Tecson V.

Comission of Elections;

G.R. No. 151434, March 3, 2004;

Callejo, Sr., J.:

Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ),
filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his
date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier,
initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the
thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming
to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were
foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a
Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier
based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe
contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley
and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a
year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack
of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The
motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004,
Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with
Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise
prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other
resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The
other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634,
both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Issue: Whether or not Ronald Allan Kelley Poe is a Filipino citizen and can be disqualified
from running for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines.

Ruling: No, the petitioner failed to prove that the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of its
discretion in dismissing the petition to disqualify respondent Poe for the petitioners failure
to allege and prove that the respondent Poe made a false representation when he stated in
his certificate of candidacy that he is a natural-born Filipino.The only evidence adduced by
the petitioner to prove the falsity of respondent Poes statement that he is a natural-born
Filipino are the following:(1.) Certified photocopy of the Certificate of Birth of Ronald Allan
Poe, which indicates the citizenship of Lorenzo Pou as Espaol;(2.)Certified photocopy of the
Marriage Certificate of Allan Fernando Poe and Paulita Gomez, which indicates the
citizenship of respondent Poes father as also Espaol; and (3.)Certification issued by Director
Ricardo Manapat that the National Archives does not possess any record in regard to the
entry of Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou in the Philippines before 1907. Therefore the petition
was dismissed on the grounds of prematurity and wants of jurisdiction; and for failure to
show that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
Mercado V. Manzano and Commission on Elections;

G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999;

Mendoza, J.:

Facts: Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were
candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one
was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:

Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853

Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894

Gabriel V. Daza III 54,2751

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was
not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,2
the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a
dual citizen and, under §40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship
are disqualified from running for any elective position. On May 8, 1998, private respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration.3 The motion remained pending even until after the
election held on May 11, 1998.Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated
May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice
mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner. On May 19, 1998,
petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.4 Petitioner's motion was
opposed by private respondent. The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998,
the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner
abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared
private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections. Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on
the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of
Makati.

Issues: Whether or not Eduardo B. Manzano cannot run for public office?

Rulings: Yes, The Court first defined dual citizenship and compared it to dual allegiance. Dual
citizenship arises when a person whose parents are citizens of a state that follows jus
sanguinis and was born in a state that follows jus soli, hence, resulting to a concurrent
application of different two laws or more. On the other hand, dual allegiance is a situation
where a person simultaneously owes loyalty to two or more states. In this case,
Respondent, though dual citizen, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy tantamount to his
election of Phil. citizenship – meaning he forswears allegiance to the other country and
thereby terminating their status as dual. The Court stressed that participating in the election
is an express renunciation of American citizenship. Therefore the Court dismissed the
petition for lack of merit.
Republic V. De La Rosa;

232 SCRA 785; June 6, 1994;

Quiason, J:

Facts: On September 20, 1991, Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization under the
Commonwealth Act No. 63 before the Regional Trial Court Manila. On October 7,1991, Judge
dela Rosa set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the publication of the
said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for 3
consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least 6 months before the date
of the hearing. On January 14, 1992, Frivaldo asked the judge to cancel the March 16 hearing
and move it to January 24, 1992, citing his intention to run for public office in the May 1992
elections. Judge granted the motion and the hearing was moved to February 21. No
publication or copy was issued about the order. On February 27, 1992, the Judge rendered
the assailed Decision and held that Frivaldo is readmitted as a citizen of the Republic of the
Philippines by naturilazation.

Issues: Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted on his citizenship as a Filipino.

Rulings: No, Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent (De La Rosa) is declared not a
citizen of the Philippines and is therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as governor
of the Province of Sorsogon. The irregularities are as follows: (1) The hearing of the petition
was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order
advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six
months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath
of allegiance before the finality of the judgement; and (4) petitioner took his oath of
allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.
Republic V. Huang Te Fu;

G.R. No. 200983, March 18, 2015

Del Castillo, J.:

Facts: On March 19, 2004, respondent Huang Te Fu, a.k.a. Robert Uy – a citizen of the
Republic of China (Taiwan) – filed a sworn Declaration of Intent to Become a Citizen of the
Philippines6 with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). On April 27, 2005, respondent
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial court) a Petition for Naturalization,7
which was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. Q-05-55251 and assigned to Branch 96. After trial, the
trial court issued a September 24, 2007 Order10 granting respondent’s petition for
naturalization.

Issues: Whether or not the respondent has duly complied with the rigid requisites prescribed
by commonwealth act no. 473.

Rulings: No, In Republic v. Hong, it was held in essence that an applicant for naturalization
must show full and complete compliance with the requirements of the naturalization law;
otherwise, his petition for naturalization will be denied. This ponente has likewise held that
"the courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the
highest public interest. Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed
in favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the
applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of law."

Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law or CA 473 requires, among others, that an
applicant for naturalization must be of good moral character and must have some known
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation.

Having decided in the foregoing manner, We must conclude the instant case and disregard
the other issues and arguments of the parties; they are deemed irrelevant and will not alter
the conclusion arrived at. As far as this Court is concerned, respondent has failed to satisfy
the law which renders him completely undeserving of Filipino citizenship.
Maquiling V. COMELEC;

G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013;

Sereno, CJ.:

Facts: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of

his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. On 28 April 2010,
respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify
Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections. Respondent
Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is
a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23
April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." To further bolster his
claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-
generated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using
his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record
shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and
again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009. On 30
April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.After
Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present
evidence ex-parte. Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010
elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently
proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Issue: Whether or not the continued use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship affects the qualifications to run for public office.

Rulings: Yes, the continued use of a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is a voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship. While
the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act
No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine Citizenship, it is nevertheless an act
which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a Filipino citizen who is also a
citizen of another country to qualify to run for a position.
Frivaldo V. COMELEC;

174 SCRA 245, June 23, 1989;

Cruz, J.:

Facts: On March 20,1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo files his COC for the office of
Governor of Sorsogon. On March 23, 1995, Petitioner Raul R. Lee, filed a petition with the
Comelec praying that Frivaldo be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or
position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines, and that his COC be
cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resulution
granting the petition. The Motion for reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted
upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for
during the elections held on the said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc affirmed
the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division. On December 19, 1995, the Comelec
First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution holding that Lee, "not having
garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-
elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes, and
having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725is qualified to hold the office of governor of
Sorsogon"

Issues: Whether or not the disqualification for lack of citizenship bars his eligibility to run for
or be elected to or hold public office.

Ruling: No. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a
person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or
for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the
purpose.
Labo V. COMELEC;

176, SCRA 1, August 1, 1989;

Cruz, J.:

Facts: Herein petitioner, Labo, claiming for recognition as a Philippine citizen is a mayor-elect
who, through his marriage with an Australian national, was naturalized and took an oath of
allegiance as an Australian citizen. Said marriage was found to be bigamous and therefore
was annulled. Petitioner claims that his naturalization made him only a dual national and did
not divest him of his Philippine citizenship.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of his Philippine citizenship.

Ruling: Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated that Philippine citizenship
may be lost through naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship;
and by oath of allegiance to a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner.
Yu V. Defensor- Santiago;

169 SCRA 364, January 24, 1989;

Padilla, J.:

Facts: The petitioner was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, valid for five years
and renewed for the same period upon resentment before the proper Portuguese consular
office. On 1978 the petitioner was naturalized as a Philippine citizen.

On 1981, however, the petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese passport by the
Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his
Portuguese passport expired on 1986. While still a citizen of the Philippines who had
renounce, upon his naturalization, “absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty” and pledged to “maintain true faith and
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,” he declared his nationality as Portuguese in
commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate
Ltd. Filed in Hong Kong around April of 1980.

Issue: Where or not the act of applying for a foreign passport and declaration of foreign
nationality in commercial documents, constitute an express renunciation of one’s Philippine
citizenship acquired through naturalization.

Rulings: To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an
express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In
Board of Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, express renunciation was held to mean
a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or
implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced
Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his
prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and
represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized
Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship. Philippine citizenship, it must be
stressed, is not a commodity or was to be displayed when required and suppressed when
convenient. This then resolves adverse to the petitioner his motion for clarification and
others.
Frivaldo V. Comelec;

257 SCRA 727, June 28, 1996;

Panganiban, J.:

Facts: Frivaldo, J. was elected as a Governor of the province of Sorsogon on January 22,
1988. On October 27, 1988 the League of Cities of Sorsogon President Salvador Estuye filed a
petition to COMELEC requesting to disqualify Frivaldo from his office on the grounds that he
was a naturalized citizen of the United States of America. Frivaldo was naturalized as an
American citizen in Januray 20, 1983. Frivaldo admitted but said that he was only forced to
do so since the time of Marcos regime he was considered as an enemy and he went to USA
seeking refuge and his naturalization is not impressed with voluntariness as he went back
after the Marcos Regime to the country to help the restoration of democracy. He implies
that he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by participating in the election. The case was
approved by COMELEC and motion to dismiss filed by Frivaldo was denied to which Frivaldo
filed a motion for certiorari and prohibition to the court.

Issues: Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his
election on January 18, 1988.

Rulings: No, Juan G. Frivaldo is not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore is disqualified
from serving as the Governor of the Province of Sorsogon, vacancy shall be filled by the
elected Vice- Governor. Local Government Code section 42 indicates that a candidate for
local elective office must be a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the
constituency where is running. Omnibus Election Code section 117 states that a qualified
voter, among other qualifications, must be a citizen of the Philippines. The Court rules that
Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election as the evidence shown
from the certification of US District Court of North California stating that he is a citizen of
the Philippines. Frivaldo’s argument that he reacquire his Philippine citizenship through the
participation in the election which in his view repatriated him to which the Court refutes that
there are proper methods to which one can reacquire citizen ship either through Direct Act
of Congress, Naturalization or Repatriation to which Frivaldo did not access to. Only citizens
of the Philippines which have one allegiance can run in local elective office.
Lasco V. United Nations Revolving Fund;

241 SCRA 681, February 23, 1995;

Quiason, J.:

Facts: Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the
United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a
special fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint
project of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in
Dinagat Island. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages before the
NLRC, respondent Labor Arbiter issued an order dismissing the complaints on the ground
that private respondent was protected by diplomatic immunity. The dismissal was based on
the letter of the Foreign Office which confirmed that private respondent, being a special
fund administered by the United Nations, was covered by the 1946 Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of which the Philippine Government was an
original signatory. Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari without first seeking a
reconsideration of the NLRC resolution. Petitioners argued that the acts of mining
exploration and exploitation are outside the official functions of an international agency
protected by diplomatic immunity. Even assuming that private respondent was entitled to
diplomatic immunity, petitioners insisted that private respondent waived it when it engaged
in exploration work and entered into a contract of employment with petitioners. Private
respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality
since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity.

Issues: Whether or not specialized agencies can apply diplomatic immunity.

Rulings: Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse. Section 31
of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the
United Nations states that ³each specialized agency shall make a provision for appropriate
modes of settlement of (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private
character to which the specialized agency is a party.´ Private respondent is not engaged in a
commercial venture in the Philippines. Its presence is by virtue of a joint project entered into
by the Philippine Government and the United Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat
Island.
Arigo V. Swift;

G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014;

Villarama, Jr, J.:

Facts: The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In
December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the
said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the
port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew
liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13,
2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan. On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian
departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at
2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South
Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was
injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect
the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros
Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their
constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

Issues: Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

Rulings: No, The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ
of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal
case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed
separately. The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of
criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for
the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a
petition for a writ of Kalikasan. The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine
whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot
grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules
allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A.
No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging
the same violation of an environmental law.
HUDCC V. Roque;

G.R. No. 203610, October 10, 2016;

Brion, J.:

Facts: Gonzalo Roque, Jr. (Gonzalo), Manuela Almeda-Roque, Eduvigis A. Paredes, Michael
A. Paredes, Purification Almeda, Jose A. Almeda, Michelle A. Almeda, Michael A. Almeda,
Alberto Delura, and Theresa Almeda (respondents), owned several parcels of land with a
total area of about 9,811 square meters, located in Constitution Hills, Quezon City. Gonzalo
represented the respondents in the court proceedings. In 1978, the Republic, through the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), approached the respondents and asked
them to sell a portion of the land at government-dictated prices lower than the market
value. The Republic was supposed to use the land for President Marcos' National
Government Center (NGC) Project — his plan to bring together the various national
government offices in one venue for greater efficiency and to create additional areas for the
expanding needs of the central government and the people. The respondents allege that
several public hearings regarding the sale took place between the Republic and the
respondents; and that during these meetings, the Republic made the following
representations:

First, the Republic guaranteed that although the respondents would get paid a price much
lower than the market value of the land, the construction of the NGC Project would
eventually enhance the value of the surrounding portions of the land that they still own.

Second, the Republic assured the respondents that, in the remote possibility that it
abandons the project, they will have the right to buy back the land.

The respondents further allege that they were reluctant to sell the land, but felt compelled
to do so because martial law was in force, and they dared not resist a project of President
Marcos. Thus, relying on the Republic's representations, the respondents signed the deeds
of absolute sale. The Republic did not immediately take possession of all of the land it had
bought from the respondents; thus, the respondents continued to occupy portions of the
sold properties. Realizing that the Republic had completely abandoned its initial plan to use
the land for the NGC Project, in 2005, the respondents filed a complaint for the annulment of
the sale of the properties on the grounds of fraud, force, intimidation, or undue
influence. They also asserted their right to buy back the properties at the same price at
which they sold them since the Republic failed to develop the land according to the original
purpose for which it was "expropriated." Alternatively, they asked for the payment of
additional compensation in the amount of not less than Five Million Pesos.
Issues: Whether or not the Republic is immune from suit.

Ruling: No, the republic is not immune from suit. The Constitution provides that "the State
may not be sued without its consent." One instance when a suit is against the State is when
the Republic is sued by name, as in this case. A suit against the State is allowed when the
State gives its consent, either expressly or impliedly. Express consent is given through a
statute while implied consent is given when the State enters into a contract or commences
litigation. Although not all contracts entered into by the government operates as a waiver of
its non-suability, the Court held in the two cases below that the State effectively gave its
consent when it entered into contracts and committed breach. In the present case, the
Republic entered into deeds of sale with the respondents to construct the NGC Project on
the lots sold. To facilitate the sale, the Republic created a negotiating team to discuss the
terms of the sale with the respondents. The latter agreed to the negotiated sale on these
alleged conditions: (a) that they will have the right to repurchase the properties if the NGC
Project does not push through; and (b) that the NGC Project will increase the market value
of their remaining properties.
City of Bacolod V. Phuture Visions co., inc.;

G.R. No. 190289, January 17, 2018;

Velasco, Jr., J.;

Facts: Phuture was incorporated in 2004. Its Articles of Incorporation (AOI) was amended to
include the operation of lotto betting stations and/or other gaming outlets as one of its
secondary purposes. Eventually, it applied with PAGCOR for an authority to operate bingo
games at SM Bacolod as well as with SM Prime for the lease of a space in the said building.
Phuture was issued a provisional Grant of Authority (GOA) by PAGCOR, subject to
compliance with certain requirements, and received an Award Notice from SM Prime.
Phuture commenced bingo operations at SM Bacolod prior to the issuance of the actual
hard copy of the mayor's permit. However, respondent learned that its bingo outlet was
padlocked by agents of the Office of the City Legal Officer and that a copy of a Closure Order
was posted at the entrance of the bingo outlet. Phuture claimed that the closure of its bingo
outlet at SM Bacolod is tainted with malice and bad faith and that petitioners did not have
the legal authority to shut down said bingo operations. The RTC denied the prayer for the
issuance of a temporary mandatory order and dismissed the case for lack of merit. Phuture
filed an Urgent Motion for Partial Reconsideration but it was denied. On appeal, while the
CA ruled that the Mayor's power to issue licenses and permits is discretionary, and thus,
cannot be compelled by mandamus. Accordingly, the CA ordered the case to be reinstated
and remanded to the RTC to determine if damages should be awarded. According to
petitioners, hearing the action for damages effectively violates the City's immunity from suit
since respondent had not yet obtained the consent of the City Government of Bacolod to be
included in the claim for damages.

Issues: Whether or not the City of Bacolod is immune from suit.

Ruling: No, Petitioners have not given their consent to be sued.

The principle of immunity from suit is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which states that "the State cannot be sued without its consent."
The purpose behind this principle is to prevent the loss of governmental efficiency as a
result of the time and energy it would require to defend itself against lawsuits. The State and
its political subdivisions are open to suit only when they consent to it. Consent may be
express or implied, such as when the government exercises its proprietary functions, or
where such is embodied in a general or special law. The Court has held that the power to
issue or grant licenses and business permits is not an exercise of the government's
proprietary function. Instead, it is in an exercise of the police power of the State, ergo a
governmental act. The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is
essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units
to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of
the State within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local Government
Code.
Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. V. CA;

G.R. No. 91359, September 25 1992, 214 SCRA 286;

Grino-Aquino, J.:

Facts: Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI) alleges that the provisions
under Section 4 and 17 of Republic Act No. 5487 or the Private Security Agency Law violate
the 1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint
of trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and
Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest
in more than one security agency. Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of
paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to
Operate and Private Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of
PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades,
requiring that “all private security agencies/company security forces must register as
members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are
located...”.

As such membership requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature; it allegedly violates

legal and constitutional provisions against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations
in restraint of trade. A Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC
Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of
security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro
Manila. Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-
throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower
than the standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May
12, 1986. PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition; hence, the PADPAO
Committee on Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the
cancellation of its license to operate a security agency. The PC-SUSIA affirmed the findings
and likewise recommended the cancellation of VMPSI’s license. As a result, PADPAO refused
to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI. VMPSI made a request letter to the
PC Chief to set aside or disregard the findings of PADPAO and consider VMPSI’s application
for renewal of its license, even without a certificate of membership from PADPAO.

Issue: Whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against
the state without consent.

Ruling: Yes, A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity
if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the
acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were
performed as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no
recovery may be had against them in their private capacities. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12,
1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State to be sued. The consent of the
State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, a legislative act, not from a
mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction over
the public respondents. Petition for review is denied and the judgment appealed from is
affirmed in toto.
Garcia V. Chief of Staff, et al;

G.R. No. L-20213, January 31, 1996;

Regala, J.:

Facts: Plaintiff, Mariano E. Garcia filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an
action to collect a sum of money against the Chief of Staff and Adjutant General of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines , the Chairman of the Philippine Veterans Board and /or the
Auditor General dated December 1, 1961. Gacia alleged that sometime in July 1948, he
suffered injuries while on a military training camp at Floridablanca, Pampanga . Thereafter
he filed his claim for disability benefits and so submitted papers to support it to the Office of
the Adjutant General. May 2, 1957, plaintiff received a letter from the said Adjutant’s Office
disqualifying his claim. The Adjutant Office denied his claim of disability benefits alleging that
Commonwealth Act 400 had been repealed by R.A. 610 which took effect on Jan. 1 , 1950.
That due to the injuries plaintiff suffered he lost his sight making him permanently disabled.
That by the unjustified refusal by defendants the latter didn’t enjoyed his supposed disability
pension from July 1948. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine Veterans Administration filed motions to dismiss the complaint on grounds that
the court has no jurisdiction on the said matter of the complaint. The court on March 2, 1962
rendered an order dismissing the complaint. However, motion for reconsideration of the
said order has also been denied.

Issue: Whether or not the court is right in dismissing the complaint.

Ruling: The SC upheld the order of dismissal for the simple reason that the Court of First
Instance has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it being a money claim against the
government. It was already held in the case of New Manila Lumber vs. Republic in L-14248,
4/28/60, that a claim for the recovery of money against the government should be filed with
the Auditor General, in line with the principle that the State cannot be sued without its
consent.

Commonwealth Act 327 provides:

Section 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of
accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within 60 days,
exclusive of Sundays and holidays after their presentation….
Section 2. The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement
of an account or claim, may within 30 days from receipt of decision, take an appeal in writing
to (c) the Supreme Court, if the appellant is a private person or entity.

The well-established rule that no recourse to court can be had until all administrative
remedies had been exhausted and that actions against administrative officers should not be
entertained if superior administrative officer could grant relief is applicable to this case. The
order dismissing the complaint is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Callado V. IRRI;

G.R. No. 106483, May 22, 1995;

Romero, J.:

Facts: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day while
driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured
in an accident. Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation
conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager. In view of the
findings, he was charged with:

(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;

(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the failure of the vehicle
to start because of a problem with the car battery, and

(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.

Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. However, IRRI
issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before
the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees. IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the
Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1620, 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international
organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same. While
admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued
by the Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its
immunity," and, accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle
in resolving the case. The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and, finding that
IRRI did not waive its immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside
and the complaint dismissed. In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the
IRRI as an international organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620
may not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its
Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D.
1620."

Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an
employer-employee relationship.

Ruling: No, P.D. No. 1620,

Article 3 provides:

Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil
and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived
by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.

The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case "a
categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys
immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held to
be a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarass a political
department of Government. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our
system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question
and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the
executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to
accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the
government or other officer acting under his direction. The raison d'etre for these
immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies
concerned. The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by
its Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.
Merritt V. Government of the Philippine Islands;

G.R. No. L-11154, March 21, 1996;

Trent, J.:

Facts: Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped by the
ambulance of the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to
return to work. The legislature later enacted Act 2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit
against the Government in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the collision
was due to the negligence of the driver of the ambulance. It then determined the amount of
damages and ordered the government to pay the same.

Issue: Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from suit or
did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff.

Rulings: By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favour, or extend
its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-
existing liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defence
Ministerio V. City of Cebu;

G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 464;

Fernando, J.:

Facts: Petitioners sought the payment of just compensation for a registered lot alleging that
in 1927 the National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and
material possession of it and used it for the widening of a national road, without paying just
compensation and without any agreement, either written or verbal. There was an allegation
of repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its possession, but defendants
Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession.

Issue: Whether or not the City of Cebu is immune from suit.

Rulings: No, Where the judgment in such a case would result not only in the recovery of
possession of the property in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial
liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as one against the government
itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the court except
with the consent of said Government. In as much as the State authorizes only legal acts by
its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State,
and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within
the rule of immunity of the State from suit.
Republic V. Purisima;

G.R. No. L-36084, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 470;

Fernando, Acting C.J.:

Facts: The jurisdictional issues raised by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding arose from the
failure of respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila to
apply the well-known and of-reiterated doctrine of the non-suability of a State, including its
offices and agencies, from suit without its consent. It was so alleged in a motion to dismiss
filed by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of
respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of
contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.

Issue: Can an agreement between the Rice and Corn Administration and Yellow Ball Freight
Lines, Inc. Operate as a waiver of the national government from suit.

Rulings: No, The consent to be sued, to be effective must come from the State thru a
statute, not through any agreement made by counsel for the Rice and Corn Administration.
Apparently respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the contract between the private
respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant Rice and Corn Administration which,
according to him, anticipated the case of a breach of contract within the parties and the
suits that may thereafter arise. The consent, to be effective though, must come from the
State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil.
Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no
binding force on the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority.
Philippine National Railways V. Intermediate Appellate Court;

G.R. No. 70547, January 22,1993;

Melo, J.:

Facts: On 10 September 1972, at about 9:00 p.m., Winifedro Tupang, husband of Rosario
Tupang, boarded Train 516 of the Philippine National Railways at Libmanan, Camarines as a
paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical defect, the train stopped at
Sipocot, Camarines Sur for repairs, taking some two hours before the train could resume its
trip to Manila. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena Quezon, Winifredo
Tupang fell off the train resulting in his death. The train did not stop despite the alarm raised
by the other passengers that somebody fell from the train. Instead, the train conductor,
Perfecto Abrazado, called the station agent at Candelaria, Quezon and requested for
verification of the information. Police authorities of Lucena City were dispatched to the Iyam
Bridge where they found the lifeless body of Winifredo Tupang. As shown in the autopsy
report, Winifredo Tupang died of cardio-respiratory failure due tomassive cerebral
hemorrhage due to traumatic injury. Tupang was later buried in the public cemetery of
Lucena City by the local police authorities. Upon complaint filed by the deceased’s widow,
Rosario Tupang, the then CFI Rizal, after trial, held the PNR liable for damages for breach of
contract of carriage and ordered it to pay Rosario Tupang the sum of P12,000.00 for the
death of Winifredo Tupang, plus P20,000.00 for loss of his earning capacity, and the further
sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages and P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and cost. On appeal,
the Appellate Court sustained the holding of the trial court that the PNR did not exercise the
utmost diligence required by of a common carrier. It further increased the amount
adjudicated by the trial court by ordering PNR to pay Rosario Tupang an additional sum of
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages. Moving for reconsideration of the above decision, the
PNR raised for the first time, as a defense, the doctrine of state immunity from suit. The
motion was denied. Hence, the petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the part of Tupang.

Ruling: PNR has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to
observe extraordinary diligence in doing. Death or any injury suffered of its passengers gives
rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its obligation under the
contract of carriage. PNR failed to overthrow such presumption of negligence with clear and
convincing evidence, inasmuch as PNR does not deny, (1) that the train boarded by the
deceased Winifredo Tupang was so overcrowded that he and many other passengers had no
choice but sit on the open platforms between the coaches of the train, (2) that the train did
not even slow down when it approached the Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the
time, and (3) that neither did the train stop, despite the alarm raised by other passengers
that a person had fallen off the train at Iyam Bridge. While PNR failed to exercise
extraordinary diligence as required by law, it appears that the deceased chargeable with
contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the coaches of
the train, he should have held tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the
side of said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train. Such contributory
negligence, while not exempting the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of
the amount adjudicated as moral damages. The Supreme Court modified the decision of the
appellate court by eliminating therefrom the amount of P10,000.00 and P5,000.00
adjudicated as moral and exemplary damages, respectively, without cost.