CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., vs HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, et.

al

G.R. No. L-17931 February 28, 1963

Facts:

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of
petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.

Pursuant to the provisions of RA 2609, or the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank
of the Philippines issued its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee on foreign exchange
transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing
the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee. Petitioner Casco
Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde
and paid therefor the aforementioned margin fee. Petitioner had sought the refund of the margin fee
relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, declaring that the separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Although the Central Bank issued the
corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused
to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption granted by the
Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with
the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609. On appeal taken by petitioner,
the Auditor General subsequently affirmed said action of the Auditor of the Bank. The parties pray
that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 2609 reads:

The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall
not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:.

xxx xxx xxx

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for
the exclusive use of end-users.

Issue:

Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid
margin fee.

Ruling:

No. Whereas "urea" and "formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the manufacture of
synthetic resin glues, the National Institute of Science and Technology has expressed, through its
Commissioner, the view that urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin
formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain
conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is
clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea" and "formaldehyde", as
separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde".
Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea formaldehyde"
instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure passed by Congress and approved by the President.
 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION vs ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO, et.al

G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989

Facts:

The petitioner Department of Education claims that private respondent Roberto C. San Diego took
the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner
rejected his application on the basis of its rule that-

h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive
failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. (MECS Order No. 12,
Series of 1972)

Petitioner then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his
admission to the test. After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision declaring the
challenged order invalid and granting the petition and held that the petitioner had been deprived of
his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.

Issue:

Whether or not a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is
entitled to take it again.

Ruling:

No. The Court did not sustain the respondent judge and her decision is reversed. The government is
entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of
"upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of
medical education in the country." There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State.
Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the
means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals (Article XIV, Section 5(3) of the
Constitution).

In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject
and a lawful method.

The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution
also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to
fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.
 Farinas vs Executive Secretary
GR No. 147387, December 10, 2003

Facts:
SEC. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective
official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free,
Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Elections Practices, insofar as it
repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section
26(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should
be in expressed in its title.

The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA 9006 constitutes a
proscribed rider. The Sec 14 of RA 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of
media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices. Sec 67 of the OEC
imposes a limitation of officials who run for office other than the one they are holding in a permanent
capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The repeal of Sec 67 of the OEC is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the
subject matter of RA 9006.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider

Ruling:
No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive enough
to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require
that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a
complete index of its content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section
14 of the RA 9006 does not violate "one subject-one title rule." This Court has held that an act
having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and
means of carrying out the general subject.

Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its
title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent
the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the
legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of
the repeal of Section 67 of the Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon
by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners as members of the House of Representatives,
expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the
legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs

In legislative procedure, a rider is an additional provision added to a bill or other measure under the
consideration by a legislature, having little connection with the subject matter of the bill. Riders are
usually created as a tactic to pass a controversial provision that would not pass as its own bill.
 Dumlao vs Comelec
GR No. L-52245, January 22, 1980

Facts:
Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of
candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner
Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as
discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution
which provides that “….Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65
years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be
qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.” He likewise alleges that
the provision is directed insidiously against him, and is based on “purely arbitrary grounds, therefore,
class legislation.

Issue:
Whether or not 1st paragraph of section 4 of BP 22 is valid.

Ruling:
Yes. It is valid.

In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal
office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired,
as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The
tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that
the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government
work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very
reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that
provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit of such denial.

The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a
classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a
reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to
the purpose of the low and applies to all those belonging to the same class.

WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared
valid.