims to be understood characteristic effects to occur. We have fOUIld that Averroes agrees
equrrement has repeated!'d .
eftorts at interpretation
. . Thus, we have made al>y gm daned our 0WIi . with the philosophers, in contrast to al-GhazaIr, that things have
commentaries, not only to see ho A un t use of his such natures and that their activities must be characterized as nec-
b t t '11 w :verroes underStOOd th .
. u .0 I ustrate how his discussion of th. . e anCients, essary in conformity with them. But he rejects the philosophers'
Ify hiS treatment of causal effic . their views can help to clar- conception of a reciprocity relation between efficient causes and
. acy In e Tahiifut Th .
works ,In short, represent an indo . ' . e exegetical their effects by which they are inseparably linked and mutually
Tahlifut debates. Ispensable aid for Interpreting the
entailed. Such a relation holds only for formal and final causes and
While Averroes presents these their effects, while efficient causes are at all times and in principle
of al-GhazalI' argument . exchanges as a critical analysis· separable from their effects. This, as we have seen, indicates both
that they also contain: a?aInst the p.hilosophers, we have found Averroes' familiarity with and acceptance of the "in principle" argu-
vigorous critIque of th I I .
Ph ers themselves which' fr e s amlc philoso- ment by which an efficient cause may be posited and its effect denied
evident in his crit~riologi~1 equently overlooked. This is especially without contradiction. As a result, we have found that he does not
Discussion, where he examin:~co~t of agents and acts in the Third regard causal and logical necessity as different sides of the same
a
of his predecessors on how GOd ? ~valuates the conflicting claims coin, as did Avicenna and his followers, nor does he construe neces-
verse and the latter is Hi t IS e Agent and Maker of the uni- sary connection as an ontological link between cause and effect.
sac.
As we have seen, Averroes steers . d Both of these conclusions in tum cast doubt upon the plenitude/
the philosophers' view that I ~ In ependent course between overflow model of causation, since it affirms just such a link
causa efficacy is an .
agent/ patient relation in which t h . expressIOn of any Our analysis of the temporal relations between efficient causes
only P?ssible, proceeds necessaril e f=t:ce of the effect, in itself and effects, in tum, indicates that for Averroes and the philosophers,
a plemtude/overflow model, and ~I-Gh ~ nat~~ of the cause on causal efficacy obtains per se only when agent and patient are
be ascribed only to an anl'm t azah s rejOInder that it can temporally co-existent. This co-existence, in fact, is implied in the
a e agent who know 'Il
ch ooses to create his acts w ' t h ' S, WI s, and freely notion that causation consists in an individual's having a direct
is, ex nihilo. Averroes mai~talinso~t ~nYdreference to a patient, that impact on, exercising power over, or producing existence in some-
simply to the characteristic beh I~S ea f that causal efficacy refers thing other than itself, even if it is only something possible or
in relation to other thing Wh a~lOr ~ an agent or efficient cause potential. Causation is thus a genuinely dyadic relation, inasmuch
. th s. at primarily charact' ch
IS at it draws something fr emes su a cause as only a co-existent particular or state of affairs is directly alterable
tion or by natIrre. Moreove ~~ p:ency to act, either by delibera- in principle. Their counterparts in the past cannot be altered at all,
of affairs by virtue of its sp:~~. pr uc.es ne~ individuals or states while those in the future can be affected only indirectly. Thus, given
change in other existents as patli~~~P~I.ty. to Induc~ certain kinds of the cause, the effect must occur without delay, unless it is somehow
constitutive powers and th d' :. IS IS a functIon of its intrinsic, impeded. While both the philosophers and Averroes allow for cases
th e ISposltIons of the paf t A
us the only participant in th d b ' len. verroes is in which causes and their effects may succeed one another in time,
explicitly the notion of causal eo': at~ to Introduce and discuss they ascribe these non-contemporaneous instances to a transient
and voluntary agents While th Phil ers In relation to both natural or accidental order, which is shown to include either intervening
th ff . e p osophers presup th .
ey 0 er no account of it t I . pose e notion causal relations which were at one time co-existent or to be part of
I Gh I ,a east not In the Tah-fut h '
a - aza 1 ultimately reserves I a . w ereas
causa power to God alone as the

258 AVERROES AND TIlEME:TAPHYSICS OF CAUSATION
an ongoing process, whose various stages can be traced to the same
cause.
. I~ is this relation of temporal co-existence and Aristotle's dis-
tmctlon between kineseis and energeiae, moreover, which enable
Averroes to rank the various kinds of causes and effects in a hierar-
chy by referen<;e to the continuity and uniformity of their efficacy.
The more contmuous and stable their specific acts in relation to
what they.act upon, the more worthy they are of the title "agent."
The. o~~oslte holds true for causes with discontinuous action and
va.nabIlI~ of effect. By this standard, God may be regarded as the
pnmary mstance of an agent only if His activity is continuous and
invariant. The world, in turn, can be the primary instance of an
effect, only insofar as it has continuous and unifonn circular motion
in short, only if it is eternal.
While the criteriological analysis of agents and acts reveals
fundamental differences between the metaphysical presuppositions
of the philosophers, al-Ghazalf, and Averroes, it does not suffice to
explain them. Explanation of those differences appears only in the
Seventeenth Discussion where they present their respective analy-
ses and ~valuations of the empirical and metaphysical grounds for
and agamst necessary causal connection. It is in these arguments
that the various parties to the debate disclose their basic ontologi-
cal commitments.
The philosophers, it is clear, presuppose a world of enduring
substances and accidents linked together by real relations which
can b.e ~scertained only after repeated observations of ;egular
associatIOn. Necessary causal connection for them is just such a
relation. More specifically, it is a necessary accident of substances
:v~ich links th~m together as agent and patient. But precisely becaus~
It IS characterIZed as an accident, it is also extraneous to the essences
of things, so that the identification of essential natures as such is
possible apart from their causal relations.
al-Ghaza:Il, however, rejects necessary causal connection in any
form and specifically dismisses its identification with the ground-
consequence relation. While he generally refrains from explicit for-
mulations of his ontological commitments, it is nonetheless clear
that he subscribes to an ontology of radically discrete and ephem-
eral events. These are created ex nihilo in al-Ghazalf's view by the
only agent satisfying his criteria for agency, the Deity. Moreover,
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 259
they bear no other relations to one another th~n conti~ity ~nd
succession and must therefore be regarded as mert and meffIca-
cious as well. Whatever regular associations they are observed to
have are imposed entirely ab extra. Thus, what the philosophers
... see as concrete, enduring particulars are no more than momentary
configurations of accidental qualities supported by equally ephem-
eral atoms. It is this punctiform ontology of powerless events that
underlies his insistence that no real links are ever observed between
so-called causes and their effects, regardless of repeated associations,
and that it is always possible to affirm the "cause" and deny the
"effect" without contradiction.
Averroes, for his part, denies both the philosophers' contention
that repeated observations are always necessary to make valid causal
' judgments and al-GhazaIr's claim that all we ever observe are con-
comitances of events. The fact is that we often directly observe
enduring and powerful individuals acting on other individuals, even ~n
single or unique instances. Thus, while al-GhazaIr may b~ con:ect m
noting the lack of empirical evidence for any ontological lInk or
tertium quid between causes and their effects, there is also no such
evidence for his ontology of punctifonn events created out of nothing.
Both sides, it turns out, misconstrue the nature of causal necessity.
In Averroes' view, necessary causal connection is a modality of
how powerful particulars act. It is not something in general existing
between particulars or states of affairs, like an invisible bridge over
which efficacy mysteriously crosses. It is rather the particular set of
congruity relations by which the active powers of a cause are
matched or aligned with the passive powers of what it acts upon so
as to produce a change. When such a relation or s:t of relatio~s
obtains and the degree of power is sufficient, there IS no delay m
the efficacy of the cause. When these conditions do not fully obtain,
causal efficacy is either intermittent or absent altogether.
Such an account of causal necessity presupposes a substance/
accident ontology in which particular substances are understood
as dynamic configurations of reflexive and relational powers. On
this analysis, causal efficacy is an essential, as opposed to an
accidental, feature of what the particular is. .
Averroes goes on to employ this -conception of particulars m
his metaphysical defense of necessary causal connection. His argu-
ment, in essence, is that to deny that things have specific acts necessi-
tated by their natures is to deny that they have specific natures by
 260 AVERROFS AND lHEMIITAPHYsICS OF CAusATION 261
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation

virtue of which they are name bl d .

to deny their unity or self-iden~i;'. efmab~e and self-identical. But of efficient causes also enables Averroes to explain both how effects
possibility of being. ' m turn, IS to deny them the very are necessarily produced by their causes and how it is nonetheless
possible to affIrm the existence of a cause and deny its proper effect
Contrary to a prevailing interpretation of thi without contradiction.
construes it as a defense of the p ·b T s argument, which ..... The explanation lies in the bi-valent character of specific natures.
found instead that its. OSSI . I Ity of lmowledge, we have
. prunary concern IS with th . . In their fonnal or structural aspect, specific natures must exhibit
to exISt. As such it de ends u e capaCIty of thmgs
not developed i~ the :rgume~~~ ~o presuppositions which, while certain stable and invariant features in order for them to be the
se
Tahiifut and the commentaries I Th ,ar . e t~ken up elsewhere in the kind of things they are, such as the particular selection of their
d. . e flTst IS the notio th t b . powers and dispositions or their developmental characteristics. These
an actualIty are mutually imp!" d b n a emg are the features which ground our universal concepts about causes
thing to be actual it must act .,e y one another and that for any-
relation to something else T' '~teract: or h~ve.the power to act in and the necessary and invariant logical relationships which hold
any activity, or for that ma~terOlia~i~~';~I:c:?ert .a~ incapable of
between them. But in their dynamic aspect, the powers which con-
stitute specific natures are susceptible to quantitative measures of
be at all. The operative maxim h . th ' '~n, '~ erefore not to
The d . . . ere IS at 'bemg IS as being does .. sufficiency and deficiency by virtue of which they may be more or
. th ~on presupposItion IS related to the first It is th t . less efficacious in performing their characteristic acts. Thus, while
IS e ultimate mark of the real 0 I th .. a power a specific kind of cause should invariably and necessarily produce
cernible difference in the wo Id· .~ . at whI~ can make a dis-
or being affected, even if o~ 'i~' er m affectmg something else a certain effect, it may nonetheless fail to do so either because it
shortest time, can be consider~ realth~smallest depee or for the
was overpowered in relation to surrounding conditions, or because
or potency in . us, any demal of real power it never achieved the requisite congruity relations with the patient,
rerum natura such as al-Gh -r d or perhaps even because it changed in nature. It is primarily the
a denial of the capacity fo~ thing t b aLa I en orses, is ultimately
A s 0 e. power variability of causes in terms of limited degrees of more and
verroes suggests further that the T less that determines whether a given cause will produce its effect
things consist of active and passive pow~:~.:tur.es he f~nds in
themselves by way of form and matter r . I exISt or dIsclose always or for the most part.
The possibility of rare occurrences on this model also indicates
that powerful particulars are not espectlvely. By this he means
how Averroes probably construed miracles. For it presumes that
dispositions, but structured ensemb7er~ ag~egate~ ?f powers and
the basic capacities of natural causes do not exceed certain gener-
constituent powers cohere in s eci::S m ~~ch a !mlte selection of
ally lmown limits, if they are to maintain their specific natures.
duce the overall behavior WhiJ: ch c r~ a~IOnshIPs. so as to pro-
Consequently, for Averroes miracles do not involve either extraordi-
kind. Such a conceptual model arac enzes partIculars of that
nary extensions of the psycho-kinetic powers of prophets, as the
within any given particular are pr~supposes th~t certain powers
philosophers maintained, or heterogeneous incursions of the Deity
they organize and, as it were, ha~: :eothers m ~e ~nse that into the habitual course of events, as al-Ghazali believed. Rather,
ways under specific conditions Th Im to functIOn m specific
they are more like spontaneous natural events resulting from inter-
sponds to the form or real es . e /:u tanto arrangement corre-
ically, it is a generative mechse~ce 0 e partIcular. Taken dynam- secting causal sequences as discussed by Aristotle. Still, because
vidual's reflexive d . amsm capable of producing the indi- they serve a practical function in validating religious laws for the
an relatIOnal behavior. From a static r . untutored masses and teaching moral virtue, Averroes maintained
?n the other hand, it represents a limiting factor wh. ~ spect~e, that they ought never to be questioned, even if their causes can in
mg the abilities and susceptibTf f . Ich, m specify-
lishes its identity as being f I I Ies o. a ~artlcular, likewise estab- fact be ascertained.
b o a certam kmd In this ·t While the problem of rare and miraculous occurrences reflects
oth naming. and real definitions Possible.· way I makes the theological context in which causal efficacy was discussed in
Equally Important, we believe , is the fact that thoIS conceptIOn . the Tahiifut, we have seen that Averroes' chief concern was with the
262
AVERROFS AND 11IE METAPHYSICS OF CAusATION
regu~ar and continuo~s character of change in the sublunar world.
But m order to explam why the powers and dispositions of thing
· ch aractenstic
assu,?e th elr. . forms in generation and corruption,s
remal~ cohesive, and sustain their operation over time, Averroes
found It. necessary to introduce the notions of celestial and Divm'e
causatIOn.
Specifically, we have found that he traces the continuous fea-
tures of sublunar change to the continuous circular movement of
the celestial spheres and to the incorruptibility of their physical
constitution. The generable and corruptible features of sub lunar
change, on the other hand, are ascribed to comparable aspects of
celestial movement, such as the variety of distinct revolutions begun
and completed, planetary configurations established and dissolved
and especially solstices and equinoxes arrived at and left behind. '
The efficacy of the spheres, conceived as powerful particulars
in their OWTI right, lay in the succession of congruity relations they
establish with the elementary bodies of the sublunar world, which
they keep in motion via physical contact and temperature variation.
While the elements, if left to themselves, would invariably move
towards their natural places, the movements of the spheres pre-
clude their ever being left to themselves. By thus bringing elemen-
tary powers into proximity with one another, they facilitate the
processes of clashing and bonding which establish new particulars,
both animate and inanimate. Averroes goes on to explain the spheres'
capacity to produce life by arguing that the spheres function as a
system which manifests the behavioral characteristics of an eternal·
Uving Creature capable of generating its OWTI vital parts. As such,
he holds that it should be regarded as genuinely alive. While sev-
e~1 of the co~siderations he offers for this view are quite ingenious,
given the antiquated cosmology he presupposes, neither his argu-
ments nor his assumptions compel any such conclusion.
To the problem of why an animate celestial creature would
endlessly turn on its axis and thereby produce the particulars it
does, Averroes responds by re-working the conventional elements
of Aristotle's theory of separate substances to accord with his con-
ception of forms as configurations of powers. Each of the separate
substances or Intelligences is understood as a configuration of active
powers exclusively. As such, the Intelligences are both impervious
to corruption and change and are at the same time functionally
congruous with the passive or desiderative powers of the spheres
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 263
to be moved. By containing, in addition, the forms. of all th~ exist-
ents found in their respective spheres, the celestial IntellIgences
also provide, as it were, the structural and kinetic codes which deter-
mine the behavior of both their respective spheres and what they
con.t.;J.in.
Thus we find that for Averroes, the relation of the Intelligences
to the spheres they move is the cosmic analogue of the relation a
substantial form bears to its concrete particular, with the notable
exception that the celestial forms must be entirely separate from
matter in order to be eternally active vis-a-vis their spheres.
This exception, as we have shoWTI, introduces two major prob-
lems into Averroes' account of Divine causation which he is at pains
to resolve. The first is how an eternal sphere system may be regarded
as the act or creation of God, conceived as a separate Intelligence.
The second is how a separate form can be an agent at all, since it
belongs to an order altogether different from the physical system it
allegedly produces or acts upon.
Averroes' response to the first difficulty turned out to be the
doctrine of eternal creation. Despite conflicting interpretations of
its meaning and coherence, we have found that Averroes claims no
more than to revive an ancient Peripatetic doctrine devised as a
reply to Platonist criticism. Accordingly, he maintains that the world is
most appropriately described as everything mobile, taken distribu-
tively. Insofar as the actuality of the spheres and all other natural
things consists in moving from particular potential states .t~ actual
ones, each one is originated or created to the extent that It IS a~­
ally set in motion. While the total process has no temporal begm-
ning and does not occur ex nihilo, it is nevertheless sustained by
the activity of a supreme Agent and does result in the emergence of
both individuals and states of affairs that never existed before. On
this analysis, therefore, we find that the doctrine is not a paradox,
as is generally assumed, but is merely a restatement of Aristotle's
position in traditional theological language. Uke his ancient prede-
cessors, Averroes intended it not as a synthesis of two positions,
but as a tactical rejoinder, now to the Ghazalian critique of philo-
sophy. .
To the second problem of how a separate Intelligence may be
regarded as the efficient cause of any physical state of affairs,
Averroes responds in similar fashion. While he speaks often of a
Divine will and implies that it differentiates actual states of affairs
264 AVERROFS AND 1l1EMETAPHYsICS OF CAusATION
from others which are only lOgically possible, our examination of
what he means by will indicates that it is simply God's attribute of
goodness, by which the ordering of possible states of affairs in the
Divine mind must be the best ordering. Since the Deity is limited to
performing only the best act, the supposed act of willful creation
turns out to be the necessary replication of this teleological rank-
ing in the world itself.
Averroes, in turn, characterizes the specific act by which God
produces these particular states of affairs as causal knowing. While
his conception of this act has certain affinities with the NeD-Platonic
account of Nous, it is clear that he nonetheless identifies it with the
self-thinking activity of the Aristotelian Deity described in Metaphysics
XII. God is an agent both by inducing movement in the sphere-system
as a final cause and by determining the natures of things as their
formal cause. He produces, in sum, by continuously thinking the
forms of things with which He is cognitionally identical.
Since God's efficient causation is explained on a purely formal/
finalistic model, it is not to be identified with the emanative theory
of al-FarabT and Avicenna or for that matter with any modification
of it. While it is true that Averroes espoused the plenitude/overflow
model early in his career, there is good evidence that he rejected it
in all major respects by the time he wrote the TaMfut and the Long
Commentary on the Metaphysics. Thus, contrary to Averroes' cele-
brated image as a lifelong disciple of the Stagirite, we think it more
likely that he was a philosophic "convert" to the Aristotelian cause
and was probably influenced in changing his view, ironically enough,
by his encounter with al-GhazalT's critique of the philosophers.
Still, Averroes' account of Divine causation and much of his
theory of celestial causation is inadequate on philosophical grounds.
For quite apart from his antiquated conception of the cosmos,
Averroes fails to explain, as opposed to describe, the operation of
final causation with respect to it. Again, he bases his account of
Divine causation on an inadmissably ambiguous use of the verb "to
know," and, finally, his doctrine of causal knowing leads to an infi-
nite regress in which Averroes' philosopher-God cannot know every-
thing He must know in order to function as the universal Agent. In
sum, his account of efficient causes as powerfully active substances
seems eminently plausible and often persuasive as far as our ordinary
experience of causal relations is concerned, but it ceases to be
The Doctrine of Eternal Creation 265
viable beyond the realm of what Averroes would have called
sublunar physics. . '
This rather qualified result should occasion neIther su~nse
·
nor d lsappom . tInent . For as we saw at the outset, Averroes himself
~drnitted that his arguments in the TaMfut would not be d~mon-
strative. His premises are not always unambiguous or self:evlden~,
nor are the inferences he draws from them beyond questIOn: Nei-
ther by his standards nor by our own would we expect t? fmd a
Q.E.D. at the end of his contribution to the debate on causation.
But if his arguments do not strictly compel our assent, they
nonetheless warrant our serious consideration and r~spect. Fo~ the~
address the main objections to causal efficacy in a direct and tllunu-
nating way. They offer a version of the theory whi~ accounts for
much in our ordinary experience, and they express WIth uncommon
skill Averroes' persistent attempt to have us see the world of nature
and what it implies. The world he thus depicts is no. mer~ parade. of
discontinuous phenomena, unfolding in regular conjunctIOns by .h~t
or by chance, yet beyond our capacity to comprehend. Instea~, It IS
a multifarious system of dynamic entities. Whether th~y are slm~le
or complex, sentient or insentient, they develop and mter~ct With
each other in confonnity with their inherent natur~s and I~ W~ys
we can progressively understand. Causation, acc~rdmg to thiS view
of things, is not the cement of a universe otherwise on the. edge of
falling apart. On the contrary, it infuses the .structure Itself so
intimately that without it no universe could extst at all. Thus, ~e
world which Averroes undertakes to investigate tu~ns o~t to be. m
many ways a familiar one, even if most of its vast vam;ty. still re~ams
to be understood. For when all is said and done, It IS. not Just a
construct of the philosopher's imagination that he depicts for us,
but the world we live in.
 Notes

Chapter One

I. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1:2, 7Ib9-12; ll: 11, 94a20; Physics I: I,

184aI2-14; 1l:3, 194bl9-21; Metaphysics 1:3, 983a25-26; V111:4, l044b3-15.
2. Bertrand Russell, "On the Notion of Cause," Mysticism and Logic
(London: George Allen and Unwin, lid, 1970), p.132.
3. Averroes, Tahaf6t at-Tahaf6t, Texte arabe etabli par Maurice Bouyges
(Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique, 1930); Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoher-
ence of the Incoherence), translated with introduction and notes by Simon
Van den Bergh (London: Luzac and Company, 1954). Cf. Averroes, Destrudio
Destructionum Philosophiae Aigaze/is in the Lotin Version of Calo Calonymos,
ed. Beatrice H. Zedler (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961). Here-
after, the Arabic and Latin texts will be referred to by the author's name
and their short titles. Thus, Averroes, Tahafut, p ....; Destrudio, p.... Page
references to the Arabic text will follow the Bouyges edition, while those to
the Latin text will follow the Zedler edition. Since Van den Bergh's now
classic translation has become a standard and easily available work, I have
followed his English rendering of the Arabic in most citations. Those cases
in which I diverge from his translation are indicated in the accompanying
footnotes. Finally, my transliterations of Arabic follow the standard of The
Library of Congress Cataloguing Service, Bulletin #118, Summer, 1976, except
in those footnotes in which an author or editor has supplied a romanized
title of his own.
4. al-Chazili, Tahaf6t al-Falasifat, Texte arabe etabli par Maurice Bouyges
(Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique, 1927); Tahafut al-Falasifah (Incoherence
of the Philosophers), translated by S. A Kamali (Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical
Congress, 1963). Hereafter, the Arabic text will be referred to by its author
and short title, al-Ghazill, Tahafut, p .. -
5. Ibid, pp. 4-6. al-ChazaJi's autobiography, al-Munqidh min al-paraJ

267
268
(Deliverance from Error), indicates that his hostility toward the philoso.
J?hers may reflect in. part his personal disappointment with philosophy and
Its proponent~ ~urmg or soon after a period of crisis characterized by
extreme skepticism. See W. Montgomery Watt, The Failh and Praclice of
al·Ghazali (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 1963), pp25-65.
6. Ibid., pp. 6-9. al·Ghaziili's choice 01 the term lahaful nicely captures
the logical as well as the religious point 01 his critique. For the term can
signify both the collapse 01 something such as a structure and the phenom.
enon 01 people tumbling over one another in a lall. al-Ghaziili seems to
suggest by the title 01 his book that his critique will cause the edilace 01
the philosophers to collapse and that the heretical character 01 their beliels
will cause them to tumble over one another on the way to hell·Iire (yala.
hafaluna aM al·nar, as it is put in a ~adilh regarding unbelievers). For
additional background on the use 01 the term lahaful in the works 01
al·GhaziiIi and Ibn Rushd, see Leon Gauthier, La Theorie d'Ibn Rochd
(Averroes) sur les Rapports de la Religion el de la Philosophie (paris: Ernest
~-
Leroux, 1909), pp. 99 and Louis Gardet, "Raison et Foi en Islam," Revue
Thomisle (April, 1938), p. 343.
7. Ibid., p. 13.
8. Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Kilab Fa~1 al·Maqal, ed. G. F. Hourani (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1959); Averroes on Ihe Harmony of Religion and Philosophy, G. F.
Hourani, trans. (London: Luzac and Co., 1961), herealter relerred to as
Harmony.
9. Ibid, pp. 6-18. O. Michael E. Marrnura, ''Causation in Islamic Thought,"
Encyclopedia of Ihe Hislory of Ideas, I (1968), p. 289.
10. Apart from Muslim historical sources to be noted below, there are a
number 01 briel surveys 01 Averroes' Iile available in the scholarlv literature.
These include: R. Arnaldez, "Ibn Rushd," Encyclopedia of Isla~ (New ed.;
Leiden: Brill, 1971) lII, pp. 909·10; M. Fakhry, Ibn Rushd: Faylasuf Qurtubah
(Beirut: al·Matba'ah al·Kathiilikiyah, n.d.), pp. 9·12; L Gauthier, Ibn Roschd
(Averroes) (paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948), pp. 3-11; G. F.
Hourani, Averroes on Ihe HarlOOny of Religion and Philosophy (London: Luzac
and Company, 1961), pp. 14-18; S. Munk, Melanges de philosophie ju(ve el
arabe (paris: A Franck, 1857), pp. 418-27, and E. Renan, Averroes el l'averroi"sme
(paris: 1861), pp. 7·35 and 435-65.
11. Ibn Abi Uli'lybi'ah, 'UyiJn al·Anoo' fi "fabaqal al·Ariboo', ed. A Muller
(KOnigsberg: 1884), II, pp. 75-76.
12. Averroes, Amlolelis De Caelo. . .cum Averrois Cordubensis variis in
eosdem Commentariis (Venice: Juntas, 1574), Bk. 11,101. 171 D-H; CI. Epilome
De Caelo, Ill,Iols. 312M· 313A
13. Averroes, Amlolelis Melaphysicorum Libri cum Averrois Cordubensis
Commentariis (Venice: Juntas, 1574), Ill, c. 45, 101. 329 LAM; Tafsir Ma Ba'd
ar·"fabi'al, Texte arabe inedit etabli par Maurice Bouyges (Beyrouth:
Imprimerie Catholique, 1952), Ill, LAM, c. 45, pp. 1644-45. Hereafter, the Ara·
bic text will be relerred to as Tafslr.
Noles 269
14. al-Marriikushl, Killlb al·MuJib fi Tafkhl~ Akhoor al-Maghrib, ed. R. DOzy,
2nd ed.; (Leiden: 1885), pp. 174-75.
15. Ibid., p. 175
16. Hourani, op. cit., p. 16.
""'; 7. Ibn Abi Uli'lybi'ah, op. cit., pp. 76-77; al·Marrakusru, pp224-25. 0, Munk,
p. 426 and Renan, p. 21.
18 See al.Ansari's Iragment on the lile 01 Ibn Rushd in E. Renan, op. cit.
pp. 2i.22, 444; C( Munk, p. 424, Fakhry, p. 11, and Hourani, pp. H;·l7.
19. But see Munk on Tiij al·Din ibn J:!amawayh's account 01 ~verroes'
continued house arrest in Marriikush and his subsequent death m lorced
seclusion., op. cit., p. 428.
Chapter Two
1. Averroes, Tahllful, p. 3; Destruclio, p. 69. A demonstration in this con·
text is a lorm 01 modal syllogism, all 01 whose propositions are true and
necessary. Averroes applies the term "demonstrative" ~ariously. to the
propositions which comprise demonstrati?ns, to those scI~nces wh.lch are
made up 01 demonstrations, and to the kind 01 human bemg who IS natu·
rally capable 01 mastering these sciences.
2. Averroes, TaMful, p. 358; Deslrudio, p. 292. In theFas~ al·Maql1~
Averroes makes virtually identical remarks about the allegoncal mterpreta·
tions 01 Qur'iinic texts and those who declare such interpretations openly
to individuals equipped to grasp only the apparent meanmg.ol such pa~es.
"Anyone 01 the interpretive class who discloses such [an mterpret~tlo~l to
him is summoning him to unbelief, and he who summons.to un.behef IS a?
unbeliever." The parallelism between Averroes' views on diSCUSSing alleg~n.
cal interpretations of the Qur'an and theoretical questions of met~physlcs
and natural science is hardly accidental. For the thrust 01 the entrr~ trea·
tise is that the teachings 01 Islam expressed in scripture ~re true, Just .as
the conclusions of genuine demonstrations are true; thus 'we the Mushm
community know definitely that demonstrative study does not lead to con·
clusions conflicting with what scripture has given us; lor truth does not
oppose truth but accords with it and bears witness to it." Averroes, Harmony,
pp. 6Q.61, SO.
3. Averroes, Tahaful, pp. 356, 361·362; Deslructio, pp. 291, 294.
4. Later Averroes withdraws somewhat from id~ntifying a1-Ghaziili him-
sell as ignorant or wicked. But he maintains ironically tha~ u~,wlse ,,:,ords
and wicked talk may nonetheless proceed ''by way 01 exceptIOn Ir~m .mtel.
ligent and moral men. See Tahllful, pp. 485486; Deslrudio, p: 380. Simllru:ly,
in the Fasl-al-Ma~ Averroes names a1-Ghazii.li once agam as .revealing
allegorical interpretations to those who were not equipped to receive them.
Averroes, Harmony, p. 61. CI. Tahaful, pp. 209·210; DestrucllO, p. 195.
 270
5. Averroes,Harmony, p. 62.
6. Ibid., p. 68. "...True allegories ought not to be set down in popular
363. let alone false ones." See also Averroes . Tahiifut , p. 463'I Des~-~o
books, p
HUl.U • •
7. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 588; Destrudio, p. 456. Averroes frequently asks for
pardon for writing even as much as he does on these questions and justifies
himself only by the claim that the task has been forced on him. All such
statements tend to show that Averroes designed his Tahiifut, however
:eluctantly, for the literate, but non-professional audience we have described,
I.e., those who have been harmed by al-Ghazali's Tahfifut. Cf. Tahiifut, pp.
356-358, 430, 463, 588; Destrudio, pp.292, 338-339, 363, 456; and Harmony,p.
~
8. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 209; Destructio, p. 195. Here we follow Bouyges in his
reconstruction of the text and diverge somewhat from Van den Bergh, who
reads 'We shall try to show some plausible premises and true propositions. _"
9. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 427-8; Destrudio, p. 337. Averroes' admission that
his presentations are not of a demonstrative character indicate once again
that the Tahii'!'t was conceived as a "popular work" and not specifically
mtended for hIS fellow philosophers, for one is only forbidden to include
demonstrative material in books designed for non·philosophers. Needless
to say, the Cordovan Sage felt no such inhibition in writing his extensive
co~entari",: on the ,:,orks of Aristotle, inasmuch as they were obviously
wrItten for sUItably tramed professionals. Indeed, to admit in works of the
latter sort that they were altogether lacking in technical demonstrative
discussions would be quite a damning acknowledgment f~r a Peripatetic
trying to distinguish between dialectics and demonstration.
" 10. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 210; Destrudio, p. 196. Cf. Averroes, Harmony, p. 62.
But the damage done to people by demonstrative books is lighter [than
the damage produced by those conveying allegorical interpretations of scrip-
ture], because for the most part only persons of superior natural intelli-
genc~ become acquainted with demonstrative books, and this class of per-
sons IS only misled through lack of practical virtue, unorganized reading,
and tackling them without a teacher."
11. Averroes, Harmony, pp. 106-107, n. 142, and p. 114, n. 191. See also
George F. Hourani, "Ibn Sina's 'Essay on the Secret of Destiny.''' Bulletin of
the School of Oriental and African Studies, XXX (1966), pp. 41-48. Cf. Leo Strauss,
Persecution of the Arl of Writing (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1952), pp.
22-37, 46-78, and "On a Forgotten Kind of Writing," in What is Political
Philosophy? (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), pp221-232; Harry A
WO.lfson: "~e Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy, and
Malmomdes, Harvard Theological Review, XXXI (1938), pp. 151-173; Ralph
Lern,;:, ~ on Pla!o~ "Republic" (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974),
pp. XIJ-XXIV.
12. Averroes, Tahiifut, pp. 429430; Destrudio, p. 338.
Notes 271
13. Hourani, op. cit. p. 48.
14. Cf. R. E. Allen, Plato's 'Euthyphro' and the Earlier Theory of Forms
(London: Routledge and ](egan Paul, 1970), pp. 144-145.
15. Averroes, Harmony, p. 62. Cf. Tahiifut, pp. 209-210; Destructio, p. 196.
....
16. Hourani, op. cit., p.48.
17. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 150; Destrudio, p. 158. A M. Goichon notes in her
Lexique de la Langue Philosophique d'lbn Sinii (Paris: Desclee de .Brouwer,
1938), pp. 195-196, that the term <jaror; connotes the necessary ~n ~Oth a
positive and negative sense. It .designates. tt.'at is, both .necesslty m ~e
positive sense of absolute reqUIrement and In the negative sense of Im-
possibility. "The necessary and the impossible hav: the hig~est d,,?"ee of
opposition between them, even though. the~ are mcluded m. the I?e~ of
necessity. But the former is necessary m exIstence (necessarIly exIstmg)
and the latter necessary in privation (necessarily not existing) (Najii, 29)."
Necessity conceived in this fashion applies both to modal propositions and
to essences, qualities, and states. It is employed with equal facility in speaking
about the existence of the First Cause and the relationship between prem-
ises and conclusion in a syllogism. According to Goichon, this usage has
the widest possible extension.
The expression luziim, on the other hand, connotes the notions of accom-
paniment and, particularly, consequence, i.e., relation of following from or
proceeding from. Whenever it appears with the preposition 'an (from, ~way
from, out of), the meaning is definitely that of consequence. In logIc, It
expresses the relation between premises and conclusion in the sense of
entailment. "If you say 'every man is an animal' and 'every man is rational:
it does not follow necessarily that every animal is rational, but it does
follow that a certain animal is rational" (/shiiriit, 74). Yet, as we have seen,
Avicenna does not restrict its use to logic.
18. Averroes, Tahiifut, pp. 149-150; Destructio, pp. 157-158.
19. Ibid., Tahfifut, p. 153; Destructio, p. 159.
20. Avicenna, al-Shifii'; aI-lliihiyiit (Metaphysics), eds. G. C. Anawati, S.
Dunya, and S. Zayed, revised by I. Madkour (Cairo: Organisation General
des Imprimeries Gouvernementales, 1960), II, pp. 257, 2~. "By agen.t [~e
mean] the cause which bestows existence separate from Itself, that IS, Its
essence is not in the first intention an underlying subject for that [effect
qua possible-in-itseIQ which receives from it the existence of the thing which
is formed by it. ..." The Latin translation of his .Metaphysics r~ds as .f?lIows:
uAgens vero est causa quae acquirit rei esse dlscretum a. seIPS?, sclhc~t.ut
essentiae agentis secundum primam intentic;mem non Sit sublec~ Ilhu~
esse quod acquiritur ab eo nec informetur per iIIud ...... MetaphYSlca, ":'I: I
(Venice: Juntas, 1508), fol. 91 rb E. Gilson credits Avicenna with"a ra?lca,!
reinterpretation of the Aristotelian efficient, or :nore correctly, mo~mg,
cause, by characterizing its fundamental oper.ation as produ~n~ bel~g a~
such. See "Avicenne et Les Origines de la NotIon de Cause EffIclente, Attl
 272
XII del Congresso Intemazionale di Filosofia, IX (1960), pp. 121-130.
21. Ibid., al-ShifO.': al-fliiliiyiit, II, see pp. 259-260. Cf. Arthur Lovejoy, The
Great Cham of Bemg: A Study m the History of an Idea (New York: Harper and
Row, PublIshers, 1960), pp. 24-66.
~. ~id., I, p. 37. There is a general tendency to confuse the categories of
possIbIlIty and contingency, and Avicenna's use of technical tenninology
does n.ot always succ~ in avoiding the problem. For the purposes of thIs
~nalysls, ,,:e ru:e. defmmg the relevant modal tenns by reference to the uncle-
fmed. b~t mtmtlvely grasped notion of impossibility. X is possible, if and
only if I~ IS not. the ca.se tha~ it is impossible. X is necessary, if and only if
?ot-X IS. ImpossIble. X IS contmgent, if and only if X is neither necessary nor
ImpossIble. It wil! be immediately evident that anything characterized as
necessary accordmg to these definitions is also possible, since neither the
necessa~ nor the po~sible are impossible. For the same reason, anything
ch~ractenzed as contmgent is also possible. In short, the class of possible
thmgs mclu?es both. contmgent and necessary things. Consequently, the
class of co~tmge~t ~mgs cannot be identical with the class of possibles.
When AVlcenna s d,scuss,on of the possible-in-itself, the necessary.through-
~?ther, and the necessary-in~its:1f is examined in the light of this analysis,
It 1S.c1ear that the posslble-m-Itself, prior to its entry into existence is
contmge~t. After entering into existence, as something necessary-through-
another, It IS no longer contingent. It is merely possible-in·itself and nec-
essary·through·another. Also, "the Necessary of Existence" which is Avi-
cenn.a's term for C!<'d, is no longer entirely devoid of possibility, since even
a Bemg whose existence IS necessary-in-itself is not impossible. The most
he woul~ be able to claim is that God is not contingent. If he would insist
on denymg that any possibility whatever pertains to God, Avicenna would
have to present a radically different conception of His necessity.
23. Avi~enna, ~1.Na~, ed: M. S. Kurdi. Second edition (Cairo: 1938), p. 235
and al.Rls~I.~h al-'A"!hlyah, m Rasii'illbn Sinii (Hyderabad: 1935). p. 4. Cf. G.
F. HouraD!, Ibn Sina on Necessary and Possible Existence," The Philosophi.
cal Forum, IV, No.1 (Fall, 1972), pp. 78-79. This explicit statement by Avicenna
leaves lIttle doubt that he did not regard the possibles as a kind of "buffer
state" which is both outside of God and lacking in real existence dangling
as It w:re, in a metaphysical void. Nevertheless, the question of how a pur~
nOll-exI.stent can "~eceive" existence or have existence bestOWed upon it
from WIthout remams unanswered, unless, of course, Avicenna has in mind
~ etemal existent which continuously receives additional existence from
WIthOUt. For ~ fuller presentation of this view in comparison with that of St.
Thomas Aqumas, see Gerard Smith, "Avicenna and the Possibles," New
ScholastiCISm, XVII (1943), pp. 340-357.
24. Rasii'illbn Sinii, p. 2. Cf. Hourani, op. cit., "Ibn Sina on Necessary and
Possible Existence," p. 77.
25. Avicenna, al·Najii, p. 224; d. Hourani, op. cit., "Ibn Sina on Necessary
and Possible Existence," p. 79.
Notes 273
26. Here, Avicenna follows Aristotle's view that "scientific knowledge
and its Object differ from opinion and its object in that scientific knowledge
is commensurately universal and proceeds by necessary connections, and
that which is necessary cannot be otherwise." (emphasis added) Posterior
Analytics ~32, 88b30. Oxford translation, G. R. G. Mure.
27. Avicenna, al-ShifO.': al-Burhiin (Demonstration), ed. A E. Alfifi, revised
by I. Madkour (Cairo: Government Press, 1956), V, pp. 322, 324.
28. Ibid., pp. 180-181,298,321.
29. Averroes, Tahiifut, pp. ISO, 147; Destrudio, pp. 158, 156.
30. Ibid., Tahatut, p. 154; Destructio, p. 160. Much of contemporary action
theory proceeds from assumptions very similar to those expressed here by
al.Ghazrui. See Lawrence H. Davis, Theory of Adion (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.:
Prentice-HaII, 1979). Actions properly so-called are distinguished from doings
i,
~.
and doing-related events, chiefly because they are characterized by volition,
whereas doings are not. Raising an ann, whistling a tune, and reading a
( book are all examples of actions an agent performs, while hiccuping,
trembling, and stmnbling are things he does, but they are not his acts.
' .• Volition is thus the principal defining characteristic of action. in addition,
"volitions lead to awareness of the action one is perfonning, and awareness of
the type of action one is willing (trying) to perfonn. The agent is not gener-
ally aware of the willing, the volition, in itself ...." Ibid., p. 18. Thus, know·
ing or being aware of an action-type is a second defining characteristic of
action. But for contemporary action theorists, in contrast to al-GhazaJi, choos-
ing may not be a necessary condition for an act to occur. For "not every
action is chosen, decided upon, wanted, or anything similar." Ibid., p. 45.
Indeed, conscious and deliberate choice may even impede the performance
of an action under certain circumstances. Nevertheless, at this stage of
al-GhazaJi's criteriological analysis, the similarities between the medieval
and modem discussions noticeably outweigh the differences in both method
and general content.
31. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 147, 154-157, passim; Destruclio, pp.l56, 160-163.
32. Ibid., Tahatut, p. 35; Destruetio, p.89. For a discussion of al-Ghazrui's
conception of the will within the context of what came to be known as the
problem of "Buridan's Ass," see N. Rescher, "Choice Without Preference: A
Study in the History and Logic of the Problem of Buridan's Ass," Kant Studien,
XII (1959-60), pp. 142-175.
33. Michael E. Marmura, "Some Aspects of Avicenna's Theory of God's
Knowledge of Particulars," Journal of the American Oriental Society, LXXXII,
No.3 (July-September, 1962), pp. 229-312.
34. al-Ghaziili, Tahiifut, p. 88; Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 35; Destructio, p. 89. I
diverge slightly from Van den Bergh here by translating the Arabic tenn
sha'n. "character" rather than "faculty." Sha'n simply connotes a thing's
affair, concern, character, or nature and has a less dynamic connotation
than "faculty" does.
 274 Notes 275

35. Averroes, TahafuJ, p. 148' Des . . one of the.B sort. I have. that is, explained the 'cause-effect' relation in
recalled, differentiates demonsb-ati:~dlO, p~. 156:157. Anstotle, it will be terms of the 'producing-by-means-of' relation. Second: I have tried to give a
eoce to the character of their pre . e r : dlalectIC:al arguments by refer~
from premises which are the T1ses. monstratIve arguments proceed general account of the producing-by-means-of relation itself: what it is to
produce B by producing A. We learn by experience that whenever in cer-
knowledge of them derives o~~n:~~y ~ma~echrimaIY. or such that our tain conditions we manipulate objects in a certain way. a certain change. A,
true and primary "which are believed th premIses. Premises are .. occurs. Perfonning this manipulation is then called: 'producing B: and, since it
but themselves." They are, in short s~7f-e e. ;tr~~gth not ~f an~ing else is in general the manipulation of producing A, in this case it is called
ments proceed however from tho ' . . VI en y true. DlaleclIcal argu_ 'producing B by producing A.'" Essentially similar accounts are given by R
.th ' , se opmlons that are "gen II
el er by everyone or the majority of the Ie d era Y accepted" G. Collingwood, "On the So-Called Idea of Causation," Proceedings of the
to be true. Topics 1:1, IOOa25-IOOb23. arne . They are also assumed Aristotelian Society, XXXVIII (1937-38), pp. 85-108, and by H. L A. Hart and R
Both Aristotle and Averroes tend to contu I . M. Honore, Causation in the Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), pp. 24-57.
c~:>nsiderations in their criteria for demonstrativ": oglcal and. psychological
tlOn of self-evidence inevitabl' arguments, smce any asser- 48. Gasking is, of course, quite prepared to grant that this is so, but he

the proposition alone. But they ,

a
tain intellectual capacity. inte;e:~~:;s n;ferenc~ t? someone with a cer~
prelvlOus trammg, and not merely to
claims that there is no need to jettison the theory on this account. "...One
may say that the rise in mean sea level at a certain geological epoch was
cannot ask for the wh a are sure y correct m the belief that one due to the melting of the Polar ice<ap. But while one can properly say this
wi!hin the framework ~f t~~t~~~;~~~r:~~ ~~I:irS~ printhciPles Of. a ~ience, sort of thing, it is always the case that people can produce events of the
pnmary. . re am ose pr.Inclpies as lirst sort as a means to producing events of the second sort. For example,
one can melt ice in order to raise the level of water in a certain area." Ibid.,
36. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 148; Destrudio, p. 156. p. 483. The defect in this rejoinder lies in the fact that it fails to account for
the particular instance of rise in sea level occurring at a given point in
37. Ibid., TahiifuJ, pp. 150-151; Destruetio, p. 158.
time. People did not melt the Polar ice cap in that geological epoch. It is
38. Averroes, Tatsir (DAL) /I c 2 and c. 3 - pointless to assert causation as a manipulatory technique in such instances in
al-'illah al-ta'i/ah, a'ni min h~yih~ ibtad' ,pp. 484e, 491e. Aroda bi-hi the absence of anyone to employ it. If natural causes are given a more
al-awwal alladhi minhu awwalan k - a at al-taghayyur wa-al-takawwun extended sense whereby they too can produce effects of this sort, but not
~~::;=~r;:: (Ve~iceth: Juntas, I{~)~~.~. ~ -~~~a~~~~~. i~;ie;~~:~. ~~ merely as means, the conception of cause is no longer the same. It is no
longer an accessory or technique which persons can manipulate. al-Ghaziili
n onu s e reference to change [tagh l' th d
which is present in the Arab' Wh th ayyur m e efinition, would concede that no human beings were present to bring about the rise
the reference to generation I~O en e reference. to change is joined to
definition of an ..' :v
ever , the parallelIsm between Averroes' in sea level, but deny that no "person" was present to do so. His radical
in the comment:~~~~~~eei~'::::~~7~ ~::,~~linition of an efficient cause
solution, as we shall see, is an occasionalist theology.
49. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 153; Destructio, p. 160.
39. Avicenna, al-Najii (Metaphysics), /I, p. 224.
50. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 156-157; Destruetio, p.l62.
40. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 151; Destruetio, p. 158.
51. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 154-155; Destruetio, p. 160.
41. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 153; Destrudio, pp. 159-160.
52. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 158; Destruetio, p. 163; see Aristotle, Metaphysics 1X:2,
42. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 158-160; Destruetio, pp. 163-164. 1046b4 Ii. "And each of those [potencies, originative sources of change]
which are accompanied by reason is alike capable of contrary effects, but
43. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 154-155; Destruetio, pp. 160-161. one non-rational power produces one eliect; e.g., the hot is capable only of
44. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 155-156; Destruetio,p. 161. heating, but the medical art can produce both disease and health." Cf.
Metaphysics 1X:5, 1047b35-1048a1O and Averroes' comments, Tafsir (1TA,),II,
45. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 156; Destruetio, p. 161.
c.3 pp.l 118-11 19k, c.lO, pp. 1I51e-1I53m; In IX Metaphysieorum,lc. 3, 10, fols.
46. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 159-161; Destrudio, pp. 163-165. 228vH, 234vl-M.
47. A very concise formulation d d f " 53. Ibid., Tahiifut pp. 154-160; Destruetio, pp. 160-164.
Douglas Gasking's "Ca r dan. e ense of thIS vIew can be found in
"I have made two POi~::' ~~~s:nth!e~lpes,,, M~nAd, LXXIV (1955). pp. 479-87. 54. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 155, 158; Destruetio, pp. 160, 163.
'. ne says causes B' in cases h
one cou Id produce an event or state of the sort A as a means to producing
were 55. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 153; Destrudio, p. 159.
 276
56. George F. Hourani op cit "Ib S--
Existence," pp. 76, 84 n.5 'In th ,'_ n Ina _~n Nece~sary and Possible
al.Farabi but now thought to ;e ~un al-;:asa Ii: preVIously attributed to
argued t?at "this possibility [of exist~~~r iso:,,:~~~na or a disciple,. it is
:it ~hat.'s everlasting. or to what exists for a time but ~o~~~r~it~ee~~er
. SjUnction should be mterpreted as exclusive for as Prof Hi:> . . e ... something would come to be from nothing. 'Therefore, according to him,
m the aforementioned note "the two classe~ of' . uraru observes
~erlasting, unchanging thi~gs of the heavens an~';;.~s;~:~~~t~~re th~
e world of becoming. Both are possible in the sense em mgs 0
lasting things are contingent, not existing through any ~I:;'::'~:i;~~ ~e~­
own essences, so they need external causes." eIr
~~r:~~:~;~:;~;~~~=~!:~;~~~::£~:~~!e;s~~~~~~
~~~~~~ni!~li~~~!! ~a~~ost P~losoPhers would today ~~":;d ~fs ~~:
itself and nece an ev~ry part of the world IS possible-in-
follow that th ssary-~ough-another, msofar as it exists at all, it does not
e same IS true for the whole, I.e., the world.
57.. Ibid., ~. 76. The notion of an infinite regress of causes is . 305vG. For an opposing interpretation of this doctrine, see Majid Fakhry,
o.~SIY ~mposslb~e as is suggested here. Even for the medievals it ':;s ~~VI­
Sl ere Impossible only in the essential order of causes and efiects' such:
regress was not deemed inadmissible in the accidental order. ' 63. Aristotle, Metaphysics IX:6, 1048b18-35. Cf. De Sensu et Sensato, ch. 6,
'ts 58. Avicenna, al-ShifO. ': al-llahiyiit' II ,p. 266".. . .When some thomg through
I . o~ ~nce is continuously a cause for the existence of some other
th~n~. It IS ,a cause for it continuollsly as long as its essence continues
:'~~~~'::ly't ~::. c:~~et]I'Sexl'kststhcont[inuoUS]Iy, then that which is caused exists
, I e IS cause IS among the highest f'
pr~vents the non-existence of something, and it is that wh'ch g~auses, °fr It
eXIstence to th· 171" I lVes per ect
[ibdii1 by th ~~e ,~g. IS IS the meaning of that which is called 'creation'
after absolu~:n~ os0p,
.
tn;,naFmel~, the bringing into existence of something
n-e:a s ence. or It belongs to that which is caused· 'tself
~at It does not eXIst [la>:",], while it belongs to it from its ca~1II~t it
· ~ ~ [a~a] . .That which belongs to something in itself is prior accord-
'{if 0 e m'."d, In .essence, not in time to that which comes from' anoth
· us, everything which IS caused is existing after non-existing by a posterio::'
:;'. terms of essence." (emphasis added) Clearly, for Avicenna the first :;;
in e:l~auses i~ God, the Necessary of Existence. That which i; caused but
· I ~o':"'st"."t, corresponds to the possible-in-itself, whereas that whlch
:~:'~r of e::~I:'~~:U~~~~~ another is simply the necessary-through-
59. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 162; Destrudio, p. 165.
60. Ibid., Tahiifut,
con' .. pp. 65-66'' Destructio,p .104
. Cf. narmony,
U
pp. 11-13 for a
Phil~:P,;;osllldonth0f thle. points of agreement and difference between the
ers an eo oglans on the creation of the world.
6!. Ibid., Cf. Tahiifut, pp. 166-167; Destructio, p. 168.
Noles 277
62. Ibid., Tahafut, pp. 66-Q9; Destructio, pp. 104-106. There, in the name of
the philosophers, Averroes denies that there can be a beginning for the
world's existence in motion. and thus there can be rio beginning of time. In
the Tafsir, his rejection of creation ex nihilo is explicit. For he observes that
according to Aristotle an agent does not create or invent form, for II it did,
form has neither generation nor corruption except accidentally, that is, by
way of the composite coming to be and ceasing to be. This principle is
such that if one follows it in luUilling [the requirements of] theoretical inquiry
regarding these matters and does not disregard it, none of these errors [of
the Mutakallimiin] will befall him." Tafsir (LAM), III, c.l8, p. 1503t; In XII
Metaphysicorum, t.C. 18, fol. 305rbE-F. What underlies this denial of creation
ex nihilo is its implicit denial of potential existence, i.e., real possibilities.
Thus he dismisses the theologians of Islam, among whom he no doubt
includes al-Ghazali, with the observation that "they deny on this account
the existence of what is potential [or "powerful"] and the error in this is
entirely plain to anyone who has some training in this science, i.e., divine
science." Tafsir (LAM), III, C. 18, p. 1504 u; In XII Metaphysicorum, t.C. 18, fol.
"The 'Antinomy' of the Eternity of the World in Averroes, Maimonides, and
Aquinas," Le Museon, LXVI (1953), pp. 151ft.
446b2, Metaphysics XII:7, 1072b14-3O; Nichomachean Ethics X:3, 1073a29-1073b7,
X:4, 1174bI2-13, X:7, 1177a2()-27.
64. The interpretation of these criteria in general and particularly the
question of what is meant by a present tense energeia verb entailing a
perfect tense energeia verb is subject to controversy. J. L. Akrill argues that
the perfect tense energeia verb entailed by a present tense correlate refers
to a prior instance of this action in the post which nevertheless goes on
through time. "Aristotle's Distinction Between Energeia and Kinesis," New
Essays in the Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, ed. R Bambrough (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 126-127. Terry Penner oilers a detailed
reply which establishes among other things that the perfect tense energeia
verb entailed by a present tense correlate can more plausibly refer to the
present moment so that a preceding period is simply not required. ''Verbs
and the Identity of Actions-A Philosophical Exercise in the Interpretation
of Aristotle," Ryle: A Col/edion of Critical Essays, eds. Oscar P. Wood and
George Pitcher (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 405-411,
454-456. Cf. L. A Kosman, "Aristotle's Definition of Motion," Phronesis, Vol.
14-15 (1970), pp. 58-62. Averroes, if our interpretation is correct, apparently
reads Aristotle's distinction in the same way as Akrill and treats "origination"
or ''beginning'' as an energeia. Tahafut, p.l21; Destructio, p. 138. "... Each
temporal beginning is a present, and each present is preceded by a past,
and both that which exists commensurable with time, and time commensu-
rable with it, must necessarily be inlinite." In this connection we should
also note that because the philosophers hold that circular motion has no
beginning, it follows in their view that it has no end either.
 278 NOTF.S
65. From Avicenna's discussion of causes in the Shira', it is clear that he
considered continuous causes to be causes in the fullest sense of the term.
By extension this would apply to continuous acts. "If it [the cause] exists
continuously, then that which is caused exists continuously. Thus, what is
like this is among the highest causes, for it prevents absolutely the non-
existence of something and it is that which gives perfect existence to something."
(emphasis added) op. cit., Ii, p. 266.
66. Averroes, Tahiifut, pp. 162-163; Destructio, p. 165. The fourth argument
appears only in the Arabic text, Tahiifut, p. 163.
67. Ibid., Tahafut, p. 165; Destructio, p. 167.
68. Avicenna, al-Shira:· al-llahiyat, Ii, pp. 264-265. "...The builder, the
father, and the fire are not realiy causes for the subsistence of these things
which they cause. The builder who produces the aforementioned [building]
is not the cause of the subsistence of that building, nor [the cause] for its
existence. As for the builder, his movement is the cause of some other
movement. ... As for the father, he is the cause of the movement of the
semen .... Hence, the causes which are truly causes exist simultaneously
with the things caused. But as for causes which precede the things caused,
they are causes either accidentally or as accessories. For this reason one
must believe that the cause of the shape of the building is the coming
together [of its materials] and [that] the cause of that is the natures of the
things which come together and their fixity in accordance with how they
were put together. The cause of that [in tum] is the separate [incorporeal]
cause which produces the natures [i.e., the Active Intelligence]. [Similarly,]
the cause of the child is the coming together of his form with his matter
through the cause which bestows the forms. [Likewise,] the cause of the fire
is the cause which bestows the forms and simultaneously the cessation of
the complete predisposition for that which is contrary to those forms. We
find, therefore, that causes are simultaneous with the things caused."
69. Ibid., I, p. 165.
70. Ibid., I, p. 169. The force of Avicenna's argument is compromised on
two counts. First, it is both psychologistic and linguistic, that is, it tries
prove its conclusion about things in the world by arguing from how we
think and speak about them. Second, it can be argued that Avicenna begs
the question by introducing causal terminology in less obvious forms. This
at least seems to be the case with expressions like "occur through," ''have
. existence from," etc. Avicenna would most likely respond that the complete
elimination of causal expressions from such explanations leaves us unable
to account for the causal efficacy of things altogether. In other words, our
causal language describes what in fact occurs.
71. For a fulier discussion of causes as necessary and/or sufficient
conditions, see Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic, 3rd ed. (London: The
MacMillan Company, 1968), pp. 322-325; John Hospers, Introduction to Philo-
sophical Analysis (2nd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice Hall. 1967), pp.
279
Notes
290-297; P. F. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory (London: Methuen and
Co., Ltd., 1963), pp. 21-25.
72. Ibid., Tahafut, pp. 166-167; Destructio, p. 168.
73. Ibid., TahOfut, p. 141; Destructio, p. 151.
74. Ibid., Tahafut, pp. 163-164; Destructio, p. 166.
75 The qualification "taken as a whole" is imp.ortan~ here; becau~e
A ~ allows that there are certain existents to whIch AVlcenna s desa:'p-
."err be pplicable He names specifically the forms of heavenly bodIes
:~ :~~ th~ perceive· about the separate immaterial f0.rms. By the fo~er,
he evidently means the forms inherent in the celestIal spheres, whIch
Avicenna calls "souls." They are esse~tially relayonal, because they can be
differentiated only in relation to theIr respectIve spheres. To ~owh :::~!
each one is there must be an essential reference to the sphere? WI. I
is the inhe;ent form. As for what is perceived of the separate Im~aterIal
forms, Averroes has in mind the celestial Intelligences: wh.o",: e~stence
consists in their act of thinking. Thus, he reasons .that If thm~ng IS rela-
tional (since it is always of something) and. if theIr whole eXI~tence con:
. . tho king their existence is necessarIly relatIOnal. Tahafut, p. 166,
SIStS m m , . '111 PI a1.ty f the bnmovable
Destructio, p. 168; Cf. Harry A Woifson, op. cll, e "ur I 0 .
Movers in Aristotle, Averroes, and St. Thomas, PP: 245-2~9, and. JulIus
Weinberg, Abstraction, Relation, and Induction (MadIson, Wlsconsm: The
University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), pp. 68-78, 90-95.
76. Aristotle, Physics 1:8; 191b15, 1:9, 192a5; and Metaphysia: XII:2 1069b2~
ff. Cf. Averroes' remarks on privation in th: long commentarIes on9a~~~.
these passages and particularly the last. TafslT(LAM), m, c.l1, pp. 144 -, '
In XII Meta hysicorum, t.c. 11, fol. 297rbD-E. The context of Averroes c?m-
ment is an ~nalysiS of just how being may be thought to come from non-bemg.
77. Averroes, Tahafut, pp. 168-170; Destruclio, pp. 169-171.
78. Ibid., Tahafut, p. 169; Destructio: p. 170.
79. Ibid., Tahafut, p. 170; Destructio, p. 171.
so. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid., Tahafut, p. 169; Destrudio, p. 170.
83. Ibid., TahOfut, pp. 170-171; Destrudio, pp. 171-172.
84.lbid., Tahaful, p. 169; Destruclio, p. 170.
85. Ibid.
 280
281
NOTIS Notes

ular statements about a cause

Chapter Three "universal" causal laws entail partIe e l ' to the particu-
~~~ ft.:':ffect in the absence of additional premises r errmg
I. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 514; Destrodio, p. 402. This discussion originally lars in questlon. . 401 For a fuller account
appeared as "The Philosophers, al-Ghaziilf, and Averroes on Necessary Con-
7. Averroes, Tahiifut, ~p. 512-513; Des~:~~~roPhet and its relation to
nection and the Problem of the Miraculous," in Islamic Philosophy and Mysti- ~f the intellectual revelatlOn bestowed up 't pp 30-36 and his accompa-
cism, ed. Parviz Morewedge (Delmar, New York: Caravan Books, 19BI), Pp. - . eF Rahman Op.CI., . h
113-132. Reprinted with permission. the theory of ema,:,~tlOn, ~ ~ion of A~icenna's arguments for prop e<:J;',
nying notes. A wtlcal dl~ "A . a's Psychological Proof of Prophecy,
2. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 536-537; Destroctio, p. 41B. in M. E. Marmura s Vlcenn 49-56 .
.i~ of Near Eastern Studies, XXII (January, 1963), pp.
3. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 512; Destroctio, pp. 399-400. Avicenna, as we might ourn _ 3-514' Destructio, pp. 401-402. Cf. F. Rahman,
expect, likewise presents both propositions in conjunction. 'The existence B. Averroes, Tahafut, pp. 51 'd U' I'ty Press 1952), pp. 8-12,
, I (London: Oxfor nIvers '. .
of every effect is necessary together with the existence of its cause, and the Avicenna s Psycho ogy . ' r cit in this statement eVidently raises
existence of its cause necessitates the existence of the effect from it" al-Shifft: 99-1 00 . The dualistic assumptlon
.
Imp!
E en if It were e
th case moreover, that the
I
al-lliihlyat, I, p. 167. See also ai-Naja, p. 224. no difficulties for AVlcenna. ': f ct parable to that of ruler to servant,
. f I d body was m a com 'nfl
4. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 512; Destroctio, pp. 400-401. relation 0 sou an . h arate soul-substance exerts any I u-
this still fails to explam ow a sep
5. Avicenna suggests independent causal sequences or emanations to ence whatever on a body.
account for both purely intellectual revelations and imaginative ones. 9. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 514; Destroctio, p. 402.
aI-Farabr, on the other hand, maintains that only emanations from the sep-
10 Ibid. Tahiifut, pp. 7, 11, 13; Destructio, pp. 71, 74, 75.
arate Intelligences and especially the Active Intelligence produce prophecy. In
. , . C" by Averroes and
intellectual revelation, the emanation overflows upon the rational faculty 11. Majid Fakhry, Islamic Occasionali~m and Its ~:;T,'~08.
alone, while in imaginative prophecy, it overflows upon the imaginative Aquinas (London: George Allen and Unwm, 1958), pp.
faculty. No imaginative representations, in his view, derive from the celes-
tial realm as such. For a thorough exposition of their views on this and 12. Averroes, Tahiifut, pp. 514, 527; Destructio, pp. 402, 410.
related subjects, see F. Rahman, Prophecy in Islam (London: George Allen 13. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 527; Destroctio, p. 410.
and Unwin, 1957), pp. 30-45.
14. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 514; Destructio, p. 402.
6. Averroes, Tahiifut, pp. 512, 494-497; Destrodio, pp. 400, 385-388. How-
ever successful Avicenna's theory may be in accounting for prognostication, it 15. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 528; Destroctio, pp. 410411.
involves a ·number of inconsistencies with other elements in his system. 16 Ibid Tahiifut, pp. 515-516; Destrodio, p. 403. .
Perhaps the most obvious of these is the assertion that forms and representa- . ., r ed Harry Blumberg (Cambndge,
tions emanate from the Intelligences and Souls which function as efficient 17. Averroes, Epitome of Paroa N:ra.w~ 1961), p. 52. In his proemium to
causes of the prophet's predictive knowledge. Given Avicenna's definition Mass.: The Mediaeval Academy of. e~~';oes does suggest that the term
of efficient causes, it should be pure existence which emanates from these the Long Commentary on. the PhYSICS, ~. men untrained in the natural
celestial beings, not intelligible forms and imaginative representations, which "man" is predicated eqmvocally o~ or I~~~O he;s who are so trained. But
are both associated with essence. and theoretical sciences, and genumeh~hl Pk that the primary significa-
fr th context of IS remar . d'
It should also be noted that Avicenna seems to confuse the functions of it is quite clear am ~ h Th derivative signification IS the or 1-
imagination and sensation in the prophet's acquisition of predictive know- tion of "man" is the philosop er: e . the fullest sense. While it was
ledge. The imagination may conserve, combine, or produce images, but by nary man. Only the philosopher IS a ;nan m rs b such epithets as "divine"
Avicenna's own standards, it hardly sees or apprehends anything, least of common in Arabic texts to reler to P~o~~ n~ indications that philoso-
all images from the imaginative faculty of another soul. and "holy" these were largely hononfic e .' "In this science it is se]f-
Finally, the whole process of acquiring knowledge seems to be reversed. , b f the human species.
phers were not m:m . ers a the name 'man' of someone perfected by theo-
Instead of deriving universal propositions from particulars, the celestial evident that predlcatlOn of d b 't or of someone not even
Souls evidently derive knowledge of concrete particulars from universals. . f e not perfecte Y I ,
retical SCience, o. someon rf ted by it is equivocal, just as the name
But how is this possible in the absence of any concrete data? At most, the having the capacity to be pe e~. man and of a human corpse or the
celestial Souls would be able to produce imaginative representations of 'man' which is predicated of a. hYIngI b . g nd of a stone [is equivocal]."
universal notions or propositions, but not of particular events as such. For predication 'man' of some ratlona em a
 282
Proemium Auerrois in Libras Physicorum, fol. IvaH (Anliqua Translalio).
18. Aristotle, Physics 1I:4, 196b14; lI:5, 197b34-35.
19. Our interpretation of Averroes' theory of miracles as spontaneous
natural events rather than heterogeneous incursions of the Deity into the
~atural course of events receives additional confirmation from the follow-
Ing facts:
. (a) Averr.oes consistently speaks of miracles as the principles of reli-
gIOus laws In the plural (a~-shara'i'). Yet it would hardly be acceptable to
suppose that the Deity confirms the truth of several distinct and often con-
tradictory revelations by deliberate intervention, while it is conceivable
t?at a variety of impressive, spontaneous events could be taken to authen-
tIcate several rev:elations, at. least in the view of the masses. Clearly, mira-
cles would have little probatIve force in themselves.
. (b) In fact, the le,,;,"ned do not even look to miracles to justify their belief
m p~ophets, ac~ord~ng to Averroes; belief in prophets is justified by their
ability to explam hidden things, that is, to speak convincingly about the
na~re and action~ of God and the angels and to establish religious laws.
Agam such a.n attitude is more likely in the case of chance spontaneous
events than In the case of Divine incursions into nature or superhuman
acts of prophets. Tahafut, p. 516; Destruclio, p. 403.
(.c~ Averroes i.nsists that the philosopher is obliged to choose the best
religIOn of the time in which he lives. He must also believe that the best
existing ~eligion will be superseded by the appearance of others which are
bett~r stIlI-a rather sh0ck!~g admission for one who spoke earlier of the
Qur an as ~ ~",:"tedly ",:rifIable miracle. One would hardly expect this to
occur b?, Dlvme mterventIon, if Muhammad is the seal of the prophets. Nor
would It be obligatory to hold it will happen, if miracles represent the
superhuman powers of prophets; for what makes it necessary that those
po~ers eve,r be exercised? Spontaneous events, however, as the outcome
of mters~ctIng causal chains would have to occur from time to time on the
a":,,~ptIon. of cau",:1 necessity, which is just the thesis Averroes defends in
thiS diSCUSSIOn. Tahafut, p. 583; Destructio, p. 454.
(.d) In the Long Co'!'mentary on the'Physics, Averroes takes up an interpre-
ta:lOn of ~ance, which proposes that it is a cause in its own right and that
thIS ~~ IS myst~rious and Divine, The comment does not specify whether
the DIVIne cause IS thought to be God, or some other superhuman agency,
~evertheless, Averroes' response to it is clear. He denies that chance is an
I?de~endent, unknowable cause, distinct from the traditional four, and he
likeWise notes that Aristotle passes over in silence the view of those who
regar~ th.is cause a~ ~ivine. But here the reason for his silence is not that
the pnnclples of religiOUS laws are at stake; It is rather because Averroes
regards this view as irrational. ". ' .. He begins to introduce a third group,
and they are th?se ~o ~lIow that It [chance] is a cause, but they say that
no one kno:"s l.tS quiddity. Rather it is something Divine. And he passes
them ~ver III sllen~e, because that statement is irrational, namely. that
there IS a cause which is naturalIy inscrutable. The refutation of these pea-
Notes 283
pIe consists in demorIStrating just what chance is." See In Libras Physicorum, t.
c. 47, fol. 66rA Cf. Physics 1I:4, 196b5-7. While Averroes' comment does not
directly prove that miracles, which he calls Divine things, are instances of
chance and spontaneity, it clearly rules out the notion of miracles as exam-
ples of Divine. i.e., superhuman, interruptions of the course of nature.
Indirectly, however, by the appearance of the expression res diuina and the
reference to Aristotle's silence, Averroes establishes a clear connection, in
our view, between tbe problem of chance and spontaneity, and that of
miracles.
(e) In his Commentary on Plato's ''Republic,'' Averroes at one point speaks
of "the miraculous" in a thoroughly unguarded, unseU·<:onscious manner,
expressing what he naturally believed the term to mean. After arguing that
it would be impossible for every individual to attain all of the virtues, he
goes on to suggest by contrast, "if it were possible for these perfections to
be combined in one man, this would be considered difficult, if not miraculous.
The usual situation is that each and every kind of human being [is dis-
posed] toward some particular one of these perfections." Here again, the
miraculous is presented as both logically and naturally possible, but
extremely unlikely. Auerroes on Plato's "Republic," trans. Ralph Lerner (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, (974), p. 86.
20. Averroes, Tahafut, p. 356; Destructio, pp. 291-292.
21. Fakhry, op. cit., p. lOB.
22. Averroes, Tahafut, p. 527; Destruclio, p. 410; d. Harmony, p. 1.
23. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 512; Destruclio, p. 399.
24. The distinction which Avicenna has in mind between tested experi-
ence (al-tajribah) and induction (al-istiqra') is not immediately obvious. At
least one able scholar, Julius Weinberg, seems to have identified them in
his discussion of the latter, for he cites the example of scammony purging
bile as an instance of induction rather than one of tested experience. See J.
R. Weinberg, op. cit, pp. 134-135. This is understandable inasmuch as both
tested experience and induction are expressed in judgments based upon
repeated observations and memories of connections between facts in the
world. The latter differs from the former, however, insofar as it is explicitly
a universal judgment about a certain range of facts. Thus Avicenna defines
induction as "a judgment according to the whole [a universal judgment],
because of this judgment's being about the particulars [classed under] this
universal, whether it be about all of them, that is, a complete induction, or
about the majority of them, and this is [only] a generally accepted induction."
(ai-Naja, p. 90). Tested experience, on the other hand, is not treated in
terms of judgments "according to the whole."
The grounds for this distinction are to be found in the opening para-
graphs of Aristotle's Metaphysics (1:1, 980b27 ff.) where the Stagirite himself
contrasts experience with art and science. "Now from memory experience
is produced in man; for several memories of the same thing produce finally

284 NOTFS
the
. capaci'ty f or a'smgle expenence.
. And experience seems pretty much
lIke s~lence and art, but really science and art come to men through
experience. ".. Now.art arises when from many notions gained by experi~
ence ?ne unIversal Judgment about a class of objects is produced. For to
have ~u~gmen~ that when Callias was ill of this disease this did him good
and slmliarly ill the case of Socrates and in many individ I .'
matt f . b" ua cases, IS a
<;r 0 exp~n~nce; ut to Judge that It has done good to all persons of a
c<;rtam constJtutlOn, marked off in one class, when they were ill of this
?Isease, e.g., to phlegma.tic or. bilious people when burning With fever-this
IS a matter of art ...experlence IS knowledge of individuals, art of universals."
25. Avicenna, al-ShifO.:· al-Burhan, p. 95.
26. ~arviz.Mor:wedge, The Metaphysica of Avicenna (ibn Sinii) (New York:
ColumbIa UnIV~lty Press, 1973), pp. 15-16, 112-115, 192-195. Prof. Morewedge
concedes that AVlcenna divides Being into substance and accident but con-
tends that th';, di~tincti~n is proc"'!ural rather than ontological. Cf. Michael
E. Ma':"l~a, AVlcenna s Chapter On the Relative in the Metaphysics' of
the Shifii, Essays on IslamIC PhIlosophy and Science, ed. G. F. Hourani, (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1975), pp. 83-100. The major part oi
Avic<;nna's disc.ussion of rela~ions in this chapter has the explicit aim of
r~futmg tJ;e c1auns of the Kalam that relations have no reality outside the
mmd. He IS unequivocal in his affinnation that there are relations in
natura. In keeping With this fact, Prof. Mannura observes, "If anything~
~ond part reveals the total commitment of Avicenna's doctrine of rela-
tIon to a substance-accident ontology." (emphasis added), p. 87.
27. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 518; Destructio, p. 404. I diverge slightly here
from Van den Bergh so as to be more literal.
28. Michael E. Marmura, "Ghazali and Demonstrative Science" Journal
of History of Phiiosophy,lIl (1965), p. 195. ' infinity, as for example, flesh being from earth, earth being from water, and
29. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 519; Destrudio, p. 405.
30. Majid Fakhry, op. cit, p. 98.
31. Averroes, Tahiifut, pp. 224, 519, 520 526 528-529: Destructio pp 203
405,406,409-411. "" . ,
32. Ibid.,. ~ahiifut, p. 517, cf. p. 14; Destructio, pp. 403-404. cf. p. 76. The
theory of efficIent causes as powerful particulars has been developed recently
by E. H. Madden and R. Harre et al. as an alternative to various Humean
acco:m~s of c~usation and scientific explanation. By Professor Madden's
a?misslOn , th~Ir ar~e~ts owe much to Averroes' own. In turn, they have
aIded me conslderabl~ ill mterpreti~ the -:,ahiifut debates on causal efficacy.
~ use of the terms powerful partIcular and "ontological tie that binds"
~ dra~ from their di~ion and gratefully acknowledged. See E. H. Madden,
C!'usahty and the NotJon of Necessity," Boston Studies in the Philosophy of
Scle~ce, IV (1967), pp. 450-462; E. H. Madden, "A Third View of Causality,"
ReVIew of Metaphysics, XXIII (1969), pp. 67-84; R. Harre, "Powers," British
Notes 285
Journal of the Philosophy of Science, XXI (1970),pp. 81-101; E.H.Madden and
P. H. Hare, 'The Powers That Be," Dialogue, X (1971), pp. 12-31; E. H. Madden
and R. Harre, "In Defense of Natural Agents," The Philosophical Quarterly,
XXIII (1973), pp. 117-132; R. Harre and E. H. Madden, CausalPowers (Totawa,
New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1975).
..", 33. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 530; Destrudio, pp. 412-413. Cf. M. Mannura. op. cit.,
"Ghazali and Demonstrative Science," pp. 200-204.
34. Aristotle, Metaphysics XII:9, !074b35. Cf. Averroes, Tafslr (LAM), Ill, c.
51, p. 1700s; In XJJ Metaphysicorum, t.c. 51, fol. 336raBC. "...That which he
[Aristotle] meant by knoWing, sensing, supposing, and understanding is dif-
ferent from that to which it is [directed]; that is to say, it is different from
that which is understood, that which is known, that which is sensed, and
that which is supposed in us, and that means that these activities [deriving]
from these powers are [directed] to things other than themselves, not to
themselves except by accident. I mean that sensing, supposing, and under-
standing are [directed] to that which is understood, that which is sensed,
and that which is supposed respectively, and not to themselves except by
accident. This is to say, that the intellect belonging to us only understands
[or "thinks'1 itself by accident, I.e., by the way of what happens to the
object understood once it is a fonn belonging to the intellect"
35. Averroes, Tahafut, pp. 264-265; 267-269; Destructio, pp. 227-228. The
basis of this distinction for Averroes can be found in his comments on
Metaphysics II (a):2, 994a1ll, where Aristotle maintains that a chain of causes
cannot be infinite in a straight direction or according to kind. "His state-
ment in this chapter is self-evident, namely, that it is not possible to find
one of the four causes going on to infinity Within its own genus. This is to
say that there is nothing here [in the sublunar domain] which has a mate-
rial cause whereby its matter in turn has matter, such that this goes on to
water being from something else such that this goes on to infinity. Again
there is no moving cause like this either, that is to say, [that] things here
[in the sublunar domain] have a mover, which in tum has a mover so that
this goes on to infinity, as for example water being moved by air. and air
being moved by the celestial body [I.e., the sun], and the celestial body
being moved by aggressive victory, [I.e., Strife] as Empedocles puts it, and
the victory being brought about by something else, such that this goes on
to infinfty. As for his [Aristotle's] saying [that such regresses occur] 'neither
by way of a straight path nor by way of genus: he means by 'straight path'
that the causes in question co-exist simultaneously as in a straight line and
'by way of genus: he means that the causes are sequential and not cc>-
existent, as in the case of things which belong to a single kind, that is to
say, that one individual exists after another individual and one group after
another group, provided that when the subsequent [cause] exists, the prior
[cause] has been corrupted And one might allow that he means bY 'straight
path' that the causes belong to one and the same species, as for example,
 286 NOlES
one man arising from another [in a gerierationailine] while 'byway of kind'
~eans that ~e causes belong to it [a single kind] by different species com-
~g under a smgle genus, as for example, the fact that fire arises from air
al~ fr?ffi ,water" and water from :arth" All these causes are causes which
com~l~e m [th,~lr] g:nus, namely, m bemg material, but they differ in [their
specifIc] form. TafSIr (Petit ALIF), I, c. 5, pp. 17a-I&; In nMetaphysicorum t
c. 5, fol. 3Ova-vbH-K. ' .
36. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 520; Destructio, p. 406. Again following Aristotle, In n
PhYSlcoru,:" t. c. 6, fol. 5OrbF-5OvaH, Averroes makes essentiallv the same
pomt agamst those who require proof that natures exist. But it should be
noted, that whereas Aristotle's aim is to defend the proposition that nature
exists, ~verroes IS concerned (in the Tahiifut) to argue that natural causa-
tIOn exISt~. ~e two points, though related, are not identical. "... That
nature. exIStS IS self-evident, since there are many [such] entities per se. It
[the misplaced attempt to prove the existence of what is obvious] happens
to those ,,":,,0 .support themse~ves. by demonstrating what is self-evident
fro~ :vhat IS hidden, smce nothmg IS more obvious than what is self-evident
This IS the custom of someone who is by nature unable to distinguish
be.tween something which is self-evident and something which is made
eVlde~t by reference to another thing. That kind of man never was and
never IS able to philosophize." Cf. Physics 11:1, 193a1-8.
vm
37. Ibid., Averroes, In Physicorum, t c. 23, fol. 358va-bG-M Cf Averroes
Tafsir (TTA ,), II, c. 2, 10, pp. 1113p, 115Id-1l52h; In 1X MetaphYSico~m t c 2'
fol. 227vaG. "By his saying 'Therefore the two are together .. .' he :n~a~s;
And because some of the ,active P?wers are in the agent, it is necessary
that t.he .agent not do anything until It and that on which it acts are together,
that IS, m the same pl~ce." (Cl. t. c. 10, fol. 234val-K.) "...What is possible
only .c~~es to b.e possible at a certain moment and in a certain manner of
~ossl?llIty ~nd m general through all of the conditions which must be dis-
tI~gulshed m each individ~a1 possibility.... As for those powers which are
WIthout r~n [I.e., non-~atlonal powers], if the agent approaches the patient
and there IS no external Impediment, then it is necessary that the agent act
and the patient be acted upon. An example of this is the fact that when fire
comes clos~ to somethi.ng combustible and there is no impediment present
to prevent It from burnmg, the combustible object will necessarily burn."
38. Acco:ding to Ave.rr~, the Ash'arite theologians of Islam claimed
that there IS no potentIality prior to that which is actual and he adds
els~wh~re that those who identify the potential with the ~ctual likewise
mamtam tha~ all things are in motion. While Aristotle was, of course, chiefly
concerned WIth the Megarian arguments against potentiality, it is clear that
Averroes regards ~e occasionalist position in Islamic theology as the con-
t~mp?rary expr""':IOn of the same position. The new flux is one which con-
Sists m t!'e succ~lon of ephemeral atoms and their accidental qualifications,
see Tars" (ITA,), II, c. 5, p. 1126b; In 1X Metaphysicorum, t c. 5, fol. 229vbM
and In vm Physicorum, t c. 23, fol. 358va-bl-K. . ,
Notes 287
39. Averroes, In vm Physicorum, t c. 22, fol. 35!JvaH..L Cf. Ibid, fols. 358vb
L-359raA, vaG, rbD-E.
40. Avicenna, al-Shifii ': al-niihiyiit, I, p. 167. ''Therefore, the existence of
every effect is necessary in conjunction with its cause, while the existence
of its cause necessitates the existence of the effect from it. They occur
1'!lgether in time or duration or what have you, but the two of them are not
on a par in relation to the realization of existence. That is because the
existence of the one [the cause] did not come about from the existence of
the other [the effect], for the occurrence of existence belonging to the one
[the cause] does not derive from the occurrence of existence belonging to
the other, for the occurrence of existence belonging to the one [the cause]
is prior in relation to the attainment of existence." This priority may be
called ontological priority.
Avicenna, in fact, distinguishes between two kinds of ontological priority.
In one case, the prior is a necessary condition for the existence of the
posterior, but does not necessitate the existence of the latter. Thus, the
number one is necessary for the existence of subsequent whole numbers
but hardly necessitates that there are two, three, etc., of whatever we should
like to count. In the second case, what is prior is both a necessary condi-
tion for the existence of the posterior and a factor which necessitates the
latter's existence as well. This kind of priority is represented by essential
efficient causes as Avicenna conceives them. The objection we have cited
is clearly aimed at the second notion of ontological priority. On Avicenna's
theory of causation and its probable relation to the criticisms of the Ash'arite,
al-Baqillani, see M. E. Marmura, ''The Metaphysics of Eificient Causality in
Avicenna (Ibn Sina)," in the recent festschrift for G. F. Hourani, Islamic Theol-
ogy and Philosophy, ed. M. E. Marmura (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1984), pp.ln-187.
41. Ibid.
42. Avicenna, al-Shifii': al-Qiyiis, pp. 322-324.
43. Another interpretation along different lines would be to argue that
the objection does not derive from an occasionalist source at all, since it
nowhere repudiates the "necessary and necessitating" relationship between
cause and effect. Thus, when it is stated that no one of them is prior to the
other in bestowing existence, what Is meant is simply that both are co-equal
in either bestowing or receiving existence. The consequence is not unlike
that which follows from conceiving of causes as necessary or sufficient
conditions for an event. If the "cause" is a necessary condition for the
occurrence of the "effect," the "effect's" occurrence is itself a sufficient condi-
tion for the occurrence of the "cause,'"' In that sense, each is detenninative
of existence with respect to the other and, herice, a cause. Nevertheless,
while this line of interpretation is possible, it is not convincing. The reason
is surely that Avicenna explains causation in terms of priority and posteri-
ority. They are notions without which his account of essential efficient cau-
sation cannot even be understood. (It is no accident that his discussion of
 288 NOTIS
the prior and the posterior is likewise antecedent to his treatment of causa-
tion in Book VI.) If, therefore, neither "cause" nor "effecf' has a greater
claim on priority, ontological or otherwise, then it makes no sense to speak
of one as necessary and necessitating vis-a-vis the other. In short, there is
no ground for speaking of a cause at all, unless by merely linguistic
convention. And in the clrcumstances described, this seems arbitrary indeed
44. Avicenna, al-Shira~· al-I1ahiyat, I, p. 168.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., p. 169.
47. M. E. Marmura, op. cit., "Ghazali and Demonstrative 5cience." p. 199.
Marmura contends that Avicenna merely presupposes the theory of essen-
tial efficient causation in an effort to explicate the ambiguities inherent in
the objection. We do not dispute this conclusion as far as it goes. But we
add to this the suggestion that the entire discussion of "the prior and the
posterior" is itself a basis for the theory of essential efficient causation and
that the presupposition, viewed in this context, goes beyond begging the
question so as to produce a logically circular argument. Concomitantly,
Avicenna does not stop at clarifying the possible meanings of the question;
he goes on to answer it and even claims to have done so successfully.
48. It might be argued that al-Ghaziili intended to show only that neces-
sary causal connection was not conclusively established by Avicenna, not
that it was a false view. Indeed, certain passages in the second half of
Discussion Seventeen lend prima facie evidence to this hypothesis. It is to
be rejected, in our view, because of al-Ghaziili's consistent reference to the
occasionalist thesis- all efficacy is reserved to God-both in this very para_
graph and throughout the entire discussion. Even in the latter part of the
chapter, as we shall argue below, al-Ghaziili was not seriously propounding
a doctrine of modified natural causation for himself. He sought, rather, to
show that even on the philosopher's own premises, genuinely "miraculous"
changes in nature need not be rejected. This step, if successful, would of
course make their conception of natural causation appear needlessly rigid
and religiously unacceptable. For a vigorous defense of the view that
al-Ghaziili was not an occasionalist and did not deny the existence of cau-
sation in nature, see Lenn E. Goodman, "Did al-Ghaziili Deny Causality?",
Studia Islamica, 47 (1978), pp. 83-120. We agree with Goodman that al-Ghaziilf
does not wish to espouse or defend occasionalism in any of its varieties in
the Tahafut al-Faliisifah (See p. 13); we maintain only that the presupposi-
tions of the arguments he actually uses are typically Ash'arite.
49. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 517; Des!ructio, pp. 403404.
SO. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 52()..521; Destrudio, p. 406. My translation diverges
slightly from that of Van den Bergh in an attempt to present the full argu-
ment somewhat more literally.
51. Majid Fakhry, op. cit., p. 98. "...The negation of the causal principle
Notes 289
violates this very law of identity [which all beings m,:,st manifest] inas-
much as it runs counter to the law of necessary concomitance between the
knowledge of Being and its causal operations .... Being, ~s ,,:,e have see.n,
utters itself in causality, otherwise its nature would remaIn hIdden; th~t IS,
it would remain utterly unlmowable and impervious to human conSClOllS-
4, ness." Cf. Simon Van den Bergh, Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoher-
ence of the Incoherence), II, p. 178, n. 4. "All conceptual thought implies the
idea of identity, and all identity in the real implies a conformity to law, a
sameness of action under the same conditions, Le., that in such and such
conditions a certain entity will necessarily act in such and such a way; the
concept of fire, for example, implies a foreknowledge of h~?thetical
necessities: if fire acted in different ways under the same condItIOns, the
concept of fire would not convey any meanilIl!." CI.. ~~ A Wolfson, The
Philosophy of the Kaliim, pp. 553-558. Wolfson Ident~Ies five arguments of
Averroes against the Mutakallimun's denial of essentIal natures ~nd ",,:u.sa-
tion. Of these, three deal explicitly with the consequences of theIr pOSItion
for scientific knowledge. While he cites the concluding passage of the meta-
physical argument, i.e.. that a denial of esse~tial natures ~inat~ in non--
being, he offers no analysis other than to CIte the passage In ArIstotle on
which the conclusion is based.
52. Ibid., Fakhry, p. 98; ct. pp. 84-85.
53. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics [:2, 71b9--11.
54. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 302; Destrudio, p. 252. CI. Averroes, Tafsir (DAL?,
II, c. 14, pp. 561o--562p. In V Metaphysicorum, t. Co 14, fol. 117rbF-vaG; TafsIT
(YA ,), lIl, c. 10, pp. 1297b-128Od, In X Metaphysicorum, t. c. 8, fol. 257rbE--vaG.
55. Ibid., In I Physicorum, t. c. II, fol. IlraC.
56. Ibid.,ln vm Physicorum, t. c. 22, fol. 357raBC; t. c. 23, fol. 358rbD.
57. Ibid, In U Physicorum, t Co 3, fol. 49ra-bB, E; t c. 6, 5OrbF. See also In
vm Physicorum, t. c. 22, fol. 357rb--vaFG. CI. 357ra-rbCD.
58. Averroes, In I Physicorum, t. c. 8, fol. 9 va-b[-L ".. He who sa".s th.at
being is one and immobile denies the principles which the natural SCIentist
lays down [in order to proceedl, namely, that ~~e ~e many na~l entities,
that they are mobile, and that they have o~gIn~tIVe sources, I:e., they a~e
composite. For when it is laid down that b~I~g IS one, there wIll n?t be In
that case any originative source at all. Sumlarly, wh~n m?tion IS taken
away, there will not be an originative source of ~otion ';Ither, namely,
nature. And whoever lays this down denies the prInCIples laId down by the
natural scientist. Again, he says that the natural scientist does not have to
speak about, i.e., defend, principles. That is to say, tha~ ther~ is Ii!'ewi~ no
need to speak about self-evident principles in connectIOn With thIS SCIence
or, if there is, it will be done by someone other than the natural scientist as
such." (emphasis added)
59. Averroes, In II Physicorum, t. c. 3, fol. 49raJl..C. "Because it is self-
290 NOTES
evident that those things are natural which have an origlnati.ve source [or
"principle'1 by which they are changed and by which they cease changing,
per se, according to which they are natural things, and that through [this]
nature they both move and rest, arise and perish, it was evident from this
fact that nature is an originative source and cause by which that in wWch
it exists is changed and comes to rest, primarily and per se, not by accident.
And that definition of nature is obvious here. That nature exists is also
self-evident, as Aristotle wiil state later, and it one of the principles of that
science. It is not something to be demonstrated by the metaphysician [a primo
Philosopho] nor is it one of the things that is not self-evident, as it would
appear from the words of Avicenna. . ,," (emphasis added)
60. Averroes, Tahiifut, pp. 15-16; Destrudio, p. 77.
61. Averroes, In I Physicorum, t. c. 8, fol. 9vbK. "And it is correct that
there should be no arguing with him [someone who denies the fundamen-
tal principles of natural science], just as the geometer does not argue with
those who deny the principles of geometry. Rather, speaking with men of
this kind belongs to another science, either [to one] special science or to
one which is shared by ail the sciences, namely, to first philosophy or to
the art of arguing." One should note here that the metaphysician or master
of the art of argument is not depicted as demonstrating the first principles
of natural science, but as merely speaking to, i.e., arguing against, those
who deny them. See also t. Co II, fol. lIrb-vaF-G. ".. His [the natural scientist's]
contemplation is of what is natural and ... his primary aim is not to contra-
dict false opinions [held] in connection with this science, but to determine
the substances and quiddities of natural things .. " When this is the case, if
we should assert that there is need for an art to contradict false opinions
regarding one's art, it need not however contradict ail of them. Rather it
should contradict only those which are inferred from the primary proposi-
tions of that art, but with a false conclusion." Cf. In I Physicorum. t. c. 8, fol.
9va-vbl-M; In vm Physicorum, t c. 22, fol. 357 rbE-F, and In mDe Caelo. t c. 4,
fol. 175 vbK-L
62. Ibid., t. c. 8, fol. 9vbM.
63. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 224; Destrudio, p. 203. ".. An agent is an agent
insofar as it exists in act, for what does not exist [in act] does nothing."
(emphasis added) My translation departs somewhat from Van den Bergh's
in order to bring out the connection between being and act more clearly.
64. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 199; Destrudio, p. 189.
65. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 169; Destruclio, p. 170.
66. Many find the main difficulty with the notion of causal necessity
right here. Defenders of the notion apparently want to have it both ways.
Causal necessity, it seems both ailows and does not ailow for exceptions.
This leaves us with an outright contradiction which Ghazalians and Humeans
of ail types must reject. Others see a confusion between the ontological
Notes 291
and logical domains. While relations between ideas are ti~eless and
invariant relations between matters of fact are not. Thus, to Import the
stability ~f logical relations into nature is a mistake from the outset. Nor is
it mitigated. they claim, by changing the "point of view" so that viewed
from "within," the effect of a given particular is absolutely necessary. The
-;H'culiarity involved here is very likely the crux of the issue, but as we shail
show below, it can be explained quite adequately within Averroes' concep-
tual framework.
67. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 221; Destructio, pp. 201-202.
68. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 257-258; Destructio, p. 224.
69. F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (The Sophist, 247 E), p.
234. Cf. p. 236. "...The Platonic dynamis can be defined as a prooerty or
quality which reveals the nature of the thing. It may be manifested under
one or [the] other of two aspects: as an activity or principle of action, of
movement, or as a state or principle of passivity. of resistance. By either
aspect, or sometimes by both, it unveils the inmost and hidden nature of
things; still more, it distinguishes their essences. The dynamis makes it pos-
sible to give each thing a name conforming to its peculiar constitution, and
places things in separate groups. In a word, it is at once a principle of
knowledge and a principle of diversity."
The similarity between Cornford's account of power and the ultimate
basis of differentiation in nature, name, and classification, and Averroes'
account is strikingly obvious. However, Averroes does not identify powers
with properties. Rather, powers are made manifest in certain properties.
Heat is not a power of fire, but a property of fire, namely, the property
disclosed by the power of fire to make things hot. Again, the crucial point
about powers for Averroes is not that they distinguish things as being of
certain kinds from the standpoint of our knowing them. Rather, powers, as
the mark of the real, make things of certain kinds to be.
70. Ibid., p. 240, ad loe. Sophist, 248 C. "The Friends of the Forms take
unchangeableness as the mark of real Being, variability as the mark of
Becoming. This had been asserted in the Phaedo with all possible emphasis.
The Forms admit of no sort of change, whereas many sensible things never
remain the same. In the Phaedo and Republic, the ideal world is constantly
spoken of as excluding any change, and this was always treated as the
necessary condition for the existence of knowledge," p. 244. Whether this
remains Plato's position in the Sophist is open to doubt, especially in view
of the Eleatic Stranger's subsequent comments regarding soul, life, and intelli-
gence (248 E-249 A)_ Cf. Cornford, pp. 241, 246-248.
71. Aristotle,Metaphysics lX:I 1046a10-1I; ct. 1046a1-2 and V:12, 1019al5-24.
72. Aristotle, Physics 11:1, 192b13, 192bl8. For further illustrations of Aris-
totle's conception of "innate urge" or "impulse" see, Posterior Analytics 11:11,
9SaI;Metaphysics V:23, I023a9, 18,23; and Eudemian Ethics 11:8, 1224aIS-I224b9.
73. Ibid., Metaphysics V:4, IOI4b35-IOISaI5. See AP.D. Mourelatos, "Aris-
totle's 'Powers' and Modern Empiricism," Ratio, IX (1967), p. 100 n.l6.
 292
74. A~erroes, TahlIfut, p. 433; Destrudio, p. 340. This passage has the
grammatIcal form of an anacoluthon and represents only the first part of
the full statemenl. CI. In I Physicorum, t. c. 4, fol. 49 rbM.
75. Averroes, Tarsir (TTA ,), II, c. 2, pp. I11Od-111 Ig. In IX Metaphysicorum
I.e. 2, fol. 227 ra-rbA-D passim.
76. Averroes, Tafsir (z,n?, n, e. 59, pp. 1007a, 1001m; In vn Metaphysicorum,
t.C. 59, fol. 207 raA "...That which the definition signifies is the substance."
See inl. p. lO11m; fol. 207rbF- 207vaG. 'Then Aristotle says, 'Plainly, the
cause is being soughl. . .' [by this] he means that someone asks questions
like those which he has just mentioned. And his statement that 'this is the
quiddity of the thing, as for example, that which is in the species of the
rational,' means that if all of this is as we have set down, then it is evident
that what was being sought after in passages like this is literally the
'wherefore,' the cause which is the essence of the thing, namely, that which
we have described in the preceding logical description, i.e., where he said
that it is what the definition signifies. This means that he explains the
existence here of this same cause, which is the form, by two logical explan-
ations, one of which is the definition and the other of which is what is
asked for in saying literally 'wherefore?'"
77. Averroes, TahlIfut, p. 159; Destructio, p. 163.
78. Aristotle, Physics II:B, 199a 9-10.
79. Averroes, In nPhysicorum, I.e. 7B, fol. 7B raA fl.
SO. Ibid., I.c. 4, fols. 49 vbM-50 raA "But it seems that this ought to be
granted by the natural scientist, and he takes it from the philosopher
[metaphysician], namely, that the nature, which is spoken of regarding form, is
substance.. " Thus, the composite is more worthy of having this name,
'substance,' than matter, because it is in act while matter is in potency. And
form is more worthy of having this name, 'substance,' than the composite,
since it is through the form that the composite is in acl."
BI. CI. Majid Fakhry, op. cil., p. 86. ''For Averroes as for Aristotle, the
Being of an entity is inextricably bound up with the Act through which it is
constituted; that is, posited in being. II the notion of Act here envisaged
were a univocal notion, as monistic pantheism holds, then the dialectic of
oneness would be absolutely inexorable. Diversity and multiplicity would
have no part in the ontological structure of the real, and the deceptive
panorama of manifoldness, as the Eleatics taugh!, would be a fleeting mirage
of absolute and abiding identity. II, on the other hand, the Act is reduced to
the status of contingency, the universe would become the demoniac stage of
whimsical and unpredictable Power." (emphasis added) Fakhry clearly takes
the denial of specific acts to things as implying a reduction to the Parmeni-
dean notion of being. The reference to the contingency of acts leads to conse-
quences Averroes also discusses but in a different context, as we have seen.
82. Averroes, TahlIfut, p. 520; Destrudio, p. 406.
83. Averroes, In I Physicorum, I.c. 19, fol. 14 rbF-14 yaH and TahlIfut, p.
Notes 293
519; Destrudio, p. 405. Cf. In I De Caelo, I.e. 7B, fol. 53 raA "And it is evident
that the existence of the world out of those parts is necessary and cannot
be otherwise. We ought to know that someone who has grown ac~.stomed
to the words of the theologians [of Islam] can grant that proposition and
' others like it only with difficulty at best or not at all. For these people think
.., that all things are possible and what is necessary is nothing at all. The f!rst
philosopher [metaphysician] ought to destroy the words of all the sophists
whose wisdom consists in denying just principles and destroying wisdom."
That Averroes sees the "Heracleitean" flux lurking behind the occasionalist
thesis is made quite explicit in the Second Discussion. See TahlIfut, p. 137;
Destrudio, p. 149.
84. Averroes, In I Physicorum, I.e. 1B, fol. 14 ra.
SS. Averroes, In I De Caelo, I.c. B, fol. 6 vbL-M.
86. Averroes, TahlIfut, pp. 520-521; Destructio, p. 406.
B7. Averroes, Tarsir (GIM), I, c. 3, p. 312b-c; In IV Metaphysicorum, t.C. 3,
fol. 66 rbK-M.
88. Ibid., Tafsir (TTA'), II, c. 2, p. 1113p, and c. 10, p. 1152h; In IX Metaphys-
icorum, I. c. 2, fol. 227 vaC, and I. c. 10, fol. 234 vbK.
89. Ibid., TahQfut, p. 521; Destruetio, pp. 406-407.
90. Averroes, In nPhysieorum, I.c. 48, fol. 66 vbM-67 raA
91. Averroes, Tafsl r (ITA '), II, c. 5, p. 1126b; In IX Metaphysieorum, I.c. 5,
fol. 229 vbM. See Majid Fakhry, "Some Paradoxical Implications of the
Mu'tazilite View of Free Will," Muslim World, XLlll (1953), pp. 9&-108. Fakhry
shows that at least some of the Mutakallimim subscribed to a doctrine of
tawallud or generated acts, thus ascribing some degree of causal efficacy
to agents other than God.
92. Averroes, Tafsir (ITA,), n, c. 6, pp. 1131b, 1132g; In IX Metaphysicorum,
I.c. 6, fol. 230 vbK, M.
93. Ibid., Tafsir (TTA'), II, e. 7, pp. 1135<1-1, 1136f-g, i; In IX Metaphysieorum,
I.c. 7, fol. 231 va-vbG-K.
94. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1:4, 985b1B.
95. Averroes, TahlIfut pp. 512, 530, 537, 563. CI. p. 13; Destructio, pp. 400,
412-413,419,440. Cf. p. 75.
96. Ibid., TahlIfut, p. 530; Destructio, p. 413. Van den Bergh inexplicably
omits the last sentence in his translation of the Arabic.
97. Ibid., TahlIfut, p. 523; Destructio, p. 407.
98. Averroes' Middle Commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge and on Aristotle's
Categoriae, ed. Herbert Davidson (Cambridge, Mass.: Mediaeval Academy of
America, 1969), p. 60. ct. Averroes' Middle Commentaries on Aristotle~ Catego-
ries and De Interpretatione, ed. Charles Butterworth (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1983), pp. 62-63.
 294 NOlES
99. Qur'an, 35:41-42.
100. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 523; Destrudio, p. 408.
101. Davidson, op. cit., p. 60.
. 102. Averroes, Ta~iifut, p. 523; Destmetio, p. 408. I accept Wolfson's sugges-
lIon that the ArabIc text requires emendation. In order to preserve th
sens:' of Averroes' argument against al-Dhaziili, he reads ghayr mumkin ("no~
~sslble") as ghayr mankar ("not denied") and notes that this reading agrees
WIth both the Hebrew bllll mukhash and the Latin non negamus. If the text
IS ~ot. emended, Averroes ends up rejecting his own account of nature b
clalmmg.that (a) habit in things is really nature and (b) it is not possibl~
~at a thmg should have a nature which determined it either necessarily or
m most cases. See Harry A Wolfsoo, The Philosophy of the Kaliim (Cambridge
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 557, n. 33. '
103. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 523; Destruetio, p. 407. I depart here from Van den
Berg and translate the first reference to 'aql as "intellect" rather than "soul."
104. Averroes, Talkhi~KitGb al-Nafs, ed. F. Ahwany (Cairo: 1950), p. 87.
105. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 523; Destruetio, p. 407.
106. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 531; Destrudio, p. 413.
10:. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 518; Destruetio, p. 404. Cf. John Moline. "Provided
Nothmg Interferes," Mind, LXXXIV (1975), pp. 224-254. . in "al-Dhaziili's Second Causal Theory in the 17th Discussion of his Tahflfut,"
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 519; Destrudio, p. 405.
110. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 525; Destruetio, p. 409.
II 1. al-Dhazali would no doubt regard this as circular since the debate
about miracles ultimately comes down to a debate abou't the extension of
"actual experi,:nce." .Even among contemporary philosophers, who would
a~ee to the dlstmctlOn employed by their Islamic predecessors, there is
still no agreement about the logical status of the "laws" of nature.
112. Imman~e~ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith (New
York: St. Mar~m s Press, 1929), A597-B625, p. 503; cf. B270-A223. p. 241. "A
~ubs.tance whIch would be permanently present in space, but without fill-
mg It. .. or a ~ecial. me?tal power of intuitively anticipating the future
(and not ~erely mferrmg It), or lastly a power of standing in community of
thou~~t. WIth ou,.er men, however distant they may be-are concepts the
pOSSIbIlIty of whIch is altogether groundless, as they cannot be based upon
exp.enence an~ Its, known laws; and without such confirmation, they are
arbl~a~ combmatlOns of thoughts, which, although indeed free from con-
tradIctIOn can make no claim to objective reality and none therefore as to
the possibility .of an object such as we here profess to think. As r~gards
realIty, :ve obvlOus.ly <;'lnnot think it in concreto, without calling experience
to our ald. For reality IS bound up with sensation, the matter of experience,
NOles 295
not with that form of relation in regard to which we can, if we so choose,
resort to playful inventiveness."
Both arbitrary combinations of thoughts and playhll inventiveness would
have been classified as activities of the imagination by the medieval
philosophers, and Indeed Maimonides denounces the views of the Muta-
.... k211imun as deriving largely from the imaginative as opposed to the rational
faculty's grasp of the real natures of things. See The Guide of the Perplexed,
trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), Part I,
ch. 71, p. 179. Cf. Alfred L. Ivry, "Maimonides on Possibility," Mystics,
Philosophers, and Politicians, ed. J. Reinharz et al. (Durham: Duke University
Press, 1982), pp. 67-84.
113. Averroes, Tahflfut, p. 529; Destrudio, p. 411.
114. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 530; Destrudio, p. 413. al-Ghaziilrs exact statement
is fa-Iaysa fi hfldha al-kaiam ilia tashni' ma~d. "And so in this talk there is
nothing but sheer vilification." What al-Dhazali meant by this has become
a focal point of divergent interpretations about his own view of causation.
L E. Goodman, op. cit., p. lOS, understands it as an explicit repudiation of
the occasionalism al-Ghaziill had just defended in the preceding paragraphs
and not a rejoinder to the philosophic objections which had prompted that
defense. Thus he translates it, "There is nothing in this entire line of argu-
ment but pure absurdity," and takes the second "philosophic" account of
causation and miracle as expressing al-Dhazali's own view. M. E. Marmura
Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism, ed. P. Morewedge (Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan
Books, 1981), p. 91, understands it as a response to the objections which
prompted al-Dhazalrs defense of occasionalism rather than a repudiation
of that defense. Accordingly he translates it, "Hence in [all] this talk [of
theirs] there is nothing but sheer vilification." The second theory of causa-
tion is understood as no more than a tactical concession which is at best
"possible." Of the two accounts we find Marmura's more persuasive on
both linguistic and contextual grounds. For example, while Goodman is
correct in noting that the root meaning of shn' refers to what is reDugnant
and horrible, etc., the words tashni' and tashni'at are in the second form
which typically has intensive or causative force. Hence, it connotes "making
something repugnant or horrible," i.e., vilification.
115. Ibid" Tahiifut, p. 533; Destruetio, p. 415. Cf. M. E. Marmura, op. cit.,
"al-Ghazalrs Second Causal Theory in the I 7th Discussion of his Tahiifut,"
pp. 91-92, 101-107. Marmura takes issue with William Courtenay, ''The Cri-
tique of Natural Causality in the Mutakallimiin and Nominalism," Haroard
Theological Review, 66 (1973), pp. 77-94, in which it is suggested that
al-Dhaziilrs own position is more closely in accord with the revised account
of miracle than with Ash'arism.
116. Averroes, TahaFut, pp. 514, 534; Destruetio, pp. 402, 415.
117. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 534; Destruetio, p. 416. al-GhazaIrs conceDtion of
providence is not part of an argument for the veracity of miracles per se,

296 NC7fFS
lest he flagrantly beg the question, but part of his explanation 01 how and
under what c~rcumstances miracles may occur, assuming they do occur.
Clearly, he rehes upon independent grounds- the logical possibility of mlr-
acl,:, and th~ transmission of innumerable corroborating reports (naql
tawatur) derIVmg from scripture and public, empirical evidence-as sub-
stantiating the occurrence of miracles as such.
llB.lbid., Tahafut, p. 535; Destruelio, p. 416.
ll9. Ibid., Tahafut, p. 535; Destrudio, p. 417. Cl. Tahiifut, p. 517: Destruelio,
p.403.
120. The position formulated here is strikingly reminiscent of views ascribed
~,o Antisthenes by Arist~t1e. The Stagirite portrays him as supposing that
nothmg could be descrIbed except by the account proper to it-one predi-
cate to one subject; from which the conclusion used to be drawn that there
could be no contradiction, and almost that there could be no error."
Metaphysics V:29, 1024b32-34. Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, The Sophists (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 209 fl., 304-311. Antisthenes'
position, of course, in no way depends upon an assumption of Divine
o.mnip~tence. Nor does this assumption, once introduced, imply conclu~
SlOns hke those of Antisthenes. al-Ghaziili obviously subscribes to and
vigorously defends the thesis that God is all-powerful, but he is quite explicit
in holding that Divine power cannot exceed the limits of logical coherence
as our analysis will show. '
121. Averroes, TahafuJ, p. 536; Destruelio, p. 418.
122. Ibid.
123. See Alfred Ivry in "Averroes on Causation," Studies in Jewish Religious
and Intelledual History, eds. S. Stein and R Loewe (University, Alabama:
University of Alabama Press, 1979), pp. 143-156.
124. Averroes, TahOJut, p. 138; Destruelio, p. 149.
125. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 536-537; Destrudio, p. 419.
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 5:J8.S4O; Destrudio, pp. 420421. No reference is made
here to the "corporeal form" of indeterminate tridimensionality which
Averroes in fact held to be prior to the elemental forms in relation to prime
matler. See H. A Wolfson, Creseas' Crilique of Aristotle (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1929), pp. 99 ff. and pp.579-590; and Arthur HYman
"Aristotle's First Matter and Avicenna's and Averroes' 'Corporeal Form: ,:
Hany Austryn Wolfson Jubilee Volume (Jerusalem: American Academy of jew-
ish Research, 1965), pp. 384406.
129. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 536; Destrudio, p. 418.
130. This interpretation has been cogently stated by J. M. Moravscik in
"Aristotle on Adequate Explanation," Synthese, XXVIII (1974), pp. 3-17; and
Notes 297
"Ailia as Generative Factor in Aristotle's Philosophy," Dialogue, XIV, no. 4
(December, 1975), pp. 622-638.
131. Aristotle himself suggests precisely this kind of analysis in De Partibus
Animalium 11:1, 646a 13 ff. "Now there are three degrees of composition; and
of these the first in order, as all will allow, is composition out of what some
"&11 the elements, such as earth, air, water, fire. Perhaps, however, it would
be more accurate to say composition out of elementary fOlCes [dynameis, i.e.,
powers] nor indeed out of all of these, but out of a limited number of them as
defined in previous treatises. For fluid and solid, hot and cold form the material
of all composite bodies; and all other differences are secondary to these,
such differences, that is, as heaviness or lightness, density or rarity, roughness
or smoothness, and any other such properties of matter as there may be.
The second degree of composition is that by which the homogeneous parts
of animals, such as bone, flesh, and the like are constituted out of primary
substances. The third and last stage is the composition which forms the
heterogeneous parts such as face, hand, and the rest." (emphasis added)
132. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 539; Destruelio, p. 421. Cf. Aristotle, De Anima 1:3,
407b13; De PartibusAnimalium V:IO, 687a6ff.
133. Ibid., Tahafut, pp. 54(1.541; Destruetio, p. 421.
134. Qur7m, 23:12-14.
135. Averroes, Tahiifut, pp. 540-541; Destruetio, p. 421.
136. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 541; Destruetio, p. 422.
137. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 542; Destrudio, p. 422. Cf. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 34.
Averroes' table of opposites is patterned on the contraries to be found
among accidents, e.g., anterior/posterior with respect to time; black/white
with respect to quality and so on. If the other accidental qualities are also
included in this view, then activity and passivity will likewise have oppo-
sites and correlates with appropriate limits to their possible combinations
in particular natures.
Chapter Four
1. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 211; Destrudio, p. 196.
2. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 542; Destrudio, p. 422.
3. The problem at issue represents one aspect of Aristotle's tenth aporia
as stated in Book 11 of the Metaphysics. The question there is whether the
originative source of generable and corruptible things is itself generable
and corruptible or eternal. "If they are perishable," Aristotle observes,
"evidently these also must consist of certain elements (for all things that
perish, perish by being resolved into the elements of which they consist);
so that it follows that prior to the principles there are other principles. But
this is impossible whether the process has a limit or proceeds to infinity."
 298 NoTES
Metaphysics B:4, IOOOb24-27. Averroes takes the priority in question to be
tempo.ral so tJ;at for each principle of generable and corruptible things
~ere IS a prevl.ous gen~rable and c~rruptible principle. This interpretation
IS clearly consIstent WIth the possIbility of an infinite process. It is less
clear how this temporal series is to be reconciled with a process which has
a limit A more adequate interpretation of Aristotle's point here is that an
.a,
ontological priority is intended. What Aristotle is looking for is a set of
enduring and intrinsic principles for things that change. Cf. Joseph Owens,
The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Pon-
tifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963), p. 247.
4. Averroes, Tahafut, pp. 152, 229,394; Destrudio, pp. 159,206,316. Ct. Tafsir
(LAM), lll, c. 30, p. 1569m; In XlI Metaphysicorum, tc. 30, fol. 315ra.iJ D. 'Then
Aristotle says, 'Nevertheless, if this is the case [that not everything that is able
to act acts, and the potency is prior to the act], then none of the things that
exist [need exist], since it has already been granted that it is possible for it to
exist and that it does not [actually] exist.' He means that this is impossible
for if a potency for moving and acting were to exist in every moving and
active thing, then it would be possible for a certain moment to occur in which
no existent at all would be found, because it is possible for every thing to
exist and not to exist, for if it were possible for the First Mover to be annihi.
lated or not to move [things other than itself], it would be possible for nothing
at all to exist, and that is absurd." (emphasis added) Ct. Ibid., Tafsir (LAM),Ill,
e. 33, pp. 1578a-1579b, and c. 41, pp. 1632o-l634r; In XlI Metaphysicorum, I.c. 33,
fol. 316vaG-H and I.c. 41, fol. 325ra A-C. The reason why Averroes regards this
dissolution of essential natures as possible at all is that every power in a
body is necessarily finite. It is inextricably bound up with potentiality and
thus with possible corruption. Ibid., c. 41, pp. 1633r-l634r; tc. 41, fol. 325ra C.
The immediate source of the observation is the pseudo-Aristotelian De
Mundo, chapter 6, 397b, where Deity is described as "the cause which brings
together the whole." Cf. Theatetus 153d.
5. This is a second aspect of Aristotle's tenth aporia. ''But if the principles
are imperishable, why will things composed of some imperishable principles
be perishable, while those composed of the others are imperishable. This is
not probable, but is either impossible or needs much proof." Metaphysics
11:3, lOOOb 27-30.
6. Averroes, Tahiifut, pp. 175-176; Destructio, p. 175. Cf. Tafsir (LAM), Ill,
c. 6, pp. 1429a-143Oc; In XII Metaphysicorum, I.c. 6, fol. 294ra·b C-E.
7. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 212-213; Destructio, p. 197. Cf. Tahiifut, p. 102.
S. Ibid., Tahafut, p. 394; Destrudio, p. 316.
9. Both diagrams are taken from Thomas S. Kuhn's The Copernican Revolu.
tion (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 22, 36. Reprinted
with permission.
10. Averroes, In n De Generatione et Corruptione, I.c. 56, fol. 385va-b I-K
See Tafsir (LAM) Ill, c. 33, pp. 1578a·1579b; In XlI Metaphysicorum, t.C. 33, fol.
316va G-l.
Notes 299
II. See Aristotle. De Generatione Anirmlium 11:1, 646a15 and Af,;teorologica
1:2,9. Cf. Averroes, In I Meteorologicorum e.I, fo!. 404rb F-va G-!. It v:as also
seen in the Book of Generation and Corruption that some of those thm~s are
found in [connection with] others according to mixture and accordmg to
likeness and especially so on the earth."
12. Averroes, Tahflfut, p. 261; Destructio, p. 226. See also Tahiifut, p. 486;
Destructio, p. 380.
13. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 47S; Destrudio, p. 375. Averroes' formulation is iIl-
expressed. He does not mean to suggest that all sublunar ~stents are
endowed with life, since he clearly indicates elsewhere (Tahafut, p. 211;
Destrudio, p. 196) that these are divided into animate and inanimate cate·
gories exclusively. It does leave the larger problem of how celestial move-
ment can produce life unanswered, however.
14. Averroes, Tafsir (LAM), Ill, c. IS, p. 15oap; In XlI Metaphysicorurn, t.C.
IS, fol. 304vb M.
15. Ibid., pp. 15OOp·150Ip; fo!. 305ra A
16. Ibid., p. 1501q; fol. 305ra B-C. Cf. Sermo De Substantia Orbis, c. 2, fols.
7vb M-8ra F; In IV De Caelo, t.C. 32, fol. 259va I-K, and In II De Generatione
Animalium, I.c. 3, fols. 75va G·I; 76ra C, rb F.
17. Ibid., In II De GenerationeAnimalium, fol. 75ra H.
18. Averroes, Tafsir (LAM), c. IS, p. 1502s; In XII Metaphysicorum, I.c. IS,
fol. 305rb D.
19. Ibid., p. 1502s; fol. 305rb D. Cf.1n n De Generatione Animalium, I.c. 3,
fol. 76va C.
20. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 407-40S; Destructio, p. 324.
21. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 492; Destrudio, p. 384.
22. Rene Descartes, "Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the
Reason," The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and
G. R T. Ross (Cambridge, Mass~ Harvard University Press, 1967), I, pp. 116 If.
Cf. Lewis Thomas, The Lives of a Cell: Notes of a Biology Watcher. (Toronto:
Bantam Books, Inc., 1974). It is not altogether surprising that thIS analogy
should be revived by an eminent physician and student of biology, since Aris-
totle clearly had, and was perhaps preeminently guided by, the same int~rests
in his own cosmological reflections. See Thomas, p. 4, "I have ~n try~ng ~o
think of the earth as a kind of organism, but it is no go. I cannot thmk of It this
way. It is too big, too complex. with too many working parts I~cking vis!ble
connections .... I wondered about this. If it is not like an orgamsm, what IS It
like, what is it most like? Then, satisfactorily for that moment, it came to
me: it is most like a single cel!."
If the earth can be likened in this manner to a single cell, a contemporary
Averroist would have little hesitation in drawing the larger analogy between
the universe and an organism. His task, however, would be to uncover just
 300
those connections, whether visible or not, that knit the cosmic "creature"
together.
23. Aristotl;. Physics. Vlll:l, 250bI4. Cf. Averroes, In VID Physicorum, t.c. I,
fo~. 338vb H-I. 'Then Aristotle says, 'but is it a sort of life, as it were...7' By
thiS h.e hl~ts at the fact that what is necessarily in motion, has neither ceased
[movmg] 10 the past nor will it [cease moving] in the future ... For it appears
that the constitution of natural entities and of that which is in them is a kind
of life, as i: wer~, [in. th~t] it is moved. For the principle of motion in regard
to all mobile thmgs IS like the soul in regard to living things."
24. Averroes, TahGfut, pp. 188-189; Destrudio, pp. 182-183.
25. Ibid., TahGfut, pp. 188-192; Destructio, pp. 183-185.
26. Ibid., Tahatut p. 216; Destructio, p. 199.
27. Ibid., TahGfut, pp. 489490; Destrudio, p. 382.
28. Cf.Aristotle,Metaphysics XII:lO, 1075a12-24, andAverroes, Tafsir(LAM),
III, c. 52, pp. 1710b-1714i; In XII Metaphysicorum, I.e. 52, fols. 337val-338rbD.
29. Averroes, Tahatut, pp. 476477; Destructio, p. 374.
30. Ibid., TahGfut, p. 480. Cf. p. 472; Destructio, p.376. Cf. p. 371. To avoid
ambiguitywe substitute "conceive" for Van den Bergh's "represent" in the last
sentence. The former is associated with the intellect, the latter with the
imagination.
31. Averroes, Tahatut, p. 484; Destructio, p. 379. Cf. Sermo de Substantia
Orbis, c. 2, fol. 6raAB.
. 3,2. Ibid., TahGfut, p. 192; Destrudio, p. 185. Cf. Harry Austryn Wolfson, op.
CIt., 'The Problem of the Souls of the Spheres from the Byzantine Commen-
taries on Aristotle through the Arabs and SI. Thomas to Kepler," I, pp. 4045.
33. Ibid., TahGfut, p. 481; Destructio, p. 376; d. Tahatut, p. 158; Destrudio,
pp. 162-163.
34. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1X:8, IOSOb28-30. Cf. Joseph Owens, "Teleology
of Nature in Aristotle," The Monist, UI (1968), pp. 165-168.
.35. Aristotle, Physics VIII:9, 265b32-34. De Caelo 1:7, 275b25-26; D:2, ~.
Aristotle, Metaphysics XII:8, 1074bl fl. Cf. Averroes, Tafsir (LAM), Ill, c. SO, pp.
168ge-1690g; In XII Metaphysicorum, I.c. 50, fol. 334raC-rbD.
36. Averroes, TahGfut, p. 185; Destructio, p. 181. Cf. Sermo de Substantia
Orbis, c. 2, fol. 6raC. For a valuable discussion of this principle and the
v~r.ious interpretations of it, see Herbert A Davidson, ''The Principle That a
Fmlte Body Can Contain Only a Finite Power," Studies in Jewish Religious
and Intelledual History, eds. S. Stein and R Loewe (University Alabama:
University of Alabama Press, 1979), pp. 75-92. ' 48. Averroes, Tahafut, pp. 214-215; Destrudio, p. 198.
37. Averroes, Tafsir (LAM), III, c. 41, pp. 163lm-l633q; In XII Metaphysicorum,
t.C. 41, fols. 324vaH-325raB. The substance of the sphere has no contrary
Notes 301
and, as such, is Incorruptible. But motion does bave a contrary in terms of
resl. This being the case, Averroes suggests that it is possible for the heav-
ens to cease moving. if no other factors but the heavens are taken into
consideration. See Sermo de Substantia Orbis, e. 3, fo!. 9rbE-9vaH.
38. Averroes, TahlIfut, p. 214; Destructio, pp. 197-198.
39. Averroes, Sermo de Substantia Orbis, c. 2, fols. 6va-bl-L, BvaK-L, 9raBC;
e. 3, fols. 8vbM-9vaA, vhF; c. 4, fol. 12raC, 12rbEF. Size and Intensity of
power have no direct correlation with each other in most particulars, unless a
further qualification is made. For if we are talking about things of the same
kind, I.e., powerful particulars belonging to the same species or genus, this
gains plausibility. A larger charge of dynamite is more powerful than a
smaller one. A large well-trained army is generally considered more power-
ful than a smaller one with equivalent skills and training. There is a prob-
lem for Averroes, however, in applying this standard to the spheres or the
Intelligences which move them, since they belong to neither the same spe-
cies nor genus. Their relations are essentially analogical, per prius et posterius.
40. Averroes, TahlIfut, pp. 210-218; Destrudio, pp. 195-203.
41. Ibid., TahfIfut, pp. 433434; Destrudio, pp. 340-341.
42. Averroes, Tafsir (ITA'), ll, c. 2, pp. lllOe-llllf; In IX Metaphysicorum,
t.C. 2, fol. 227ra B.
43. Averroes, Sermo de Substantia Orbis, c. 7, fol. 14vaGH. "lndeed, even
the souls of the celestial bodies are nothing more than powers [virtutes]
embracing spiritual forms stripped of matter."
44. See Mario Bunge, Causality: The Place of the Causal Principle in Mod-
em Science (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1963), pp. 119-137, 226-232; Patterson
Brown, "Infinite Causal Regression," The Philosophical Review, 75 (1966), pp.
510-525; AD. P. Mourelatos, "Aristotle's 'Powers' and Modem Empiricism,"
Ratio, 9 (1967), pp. 102-104.
45. Averroes, Tahafut, pp. 214, 480-481; Destrudio, pp. 198-199,376. But it
should be noted that Averroes takes the meaning of anima applied to both
the heavens and terrestrial animals in an equivocal sense, not that the
term is absolutely equivocal, but that it is equivocal by reference. See TahfIfut,
p. 473; Destructio, p. 371, and In VDl Physicorum, I.c. 30, fol. 367rb F.
".. .impossibile est animam esse sine corpore nisi aequivoce."
46. Ibid., TahlIfut, pp. 434-435; Destrudio, p. 341.
47. Aristotle, De Anima III:8, 431b 20-23. Cf. Joseph Owens, "Aristotle-
Cognition as a Way of Being," Canadian Jolimal of Philosophy VI (March,
1976), pp. I-II.
49. Averroes, Sermo de Substantia Orbis, c. 1,6, fol. 5va H, 11vbH, 13ra DE.
 Notes
303
302

Cf. 5rbF-5vaG. The objection is presumably raised against Avicenna who nno de Substantia Orms, c. 6, fol. 13 ra A
59 . A:verroes, Se
conceived of the souls of the spheres as being "in" the celestial spheres,
just as the souls of terrestrial animals are "in" their bodies. For the Aristote-
lian origins of the notion of separate form, see Joseph Owens, The Doctrine Chapter Five
of Being in the Aristotelian Melaphysics (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediae-
val Studies, 1963), pp. 279-285, 421-473. """ 1 MAllard uLe rationalisme d ,)l"verrocs ' d 'a pesr .une etude surXIV
la
.., . d I" t't t franrms de Damas,
creation," Bullelin d'etudes onentales e ,ns I u ..,.
SO. Averroes, Tahiifut, pp. 178-179,233; Destructio, pp. 176-177,208, and
Tafsir (LAM), llI, c. 44, pp. 1646a-1648b; In XII Metaphysicorum, t.C. 44, fol. (1952-1954), p. 55.
327rbE-vaH. 7<a h -, t I Tahiifut (The Incoherence of The Incoherence'),
2. SAvVerroes , Be arg~ (~ndon' Luzac and Co., 1969), I, p. xvi; II, pp. 87,
51. Averroes, Senno de Substantia Orbis, c. 6, fol. 12raC. This leaves the trans. . an d en .
impression that there are in fact many celestial animals. Averroes, no doubt, n. 134:1 and 176, n. 317:2.
would contest this and argue that the activities of all of the spheres cohere . 94 124 Cf Seymour Feldman, 'The Theory 01
3. Majid F.~, Op.CI!.,. PCp· , . d 'Some of His Predecessors," Viator:
to produce a single specific act-the world process. Insofar as different activi- Eternal CreatIOn III ,,!asdal rescas an
ties can still be distinguished under this broad heading, they would proba- Medieval and Renaissance StudIes, XI (1980), pp. 301-304.
bly represent no more for Averroes than the operations of specific limbs or
Tahiifut p 162' Destructio pp. 165-166. I diverge here from
organs. Still, this would remain unconvincing, since there is no basis for 4. Averroes, ,., '. I . tency of the argument
supposing, even in an Averroian ontology, that the various organs of a Van den Bergh i~ order to maint~in!~~~~~~e~o~;I~biguity and shifts in
liviog body are directed by several minds. If equivocity by reference is as I understand let. Th~ P~~gi~~~th, and muhdath); and much depends on
invoked, we end up with the anomalous situation of greater functional econ- the use of terms e.g., . u . ' '11 dh- ffIda i:e whether it refers to God,
omy in the constitution of terrestrial creatures than that of celestial ones. how we read the expreSSIOn a all· I a ;uc~ation or to language and
who ''brings about" ?r "procures an ete~ g of such a creation. Van den
what it signifies, v:t'lch co~vey ~~:~~~gh possible, involves a shift in
52. Averroes, Tahiifut, pp. 184-185,484; Destructio, pp. 180-191,378-379.
53. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 480; Destructio, p. 376. Bergh adopts the hrst readmg, WI, f th world to God and back to
subject midway through the argum~~t- .romhi~ the world and language
54. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 214-215; Destructio, pp. 197-198. the world. I adopt the second rea mg m w hout
used to describe it remain the subject of the argument throug .
55. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 233-234, 491-492; Destructio, pp. 208, 384.
.
5. Aristotle, Cotegories 5:3a21, PhYSICS,
1:2 185a30 Melaphysics V:7, 1017b25,
'
56. Averroes, Tafsir (LAM), llI, c 45, pp. 1663i-1664I; In XII Melaphysicorum,
t.c. 45, fol. 329vbK-M. The most readable general account of these issues VlI:I,1028a34. I .
can be found in Thomas S. Kubn's The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astron- 6. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 167; /Jestructio, p. 169. a. Aristotle, Meleoro oglca
omy in the Development of Western Thought (New York: Vintage Books, 1957). A IV:9,387a29.
more technical treatment of the Ptolemaic theory in relation to the Eudoxian Senno de Subtantia Orbis, c 6, fol. 13ra s.c. See also Averroes,
is in Otto Neugebauer's The Exact Sciences in Ancient Antiquity, 2nd ed. 7. Averroes, . 168-169 Cf Tafsir (LAM), III, cAl, pp.
(Providence: Dover Publications, Inc., 1957). This has now been supplemented Tahiifut, pp. 166, 168; Destructro, pp. ., BC aH-1
1628f-g, 1631m; In XII Melaphysicorum, t.c.41, fol. 324ra ,v .
by his monumental three-volume study, A History of Ancient Mathematical
Astronomy (New York: Springer Verlag, 1975). Averroes' views on these prob- I d does not specify what these parts
8. Wbile Av:rr~, to my kno:s~l~eiliat he had the individual revolu-
are in the Tahafut,. It s~e:~ PI~estial body that did not complete its regu-
lelM are discussed in a very general way in two short studies: Leon Gauthier,
"Une Reforme du Systeme Astronomique de Ptolemee tentee par les Philo-
tions of each body ~n mm.' ce in its motion. The problem with
lar cycle could easl~y qua~lfy as ~trruP~~d. that there is no obvious criter-
sophes Arabes du XII Siecle," Journal Asiatique, XIV (1909), pp. 483-510, and
Francis J. Carmody, 'The Planetary Theory of Ibn Rushd," Osiris, X (1952), making these parts mto stIli sma er um IS ents of a single part
pp.556-586. ion by which to determine how large or small.the segrn
57. Aristotle, De Anima 1lI:8, 432a 1-3. Cf. J. Owens, "Aristotle-Cognition should be.
as a Way of Being," op. cit., p. 8. 9. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 152; Destructio, p. 159.
58. Averroes, Tafsir (LAM),llI, c 36, pp. 1593b-1594d; In XII Melaphysicorum, iO. AYerroes, .,.. fs-r (LAM) III c 18 p. 14990; In XII Melaphysicorum, t.C.
Ja I ".,
t.c. 36, fol. 318rbF-vaH. 18, fol. 304va H-1.
304
II. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 168; Destructio, p. 100. Taken in context, the
definition is offered as the lirst 01 two reaSons why the world Is still In
need 01 the presence 01 its agent once it exists. The Arabic reads: li-kawn
jawhar al· 'alam ka'inan Ii ai-if arakah, which Van den Bergh translates as
"the substance 01 the world is continually in motion." [q.v.J But to my mind
this is not altogether convincing, because it allows lor the world to be
contingently in motion. Now il it only happened to be in a state 01 continu-
DUS motion and was not in motion by its very nature or substance, then it
might continue existing as a world, but cease both to move and to be in
need 01 a mover. It would then be like the house which the builder could
leave without affecting its being a house. Since the point 01 Averroes' argu-
ment was to loreclose just this possibility and show that the world does
need the Creator alter its existence, I have rendered the text "the sub-
stance 01 the world is being-in-motion."
12. The best brief critical trealment published in English on Averroes'
discussion 01 the eternity 01 the world is George F. Hourani's 'The Dialogue
between al-Ghaziili and the Philosophers on the Origin 01 the World," Muslim
World, XLVlll (1958), pp. 183-191, 3Q8.315. A more extensive analysis of the
whole discussion plus a parallel passage in Averroes' F~I al-Maqal appears
in Michael E. Marmura's unpublished PhD. dissertation, ''The Conflict over
the World's Pre-Eternity in the Tahafuts of al-Ghaziili and Ibn Rushd"
(University 01 Michigan, 1959.)
13. Averroes, Tahiifut, pp. 60, 69, 209, 428; Destructio, pp. 101, 105, 195,337.
14. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 68-69, 90-97; Destruetio, pp. 105, 118-122. Cf. Tafsir
(LAM), IiI, c29, p. 1560g; In Xl! Metaphysieorum, I.e. 29, fol. 313 vb L.
IS. Aristotle, Physics iIi:I-2, 200bI2-202a12.
16. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 66; Destructio, p. 104. Cf. Tahiifut, pp. 167,211-212;
Destrudio, pp. 204, 362-363. See Fr. J. Weisheipel's insightlul discussion of this
doctrine in 'The Principle Omne quod moveJur ab alio movetur in Medieval
Physics," Isis, LVI (1965), pp. 26-45.
17. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 164-165; Destrudio, p. 167.
18. Averroes, Sermo de Substantia Orbis, c. 4, fol. IOva H-1.
19. Averroes, TahfIfut, pp. 60-62,102, 213; Destruetio, pp. 101, 125, 197.
20. G. C. Field, The Philosophy of Plato (London: Oxford University Press,
1969), p. 95.
21. Majid Fakhry, "The 'Antinomy' 01 the Eternity 01 the World in Averroes,
Maimonides, and Aquinas," Le Museon, LXVI (1953), pp. 139-155; Michel Allard,
op.cil., pp. 54-55; ci. S. Van den Berg, op.cil., ll, p. 9, n. 11:1; p. 27, n. 33:4; p. 66,
n.97:1.
22. Averroes, Tahiifut, pp. 162, 165, 168, 171-172, 213; Destructio, pp. 165,
167, 169, 172, 197.
Notes 305
23. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. ISO; Destruetio, p. 158.
24. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. lSI; Destruetio, p. 158.
25. Ibid. Tahiifut, p. 171; Destruetio, p. 172.
"';:6. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 415; Destrudio, pp. 329-330.
27. Averroes, Tafsir (LAM), iIi, c. II, pp. 1449a-145Od; In Xl! Metaphysieorum,
I.c. II, fol. 297 rb D-F.
28. Averroes, Tahiifut, p.l64; Destrudio, pp. 166-167.
29. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 131; Destruetio, p. 145.
30. Ibid. Tahiifut, p. 452; Destrudio, p. 353.
31. Averroes, Tafsir (LAM), iIi, c. 18, p. 1505z; In Xl! Metaphysieorum, I.c.
18, 101. 305va I.
32. Ibid., p. 1499n; 101. 304va l-vbK.
33. See Aristotle, Physics V:I, 224b28-225b7; Averroes, In V Physieorum, I.c.
7, fol. 211rb D-E.
34. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 162; Destrudio, p. 165.
35. Averroes, Tafsir (lAM), iIi, c. 30, pp. 157Op-157Ip; In Xl! Metaphysicorum,
I.c. 30, 101. 315rb F. Cf. Plato, Timaeus 29d-3Oc, 4ge-52d.
36. Averroes, TahfIfut, pp. 171-172; Destruetio, p. 172.
37. Aristotle, De Anima iIi:5, 43Oa18; Metaphysics XlI:7, lO72bl4-1073a3. Cf.
TahfIfut, pp. 185,214,434-435; Destruetio, pp. 181, 198-199,341-342.
38. Ibid. Tahiifut, pp. 306-307; Destruetio, pp. 255-256.
39. I am greatly indebted here to Prof. Alfred Ivry 01 Brandeis University
who shared with me a copy of his unpublished paper on "Intellect and Will
alter Averroes in Late Medieval Jewish Philosophy." This study has b~en
most helpful in raising the major questions for int~rpreting A,!erroes' doctrine,
although I diverge lrom Prof. Ivry in sever~1 b~~lc concluslo~s to the ques-
tions taken up below, particularly on the ViabilIty o.f a meanmgful sense of
will in Averroes' account 01 Divine causation. A reVised and expa~ded ver-
sion of this paper has appeared as ''The Will of God and ~e Practical Intel-
lect of Man in Averroes' Philosophy," Israel Oriental StudIes, IX (1979), pp.
377-391.
40. This is contrary to M. Fakhry, who maintains that Averroes does not
predicate will 01 the Deity in either an ordinary or transcendent mod~ .. Cf.
!slamie Oceasionalism, p. 117. Averroes' numerous references to the Dlvme
will are clearly to be understood in a transcen~ent mode. :n
e only ques;
tion is what content remains of the original notIOn of Will given Averroes
reinterpretation of it. For references to the Divine wiii by Averroes, s~
Tahiifut, pp. 39-41,157_161,426-427,438439,449450,475,526, 531-533; DestructIO,
 306
NOlFS
pp. 88-91, 162-166,336-337,344-345,352-353,373,410,413414.
41. Ibid., Tahafut, p. 438; Destrudio, p. 344.
42. Ibid., Tahafut p. 41; Destruetio, p. 91. For an excellent historical and
philosophic analysis of the issue, see Nicholas Rescher, "Choice Without
Preference: A Study of the History and of the Logic of the Problem of
'Buridan's Ass,''' Kant Studien, XII (1959-00), pp. 142-175.
43. Ibid, Tahafut, p. 427; Destruetio, pp. 336-337.
44. Ibid., Tahafut, p. 532; Destruetio, p. 414. I depart siightly from Van den
Bergh's translation for the sake of logical clarity.
45. Ibid., Tahafut, p. 412; Destruelio, p. 327. Cf. Herbert A Davidson
"Arguments from the Concept of Particularization in Arabic Philosophy,':
Philosophy East and West, 18 (October, 1968), pp. 299-314.
46. Ibid., Tahiifut. p. 426; Destruelio, p. 336.
47. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 328, 439, 38; Destrudio, pp. 272, 344-345, 90. Ultimately,
Averroes goes so far as to admit that it is only because of the Divine law
that we call it a will at all. See Tahafut, p. 38; Destruelio, p. 90.
48. Ibid., Tahafut, pp. 3941; Destruetio, pp. 90-91.
49. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 489, d. pp. 48-50; Destrudio, p. 382, d. pp. 94-95.
SO. Ibid, Tahiifut, p. SO; Destruelio, p. 94.
51. Aristotle, Metaphysics XIl:7, 1072a30-31; lO72bl4-29; 1073a3-12.
52. Averroes, Tahafut, p. 532; Destruetio, p. 414.
53. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 310, 339-340, 382, 463; Destruelio, pp. 259-260, 280,
294-295, 363.
54.Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 202,217-218,462; Destruelio, pp. 191, 199-200,362.
55. Averroes, Harmony, APpendix, pp. 72-73.
56. Averroes, Tahafut, pp. 201-203, 204, 339-341, 362; Destruelio, pp. 189-191,
191-192,279-280,294-295. . 73. Ibid., 429b5-10.
57. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 203, 215-216, 218, 339, 362, 446; Destruelia, pp. 191,
198-199,279,294-295,349.
58. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 340, 345, 446, 462; Destruetio, pp. 280, 282-283, 349,
363. Cf. Harmony, APpendix, p. 75.
59. Van den Bergh, op.cit., IT, p. 121, n. 203:1; p. 182, n. 326:1. "For Avicenna,
God cannot know individuals (at least not as individuals), but His knowl-
edge is limited to unalterable eternal universals (porphyry, Sentent., XXXIll
expressed the difference between the universal intellect and the particular
in this way: in the universal intellect the particular existents also exist
universally, whereas in the particular intellect both the universal and the
Notes 307
individual exist indIvidually.) Averroes goes beyond this: God knows through
a knowledge which is neither the knowledge of universals nor ';he knowl-
edge of IndIviduals, and is superior to the knowledge of men ~nd mco~pre­
hensible to them. This, of course, makes the term 'knowledge as applied to
God not only incomprehensible but meaningless."
-"'l 60. Averroes, Tahafut, pp. 442, 345; Destruetio, pp. 347, 283.
61. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 463; Destruelio, p. 363.
62. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 357, 362; Destruelio, pp. 292, 294-295.
63. Aristotle, De Anima 1ll:8, 432a1-3; Metaphysics VlI:6, II, 1037a33ff. See
Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics 2nd ed.
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963), pp. 444, 457-458.
64. Aristotle, Categories, ch. 12, 14b9-23. "It is because the actual ~ing
exists or does not exist that the statement IS called true or false. Cf.
Metaphysics ll:I, 993aI9-30 and Averroes, Tahafut, pp. 531, 463; Destruelio, pp.
414,363.
65. Aristotle, De Anima ll:3, 414bI7-18; Metaphysics X;7, 1072a26-35,
lO72b 14-25.
66. Averroes, Tahiifut, pp. 339-340; Destruelio, p. 279.
67. Aristotle, De Anima 1ll:8, 431b21, 432a1-3.
68. Averroes, Tahafut, pp. 180,462; Destruelio, pp. 177, 363.
69. Ibid., Tahiifut, pp. 216-217, d. pp. 202, 227-228; Destruetio, pp. 198-199,
d. pp. 191,204-205.
70. Tatsir (LAM), lll, c. 18, p. 1502s; In XII Metaph~sieorum, t.c. 18, fol.
305rb D; d. Aristotle, Metaphysics XII:9, 1074bl-IO; Tats" (LAM), III c. SO, pp.
1688a-168ge; In XI! Metaphysieorum, t.C. SO, fol. 334 A-C.
71. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 340; Destruetio, pp. 279-280.
72. Aristotle, De Anima 1ll:4, 429aI2-17.
74. Averroes, In Aristotelis De Anima Librum Tertium, ed. F. S. Crawfor.d
(Cambridge, Mass.: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953), I.c. 8, p. 420. ThIs
interpretation of Aristotle has been defended more recently by G. E. M.
Anscombe and P. T. Geach, Three Philosophers (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1961), pp. 59-60, aI;ld by Richard Norman, "Aristotle's Phi-
losopher-God," Phronesis, XJV-lN (1970), pp. 63-74.
75. Averroes Tahiifut, pp. 226-227, 462-463; Destrudio, pp. 204, 362-363. I
diverge slightly'from Van den Bergh by translating huwa as the "is" of iden-
tity instead of "includes."
76. Aristotle, De Anima lll:4, 430a34. " .. .In the case of objects which
 308 NDTFs
involve no matter, what thinks and what is thought are identical for theo--
retical knowledge and its object are identical." Cf. Metaphysics XII:9', lO15al-5.
'We answer that in some cases the knowledge is the object. In the arts, the
knowledge is the substance and essence of the object, and in it only the
matter is omitted, while in the [theoretical] sciences the definition and
knowing is the object Since, then, thought and the object of thought are
not different in the case 01 things that have not matter, the divine thought
and its object will be the same, i.e., thinking will be one with the object of
its thought."
77. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 343; Destructio, pp. 281-282.
78. Averroes, Tafsir (LAM), lIf, c. 49, p. 1686g; In XII Metaphysicorum, t.c.
49, 101. 333vaH. 'Therefore. what is necessary as regards the First Form,
insofar as it is perlect and an end, is that it not possess a form [as material
things do], lor it is simple and everything that is simple is not in matter."
Cf. Tahafut, p. 178; Destructio, p. 176.
79. CI. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, Book VII, II54b20-28, "If no one thing is
permanently pleasant [to men] this is because our nature is not simple,
and so we mortals have a better and a worse component, so that if the one
commences an action it is contrary to the nature 01 the other, but when-
ever they contribute equally to an action, this is neither pleasant nor painful.
Should there exist a being with a simple nature, the same thing will be
permanently pleasant to it in the highest degree. Hence, God enjoys lorever
one pleasure. For there is an activity 01 motionlessness as well as of motion,
and pleasure is rest rather than motion." Clearly the activity Aristotle has
in mind here is thought; c/o TahMut, pp. 180, 185, 233; Destructio, pp. 177, 181,
275.
80. Averroes, Tafsir (LAM), lIf, c. 51, pp 1704bb-17061f; In XII Metaphysicorum,
t.c. 51, fol. 336va-b G-M passim. See also Tahiifut, p. 259; Destructio, p. 225.
81. Averroes, Tahiifut, pp. 215-216, 218, 253, 339, 362; Destrudio, pp. 198-199,
221,279,294,295.
82. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 363; Destrudio, p. 295. Cf. Van den Bergh ad loc.,
"through their knowledge."
83. Ibid., Tahiifut. p. 232; Destructio, p. 207. This statement of Averroes' .
p~sition has prompted Simon Van den Bergh to complain that ''The theory
here exposed shows that in God the opposites coincide-He is the One who
contains the Many. He is the lorm and end He bestows on others. He is the
prime mover and supreme end-and substantiates al-Ghaziili's accusation
01 the irrationality 01 this theology." The Incoherence of the Incoherence, II,
p. 91, n. 138:5. The criticism, in view 01 our analysis, seems premature. More
to the point is the lact that it is based upon an antiquated scientific model
01 the universe and requires lar too many distinctions and qualifications to
justify its basic claims.
84. Aristotle, Metaphysics XIII:1087al5-21; d. Joseph Owens, The Doctrine
Notes 309
of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, pp. 427430. See also Barry Kogan,
"Some Reflections on the Problem cil Future Contingency in Alfarabi, Avicenna,
and Averroes" in Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philoso-
phy, ed. T. M. Rudavsky (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1984),
pp.95-101.
85. Averroes, Tahiifut, pp. 345-346; Destructio, p. 283.
86. On Aristotle's conception of teleology in nature and modern criti-
cism 01 his views, see Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause, and Blame: Perspec-
tives on Aristotle (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1980), pp. 155-
174. For recent discuSsions of the lact/value distinction, see W. D. Hudson,
ed., The Is-Ought Question (London: Macmillan and Co., Inc., 1969).
87. C/. Edward Hussey, The Pre-Socratics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1972), pp. 58-59. Hussey raises the problem 01 the map paradox in connection
with the interpretation 01 Heracleitos. There the paradox is generated by two
contrary claims by Heracleitos about the relation 01 Divinity to the cosmos,
namely: (I) that Divinity is identical with everything else, and (2) that
Divinity is somehow beyond, beneath, or behind the cosmos. Here the para-
dox is generated by the inconsistency between Divine omniscience and the
finity 01 alllorm qua lorm, even separate lorm or substance.
88. Aristotle, Metaphysics V:17, 1022a6-IO. Cf. Joseph Owens, The Doctrine
of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute
01 Mediaeval Studies, 1963), pp. 457, 467468, 470. "Perfection is equ~~ed
with finitude, act coincides with lorm" in the case 01 the separate EntItIes,
p. 468. Also, Ernan McMullin, ed., The Concept of Matter in Greek and Medie-
val Philosophy (Notre Dame, Indiana: University 01 Notre Dame Press, 1965),
pp. 302-303. ".. For him [Aristotle], 'actuality' was something sufficient to
itself, definite, possessing its own limit; unlimit connoted for h.im im.pe~ec­
tion and incompleteness, while 'potency' was always linked WIth prIvatIon
and change .... [1he] inversion of the Aristotelian roles of 'actuali~' and
'potency' took place in two stages. Plotinus identilied the One WIth the
Unlimited and hence he was led to re-clefine the philosopher's key term,
'actuality: by associating it with the infinite rather than the finit,:,. Thus
limitation now becomes a sign of imperfection and incompleteness illstead
of the opposite .. _ Aquinas completed the inversion by using ~e Aristote-
lian term 'potency' for this principle of limit, even though ArIstotle had
made act, not potency, his principle of limit"
89. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Barry S. Kogan,
"Averroes and the Theory of Emanation," Mediaeval Studies, xun (1981),
pp. 384404. Portions reprinted with permission.
90. Averroes, Tahiifut, p. 150; Destructio; p. 158.
9!. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 173; Destrudio, p. 173.
92. Ibid., Tahiifut, p. 183; Destructio. pp. 178-180.
 310 NOTIS Notes 311

93. Cf. Michael F. Wagner, "Vertical Causation in Plotinus," in The Struc- York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1982); ~red [v.ry, "Aven:oes
ture of Being: A Neoplatonic Approach, ed. R. Baine Harris (Albany: State on Intellection and Conjunction," Journal of the American Onental Soaeo:,
University of New York Press, 1982), pp. 51-72. 86 (1966), pp. 76-85; S. C. Tornay, "Averroes' Doctrine of the Mind," Phil-
osophical Review, 52 (1943), pp. 270-282; Leon Gauthier, Ibn Rochd (Avenues),
94. Herbert A Davidson, "Aliarabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect,"
Viator, 3 (1972), pp. 109-178. pp.236-256.
104. Averroes, Tafsir (LAM), lll, t.c. 44, p. 1652h-i. Cf. pp. 1648c-1649d; In
95. Averroes, Talkhi~ Kitab Ma Ba'd al-"(abi'ah, ed. Uthman Amin (Cairo:
XU Metaphysicorum (1073bl-3 fl.), I.e. 44, 328 D-E. Cf. 327vl.
1958), Treatise 4, pars. 53-65, pp. 148-156 passim; Epitome in Libras Meta.
physicorum (Venice: 1574), Treatise 4, 391vM-394rE passim. For an analysis 105. For further discussion of this interpretation, see Kogan, op.cil., pp.
of the relevant texts by category, see Kogan, op.cit., pp. 387-392. He[en 403-404, n. 55.
Goldstein argues that Averroes rejected the doctrine of the Active [ntelli-
gence as giver of forms some five years earlier. See Helen Go[dstein, "Dator
Formarum: Ibn Rusbd, Levi Ben Gerson, and Moses Ben Joshua of Narbonne,"
Islamic Thought and Culture, ed. l. R a[-Faruqi (Washington: International
Institute of Islamic Thought, 1982), pp. 107-121.
96. Supporters of the rejectionist interpretation include H. A Wolfson,
'The Twice Revea[ed Averroes" and 'The Plurality of Immovable Movers [n
Aristotle, Averroes and SI. Thomas" in Studies in the History of Philosophy
and Religion [, eds. l. Twersky and G. H. Williams (Cambridge, Mass.: 1973),
pp. 376, 12; Majid Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism and its Critique by Averroes
and Aquinas (London: 1958), p. 136 n. 91, and M. Allard, ''Le rationalisme
d'Averroes d'apres une etude sur [e creation," Bulletin d'etudes orientales de
l1nstitut fran~ais de Damas 14 (1952-54), pp. 23-25, 49. Supporters of the view
that Averroes retained the theory in modified form include Leon Gauthier,
Ibn Rochd (Auerroes) (Paris: 1948), pp. 264-265, and Simon Van den Bergh,
trans., Averroes, Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the InCOherence), [[
(London: 1954), p. 73, n. 107:4.
97. Averroes, Tahatut, p. 193. Cf. pp. 175, 179,230,249-250; Destructio, p.
185. Cf. pp. 175, 177,206,219.
98. Ibid., Tahafut, p. 180; Destructio, p. 177; see Van den Bergh, op.cil., p.
73, n. 108:1.
99. Averroes, Tafsir (LAM), lll, c. 44, p. 1648c; In XU Metaphysicorum
(1073bl-3), tc. 44, 327vH.
100. Averroes, Tahafut, p. 184; Destructio, p. 180.
101. [bid., Tahatut, p. 233. Cf. pp. 175, 178, 180-181; Destructio. p. 208. Cf.
pp. 175-176, 177-178.
102. [bid., Tahafut, p. 179. Cf. pp. 524, 529; Destructio, p. 177. Cf. pp. 408,
411.
103. The Active Intelligence, of course, continues to playa prominent
part in Averroes' epistemology. See Ka[man P. Bland, The Epistle on the
Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect by Ibn Rushd with the Com-
mentary of Moses Narboni: A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation (New
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 INDEX

Abraham, 145 necesssry through another, 28

abstraction, 233 Active Intelligence. 76, 249-50, 2BO n. 94, 103;
Abu Ya'qiib YOsuf, 10-11 as Giver of forms, 252, 310 n. 95;
AbO YOsuf Ya'qiib, 12 as source of the sublunar fonDS, 249
accidental cbanges, 122 active powers. See powers, active
accidental qualities, 91 activity,
accidental sequences, 4 being and, 204;
accidents, See atoms and accidents Divine 215;
act/s. 35-36, 58, 60,107,172, 190,218,222, and passivity, 297 n. 137;
256; pure, 190
Averroes on, 67; adum,28
cbaracteristics of, 52; actual existence, 62
as continuous or eternal, 211; actual existents.
distinction between two kinds of, 50; as powerful particulars of specific kinds,
as effects or prOOucts, 53; 124
as an entirely new creation, 58; actuality, 62, 113-14, 176-77, 188, 196,209,
the "exteriorization" of JXlwers and dis- 212,221,232,243,253;
positions, 124; and activity, 195,201;
al-Ghazall on, 31, 39, 65; Aristotie on, 309 n.B8;
imperfect, 53; as the counterpart of activity, 115;
meaning of, 205; as the end or goal, 212;
natural, 52, 175; Plotinus on, 309 n.B8;
the philosophers on, 39, 54; vs. actualization, 212
proceed from God through knowledge, actualization, 212
222; 'Ad. people of, 12
voluntary, 40, 52, 65, 175; al-'adam, 216-17
as substances not relations, 61; 'adah,l36
world as God's, 221 affirmation, 150
action/s,50; affinnatio, ISO
as cbaracteristic of animate beings, 31; agency, 34;
. modero theory 01, 273, n. 30; and activity, 290 n. 63;

329
330 Index 331
continuity criterion of, 96; alligatio, 54 art and the Intelligences, 177 lOS, 178-79, 193, 204, 249, 251, 255, 257,
Divine. 34; Almodhads, 10, 12 asbestos, 145 271 n. 17,276 n. 58, 283 n. 24;
requires essential reference to agent, 32 anaIogy/les, 159, 183; Ash'arism,8, 156.295 n. 155; and the Aristotelian efficient cause,
agent, 2, 25, 28, 34, 37-38, 42, 45, 52, 54, arguments from, 22; and al-Ghazali, 66 271 n. 20;
60-61,64,66-67,85,99,204,221,241-42, between heavens and living creatures, Ash'arite theologians. See theologians, on causal efficacy, 8;
248,253,256,258,264,271 n. 20; 181; Ash'arite. emanative theory of, 264;
Averroes on, 35, 42; people of, 22; Ash'arite theological presuppositions, 79; on intellectual and imaginative revelation,
Avicenna on, 54; structural, 182 al-Ghazetlfs return to, 156 280 n. 5;
brings new individuals from noo-being to Anawati, G. C., P 271 n. 20 Ash'arite theclogy, lOB, lIS; on necessary and possible existence,
belng,219; ancient philosophers. See ancients. hostile to philosophy, 135 276 n. 56;
characteristics of, 51; ancients, 6, 8-9,17,80,255; Ash'arites, 26, 37, 44, 68, 107, 126, 138, 147, on necessary connection. 287 n. 40;
connection with non-existence, 54; astronomy of, 197; ISS, 157,220,225,286 n. 38 on ontological priority, 287 n. 40;
definition of, 42; myths of the, 235 astronomy, 197; and possible existence, 272 n. 23;
definition compared, 35-36; angels,79; Averroes and, 198; on tested experience, 283 n. 24
essential characteristics 0/, 31; intennediation of, 143; based on Aristotelian physics, 10
essential reference to 2; anima, 193; mathematical (Ptolemaic), 10, 197-98
a1-Ghazali on, 3, 30-31, 39, 58; al-BaqiWini, 287 n. 40
meaning of, 301 n. 45 atoms and accidents, 91-92, 95, 97, lIS, 147,
imperfect, 51-53 Becoming, 116,291 n. 70
Anscombe, G. E. M., 307 n. 74 159,241,259,286 n. 38;
Being, 109, lll, 115-16, 126,204,219,
and Maker of the universe., 221; anliquitas, 212 Averroes on, 94;
301 n.47;
inseparability from act, 36; Antisthenes, 296 n. 120 created ex nihilo, 99;
as act, liS, 127, 133;
in metaphysics, 36; 'aqI,193 duration of, 91;
and act, 73, 113,292 n. 81
natural, 34, 43, 51, 166, 184; aI-'aqi aI-awwaI, 249 al-Ghazali on, 96;
actual,207;
natural, as imperfect agents, 51; 'aqi bi-al-malakah, 140 as inert and inactive, 91;
and actuality 133, 280;
and patient, 286 n. 37; Aquinas, Thomas, 272 n. 23 metaphysics of, 153;
Averroes on, 106;
the philosophers on, 27-28, 31; argument/s, 211; ontology of, 147, 165;
causal operations of, 116;
produces a composite of matter and form. demonstrative, 17,63,210,274 n. 35; succession of, 126, 139 degrees of, 127;
209· dialectical 8, 210, 274 n. 35; Atomists, 135
dynamic character of, 118;
in relation to non-existence, 53; sophistical 92, 98, 126, 211 automata, ISO "is as being does", 260;
separability from act, 36; Aristotle, Ix. 1,6,8-11,63,83,116-17,121, Averroes,lx. I, 2, 5-11, 22, 35, 61, 66, 94,
is indivisible, 127;
temporal relation to acts, 54; 154, 169-70, 176-77, 181, 188,206.218, 106,112,142,148,182,188,191,198,201, knowledge of, 107, 109;
universe as product of 221; 220-21,227,235-37,239,244,252,261-64, 204,209-10,216,218,231,233,245,250,
as manifold and diverse,llO,l13;
voluntary, 34, 39-41, 43, 51-52, 65,166, '2S7 n. I, m n. 62, 64, 285 n. 35, 296 n. 120, 252,255-58,281 n. 17,282 n.19, 339-40 in motion or at rest, 110;
184; 299 n. 22; on agents and causes, 42; 25
voluntary and a1-Ghaza]i, 39; [JeAnima, 221, 237; . d' necessary. 1 ;
commentanes an epitomes on Aristotle, and non-being, 109,219;
voluntary and natural, 28, 184, 256 defense 01220; II; as one and Immobile, 112,289 n. 58;
agent/act relation: cognition and its objects 285 n. 35; concept of agents and agency, 34; possibility of, 260;
phi10s0pbers' analogy for, 63 on creation, 209; conception of Divine will, 223; as self-identical, 107;
agent/s and act/s: on experience and science, 283 n. 24; ~th~~
continuity criterion for, 52; .. 1254 rea,1291 n.,
70:
on natural sciences and metaphysics, 21; and Dlvme causat on, ; relation to activity, 106;
created ex nihi/o, 91; noetic of 244; early acceptance of Avicenna's account and unity. 127
crfteria for, 69; philosophy 01197; of emanation, 249; b . go' t 68
criteriologicaJ analysis of, 258; . 9: em m-ac,
on scientific knowledge, 109; earlye d
simultaneity relation between, 55, 61; -Ghaucallon
fi'
of, ,h . . bel'lever/ S, 22 138
:za 5 m~tap YSlcai neutra~lty, 44; Berkeley, George, 5
I
self-thinking God of, 233; ?n al
temporal connection between, 58-59 works of, 24, 63; mdependent position on causal efficacy, bi-al-fi'l. 115
agent/patient model of creation, 62 Anna!dez, R, 268 n. 9
259; Bland, Kalman P., 310 n. 103
agent/patient re1atlonship, 52, 256 ars divina intellectualis, 178 on relation between acts and agents, 60; block universe, 78
AIoill, J. L, 277 n. 64 art: on separation, 36; body/ 20B
Alexander of Aphrodlsias, 237 '11 11 ies,l99, ;
Divine intellectual, 235; qlldi 0 f SeYJ e, ; animate, 179. 184;
Allard, Michel, 2M, 303 n. 1,304 n. 21, primary, 235; teachings pubJicaUy condemned, 11; celestial, 179, 194, 199;
310 n. 96 subordinate, 235; theory of creation, 63; created to be governed by the soul, 76;
allegory, 74, 86, 270 n. 6 universal, 253; on the world, 209 or matter, 192
Allen, R E., 271 n. 14 universal and FIrSt Unmoved Maver, 253 Avicenna, ix,~, 26, 30, 54, 77, 81, 88, 10()... bonum, 149
332 Index 333
Bouyges, Maurice, 267 n. 3, 4, 266 n. 13, causal judgments, 259 as procession. 248; as sufficient condition, 57;
270 n. 8
Brown, Patterson, 301 n.44
Bunge, Marlo, 301 n. 44
causal knowIng, 229, 231, 238, 241, 24344,
246, 255, 264;
and Aristotle's Unmoved Mover,244;
, as property or essential accident, 105;
two orders of for Avicenna, 55;
causatum, 27
three explanatioos for their failure to pro-
duce their effects, 129-30
uncaused, 191;
Buridan's Ass, 271 n. 32 Averroes' views on, 231, 233, 240; cause/effect re1ations, 14; voluntary and non-voluntary, 41
Butterworth, Charles 293 n. 98 not contemplative production, 243; inseparability of, 30 causes. See also agents, voluntary and
as an esoteric teaching, 232-33; reciprocity of, 29, 30 natural
essence of the doctrine, 241; cause and effect, 74,86,92,248,257; celestial animation, 180, 182-83
Calipus, 170
God's, 204; co-ex:istence of in Avicenna, 100; celestial bodies, 179, 194, 199,243,276 n.56;
calor, 177
philosophical underpinnings of, 231; concatenations of, 75; movement of, 143, 170, 175, 184, 197;
caiorartificiaiis,l77
two meanings of the word 'know' in, 246 as discontinuous events, 106; do not perceive by means of sense
capaclty,2
causal necessity, 15,30,89,95, 1()4.jj, 109, as distinct Individuals, 104; experience, 199;
Cartesian revolution, 180
129; as an entailment relation, 29; principles of, 235;
categories, 110, 159
not an abstract phenomenon, 95; al-GhazaIi on, lOS; specific act of, 172;
causal activity and passivity;
Avicenna on, 88; logically distinct, 104; souls 01, 301 n. 43
degree of, 99
main difficulty with, 290 n. 66; ontological bond between, 144,257,259; celestlal causaHoo. See causation, celestlal
causal chain/s, 77, 78, 165, 192
as a modality of the agent/patient reciprocal relations between, 30; celestial causes. See causes, celestial
causal connection;
'relationsWp,I29; relation between, 14 celestial forms, 235
between mover and sphere, 195
as necessary accident, 88; cause/s, 42, 109, 136, 143, 185, 271 n. 20, celestlallntelligences, 66, 75, 175, 195-96,
causal conditions, 130
causal principle, 107, 191; 278 n. 65; 221,230,262-63,279 n. 75, 301 n. 39;
causal determinism, 77
negation of, 288 n. 51 affrrmed and its PrqJer effect denied with- act by necessity of their natures, 144;
causal efficacy, Ix, 34, 8-9,14,71,77,79,
causal processes, 14 out contradiction, 261; actuality and activity of, 195, 201
86-87,89,90,92,94,97,106-10,114,118,
causal relations, x accidental, 55; causal action of, 145;
126, 128, 133, 1=, 142, 156-57, 165, 169,
causal sequences, 4 Averroes on, 191; contemplate the paradigms of the natu-
174, 180, 229, 231, 238, 241, 245, 248, 250,
causation, 1,2, 5, 10, 103, lOS, 108, 109, 245, efficient See efficient cause/s; ral order, 196;
256-57,259,261;
249,255; as essence of the thing, 292 n. 76; and souls, as efficient causes 01 prophetic
Averroes on, 2, 5, 112, 204, 255;
Averroes on, 256; can be known to pnxluce their effects, predictions, 280 n. 6;
basic thesis of, 3;
backward,4; 4; and the spheres, 200
classical objections against, 15;
celestial, 164, 175, 178, 185,251,255,264; celestial, ISO, 180; celestial mechanics, 14-15
congruity requirement fOf, 130;
as the characteristic behavior of an agent, concatenation of, 221; celestial motion/s, 64,170,172,175,177,
continuity and discontinuity in, 50;
256; . contingent, 55; 182, 184, 187, 197, 199,227,234,262,
continuity. uniformity of, 258;
continuous, 276 n. 58; efficacious entities, ix; 299 n. 13;
controversy about, ix;
controversy about, 2; efficient 224; cessation of, 186;
definition of, 2;
and creation, 221; essential, 55; continuity of, 172, 184;
and emanation, 248;
denial of, 107, 109; essential and necessary, 55; and ectiptic, 177;
emanation as a model of, 229;
direction of, 251; final, 67, 169, 196,24346,252; eternity 01, 182;
empirical defense of, 96;
discontiuities in acting and being, 98; fictive, 130 peculiarities of, 227;
as an essential feature of what a particu-
Divine, 14,38, SO, 203, 242, 253, 264M, formal,67, 169, 242-44,250,254,264; as temporal, 172;
lar is, 259;
282-83 n. 19; infmite regresses of, 192; two-fold character of, 172
al-Ghazalrs reply, 89;
as a dyadic relation between co-existing Intrinsic dynamis of, 167; celestial Souls, 75, 78-79, 280 n. 6
idea of, 5;
things, 257; neces.sary and necessitating, 57; celestial spheres, 180, 190,214,262,
in ordinary experience, 34;
final, 201, 205; natural, 40, 41; 279 n. 75;
Islamic philosophers' view of, 256;
formal,251-52; as necessary and/or sofficlent conditions, movement of, 171-72, 174, 177,201
as limited to unobserved celestial princi-
al-Ghazall on, 256; 278 n. 71,287 n. 43; chance, 84, 265, 282-83, n. 19
pIes, 143;
as a manipulative technique, 274-75 n. 47, as ontologica1ly prior, 3; change, 4,77, 118;
metaphysIcs and, 100;
48; as originative source, 3; as actualization of the potential qua
as mysterious. 4;
natural, 147; partIcular, 4; potential, 135;
as neither obscure nor mysterious, 93;
not the cement of the universe, 265; priority to their effects, 3; continuity of, 167-68, 178, 186, 190,262;
and powers and dispositions, 98;
occasionalist account of, 106, 136; produce their effects, 2; continuous, 99, 165, 169, 178,207;
specilicity of, 4
plenitude/overflow model of, 256-57; proximate, 73; different phases of, 99;
causal explanation, 121
in terms of priority and posteriority, remote, 97; In nature, 46, 167,261;
causal influences, 148
causal interactions of corporeal entities, 150 287 n. 43; as substance or events, 103; in place or quantity, 99;
 334 Index 335
mock, 134; continuous causes, desiderative power/s, 2QO.01, 262 fomud/Hnallstic model of, 264;
reality and intelligibility of, 166; as causes In the fullest sense, 278 n. 65 desire, 199, 200, 225; of God, 264;
and specifIc natures of powerful par_ continuity, SO, 258; Averroes on, 201; plenitude/overHow, model of, 36, 264;
ticulars, 203; a1-GhazaIT on, 59 as bodily power, 201; themy of, 28
as a structured. continuous process, 203; continuity criterion, 51-52, 92, 98-99 object 01, 199; efficient cause/s.3, 43,45, 58, 67, 90, 96, 98,
sublunar, 170, 179, 187; continuous change. See change, continuous special sense in of relation to spheres, 108,201,213,224,243, 261, 2~,
as a succession of different forms, 154; contradictories and contraries, 219 199; 271 n. 20, 280 n. 6;
three kinds of, 219; contraries, 173 in the spheres, 2QO.01 and their eHects, 71, 257;
as a transition from potency to actua1ity, contrary to fact conditionals, 45, 120 determirdsm, 79 exist by the eHect does not occur, 129;
134 Ccpi, Irving M., 278 n. 71 dialectician, 111 natural, 32, 35;
choice, 32, 306 n 42; Comford, F. M., 291 n. 69, 70 dialectics, 163,270 n. 9 as powerful particulars, 284 n. 32;
without preference, 223 corporeal fonn, 296 IL 128 differentiae substantia/es, 206 and production, 97;
circular motion, 172, 184,262 cosmological argumen~ 57-58 differentiation: remote, 170;
code/s: cosmology, 14 Ash'arites on, 225; separable in principle from their eHects,
kinetic, 198; Courtenay, Wdliam, 295 n. 115 philosophers on, 225 257;
structural, kinetic, and developmental, 196 Cratylus, 125 discontinuity criterion, 92 and separate Intelligences, 195;
cognition, 32; creation, 63, 209, 214-15, 219, 223; dispositio, 141 theory of, 28;
actualized, 237; Avicenna on, 276 n. 58; dispositions, 42, 120; voluntary, 35
Divine, 237; distributive sense of, 214; not habits, 139; efficient power. See power/s, efficient
human, 243; eternal, 229; of the patien~ 99 eidos, 181
and Its objects, Aristotle on, 285 n. 35; as generation of lodividuals, 214; Divine act. 46 E1eatic Stranger, 115-16, 291 n. 70
as a way of being, 301 n. 47 linked to movements of the world, 49; Divine attrIbutes, 18 E1eatics, 111
cognitional Identity, 236, 238, 240, 24344, of man, 162-63; Divine causation, 14,38, SO, 203, 242, 253, elementary bodies, 262
247,251,264 as voluntruy and miraculous, 26 255, 2~, 282-83 n. 19 elementary powers, 282, 297 n. 131
coincidence, 87-88 creation ex nihilo, 26, 62, 66, 91, 215-16, Divine craltsman, 220 elements, 158, 175, 183, 186, 252
Collingwood, R G., 275 n. 47 218,241,277 n. 62 Divine intellective art, 178 emanation, 27-28, 33, 36, 75-76, 93, 229, 248-
common substratum, 154, 159 Creator. Divine law, 306 n. 47 49, 252, 264;
composite entities, 292 n. 80 three main attnbutes of, 224 Divine omnipotence, 71-73, 78 Averroes on, 253;
composition, 208; Divine revelation, 22 Avicenna on, 248;
between form and matter, 209; Divine self-thinking: and cause and eH~ 248;
dator formarum, 144
cause of, 208; as an exercise in theoretical sciences, 237 and celestial Intelligences, 144;
two senses of, 208 Davidson, Her~ 293 n. 98, 300 n. 36, Divine simplicity, 238-39; distinguishing features 01, 246;
306 n. 45, 310 n. 94
concealment as God's unimpeded and uninterrupted a1-GhazaIi on, 238;
devices of, 83; !JeAnima, 221, 237
act of thinking, 240; and God's causation, 249;
and disclosure, 21
!Je Substantia Orbis, 201 Averroes on, 239-40; model 01 causal efficacy, 229, 248;
Decisive Treaties. See F~ al-Maqli
condition, 141; Avicenna on, 238 Nee-Platonic theory 01, 76;
deficiency, 131-32
and conditioned, 163; Divine will. See will, Divine rejected as model of efficient causation.
definition of, 56; deHnitlon/s 109, 119, 121, 123, 125, 134, 158, doings, 273 n. 30
163; . 254;
necessary, 57; doing-related events, 273 n. 30 terminology of as metaphorical, 252;
sufficient, 57;
See also real defmltions Dozy R, 269 n. 14 theory 01, 204, 229, 248
Deity, See God
ccngruity,95, 122-23, 128, 130, 162, 166, 185, dynamic entitles, 265 emanative overflow. See emanation
Dernlurge, 200
213,218,259,261-62; dynamis, 116,291 n. 69 emanative terminology, 254
absence of, 130;
demonstration,22, 74, 107, 163,216,269 n. I, dynamism, 2-3 end. See final cause
2, 270 n. 9
of active and passive powers, 213; dynesthai, 115 energeia and kinesis, SO, 258;
between God's knowledge and the exist- demonstrative argument/s, 17,63,210,
Aristotle's distlnctlon between, 277 n. 64
274 n. 35
ents,228;
ecliptic, 174; energeia/e, SO, 116,211-12, 258, 277 n. 64;
demonstrative books, 9, 19,24, 199,255,
functional, 195-95,201,209,246; definition 01, 173 as Intrinsically desirable, 232;
270 n. 10
spheres and separate Intelligences oper- eHects,4, 28, 53, 71, 129,257; and though~ 233
ating in, 200; demonstrative man, 24, 227
entailmen~ 65, 67, 95,132,271 n. 17
demonstrative proofs, 75, 86 specific, 167
between powers and dispositions, 98, 162; eHective psychological faculty, 76 entailment relation:
relations. 174 demonstrative propositions, 21-22, 269 n. 1
efficient causation 198,241,248,253-54, between cause aod eHect, 86;
demonstrative sciences, 269 n. 1
consuetudo, 136 287 n. 43, 288 n. 47; logically necessary, 142
Descartes, Rene, 299 n. 22
 336 Index 337

entelecheia, 212, 233 possible, 190; exists potentially In prime matter, 218; 260,262
equinoxes, 172-73
esoteric doctrine, 23
esoteric writing, 254
at rest, 66
exoteric/esoteric writing:
and demonstrative truths 22·
, as a generative mechanism, 118;
immateriality of, 193;
:md innate urge (honne), 117, 119;
Gilson, E., 271 IL 20
Giver of forms, 144, 178-79, 252, 310 n. 95.
See also active Intelligence and dator
esse,216 tradition of, 21 ' I mtennedlary, 162; formarum
essence/s lOB, 116, 121-22, 126, 134,291 n. exiernaisenses,75 and matter, 189, 232, 260; God, 36, 56,149,217,224,237,258;
69; as a principle of actuality and activity, act of, 263;
and accident, Aristotle on, 121; 232' act of knowing, 229, 246;
Fakiny, Majid 92, 107,268 n. 10,269 n. 18, separate, 192, 200,232,263;
and attributes, Ill; action of consistent with His simplicity,
277 n. 62, 288 n. 51, 292 n. 81, 293 n. 91, specific, 227; 248;
and existence as distinct, 60;
303 n. 3, 304 n. 21, 305 n. 40, 310 n. 96 and stable structures of things, 141; activities performed by, 137;
names and definitions, 107
falasifah. See philosophy
essential and accidental causation 97 sublunar, 249; activity in creating the world, 46;
al-F~r~bT, 6, 8, 26, 229, 251, 255, 280 n. 5
essential causes, 55, 189 ' substantial, 154 acts as natural cause, 38;
Fasl al-Maq~l, 7, 22, 268 n. 8, 269 n. 4
knowledge of, 109 fannal causation. See causation, fannal acts without mediation, 134;
fayd,248
essential efficient causation, 68, 103; fann of fonns, 198, 232, 234 as actualized Intelligence and the total-
Feldman, Seymour 303 n. 3
I
Avicenna on, 100 four causes, 282 n. 19, 285 IL 35 ity of existents, 233;
Field, G. C., 214, 304 n. 20
essential nature. See nature/so essential four elements, 174,208 as Agent and Maker of the world 25, 38,
fiery furnace, 145, 148
eternal creation, 15,48, SO, 204-5, 210, 215, Friends of the Forms, 116,291 n. 70 52,61,64,85,168,204,221,241-42,248,
fifth element (ether), 172, 187,207
218-19,221,242; .jawhariyah,206 253, 256, 265;
final causation, 243, 345-46, 252
doctrine of, 203-204 as all-poweriul, 136;
final cause, 225, 24244, 246, 250, 254, 264;
ex nihilo, 215-16; Galen, 20 Arlstotellan conception of, 264;
and God, 243-44
Averroes on, 204; Gardet, Louis, 268 IL 6 attributes of, 226;
final judgment, 74
See also creation ex nihilo Gauthier, Leon, 268 n. 6, 302 n. 56, 310 IL of Averroes, 253;
First Cause, 26,191-92,196,241-42,249, Averroes on, 233, 245;
eternal origination. See eternal creation 96, 3111L 103
251-52;
eternal world, 203 Gasking, Douglas, 274 IL 47, 275 n. 48 aware of particulars, 136;
eternity, 205, 212; as cause of existence, 241; and believers, 138;
of the world, 203; as cause of intelligibility. 241; al-GhazaIi,Abul:lamid,ix,3,6-8, 13-14, 18-20.
as best of creators, 163;
two senses of, 205 distinguished from first Intelligence, 251; 30-31,39,44,58-59,65-66,73,91,96,104,
can create anything not logically imp0s-
event/s,4; God as, 242 138, 149, 152, 194,204,223,238,256,
288 n. 48, 295 n. 114; sible, 146;
and chance, 84; First Commander, 186 causal relation with the world, 246-47;
concomitance of. 259; First Existent, See God autobiography of, 267 IL 5;
charging philosophers with unbelief, 19;
and causal knowing, 15;
concrete, observable, 142; First Intellect. See First Intelligence causation of, 245;
habitual course of 137' First Intelligence, 235, 237-38, 249, 251; criteria for genuine agent, 222;
critique of the philosophers' emanative
as cause of every existent, 38;
as Inefficacious, 259; , ~ simple and absolute, 239; as cause of unity, 242;
theory, 264;
as both logically discrete and metaphysi. . slmpIer than others, 240 contemplative activity of, 246;
cally powerless, 143; First M?ver, 43, 191, 195,298 n. 4 on the empirical argument for causal
efficacy, 89;
creative activity of, 214;
miraculous lSI' first philosopher. See metaphysician as creator, 25-26, ll5, 128, 151;
natural and Av~rroes 142' first philosophy, 253; and occasionalism, 137-138, 2881L 28;
essential and necessary efficient cause,
as natural causes 136' I as the art of arguing, 290 n. 61 on ontology of atoms and accidents, 92;
on the relation between acts and agents, 68;
ontology of, 258-59; . First Principle. See First Cause and God eternal activity in creating, 64;
regular associations between, 259; first substances, 235
58;
rejects necessary ccnnection In any fann,
eternaJ and continuous activity of, 138;
regularity of in nature 136' flux, 126; as eternal mover, 66;
spontaneous 84-85 261' ' Ash'arite, 126; 258;
reserves causal power to God alone, 256; eternity of, 168;
succession of 45 136 ' Heracieitan, 125, 128,293 n. 83 all existents seek their end by movement
existence, 68, I io, i35, 276 n. 56; force. See power skepticism of, 267-681L 5
Geach, P. T., 307 n. 74 toward, 243;
and non-existence, 226; form/s, 11-19,46, 118, 140, 154, 169, 172, as final cause, 244;
existent/s,66; 176,179,181,188-89,192,209,216,218, genera, 113, 154, 166
of aI-Ghaz,jJj, 149;
come to be from the non-existent as 220-221,235,24243,260,263-63,292 n. 76, generation and corruption, 36, 169, 172, 209,
219; as the hierarchy of existents, 235;
potential,217; 60; as highest of the Intelligences, 245;
as configurations of different powers, 117; and active and passive powers, 188;
cause of, 173-74;
elllcient causes of, 201; as an Incorporeal agent, 37;
as consequence of God's knowledge, 228; as configuration of active powers 212 incorporeality, ISO;
232,262' , realm of, 32
and movement, 206; Intellect of, 15;
degrees of, 235; generative mechanism. 118, 123, 124, 140,
 338 INDEX
and kinetic code 242'
knowledge emb~ces'natures of things
228'
knowledge is causally efficacious, 230;
knowledge of, 32, 230, 244, 24647;
knows the opposites. 222;
lacks capacity for change, 239;
may impede activity of natural causes
148; , figments of, 142
must perform the best act, 211, 226;
as necessary of existence, 27, 29,
276 n. 58;
neither a natural nor voluntary agent, 34; heat, 177-79;
Neo-Platonic account of, 248;
not generable or corruptible, 34;
as omnipotent, 72, 84, 115;
as "philosopher", 225, 264, 307 n. 74;
of the philosophers, 149;
as p~imary instance of an agent, 258;
ommpotence of, 71, 128, ISO, 152-53, 163;
ontologically prior to world, 64, 66;
pleasure of, 308 n. 79;
principal activity is thought, 308 n. 76;
power of, 159;
providence of. 207;
as radically transcendent, 249;
self·knowledge of, 237;
and separate Intelligences, 252;
as a separate Intelligence, 252;
as separate form, 246;
simplicity of, 308 n. 78;
as sole agent, 66;
specilic act of, 245;
and the sphere system, 234;
teleological order in mind of 225 264'
temporally co-existent with ~reation. 66; Hippocrates,116
tenninus ad quem of causation, 252;
tenninus a quo of emanation 249'
thinks on thought, 228; " pure, 193;
thinks only His own essence, 229;
thinks patterns of specific natures, 243; Hudson, W. D., 309 n. 86
three main attributes of 226 228·
as the totality of existedce, 229; ,
as ultimate cause of particular events, 89; Hume, David, ix, 5, 67
and unbelievers. 138;
will of, 15, 222;
wisdom of, 163, 168, 172, 178;
wisdom and customary course of, 167-69
gods, 235
Goichon, AM., 271 n. 17
Goldstein, Helen, 310 n. 95
Goodman, Lenn, 288 n. 48, 295 n. 114
Index 339
ground-consequence relation 258 Ibn Tufayl, Abu Bakr, 10 11 fslam, 6, 63, 86;
c..
Guthrie, W. K. 296 n. 120 ' Ibn Tumart, Muhammad. 10 modem philosophers of, 8;
' Identity, 121-122,289 n. 51, 292 n. 81; theologians of. 221;
habit, i36-37, 13940
r, cognitional, 198; fslamic philosophers, 14,47,256,277 n. 62
and conformity to law, 289 n. 51; fslamlc theology, See theology
habitual course of events, 137, 155
principle of. 107 al-istiqrii'. 87, 283 n. 24
~al,141
i~dath, 60, 215, 303 n. 4 ithoo(,152
al·Mdith,53
a[.~ariirah, 177 imagination, 75 lvry, Allred, 295 n. 112,296 n. 123
al-fJaro.rah al-~na7yah. 177
Hare, P. H., 285 n. 32 hnaginative faculty, 75, 280 n. 5, 6, 295 n. 112
imkiln, 74 kallIm, See theology
Harre, R., 284-85, n. 32 Kant, Immanuel, 294 n. 112
impediment/s,30, 114, 129,131-32,148, ISO
al·~awl1dith, 155 Kamali, S. A, 267 n. 4
impossibility/ies, 81, 146,151·53,272 n. 22;
and formal contradiction, 152; kinesis, SO, 201
elementary, 179; kinesis and energeia,
in seeds, 177. 179; logical, 154;
notion of, 152; Aristotelian distinction between. 258,
measures or determinations of '178-79: 277 n. 64. See energeia
vital,l79 " physical, 138, 154
inconvenientia, 146 kinetic code, 263
heavenly bodies, 150, 171 knowing, 232, 234;
heavenly sphere, 171 Indelible Tablet, 75, 77
induction, 87 Aristotelian model of, 232;
heavens, the, 10, 181-82,184,213; as cognitional-identity, 233;
Averroes on. 182, 188 infinite regress, 168, 192,264,276 n. 57,
285 n. 35, 301 n.44 two stages of in humans, 236
chain of command In. 182; knowledge, 107, 109, 147,222;
circular movement of. 207; innate ideas, 199
innate impulses. 132 Aristotelian doctrine of, 192;
eternal or created. 10; as apprehending the causes of things, 109;
exist on account of their motion, 213; innate urge (horme), 117, 119, 132
hmer spheres, 170 of causes, 150;
and life. 186; always in conformity with the nature of
move by desire, 199; innovatio, 53, 60,155,212,214-15
innovatio continua. 48 the thing known, 141;
and the order of causes, 185; created in us by God. 155;
possible to cease moving, 301 n. 37; innovatum.58
intellect/s, 140, 161, 178, 192·93, 199,200; demonstrative, 144;
similarity to their creator 184 denial of, 107;
active and passive, 193;
Heracleitians. 111. 126 ' as d!stinguished from mere opinion, 141;
as the cause of the existents. 237;
Heradeitus, 125-26,309 n. 87 God s, 223, 228, 230, 244;
heresies, suppression of, 19 eternal. 164;
and God's essence in Averroes, 229; possibility of, 260;
heretical innovations, 7 as power. 229;
hierarchical classification schemes 122 a higher activity of the soul. 194;
' human, 167, 198,235,239; theoretical,73;
as the perception of order and arrange- and volition of God, 204
Hourani, George F., 23, 268 n 8, 10,269 n. Kogan, Barry 5., 309 n. 84, 89.
16, 18,270, 11,272 n. 24, 25, 284 n. 26, ment in existents. 233;
Kosman, L. A, 277 n. 64
287 n. 40, 304 n. 12 Kuhn, Thomas 5., 302 n. 56
honne See innate urge thinks ItseU, 237;
and will, not distinct in God for Averroes
228' ' Lerner, Ralph, 270 n. 11
~udilth, 212, 214-215, 303 n. 4
and will, relation between, 222 living creatures, 177, 181;
al·~udilth al-da'im, 48
intellectus, 193 causes of, 176;
Hussey, Edw'ard, 309 n. 87 intellectus in habitu. 140 characteristics of, 181;
intellectus primus, 249 as composite structures, 196;
Hyman, Arthur, 296 n. 128
Intelligences, celestial. See celestiallntelli- forms of, 176;
gences heavens as, 184
Ibn AblU!"ybi'ah, 268 n. 11,269 n. 17 intention, logical entailment, 65, 67, 95;
Ibn l:Iamawayh, 269 n. 19 second,l96 between God and the world, 67;
Ibn Rushd. See Averroes al·iriidah, 222 Lovejoy, Arthur, 272 n. 21
Ibn SIn~. See Avicenna irtioo(,54
 340
luzlim.248
ma'a,64
al-mabda' al-awwal, 249
Madden. E. H.. 284-85 n. 32
mafU/.28
magic. 79. 80. 85
Maimnnides. 294 0. 112
Malebranche. N.• 5
malleable natures. 153
ma·1fl1.27
Mamura, Michael E.. 268 0. 9. 273 n. 33.
281 0. 7. 284 0. 26. 28. 287 0. 4ll. 2B8 0. 47.
2950. 114. 115.3040. 12
man:
Averroes on the equivocity of the term.
2810.17;
three main attnbutes of. 226
Map paradox. 309 0. 87;
God's knowledge and, 24647
maqdUr.74
a1-Marrakushi. 269 0. 14. 17
materialists. 115
matter 66. 76-77. 120. 134. 158-60. 162. 176.
192.209.211.218.222.263.2920.80;
analogical conception 01. 180;
as context related, 160;
difference between theologians' and phi-
losophers' conceptions of. 159;
differentiation of. 175;
dispositional characteristics of. 144;
as an ensemble of passive powers. 212;
and form. 11-19.169. 172. 188-89. 243;
and lassitude. 184;
as a particular eleroent. 75;
as position related. 160;
responsible for multiplicity. 240;
separate from substance. 221
'matters' and 'forms',
hierarchy 01. 160-61
McMullin. Fmao. 309 n. 88
Megarlans. 133. 135. 2B8 n. 38
"men at demonstration", See demonstra-
tive men
metaphysics. 21. 28. 38. 100. 153;
occasionalist, 147;
theoretical questions of. 18;
science of. 19
metaphysician, 111. 290 n. 59. 292 n. SO.
2930.83;
as master of the art 01 argumen~ 290 0. 61
al-mihnah al iRiliyah al-·aqliyah. 178
INDEX
mind:
Divine. 164. 168
mind-body probfem. 150;
of celestial substances, 199
miracle!s. 71-73. 75-79. 81. 84-86. 138. 141.
144. 146-49. 151.261.295 n. 115;
ascribed to purely mechanical factors,
151;
Averroes on, 148,282 n. 19;
existence no doubted, 72;
as extraordinaJy extensions of nature. 74;
as extraordinary instances of natural
causation. 72;
as extraordinaJy momentaJy-creations 01
God. 72;
of the fiery furnace. 145;
aI-GhaziiIi on. 73. 152;
as heterogenious incursions of God into
the habitual course of nature. 261;
as interruption of the course of nature,
74;
as necessary principle for virtue, 83;
and occaslonaJism, 150;
occur to verify prophet;s credentials and
establish religious law. 149;
as the outcome of rare intersections of
causal chains. 148;
possibility of. 147;
as principles of religious laws, 2B2 n. 19;
and prophets. 151;
providential interpretation of. 149;
as purely spontaneous natural events,
83.261;
theological interpretation 01. 138
modal SYllogism. 269 0. 1
Moliere:
Le Malade lmaginaire, 44
moral virtue. 73
Morewedge. Parvis. 284 0. 26. 295 n. 114.
296 n. 130
Moses. 74
motion!s.35. llO. 127. 135. 170. 175. 184.
187.213.289 n. 58;
celestial. 64. 170. 172. 175. 182. 184. 187.
199.227.234;
circular, 188;
defulltion of. 212;
disorderly. 220;
energeia and kinesis, 50;
eternity of. 210;
primaly. 172;
sublunar. 64
Index 341
motion and rest:
natural philosopby. 28
as principles of being. llO; natural place/s. 174. 183-84.245.262
principles of. 98
natural sciences, 21, 290 n. 61
'I Moure1atos A P. D.• 291 n. 73. 301 0. 44 natural scientistJs. lll. 289 0. 58. 292 n. SO
I movement/s.49. 110. 171-72. 174. 177. 184- natural species.
I 85.201.206.221.227.243.246; eternal and unchanging character 01. 45
i celestial. 177. 197.262.299 0. 13;
circular. 182-83. 207;
nature!s. 3. 74. 98. ll4. ll6-ll8. 120-23. 125.
129.136.140.227.233.257.260.265;
continuous and eternal, 171; acts in the same way always or for the
existence in the intellect, 196; most part. 84;
finite. 207; allows for quantitative measures. 132;
gyrational. 197; as totality of its essential powers. 117;
bas finite parts. 171; chaoges in. ll4;
local. 190;
definition of. 290 n. 59;
natural, 184, 242; and operations of things. 163;
parts 01 the world·s. 211;
as hierarchy of active and passive powers,
patterns of eternal circular. 196; 166;
succession of, 206;
as principle 01 motion and ~ 184;
totality of. 211; dynamic and variable aspect 01. 132;
voluntary. 242 as essence. ll7;
mover. 194-95; explanatory function of. Ill;
actuality and efficacy. 213; includes specific selection 01 powers and
celestial. 193; dispositions, 132;
Giver of existence. 213; malleable. 142. 153;
Giver 01 motion. 213; models 01. 98;
immaterial. 190; 01 motion and r~ llO;
of the stellar spheres. 250; not identical with the totality of their
See also FIrSt Mover properties. 122;
mulidalh. 303 does nothing superfluous. 131;
MuJ:>ammad. 282 0. 19 has one and the same motion, 127;
Munk, S, 288 n. 10.2690. 17-19 as originative source of motioo. 289 0. 58;
Mulakallimiin. 289 n. 51. 293 n. 91. as ausia, 117;
2950. ll2. ll5 as principle of movement, 125;
mutanbsibiit mutaqiibilflt, 163 as rellexive power. 120;
myths. 235 specific. See specific natures;
mu~atat, 146 stable. 142;
01 a thing. 121
nafs.l93 necessary acts, See act/s, natural
naly. 152 necessary being. See being/s. necessary
names. 107. 125-127. 134 necessary causes, 55, 68;
nahrrai acts, See act/s, natural Averroes on, 36
natural agents. See agent/so natural necessary concomitance:
natural causation. 72-73. 78. 90. 147. 150. law of. 289
215.255.286 0. 38; necessary connection/so 2-3.14-15.28.67.
critique of. 295 0. 115; 71-74.76.78.82.87-88.91-92.95.104-{)5.
dissolved by "" nihilo creativity. 218 121. 128. 138. 142. 151-52.258.287 0. 40.
natural cause!.. See cause/so natural 288 0. 48;
natural necessity. 2. 157; as correlation or congruity, 95;
b~vaIent feature of powerful particulars. defence of on metaphysical grounds. 100;
133 emanation of world from God by. 36;
natural processes, empirical basis for, 87;
acceleration of, 148 empirical defense of, 258;
342
examples of, 36;
metaphysical defense of, 258-59;
a modality of how powerful particulars
act, 259;
modified, 288 n. 48;
as a necessary accident of substances,
258·
perceived directly according to Averroes,
93,96;
necessary consequence, 248-49, 271 n. 17
necessary correlations, 163
necessary creation:
theory of, 221
necessary of existence, 27, 29, 57. 74,
276 n. 58;
Avicenna's term for God. 272 n. 22
necessary through another, 28-29, 47, 170,
272 n. 22, 276 n. 56
necessitation.
direction of, 3
necessity, 35, 91, 94, 95, 109, 128-29, 131,
147,225,261,272 n. 22;
absolution, 129-30;
causal, 65, 67, 73-74, 104-06, 109, 114,
127-28, 132, 257, 259;
conception of, 67;
conceptual, 154;
hypothetical, 289 n. 51;
idea of,271 n. 17;
logical, 29, 65, 67-li8, 74, 87,104-05,114,
129, 132,257;
natural, 129;
ontological, 290 n. 66
negatiD, 152
negation, 152
Neugebauer, Otto, 302 n. 58
Nicholas of Autrecourt, 5
n~m al-Khayr, 149
noesis, 201
nominal definitions, 123;
parasitic or real, 123;
See also real definitions
non-existence, 62, 126,219;
as absolute privation, 216;
and the agent, 54;
as being-in-potentiality, 219;
as not-being-in-actuality, 219;
as potency. 216;
and prime matter, 219;
as privation of forms, 216;
three senses of, 216
nothing, 65, 66, 107
INDEX Index 343
Nous, 233, 245 abilities and ~usceptlbllitles of, 260; of existence, 189;
occasion.llsm, 44, 59, 78, 93, 134, 14648,
153-54,215,220,286 n. 38, 293 n. 83;
, animate and inanimate, 262;
atomic, 66;
formal aspect of, 132
logically, 82-84;
physically, 82-84;
physically and epistemologicalJy, 148
and Ash'arltes, 155; passive power. See power/s, passive possible-in-itseU, 28;
passivity, 192,237; defmition of, 29;
al-GhazaIT on, 138,286 n. 48, 295 n. 114;
in the recipient, 190 posteriority,56, 100,287 n. 43
metaphysical and epistemic, 137-38;
patien~ 258; See also agen~ and patient temporal, 64
occasionalist/s, 74, 78, 106, 136, 147, ISO,
per prius posterius, 198 potency, 35, 42-43, 51-52, 114, 189, 192;
204·
concept of causation, 136; perfect acts, and act, 35;
thesis of, 288 n. 48 characteristics of, 51 and actuality, 209;
philosophers, the, 7, 10, 19,27-28,31,38- and existence, 134
omne quod move/ur ab alia move/ur,
39,53-54,63-64,67,84,149,158-59,163, potentia Dei abso/uta, 148
191
222, 224-25, 264; potentia Dei ordinata, 148
One, the, 127-28, 249
of Heraeleitus, 125-26; and eternal creation, 219; potential existence, 60, 62~
and matter, 159; potentiality/ies, 61-62, 133, 135,211-12,
the nature of, 107
of Parmenides, 136; and politics, 73; 236-37,253;
potential, 180; and .ctuality, 243;
ontological bond, 259, 284 n. 32;
between cause and effect, 93, 144 presuppose a world of enduring sub- ascription of, 139;
ontological priority, 3, 100-04, 287 n. 40; stances and accidents, 258; as existence cojoined. with non-existence,
view of Divine will, 222 63;
as necessity and necessitating, 101, 103
ontology, 73, 147, 165,258-59; philosophy, 22, 135, 197; inheres in matter, 218;
of emphemera1 atoms and accidents, 147; and theology, partisans of, 12; and passivity, 192;
of substance and accident, 89, 95 falsaifah,5-8, 17,250,252-53 real,224;
opposita et convenientia, 163 physical-object statements, 95-96 specific, 217
physical objects, 97, 154 power/s, 2-3, 33, 42-45, 59, 75, 94, 98,110,
opposites, 167, 175;
and correlates, 167,297 n. 137; physis,117-18 115-18,120,124,129,140,176,195-96,200,
not equivalent in value, 224; planets, 259-61;
imowledge of, 224; retrograde movement of, 197; active, 29, 116-19, 128, 131-32, 166, 188-
variations in brightness of, 197 89,212-13,232;33,243,246,256,260,~
ordo, 149
"order of the good", 14849 Plato, 10, 115-16, 125 287 n. 37;
organism, Platonists, 220, 263 of the agen~ 99;
concept of the universe as, ISO plenitude, 28, 37 Aristotle's definition of,l16;
originated events, 155 Plotinlan Nous, 245 artificalJy productive, 176;
origination, 205, 212 Plotinus, 233, 309 n. 88 beyond our ken, 150;
originative source, 289 n. 58, 290 n. 59, political leaders: in a body, 186, 199;
297 n. 3 imitate the heavens and nurture life, 185 causal, 110, 162,256;
posse, 74, 115 configurations of, 160;
ousia/e, 117, 123, 125
possibilitas, 74 of conjecture, 75;
outennost sphere, 169-70, 194-95
overflow, 28, 37, 77, 93, 248; possibility, 72, 74, 102, 120,210,260, defined as originative source, 119;
and celestial intelligences, 144; 277 n. 62; degree of, 187;
production by, 28; and impossibility, logical, 151; desiderative, 200-01;
see also emanation Kant on, 14546; and Divine agency, 34;
Owens, Joseph, 298 n. 3,300 n. 34, 301, n. logical, 138, 14547,224,226; dynamic configurations of reflexive and
47,302, n. 49, 307 n. 63, 309 n. 88 miraculous, 141-142; rational, 259;
and necessity, catagory of, 35; efficacy as the product of, 97;
notion of, 145; efficien~ 178;
Parmenides, 126-27, 136; physical, 155; elementary, 175-76;
on the One, 127 physical or nomological, 14546; as an impulse toward stability, 117;
parsimony, and potentiality, 211; for al-Ghaz.j]i, 91;
principle of, 57 real,224 God's. 33, 138, 152, 176;
particulars, 4, 136,214,24344, 259, 262~; possible, 87, 139; intelligent, 176;
 344
01 intelUgent creatures, 176;
known only by Its effect, 116;
01 living things, 176;
as the mark 01 the real, 133, 260;
INDEX
and posteriority, 56, 100;
of separate intelligences, 195;
temporal, 56, 64
privation, 49, 62-83, 114,216;
Index 345
Rahman, F., 280 n. 5, 281 n. 7, 8 God produces unity in, 242
rational faculty, 295 n. 112 separate intelligences, 75, 143, 165, 169, 178,
rationalists, 22
real defmftion/s, 4245, 108, 120, 122,260
183,187, 194-95, 198,200,201,
245,247,249,252, 263;
=, 240,

notion of, 15,88;
organized set of, 124;
passive, 29, 119, 131-32, 166, 188-90, 212-
13, 232, 246, 256, 260;
pertains to static and dynamic properties,
116;
and potentIality, Megarian arguments
against, 133;
as principles of change, 118;
proximate, 88;
psydtic, of prophets, 74;
rational, 117;
and reality, 116;
as related to two contraries, 33;
as relational, 116;
relative sufficiency or deficiency, 132;
reflexive and relational, 117, 259;
selection and arrangement of, 119, 166,
176,189;
sufficiency of, 131-32;
variability of, 133,261;
wfthfn the spheres, 187
power and potentIality. See power
powerful particulars, 94-96, 117-18, 123-24,
132-33, 166, 185-86, 195,203,209,212, 232,
241, 25%0, 262, 284 n. 82;
efficacy of, 99;
interaction of, 211;
necessity as a modality of, 259
powers and dispositions, 14,4445,95-99,
112, 118-20, 124, 128, 132, 148, 161-S2,
166-S9, 176-77, 181, 185,218,256,260,
262·
being weak or strong, 132;
combinations of, 166, 168;
living creatures, 177;
recombinations 01, 175;
selection of, 261
primary motion, 172
prime matter, 120, 134, 160,218;
forms exist potentially in, 218;
primordially malleable, 148;
as universa1 'receptacle', 148
Prime Mover, 207; See also, FIrst Cause,
First Mover, and God
primum principium, 249
priority, 195,287 n. 43
ontological, 56, 101;
absolute, 62; expresses the minimum distinct power_ cosmic function of, 234;
Averroes on, 61; content of a nature, 123 human cognition and, 236;
relative, 62 real essence, 140 immateriality 01, 237;
process/es, 2,212 real possibilities, as powerfu1 particulars, 195;
procession, 33, 248-49. See also emanation Islamic theologians' denial of, 277 n. 62 priority of, 195;
and overilaw reality, 116; as specifically different, 198;
prcxluction, 2, 4. 28, 96-.98; dynamis, theory 01, 116; substances as, 262
connective aspect 01, 53; and illusion, 146; Sextus Emplricus, 5
contemplative, 229, 243; objective, 294 n. 112 sinliah ra'isah, 235
ex nihilo cannot be observed by empiri- Receptacle 01 Becoming, simplicity, 58, 238-40, 308 n. 78;
cal means, 216; disorderly motion in, 220 as an eqnivocal term, 238;
natural causes produce certain effects, reciprocity, as homogeneity, 238
41 in the implication of existence, 100; simultaneity, 84-S5, 67, 102;
prognostication, 75 as ontological association, 101; as temporal co-existence, 101;
proof, relation between cause and effect, 74, 257; between cause and effect, 92;
follawers of, 22 regular conjunctions, 14,91, 136, 265; in temporal relations between act and
prophecy, 73, 79; and God's eternal wiU, 148 agent, 59
hnaginative and intellectual, 77 relation/s, 61-2, 176; skeptic/So 79 85
prophet/s, 74, 76-77, 79, 82-83, 14748, lSI; between acts and agents, 53; skepticism, 80
as a human being, 82; category of, 61; Smith, Gerard, 272 n. 23
and miracles, lSI; Renan, E., 268 n. 10,269 n. 17, 18 social order:
psydtic powers of, 74; Rescher, Nicholas, 273 n. 32, 306 n. 43 founded upon a religious law, 85
psycho-kinetic powers of, 76, 261; resurrection, 74,82, 149 solstices, 172
soul of, n; revelation: sophist/s, liS, 126,293 n. 83
as a superhuman being, 82 Imaginative, 75, 280 n. 5; sophistry, 92, 98
pTOfX)Sitions, inteUectual, 75, 281 n. 7 soul/s, 76-77, 183, 186, 192, 194,236,
analytic, 153; Rudavsky, T M, 309 n. 84 301 n. 43, 302 n. 49;
synthetic a pri~n", 153 rule of uniqueness, 249-50; human, as a substance, 76;
prophetic intuition: Averroes' denial of, 250 of and intellect, 193-94;
Avicenna's account of, 149 Russell, Bertrand, 1,267 n. 2 moves spberes rather than nahrre, 183;
proventio, 248 01 the prophet, 76-77;
proventus, 248 al-sanlii' al·kalhirah, 235 of the spberes, 194;
psycho-klnesis, 77 scientific explanation, 135 of terrestrial animals, 199
Ptolemy, 10, 198 scientific investigation, Sorabjl, Richard, 309 n. 86
Ptolemaic astronomy, 198 focus on generative mechanisms, 132 species, 113, 166;
scientific knowledge, 73, 86; as Immutable, 46
Aristotie on, 10; specific act/s. 107-08, 117, 132, 134, 167, 245,
qlt(t of Seville, 11
possibility of,72; 292 n. 81;
qawiya,33
possibility through real definition, 120 and actuality, correlation of, 113-14
qidam,212
secarus. 248 as extemali7ations of specific natures, 227
qudrah,59
seeds, 177; specific differences, 227
Qur<n, 75,81,84,139,145,163,160,216,
heat in, 177, 179 specific names, 107
221;
sell-identity, 108, 115, 127, 147,233; specific matter, 162
allegorical interpretations 01, 12;·
and causation, 108 specific natnre/s, 34, 73, 84, 90-91, 107, 113,
as a repeatedly verifiable miracle,
sense data, 97 121, 124-25, 127;31, 147, 160, 167, 169, 180'
282 n. 19;
sense-<latum statements, 95-96 81,227,238, 242,245,257,259-S1;
miraculousness of, 84 bi-vaient character of, 261;
senses, extemal, 75, 24546
qiiwah, 33, 59
sensible substances, 171; determine distinctive acts, 107;
346
and dynamic aspect of powers, 261;
God thloo patterns of, 243;
malleable In the hands of God, 154;
sufficiency and deficiency of power, 261
spheres, 75, 77, 165, 172, lBO, 183, 187, 194-
95, 199,200-01,207,221,226,245-46,
249,262-63,301 n. 39;
activity of, 209;
Avicenna on, 302 n. 49;
celestial, 209;
desiring, 196;
efficacy of, 262;
function of, 195;
inner, 170;
movement of, 243;
natures of, 184;
oblique, 182;
outermost, 166-67, 194-95;
souls of, 75, 302 n. 49;
spatial arrangements of, 195;
substance of, 300 n. 37;
systenn, 165, 170, 186'87, 194,209
stability,
structura1, 167
stipulaUve definitions. See definitions
Strauss, Leo, 270 n. II
Strawson, P. G., 270 n. II
sub1unar, bodies, 208
sublunar change. See change, sublunar
sublunar physics, 15, 265
sublunar sphere, 76
sublunar world, 97, 170, 173-75, 179, 181,
207,213,235,243,249,252, 262, 276 n. 56;
particulars 01, 209
substance/s, 2,61-62, 76,89,95, 120, ISO,
154-55,159,163,171,189,258,262,
300 n. 37;
and accident ontology, 259, 284 n. 26;
in act, 190;
Averroian.119;
catego<y 01,61;
as dynamic coofigurations 01 relIexive and
relative powers, 259;
lnunaterial, 193;
peculiar mark of, 206;
In potency, 190;
powerfully active, 265;
as pure act, 190;
sensible, 171;
separate, 179, 262;
as separate Intelligences, 282
substratum, ISO, 211;
INDEX
Index
347
universal receptIvIty of, ISO and phflosophers, 158;
suditr, 248 wlijib ai*wujiid, 29
and philosophers on matter, 159
sufficient reason, theology, 5, 7-8, 12, 15, 115 wajib bi-gharyrihi, 29
principle 01, ISO, 191-92 Water/Hand analogy:
theoretical knowledge, 73
sun, theoretical sciences, 82 al-Ghaza!r on, 65;
movement of ecliptic, 181 thlnkiog on thought, 193 Averroes on, 66;
sunnah.l69 Thomas, Lewis, 299 n. 22 philOSOphers on, 63-64;
syliogism, middle term 01, 75 Tomay, S. C., 311 n. 103 Weinberg, Julius, 297 n. 75
sympathy, truth, 141; Weisheipel, J, 304 n. 16
Stole concept of, 76-78 will, 31, 39, 43, 221-22, 225, 227, 304 n. 40;
and falsehood, 307 n. 64;
autonomous, 32;
does not oppose truth, 269 n. 2
Tahlfut aJ.Fa/lBifah (The Incoherence oJ time, Dhrine, 33, 78,84,222-25,227263
305 n. 40; , ,
the Philosophers), 6-7, 17-18,20-21,25, coeval with the universe, 49;
eternal, 225;
87,136,255 numerable aspect of movement, 49
al-Ghaza!i on, 223;
Tahlfut al-Tahlfut (The Incoherence of
human,222;
the Incaherence), 5, 7-9, 17; unbelief, 7, 269 n. 2
notion of, 225;
audience of, 18-20; unbeJiever/s, 22, 138,269 n. 2
as perfection, 223;
conceived as a "popular work" 270 n 9;
I
unity, 127,238,242,249;
philosophers on, 31, 38, 222, 224;
Eleventh Discussion, 108; undlfferentiated, 125
selective functions of, 224
FIfteenth Discussion, 1BO; universaI concepts, 261
William of Ockham, 5
Fourteenth Discussion, 180; universaI judgments, 283 n. 24
WoUsan, Harry A, 270 n. 11,279 n. 75,
and harmony between religion and phi- universaI laws, 3
losophy, 22; 283 n. 24, 289 n. 51, 294 n. 102,300 n. 32,
universals, 243-44, 306 n. 59; 310 n. 96
literary character of, 13, 17; and God's knowledge, 244;
world, 52, 209, 213, 265;
not designed as a dennonstrative book, as a capacity to re-apply a particular.act
as ac~ 26, 61-62, 64, 221
231;
01 knowIng to similar cases, 244; Averroes on, 209;
Seventeenth Discussion, 13-14, 69, 71, 87, In potentiality, 244
as being-in*motion, 304 n. 11;
93,117-18,133,167; universe, See world
cessation 01, 55;
Tenth Discussion, 187; Unmoved Mover, 227, 244, 253
as CC)·eternal with God, 26;
Third Discussion, 13-14, 93, lBO, 187, 204, unobserved entities,
as a creation of God, 25-26, 54, 61, 221;
242,248 as causes of events in nahrre, 143
as created alter privation, 49;
tajaddud, 58
untutored masses,18, 22, 261, 282 n. 19 W' essential, necessary effect of God, 48;
i
al-Tajiift, Abu la'far Hiirfln, 9
Van den Bergh, Simon, 204, 215, 230, 267 n. 3, as an essentially mOving entity, 210-11;
al-tajribah, 87, 283 n. 24
270 n. 8, 273 n. 34, 284 n. 27, 288 n. SO, as eternal, 26, 45, 47, 51, 54, 78, 203, 211
talc, 148 214; ,
teleological behavior, 181
teleological rankIng,226-27,
replicated. in rerum natura, 228
I 289 n. 51, 294 n. 103,300 n. 30, 303 n. 2,
4,304 n. 11,306 n. 44, 59, 107 n. 75,
308 n. 83, 310 n. 96, 98
value/s,
as eternal creation, 49, 51, 214;
emanates or Proceeds from God, 27, 36;
God's causal relation with, 246;
teleology: gradations of, 228;
linked with nOn-existence, 213;
in Averroes, 226; hierarchy, 224, 227
asa living creature, 77;
In behavior 01 elementary bodies and the Venerabfe Book of Allah. See Qur'an
motion of, 212;
celestlal spheres, 226; virtue/s, 80-81, 84-85, 261; .
multiplicity of, derived indirectly from
telos, 181, 183 and happiness, 84;
God, 248;
temporal origination. See creation as a prerequisite for study of theoreticaJ
nec~,47,276n.56;
tested experience: sciences, 80
ontologlcaI Qepeodence upon the Deity
Avicenna on, 283 n. 24 VOluntary agenl/s. See agenl/s VOluntary
as Its mover, 213;
tertium quid, 93 ooiuntas, 222
order of, 220;
theologian/s,98, 107, lll, 133, 142, 160, VOlition, 273 n. 30
as perfect act, 51;
162-63,216,293 n. 83;
POSSible-in-itseU, 47, 276 n. 56'
Ash'arite 5-6; sublunar, 213; ,
Wagner, Michael F., 310 n. 93
Islamic, denial of real possibilities, as substance, 61;
wiihib al-suUXlr, 144
277 n. 62; substance of, 209;
I
I,
_I
348

teleological order of, 226;

temporal beginning of, 52-53;
without beginning or end, 51;
as a whole, 210
al-wujfKi,216

zahirites, 22
ZedJer, Beatrice H., 267 n. 3