Chopra2017 PDF

This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been
fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TVT.2017.2765004, IEEE
Transactions on Vehicular Technology
Possible Security Attack Modeling in Ultra Dense Networks

using High Speed Handover Management
Garima Chopra, Student Member, IEEE, Sanjeev Jain, Member, IEEE and Rakesh Kumar Jha, Senior Member,
IEEE
Abstract: The next generation of mobile communication The basic idea of UDN is to make users as close to BS as
have progressed towards the deployment of small cells to possible. In order to fulfill such criteria dense deployment
meet the growing demands of increased capacity and QoS. of small cells are done resulting in the generation of high
As compared to conventional method where all the amount of traffic. This huge amount of traffic generation
computations were performed by the BS’s only. To reduce by users creates a challenging task of backhauling during
burden at the BS side, small cells deployment have been the deployment of UDN. The problem of interference
stressed upon. Thus resulting in the formation of Ultra
from the neighboring cells is also predominant factor in
Dense Networks (UDN) having high concentration of small
cells (eg. Picocell, femtocell, hotspots) and as a counter effect limiting the performance of network due to close
of which distance between two small cells is reduced to a proximity of small cells among themselves. Therefore, a
greater extent. Such a close association of cells in UDN, the strict interference mitigation strategies need to be
probability of frequent handovers also increases abruptly. employed to stop hindrance from the neighboring cells
As a result, the chances for attacker to spoof the bandwidth BS. The users who are experiencing sudden arrival and
also increases many folds. In this paper, we have analyzed departure for them interference is a limiting factor for
SNR, SINR and CQI channel parameters. Such that the achieving a considerable higher level of performance
position of moving users at which handover is initiated in goals. The power consumption is also a limiting factor
Picocell deployment of UDN can be traced out successfully
and hence, the motivation for idle model concept should
or region where the probability of attackers presence is high.
Through this paper, we have tried to introduce the attacking be done such that unused small cells can be turned off
scenario for the high mobility conditions in UDN. partially (or fully) or they should be equipped with traffic
offload capability in order to make network efficient in
Keywords: UDN, Small cell, SNR, SINR, Handover, Spoofing, terms of energy or spectrum.
SIT, security issues. The nature of the users inside a UDN is highly mobile
and they are subjected to frequent handover as the user
I. INTRODUCTION switches its location from one cell region to another. This
The increase in demand for high QoS for next generation has attracted many potential attackers to explore the
cellular communication has gathered the interest of many weaknesses present in the UDN architecture. During the
researchers and industries to meet with growing demands handover phase, the attacker might try to steal the
of subscribers. It is expected that the overall traffic information and use for its own benefit known as
requirement of these devices will grow exponentially and bandwidth spoofing attack. However, the eavesdropper
grow up to 30.6 exabytes per month which is eight times action is related with its nature. The monitoring of the
more than the requirement in 2015 [1]. This network behavior by the attacker can be done either
transformation begins in terms of data rate, mobility, actively or passively. But the anomalous behavior of the
coverage area and the spectrum utilization of network. In attacker is very difficult to detect as the information about
order to provide seamless coverage to subscribers with the state of the channel is not readily available.
high data rate capability, small cells are deployed in There are variety of limiting constraints which would
greater density which serves as the best alternative. These greatly affect the propagation of RF signals in dense
small cells deployment under a macrocell results in the environment: 1. firstly, RF signal in the range of 3~300
formation of Ultra Dense Network. From the basic GHz experience high path loss with small size of antenna
definition of UDN, the density of small cell BS will be experiencing more spreading loss, 2. Molecular
very large as compared to UE (User Equipment) density absorption in which a part of energy of propagating signal
such that ideally one UE is entertained by only one BS is converted into kinetic energy. The network
with the capability to support connection for high speed densification techniques incorporated with the help of
vehicles having speed up to 500 km/h [2]. pico/femtocells, relays installation and device-to-device
communication may also give boost or add-on to
interference power even if directional antennas are used
Garima Chopra is a PhD Research Scholar in Department of Electronics at BSs [3]. But Picocells are low transmit BSs with are
and Communication Engineering, Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University,
J&K, India. (E-mail: garimachopra100@gmail.com).
used for indoor/outdoor deployment and often equipped
Sanjeev Jain is a Professor in Department of Computer Science with omnidirectional antenna such that it can act as
Engineering, Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University, J&K, India. (E-mail: Hotspot [3].
dr_sanjeevjain@yahoo.com). In such a case, SINR is a fundamental performance
Rakesh Kumar Jha, is Assistant Professor in School of Electronics and
Communication Engineering, Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University, J&K,
metrics for the analysis of wireless communication
India. (E-mail: jharakesh.45@gmail.com).
1
Copyright (c) 2015 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to use this material for any other purposes must be obtained
from the IEEE by sending a request to pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
0018-9545 (c) 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TVT.2017.2765004, IEEE
Fig 1 . General architecture for UDN.

steal information from the legitimate/targeted node by
systems [4]. It can be defined as the ratio of signal power overtaking the bandwidth allocated to that user and this
to summation of noise power and interference power. The type of attack is known as Bandwidth spoofing. The work
SINR depends on many critical parameters such as on the preventive measures need to be performed as soon
distance and path losses, shadowing and fading. However, as possible.
the value of SINR further helps in the calculation of
various information theoretic metrics like coverage 1.1 Background, Related Work and Motivation
probability, spectral efficiency, symbol error rate [5]. The author(s) in [8] have listed out some of the
However, the placement of nodes based on random major security issues in the LTE Femtocells. The authors
distribution follows Poisson-point process (PPP) model in [9] have also described the vulnerabilities present when
on interfering nodes [6]. But using the classical process location sharing apps are used which results in getting the
for obtaining the exact SINR value requires the current location of the user. The authors in [10] have
knowledge about the Probability density function and focused on the security issues for 5G communication in
hence becomes a difficult task. UDN specifically stressed on the need to protect Physical
The replacement of traditional macrocell BS can be Layer. They have also covered various technologies that
done by the installation of low power transmit access has been merged with the 5G along with their security
points as pico, femto and relay nodes as discussed earlier. design issues. Figure 1 shows the general scenario for
In heterogeneous wireless network, there are two types of UDN deployment covering different applications having
transmission modes: 1. Intracell mode: When the source different types of cell structures [11-15]. The general
selects a destination point located within the same cell requirements and challenges in the UDN architecture
such that one hop transmission is only required, and 2. have been listed out in [11-15]. The examples are as
Infrastructure mode in which the two communicating follows: 1. Road side area(i.e Highway) where access
nodes are located in two different cells. For outdoor points are present, 2. Picocell covering academic areas, 3.
deployment, transmit power ranges from 250mW to 2W densely populated regions where coverage expansion is
[7]. Picocells are widely used for hotspot coverage such enabled through the installation of APs on the top of
that when the load on macrocell increases drastically, it buildings and many more.
could handover the management of UE to Picocell.
60
However, handover boundary setup coverage task needs M-P cell
to be taken care of as low signal region can cause 50
P-M cell
M-M cell
substantial drop in the RF link. Along with this major P-P cell
challenges is the device security or the information overall

Handover Failure Rate(%)
40
security. With the increase in density of UE, the chances
for jamming a larger number of users also increases many 30
folds and getting the accurate knowledge of the channel
state of the eavesdropper also becomes a difficult task. 20
For proper protection, the time taken to detect the
presence of any malicious activity ought to be less than 10
the transmission rate. Such that prevention can be
mitigated before severe damage is caused to the network. 0
1 2 3
With the increase in handover percentage, it is expected Speed of UE(30km/h,60km/h and 120km/h)
that during the handover phase the attacker might try to Fig 2. Handover Failure Rate vs Speed of UE.
1
Fig 3. Possible security scenario in UDN for 5G network.

Moreover, the authors [18] have addressed another type
In Figure 3, we have covered various possibilities of of attack in which the report about the channel conditions
security attack in the UDN such as challenges associated as a feedback to the BS could be altered during the
with interference region with the huge amount of transmission. Main aim of the attacker is to get
overlapping among cells, next is the IP spoofing attack possession over the bandwidth of the victim node. So this
because each and every device is connected through is another type of possibility of attack and they have also
internet and the whole architecture of UDN is based on IP proposed the mechanism for securing the transmission.
addresses [16]. So this will emerge as an open issue During handover process, typically the decision was
where the difficulty arises in tracing the traffic of the made based on the measured values of signal strength or
attacker. Another problem is the frequent connection loss quality. It involves a series of procedures which includes
due to SCAs, similarly we have taken another area which events triggering and message exchange among the
recently enveloped an emerging technology is the IoT in serving, target cells and user and these measured values
which the identity of the device is based on the RFID tag will play a major role in the QoS. Here, we are
having the critical information and at the last we have investigating the weaknesses of mobile users during the
stressed on the case 3 where the problem associated with swapping of control of network. The protocol called SIP
the mobility of user is taken up and used for analysis is used for establishing, terminating and modifying user
purpose marked with the highlighted portion in Figure 3. sessions for VoIP applications. SIP protocol is analogous
The author in [17] provided simulation results for HOF to handovers in wireless communication. The authors in
rate for mobile user considering various UE speed such as [19] have proposed the solution for protection of packets
30km/h, 60 km/h and 120km/hr as shown in Figure 2. For in SIP by using IPSec and TLS. But these securing
high speed UE, QoS deteriorate gradually as it moves mechanisms also have potential drawbacks for mobile
more into the interference region due to small coverage user because when the mobile user switches its network
area and lower transmit power of Picocell. Such that it he/she again has to establish tunnel which increases the
will experience continuous service interruption resulting overhead and bandwidth consumption. The authors in [20]
in more signaling overhead. The time for which UE stays have proposed an efficient solution for analyzing the
in common (or interfering) region is also very small. vulnerabilities in MVPN and compared it with the IETF
There could be several techniques that can be employed based SIP-based MVPN.
to reduce the risk of handover failure by employing eICIC The flow of the paper is as follows: section II describes
for mobility management. Other things could be done is the state of art and contributions. Section III describes the
by efficiently predicting speed of UE to enable good system model along with the mathematical modeling for
accuracy or probable region of handover. Several real time analysis. Section IV presents the objectives of
techniques have been employed for predicting UE speed the paper. Section V comprises of channel models that are
such as handover counting, location estimation, neighbor used for calculating path losses for various deployment
eNB location collection and Doppler estimation. In the scenarios and section VI contains the simulation
release 12 of 3GPP, they have also incorporated a special parameters that is used during the simulation. Section VII
feature containing the list of previously visited cells & VIII gives the detailed description about the results and
having information about global cell ID and ToS (Time of conclusion derived from it respectively.
Stay) within that cell.
1
II. STATE OF THE ART AND CONTRIBUTIONS  Once the real time deployment have been performed
It is already known by now that in UDN cell size reduces in the third stage , we have performed the analysis of
in order to provide seamless connectivity (i.e. for Picocell the results on the basis of SINR, path loss, real time
in our case) to the users. As far as practical deployment is positions of attack, handover mobility and we are
concerned, user handover probability is very high and the also able to trace the sensitive time (SIT) and
rate at which handovers occur depends on the speed with spoofing distance with the considerations of all
which user is traveling from one region to another. possible conditions.
Therefore, the channel conditions for high mobile UE The optimal goal of this paper is to find the flaws/issues
varies frequently like from favorable conditions to that will be encountered during handover phase when one
interference conditions between or among different cells. user switches its location from one small cell to another
Hence, the probability of spoofing attack increases in the Ultra dense environment. However, the main
because large number of overlapping regions have been contribution of this paper is to find the possibilities of
appeared during the journey of UE from one BS to other. security attacks on the basis of mathematical analysis.
In this paper, we have proposed an architecture and Also, in the case of handover conditions SNR value is
system model for possible spoofing attack in case of high examined and the SIT (in seconds) is calculated on the
speed handover management. basis SINR values obtained for signals received from
adjacent cellular areas. We have also performed the
Below are the few points listed to provide readers with real-time analysis for actual spoofing attack in UDN. This
the clear understanding about the work performed in this paper also comprises of algorithms which will be helpful
paper: in the development of small cell scenario for observing
 In the first phase, we have considered real time the security related issues. Table 1 shows the comparison
deployment of UDN with two possibilities i.e. of existing work with the work presented in this paper.
straight and random path deployment. On the basis However, main purpose is to show the novelty in the
of assumptions, we have derived the SINR and CQI work because comparisons cannot be made due to highly
for real-time system model deployment. diversified topics covered in various areas.
 In the second phase, we have proposed a system
model in order to calculate the handover percentage
in different cell approaches.
TABLE 1
COMPARISON TABLE WITH EXISTING WORK
Reference Physical Security Application Technique adopted Results/Conclusion
No. Layer Analysis in covered
Security UDN
[27] X  UDN General Analysis Analysis of SR vs UE &
Eavesdropper density for idle mode
BS and LOS path of UE.
[28]  X WPT AN assisted IA Drop in Eavesdropper rate as the
scheme noise is increased
[29]  X Cognitive Radio Joint information and Minimizing transmission power of
Networks AN Beamforming ST.
Technique in Security for SU and PU.
Spectrum Shared
Networks
[30]  X D2D pairs AN scheme AN is used for achieving non-zero SR
[31]  X WPC (wireless Power Beacons Eavesdropper SNR lowered with PB

power
communication)
Proposed X  UDN for picocells RSS variation with Weak zones are extracted based on
Attack with handover respect to speed of results to get the probable region of
Modeling UE Handover attack.
ith node to jth node where i and j can be BS and Mobile

User or vice-verse in Rayleigh Flat fading channel. The
III. SYSTEM MODEL received signal of jth user is given by:
A. Description of System Model Y j  H i , j X i  ni (1)
Considering downlink transmission in case of dense where X i is the signal transmitter by ith node and ni is the
picocell deployment for UDN. However, it is assumed receiver’s Additive White Gaussian Noise with
that the BSs are equipped with omnidirectional antennas
and channel conditions are known at both the transmitter 
ni   0, 2  having zero mean and  2 variance in
and receiver side having channel coefficients of Hi,j from milliwatts (mW). The path losses for individual users
1
Fig 5. Proposed System Model.
have been computed based on the deployment scenarios Remark 1: In the UDN scenario, the coverage range of
with each user is having different values for cell reduces and they are closely associated, thus
urban,sub-urban and rural areas. The channel conditions increasing the interfering regions many times than the
of each user can be seen from their path loss values and conventional scheme. Here, we are taking two
their corresponding channel gain parameters. Here, we trajectories of user i.e. random as well as straight. We
are checking for the probable regions of handover for a have tried to compute received signal power for both
moving user where the presence of attacker could be felt movements of user.
from its action (see lemma 2). In this paper, we are The main objective of this paper is to check for the
observing signal strengths i.e. the RSS parameters for possibility of security breach in dense conditions which is
checking handover conditions. enabled with frequent handovers for high mobile user,
The Received signal power for the moving client is given hence increasing the probability/chance for the attacker.
by : The attack is initiated by checking the values of SNR (or
Pr ,i | H i , j |2 Ptx   2 (2) SINR) at the interfering regions.
Definition 1: SINR can be defined as the ratio of signal
The received power at the BS can be computed by:

power to noise power and is given as:

Pr ,BS  1  d 2  2
(3) SINR 
Signal power
Interference power  Noise power
The Total power received at the BS from mobile at a
distance ‘d’ is given by: which can be further rewritten into a mathematical
 expression as:
 

2
PBSt   1  x 2 dx Ptx | H i , j |2

(4) SINR  2
(8)
On further modification, the above integration can be  I 
reduced to [21]: Pp ,tx Giu , p
SINR 
  ( 1 )  1 n N 1
N o B   Pp ,txa ,iu Giu , p a   Pj ,tx G j ,iu
PBSt  where 1 
( 2) 2 (5)
t 1 j 1
(9)
and the background noise is given by where  I represents the summation of interference from
N b  KTB other base station (BS) and the adjacent node interference
(6) power. In equation 9, j≠iu for calculating adjacent nodes
and the log-normal distribution R.V ‘yi’ is given by with interference and ‘a’ represents the symbol for adjacent
( i' , i' 2 ) : BS . However, the value of interference due to adjacent
(ln yi  i' )2 nodes are very less. Thus, the interference power is

1 2(  ' i )2 considered from the adjacent BSs only.
f ( yi )  '
e
2  yii (7)
1
Let D  { d 1 ,d 2 ,...d n } be the distance vector and for distance ‘x’ is ‘x/v’ where x can be calculated by
each di  D SINR and SNR are computed for BS1 and assuming coordinates of user at distance ‘di’. During that
time SINR1 and SINR2 is calculated or signal strength for
BS2 for straight and random trajectory of user as shown in both the BSs. For our analysis purpose, we have taken 3
figure 5. SINR for BS1 is given by positions which shows the maximum possibility of attack
SINR BS1 st / rand  { SINR BS1 1 ,SINR BS1 2 ,...,SINR BS1 n } during the movement consisting of P1 which is present at
Similarly, the boundary of interfering region, P2 at the middle of
SINR BS2 st / rand  { SINR BS2 1 ,SINR BS2 2 ,...,SINR BS2 n } overlapping region and last P3 at the boundary but close
to cell 2 as shown in Figure 4. All these positions shows
The main purpose of computing the SINR values is to
the random mobility. Our main aim is to check the
extract the colliding point where both BSs have the same positions where handover would take place and hence
values (see lemma 1). such critical regions can act as a sensitive zone.
Additional comments: The interference is due to close
For the real time analysis, we require to find out the
association of BSs i.e nearer the user more is the received
maximum number of Picocells that could fit into a one
power. The channel gain G is predominantly affected by
large macrocell of radius 500m. To calculate the actual
path loss value which varies with indoor or outdoor
number of cells deployed is very important as for real
deployment conditions. time environment. The calculate for number of Picocells
is based on mathematical analysis. Here, we are taking
Definition 2: Channel Quality indicator is defined as
interfering regions to be between 30-50%. The reason for
quantity to measure the performance of RF links
taking such a value is that signal strength degrades only
based on the signal strength values.
around the boundary and we cannot take such cases in
CQI puts the channel conditions on a scale ranging from
which one cell cover almost another cell such case wont
0~30 in which 0 depicts bad channel conditions and it be acceptable. Moreover, only after a break-point distance
should not be used for channel transfer and a highest our strength degrades drastically with inverse of forth
value of 30 depicts very good channel state and UE can
power of distance of node from the BS. So taking such a
transmit the packets with larger block size. The CQI is
range would serve our purpose appropriately and tends to
defined for 3GPP standard by [22]:
provide feasible results. For calculating the number of
 0 ; SINR  16dB Picocell BS that can be accommodated in a large cell, we
 SINR have divided macrocell into 8 sectors such that maximum

CQI    16.62 ; 16dB  SINR  14dB (10) number can be seen during extreme dense conditions. The
 1.02 number of sectors(S1, S2, S3,.. so on) varies or can be
 30 ; SINR  14dB
varied depending on different approach considered for the
On the basis of the SINR value, handovers may take place sectorization. However, this number may vary according
if the user is not provided with the desired threshold value to the user density as some area may experience
and capacity. Here, capacity is referred to as Shannon degradation in performance due to fading or shadowing
capacity theorem having maximum achievable rate effect but installing more BSs than required could only
required for our application like audio, video or files increase the installation cost and handover probability
which satisfies the desired barrier and it is represented as: when signal strength is sufficient to provide good QoS.
B* log 2 ( 1  SINRi )   . In Figure 5, Picocells deployment is considered in
As far as interference is concerned in handover conditions which a particular user is concentrated and its movement
in the case of Picocells under Macrocell deployment. The is checked. However the user is present at a specific
numerical value as per the Mathematical, Theoretical and location from base station at a distance ' d ' and angle ‘θ’
Actual model implementations, the value of interference with d  ( c  x )2  ( f  y )2 where ( c, f ) and ( x, y ) are
is very low because considering practical deployment
scenario i.e Handover conditions between Picocells, the the coordinates of the Base Station and user respectively
maximum number of interfering points are appeared to be [25]:
only 2-3 points. Throughout the simulation work, the  d ;i  0
receivers are equipped with a single-antenna. For ri   2 2
Multi-antenna communication could serve as a possible  ( d  d i - 2dd i cos(  - i ) ;i  1,2,..., pn (11)
extension to the the work for attack analysis. In the The security flaws in the ultra dense network scenario can
analysis purpose random positions for mobile user is be explored by considering a small network consisting of
taken in the overlapping region and distance from a group of small cells which depicts a dense environment.
previous location is computed and receiver signal The typical range of group of small cells are taken to be
strength. 150-200m having the configuration of a Picocells. These
cluster of small cells are embedded within a macrocell
B. Real time deployment in case of Ultra Dense Network having base station NB. Here the concentration on users of
Here, we have taken the BS1 coordinates to be (0,0) only one Picocell with highlighted background. The
and (C1, C2,…) values represent the cell numbers. In case deployment of users, N is purely random within a cell
of UDN, the user is assumed to have high mobility with a region and N≥6. But the stress on mobile users are here
speed of v km/hr. So the time elapsed to cover a certain laid upon which is subjected to frequent change in its
1
Fig 4(a) & 4(b). Handover probability in UDN and Probability of interference regions respectively.
state and it serves as an attractive center for the attacker 9%

2% Macrocell
to exploit its weaknesses. Picocell(200m)
TABLE 2 Picocell(100m)
NOTATION TABLE FOR SYSTEM MODEL Femtocell
Parameter Description
CQI Channel Quality information
I Summation of interference.
No Noise PSD (AWGN channel) 26%
Hi,j Channel coefficient from ith source to jth
destination.
|Hi,j|2=G Channel gain from ith source to jth destination.
yi Random variable
σ2 Variance or Noise power 64%
µi, σ2’ Log-normal mean and variance
K=1.23 x 10-23 Boltzmann Constant
T Room Temperature (in kelvin)
φ Noise Figure
α Path Loss exponent Fig 6. Handover percentage for different cell
The number of handovers can be calculated as
3.2 Real Test-bed scenario for Handover percentage. follows:
HONM
HO(%)  100%
As shown in pie chart, Femtocells of radius 40m has the HONM  HONx  HONy  HONz
maximum number of handover counts followed by
picocells then macrocell. Here in the construction of pie
chart we have considered an area of 1800m x 1000m and
for the calculations of handovers a straight trajectory is
considered. We have concluded from fig. 6 that in case of
small cells approach which has a bright side of increase in
user capacity but has a major challenge of security issue
during the handover session which is our major concern
due to abrupt change in handover percentage. The number
of handover in a cell is calculated by considering the
horizontal movement. Based on the given area and the
distance between the interference region, for macrocell as
shown in Figure 7 only one handover is possible i.e the
least value. Now moving on to the Picocells maximum
number of handover in one go can be at max. 4 which is
small but considerably having more value than previous
case. For smaller cell radius less than 200m same Fig 7. Methodology used for calculating Handover(%) using different
cell approach.
procedure is used.
where HONM , HONx , HONy , HONz represent the
handover number for Macrocell, Picocell(200m),
1
Picocell(100m) and Femtocell(40m) having 1, 4, 12, 30 14: assign new location s.t. above condition satisfies
count respectively. 15: end if
The method used for getting the values are as follows: 16: end for
1.For Macrocell, HO(%)=1/(1+4+12+30)=2%(approx.)
2.Similarly, for Picocell having 200 m radius Algorithm2:Calculation of channel path loss and other
HO(%)=4/(1+4+12+30)=9%(approx.). Using the same performance parameters for users in picocells
procedure, the other two values can be computed in the Initialization:
same manner. 1: assign frequency to users
2: target a mobile user
III. REALIZATION AND REPRESENTATION OF OBJECTIVES LOOP Process:
3: for (distance  d i  from BS1 and  d i1  from BS2 wit
This section comprises of the objectives that is fulfilled
respect to user %for straight trajectory
through the work. However, algorithms best describes the
4: compute path loss from equations (table 4)
method for implementing and realization of objectives.
5: compute received signal power
Hence, we have divided algorithms into three parts: 1)
6: SINR(BS1)=Received power - Pl (BS1 & user)
Algorithm 1 describes the basic deployment scenarios of
7: SINR(BS2)=Received power - Pl (BS2 & user)
the cells and the various parameters associated along with
8: end for
it as shown in Figure 8, and 2) Algorithm 2 describes the
further approach towards the computation of parameters  
9: for distance d i' from BS1 and d i1' from BS2  
of interest as shown in Figure 9, and 3) Algorithm 3 10: compute path loss from equations (table 4)
describes the loop hole when the attack will occur in a 11: compute received signal power
cell. The main objectives have been listed as follows: 12: SINR(BS1)=Received power - Pl(BS1 & user)
1. Firstly, to determine the spoofing attack in UDN. 13: SINR(BS2)=Received power - Pl (BS2 & user)
2. To determine the handover possibilities(%age) in the 14: end for
UDN. CONDITIONAL statement:
3. Considering the effect of interference in UDN for 15: if (‘A’< SINR(BS1) <‘B’) then %simultaneously
security concerns. calculate CQI for BS2
From fig. 5(a), as per the literature survey, the Handover 16: CQI(BS1)= ‘x’; %based on eq. 11
probability is increased by 10% from 3G to 4G 17: else CQI(BS1)=0;
migrations because we know from the concept as the 18: end if
operating frequency increase resulting in the cell size 19: Plot numerical results
reduction (for end-to-end delivery). As far as 5G is 20: end for
concerned, the frequency of operation is 28-32 GHz
(licensed band) and cell size is up to 500 m(macrocell). Algorithm3:Method for attacking scenario
So, for the UDN large number of Picocells/Femtocells CONDITIONAL statement:
recites under this scenario (Fig. 5(a)) i.e probability of 1: if (SINR(BS1)<SINR(BS2)) then
interference between 2 or more than 2 cells can be 2: Initiate handover
increased by 20-30%. Hence, this is the prime objective 3: Send control messages
of researchers and for our paper also to do the analysis for 4: Compute the time ‘ta’ seconds such that above
spoofing in the case of handover scenarios. condition satisfies
5: Initiate attack s.t Bandwidth is spoofed and user gets
Algorithm1: Deployment of users in picocells for UDN disconnect from region
scenario 6: end if
Initialization:
1: enter Ni ith picocell TABLE 3
2: input transmit power Ptx,p of picocell BS PARAMETERS USED IN PSEUDO-CODE
Notation Description
3: input transmit power Ptx,m of macrocell BS
CONDITIONAL statements: N No. of users in a Picocell
4: if (Ni >max(no. of user in a cell)) then NBS,p No. of Picocell BSs
5: reassign users
CQI(BS1) & Channel Quality information between mobile user
6: end if CQI(BS2) with respect to BS1 and BS2 respectively.
Initialization SINR(BS1) & Signal to noise and interference ratio between user
7: enter Nt & Nr SINR(BS2) with respect to BS1 and BS2 respectively.
8: input cell size (r, θ2 ) and (R, θ1 ) Nt Number of transmit antennas
LOOP Process Nr Number of receiver antennas
9: for i=1 to N do Gr Gain of receivers antenna
10: assign random values (xi,yi)
11: if (distance between((xi,yi) & BS) < r) then Gt Gain of transmit antenna
12: deploy user and mark with ‘*’ NBS,m No. of macrocell BS
13: else ri Distance of User from ith Picocell BS (i=1,2…)
1
d Distance of user from pico BS with which it has are having mobility or some may have static orientation.
already established connection. Here, we are talking about the cellular users but they may
ta Time of attack when SINR variation is observed.
be other wireless systems connected through the base
R,θ1 Radius and angle of macrocell deployment station like wireless printers, laptops etc. In this scenario,
r,θ2 Radius and angle of Picocell deployment the various channel models have been applied keeping in
Ptx,M, Pp,tx Power transmitted by macro and Picocell BS mind the area in which it is the deployed typically for
Urban or sub-urban regions. Each user experiences
Pl , σm Penetration losses for indoor user and Standard
deviation of shadow fading for all users in macro
BS
Fig 9. Flow Chart for calculation of SIT and synchronization time of

attacker.
Fig 8. Flow Chart for random deployment in UDN.
different fading conditions with different values of path
loss component with respect to the position at which it is
IV. DEPLOYMENT SCENARIOS AND CHANNEL MODELS
present. The noise experienced by the transmitted signal
This section comprises range of various referred either from BS or from User is Gaussian in nature i.e
channel models based on widely accepted 3GPP scenario AWGN channel is added. [24] Table 4 & 5 provide the
and ITU-T standards [23]. These channel models help in general path loss model and the simulation parameters
the estimation of various parameters of interest like Path with the optimized path loss equations for different
Loss, Received signal strength, SINR and Channel deployment scenarios respectively for Non-LOS
Quality information. conditions. In case of LOS communication link, free
Space propagation model serves as an best alternative
V. SIMULATION PARAMETERS ignoring various fading conditions but in case of mobile
This section gives a brief description about the channel user Jake’s Model can be used in place of Rayleigh for
parameters and the path loss models taken up as obtaining the channel coefficients.
represented in Figure 5. The above system model shows TABLE 4
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
the 4 Picocells having a coverage range of 200m and all Parameter Value
are having its own overlapping regions. Each cell consists
Urban Macrocell Radius 500m
of few users connected to a Picocell BS in which some
1
10
Picocell Radius 150-200m VI. SIMULATION RESULTS

Macrocell Base Station Transmit Power 43dBm or 13dB This section comprises of the simulation results and
Picocell Base Station Transmit Power 24dBm or -6dB (max) inferences derived from the small cell deployment for
14dBm or -16dB (min) mobile user which experiences frequent link control shift
during the movement from cell to another. However, the
Noise Power -106dBm
attack is initiated when the intruder is successful in
UE Max.-Min Transmit Power 21dBm to -50dBm tracing out the user.
White Noise Power density -174dBm/Hz 1. The need for small cells that are being deployed
clearly depends on the population of that area. More
Handover Margin 3dB
denser area requires more service to serve for the purpose
Carrier Frequency 2.4 GHz of meeting target capacity requirements. Different areas
System Bandwidth 5MHz are having different path loss values and exponent. It is
Number of Users 6
clear from the graph (fig. 10) as the distance increases
path loss values shows a considerable exponential growth
Path Loss Model at distance d (km) 128.1+ 37.6 log10(d)+21 but has more value for urban then for sub-urban and at the
log10(fc/2.0) dB last for rural areas depending upon the fading component
Path Loss for Urban at distance d (km) 199.5653 + 39.0864 and losses encountered during the transmission. Also, the
log10(d) dB user density has a great amount of variation in urban with
respect to other two scenarios.
Path Loss for Suburban at distance d (km) 180.4953 + 38.64
Path loss[dB] vs distance[km]
log10(d) dB 180
path loss urban
Path Loss for rural at distance d (km) 177.8878 + 38.64
170 path loss suburban
log10(d) dB path loss rural
Speed of User 60km/hr 160
TABLE 5
150
MACRO-PATH LOSS MODEL
Path loss in db
and
d)-3+20log10(fc)-(3.2(
5log10(h)-(24.37-3.7(h/
161.04-7.1log10(W)+7.
140
log10(11.75hUT))2-4.97
2-3.1log10(hBS))(log10(
hBS)2)log10(hBS)+(43.4
1. 10m < d < 5000m
3. W=20m, h=20m
130
Urban (NLOS)
hBS=25m
hUT=1.5m
120
110
2.
100
and
61.04-7.1log10(W)+7.5lo
g10(h)-(24.37-3.7(h/hBS)2
0(fc)-(3.2(log 10(11.75hUT
)log10(hBS)+(43.42-3.1lo
(hBS))(log10(d)-3+20log1
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200

Distance in Meters(10m and 200m)
1. 10m < d < 5000m
Suburban (NLOS)
3. W=20m, h=10m
Fig 10. Path loss for different deployment scenarios as shown in table 4.
hBS=25m
According to latest 3GPP release 13 standards, for 5G

hUT=1.5m
))2-4.97)
scenarios we have compared 3 different deployment areas

depending upon the density of the users as shown in
g10
2.
Figure 10. The comparison between the path loss

variation with respect to distance has been done which
(h)-(24.37-3.7(h/hBS)2)log10(h
(log10(d)-3+20log10(fc)-(3.2(l
161.04-7.1log10(W)+7.5log10
projects that urban area experiences more path loss

2. hBS=25m and hUT=1.5m
BS)+(43.42-3.1log10(hBS))
followed by suburban and then rural. The comparison has

og10(11.75hUT))2-4.97)
1. 10m < d < 5000m
been initiated because we want to use the SNR variations

3. W=20m, h=5m
with respect to distance (distance here serves a prime

Rural (NLOS)
factor to observe the changes from one cell to another).
2. In the real-time scenarios, the users have been

distributed randomly from BSs i.e some users are close to
BS and some are far away as shown in Figure 11. Since,
Loss
we are doing the performance analysis for UDN. Hence,

there is high probability for interference within or among
the cells. From the background of research, we have
Equation
Scenario
already discussed this region to be 30-50%.

Path
1
11
250
200
150
100
y coordinate(m)
50
-50
-100
-150
-200
-250
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500

x coordinate(m)
Fig 11. Handover scenario in UDN.

Fig 13. Possible SIT for SNR vs Time.
3. Proposed Approach:
Case 1: Spoofing attack on the basis of SNR: Thus, we have ignored the interference due to adjacent
Under this scenarios, let us assume that the user ‘u’ has user within the same cell. But the power radiated by the
high mobility with straight line trajectory and it will show cell2 BS is more and we have taken interference power
its movement from one BS of cell1 to another BS of cell2. due to BS’s only. So, from the graphical analysis of
Hence, from the simulation results we have concluded Figure 14, we have obtained the colliding point P2 at
that values of SNR shows an exponential decrease with which both the SINR1 and SINR2 have shown an
respect to BS1 but increase in SNR value for BS2. From approximately same value. At that same instant of time
the graphical analysis of Figure 12, we have concluded (or distance), channel conditions improves for the BS2 as
that we have obtained one cross-over point . Using this the user is approaching nearer to BS2. So, intruder will
approach i.e our proposed approach can be able to find keep on tracing to find the exact point or the handover
the exact handover point. distance called spoofing point at which he/she can initiate
SNR[dB] vs distance the process.
50
SNRusercell1
SNRusercell2
40
30
20
10
-10
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Fig 12. SNR Variation with respect to distance for scenario represented
in Figure 4.
Case 2: We have applied the same concept for random Fig 14. Possible Spoofing distance for interference of different cells.
mobility. In this case, we have again measured the
handover point for random mobility points. On the basis In Figure 15, we have observed an abrupt decrease in CQI
of the above approach, we are able to compute the SIT with respect to distance. This shows the presence of
and the handover distance as shown in Figure 13 and 14. faulty region where bad channel condition will indicate
Here, we have developed the prototype study for the the probable region of attack.
UDN scenarios and the observations are performed on the
case study basis. Now, the SINR variation is used for a
user for random mobility. The modulation scheme used in
5G is the OFDM and we are assuming that the
sub-carriers are orthogonal to each other such that the
interference between the two user is negligible.
1
12
Fig 15. CQI vs distance. Fig. 17. Tracing pattern for Spoofing attack vs different mobility of UE.
On comparing both graphs in Figure 13, 14 & 15, we In our proposed work, we have done pattern analysis of
have observed that at a distance around 150 m, the SIR versus speed and SNR versus SIT with considering
channel conditions of the user receiving signals from both speed. On comparing the results from fig. 16 & 17, we
the BS’s are not very appropriate for further transmission have found that both results are justified to each other and
to continue. at the same time minima and maxima point have been for
the same value of SNR having different value of UE
40 speed corresponding to different speeds. However, the
evaluated results can be used to predict the positions of
35 user irrespective of where the BS’s are deployed. But the
estimation of exact position of user is a complex task but
30 the actual region of attack lies nearer to the computed
values.
SIT (seconds)
25 VII. CONCLUSION
The need for security the systems arises with the increase
20 in capacity demand by the users with considerably good
QoS in future generations of mobile communication . The
15 efforts for securing the transmissions is needed to make
our information secure with the evolution of wireless
10 communication.
In this paper, we have tried to explore the weaknesses
5
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 associated with handover conditions in dense
Speed of UE(km/hr) environment which is expected to continuously switch
Fig 16. Time instant for spoofing attack with respect to mobility of UE. from one cell area to another cell. Thereby increasing the
chances between 20-30% of attack. This paper also
We have performed the above analysis for predicting the concludes that using the trace method approach, once the
position of attack for a UE speed of 60 km/hr. As the SIT(session initiation time) gets synchronized with the
speed of UE increases, time taken to reach the attacking attackers time. Thus, we have created a scenario which
region decreases as shown in Figure 16. When we talk will continuously monitors the signal strength resulting in
about the UDN architecture, we generally assumes the the increase of successful execution of attack. The
speed of moving user to be high. Hence, the above protection against this will serve as a major challenge for
analysis shows the exponential decay trend as the speed the researchers with the increase in connection make and
increases. By analyzing the SIT vs Speed graph, we have break.
concluded that handover time varies with UE speed. In One approach that we have used in this paper is by
Figure 17, we have tried to analyze the trend that would tracing the victim by constantly checking the values of
be followed by the user for different speeds for SNR SNR and SINR. Another possible solution by seeing the
values in the case of random motion. The square filled CQI parameters where extremely low numerical values
with blue color is the values for SNR’s when user is indicates the region where the attacker is more
having high mobility of 120 km/hr. Whereas, triangle susceptible to be present in that region and the channel
shaped values marked are the values for SNR’s for cell1 conditions deteriorates.
and cell2 for both when user is moving with 60 km/h. In this paper, we have concentrated on only one scenario.
Similarly, circle having green color marked values are for The other challenges which would be present in UDN are
speed of 30 km/h. as follows:
1
13
1. In this paper, we have presented the mobility scenario   I2   2 

1/ 
for the outdoor coverage area. Also for indoor di  d  '

i 
deployment these cells are used. Further, the security   I1   1  (15)
aspects related to femtocells deployment for indoor Here di is the distance where both the signal powers will
coverage area can be considered [26]. be equal and after that handover process will initiate.
2. Another area of concern is the problem attached with From equation (15), we have concluded that cross-over
the vertical handovers in the buildings. The possibility of distance depends on interference powers and channel
tracking the movement of user is quite easy as the user noise powers from both BSs respectively.
will roam only inside the buildings. Moreover, for indoor
coverage area, Rogue AP attack can be easily initiated in Lemma 2. Our attack modeling is based on the
case of handover phase instead of switching to the actual handover regions as from lemma 1 we are successful in
AP. The user might get the good signal strength from the finding out the point where channel conditions have
attacker. shown similar behavior. In this, we need to find the
3. The possibility of jamming is more for UDN because conditions where handover condition is satisfied.
the distortion in the information is done by attacker up to As the user changes its location, the new distances from
an extend where it is quite difficult to retrieve information. BS1 and BS2 are given by:
Hence, increasing the handover failure rate. di1  di  d1
APPENDIX di 2  di  d 2
Lemma 1. Consider the values of SINR at distance d i Handover will occur only when,
for both BSs from equation (1) SINRuBS1 ( d i1 )  SINRuBS2 ( d i 2 )  T
Ptx , p H ij ( di )di  The above equation can be further reduced into a
SINRuBS1 ( d i )  
 1,th simplified version as shown below and we are taking only
 Ptx , p H ik ( d k )d k  1 noise due to channel conditions only for simplicity
(12)
Where k ranges from 0 to (N-1) and N includes users purpose. However, for complex analysis this equation can
present within the small cell (i.e. picocell) and be reduced by taking interference power:
interference power received from adjacent BSs. The value Ptx , p G1 Ptx , p G2
of SINR should be above a particular threshold value. 10 log( 2
)  10 log( 2
)  T
 
Similarly, for neighboring BS SINR is given by:
G
Ptx , p H ij ( di' )di'  10 log( 1 )  T
SINRuBS2 ( d i' )  ' ' 
 2,th G2
 Ptx , p H ik' ( d k )d k   2
(13) H ij d i1
where  1,th and  2,th are desired threshold values for  T
H ij' d i 2 
maintaining a connection with respect to their picocells 
BS’s (Base Stations).  di1  H ij'
   
We have to check the distance or condition where both  di 2 
T
H ij
the SINR values are equal and is given by:
where G1 and G2 are the channel gains of BS1 (base
Ptx , p H ij ( di )di  Ptx , p H ij ( di ' )di ' station 1) and BS2 (base station 2) respectively. On further

 ' ' 
 Ptx , p H ik ( d k )d k  1  Ptx , p H ik' ( d k )d k   2 solving the equation, we get

 di1   1 H ij 
(14)     
  T H ij 
'
Both the SINR’s will be equal when their channel  di 2
conditions are similar and on further solving the above 
equation can be rewritten as:  1 H ij 
di1  di 2  
d i  d i '  T H ij' 
   (16)
 ' ' 
 Ptx , p H ik ( d k )d k  1  Ptx , p H ik' ( d k )d k   2 By rearranging previous equation (16), we need to find
d i  d i '  out the minimum threshold value for or difference
 between SNR’s such that handover regions could be
 I1   1  I 2   2
decided properly:
The resultant interference powers with respect to BS1 and 
BS2 are given by I1 and I2 respectively.  d  H ij 
T  i2  ' 
d i   I1   1 di1  H ij 
  
' 
di  I2   2 
 d   H ij 
 T   i 2   ' 
 di 
 '  
 I2   2  di1   H ij 
 di   I1   1
1
14
 [13] Antonis g. gotsis, Stelios Stefanatos, and Angeliki Alexiou,

d  “UltraDense Networks:The New Wireless Frontier for Enabling 5G
T   i 2  K Access”, IEEE Vehicular Technology Mag., June 2016.
 di1  (17) [14] H. Peng, Y. Xiao, Y.N. Ruyue, and Y. Yifei, “Ultra Dense Network:
Minimum value of threshold is provided by Challenges, Enabling Technologies and New Trends,” IEEE Access,
Feb 2016.
differentiating above equation (17) with respect to di1 and [15] Kamel, et al “Ultra-dense networks : A survey,” IEEE Commun.
equating the resultant term after derivation to zero, Survey and Tutorials, vol. 18, no.4, May 2016.
d T [16] G. Chopra, et. al., “A survey on ultra-dense network and emerging
min T  : s.t. 0 technologies: Security challenges and possible solutions,” Elsevier,
dd i1 JNCA, vol. 95, Pg. 54-78, Oct. 2017.
(18)
1 1 [17] Kathiravetpillai Sivanesan, Jialin Zou, Subramanian Vasudevan,
d T  di 2   1  di 2   and Sudeep Palat, “Mobility performance optimization for 3GPP LTE
 k  .0  0 HetNets”, Jan. 2017.
dd i1  d 1 1   d i1  [18] Dongho Kim, and Yin-Chun Hu, “A study on false channel
i1
condition reporting attacks in wireless networks”, IEEE Transaction on
1
 di 2   1 Mobile Computing, Vol. 13, No. 5, May, 2014.
[19] Jan Seedorf, “Security Challenges for Peer-to-Peer SIP”, IEEE
k 0
1 1
 di1    Network, Sept/Oct, 2006.
[20] Zong-Hua Liu, Jyh-Cheng Chen, and Tuan-Che Chen, ”Design and
1 Analysis of SIP-Based Mobile VPN for Real-Time Applications”, IEEE
1 1  di 2  
 di1    .k Transaction on Wireless Commun., Vol. 8, No. 11, Nov 2009.
[21] Sreenath Ramanath, Eitan Altman, Vinod Kumar and Merouane


Debbah, “Optimizing cell Size in Pico-cell networks”, IEEE Conference,
  d  1    1 2009.
[22] Physical Layer Procedures (FDD), Release 5, V5.5.0, 3GPP
di1   .k 
i2
   Organizational Partners Technical Specification Group Radio Access
  Network 25.214, June, 2003.
(19) [23] “Guidelines for evaluation of radio interface technologies for
Note: The values of SINR that we have taken above is in IMT-Advanced. Technical report”, ITU, M.Series, 2009.
decibels. [24] A. Gupta, R. Jha, “Power optimization using massive MIMO and
small cells approach in different deployment scenarios”, Springer,1
2016.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT [25] Xiaojun Yan, Jing Xu, Yuanping Zhu, Jiang Wang, Yang Yang,
The authors gratefully acknowledge the support provided and Cheng-Xiang Wang, “Downlink Average Rate and SINR
by 5G and IoT Lab, DoECE, and SMVDU-TBIC, Katra, Distribution in Cellular Networks,” IEEE Transactions on Comm., Vol.
Jammu and Kashmir. 64, No. 2, Feb. 2016.
[26] G. Godor, Z. Jako, et al., “A survey on handover management in
LTE-based multi-tier femtocell networks: Requirements, Challenges
REFERENCES and Solutions”, Elsevier, Computer Networks, November, 2014.
[1] “Cisco visual networking index:Global mobile data traffic forecast [27] M. Kamel, W. Hamouda, et. al., “Physical Layer Security in
update, 2015c2020,” Cisco, Feb. 2016. Ultra-Dense Networks,” IEEE, Wireless Commun. Letters, 2017.
[2] Pingzhi Fan, Jing Zhao, Chih-Lin I, “5G High Mobility Wireless [28] N. Zhao, et. Al., “Artificial Noise Assisted Secure Interference
Communications: Challenges and Solutions”, IEEE China Networks with Wireless Power Transfer,” IEEE trans,. on Vehicular
Communication, 2016. Techn., May 2017.
[3] A. Damnjanovic, et al., “A SURVEY ON 3GPP [29] F. Zhu and M. Yao, “Improving Physical-Layer Security for CRNs
HETEROGENEOUS NETWORKS”, IEEE Wireless Comm., Jun. 2011. Using SINR-Based Cooperative Beamforming,” IEEE Trans. on
[4] Arman Shojaeifard, et al., “Exact SINR Statistics in the Presence of vehicular Tech., vol.65, no. 3, Mar. 2016.
Heterogeneous Interferers”, IEEE Trans. on Inf. Theory, vol. 61, No. 12, [30] Y.J. Tolossa, et. al., “On the Uplink Secrecy Capacity Analysis in
Dec. 2015. D2D-Enabled Cellular network,” IEEE SYSTEMS JOURNAL, 2017.
[5] Xiaojun Yan, Jing Xu, Yuanping Zhu, Jiang Wang, Yang Yang, and [31] Z. Chen, et. al., “Improving Secrecy Performance of a Wirelessly
Cheng-Xiang Wang, “Downlink Average Rate and SINR Distribution in Powered Network,” IEEE Transac. on Commun., 2017.
Cellular Networks”, IEEE Transactions on Comm., vol. 64, No. 2, Feb.
2016.
[6] Xin Liu, Zhiwen Pan, Nan Liu, and Xiaohu You, “Downlink SINR Miss. Garima Chopra received
and Rate Distribution of Ultra-Dense HetNets with Burst Traffic”, IEEE the B.Tech degree in Electronics
China Communication, September, 2016. and communication from Shri
[7] A. Ghosh, N. Mangalvedhe, R. Ratasuk, et al. “Heterogeneous
Cellular Networks: From Theory to Practice”, IEEE Commu. Lett., June Mata Vaishno Devi University,
2012. Jammu and Kashmir, India, in
[8] I. Bilogrevic, M. Jadliwala and J. Hubaux, “Security Issues in Next 2013 and M.Tech Degree
Generation Mobile Networks:LTE and Femtocell,” IEEE, 2015. Specialized in Communication
[9] Li, Zhu, et al. “Privacy leakage of location sharing in mobile social
networks: Attacks and Defense,” IEEE trans. on Dependable and and Information Technology
Secure Computing, Aug. 2016. (CIT) in Electronics and
[10] Yang, Wang, et al, “Safeguarding 5G wireless communication Communication Department
networks using physical layer security”, IEEE Commun. Mag., Apr. from National Institute of Technology, Srinagar, Jammu
2015.
[11] X. Ge, S. Tu, et al.“5G Ultra-Dense Cellular Networks,” IEEE and Kashmir, India,in 2016. She is currently pursuing the
Wireless Communication, vol. 23, no. 1, Feb. 2016. Ph.D. degree in Electronics and Communication
[12] C. X Wang, F. Haider, X. Gao, et al., “Cellular Architecture and Engineering at Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University,
Key Technologies for 5G Wireless Communication Networks,” IEEE Jammu and Kashmir, India.
Commun. Mag., vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 22-30, Feb. 2014.
1
15
Her research interest includes the security in emerging

technologies of 5G wireless communication network.
Currently she is doing her research work on Security
issues of Ultra Dense Network in Fifth Generation
wireless communication. She also worked on the security
issues of Wireless Communication and their Security
aspects. She has worked on Qualnet 5.0.2 simulation and
Matlab Tool for Wireless Communication.
Miss Chopra has received a Teaching Assistance from
2014-2016 through MHRD and is currently a member of
IEEE.
PROF. SANJEEV JAIN, born at

Vidisha in Madhya Pradesh in
1967, obtained his Post Graduate
Degree in Computer Science and
Engineering from Indian Institute
of Technology, Delhi, in 1992. He
later received his Doctorate
Degree in Computer Science &
Engineering and has over 24
years’ experience in teaching and research. He has served
as Director, Madhav Institute of Technology and Science
(MITS), Gwalior. Presently, he is working as a vice
chancellor at Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University, Katra.
Besides teaching at Post Graduate level Professor Jain
has the credit of making significant contribution to R & D
in the area of Image Processing and Mobile Adhoc
Network. He has guided Ph.D. Scholars and has
undertaken a number of major R&D projects sponsored
by the Government and Private Agencies. His work on
Digital Watermarking for Image Authentication is highly
valued in the research field.
Dr. Rakesh K Jha is currently an

Assistant Professor in school of
electronics and communication
department, SMVD University
Katra (J&K). He is carrying out his
research in WiMAX and Security
issues in the laboratory ECED Lab,
SMVDU. Involved research topics
include WiMAX performance analysis, LBRRA, power
optimization and security analysis. He has done B.Tech in
Electronics & Communication from Bhopal and M.Tech
from NIT Jalandhar, INDIA. Received his PhD degree
from NIT Surat in 2013.
Published more than 50 International Conference and
Journal papers. His area of interest is Wireless
communication, Communication System and computer
network, and Security issues (Opti System).
Dr. Jha’s one concept related to router of Wireless
Communication has been accepted by ITU (International
Telecommunication Union) in 2010. He has received
young scientist author award by ITU in Dec 2010, APAN
fellowship in 2011 and student travel grant from
COMSNET 2012. He is a member of IEEE, GISFI and
SIAM, International Association of Engineers (IAENG)
and ACCS (Advance Computing and Communication
Society).
1

Chopra2017 PDF

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Chopra2017 PDF

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been

Possible Security Attack Modeling in Ultra Dense Networks

Fig 1 . General architecture for UDN.

challenges is the device security or the information overall

Fig 3. Possible security scenario in UDN for 5G network.

[31]  X WPC (wireless Power Beacons Eavesdropper SNR lowered with PB

ith node to jth node where i and j can be BS and Mobile

Fig 5. Proposed System Model.

state and it serves as an attractive center for the attacker 9%

Fig 9. Flow Chart for calculation of SIT and synchronization time of

Picocell Radius 150-200m VI. SIMULATION RESULTS

Speed of User 60km/hr 160

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200

According to latest 3GPP release 13 standards, for 5G

scenarios we have compared 3 different deployment areas

Figure 10. The comparison between the path loss

projects that urban area experiences more path loss

followed by suburban and then rural. The comparison has

been initiated because we want to use the SNR variations

with respect to distance (distance here serves a prime

factor to observe the changes from one cell to another).

2. In the real-time scenarios, the users have been

we are doing the performance analysis for UDN. Hence,

already discussed this region to be 30-50%.

-100 0 100 200 300 400 500

Fig 11. Handover scenario in UDN.

1. In this paper, we have presented the mobility scenario   I2   2 

for the outdoor coverage area. Also for indoor di  d  '

 [13] Antonis g. gotsis, Stelios Stefanatos, and Angeliki Alexiou,

Her research interest includes the security in emerging

PROF. SANJEEV JAIN, born at

Dr. Rakesh K Jha is currently an

Вам также может понравиться