TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE vs.
LA granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT
March 22, 2011
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a
cooperative, registered with the Cooperative
Development Authority, and organized to provide
domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La
Trinidad, Benguet.
La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility
created under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198, as
amended. It is authorized to supply water for domestic,
industrial and commercial purposes within the
municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet.
9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the National Water
Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate
of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a
waterworks system in Barangay Tawang.
LTWD opposed TMPC's application. LTWD claimed that,
under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its
franchise is exclusive.
In its Resolution the NWRB approved TMPC's application
for a CPC. NWRB held that LTWD's franchise cannot be
exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional
and found that TMPC is legally and financially qualified to
operate and maintain a waterworks system.
LTWD filed a motion for reconsideration. The NWRB
denied the motion.
Then they filed to RTC. The RTC held that Section 47 is
valid. RTC ruled in favor of LTWD.
TMPC filed a motion for reconsideration. the RTC denied
the motion. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WON RTC erred in holding that Section 47 of PD No. 198,
as amended, is valid.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious.
What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done
indirectly. This rule is basic and, to a reasonable mind,
does not need explanation.
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states
that: No franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
corporations or associations organized under the laws of
the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital
is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise,
certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or
for a longer period than fifty years. (Emphasis supplied)
Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973
and 1987 Constitutions are clear - franchises for the
operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in
character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
expressly and clearly state that, "nor shall such franchise
x x x be exclusive in character." There is no exception.
Basic is the rule of statutory construction that when the
law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left with no
alternative but to apply the same according to its clear
language.
WHEREFORE, Section 47 of P.D. 198 is unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We DECLARE
Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 198
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. We SET ASIDE of the RTC.
REINSTATE Decision of the NWRB.
DE CASTRO VS. JBC
FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17,
2010 decision of the Court.
The said decision directs the Judicial and Bar Council to
resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates
to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement
of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010,
and to prepare the short list of nominees and submit it
to the incumbent President.
Movants argue that the disputed constitutional
provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1)
clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments to
cover the members of the Judiciary,
and they contended that the principle of stare decisis is
controlling, and insisted that the Court erred in
disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.
ISSUES: Is the decision on March 17 2010 controlling?
Did the Constitutional Commission extend to the
Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during
the period stated in Section 15, Article VII?
HELD: Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin
maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e., to
adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are
settled. It simply means that a principle underlying the
decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority,
controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court
and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless
and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled
by a court of competent authority.
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute
itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily
become, to the extent that they are applicable, the
criteria that must control the actuations, not only of
those called upon to abide by them, but also of those
duty-bound to enforce obedience to them. In a
hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the
higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-
ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one
highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the
innate authority to rule according to its best lights.
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be
guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the
Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged
to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines,
after re-examination, to call for a rectification. The
adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-
law setting like the United Kingdom, where judges make
law as binding as an Act of Parliament. But ours is not a
common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not
always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial
pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as
a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning
and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter
case accepts such reasoning and justification to be
applicable to the case. The application of the precedent
is for the sake of convenience and stability.
For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to
be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that its
wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case
is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They
seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself
recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to
modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down
in any decision rendered en banc or in division.
The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio
Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional
Commission did not concern either Section 15, Article VII
or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but only Section 13, Article
VII, a provision on nepotism. The records of the
Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had proposed to include judges and
justices related to the President within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity among the persons
whom the President might not appoint during his or her
tenure. In the end, however, Commissioner Davide, Jr.
withdrew the proposal to include the Judiciary in Section
13, Article VII "(t)o avoid any further complication,"such
that the final version of the second paragraph of Section
13, Article VII even completely omits any reference to the
Judiciary, to wit:
Section 13. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or
affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President
shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries. DENIED.
DE CASTRO v. JBC | March 17, 2010 | Bersamin
Petitioner: Arturo M. De Castro, Jaime N. Soriano,
Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA)
Respondents: Judicial and Bar Council and President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
Doctrine: Article VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution
prohibiting the President to make appointments two
months before the next Presidential election is not
applicable to the Judiciary. Article VIII, Sec. 4 (1) which
provides that any vacancy shall be filled within 90 days
from the occurrence thereof is mandatory.
FACTS
● The forthcoming retirement of Chief Justice
Puno on May 17, 2010 (7 days after the Presidential
election led Congressman Matias V. Defensor (an ex-
officio member of the JBC) to address a letter to the JBC
requesting that the process for nominations be
commenced immediately.
● The JBC in its meeting en banc passed a
resolution that they unanimously agree to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice Reynato
Puno. As a result the JBC opened the position of Chief
Justice for application or recommendation and published
its announcement for that purpose.
● Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC
“automatically considered” the 5 most senior of the
Associate Justices of the Court: Antonio Carpio, Renato
Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, Presbiterio J. Velasco,
Jr, and Eduardo Nachura ( The last two declined their
nominations). Other candidates either applied or were
nominated
Candidates who accepted their nomination w/o
conditions: Renato Corona (SC), Teresita Leonardo-De
Castro (SC), Arturo Brion(SC), Edilberto Sandoval
(Sandiganbayan)
Candidates who accepted their nomination w/ condition:
Antonio Carpio (SC), Conchita Carpio Morales (SC)
Declining their nominations: Atty. Henry Villarica, Atty.
Gregorio Batiller
● In its meeting of Feb 8, the JBC resolved to
proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the
ff candidate to invite the public to file their sworn
complaint, written report or opposition if any: Carpio,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion,
Sandoval
● Although the JBC has already begun the process
for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in
accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on
when to submit to the President the list of nominees for
the position due to the controversy (whether this was
covered by the Constitutional prohibition prohibiting the
President to make appointments two before the next
Presidential elections)
NOTE: Valenzuela Case
● In this case, the Court held that prohibitions
found in Art VII Section 15 covered even judicial
appointments.
● Petitioners say that this case is valid precedent
and must be applied in the instant case
In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon.
Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as
Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago
City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively
(Valenzuela),7 by which the Court held that Section 15,
Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of
the power to appoint to judicial positions during the
period therein fixed.
SSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the
successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply
to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or
to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department),
provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial
Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court
shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion,
in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the
President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to
the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the
President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to
the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of
the same character, in that they affect the power of the
President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section
16 refer only to appointments within the Executive
Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also
applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e. that every part must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume
that the framers deliberately situated Section 15
between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended
Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be
clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1)
thereof.
TALA REALTY SERVICES CORP., petitioner, v. BANCO
FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, Respondent.
June 25, 2001 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Banco Filipino filed a complaint with the (RTC) of Manila
against Tala Realty Services Corporation, Inc. (Tala
Realty) and the individual petitioners. This was one of the
17 reconveyance cases instituted by Banco Filipino
against Tala Realty covering properties located in
different parts of the Philippines.
The complaint alleged that the properties were covered
by a trust agreement between Banco Filipino, as trustor-
beneficiary, and Tala Realty, as trustee.
The trust agreement was essentially a sale and lease-
back arrangement wherein Banco Filipino sold various
properties to Tala Realty, including the one located in
Sta. Cruz, Manila, while the latter concurrently leased to
Banco Filipino the same property for a period of 20 years,
renewable for another 20 at the option of Banco Filipino.
Banco Filipino admitted that the purpose of the trust
agreement was t o "allow more flexibility in the opening
of branches and to enable the bank to acquire new
branch [sites]," since at that time, Banco Filipino was
concerned about keeping within the 50% capital asset
threshold for banks under the General Banking Act.
However, sometime in August 1992, Tala Realty claimed
the property for itself and threatened to eject Banco
Filipino.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint based on
the following grounds: forum shopping, lack of cause of
action, and pari delicto. The RTC initially denied the
motion to dismiss but later reversed itself. It ordered the
dismissal of the complaint against herein petitioners
except Tala Realty a nd ordered the suspension of the
proceedings in view of our decision in G.R. No. 137533.
Banco Filipino moved for reconsideration which the RTC
denied.[13]
Consequently, Banco Filipino elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals (CA) via Rule 65. The CA granted the
petition, finding that the RTC should have hypothetically
admitted the truth of the factual allegations in the
complaint—including the validity of the trust
agreement—when it ruled on the motion to dismiss.[15]
The CA also said that the proceedings should not have
been suspended because the matter resolved in G.R. No.
137533, which originated from an ejectment suit, is
distinct and separate from the subject matter of the case
for reconveyance.[16] The CA subsequently denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.[17]
Hence, this appeal under Rule 45 where petitioners
principally claim that Banco Filipino's action for
reconveyance is already barred by stare decisis and
conclusiveness of judgment considering the en banc
decision in G.R. No. 137533, as reiterated in the April 7,
2009 consolidated decision in G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469,
155171, 155201, and 166608[18] and the June 27, 2012
decision in G.R No. 188302.[19] They also argue that
Banco Filipino availed of the wrong remedy when they
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA instead of an
ordinary appeal. In response,[20] Banco Filipino insists
that it availed of the correct mode of review and
counters that G.R. No. 137533 cannot apply because it
involved an ejectment suit, which is distinct from its
action for reconveyance. It cites the final rulings in G.R.
Nos. 144700,[21] 130184,[22] 139166,[23] 167255[24]
and 144705[25]—which commonly held that the
elements of forum shopping, litis pendentia and res
judicata were not present in Banco Filipino's various
reconveyance cases—as the controlling precedents.
ISSUE: WON
RULING:
Clearly in light of the Decisions of this Court in G.R. Nos.
129887 and 137980, which we follow as precedents,
respondent Banco Filipino may not be ejected on the
ground of expiration of the lease. However, since it
stopped paying the rents beginning April 1994, its
eviction from the premises is justified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No.
44257 is MODIFIED insofar as it denies petitioner
Tala's prayer for ejectment of respondent Banco Filipino.

Judgment is rendered ordering respondent Banco

Filipino to vacate the subject premises and to restore
possession thereof to petitioner Tala. Respondent is also
ordered to pay Tala the monthly rental of P21,100.00
computed from April 1994 up to the time it vacates the
premises.
n both cases, we applied the time-honored principle of
stare decisis et non quieta movere, which literally means
"to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things
which are established," to settle the issue of whether
Banco Filipino can recover the properties subject of the
void trust agreement. The rule of stare decisis is a bar to
any attempt to re-litigate the same issue where the same
questions relating to the same event have been put
forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case
litigated and decided by a competent court.[33] Thus,
the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 137533[34] regarding the
nullity of the trust agreement—the very same agreement
which Banco Filipino seeks to enforce in the proceedings
a quo—applies with full force to the present case.
Consequently, Banco Filipino's action for reconveyance
of the Sta. Cruz property based on the void trust
agreement cannot prosper and must be dismissed for
lack of cause of action.
It is the Court's duty to follow the precedents laid down
in G.R. No. 137533,[35] G.R. No. 188302[36] and G.R.
Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608.[37]
The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on
the necessity for securing certainty and stability of
judicial decisions. As well stated by Justice Cardozo in his
book, The Nature of the Judicial Process:
x x x It will not do to decide the same question one way
between one set of litigants and the opposite way
between another. "If a group of cases involves the same
point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be
a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite
principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday
when I was defendant, I shall look for the same judgment
today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a
feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would
be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." x
x x Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather
than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the
even-handed administration of justice in the courts.[38]
(Emphasis supplied.)
PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS INC VS. CIR
FACTS:
Petitioner Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. is a
domestic corporation engaged in providing the medical
services enumerated below to individuals who enter into
health care agreements with it:
– Preventive medical services such as periodic
monitoring of health problems, family planning
counseling, consultation and advices on diet, exercise
and other healthy habits, and immunization;
– Diagnostic medical services such as routine physical
examinations, x-rays, urinalysis, fecalysis, complete
blood count, and the like and
– Curative medical services which pertain to the
performing of other remedial and therapeutic processes
in the event of an injury or sickness on the part of the
enrolled member.
On January 27, 2000, respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR) sent petitioner a formal demand
letter and the corresponding assessment notices
demanding the payment of deficiency taxes, including
surcharges and interest, for the taxable years 1996 and
1997 in the total amount of P224,702,641.18.
The deficiency [documentary stamp tax (DST)]
assessment was imposed on petitioner’s health care
agreement with the members of its health care program
pursuant to Section 185 of the 1997 Tax Code

Petitioner protested the assessment in a letter dated

February 23, 2000. As respondent did not act on the
protest, petitioner filed a petition for review in the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA) seeking the cancellation of the
deficiency VAT and DST assessments.
CTA’s decision: Cancelled the DST assessment. Ordered
the payment of VAT deficiency.
CIR appealed the decision to the CA contending that
petitioner’s health care agreement was a contract of
insurance subject to DST under Section 185 of the 1997
Tax Code.
CA’s decision: The health care agreement was in the
nature of a non-life insurance contract subject to DST.
SC’s decision on Petition for Review: Denied on the
ground that petitioner’s health care agreement during
the pertinent period was in the nature of non-life
insurance which is a contract of indemnity, citing Blue
Cross Healthcare, Inc. v. Olivares and Philamcare Health
Systems, Inc. v. CA. It ruled that petitioner’s contention
that it is a health maintenance organization (HMO) and
not an insurance company is irrelevant because
contracts between companies like petitioner and the
beneficiaries under their plans are treated as insurance
contracts. Moreover, DST is not a tax on the business
transacted but an excise on the privilege, opportunity or
facility offered at exchanges for the transaction of the
business.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and
supplemental motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: The Court Bound By A Minute Resolution In
Another Case?
RULING:
: whether this Court is bound by the ruling of the CA64 in
CIR v. Philippine National Bank65 that a health care
agreement of Philamcare Health Systems is not an
insurance contract for purposes of the DST.
In support of its argument, petitioner cites the August 29,
2001 minute resolution of this Court dismissing the
appeal in Philippine National Bank (G.R. No. 148680).66
Petitioner argues that the dismissal of G.R. No. 148680
by minute resolution was a judgment on the merits;
hence, the Court should apply the CA ruling there that a
health care agreement is not an insurance contract.
It is true that, although contained in a minute resolution,
our dismissal of the petition was a disposition of the
merits of the case. When we dismissed the petition, we
effectively affirmed the CA ruling being questioned. As a
result, our ruling in that case has already become final.67
When a minute resolution denies or dismisses a petition
for failure to comply with formal and substantive
requirements, the challenged decision, together with its
findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed
sustained.68 But what is its effect on other cases?
With respect to the same subject matter and the same
issues concerning the same parties, it constitutes res
judicata.69 However, if other parties or another subject
matter (even with the same parties and issues) is
involved, the minute resolution is not binding precedent.
Thus, in CIR v. Baier-Nickel,70 the Court noted that a
previous case, CIR v. Baier-Nickel71 involving the same
parties and the same issues, was previously disposed of
by the Court thru a minute resolution dated February 17,
2003 sustaining the ruling of the CA. Nonetheless, the
Court ruled that the previous case "ha(d) no bearing" on
the latter case because the two cases involved different
subject matters as they were concerned with the taxable
income of different taxable years.72
Besides, there are substantial, not simply formal,
distinctions between a minute resolution and a decision.
The constitutional requirement under the first paragraph
of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution that the facts
and the law on which the judgment is based must be
expressed clearly and distinctly applies only to decisions,
not to minute resolutions. A minute resolution is signed
only by the clerk of court by authority of the justices,
unlike a decision. It does not require the certification of
the Chief Justice. Moreover, unlike decisions, minute
resolutions are not published in the Philippine Reports.
Finally, the proviso of Section 4(3) of Article VIII speaks of
a decision.73 Indeed, as a rule, this Court lays down
doctrines or principles of law which constitute binding
precedent in a decision duly signed by the members of
the Court and certified by the Chief Justice.
Accordingly, since petitioner was not a party in G.R. No.
148680 and since petitioner’s liability for DST on its
health care agreement was not the subject matter of G.R.
No. 148680, petitioner cannot successfully invoke the
minute resolution in that case (which is not even binding
precedent) in its favor. Nonetheless, in view of the
reasons already discussed, this does not detract in any
way from the fact that petitioner’s health care
agreements are not subject to DST.
EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER v. BRITISH AIRWAYS,
GR No. 171092, 2010-03-15
FACTS:
She alleged that on February 28, 2005, she took
respondent's flight 548 from London,... United Kingdom
to Rome, Italy.
Once on board, she allegedly requested Julian Halliday
(Halliday), one of the respondent's flight attendants, to
assist her in placing her hand-carried luggage in the
overhead bin. However, Halliday allegedly refused to
help and assist her, and... even sarcastically remarked
that "If I were to help all 300 passengers in this flight, I
would have a broken back!"
Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to
respondent's ground manager and demanded an
apology. However, the latter declared that the flight
stewards were "only doing their job."
Thus, petitioner filed the complaint for damages, praying
that respondent be ordered to pay P5 million as moral
damages, P2 million as nominal damages, P1 million as
exemplary damages, P300,000.00 as attorney's fees,
P200,000.00 as litigation expenses, and cost of the... suit.
respondent, by way of special appearance through
counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss[4] on grounds of lack
of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the
respondent. Respondent alleged that only the courts of
London, United Kingdom... or Rome, Italy, have
jurisdiction over the complaint for damages pursuant to
the Warsaw Convention,[5] Article 28(1)
Thus, since a) respondent is domiciled in London; b)
respondent's principal place of business is in London; c)
petitioner bought her ticket in Italy (through Jeepney
Travel S.A.S, in Rome);[6] and d) Rome, Italy is
petitioner's place of destination, then it... follows that
the complaint should only be filed in the proper courts of
London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy.
Likewise, it was alleged that the case must be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent
because the summons was erroneously served on Euro-
Philippine Airline Services, Inc. which is not its resident
agent in the Philippines.
the RTC of Makati City, Branch 132, issued an Order[10]
granting respondent's Motion to Dismiss
RULING:
Petitioner contends that in Santos III v. Northwest Orient
Airlines,33 the cause of action was based on a breach of
contract while her cause of action arose from the
tortious conduct of the airline personnel and violation of
the Civil Code provisions on Human Relations.34 In
addition, she claims that our pronouncement in Santos III
v. Northwest Orient Airlines35 that "the allegation of
willful misconduct resulting in a tort is insufficient to
exclude the case from the comprehension of the Warsaw
Convention," is more of an obiter dictum rather than the
ratio decidendi.36 She maintains that the fact that said
acts occurred aboard a plane is merely incidental, if not
irrelevant.37
We disagree with the position taken by the petitioner.
Black defines obiter dictum as "an opinion entirely
unnecessary for the decision of the case" and thus "are
not binding as precedent."38 In Santos III v. Northwest
Orient Airlines,39 Augusto Santos III categorically put in
issue the applicability of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention if the action is based on tort.
In the said case, we held that the allegation of willful
misconduct resulting in a tort is insufficient to exclude
the case from the realm of the Warsaw Convention. In
fact, our ruling that a cause of action based on tort did
not bring the case outside the sphere of the Warsaw
Convention was our ratio decidendi in disposing of the
specific issue presented by Augusto Santos III. Clearly,
the contention of the herein petitioner that the said
ruling is an obiter dictum is without basis.
FLORENTINO V. RIVERA
FACTS
The petition stemmed from a complaint filed before the RTC
by Mariano, Cynthia and Adelfa, all surnamed Rivera
(hereinafter Riveras) against Vicente Florentino
(hereinafter private respondent) and the latter as third-
party plaintiff against Teofila Mendoza, et al., as third-party
defendants (hereinafter Mendozas), for rescission,
annulment, redemption, reconveyance and damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. 5761-M.
On October 20, 1986, the RTC rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered for
the plaintiffs Riveras and third parties defendants Mendozas
and adversely to the defendant and third-party plaintiff
Florentino
(aa) declaring the lease contract) terminated;
(bb) ordering the defendant Florentino to turn over the Nolasco20 where, reiterating the earlier pronouncements
possession of the leased premises to the Riveras, with made in Contreras v. Felix,21 we said:
Florentino being permitted to take all removable
improvements at his expense in accordance with the lease
contract;

(cc) ordering Florentino to pay the Riveras annual lease

rental of P500.00 for the year 1982 up to the time
possession had been delivered to the Riveras and to
compensate in cash or in kind the Riveras' claim for damage
for unrealized annual harvest of 100 cavans from 1978 up
to the present;

(dd) ordering further Florentino to pay the Riveras and the

Mendozas attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00;

(ee) dismissing for lack of merit the counterclaims in the

original complaint and the third-party complaint of
Florentino.
PAGSIBIGAN VS. PEOPLE:

FALLO
Considering that the crux of the controversy centers on a
perceived vagueness in the fallo of the trial court's
decision, it is necessary to restate the guidelines on the
contents of a proper dispositive portion enunciated
in Velarde v. Social JusticeSociety,12 viz:
In a civil case as well as in a special civil action, the
disposition should state whether the complaint or petition
is granted or denied, the specific relief granted, and the
costs. The following test of completeness may be
applied. First, the parties should know their rights and
obligations. Second, they should know how to execute the
decision under alternative contingencies. Third, there
should be no need for further proceedings to dispose of the
issues. Fourth, the case should be terminated by according
the proper relief. The "proper relief" usually depends upon
what the parties seek in their pleadings. It may declare
their rights and duties, command the performance of
positive prestations, or order them to abstain from specific
acts. The disposition must also adjudicate costs.
FACTS:
On November 3, 1976, Petitioner Pilar Pagsigiban obtained
a loan from Respondent Planters Development Bank
("Bank") for P4,500.00, secured by a mortgage over a
parcel of land.
The Promissory Note for the said loan stipulated for the first
payment to be made on May 3, 1977 and payments every
six months thereafter at P1,018.14 with 19% interest for
unpaid amortizations. It also contained an acceleration
clause.
Initial payment was made in July 6, 1977, followed by
several payments in the total amount of P11,900.00.
However, only four of these payments were applied to the
loan, while the rest were "temporarily lodged to accounts
payable since the account was already past due".
In 1984, the property was foreclosed extrajudicially upon
Petition by the bank for failure to pay an outstanding
balance of P29,554.81. This resulted in the property being
sold to the bank for P8,163.00, and later claimed a
deficiency of P21,391.81.

Petitioner filed an action for annulment of sale by Petitioner,

which the lower court granted. However, it was overturned
by CA.

It bears stressing that a decision that has acquired finality,
as in this case, becomes immutable and unalterable.15 A
final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law.16 In short, once a judgment
becomes final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed
no matter how erroneous it may be17 and nothing further
can be done therewith except to execute it.18
ISSUE:
Hence, the instant petition. Pagsibigan claims that (1) he
did not receive P215,000 from Cabasal, and (2) the lower
courts erred in ordering him to pay P20,000 attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation.
The Court's Ruling

It is settled rule that "the operative part in every The petition is partly meritorious.
decision is the dispositive portion or the fallo, and
where there is conflict between the fallo and the body of A Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
the decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory
should cover only questions of law. Questions of fact are
that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body
not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt
is merely a statement, ordering nothing."19 We expounded
centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A
on the underlying reason behind this rule in Republic v.
question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts.12

There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of

being resolved without need of reviewing the probative
value of the evidence. The issue to be resolved must be
limited to determining what the law is on a certain set of
facts. Once the issue invites a review of the evidence, the
question posed is one of fact.

Whether Pagsibigan received P215,000 from Cabasal is a

question of fact. It can only be resolved after reviewing the
probative value of the evidence. Thus, it is not reviewable.

In the instant case, the lower courts totally failed to justify

the award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
There was no factual or legal justification stated in the texts
of the lower courts' decisions. The RTC merely stated in the
dispositive portion of its 26 February 2002 Decision that,
"Accused is also ordered to pay attorney's

fees in the amount of P20,000.00 to complainant and costs

of suit." Thus, the award is disallowed. WEEK 11 and 12

WHEREFORE, we GRANT in part the petition. BAYAN MUNA v. ALBERTO ROMULO. G.R. No. 159618;
We AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the 30 January 2004 February 1, 2011.
Decision and 26 May 2004 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76291. The award of P20,000
FACTS: In 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is DELETED.
A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is
“subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the
signatory states.

In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government,

the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized
a non-surrender agreement which aimed to protect certain
persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment
suits that might be brought against them in international
tribunals.

Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents

in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it
be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as
without force and effect.

ISSUE: [1] Did respondents abuse their discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in concluding the
RP-US Non Surrender Agreement in contravention of the
Rome Statute?

[2] Is the agreement valid, binding and effective without

the concurrence by at least 2/3 of all the members of the
Senate?

HELD: The Agreement does not contravene or undermine,

nor does it differ from, the Rome Statute. Far from going
against each other, one complements the other. As a
matter of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins
the creation of the ICC. According to Art. 1 of the Statute,
the jurisdiction of the ICC is to “be complementary to
national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory states].” the
Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction
of states, like the RP, over serious crimes committed within
their respective borders, the complementary jurisdiction of
the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are
unwilling or unable to prosecute.
Also, under international law, there is a considerable
difference between a State-Party and a signatory to a
treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty. The
Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not
a State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it
is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument
obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty
would be premature. And even assuming that the
Philippines is a State-Party, the Rome Statute still
recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered
into between States, even when one of the States is not a
State-Party to the Rome Statute.
The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements
without the necessity of subsequent Congressional
approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the
earliest days of our history, we have entered executive
agreements covering such subjects as commercial and
consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent
rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and
navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The
validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our
courts.
Executive agreements may be validly entered into without
such concurrence. As the President wields vast powers and
influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation
is, as Bayan would put it, “executive altogether.” The right
of the President to enter into or ratify binding executive
agreements has been confirmed by long practice.
DISMISSED.
White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila
Facts:
City of Manila passes an Ordinance preventing hotels,
motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar
establishments offering shorttime admission as well as
pro-rated or wash up rates for abbreviated stays.
Petitioners allege, among others, that the Ordinance
deprives their customers the Constitutional guaranty to the
right of due process.
ISSUE: W/N the Ordinance is unconstitutional
Held:
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has
been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide
enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the
conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept
of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to
protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as
justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not
eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit
sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by
themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability
of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the
Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its
guarantees to the people.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate
depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of
lucrative business ties in with another constitutional
requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police
power measure. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require an interference with private rights and the
means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
of private rights. It must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less
intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment,
for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will
not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a
concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be
struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As
held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is
subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is
affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take it
away from the vastness of State police power whose
exercise enjoys the presumption of validity. Ordinance No.
7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Tañada vs Tuvera
136 SCRA 27
FACTS: Invoking the right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must
be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed
for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents,
moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the
instant petition.
ISSUE: W.O.N. publication in the Official Gazette is
required before any law or statute becomes valid
and enforceable.
HELD: Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to
give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem
excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression
of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads:
there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The
word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent
officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the constitutional right of the people to
be informed on matter of public concern is to be
given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public
nature or of general applicability is a requirement of
due process. It is a rule of law that before a person
may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared
that presidential issuances of general application which
have not been published have no force and effect.
Facts:
On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs
issued CMO 27-2003. Under the Memorandum, for tariff
purposes, wheat was classified according to the following:
(1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3)
port of discharge.[5] The... regulation provided an
exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge,
commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Depending
on these factors, wheat would be classified either as food
grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade
wheat was 3%, for feed... grade, 7%.
CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for
protest or Valuation and Classification Review Committee
(VCRC) cases. Under this procedure, the release of the
articles that were the subject of protest required the
importer to post a cash bond to cover the tariff...
differential.[6]
A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19
December 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief[7] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas
City. It anticipated the implementation of the regulation on
its imported and perishable
Chinese milling wheat in transit from China.[8] Respondent
contended that CMO 27-2003 was issued without following
the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public
participation, prior notice, and publication or registration
with the University of... the Philippines Law Center.
Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily
adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without the benefit
of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite having
imported food grade wheat, it would be subjected to the
7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing... them
to pay 133% more than was proper.
Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection
clause of the Constitution was violated when the regulation
treated non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no
reason at all.
Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application
of the regulation was confiscatory in nature.
Issues:
discuss the propriety of an action for declaratory relief.
Ruling:
The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as
follows: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have
a legal interest in the controversy; and
(4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial
determination.[15] We find that the Petition filed by
respondent before the lower court meets these
requirements.
First, the subject of the controversy is the constitutionality
of CMO 27-2003 issued by petitioner Commissioner of
Customs.
Second, the controversy is between two parties that have
adverse interests. Petitioners are summarily imposing a
tariff rate that respondent is refusing to pay.
Third, it is clear that respondent has a legal and substantive
interest in the implementation of CMO 27-2003.
Respondent has adequately shown that, as a regular
importer of wheat, on 14 August 2003, it has actually made
shipments of wheat from China to Subic.
Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial
determination, because litigation is inevitable[19] for the
simple and uncontroverted reason that respondent is not
included in the enumeration of flour millers classified as
food grade wheat... importers. Thus, as the trial court
stated, it would have to file a protest case each time it
imports food grade wheat and be subjected to the 7% tariff.
It is therefore clear that a petition for declaratory relief is
the right remedy given the circumstances of the case.
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in
nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare
issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what
the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other
hand, the administrative rule goes beyond... merely
providing for the means that can facilitate or render least
cumbersome the implementation of the law but
substantially increases the burden of those governed, it
behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly
affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be... duly
informed, before that new issuance is given the force and
effect of law.
Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements
enumerated by the Revised Administrative Code, the
assailed regulation must be struck down.
Going now to the content of CMO 27-3003, we likewise hold
that it is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause means that no person or class
of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws
enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place
in like circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of the equal
protection of laws is not violated if there... is a reasonable
classification. For a classification to be reasonable, it must
be shown that (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it
is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies eqwhiteually
to all members... of the same class.
Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these
requirements. We do not see how the quality of wheat is
affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which
country it came from.
The regulation, therefore, does not become
disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state.
It is also not clear how the regulation intends to "monitor
more closely wheat importations and thus prevent their
misclassification."
Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went beyond his
powers when the regulation limited the customs officer's
duties mandated by Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs
Law, as amended.
The provision mandates that the customs officer must first
assess and determine the classification of the imported
article before tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO
23-2007 has already classified the article even before the
customs officer had the chance to examine it. In... effect,
petitioner Commissioner of Customs diminished the powers
granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to
wheat importation when it no longer required the customs
officer's prior examination and assessment of the proper
classification of the wheat.
It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the
product of a delegated power to create new and additional
legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within
the scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative agency. It... is required
that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes
of the law; and that it be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
In summary, petitioners violated respondent's right to due
process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they failed
to observe the requirements under the Revised
Administrative Code. Petitioners likewise violated
respondent's right to equal protection of laws when they
provided... for an unreasonable classification in the
application of the regulation. Finally, petitioner
Commissioner of Customs went beyond his powers of
delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers
of the customs officer to examine and assess imported
articles.
REYES VS. LIM
Facts: Petitioner David Reyes filed a complaint for
annulment of contract and damages against respondents.
The complaint alleged that Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer
entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land located along
F.B. Harrison Street, Pasay City with a monthly rental of
P35,000.
The complaint claimed that Reyes had informed Harrison
Lumber to vacate the Property before the end of January
1995. Reyes also informed Keng and Harrison Lumber that
if they failed to vacate by 8 March 1995, he would hold
them liable for the penalty of P400,000 a month as provided
in the Contract to Sell. It was also alleged that Lim connived
with Harrison Lumber not to vacate the Property until the
P400,000 monthly penalty would have accumulated and
equaled the unpaid purchase price of P18,000,000.
Keng and Harrison Lumber denied that they connived with
Lim to defraud Reyes, and that Reyes approved their
request for an extension of time to vacate the Property due
to their difficulty in finding a new location for their business.
Harrison Lumber claimed that it had already started
transferring some of its merchandise to its new business
location in Malabon.
Lim filed his Answer stating that he was ready and willing
to pay the balance of the purchase price. Lim requested a
meeting with Reyes through the latter’s daughter on the
signing of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the payment of
the balance but Reyes kept postponing their meeting.
Reyes offered to return the P10 million down payment to
Lim because Reyes was having problems in removing the
lessee from the Property. Lim rejected Reyes’ offer and
proceeded to verify the status of Reyes’ title to the
Property. Lim learned that Reyes had already sold the
Property to Line One Foods Corporation Lim denied
conniving with Keng and Harrison Lumber to defraud
Reyes.Reyes filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended
Complaint due to supervening facts. These included the
filing by Lim of a complaint for estafa against Reyes as well
as an action for specific performance and nullification of
sale and title plus damages before another trial court. The
trial court granted the motion.
In his Amended Answer Lim prayed for the cancellation of
the Contract to Sell and for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against Reyes. The trial court
denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment.
Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to
deposit the P10 million down payment with the cashier of
the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque. The trial court
granted this motion.
Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order on the ground
the Order practically granted the reliefs Lim prayed for in
his Amended Answer. The trial court denied Reyes’ motion.
The trial court denied Reyes’ Motion for Reconsideration. In
the same order, the trial court directed Reyes to deposit the
P10 million down payment with the Clerk of Court.
Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
and prayed that the orders of the trial court be set aside for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. But the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review.
Issue: Whether on not the equity jurisdiction is an
applicable law on the matter?
Held: The instant case, the Supreme Court held that if this
was a case where there is hiatus in the law and in the Rules
of Court. If this case was left alone, the hiatus will result in
unjust enrichment to Reyes at the expense of Lim. Here the
court excercised equity jurisdiction.The purpose of the
exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent
unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution so that
substantial justice may be attained in cases where the
prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are
inadequate.
The Supreme Court also state that rescission is possible
only when the person demanding rescission can return
whatever he may be obliged to restore. A court of equity
will not rescind a contract unless there is restitution, that
is, the parties are restored to the status quo ante.
In this case, it was just, equitable and proper for the trial
court to order the deposit of the P10 million down payment.
The decision of the Court of Appeals.was affirmed.
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC, GR NO.
174689, 2007-10-19

Facts:
petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition
for the change of his first name and sex in his birth
certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is,
"anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female"
and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood.
Feeling trapped in a man's body, he consulted several
doctors in... the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation.
His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated
on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment
surgery[2] in Bangkok, Thailand.
He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate
changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from
"male" to "female."
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG,
filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.[6] It
alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries
in the birth certificate by reason of sex... alteration.
the Court of Appeals[7] rendered a decision[8] in favor of
the Republic.
Issues:
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled
to the relief asked for.
could be legally done. It was an... improper remedy
because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that
provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong
venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit... since the use of his true and
official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these
reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioner's petition in so far as the change of his first name
was concerned.
The birth certificate of petitioner... contained no error. All
entries therein, including those corresponding to his first
name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil
registry of certain acts... and judicial decrees
These acts, events and judicial decrees produce... legal
consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status
and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is
not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407.
Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by... any law,
expressly or impliedly.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical
record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.[29]
Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually
done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by...
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there
is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or
her birth, if not attended by error,[30] is immutable.
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in
altering his body and appearance through the intervention
of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry
as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is
no legal basis for his petition for the... correction or change
of the entries in his birth certificate.

Ruling:

Petitioner's basis in praying for the change of his first name

was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first
name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed
himself into through surgery.

RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the

Include the ruling of the Lower Court and Court of
Appealsground of sex reassignment.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must

present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling
reason justifying such change.[19] In addition, he must
show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name.[20] In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of
using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed

for the change of petitioner's first name was not within that
court's primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been
filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it