Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics

Truth and Authenticity in Narrative

Author(s): Lubomír Doležel
Source: Poetics Today, Vol. 1, No. 3, Special Issue: Narratology I: Poetics of Fiction (Spring,
1980), pp. 7-25
Published by: Duke University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1772407 .
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 TRUTH AND
AUTHENTICITY IN NARRATIVE*

LUBOMIR DOLEZEL
Slavic Languages and Literatures, Toronto

The study of the meaning of literarytexts - literarysemantics- is a

disciplinewith a venerable tradition.Recently,we have observed attempts
to enrichliterarysemanticsby ideas and insightsdeveloped in philosophical
and logical semantics.This developmentwhich,in my opinion,is bound to
become the most vital trendin literarytheory,was certainlyinspiredby the
excitingperspectivesopened by the rapprochementbetween linguisticand
textualsemanticson the one hand, and logic and the philosophyof language
on the other hand. While such symposiaas Semanticsof Natural Language
(published in 1972) have been withus for some time,the firstsymposiaof
philosophers,logicians and literarytheoreticianson formalsemanticsand
literaturehave appeared only veryrecently(VS 1978,No. 19/20;Poetics,Vol.
8, No. 1/2,April 1979). These collectionsof articlesreveal clearlythe state
of the exchange, its theoreticalstimulationand its possible dangers:
1. Philosophical (logical) semantics dominates the dialogue. For this
reason, the problemof fictionality emergesas the centralproblemof literary
semantics. For philosophersand logicians,the distinctionbetween reality
and fiction,between truth and falsity,between referenceand lack of
reference,is a fundamentaltheoreticalproblem. Any philosophical and
logico-semanticsystemhas to offera solutionto thisproblem.Of course, the
problemis not unknownin literarytheory.Literarycriticshave not hesitated
to use the concepts of fictionality,of truthin/ofliterature,truthfulness to
life, etc., but the theoreticalstandardof criticaldiscourse is ratherlow in
this domain.' Aware of their theoreticalweakness, studentsof literature
have been inclinedto accept the formulationsand possible solutionsto the

*
Paper presentedat Synopsis2: "NarrativeTheory and Poetics of Fiction," an international
symposiumheld at the PorterInstitutefor Poetics and Semiotics.Tel Aviv University,
and the
Van Leer JerusalemFoundation, 16-22 June 1979.
1 For a collection of classical views. see Kavser, 1959.

? Poetics
Today,Vol.1:3(1980),7-25

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8 LUBOMIR DOLEZEL

problem of fictionalityand truthin literatureofferedby philosophersor

logicians.
2. There is a fundamentaland unresolved differencebetween logical
(philosophical)and literarysemantics:Logical semanticsis a formalscience
and, as such, offersformallysatisfactory systemsforsemanticinterpretation
of logicalexpressions.Literarysemantics,however,is an empiricaltheoryand,
as such, it has to develop theoreticalsystems(metalanguages)whichcan be
transformed intoanalyticand descriptiveprocedures.As an operationaltheory,
literary semantics has to yield representationsof semantic structuresof
individualliterarytextsand textclasses.
3. The exchange between logical and literarysemantics has been a
one-way communication. Philosophers and logicians do not show any
interestin the traditionsand recent advances of literarystudy.This holds
especially true for modernstructuraland semioticconceptionsof literature
which are, in principle, preferable to the atomistic, pre-structuraland
pre-semioticapproach typical of the philosophyof language and logical
semantics. It is especially surprisingto see that in spite of the recent
developmentof the philosophicalfoundationsof semiotics,the concept of
language and literatureas complex sign systemsis alien to logical semantics.
In my opinion, problems of literarysemantics (and, indeed, of general
semantics)cannot be properlyformulated,let alone resolved,if the specific
ontological and phenomenologicalstatus of signs and sign systemsis not
taken into account. The inabilityto distinguishbetween the systemand its
particular uses, the ignorance of the systematicrelations between form
(expression) and meaning,the general blindnessto the structuralorganiza-
tion of sign systemsand "messages," the concentrationon isolated wordsor
at best on sentences,ratherthan on discoursestructure- these are some
of the common and persistentshortcomingsof many philosophical and
logical contributions.We can say that philosophical(logical) semanticshas
not reached the structural-semioticstage characteristic of modernthinkingin
literarytheory.It would be only to its own detrimentif literarytheorywere
to abandon its position under the pressureof formalsemantics.
With these preliminaryassumptionsin mind,1 would like to offera few
thoughtsabout a possible formulation and truth
of the conceptof fictionality
in literaturewithinthe framework of structural and semioticliterarytheory.
It can be easily discoveredthatthe two concepts- fictionality and truth-
do not share the same fate in recenttheoreticaldiscussions.While therehas
been little doubt that fictionalityrepresentsa fundamentalcategory of
literarytheory(cf., forexample, Wellek & Warren.1956: 14f.),the concept
of truthin literaturehas met with much skepticism.Two varietiesof this
skepticismseem to be most popular: 1. The Fregean positionassumes that
literarysentences are "neither true, nor false." Today, this position is

"Most logicians don't vet seem to have discoveredthe notion of discourse at all" (Ihwe &
Rieser. 1979: 83).

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 TRUTH AND AUTHENTICITY IN NARRATIVE 9

usually formulatedin such a way that a three-valuelogic (with the values

"true," "false" and "ncither true nor false") is postulated for literary
sentences.-2. The structuralist positionfindsno use forthe conceptof truth
in literarytheory.Mukafovskvhas stated this position very bluntly:"The
question of truthfulness does not make sense at all in poetry"(Mukafovsky,
1948: 82).4 In principle,the structuralist position is in agreementwith the
original formulationof Frege and, especially,with Austin's philosophyof
language. Austin claims that there exist categoriesor classes of sentences
which cannot be said to be true or false; the assignmentof truth-valueto
these sentences is meaningless since they are not "descriptive" and,
therefore,do not representstatements.Formulasin a calculus,performative
utterances,value-judgements,definitions,as well as "parts of a work of
fiction"are examples of such sententialcategories(Austin, 1961: 99).
It seems to me that afterhearingthese opinions, it is difficult to finda
place for the concept of truth in literarytheory.However, philosophersand
literary scholars have always been aware of the factthatin some sensewe do
make truth-valueassignmentsto fictionalsentences.Wood's bet-sensitivity is
an elegant formulationof this fact: A speaker claiming that Sherlock
Holmes lived on Baker Streetwins a bet againsta speaker who claims that
Sherlock Holmes lived on Berczy Street (Woods, 1974: 13). This possibility
of valuation of fictionalsentences was recast in terms of possible-world
semantics by Pavel (1976), Chateaux (1976), Heintz (1979) and others.
Accordingto Chateaux, the sentence "Emma Bovary finitpar se suicider"
("Emma Bovary finishedby committing suicide") has to be characterizedas
true in/ofthe world of Emma Bovary,while the sentence"Charles Bovary
est unijambiste"("Charles Bovary has one leg") mustbe designatedas false
in/ofthat world. Pavel makes a very importantpoint by statingthat the
valuationapplies onlyto the so-calledersatz-sentences, i.e., statementswhich
are paraphrases of the original literarysentences. The truth-valueof
ersatz-sentencesmay be decided by referenceto their "source," i.e., by
referenceto the original literarytext.
Thus, we are able to give a definitionof truthand specifythe criteriaof
truthforersatz-sentences in the followingform:A fictionalersatz-sentence is
true if it expresses(describes)a state of affairsexistingin the fictionalworld
of the text; it is false,if such a state of affairsdoes not exist in the fictional
world of the text. It can be observedthatin offering thisdefinition, we have
admittedthe possibilityof valuatingstatementsaboutfictionaltextsand their
worlds. However, we have not provided any definitionfor two more
fundamentalconcepts on whichthe truth-value of ersatz-sentences is based:

' In fact,such an interpretation

contradictsthe originalpositionof Frege. Frege insiststhat"the
truth-valueof a sentence . . is true or false. There are no furthertruth-values"(Frege, 1892:
123).
' Mukaiovsky uses the term 'poetry' in its broad sense, equivalent to the German term
'Dichtung,' meaning all imaginativeliterature.

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 LUBOMIR DOLEZEL
If0

a) the concept of fictionalexistence;b) the problemof the truth-value of the

texture sentences, i.e. the sentences of the text-source.In the theoretical
account which I am going to outlinethese two problemsare mostintimately
linked.
The problem of fictionalexistencehas to be formulated,in my opinion,
withinthe frameworkof possible-worldsemanticscoupled witha "realistic'
ontology. This version of possible-worldsemanticshas been designatedas
actualism (Adams, 1974). Actualismassumes that thereexistsan empirically
observable world - called the actual world, while the possible alternatives
of the actual world are constructsof the human mind. With respect to
statementsabout the actual world,the classical conceptof truth(the concept
of the correspondencetheoryv)is applicable. A statementlike Snow is white
is verifiedor falsifiedby observingthe existingstate of affairsin the actual
world. If we move from the actual world to its possible alternatives,the
concept of existence becomes fundamentallydifferent. This fact has been
stronglyemphasized by Russell: "To say that unicornshave an existencein
heraldry,or in literature,or in imagination,is a most pitifuland paltry
evasion. What exists in heraldryis not an animal, made of fleshand blood,
moving and breathingof its own initiative.What exists is a picture,or a
descriptionin words. Similarlyto maintainthat Hamlet,forexample. exists
in his own world,namelyin the worldsof Shakespeare's imagination,just as
trulyas (say) Napoleon existed in the ordinaryworld,is to say something
deliberately confusing,or else confused to a degree which is scarcely
credible" (Russell, 1919: 169). While agreeingwithRussell thatthe problem
of the existenceof imaginaryobjects or statesof affairshas to be formulated
differently from the problem of existence in the actual world, we do not
have to accept his radical conclusion: "There is only one world,the "real"
world'" (1919:169). Possible worlds, alternativeto the actual world, and,
quite often,contradictory worlds)are constantlybeing
to it (counter-factual
constructed by human thought,imagination,verbal and other semiotic
activity.The active force of semiosis lies preciselyin its abilityto construct
possible worlds related to the actual world in manydifferent ways. One of
the basic tasks of the theoryof semioticsystemsis to give an accountof the
procedureswhich"call intoexistence"possible individuals,possiblestatesof
affairs,possible events - shortly,possible worlds. Since possible semiotic
worlds resultfromworld-construction procedures,the semanticstructureof
these worlds, includingthe criteriaof existence,is determinedsolely by
these procedures.There is no otherway to decide whatexistsand what does
not exist in a semiotic world than by inspectinghow the world has been
constructed. Since various semiotic systems construct their worlds by
different constructionprocedures,the criteriaof existencein semioticworlds
are system-specific.Thus, forexample, the criteriaof "existingin a picture,

For a recentdiscussionof correspondencetheory,in-cludingthe evaluationof its relationship

to Tarski's "semantic theory"of truth,see O'Connor, 1975.

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 TRUTH AND AUTHENTICITY IN NARRATIVE II

in a possible world constructed by procedures specific for pictures, are

differentfrom the criteria of "existing in a novel," i.e., in a possible world
constructed by specific novelistic procedures."
In view of what has been said, it is obvious that the problem of fictional
existence, i.e., of existence in a fictional world, requires the specification of
the procedures which are applied - in various semiotic systems - in the
construction of fictional worlds. By concentrating on the world-construction
procedures operating in the specific semiotic system called 'narrative text,'
we intend to offer an approach which might prove useful for the discussion
of fictional existence in other semiotic systems and for the problem of
fictionalityin general.
We assume that narrative (fictional) worlds are constructed from sets of
elementary narrative units - motifs.7In every narrative text a set of motifs
- let's designate it M, - is introduced (expressed). However, the set M, is
not introduced (expressed) in a uniform way due to the fact that the
narrative text is the result of the joint operation of differentspeech acts.
From the structural point of view, it is a mistake to relate the narrative
speech act and the resulting narrative texture to a uniform "source"
(speaker), such as the author.' While the author is, of course, the "real"
source of the narrative text, the texture, its formal, semantic and
illocutionary features, are determined by the "fictional" sources.

THE BINARY MODEL

Let us consider firstthe simplest model of narrative text where the texture
results from the operation of two kinds of speech act, the speech act of the
anonymous Er-form narrator and the speech acts of the personalized
narrative agents (characters). It was demonstrated elsewhere (Doleiel, 1973)
that the texture of this model is characterized by a set of binary distinctive
features. As mechanisms of motif introduction, the two kinds of narrative
speech act appear in a binary opposition as well: The speech act of the
anonymous Er-form narrator carries the authentication authority,while the
speech acts of the narrative agents lack this authority. Authentication is a
special illocutionary force analogous to the force of performative speech acts
described by Austin (Austin, 1962). The analogy is based on the fact that the
performative illocutionary force is carried only by speech acts uttered by
speakers who have the necessary authority. In other words, the performative

If we postulate different,system-specific criteria of existence in semiotic worlds, does it mean

that the very concept of semiotic existence is not unitary? Not necessarily. The situation is quite
similar to that which characterizes the concept of truth: "That there are many methods of
verification (i.e., many criteria of truth - L.D. ) does not entail that there are many concepts
of truth" (O'Connor, 1975: 19),
' A definition and classification of motifs as elementary semantic units of narrative is given in
Doletel, 1976 and DoleMel, forthcoming; consult also Genot, 1977.
The pre-structural concept of narrative speech act underlies Woods' "sayso semantics" of
fictional sentences (see Woods, 1974: especially 35, 133).

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12 LUBOMIR DOLEZEL

authorityis a necessaryfelicityconditionof the performative speech act. To

take one of Austin's examples: a ship can be named only by "the person
properly authorized to name it" (1962: 14). In the domain of narrative
speech acts, the "speaker" properlyauthorizedto authenticatemotifsis the
anonymous Er-formnarrator.Note that in both cases the authorityof the
"source" is given by convention:in the case of performative speech acts by
social conventions,in the case of narrativespeech acts by the conventionsof
the genre.
The basic rule of authenticationin the binarynarrativemodel can be
formulatedas follows:Motifsintroducedin the speech act of the anonymous
Er-formnarratorare eo ipso authenticwhile those introducedin the speech
acts of the narrativeagents are non-authentic.The narrativespeech acts
operate as a filter dividing all introduced motifs into authentic and
non-authentic.In a formal way, the procedure of authenticationcan be
representedas a two-value functionwhich assigns to the elements of M,
either the value 'authentic,'or the value 'non-authentic.'This functionwill
be called authentication function.Its applicationresultsin the splittingof the
set M, (the set of all motifsintroduced in a narrativetext) into two
complementarysubsets,Ma (the set of authenticmotifs)and M; (the set of
non-authenticmotifs).
The concept of authenticationfunctionis a necessary,maybe a central,
concept of the theoryof fictionalexistencein narrativeworlds.What exists
in a narrative world is determinedby the authenticationfunction.The
authentic motifs and only these motifs represent narrativefacts, the
elementary constituentsof narrative worlds. The term 'fact' is very
appropriate here, if we take it - as Warnock has proposed - as
designatinga "quasi-linguistic"entity.Accordingto Warnock,"there is no
way of identifying a factexcept as that whichsome truestatementstates,or
as that which some person states in makinga true statement"(Warnock,
1963: 13). If the concept of factis interpretedas a "quasi-linguistic"entity,
we have at our disposal a convenientterm for elementaryconstituentsof
semiotic worlds. We speak about objects, things, states of affairs as
constituentsof the actual world, but we have to speak about "quasi-
linguistic"factsas constituentsof semioticworlds,since semioticworldsare
constructedby specificsignifying acts.
Narrative worlds as a special category of semiotic worlds are sets
(collections) of narrative facts. To state a narrative fact means to
authenticate the correspondingmotif. A motif is authenticatedif it is
introducedin the speech act of the anonymousEr-formnarrator,a "source"
with authenticationauthority.This is done in such a way thatthe sentence
expressingthe correspondingmotifis given in the contextof the narrator's
utterance, in that part of the narrative text which is interpretedas
originatingfrom the authoritativesource. As a part of the narrator's
utterance,the sentence expressingthe authenticmotifis subject to the
formal,stylistic,semantic,etc. restrictionswhich determinethe textureof

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 TRUTH AND AUTHENTICITY IN NARRATIVE 13

the narrator's utterance. Thus, we are led to the conclusion that authentic
motifs have specific textural features which identify them and make it
possible to distinguish them from non-authentic motifs. In the final account,
narrative facts and, consequently, narrative worlds are determined by the
forms of their expression, by the texture of authentic motifs. This
determinacy is of fundamental importance for narrative semantics and we
shall return to it in the conclusion of our paper.
It is now time to demonstrate the operation of the authentication function
in a narrative text representing the binary model. Examples of this type of
narrative are not difficultto find. If I borrow an example which was recently
used for a similarpurpose (Martinez-Bonati,1973), I do so fortwo reasons:
First, the example is very instructivebecause it poses explicitly the question
of fictional existence; secondly, it gives me an opportunity to point out
similarities and differences between my position and that of Martinez-
Bonati. The example is a passage fromCervantes's Don Quixote,narrating
the well-known scene of the encounter with the windmills:

At this point theycaught sightof thirtyor fortywindmillswhichwere standing

on the plain there,and no sooner had Don Quixote laid eyes upon themthanhe
turned to his squire and said, "Fortune is guidingour affairsbetterthan we
could have wished; for you see there before you, friendSancho Panza, some
thirtyor more lawless giants with whom I mean to do battle
"What giants?" said Sancho Panza.
"Those that you see there, "replied his master,"those with the long arms
some of which are as much as two leagues in length."
"But look, yourGrace, those are not giantsbut windmills,and whatappear to
be arms are theirwingswhich,when whirledin the breeze, cause the millstone
to go" (62-63).

Clearly, the text forces upon us the question: What exists in the narrative
world of Don Quixote - the windmills or the giants? Our answer is the
same as Martinez-Bonati's:the windmills.Our reason for this decision is
also identical with the reason given by Martinez-Bonati: We know that there
are windmills in the fields because the narrator has said so (Martinez-Bonati,
1973: 186).' However, Martinez-Bonati formulates his answer in terms of the
mimetic narrative semantics and, therefore, assigns to the narrator's
statements truth-values. In contrast, my approach is based on the claim that
the narrator's statements cannot be assigned truth-values,since they do not
referto a world, but rather constructa world. This is the fundamental
difference between a mimetic and a possible-world semantics of narrative
fiction.The consequences of thisfundamentaldifferenceare no less serious,
but we shall not pursue thistopic here. Let us just note thatin the language
of our theory,the fictionalexistenceof the windmillsis explained by the fact
that the expressionof the correspondingmotifis foundin the contextof the

SUsing the concept of narratorin his "sayso semantics"Martinez-Bonatiavoids the weakness

of Wood's formulation.

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14 LUBOMIR DOLEZEL

narrator'sdiscourse. The expression is withinthe scope of the narrator's

authenticationauthority.If the motifhad been expressedonly in the speech
of Don Quixote and/orSancho Panza, its authenticity value would change:
in that case, the motifwould be non-authenticand the existence of the
windmillswould not be establishedas a fictionalfact.
Let us stay for a moment with the example and its discussion by
Martinez-Bonati,since it leads us one step furtherin developingthe idea of
narrative worlds. Don Quixote and Sancho Panza express contrasting
we mustnaturallyask
opinions about the objects in the fieldsand, therefore,
who is rightand who wrong.The answeris quite obvious: Sancho is right
is
and Don Quixote is wrong. In justifyingthis answer, Martinez-Bonati
formulatesa general rule: "The statementsof novelisticpersonages,which
agree with those of the narratorare necessarilytrue, while those which
deviate from them are necessarily false" (1975: 186). I agree with
Martinez-Bonatithat sentence-statements of narrativeagents can be as-
signed truth-values.However, possible-worldsemanticsgives us an oppor-
tunityto formulatemore preciselythe criteriafor assigningtruth-valueto
these sentences: the basis of valuation is not agreementwiththe narrator's
statements, but rather correspondence to narrative facts. A sentence-
statementof a narrativeagent is trueif it agrees withthe narrativefactsand
it is false if it contradictsthe narrativefacts.Such a formulationmakes it
possible to use the correspondence-theory concept of truthin valuating
utterances of the narrativeagents, while Martinez-Bonati'sinterpretation
presupposes, in my opinion, the coherence-theory concept of truth.
This discussionleads us to the conclusionthatwe need two proceduresof
valuation for narrativesentences: a) Narrativesentences are valuated in
terms of authenticityvalues. The assignmentof authenticityvalue deter-
mines the functionof the sentence in the constructionof the narrative
world: only sentencesassignedthe value 'authentic'are taken as expressing
narrativefacts,i.e., as participatingin the formationof the narrativeworld.
All sentencesof the narrativetextare subject to the authenticity valuation.
It has to be emphasized,however,that at this stage of valuation,narrative
sentences are beyond the scope of truth-values.b) Narrativesentencesare
valuated in termsof truth-values. The assignmentof truth-value depends on
theiragreementor disagreementwith narrativefacts(factsof the narrative
world). All sentences of narrativeagents are necessarilysubject to the
second procedure of valuation.'"
A narrativesemanticswhichdistinguishestwo formsof valuation has, in
my opinion, definiteadvantages over other theories of fictional"truth."

" There is one trickyproblem which would need a thoroughdiscussion: Once the narrative
world is at least partlyconstructed,are not the narrator'ssentencessubject to truth-valuation as
well? Not necessarilyif logical consistencyis made a necessaryprerequisiteof the narrator's
authenticationauthority.Contradictions in narrativefactsare explainedas theauthor'serrors.The
case of the narrativetechniquewhichtolerates,or even requires,contradictions fallsoutside the
binarymodeland willbe consideredlater.

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 TRUTH AND AUTHENTICITY IN NARRATIVE 15

Firstly,it is enrichedby the concept of authenticationwhich explains the

proceduresof worldconstruction, offersa criterionof fictionalexistenceand
thus makes explicitthe factof autonomyof semioticfictionalworldsvis-a-vis
the actual world. Secondly, it does not require the abandonment or
modification of theclassicalcorrespondence-theory conceptof truth.Ifwe are
able to defendthe conceptof narrativeworldas a set (collection)of fictional
facts,then we are able to use the classical concept of truthin definingthe
second formof valuation. Let us emphasize that the concept of truthand
the criteriaof truthin fictionalnarrativesare subordinatedto the concept of
authentication.Fictional truth is strictly"truth in/of" the constructed
narrative world and its criterion is agreement or disagreement with
authenticatednarrativefacts."
At the beginningof my paper, I formulatedone basic requirementfora
theoryof narrativesemantics:the theoryshould be operationalin the sense
that its concepts should help us to discover the semantic structuring of
narrativetextsor textclasses. I would like to demonstratebrieflythisability
of the concepts of authenticationand narrativeworld by outliningthe
principlesof semanticmacrostructuring in narrativetextscontrolledby the
binary model.
The core of the semanticmacrostructure is given by the narrativeworld,
i.e., by the set of narrativefactsestablishedthroughthe authenticnarrative
motifs.Sets of non-authenticmotifsformthe belief-worlds of the particular
narrativeagents. Through the second formof valuation, the belief-worlds
are put into relationshipswith the narrativeworld, these relationships
ranging from total conformityto total contradiction.In a set-theoretical
representation,the relationshipsbetween the narrative world and the
belief-worldswill be expressed by the intersectionsof the set of authentic
and the sets of non-authenticmotifs,the intersectionbeing given by the
non-authenticmotifs which are true in/of the narrative world. If this
intersectionis empty, we can speak about a satellite belief-world,a
belief-worldwhich is in total contradictionto the narrativeworld.'2
NON-BINARY MODELS
Up to now, we have pursued the problem of authenticationand truthin
the simplestnarrativemodel, the binarymodel,characterizedby a clear-cut
and unambiguous opposition of narrator'sdiscourse and characters' dis-
course. A two-valueauthenticationfunctionwas postulatedas a representa-
tion of the world-forming
procedureapplied withinthismodel. However,we
know empiricallythat thereexist many narrativetextswhichdo not follow
the binarymodel. If we want to explain the world-formation
proceduresin
the non-binarystructures,we have to be ready to make a fundamental

" This concept and criterionof truthapplies also to ersatz-sentences:

in the finalaccount,their
truth-valuesdepends on the authenticity-value of the corresponding"original" sentencesof the
narrativetext.
2 Such satellite worlds are usually motivatedas delusions, hallucinationsor lies.

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16 LUBOMIR DOLEZEL

modificationto the theoryof authentication.This modificationconsists in

replacing the two-value authenticationfunctionwith a graded function.It
will be recognized that the formalchange of the authenticationfunction
entails substantialchanges in the whole systemof narrativesemantics.
The two-value authenticationfunctionis capable of assigningjust two
contraryauthenticityvalues. The graded authenticationfunctionis defined
as a functionwhich assigns differentgrades (degrees) of authenticityto
narrativemotifs.Theoretically,we could speak about a continuousfunction,
but it would be most difficultto make a continuousfunctionoperational in
narrative semantics. Rather, we will think of the graded authentication
functionas being characterizedby discrete intervalslocated between the
extremevalues of authenticity and non-authenticity."3I want to explore the
degrees of authenticityand the consequent features of narrativesemantics
for two non-binarynarrativestructures,the subjectivizedEr-formand the
Ich-form.
a) SubjectivizedEr-form.SubjectivizedEr-formcan be roughlycharacter-
ized as a narrative mode which displays the formal features of the
Er-formnarrative,but the semantic featuresof the characters'discourse.
(For a more detailed discussion,see Dole'el, 1973.) Due to theirsemantics,
sentences of the subjectivized Er-formintroducenarrativemotifscoupled
with attitudes,beliefs, assumptions,etc. of narrativeagents. At the same
time, being incorporatedthroughtheirformalfeaturesinto the discourseof
the Er-formnarrator,the sentencesreceive a certaindegree of authenticity
bestowed on them by the authenticationauthorityof the narrator.As a
result,these sentences can be said to presentnarrativefacts relative to a
certainagent. Worlds formedby these factsare not the absolutelyauthentic
worldsof the anonymousEr-formnarrator,since theyare permeatedby the
agents' attitudes;nor are theythe belief-worldsof the agents,since theyare
authenticatedby the Er-formdiscourse.They representa transitionalzone
between the absolutelyauthenticworldof narrativefactsand the absolutely
non-authenticbelief-worldsof the agents.
G. Flaubert was the masterof the subjectivizedEr-form'4and I shall use
the example of Madame Bovaryto outlinethe semanticmacro-structuring of
a narrativetext where this kind of authentication function operates. The
core of the narrativemacrostructure of Madame Bovary is representedby
the narrativeworld formedby motifsintroducedand absolutelyauthenti-
cated by the anonymousEr-formnarrator."Quand on partitde Tostes, au
mois de mars, Mme Bovary etait enceinte" (90) ("When theyleftTostes in
the month of March, Madame Bovary was pregnant") is a sentence

1' In the most abstract

model of authentication,we could presentthe graded authentication
function as the general frameworkwithin which the two-value authenticationfunction
representsa special case.
14M. Bal has the same techniquein mindwhen she speaks of "'double focalization"in Madame
Bovary (Bal, 1977:95f.).

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 TRUTH AND AUTHENTICITY IN NARRATIVE 17

expressingan absolutelyauthenticmotif,a narrativefactin the sense of the

binary model. However, if we read, for example, the portrayalof Charles
Bovary (part I, ch. VII), we perceiveclearlyfeaturesof Emma's subjective
semantics:
La conversation de Charlesetaitplatecommeun trottoir de rue,et les ideesde
toutle mondey defilaient, dansleurcostumeordinaire, sansexciterd'emotion,
de rireou de reverie . . II ne savaitni nager,ni fairedes armes,ni tirerle
pistolet,et il ne put,un jour,lui expliquerun termed'equitation
qu'elle avait
rencontredans un roman (59).
("Charles'sconversation was as flatas a sidewalk,witheveryone's ideaswalking
throughit in ordinary dress,arousingneitherlaughter, nor dreams. . He
couldn'tswim,or fence,or shoot,andoncehe couldn'tevenexplainto Emmaa
termabouthorseback shehadcomeacrossina novel")
riding
This is Charles for Emma, Charles, to use a common metaphor,seen
through the eyes of Emma. At the same time, however, this Charles
possesses a degree of authenticity by being describedin sentencesincorpo-
rated in the Er-formdiscourse. The degree of authenticityof this set of
motifscan be best judged in comparisonwiththe absolutelynon-authentic
motifsintroducedin an agent's discourse (Rodolphe):
Oui! tantde chosesm'ontmanque!Toujoursseul! Ah! si j'avais eu un but
dans la vie, si j'eusse rencontr6une affection,si j'avais trouvequelqu'un.
Oh! commej'aurais depense toute I'6nergiedont je suis capable, j'aurais
surmonte tout,brisetout!(171).
("I've missedso manythings! Alwaysalone! If I had onlyhada goal in mylife,
if I'd fallen in love, found someone - I would have applied all my energy,
overcomeeverything, surmounted everyobstacle!")
This is clearly Rodolphe's belief-worldwhich has no authenticityand
whose agreementor disagreementwith narrativefacts would have to be
judged separately.
b) Ich-form.Various kinds of the Ich-formnarrative mode present
problemsof authenticationwhich,in myview, have to be handled by using
the concept of graded authenticationfunction.At firstsight,this discourse
seems to be formallyand semanticallyequivalent to the discourse of a
narrativeagent (the discourse of an agent who narrates).If we used the
binarymodel, we would have to conclude thatthe narratorof the Ich-form
has no authenticationauthority.However, we are aware that the Ich-form
narratorhas a privilegedpositionwithinthe set of actingcharacters.This
privilegedpositionis given by the factthatin the absence of the anonymous
Er-formnarrator,the Ich-formnarratorassumes the role of constructing the
narrativeworld.However,the theoryof authentication should assigna lower
degree of authenticationauthorityto the Ich-formnarratorthanthe absolute
authorityof the Er-formnarrator.The world constructedby the Ich-form
narratoris relatively
authentic.It is not the worldof absolute narrativefacts,
rather, to use our tentative term, an authentic belief-worldof the
Ich-narrator.

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18 LUBOMIR DOLEZEL

We have claimed that in the absence of any absolute authentication

authoritythe constructionof the narrativeworld has to be entrustedto the
relativeauthorityof the Ich-narrator.But thisis onlya negativejustification
can be
of the Ich-narrator'sauthenticationauthority.Positive justifications
discovered by pointingto the devices of the Ich-formnarrativewhich are
designed to establish and maintainthe narrator'sauthority.We can say,
somewhat metaphorically,that the Ich-formnarrator has to earn his
authenticationauthority,while to the anonymous Er-formnarratorthis
authorityis given by convention.
The basis of the Ich-narrator'sauthenticationauthorityis his privileged
knowledge. Two kinds of devices are essential for establishing and
maintainingthis qualityof the narrator:a) devices limitingthe scope of the
narrator'sknowledge;b) devices identifying the sources of his knowledge.
The limitsof the Ich-narrator'sknowledgecan be set in a negativeway,
by an explicitrefusalto introducemotifswhichare outside the scope of his
knowledge. An example fromConstant's Adolphe should demonstratethe
device:

J'ai toujoursignorecomments'etaitformeeune liaisonqui, lorsquej'ai vu

6tablieet pourainsidire
pour la premierefoisEllenore,6tait,des longtemps,
consacree (23).
saw Ellnore, it had existed
("I neverknewhowthisliaisonarose.WhenI first
forsome timeand had been,as it were,sanctioned.")

The utterance refers to the beginningsof the relationshipbetween

Ellenore and the count, an event which,due to its temporalposition,lies
outside the scope of the narrator'sexperience.Of course,the narratorcould
remainsilentabout thisevent,as he remainssilentabout manyotherevents
unknown to him. By explicitlyexpressing his ignorance, the narrator
demonstrateshis scrupulousnessin definingthe limitsof his knowledgeand,
consequently,the scope of his authenticationauthority.
The majority of motifs introduced by the Ich-narratorappearing in
Adolphe are motifs of direct experience: "Je me rendis, en quittant
Gottingue,dans la petiteville de D***" (18) ("On leavingGoittingen, I went
to the little town of D-."). Where this direct source of motifsis not
available, the sources used by the narratorare meticulouslyspecified.One
basic problemfacingthe Ich-narrator of mentalstatesof
is the inaccessibility
other narrative agents. In this case, Constant employs frequentlythe
well-known device of "reading off" the mental state fromthe observable
physical behavior, facial expression, tone of voice, etc. of the narrative
agent: "Je d6melai dans les traitsd'Ellenore une impressionde mecontente-
ment et de tristesse"(34) ("1 discerned in Ellenore's featuresa feelingof
displeasure and sadness."). Where the motifis not available due to the
narrator'sabsence fromthe scene, reportsof agents-witnesses can be used as
a source. The events of the nightwhen Ellenore fallsill afterreceivingthe
fatefulletters(ch. X) are introducedin the reportsof Ell6nore's servants.

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 TRUTH AND AUTHENTICITY IN NARRATIVE 19

All these devices, direct experience, "reading off," mediated reports of

witnesses, make '- possible to introduce motifs in the context of the
Ich-narrator'sdiscourse and, in such a way, assign a relativeauthenticity
value to these motifs.
In the type of Ich-formrepresentedby Adolphethe narratorcontrolsthe
introductionof motifsto such a degree that the possibilityof developing
belief-worldsof other agents (and, especially, satellite worlds) is rather
limited. The only source of non-authenticmotifsis the utterances of
narrative agents expressed in conversationswith the narrator. Interior
monologues of agents other than the narrator are impossible in this
narrativestructure.The narrativemacrostructure of Adolphe is dominated
by the relativelyauthentic belief-worldof the narrator,an egocentric
structurewhich suppresses (partly by incorporation)the belief-worldsof
other agents.
One fundamentalquality of the semanticsof Ich-formrepresentedby
Adolphe is the necessaryincompletenessof its narrativeworld.'" Since the
world is constructedon the basis of limitedknowledge,it necessarilyreveals
serious gaps. In some cases, the narratortries to fill these gaps by hy-
potheses,a categoryof motifswhichis explicitly designatedas non-authentic. 6

But in most cases, these gaps are leftunfilled.The extentof the gaps is an
important macrostructuralfeature of these narrative worlds, since it
determinestheir more or less fragmentary character.
We have emphasized that the authenticationauthorityof the narratorin
the Ich-formtyperepresentedby Adolphehas to be constantlyjustified.It is
justified,generallyspeaking,by the fact that the narrativetext is based on
the model of the "actual" narrativeperformanceof a knowledgeable
personal narrator.The authorityof this narratoris the authorityof an
experiencer, a witness, a mediator of informationacquired from other
sources. Because of thisclear connectionbetweenthe literarynarrativeand
the "actual" narrativeperformance, thistypeof Ich-formcan be designated
as the motivatedIch-formmode.
There is no reason to assume that the motivatedmode is the only typeof
Ich-formavailable to literarynarratives.I do not intendto go into a detailed
investigationof other possible types; rather,I want to point brieflyonly to
one typewhichseems to be at the opposite pole of the spectrumof possible
Ich-formtypes. It is an Ich-formwhich rejects the model of the "actual"
narrativeperformanceand, instead,accepts the anonymousEr-formnarra-

'1 Narrative worlds are always incomplete (see Heintz. 1979: 90ff.). This principleshould
become one of the fundamentalaxioms of narrativesemantics.But the narrativeworlds of
Ich-formunder discussionare incompletein a specific,"epistemic"sense, being based on the
limitedknowledgeof the "constructor"of the world.
', Introducinghypotheses,conjectures,guesses, i.e., non-authentic
motifs,is a privilegeof the
Ich-formnarratornot available to the anonymousEr-formnarrator.Obviously,thispart of his
narrativeperformanceresults from the fact that the Ich-formnarratoris personalized,i.e.,
combines the functionsof narratorand narrativeagent.

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20 LUBOMIR DOLEZEL

tive as its model. As a consequence, all the essential features of the

motivatedmode are discarded,especiallythe limitedscope of the narrator's
knowledge and the identification of the sources of knowledge.Necessarily,
the Ich-formnarrator of this type is not in a position to justifyhis
authenticationauthority;instead,he appropriatesthe conventionalauthenti-
cation authority associated with the anonymous Er-form narrator. By
producing a text which follows the rules of the Er-formnarrative,the
narratorusurpsthe authenticationconventionwhichis inherentto this text.
Two examples of the unmotivatedIch-formcome to mymind.The firstis
the "L'Amour de Swann" section of Proust's Du c6ti de chez Swann. The
Ich-formnarrator(Marcel) makes his presencefeltby occasional utterances,
such as: "mon grandpere,""Et il n'avait pas, comme j'eus a Combraydans
mon enfance," etc. (see Genette, 1972: 250). However, the introductionof
motifsin this text is not at all restrictedby Marcel's possibleknowledge.All
details of Swann's actions, motivations,feelings,etc. are presented. The
authoritativenarrativediscourse is integratedwith the Ich-form,and the
principlesof the first-person mode are thus redefined.Proust's text is a
victory of convention over imitation. The Ich-narrativebecomes fully
conventionalizedby being detached,as it were,fromits speech source.'7The
existenceof the unmotivatedIch-formis supportedby mysecond example,
the popular contemporaryCzech short novel, Hrabal's Closely Watched
Trains. In this text, the protagonist-narrator not only observes, but also
narrates his own death (84-85). From the point of view of the motivated
Ich-form,and, indeed, from the point of view of any "actual" narrative
performance,such a text is an absolute impossibility.It is, however,possible
as a literarytext,since the literary narrative act is not restrictedto models
of speaking, writing and thinking.'8
WORLDS WITHOUT AUTHENTICATION
We have discussed a few examples of the variousnarrativemodes in order
to demonstratehow the authenticationauthorityof the fictionalnarratoris
established and maintainedthroughspeech-actconventions,rules of narra-
tive modes and devices of texture.We have followedthe assumptionthat
of narrative
authenticationauthorityis a necessaryfactorin theconstruction
worlds; it confers upon semiotic objects - motifsand motifsets - the
propertyof fictionalexistence.Genre conventionsand specificrules of the
narrativemodes, governingthe operations of the authenticationauthority,
representthe fundamentalsemantic normsof fictionalnarratives.

17 The transgressionsof the restrictionsof the motivated Ich-formare not restrictedto

"L'Amour de Swann," but have been noted in other parts of Proust's novel as well (see
Genette, 1972: 221f.). For this reason. Genette designates Proust's narrative mode as
polymodal.
11One of theessentialfeatures act whichsetsit apartfrom"actual"'
narrative
of theliterary
speech acts is its atemporality,emphasized by Genette: "11 s'agit Ihd'un acte instantane,sans
dimension (Genette,1972:234).
temporelle"

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 TRUTH AND AUTHENTICITY IN NARRATIVE 21

It is well knownthatin the domain of literatureno normis safe. Literary

evolution is a constantchallenge to literarynorms,a permanentprocess of
normmodification, creationand destruction.Not surprisingly, the normsand
rules of authenticationhave met the same fate: they have been modified
and, in the extreme case, annihilated.The destructionof authentication
authorityis one of the most fascinatingdevelopmentsin the evolution of
fictionalnarrative.
The description and explanation of this process is a rather difficult
problem of narrativetheory; no more than a preliminaryoutline of a
possible approach can be given here. This approach is based on two general
assumptions:
1. The annihilationof literarynormsand rules is not a destructive,but a
constructiveprocess. By annihilatingexistingnorms,literatureopens up new
semantic possibilitiesand enlarges its capabilitiesfor producingsense. The
destructionof old normsproduces new sense. In the case of authentication,
the destructionof the authenticationauthorityopens up new dimensionsof
sense by makingthe very concept of fictionalexistenceproblematic.
2. Most theoriesof literarysemantics,includingthe theoriesof fictionality,
encounter serious difficulties in explainingnon-normstructures.Typically,
literary theorieshave explained non-normstructuresas deviationsfromthe
norms or rules of the model which had been constructedto explain
norm-structures. The basic weakness of the concept of deviation has
pointed out veryoften:some of the most representativeand most original been,
literaryworks have to be explained as deviations,i.e., in a negativeway
only. Universal literarytheories which cover both the norm and the
non-normstructuresare certainlyformallyimpressiveby theirsimplicity and
consistency.They mightbe, however,unsatisfactory fromthe empiricalpoint
of view by failingto account for the complexityand varietyof literary
structures.Empiricallysatisfactory literarytheoriesdo not have to offerone,
universalmodel of literarystructures;rather,theycan be designedas model
sets capable of accountingfor fundamentally differentliterarystructures.If
these differencesreach the degree of contradictionwe should be ready to
accept contradictorymodels into our theoreticalset-up. Such a theoretical
liberalism is, I think,in full agreementwith our intuitiveconception of
literatureas an open system,a systemconstantlyofferingnew, quite often
contradictory ofstructuring.
possibilities
We have already proposed two models of authenticationin fictional
narratives,the binary and the graded authenticationfunctions.From a
purely formalpoint of view, thereare no difficulties in subsumingthe two
models under one, more abstract model of the continuousauthentication
functionwith two values as its extremes.However, once we move to the
domain of narrativewhere the normsof authenticationare annihilatedwe
are beyond the scope of any two-valuefunction.I shall argue thatwe need a
new theoreticalexplanation in terms of a three-valuefunction,with the
values 'authentic,''non-authentic'and 'withoutauthentication.'

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22 LUBOMIR DOLEZEL

Before we proceed in that direction,let us outline the process of the

destructionof authenticationnorms.All authenticationprocedureshingeon
the authenticationauthorityof the fictionalnarrator.Authenticationis
annihilated by deprivingthe narratorof his authenticationauthority.This
can be achieved by variousdevices whichdeserve a meticulousstudy.Here,
let me mentionjust two such devices: a) the narratoris inconsistentin his
postures or statementsand thus destroyshis "credibility";b) the narrator
takes an ironic attitudetoward his authenticationauthorityand thus turns
the narratingact into a not bindinggame.
Both of these devices can be found in the popular narrativemode of
Russian fiction,the so-called skaz. Skaz is a narrativewhere all the norms
and rules of the narrativeact are made a targetof irony. In the classic
examples of the Russian skaz, Gogol's stories "The Overcoat" (see
Ejkhenbaum, 1919) and "The Nose," the narrativemoves freelyfromthe
Er-formto the Ich-form,froma lofty,bookish styleto colloquial Russian,
fromthe "omniscient" to the "limited knowledge" posture.
The last featureis especiallyrelevantforour topic. The narratorof "The
Overcoat" can be certainlycharacterizedas "omniscient"when he intro-
duces, for example, motifsof Akakij Akakijevich's mental life; this is
possible only on the basis of the conventionalauthenticationauthority.But
suddenly,we are faced with a twist- the narratorprofesseshis ignorance
about Akakij's thoughts:"It is impossibleto get into a man's soul and find
out everythinghe is thinking"(p. 145). Such a statementis in contradiction
withthe narrator'sprevious"practice'"and raises fundamental doubts about
his authenticationauthority.Gogol's ironytoward the conventionalworld-
constructionproceduresof fictionalnarrativesis especially palpable at the
conclusionof "The Nose." Commentingon thefantasticelementof thestory,
the narratordeclares explicitlyhis lack of understanding and suggeststhat
variousexplanationsare possible(p. 70).'" The finalquestionsofthenarrator-
who constructedthe eventsof thestory- have one basic meaning:Did these
events happen, could they have happened? The same authoritywhich has
existence,raisesdoubtsabout thesefacts,about
assertedfictionalfacts,fictional
this existence.
I am convincedthatthe narratorwithoutauthentication authorityis a very
importantfactor in many modern narratives,includingnovels by Kafka,
Beckett and others; this intuitiveassumptionneeds, of course,confirmation
by thoroughresearchinto the semanticsof the modernnovel. However,our
theoreticalapproach to this new phenomenoncan be formulatedon the
basis of the limitedevidence drawn fromGogol's work. If we interpreted
"The Overcoat" and "The Nose" in termsof the two-valueauthentication

19 It is
interestingto note thatin the manuscriptversionof "The Nose" the fantasticeventsare
made non-authenticby the concludingcommentsof the narrator:what happened was just
Kovaljov's dream. This originalversionis a standardfantasticstoryin Todorov's meaningof
the term (Todorov, 1970).

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 TRUTH AND AUTHENTICITY IN NARRATIVE 23

function,we would have to conclude that all theirmotifsare non-authentic

and, as a consequence, that no narrativeworldshave been constructedby
these texts. Such a conclusion,however,contradictsthe fact that in these
texts the basic distinctionbetween the narratorand the narrativeagents is
preserved.I findit thereforepreferableto interpret the semanticstructureof
these texts in terms of a three-value authenticationfunction.In this
theoreticalframework,it is possible to say that the narratorconstructsa
narrativeworld by introducinga set of narrativemotifs,but he fails to
authenticateit since his authenticationauthorityis undermined.We are
presentedwith fictionalworlds whose existenceis ambiguous,problematic,
indefinite.These worldsare neitherauthentic,nor non-authentic, but create
an indeterminatespace between fictionalexistence and fictional non-
existence.
We have no satisfactory semanticmetalanguagefor describingthe status
of narrativeworlds withoutauthentication;our thinkingand our language
are dominated by the traditionaltwo-valuesemantics.2( Modern fiction,by
constructingworldswithoutauthentication, pointsto the limitationsof this
semantics.It has used its power forconstructing possible worldsto question
the universalityand absolute validityof our basic dichotomies.The law of
the excluded middleprohibitsanythingbetweenexistenceand non-existence.
Is it not, however,possible to constructsemioticworldssuspended between
existence and non-existence?Nothingcould demonstratemore clearly the
abilityof literatureto produce new sense than such an experiment.
CONCLUSION
Literary theoreticians- with a few exceptions - have treated the
problem of truthin fictionrather nonchalantly.On the other hand, the
extensiveattentionwhichthe problemhas receivedin philosophyand logical
semantics has been directed predominantlyat purely philosophical and
logical problems, such as the problem of reference,the problem of
classification of sentences,the ontologicalproblemof existence,the technical
of
problems "deviant" logics,etc. The primarypurpose of this paper is to
incorporatethe problem of truthinto the frameworkof literarysemantics,
i.e., into an empiricaltheoryof meaning productionin fictionaltexts. In
pursuingthis task, I have come to the conclusionthatin narrativesemantics
the concept of truthhas to be based on the concept of authentication,a
concept which explains fictionalexistence.My basic thesis is that narrative
worldsas systemsof fictionalfactsare constructedby the
speech acts of the
authoritativesource - narratorin the broadestsense; the narrator's
ability
to call individuals,objects, events,etc. into fictionalexistenceis
givenby his
authenticationauthority.The narrator'sauthentication authorityis the basic
20 Semantic of three-valuefunctionspresentsserious difficulties
interpretation well-knownto
criticsof "free" logics. Van Fraassen's attempt(van Fraassen, 1966)to
escape the restrictions
of
binarismcan be seen as essentialforfuturediscussionsof three-value
systems(cf. also Lambert,
1969: 106).

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24 LUBOMIR DOLEZEL

norm of the narrativegenre, determinedby artisticconventionsand/orby

the rules of the narrative modes. Procedures of authenticationare a
fundamentalcomponentof the narrativestructure.
The fact that the existence of individuals,objects, events, etc. in the
fictionalworld is determinedby the ways in which their corresponding
motifsare introduced(expressed) in the narrativetext puts the concept of
fictionalexistence squarely into the domain of intensionalsemantics as
conceived by Frege. Fregean intensionalsemanticsis an account of those
componentsof meaningwhichare determinedbytheformsofexpressionrather
thanbythereferencerelation.Beingdeterminedbytheformsofexpression,the
structureof thenarrativeworldis a purelyintensional
objectand,as such,can be
freelymanipulatedby the text.21
Since existencein a narrativeworldis an intensionalproperty,it cannotbe
explained by a theorywhichis based on theextensionalconceptof truth.The
narrativespeech act ofworldconstruction cannotbe comparedor identifiedwith
or pretending.
suchspeech actsas statingtruthor falsehood,lying,imitating All
thesespeech acts presupposetheindependentexistenceof a worldto whichthe
correspondingutterancesreferor failto refer.Basingliterarysemanticson any
of thesereferentialspeech acts meanscompletelymissingthe specificcharacter
of theworld-constructing act.
Many intensionalconcepts (withoutbeing designatedas such) have been
discussed in literarytheory (poetic figures,metaphors,plot construction,
forms of characterization,narrativemodes, etc.). However, a systematic
intensionalsemanticsand a systematictheoryof intensionalobjects are only
in the initialstages of theirdevelopment.I am convincedthatit will become
more and more apparent that intensionalsemanticsis the core of literary
theoryand, indeed,thecore of anysemiotictheoryof meaning(cf. Eco, 1976:
58ff.).
The universeof sense and of intensionalobjects is the richestman-made
universe.By settingout to map thisuniverse,intensionalsemanticswillgive
us a knowledgeof meaningswhichwe have been aware of only intuitively
or, perhaps, not at all.

2' in narrativesemantics,see Doleel,

For more about the concept of intensionality 1979.

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