Indo-Iran Ties: Prospects and Concerns

Dr. Navniit Gandhi

“Once we make up our mind, the distance between Kaashi and Kaashan is only half a step”.
-Mirza Ghalib

That he would be quoted thus by an Indian PM, flanked by an Iranian President on his side, in 2016,
could possibly not have been known to the great poet. And yet, this was the most apt quote when
much was being accomplished during PM Narendra Modi’s visit to Iran in May 2016. The visit was
crucial in terms of its timing, even as Iran is shrugging off the burden of economic sanctions and
looking forward to play an active role in global trade and commerce.

A lot has been accomplished by our PM’s visit, most notably being the trilateral agreement with Iran
and Afghanistan for the development of the Chabahar port. By committing to invest to the tune of
$500 million, India will gain direct connectivity with Afghanistan and Central Asia. It remains to be
seen, though, whether the much-lauded gains remain on paper or are expediently translated into a
concrete reality.

Till recently when the sanctions on Iran were lifted, although India did buy oil from and traded with
Iran, we could do so only by keeping it all quiet and subtle. Sustaining economic ties with Iran was a
struggle. In the post-sanctions era, we can make it openly known that Iran is a natural partner in the
wake of our common mutual interests and geographical proximity.

PM Modi, during his visit, concluded twelve other agreements with Iran. ‘These included the
extension of a credit line by India for the development of infrastructure related to Chabahar, an
agreement to establish a trade transport corridor, further Indian assistance in building rail
infrastructure to improve Afghanistan’s connectivity via Iran and a bilateral understanding to consult
on combating terrorism, radicalism, drug trafficking and cyber-crime’.i

After the lifting of sanctions-- Reliance Industries, ESSAR Oil Ltd., and Magalore Refinery and
Petrochemicals Ltd., are increasing their imports of oil from Iran.ii

Had the sanctions not been lifted, India would have found it difficult to keep walking the tightrope
and survive in the political crossfire that was going on between the US and Iran.

The Background:

The increasingly hostile American and Iranian perceptions about each other’s intentions and all overt
and covert actions would have resulted in grave consequences for International Affairs in the
foreseeable future.

The American perception of Iran since the fall of the Shah in 1979 and the founding of an Islamic
Republic is one that threatens the region, supports terrorism, backs a hostile government in Syria,
and exports aid and arms to insurgents and extremists in Iraq and Afghanistan.iii The U.S. is wary of
Iran seeking nuclear-armed missiles and its attempts at threatening the U.S.-friendly Gulf states and
Israel. The U.S. seems determined to not let Iran acquire a dominant-power status in the region. At
the same time, Iran resents the American efforts at dominating the Gulf, and its intervention in
Iranian internal affairs. The American attempts at maintaining peace and security in the region are
all interpreted as attempts at containing Iran’s power and influence, while also curbing its cultural
and commercial ties with the other states in the Gulf. The insecurity stems from memories of US
support of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, and from the tightening noose of sanctions in the very
recent past, intended to destroy the economic well-being of Iran. The growth of Iran’s capabilities
for warfare in the Gulf, changing the military balance in the region, creates a growing risk that this
aspect of US and Iranian competition could lead to a major clash or even war in the Gulf – not
because one is desired, but as the unintended consequence of rising tension and mistrust.iv

India’s relationship with Iran has historical, strategic and commercial dimensions. India and Iran have
influenced each other in the fields of culture, art, architecture, and language. The relations were
particularly strong during the 1526-1757 periods, when the Mughals ruled India. Eventually, both
nations drifted apart, especially when Iran supported Pakistan in all its wars with India. Also, during
the Cold War era, Iran aligned with the West and while India professed non-alignment, we were
close to the erstwhile Soviet Union.v

Over the past two decades, however, several agreements were signed; deals forged; declarations
proclaimed and visits exchanged at all levels. With the visits by PM Narasimha Rao in 1993, and by
President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in 1995, relations between the two nations took a giant leap.
The Tehran Declaration signed in 2001; preceded by a visit of the then Indian PM Atal Bihari
Vajpayee to Iran, further committed the two states to deeper levels of engagement, including
military cooperation. There were joint naval exercises, space co-operation, working groups focussing
on counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics, telecommunication development projects and a wide
array of programmes between India and Iran.

Though the US did not look favourably at the growing Indo-Iranian ties, India had its own needs to
fulfill; her own domestic compulsions to tackle; strategic interests to cater to and her other allies to
honour commitments with. India found itself at cross-roads. We could not completely isolate Iran,
and the Indo-U.S. relationship which has been positively transformed in the recent years—could not
be held at stake either.

Gradual Strengthening of Ties:

During 2006-2012, the U.N. Security Council passed six resolutions critical of Iran for its controversial
nuclear programme.vi There was pressure on companies to cut business or end their affiliation with
Iranian firms. The initial focus was on financial institutions and later, it expanded to include
manufacturers and service providers. Due to the lack of compliance by Iran towards ensuring the
peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, the Security Council imposed additional sanctions in
2010, expanding an arms embargo and tightening restrictions on financial and shipping enterprises
which were perceived to be linked with proliferation-sensitive activities.vii By 2012, the sanctions on
Iran were described as the harshest against any country imposed since the creation of the United
Nations.viii
In September 2005, and then in February 2006, India was asked to prove its loyalty to the United
States by lining up behind Washington at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the issue
of Iran’s nuclear programme. India was warned that it will have to pay a heavy price for a disregard
of U.S. concerns vis-a-vis Iran. And India obliged. Under an advisory provision included in the U.S.-
India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, India was supposed to dissuade, isolate, and if
necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including
a nuclear weapons capability.

India annually imported between $10 billion and $12 billion of crude oil from Iran.ixTehran and New
Delhi planned to hit $25bn in annual bilateral trade by 2016, thereby making it apparent that India
was resisting the pressure of sanctions.x Oil exports provide half of Iran’s government revenues,
while crude oil and its derivatives account for nearly 80 per cent of Iran’s total exports.xi China,
Japan, India and South Korea are its top customers. China cleverly sought capitalising its relations
with isolated, resource-rich nations, such as Iran, so as to exploit its untapped energy markets.xii
China did not have to worry (as much as other nations had to) about antagonising the U.S.; for the
latter could not afford to threaten China with harsh economic consequences for continuing to trade
with Iran.

The United States made it very clear though to India that they were concerned about India’s growing
relationship with Iran, particularly with reference to the proposed gas pipeline.xiiiDaniel Twining
quoted from one of his interviews with a senior U.S. State Department official: ‘India’s close relation
with Iran is the biggest single obstacle to the future of U.S.-India relations and the one issue that
could torpedo our strategic partnership’.xiv Even Pakistan was wary of the strengthening Indo-Iranian
ties. Pakistan was suspicious of the Indian involvement in the up-gradation and development of the
Iranian port of Chahabar, for Iran could most likely allow Indian naval forces to use the port too.
When India opened its new consulate at Bandar Abbas in 2002, Pakistan had protested that it was an
Indian move intended at monitoring ship movements in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.xv

A number of Indian firms and Indian scientists were sanctioned for allegedly passing to Iran heavy-
water nuclear technology.xviIronically though, the China-Pakistan-A.Q.Khan sponsored proliferation
which dates back from 1976 onwards and which led to the alleged nuclearisation of Iran, has hardly
ever been openly acknowledged by the U.S. and other Western powers. In fact, in 1957, Washington
and Tehran signed their first civil nuclear cooperation agreement and the over the next two decades,
the U.S. provided Iran not only with technical assistance but with its first experimental nuclear
reactor, complete with enriched uranium and plutonium with fissile isotopes. It is also possible that
the rhetoric over Iran’s clandestine nuclear operations may only partially be true. Iran had allowed
IAEA inspectors to monitor some of its nuclear plants and they had certified that Iran is not making
nuclear weapons. Even the Bush administration’s National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded in
2003 that Iran was not acquiring the atomic bomb, and had negated the Israeli claims that Iran was
within six months of gaining a nuclear weapons capability.xvii

The U.S. gradually granted India, but not China and Singapore, an exemption from the financial
sanctions in the event of trade with Iran—but only in exchange for significant cuts in the Indian
purchases of Iranian oil.xviiiHowever, India relied on imports for three-quarters of its crude needs—
had to buy from Iran to meet growing local demand for oil.xixIn 2011, Iran experienced significant
problems with receiving payments from India for its exports, when the Reserve Bank of India halted
a clearing mechanism due to sanctions. Some of the payments have been cleared through Turkish
and UAE banks. More recently, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) announced that India has
cleared all oil debts to Iran through Gazprombank of Russia and Iran has already received all overdue
payments for its exports to India.xxIn February 2012, Iran agreed to accept payment in Indian rupees
for up to 45% of its oil exports to India, and the countries have set up a credit window between
Indian and Iranian state-owned banks.xxi

The Potential Gains:

Indo-Iranian ties were rejuvenated when PM Narsimha Rao visited Iran in 1993. He was the first
Indian PM to visit Iran following the Islamist Revolution in 1979. The Iranian President reciprocated
in 1995, and a tripartite agreement ensued between India, Iran, and Russia for constructing a North-
South Transportation Corridor, which was to link Mumbai—via Bandar Abbas in Iran—with St.
Petersburg in Russia, thereby connecting the Indian Ocean with the Baltic Sea and Europe. Indo-
Iranian relations were further boosted with the visit of PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Tehran in 2001,
followed by the reciprocal visit of Iranian President Khatami to New Delhi in 2003. After a gap of
eleven years, an Indian PM (Manmohan Singh) visited Tehran to attend the Non-Aligned Movement
Summit in 2012.

Over the years, India and Iran have inched closer, owing to certain developments affecting both
nations: the Afghan civil war, the emergence of the Taliban, Pakistan’s support to the fundamentalist
regime in Kabul and Iran’s desire to involve India in finding a solution to the Afghan crisis.xxii

Iran has the second largest deposits of copper, the largest deposit of zinc and the ninth and tenth
largest deposits of iron ore and uranium, respectively.xxiiiIt holds the world’s fourth-largest proven oil
reserves and the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves. International sanctions have, however,
prevented its economy from making giant strides in the realm of its energy-sector.xxiv India’s energy
needs are rapidly rising. Iran accounts for about 8 percent of our oil imports. The relationship
between the two nations has become robust and comprehensive since the 1990s. Iran has
significantly catered to a percentage of our energy needs, while we have developed infrastructure in
Iran. The military and intelligence ties between India and Iran have gained momentum too.
Presently, Iran looks at India as a strong partner that will help Tehran to avoid strategic isolation.xxv
In January 2003, the New Delhi Declaration signed during Iranian President Muhammad Khatami’s
visit to New Delhi, expanded on the shared concerns about International Terrorism as well as U.S.
unilateralism in Iraq and articulated a mutual interest in enhancing co-operation in various areas of
science and technology.xxvi

There are joint naval exercises, space cooperation, working groups focussing on counter-terrorism
and counter-narcotics, telecommunication development projects and a wide array of ongoing
programmes between India and Iran. In 2005, we signed a 25-year, $22 billion agreement with Iran
for the export of liquefied natural gas (LNG), but nothing has materialised since then because there
cannot be a LNG plant (which India was to construct) in Iran without American components and that
is unlikely in the near future. The $7 billion Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline which is supposed to carry
natural gas from Iran to India, via Pakistan has also not made much headway, as India is obviously
concerned about the immense risks involved in such a project. The Iranian officials have made clear
to India that Iran will not wait indefinitely for India to join the project, while extending an open
invitation to join at any later date. Iran and Pakistan have signed the final agreement in May 2010.
However, if and whenever India joins the project, we will have to pay transit fee to Pakistan for
transportation of gas to India, calculated in accordance with international practices.xxvii

We not only need oil from Iran, but need to bag the multi-million dollars worth contracts, developing
infrastructure in Iran. If we move aside, there is no dearth of rival firms taking advantage of the
business potential. We also need to worry about the repercussions of openly toeing the U.S.-Israeli-
West European line of thought and action, given the fact that we cannot arouse the ire of Islamist
hardliners in India and abroad. India’s relations with Iran pose a difficult test for our Foreign Policy.
When India voted against Iran at the IAEA meeting, there was vocal criticism of Manmohan Singh’s
government for having abandoned the independent stance of our foreign-policy.xxviii We do seek
acceptance and approval as a responsible international player in the world system, and yet, we do
not wish to sacrifice our interests, especially with our neighbouring states and particularly so, when
they are termed as outlaw states by the U.S. India is not alone in its struggle to balance
relationships, as almost every nation seems to be engaged in a balancing act. Just as we must
balance between trying to maintain proximity with the Western allies as well as with our not-so-
favourably-looked-upon-by-the-West neighbour states, so also the Western states must balance
between the need to safeguard the International regimes such as the non-proliferation regime and
the need to cultivate their partnership with an emerging player on the world scene, as India is. We
are seeking a Permanent seat at the UN Security Council and also seeking access to the International
market for nuclear fuel and technology. The Indo-US nuclear deal has facilitated our entry in the
International non-proliferation regime and given us access to supply of fuel and trade in otherwise
restricted technologies.

Iranian leaders maintain that India’s current relations with the United States will not weaken their
own ties with India.xxixEven Iran is no exception to the age-old reality of International Relations and
that is that neither friends and nor foes are permanent in this world. During the Pahlavi dynasty, Iran
had this profound obsession with the U.S. and Europe, and then following the 1979 Iranian
Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini pursued a policy of neither East nor West. After the decade long war
with Iraq, Iran made a bid to improve its ties with the U.S. But then, the victory of a conservative
Islamist- Ahmadinejad found Iran returning to its anti-U.S. posture. Today, it has found cosy strategic
partners in China and Russia. Times change, and ties change.

After 25 years of isolation, war, and sanctions, Iran too will weigh its options carefully. Some analysts
believe that it ‘will not bargain away its national security concerns, nuclear ambitions, human rights
policy, or commercial creativity for unfavourable Western political and trade incentives’.xxxOur
increasing proximity to Iran could complicate matters, and even isolate us in the bargain. It is also
noteworthy that Iran had voted against India’s bid for permanent membership of the Security
Council in 2005. Iran has also repeatedly sided with Pakistan in the meetings and declarations of the
Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) and condemned India’s role in Kashmir. ‘A vote for Iran is a
vote for Khan’, said K. Subrahmanyam, while highlighting the clandestine operations of Pakistani
nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan towards enhancing Iran’s nuclear capabilities.xxxi
The Concerns:

Despite the close historical links, it has, however, not been a relationship altogether devoid of
suspicions and mistrust. For instance, during the 1965 and 1971 wars between India and Pakistan,
Iran provided military assistance to Pakistan. Iran was not supportive of the Indian nuclear tests in
1998. Iran had condemned India’s 1998 nuclear weapons tests and had voted for the UN Security
Council resolution demanding that India cap its strategic programs and sign the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty.xxxii Tehran has often criticised the Indian government for the way it responds to protests
in Kashmir. When the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) issued a statement in 2005,
emphasising that the Kashmir issue was central to the Indo-Pakistan peace process, Iran had actively
endorsed the statement. Following the terrorist attack on our Parliament in December 2001, when
India asked Iran to condemn the attack, Iran did not do so.xxxiii There are pointers linking Iran to the
July 2006 Mumbai train bombings, which killed 209 people and injured over 700 more.xxxiv

Other than our need for energy, an important reason for our continued proximity to Iran is that
both, Tehran and New Delhi would not want a pro-Pakistan regime in Afghanistan. However, today,
Iran maintains that it would not like to see Pakistan’s military interests propel in Afghanistan, but will
it sincerely work with India in the long run towards securing this objective?

The UAE continues to be the single largest trading partner of India globally. Two-way trade between
the two countries stood at USD 51 billion in 2010 (remarkably up from just USD 3 billion in 2001),
accounting for 57.4% of the total two-way trade between the GCC and India, and 10.4% globally.
Saudi Arabia, a distant second, accounted for 22.1% of the total two-way trade. On the global level,
Saudi Arabia was the fourth-largest trading partner of India, accounting for 4.0% of total trade in
2010.xxxv These states host more than 6 million Indian workers whose remittances contribute to our
foreign exchange reserves. As with Iran, we share with the GCC nations a long history of cultural and
economic ties. And these nations are wary of the growing influence of Iran, and may actively seek its
containment.

Our trade with Iran (though significant) is to the tune of about $14 billion. We must weigh our
options carefully. The GCC countries supply 45 percent of India’s petroleum, and Qatar alone
supplies five million tons of LNG to India. Our relations with the GCC countries cannot be
compromised with. Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran are rising and at this juncture, moving
too close to Iran or vociferously trying to uphold the right of Iran to a civil nuclear programme could
prove to be a mistake. Saudi Arabia is the chief supplier of oil to India and our crude oil imports from
Riyadh are likely to double in the next 20 years. Also, we need an ally with a clout in the Islamic
world.

However, Iran’s geo-strategic position makes a big difference to us. Since India has no direct land
access to Central Asia and the Caspian Basin, its proximity to Iran will facilitate access to the markets
and energy of Central Asia. Iran’s geographical proximity to Pakistan and Afghanistan matters. It
matters to us that who wields influence in Afghanistan in the wake of an exit by the American
troops. It is in the mutual interests of both - India and Iran that Pakistan is prevented from reigning
supreme in the region.
We also cannot afford to be marginalised at a time when the axis of Iran-China-Pakistan seems to be
gaining strength. China is as hungry as we are for both - oil and gas. China is now Iran’s largest
trading partner and is undertaking massive investments in the country. Iran looks at China as its
greatest pillar of support and the latter’s increasing demands for energy makes Iran its indispensable
partner. China’s permanent presence on the UN’s Security Council will prove useful to Iran if it once
finds itself isolated by the global community. At the same time, our moving closer towards Saudi
Arabia will invite Iran’s hostility. Relations are already strained between Saudi Arabia and Iran. India
could find itself dragged in the cold war. If public passions in Iran flare up against India, not only will
our core interests in Afghanistan be jeopardised, but we may see China forging ahead more strongly
than ever before.

It has taken a long time to conclude the agreement over the development of the Chabahar port. In
fact, India has allowed much precious time to lapse, while China has moved swiftly in this realm, vis-
à-vis Pakistan and Srilanka. Iran, too, will be and rightly so, predominantly guided by economic
concerns. If we delay the project unduly, China will be ready and keen to take over. Reza Khalili, an
Iranian Foreign Policy expert, describes the relationship between India and Iran thus: “India’s ties
with Iran are actually largely under-developed as compared to its much more substantive
engagement with the Arab states in the Persian Gulf and Israel… Hence, India-Iran relations can be
best described as developing relations”.xxxvi

It is important that India delivers, and that too, on time. India will also have to guide itself against
attacks on India and its consignments by Taliban factions which are friendly with Pakistan.xxxvii
Though the optimistic analysts would want Pakistan to see the benefits of trade involving India,
rather than looking for every possible way to hurt India xxxviii, the domestic political disturbances
arising in Pakistan could nullify the optimism. Strategic and military matters must give way to the
tapping of economic potential, if growth has to be long term and sustainable in the globalised world
we live.

Also, both nations cannot possibly ignore the security emanating from the rise of the Islamic state.
An increased instability in Afghanistan or Pakistan will imply greater challenges for both India and
Iran.

Conclusion:

Until the sanctions were lifted, India was walking the tightrope, as far as Iran was concerned. Today,
for reasons primarily economic but also strategic, USA has lifted the sanctions. However, the
strategic alignments and re-alignments in the future could again pose dilemmas before India and it
might have to make some difficult strategic choices. If there emerge issues of a balance –of-power
between the US and China, both Iran and India could find the other on either side. India will have to
again then, walk on a tight-rope and demonstrate greater acumen in balancing its large-range of
interests with a large number of allies. India will be then required to “navigate its regional
relationships more carefully and also independently of the US agenda”.xxxix
 Walking on the tight-rope will not cease for India, as it will have to carefully balance its ties with
Saudi Arabia, Israel and Iran—all three of which are arch rivals. Developing ties independently with
each of them will necessitate strong skills at diplomacy and statecraft.

Our relationships with both- Iran and Israel could be kept out of limelight and public view. We need
access to hydrocarbons from a mixed basket of sources, including Iran. Our ties with Israel will anger
the Islamic world, and our ties with Iran could upset Israel and Saudi Arabia. Since our strategic and
economic gains are at stake, we have to be cautious and diplomatic and if possible, maintain a low
profile while going about doing our business as usual. The challenges we face are complex and
carving a policy on the Middle East is crucial. But we do not need a policy which is hurriedly carved
or one which is driven by sentiments of history and of defending the poor South against the mighty
North. There is no non-aligned world anymore whose banner has to be held high, while arriving at
our foreign policy. There is no pragmatism and merit in joining a powerful bandwagon either.

National Interest is and must be the guiding force and the defining criterion of morality of decisions
and tenacity of actions in games of power politics among nations. Just as perceptions about and roles
assigned to Iraq and Pakistan have changed in the policies of great powers (to suit their convenience),
so also when will Iran again become an evil empire and then, an ally once again, cannot be ascertained.
Which regime becomes a threat for the mighty powers and when and why can hardly ever be foreseen
accurately in the sphere of International Relations.

We do not need to prove our mettle to the world. The fulfilment of our short term needs and long term
gains is and ought to be our only concern, and not winning laurels from one or the other block of
nations.

References:

i
Joshi Rohan, ‘Chabahar and Beyond’, May 25, 20016.
http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/chabahar-and-beyond-was-modis-visit-to-iran-a-game-changer
(Accessed on June8, 2016)
ii
“Reliance buys Iran oil after six-year hiatus”, The Hindu (New Delhi), April 25, 2016, p.15
iii
Cordesman Anthony H., WIlner Alexander, and Gibbs Michael,’ Iran and the Gulf Military Balance-1
: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions’, October 10, 2012.
http://csis.org/files/publication/121010_Iran_Gulf%20Military_Balance.pdf (Accessed on October
10, 2012)
iv
Ibid
v
Berlin Donald L. (October 2004),’ India-Iran Relations: A Deepening Entente’, Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies; Special Assessment: Asia’s bilateral Relations.
vi
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/un-resolutions (accessed on October 2, 2012)
vii
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9948.doc.htm (accessed on September 25, 2012)
viii
John Cherian (December 14, 2012) ‘Trial round’, Frontline, pp. 21-23.
ix
http://www.tehrantimes.com/economy-and-business/97715-Iran-India-seal-trade-deals-eye-24b-
trade. 10th May, 2012. (accessed on October 5, 2012)
x
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2012/13/2012312871582389.html (accessed
on October 20, 2012)
xi
http://www.eia.gov/cabs/iran/Full.html (accessed on October 18, 2012)
xii
Vakil Sanam, (Autumn 2006) ‘Iran: Balancing East against West’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.
29, No. 4, pp.51-65.
xiii
Kronstadt Alan K. and Katzman Kenneth, (August 2, 2006) ‘India-Iran Relations and U.S. Interests’,
CRS Report for Congress, Foreign Affairs- Defense and Trade Division.
xiv
Twining Daniel ( January-March 2008) ‘India’s Relations with Iran and Myanmar: “Rogue State” or
Responsible Democratic Stakeholder’, India Review, vol. 7, no.1, pp.1-37.
xv
Berlin Donald L. (October 2004) ‘India-Iran Relations: A Deepening Entente’, Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies- Special Assessment: Asia’s Bilateral Relations.
xvi
Larkin John and Solomon Jay (March 28, 2005) ‘India’s Ties with Iran Pose Challenge for U.S.’, Wall
Street Journal.
xvii
Koch Christian (Gulf Year Book 2008-2009) ‘The Gulf and the International System in 2008’, Dubai:
GRC, 2009.
xviii
Chellaney Brahma’s article at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-06-
22/news/32369070_1_india-and-iran-iran-sanctions-act-purchases-of-iranian-oil (accessed on
October 22, 2012)
xix
On 10th May, 2012. http://www.tehrantimes.com/economy-and-business/97715-Iran-India-seal-
trade-deals-eye-24b-trade (accessed on October 6, 2012)

xx
http://www.eia.gov/cabs/iran/Full.html (accessed on October 23, 2012)
xxi
On 10th May, 2012.http://www.tehrantimes.com/economy-and-business/97715-Iran-India-seal-
trade-deals-eye-24b-trade. (accessed on October 6, 2012)
xxii
Menon K.S.R. (August 2008) ‘India-Iran Relations: Tough Road Ahead’, Gulf-Asia, no.5, pp.28-31.
xxiii
Fact sheet on Iran (November 2008) Indian Embassy in Tehran, Ministry of External Affairs, India.
xxiv
http://www.eia.gov/cabs/iran/Full.html (accessed on October 23, 2012)

xxv
Berlin Donald L. (October 2004) ‘India-Iran Relations: A Deepening Entente’, Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies- Special Assessment: Asia’s Bilateral Relations.
xxvi
Indian Ministry of External Affairs,’ President Mohammad Khatami’s visit to India’, 24-28 January
2003, New Delhi.
xxvii
Aneja Atul (March 18, 2010) ‘Iran, Pakistan clinch Gas Pipeline Deal’, The Hindu, p.11.
xxviii
Varadarajan Siddharth (January 16, 2006) ‘India, Iran and the Nuclear Challenge’, The Hindu.
xxix
http://www.iranwatch.org/government/india-mea-annualreport-0405.pdf.pdf (accessed on
October 3, 2012)
xxx
Vakil Sanam (Autumn 2006) ‘Iran: Balancing East against West’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.
29, No. 4, pp.51-65.
xxxi
Subrahmanyam K. (October 19, 2005) ‘Vote for Iran a Yes for Khan’, Indian Express.
xxxii
Twining Daniel (January-March 2008) ‘India’s Relations with Iran and Myanmar: “Rogue State” or
Responsible Democratic Stakeholder’, India Review, vol. 7, no.1, pp.1-37.
xxxiii
Gupta Shishir (October 2, 2005) ‘When Left Rants that Dr. Singh betrayed Iran, it ignores the
following facts’, Indian Express.
xxxiv
Raman B. (July 29, 2006) ‘Iranian Trail to Pakistan’, Outlook.
xxxv
http://www.alpencapital.com/downloads/trade%20and%20capital%20flows%20-
%20GCC%20and%20india_final_may%2002%202012.pdf (accessed on October 10, 2012)
xxxvi
Khalili Reza, “Understanding the Nature of Iran-India Relations”, An Iranian Quarterly, Vol. 11,
Nos. 1-2, Fall 2013-Winter 2014, p.104.
xxxvii
Pillalamarri Akhilesh, ‘Chabahar Agreement won’t solve South Asia’s problems’, May 30, 2016.
http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/3-reasons-the-chabahar-agreement-wont-solve-south-asias-
problems/ (accessed on June 8, 2016)
xxxviii
Ibid
xxxix
Kumaraswamy P. R., “India between Iran and the Gulf”, Summary-Gulf Roundtable Series,
October 5, 2015, CSIS, Middle East Program, Washington DC.