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      authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to
Facts: On July 5, 1963 the petition for prohibition against
Ordinance No. 4760 was filed by Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del
Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, who is "the latter¶s president and
general manager" against the respondent Mayor of the City of
Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the
general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of
Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful
execution and enforcement of such ordinances." It was alleged
that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the
promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18)
members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as
legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city
authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving
livelihood to not less than 2,500 person and representing an
investment of more than P3 million." It was then alleged that on
June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by
the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time
acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. There was the assertion
of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the
City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on
the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in
any other law. Sec. 1: It was a violation of privacy and it was
against self-incrimination and that is why it is unconstitutional
and void. Sec. 2: classifying rooms and prohibiting persons
under 18 to be given any room without the company of
parents. On August 3, 1963 an answer was filed regarding the
respondent mayor that the petitioners are licensed to engage
in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the
provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged
nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds the
petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the
challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper
purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper
exercise of the police power and that only the guests or
customers not before the court could complain of the alleged
invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self
incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the
preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent
Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of the
petition.
Issue: WON Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is
violative of the due process clause
Ruling: The lower court held that it is and adjudged it
"unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." Nor does the
restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged
ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or
duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging
house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso
that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a
different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed
as a transgression against the command of due process. It is
neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. The right of the individual is
)' Yes. The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for
the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may be
restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public
order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the
28
police power." The policy of laissez faire has to some extent
given way to the assumption by the government of the right of
intervention even in contractual relations affected with public
31
interest. What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty
involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard
for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most
rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure
is wider.The attack against the validity of the challenged
ordinance cannot be considered a success.
c
 
refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or
letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons
without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to
public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the
surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the
address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of
stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with
the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with
data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his
passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a
person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed
his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper
or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms
and records kept and bound together; (3) provides that the
premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging
houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor,
or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives.
The ordinance also classified motels into two classes and
required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first
class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room
or restaurant and laundry; while second class motels are
required to have a dining room. It prohibited a person less than
18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels,
lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by
parents or a lawful guardian and made it unlawful for the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of
such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more
than twice every 24 hours. It provided a penalty of automatic
cancellation of the license of the offended party in case of
conviction. On 5 July 1963, the Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association (EMHMOA), its member Hotel del Mar,
and a certain Go Chiu filed a petition for prohibition against the
mayor of the City of Manila in his capacity as he is charged
with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the
City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful
execution and enforcement of such ordinances. There was a
plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final
judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and
unenforceable. The lower court on 6 July 1963 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering the Mayor to refrain from
enforcing said Ordinance 4760 from and after 8 July 1963.
After the submission of the memoranda, ruled that the City of
Manila lack authority to regulate motels and rendering
Ordinance 4760 unconstitutional and therefore null and void. It
made permanent the preliminary injunction issued by the
Mayor and his agents to restrain him from enforcing the
ordinance. The Mayor of Manila appealed to the Supreme
Court.
($' Whether the regulations imposed on motels and hotels
(increasing license fees, partially restricting the freedom to
contract, and restraining the liberty of individuals) is valid
and/or constitutional.
practices hurtful to public morals. It was made as there is
observed an alarming increase in the rate of prostitution,
adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the
existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the
ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers. The ordinance
proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and
guests of these establishments by requiring these transients
and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the
purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by
introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to
shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of
transients and guests. The increase in the license fees was
intended to discourage establishments of the kind from
operating for purpose other than legal and to increase the
income of the city government. Further, the restriction on the
   
      freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance
    ! " #$ "%& makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly
c
 
 









 authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house,
@' On 13 June 1963, Ordinance 4760 was issued by the
municipal board of the City of Manila and approved by Vice
Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting Mayor of
the City of Manila. The ordinance (1) imposes a P6,000.00 fee
per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second
class motels; (2) requires the owner, manager, keeper or duly
tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso
that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be
viewed as a transgression against the command of due
process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it
was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, are
being devoted. Furthermore, the right of the individual is
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for
the common good. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained
in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and
safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police
power. State in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business
and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.
accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons
identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the
object or subject of the law provided classification is
reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for
real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member
of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause
is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons
under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the
same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities
imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing
criteria.
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Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do
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not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law
& unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be
clear, categorical and undeniable. Hence, the Writs prayed for
@Ö
' To insure that only safe and comfortable units are are denied and was dismissed.
used as public conveyances and in order that the commuting
public may be assured of comfort, convenience, and safety, Ö*+ 
    , )  Ö 
 
the Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum 22 11 2010
Circular phasing out the old and dilapidated taxis. Pursuant to
OT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land
Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular formulating
a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and ±
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accepted for registration as public conveyances. The Taxicab
Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace
Transportation filed a petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and
mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order", to declare the nullity of Memorandum Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is
Circular of the BOT and Memorandum Circular of the BLT. a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who
are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate
(

c
' Whether or not the implementation and enforcement taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in
of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic.
constitutional rights to (1) Equal protection of the law; (2)
Substantive due process; and (3) Protection against arbitrary
and unreasonable classification and standard.

c-' On Procedural and Substantive Due Process: On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation
Petitioners cannot justifiably claim that they were deprived of (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads:
procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty
that public respondents had not availed of other sources of
inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars for the Board
gave a wide range of choice in gathering necessary SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and
information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or Dilapidated Taxis
program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a
conference or require the submission of position papers or
other documents from operators or persons who may be
affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board,
which is given wide discretionary authority. Furthermore, as
public contend it is impractical to subject every taxicab to
constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT,
it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards,
docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-
possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable
42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and
standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected
operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model
uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that
1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-
reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by
out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are
that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and
roadworthy and fit for operation.
a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally
dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to
the public specially considering that they are in continuous
operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight
hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and (

c
absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has
been met.

On Equal Protection of the Law: The law being enforced in

Metro Manila only and was directed solely towards the taxi ³A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned
industry does not violate their right to equal protection of the memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by
law for the traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the
substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal petitioners¶ constitutional right to procedural due process?
protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed. The
State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all
things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the
also regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No.
Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the
welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners¶
regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert constitutional rights to.
that their interests are disregarded". In so far as the non-
application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation
services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal
protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be
(1) Equal protection of the law;

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(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification
and standard?
c-
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged
BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and
comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and
dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power,
can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It
can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of
society. [5] It may also regulate property rights. [6] In the
language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando ³the
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise
of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded´.
Ö*+ 
. ! /

En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 12 concur, 2 concur in the
result
@' Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a
domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are
grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate
taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in
Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Ace Transportation
Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of
TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate
of public convenience.
On 10 October 1977, Board of Transportation (BOT) issued
Memorandum Circular 77-42 which phases out old and
dilapidated taxis; refusing registration to taxi units within the
National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old.
Pursuant to the above BOT circular, Director of the Bureau of
Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular 52,
dated 15 August 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the
MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the NCR,
to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of
phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for
registration as public conveyances. In accordance therewith,
cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978;
those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980;
and those of model 1974, in 1981.
Ö*+ 
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    On 27 January 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT
15 11 2010
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operation. On 16 February 1981, petitioners filed before the
c&'%
On 10 Oct 1977, BOT issued Circ 77-42 which has for its
purpose the phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis which are
6 years older. The law is set to be immediately implemented in
Metro Manila first before it would be implemented elsewhere.
Pursuant to this, the Director of the Bureau of Land
Transportation issued Circ 52 which is the IRR of the law in the
NCR. TOMMI assailed the constitutionality of the law. It avers,
among other things, that the Circular in question violates their
right to equal protection of the law because the same is being
enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards
the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed out that
implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42.
(

c' Whether or not there is a violation of the equal
protection clause by the implementation of the said circular.
c-' The SC held that Circ 77-42 is valid. BOT¶s reason for
enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in
this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to
heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. Thus is of
common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not
the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that
infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be
successfully claimed.
In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to
other transportation services is concerned, it need only be
recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that
the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to
things or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of
classification of the object or subject of the law provided
classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction,
5 6 
$+  5
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which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally
)$  )$

to each member of the class. What is required under the equal
protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so
that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would
be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred
and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the
foregoing criteria.
(Case 80-7553), seeking to nullify MC 77-42 or to stop its
implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981
and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as
those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that,
at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for
BOT a ³Manifestation and Urgent Motion´, praying for an early
hearing of their petition. The case was heard on 20 February
1981. On 28 November 1981, petitioners filed before the same
Board a ³Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or
Decide Main Petition´ praying that the case be resolved or
decided not later than 10 December 1981 to enable them, in
case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have
under the law for the protection of their interests before their
1975 model cabs are phased-out on 1 January 1982.
Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal
follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the records
of the case could not be located. On 29 December 1981, the
present Petition was instituted.
The Supreme Court denied the writs prayed for and dismissed
the petition; without costs.
" 1 )$  )
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 $' 34
PD 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power to fix
just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations,
practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed,
observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor
vehicles. Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural
guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of its
powers. Leeway was accorded the Board giving it a wide range
of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the
formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory
that it should first call a conference or require the submission
of position papers or other documents from operators or
persons who may be affected, this being only one of the
options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary
authority.
 -
 $    
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the
Circulars is not violative of procedural due process. Previous
notice and hearing as elements of due process, are
constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested
property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss
takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event
which has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential
to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to
govern future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises,
unless the law provides otherwise. (Central Bank vs. Cloribel
and Banco Filipino)
 )
   + ) )2 7$ 
  because it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
)$

 laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due
It is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and
recurring evaluation to determine its road-worthiness, not to
speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of
multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and
corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to
all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six
years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of
experience shows that by that time taxis have fully
depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on
investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and
no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public
specially considering that they are in continuous operation
practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per
shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of
arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met.
 c7$ 1     62
$+ )2
   


     ( 5 
 )=! "/" 1  "".
Equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment
be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons
identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the
object or subject of the law provided classification is
reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for
real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member
of the class. What is required under the equal protection
clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all
persons under identical or similar circumstance would be
accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and
the liabilities imposed.The challenged Circulars satisfy the
foregoing criteria.
The Circular was enforced initially in Metro Manila is that
taxicabs in said metropolis, compared to those of other places,
are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant
use (common knowledge). Considering that traffic conditions
are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists
so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly
be successfully claimed. The implementation of the Circular
outside Metro Manila was also envisioned in MC 77-42 as its
provision provides that ³for an orderly implementation of this
Memorandum Circular, the rules « shall immediately be
effective in Metro Manila. Its implementation outside Metro
Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been
implemented in Metro Manila and only after the date has been
determined by the Board.´ Further, the implementation of the
Circulars in Cebu City is already being effected, with the BOT
in the process of conducting studies regarding the operation of
taxicabs in other cities.
.  + ) *  

6 the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of
The overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the
riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated
taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can
prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of
society. It may also regulate property rights. The necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of
governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.
(
retail business of additional stores or branches of retail
business.´
-Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other
alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely
affected by the provisions of RA 1180, brought this action to
obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional
process of law and that it violates international treaties.
-in answer, the solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of
Manila contend that the Act was passed in the valid exercise of
the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in
the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival
and that no treaty or international obligations are infringed.
Issue: WON the enactment falls within the scope of the police
power of the state.
Ruling: Yes.
RD: The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual
threat and danger to national economy posed by alien
dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens
and country from dominance and control; the enactment clearly
falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru
which and by which it protects its own personality and insures
its security and future.
@' Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of
other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely
affected by the provisions of Republic Act No. 1180, brought
this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all
other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal
treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the
constitutionality of the Act, contending among others that: it
denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives them of their liberty and property without due process
of law; it violates international and treaty obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines; and its provisions against the
transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for
a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail
business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and
Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail
Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business.
The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against
persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against
associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which
are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an
exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually
engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to
continue to engage therein, unless their licenses are forfeited
in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary
retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after
juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens
and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the
forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for
violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control
weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to
trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the
establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the
retail business of additional stores or branches of retail
business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in
the retail business to present for registration with the proper
authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses,
giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their
8 9

c88-c: ;+ ) ! #< assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of
"/" 1  "".. juridical entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens
now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such
Facts: business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.
-RA 1180 entitled ³An Act to Regulate the Retail Business´ ±
nationalizes the retail trade business
)' The Court held that the Act was approved in the exercise
-The main provisions of the Act are: ³ (1) prohibition against of the police power. It has been said that police power is so far-
persons, not citizens of the Phils., and against associations, reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit
partnerships and corporations the capital of which are not its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of
wholly owned by citizens of the Phils., from engaging directly the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in
or indirectly in the retail trade « (2) a prohibition against the its scope; it is said to be co- extensive with self-protection and
establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all
governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and
illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic
framework where the demands of society and of nations have
multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and
scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as
the fields of public interest and public welfare have become
almost all- embracing and have transcended human foresight.
Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and
demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly
changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit
beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and
through which the State seeks to attain or achieve public
interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the
scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do
is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of
these are the due process clause and the equal protection
clause.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor
and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to
 )=
which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
-
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within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not.
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of
legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power, Is there
public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is
the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or
oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in
connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a
capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims
conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely
an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the
questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the
guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is
more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the
guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the
essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the
c-' Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally
attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.
There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that
would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for
that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can
deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is
due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes
and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of
the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police
power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest
and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has
been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said
distinction.
The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat
and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance
and control of the retail business and free citizens and country
from such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly
falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru
which and by which it protects its own personality and insures
the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be
said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations
because no treaty has actually been entered into on the
subject and the police power may not be curtailed or
surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional
agreement. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also
claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty
guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals
"upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country."
But the nationals of China are not discriminated against
because nationals of all other countries, except those of the
United States, who are granted special rights by the
Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade.
But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty,
the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law , and the same may never curtail or restrict the
scope of the police power of the State.
 ( 5  #

22 11 2010
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Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country
to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound
(then) ± particularly in the retail business. For some time he
and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a ³monopoly´ in
the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress
passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the
purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage
in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification
of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several
treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates
the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said
that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here
in the country who helps in the income generation of the
country he should be given equal opportunity.
(

c' Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede
treaties or generally accepted principles.
accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all
between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA
1180. The equal protection of the law clause ³does not demand
absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced´; and, that the equal protection clause ³is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not.´
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a
treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must
be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police
power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or
surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong
can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the
Pasay city market.
its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in
the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process
of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and
recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the
wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives
appear to us to be plainly evident ² as a matter of fact it
seems not only appropriate but actually necessary ² and that
in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the
Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial
department of the Government may not interfere; that the
provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this
suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or
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9

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1. Private respondent Roberto Rey San Diego graduated from
the University of the East with a BS degree in Zoology.
2. He took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times.
3. When he applied again petitioner rejected him because it
contended that under the NMAT rule: ³ a student shall be
allowed to take 3 chances to take the NMAT. After three
successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the
NMAT for the fourth time.´
4. Private respondent went to the RTC for a petition
mandamus invoking his right to academic freedom and quality
education.
5. Respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong declared the
challenged order unconstitutional.
6. Respondent Judge held that San Diego has been deprived
of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary
exercise of police power.
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Is person who has failed the NMAT three times entitled to take
it again.
c-'
The proper exercise of the police power of the State requires
)' No. The court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT
the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the
ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the
responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession
is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may
unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not
irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or
oppressive. The thee-flunk rule is intended to insulate the
medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the
intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does
not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any
other calling in which the public interest is involved, and the
closer the line, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The
State has the responsibility to harness its human resources
and to see to it that they are, not dissipated or, no less worse,
not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner
that will best promote the common good while also giving the
individual a sense of satisfaction.
The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution
also provides that "every citizen has a right to choose a
profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements. {Art. XIV,
Sec.5 (3)}
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal
protection clause is not well taken. A law does not have to
operate with equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Art. III, Sec 1 of the Constitution.
There would be unequal protection if some applicants who
have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also
qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal
protection requires is equality among equals.
constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972,
containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised
were due process and equal protection.
($' Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution
on academic freedom, due process and equal protection.
as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical
schools only to those who have initially proved their
competence and preparation for a medical education.
'
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does
not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any
other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the
closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The
State has the responsibility to harness its human resources
and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse,
not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner
that will best promote the common good while also giving the
individual a sense of satisfaction.
The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right
to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one
must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation
and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five
times. While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it
is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love. No depreciation is
intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed
that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an
absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The
only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the
medical profession, but for another calling that has not excited
his interest. In the former, he may be a bungler or at least
lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and may
even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is
entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of his
potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what
may even be a brilliant future. We cannot have a society of
square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have
left the farm and engineers who should have studied banking
and teachers who could be better as merchants. It is time
indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich
our system of education by directing the student to the course
for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and
evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity,"
in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in
intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.

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operating drugstores in the Philippines. Meanwhile, AO 171 or
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a the ±
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person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission ±
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Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again. The petitioner ´c/ 
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) was issued by the
contends he may not, under its rule that- A student shall be DOH, providing the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount in
allowed only 3 chances to take the NMAT. After 3 successive the purchase of unbranded generic medicines from all
failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of
the fourth time. The private respondent insists he can, on the senior citizens.
constitutional grounds.
DOH issued Administrative Order No 177 amending
A.O. No. 171. Under A.O. No. 177, the twenty percent discount
shall not be limited to the purchase of unbranded generic
@' Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the
medicines only, but shall extend to both prescription and non-
East with a degree of BS Zoology. The petitioner claims that he prescription medicines whether branded or generic. Thus, it
took the NMAT 3 times and flunked it as many times. When he stated that ³[t]he grant of twenty percent (20%) discount shall
applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application
be provided in the purchase of medicines from all
on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the RTC of establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of
Valenzuela to compel his admission to the test. the senior citizens.´

In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his
constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality
education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent
was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989,
subject to the outcome of his petition. In an amended petition
filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the
Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is
unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private
property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to
grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital
because 1) drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on
branded medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme
whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the
discount.
(8 in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations
of a business which may result in an impairment of property
The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a rights in the process.
forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property
for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking Moreover, the right to property has a social
for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution provides the
compensation. precept for the protection of property, various laws and
jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and the
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair regulation of contracts and public utilities, continuously serve
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the as a reminder that the right to property can be relinquished
expropriator. The measure is not the taker¶s gain but the upon the command of the State for the promotion of public
owner¶s loss. The word ?$ is used to intensify the meaning of good.
the word 

, and to convey the idea that the  8 "! #$ ! //%
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be
real, substantial, full and ample.
A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of
the senior citizen discount. As such, it would not meet the
definition of just compensation.
Having said that, this raises the question of whether
the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special
group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the
burden of partly subsidizing a government program.
The Court believes so.
The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior
citizens for medical and dental services, and diagnostic and
laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert
halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture,
leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea
travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and
purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of
senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides
that business establishments extending the twenty percent
discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax
deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which,
similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for
its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition,
but has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore
its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest
benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as ³the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending
as it does to all the great public needs.´ It is ³[t]he power
vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain,
and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the
good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of
the same.´
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as
determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the
primacy of police power because property rights, though
sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common
good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of
petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the
questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence
of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of
the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in
view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its
favor.
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that
the grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to
their business, because petitioners have not taken time to
calculate correctly and come up with a financial report, so that
they have not been able to show properly whether or not the
tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their
disadvantage.
The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the
pharmaceutical industry and the competitive pricing component
of the business. While the Constitution protects property rights,
petitioners must accept the realities of business and the State,


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FACTS:
È Petitioners, belonging to domestic corporations and
proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines, are
praying for preliminary injunction assailing the
constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9257, otherwise known as the ³Expanded Senior Citizens
Act of 2003.´ On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257,
amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and it became
effective on March 21, 2004. Section 4(a) of the Act
states:
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. ±
The senior citizens shall be entitled to the
following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount
from all establishments relative to the utilization
of services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation
centers, and purchase of medicines in all
establishments for the exclusive use or
enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral
and burial services for the death of senior
citizens;
È The establishment may claim the discounts granted under
(a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost
of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the
cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from
gross income for the same taxable year that the discount
is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the
claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable,
shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax
purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation
and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code, as amended.
È The DSWD, on May 8, 2004, approved and adopted the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 9275,
Rule VI, Article 8 which contains the proviso that the
implementation of the tax deduction shall be subject to the
Revenue Regulations to be issued by the BIR and
approved by the DOF. With the new law, the Drug Stores
Association of the Philippines wanted a clarification of the
meaning of tax deduction. The DOF clarified that under a
tax deduction scheme, the tax deduction on discounts was
subtracted from Net Sales together with other deductions
which are considered as operating expenses before the
Tax Due was computed based on the Net Taxable
Income. On the other hand, under a tax credit scheme, the
amount of discounts which is the tax credit item, was
deducted directly from the tax due amount.
È The DOH issued an Administrative Order that the twenty
percent discount shall include both prescription and non-
prescription medicines, whether branded or generic. It
stated that such discount would be provided in the
purchase of medicines from all establishments supplying
medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens.
È Drug store owners assail the law with the contention that
granting the discount would result to loss of profit and
capital especially that such law failed to provide a scheme
to justly compensate the discount.
ISSUE: WON Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act
is unconstitutional or not violative of Article 3 Section 9 of the
Constitution which provides that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation and the equal
protection clause of Article 3 Section 1.

HELD:
È The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced
subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for
public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking
for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a
just compensation. Just compensation is defined as the
full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker¶s gain
but the owner¶s loss. The word just is used to intensify the
meaning of the word compensation, and to convey the
idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to
be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
È The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens
for medical and dental services, and diagnostic and
laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters,
concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places
of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for domestic
land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and
similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation
centers; and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use
or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of
reimbursement, the law provides that business
establishments extending the twenty percent discount to
senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.
È The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which,
similar to the power of eminent domain, has general
welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an
       +)
exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general
)     5 
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terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all
exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus
assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been
described as ³the most essential, insistent and the least
5   %
limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great
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public needs.´ It is ³[t]he power vested in the legislature by

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the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner
of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
) $) @ )

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ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant
to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good

 of the MMDA¶s plans,
and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of
the same.´
È MMDA vs Bel Air Village Association
È Date: March 27, 2000
È Petitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
È Respondent: Bel Air Village Association Inc
È bodies for the delivery of the required services within Metro
È Ponente: Puno
È È
È Facts: MMDA is a government agency tasked with the
delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose
members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private
subdivision in Makati City. BAVA is the registered owner of
Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
È On December 30, 1995, respondent received
from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December
22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to
public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. BAVA was
apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision
from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
È On January 2, 1996, BAVA instituted against
petitioner before the RTC a civil case for injunction.
Respondent prayed for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary
injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and
prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court
issued a temporary restraining order the following day. After
due hearing, the trial court denied the issuance of preliminary
injunction.
È On appeal, the CA rendered a Decision on the
merits of the case finding that the MMDA has no authority to

6 !   5
6 .
order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road
and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the
authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.
È empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances,
È Issue: WON the MMDA has authority to open
Neptune Road to the public
È termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an
È Held: No
È coordinating with the various national government agencies,
È Ratio: MMDA claims that it has the authority to
open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of
the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic
services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic
management which involves the regulation of the use of
thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of
the general public. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA
was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of
Sangalang v. IAC. From the premise that it has police power, it
is now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to
enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public.
È Police power is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the
Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to
the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the
same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and
pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health,
public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.
È It bears stressing that police power is lodged
primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by
any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative
power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this
power to the President and administrative boards as well as
the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise
only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the
national lawmaking body.
È  


(12) cities and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of
Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig,
Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and
Valenzuela, and the municipalities of Malabon, , Navotas, ,
Pateros, San Juan and Taguig.   
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È The 

programs and projects is undertaken by the local government
units, national government agencies, accredited people¶s
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private
sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the
MMDA has the power to enter into contracts, memoranda of
agreement and other cooperative arrangements with these
Manila.
Clearly, the scope of the MMDA¶s function is
limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of
these is transport and traffic management which includes the
formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects
to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure
requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the
safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass
transport system and the institution of a system of road
regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement
operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education
programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system
in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this service, the
MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning
traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all
traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may
"install and administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose
and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations.
È It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are
limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. Ö     +    8 %  
5    -
Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any
legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local
government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as
agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and
people¶s organizations, non-governmental organizations and
the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of
basic services in the vast metropolitan area.   $
  )
   $  and these are actually summed units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority.
up in the charter itself This emphasizes the )
     of the MMDA.
È Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of È    !    $) 1 - 8 0 

55  (
) 

 $  where we upheld    
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a zoning ordinance issued by the Metro Manila Commission B   !   -  
6  
(MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an exercise of police  )    6     

$ It is the local
power. The first
55 decision was on the merits of the government units, acting through their respective legislative
petition, while the second decision denied reconsideration of councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In
the first case and in addition discussed the case of >+$  the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City
$   

. did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening
È    
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!   6 of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner
]
 
  )  

      +  @ , MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not
both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as
council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis they are unnecessary. Esmso
for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the È We stress that this decision does not make light
notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent of the MMDA¶s noble efforts to solve the chaotic traffic
BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any condition in Metro Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and traffic
ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our once sprawling
Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the boulevards and avenues are now crammed with cars while city
proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply streets are clogged with motorists and pedestrians. Traffic has
relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of become a social malaise affecting our people¶s productivity
roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient and the efficient delivery of goods and services in the country.
movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan
thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the scope of transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by
transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the
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implied grant of ordinance-making power, much less police subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the
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6 
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6 6 
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  @)   + $ +   7$ 5 @' On 2 March 1995, the Commission on Elections
 )   
 @ Ö  A (Comelec) promulgated Resolution 2772, which provided that
5 5 +)!    
  $!  $5 (1) the Commission shall procure free print space of not less


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  ) than 1/2 page in at least one newspaper of general circulation

$
! 6
  5  
6 ' ;"< in every province or city for use as ³Comelec Space´ from 6

$ 
    )   +   March until 12 May 1995; and that in the absence of said
7$ 5  ) ) )2 ) ;< newspaper, ³Comelec Space´ shall be obtained from any


$5  $ )   $! 

 magazine or periodical of said province or city; (2) that
  )  +   )   *    $ ³Comelec Space´ shall be allocated by the Commission, free of

B5
6  charge, among all candidates within the area in which the
È )   "0% $, the local newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the
government units became primarily responsible for the candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on
governance of their respective political subdivisions. The public issues and their platforms and programs of government;
A ?$ ) 6 
) to addressing common and that the ³Comelec Space´ shall also be used by the
problems involving basic services that transcended local Commission for dissemination of vital election information¶
boundaries. ( ))   5
6 . Its power was among others. Apparently in implementation of the Resolution,
merely to provide the local government units technical Comelec through Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong sent
assistance in the preparation of local development plans. Any identical letters, dated 22 March 1995, to various publishers of
semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a "review newspapers like the Business World, the Philippine Star, the
[of] legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to Malaya and the Philippine Times Journal, all members of
ensure consistency among local governments and with the Philippine Press Institute (PPI), advising the latter that they are
comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila," and to directed to provide free print space of not less than 1/2 page
"advise the local governments accordingly." for use as ³Comelec Space´ or similar to the print support
È    8 % B !  
 which the latter have extended during the 11 May 1992
 +
  @
 )

 ) )
  synchronized elections which was 2 full pages for each political
5@ )   -  @
 )

 $  @ party fielding senatorial candidates, from 6 March to 6 May
6  $ 6  @6 $
?$)    $
 1995, to make known to their qualifications, their stand on
   )  5 
 $@ Ö      public issues and their platforms and programs of government.
  - 6   ))    5 )+ PPI filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for
5      the issuance of a Temporary restraining order before the
È (   $ +) )$+     -   Supreme Court to assail the validity of Resolution 2772 and the
  5 
 $  
$+ 
  )6) corresponding directive dated 22 March 1995.
6 5
6  It is not even a "special metropolitan
political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of ($' Whether there was necessity for the taking, i.e.
the Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan compelling print media companies to donate ³Comelec space.´
political subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro
)' To compel print media companies to donate ³Comelec
Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an space´ of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution
official elected by the people, but appointed by the President 2772 (not less than 1/2 Page), amounts to ³taking´ of private
with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part personal property for public use or purposes. Section 2 failed
of his function is to perform such other duties as may be to specify the intended frequency of such compulsory
assigned to him by the President, whereas in local government ³donation.´ The extent of the taking or deprivation is not
insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary
limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The
monetary value of the compulsory ³donation,´ measured by the
advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers
whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very
substantial indeed. The taking of print space here sought to be
effected may first be appraised under the public of
expropriation of private personal property for public use. The
threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for
public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for
the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking.
The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by
)'
the Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of
PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to
Comelec for election purposes. Similarly, it has not been
suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been
granted the power of imminent domain either by the
Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable
relationship between that power and the enforcement and
administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is
not casually to be assumed. That the taking is designed to
subserve ³public use´ is not contested by PPI. Only that, under
Section 3 of Resolution 2772, the free ³Comelec space´ sought
by the Comelec would be used not only for informing the public
about the identities, qualifications and programs of government
of candidates for elective office but also for ³dissemination of
vital election information´ (including, presumably, circulars,
regulations, notices, directives, etc. issued by Comelec). It
seems to the Court a matter of judicial notice that government
offices and agencies (including the Supreme Court) simply
purchase print space, in the ordinary course of events, when
their rules and regulations, circulars, notices and so forth need
officially to be brought to the attention of the general public.
The taking of private property for public use it, of course,
authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of ³just
Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of
supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the
communication and information operations of print media
enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure
a fair, impartial and credible election.
($'
Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent
Commission on Elections is valid.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-
directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null
and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby
MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to
the extent it relates to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. No
pronouncement as to costs.
 -))'
1. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as
interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives,
purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free
print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal
constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified.
2. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772,
the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for
lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy.
compensation.´ Thus, although there is nothing at all to prevent Öcc8(Ö(8
8- ,-
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newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving @ Ö
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free print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in
Resolution 2772; Section 2 of resolution 2772 does not provide
a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their
will to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section
2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
Phil. Press Institute, Inc. vs. Comelec
244 scra 272
@'
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, PPI, a non-stock,
non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers,
asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the
prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government,
and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property
for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also
contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec
requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the
same time process raw data to make it camera-ready,
constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the
provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No.
2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
speech, of the press and of expression.
On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its
Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that
Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the
publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the
newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or
administrative sanction for non-compliance with that
Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, the questioned
Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in
connection with the procurement of "Comelec space," the
procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to
candidates and the conditions or requirements for the
candidate's utilization of the "Comelec space" procured. At the
same time, however, the Solicitor General argues that even if
the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter
directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would
nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the
State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of
" 2 " 1 "0&
Monday, February 02, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
@' Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast
Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization
of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It
was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case
as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to
suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject
law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the
requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge.
Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in
the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P.
No. 881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881
which provides:
³Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and
television time to be known as the ³Comelec Time´ which shall
be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates
within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations.
For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and
television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio
or television time, free of charge, during the period of
campaign.´
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law
requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and
magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time
shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it
contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television
stations to provide free air time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several
million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with
the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and
that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so
again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of
revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air
time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free
air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property.
According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in
providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this year¶s
elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of
COMELEC¶s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of
prime time daily for such.

($'

(1) Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and
television broadcast companies the equal protection of the
laws.

(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes

taking of property without due process of law and without just
compensation.

)' Petitioner¶s argument is without merit. All broadcasting,

whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there
are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are
frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting
companies, which are given franchises, do not own the
airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit
broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the
temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the
privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by
the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the
privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio
and television stations, the state spends considerable public
funds in licensing and supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and
television stations to provide free air time as against
newspapers and magazines which require payment of just
compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise
without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires
spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of
print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free
air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry
gets.

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the

airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that
they provide air time to the COMELEC.