Villavicencio vs.

Lukban,

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919

FACTS:
About midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton
Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses where
“women of ill repute” were kept confined, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed
them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. It is said that the city authorities quietly perfected
arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers.
The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the
impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge
that they were destined for a life in Mindanao and without their consent and without any
opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board
steamers for transportation to regions unknown. They had not been asked if they wished to depart
from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The two
steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.

The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted
for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael
Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous
notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila.
The attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees alleged that the
women were illegally restrained of their liberty and presented an application for habeas corpus to a
member of the Supreme Court.

Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections
to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2)
that the Supreme Court should not assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not
restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and
the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not
bring the women from Davao.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Mayor and the Chief of Police, in deporting by duress these persons from Manila
to Davao, acted in the authority of law. (NO)

Whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should be granted by the court. (YES)

Whether or not the respondents are found in contempt of court. (YES)

Ruling:

1. The deported women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not
chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other
citizens — to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. The privilege of domicile is
a principle often protected by constitutions and deeply imbedded in American jurisprudence.
 Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of
his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise
destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or
by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice
or right." No official, no matter how high, is above the law.

"The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States,
"is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting
office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy,
and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it
gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.)

2. a. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was
conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas
corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf.
(Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its
zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ
of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly
imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be made therefor. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.

b. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience,
petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first
instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by
the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands.
(Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the
writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in
the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances.

c. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential objects and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The
forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over
to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom
of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. The restraint of liberty
which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and
released or until they freely and truly waived this right.

3. An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas

corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex
parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1)
They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or
(2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons
could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to
show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.)

The respondents did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by
the respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did
 not wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive
officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another chance to
demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.

When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official who was primarily responsible
for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements
for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and
who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the
unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to
suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful.

Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the
Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the
city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25,
1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered.

The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further
rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the
individual at liberty.
RENATO L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA,
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget and Management, Respondents.

[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]

FACTS:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of
the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of
the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C:

"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately
preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a
grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception
in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years.

It was known to us that Monsod, after graduating from the College of Law and having hurdled the bar, worked
in his father’s law office. After then, he worked as operations officer in the World Bank Group for about two
years (1963-1970). Upon returning to the Philippines, he worked with the Meralco Group as a Chief Executive
Officer, and subsequently rendered services to various companies either as legal and economic consultant or
chief executive officer. He also served as former Secretary-General(1986) and National Chairman (1987) of
NAMFREL, as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987) and Davide Commission (1990), and
as Chairman of Committee on Accountability of Public Officers.

ISSUES:

WHETHER OR NOT Monsod possesses the required qualification for the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.

WHETHER OR NOT there has been grave abuse of discretion on the part of Commission on Appointments
regarding theconfirmation of nomination of Monsod.

Ruling:

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying."

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the modern concept
of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the
poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in
making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense,
perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar,
who has been practicing law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practicing law,
without first becoming lawyers.

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman
of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution. The
Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation, implicitly
determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the
Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon
a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with
the Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly show.

tne significant legal maxim is: "We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth
life."

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Campaign Manager of Coalesced Minority Parties, petitioner,
vs.
VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, Mayor of City of Manila, respondent.

G.R. No. L-1800 January 27, 1948

FACTS:

This is an action of mandamus instituted by the petitoner, Cipriano Primicias, a campaig manager of
the Coalesced Minority Parties against Valeraino Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, to compel
the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on Sunday afternoon,
November 16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress to grievances on the
groun that the respondent refused to grant such permit The reason alleged by the respondent in his
defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous
utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter
and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the
people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of
the peace and a disruption of public order." Due to urgency of the case, this Court, after mature
deliberation, issued a writ of mandamus, as prayed for in the petition of November 15, 1947, without
prejudice to writing later an extended and reasoned decision.

The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign
"police power" which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.

The Philippine legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the Municipal Board of the
City of Manila, which according to section 2439 of the Administrative Code is the legislative body of
the City. As there is no express and separate provision in the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila
regulating the holding of public meeting or assembly at any streets or public places, the provision of
section 1119 of said Ordinance to the effect, among others, "that the holding of any parade or
procession in any streets or public places is prohibited unless a permit therefor is first secured from
the Mayor, who shall, on every such occasion, determine or specify the streets or public places for the
formation, route, and dismissal of such parade or procession," may be applied by analogy to meeting
and assembly in any street or public places.

Said provision is susceptible to two constructions: one is that the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested
with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or
meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; and the
other is that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only
to the latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for
the purpose, with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets
and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of
disorder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Mayor has the right to refuse to issue he permit hence violating freedom of
assembly.

Ruling:
After a mature deliberation, we have arrived at the conclusion that we must adopt the second
construction, that is construe the provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does not confer upon
the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to
determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the
meeting may be held.

Our conclusions find support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox vs. State of New Hampshire, 312
U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of New Hampshire P.L. Chap. 145, section 2, providing that "no
parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license
therefor shall first be obtained from the select men of the town or from licensing committee," was
construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board
unfetted discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid.

We can not adopt the alternative construction or construe the ordinance under consideration as
conferring upon the Mayor power to grant or refuse to grant the permit, which would be tantamount to
authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for holding of meetings,
parades or processions, because such a construction would make the ordinance invalid and void or
violative of the constitutional limitations.

As the Municipal Boards is empowered only to regulate the use of streets, parks, and the other public
places, and the word "regulate," as used in section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code, means
and includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain, but can not be construed a synonimous
with construed "suppressed" or "prohibit" (Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil., 103), the Municipal
Board can not grant the Mayor a power that it does not have.

Besides, the powers and duties of the Mayor as the Chief Executive of the City are executive and one
of them is "to comply with and enforce and give the necessary orders for the faithful performance and
execution of laws and ordinances" (section 2434 [b] of the Revised Administrative Code), the ligislative
police power of the Municipal Board to enact ordinances regulating reasonably the excercise of the
fundamental personal rights of the citizens in the streets and other public places, can not be delgated
to the Mayor or any other officer by conferring upon him unregulated discretion or without laying down
rules to guide and control his action by which its impartial execution can be secured or partiality and
oppression prevented.

Whitney vs. California, 71 U. S. (Law. ed.), 1105-1107:

"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men
feared witches and burned women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage
of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to
fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground
to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to
believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one

In view of all the foregoing, the petition for mandamus is granted and, there appearing no reasonable
objection to the use of the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, for the meeting applied for, the respondent is
ordered to issue the corresponding permit, as requested. So ordered.
G.R. No. 49549 August 30, 1990

EVELYN CHUA-QUA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant, and TAY TUNG
HIGH SCHOOL, INC., respondents.

Evelyn Chua was a teacher in Tay Tung High School (TTHS) in Bacolod City. She was a Class
Adviser in Grade VI. TTHS has a policy to extend remedial instructions to its students.
Bobby Qua is one of Evelyn’s advisory students in Grade VI. He was under the remedial
instructions of Evelyn which is conducted after the regular class hours.
In the course thereof, the couple fell in love and got married in a civil ceremony solemnized in Iloilo
City Petitioner was then thirty (30) years of age but Bobby Qua being sixteen (16) years old, an age
gap of 14 years. consent and advice to the marriage was given by his mother, Mrs. Concepcion Ong.

Consequently, TTHS filed with the Labor Arbiter an application to terminate Evelyn’s
employment because her “actuations as a teacher constitute serious misconduct, if not
an immoral act, a breach of trust and confidence reposed upon her and, thus, a valid and just
ground to terminate her services” and she “violated the Code of Ethics for teachers the pertinent
provision of which states that a ‘school official or teacher should never take advantage of his/her
position to court a pupil or student’.”

Evelyn contended by saying that “there was no ground to terminate her services as there is nothing
wrong with a teacher falling in love with her pupil and, subsequently, contracting a lawful
marriage with him.”

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of TTHS to dismiss Evelyn’s services despite conceding
that “there was no direct evidence to show that immoral acts were committed” because according
to him it is “enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired during
those times.”

Evelyn elevated the case to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which originally
decided in her favor but was reversed on motion for reconsideration of TTHS.

Petitioner appealed the said decision to the Office of the President of the Philippines. 14 After the
corresponding exchanges, on September 1, 1978 said office, through Presidential Executive Assistant
Jacobo C. Clave, rendered its decision reversing the appealed decision. Private respondent was
ordered to reinstate petitioner to her former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
and with full back wages from the time she was not allowed to work until the date of her actual
reinstatement.

Citing its upright intention to preserve the respect of the community toward the teachers and to
strengthen the educational system, private respondent submits that petitioner's actuations as a
teacher constitute serious misconduct, if not an immoral act, a breach of trust and confidence
reposed upon her and, thus, a valid and just ground to terminate her services. It argues that as a
school teacher who exercises substitute parental authority over her pupils inside the school campus,
petitioner had moral ascendancy over Bobby Qua and, therefore, she must not abuse such authority
and respect extended to her. Furthermore, it charged petitioner with having allegedly violated the
Code of Ethics for teachers the pertinent provision of which states that a "school official or teacher
should never take advantage of his/her position to court a pupil or student."

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner relies on the following grounds for the reversal of the aforesaid
resolution of public respondent, viz.:

1. The dismissal or termination of petitioner's employment, despite Tay Tung's claim

to the contrary, was actually based on her marriage with her pupil and is, therefore,
illegal.

3. No sufficient proofs were adduced to show that petitioner committed serious

misconduct or breached the trust reposed on her by her employer or committed any
of the other grounds enumerated in Article 283 (Now Article 282) of the Labor Code
which will justify the termination of her employment. 20

THE ISSUE
WON the actuations of Evelyn Chua-Qua constitute immorality and/or grave misconduct to
warrant her dismissal.

RULING:

we are of the considered view that the determination of the legality of the dismissal hinges on the
issue of whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts which
culminated in the marriage between petitioner and her student constitute immorality and/or grave
misconduct. To constitute immorality, the circumstances of each particular case must be holistically
considered and evaluated in the light of prevailing norms of conduct and the applicable law. Contrary
to what petitioner had insisted on from the very start, what is before us is a factual question, the
resolution of which is better left to the trier of facts.

Considering that there was no formal hearing conducted, we are constrained to review the factual
conclusions arrived at by public respondent, and to nullify his decision through the extraordinary writ
of certiorari if the same is tainted by absence or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
The findings of fact must be supported by substantial evidence; otherwise, this Court is not bound
thereby. from the outset even the labor arbiter conceded that there was no direct evidence to show
that immoral acts were committed.

With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the
alleged violation of the Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private
respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. If
the two eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends
substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But,
definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with
immorality. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern
cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.

It would seem quite obvious that the avowed policy of the school in rearing and educating children is
being unnecessarily bannered to justify the dismissal of petitioner. This policy, however, is not at
odds with and should not be capitalized on to defeat the security of tenure granted by the
Constitution to labor. In termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid cause for dismissing
an employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so would result in a finding that the
dismissal is unjustified.

The charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we declare her dismissal as
unwarranted and illegal. It being apparent, however, that the relationship between petitioner and
private respondent has been inevitably and severely strained, we believe that it would neither be to
the interest of the parties nor would any prudent purpose be served by ordering her reinstatement.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the resolution of public respondent, dated
December 6, 1978 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc.
is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioner backwages equivalent to three (3) years, without any
deduction or qualification, and separation pay in the amount of one (1) month for every year of
service.

So ordered.
JUAN ANTONIO OPOSA, et. Al. petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens
of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are
"so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court."

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20
and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating
the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy),
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's
inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners
likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard
the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available
involves a judicial question.

the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the
complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly
entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such
allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory
that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which
should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They
therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before
Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause
of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further
ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the
plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.8

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The
complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is
incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from
impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary
government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development
and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially
re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code
of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the
powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect
or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which
they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology.
Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show,
prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested
upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the
Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be
validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise
by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short,
the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.
FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein.
During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed
and the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that
every time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever
beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the
killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was
able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The
information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by
beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide
with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying
that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of
his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine
her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports
in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of
the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly
granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for
reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome” plea.
Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were
presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the
records.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome” as constituting self
defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the “battered
woman syndrome”.

A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern
for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men.
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle
at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second
time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,” which
has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving
(or, at least, nonviolent) phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman
syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least
two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering
episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual
fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to
save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily
immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the
former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense.
Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly characterizing the
relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed
to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of
the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense.
Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on
one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the
Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful
aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and
unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case,
however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the
unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his
violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack
and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was
no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however, taken in favor
of appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion
and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.

The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-
spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological
paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving
her of consciousness of her acts.

As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally
produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is
committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by
a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following
requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of
mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.

2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the
killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a
quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said
to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to
appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and
deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense
that might be put up by the party attacked.

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or obfuscation.
The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that
she was eight (8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional
and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn
child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the presence
of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty
hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from
custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful
cause.