Criminal Law Case Principles-1

CRIMINAL
LAW
JURISPRUDENCE
(A COMPILATION)
2017 USJ-R CENTRAL BAR

OPERATIONS ACADEMIC
COMMITTEE
MAY 2015- JUNE 2016

CRIMINAL
2017 USJ-R CENTRAL BAR OPERATIONS ACADEMIC COMMITTEE LAW
2015-2016
PART I. REVISED PENAL CODE (RPC) BOOK I
FUNDAMENTAL AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL LAW
Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt; Burden of Proof . It is a cardinal principle in criminal law that
the prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It
is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that
conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion, with moral certainty. If the
prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the right of the accused to be
freed, it becomes the Court’s constitutional duty to acquit him. (ALBERT G. AMBAGAN, JR. vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 204481-82, October 14, 2015.)
Well-settled is the rule in criminal law that the conviction of an accused must be based on the
strength of the prosecution evidence and not on the weakness or absence of evidence of the
defense. The accused has no burden to prove his innocence and the weakness of the defense he
interposed is inconsequential. He must be acquitted and set free as the prosecution failed to
overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. ( PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ENRICO
MIRONDO Y IZON,. G.R. No. 210841, October 14, 2015 )
Double Jeopardy - In sum, although the Sandiganbayan, in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion, may have erred in dismissing the criminal case, such error may no longer be annulled
or set aside because it would place the respondents in double jeopardy. At any rate, even if we
go beyond the function of certiorari and dissect the prosecution's theory that the respondents
conspired to commit the crime, we still sustain the Sandiganbayan. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN (2ND DIVISION), G.R. No. 197953, August 05, 2015)
Corpus Delicti —Corpus delicti is the body, foundation or substance of a crime. It refers to the
fact of the commission of the crime, not to the physical body of the deceased. Because corpus
delicti may be proven by circumstantial evidence, it is not necessary for the prosecution to
present direct evidence to prove the corpus delicti. Nevertheless, the prosecution must present
the following elements: (a) that a certain result or fact has been established, i.e., that a man has
died; and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for it. In murder cases, such as in the
case at bar, the corpus delicti, the fact of murder of Betonio, was established through physical
1|Page
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
evidence, corroborated by several witnesses' testimonies. (People v. Omilig y Mancia, G.R. No.
206296, [August 12, 2015])
Alibi - In light of the positive identification by AAA, whose narration of the incident was found
credible by both the RTC and the CA, Regaspi's proffered defense of denial fails. Regaspi's denial
could not prevail over AAA's direct, positive, and categorical assertion. For Regaspi's alibi to be
credible and given due weight, he must show that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The Court has consistently held
that denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be supported by strong evidence of non-
culpability to merit credibility. No jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than that alibi is
the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove, and for which
reason, it is generally rejected. For the alibi to prosper, the accused must establish the following:
(1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its commission. These,
unfortunately, Regaspi failed to prove. Further, and more importantly, Regaspi's allegations
remain uncorroborated. (PEOPLE VS. REGASPI, G.R. No. 198309, September 7, 2015)
Accused-appellant’s alibi that he was in Sibagat, Agusan del Sur, when Paceño was killed in
Butuan City does not warrant his acquittal. For alibi to prosper, it must be proven that during
the commission of the crime, the accused was in another place and that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the locus criminis. This Court takes judicial notice that the
geographical distance between Sibagat, Agusan del Sur and Butuan City is just 37 kilometers,
which could be covered by transportation in approximately 37 minutes. It is worthy to note that
according to defense’s own account, at the time Paceño was shot in Butuan City around 4:30 in
the afternoon of April 7, 2006, accused-appellant was allegedly with a relative, Ilagan, going
around from 4:00 to 5:30 in the afternoon looking for three men they meant to talk to regarding
the hiring of trucks for transportation of logs. It would not have been impossible for accused-
appellant was with him during the entire time could not be accorded much weight and credence
being accused-appellant’s relative, and in the face of the unwavering testimonies given by
impartial prosecution witnesses that accused- appellant was in Butuan City. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. BONIFACIO DANDANON y ILIGAN a.k.a. “Boning,” G.R. No. 196258.
September 28, 2015)
We stress once more that the defense alibi is a negative defense which cannot be accorded
evidentiary weight in the face of positive assertions by prosecution witnesses. This is especially
true in the present case since accused-appellant failed to establish ill motive on the part of the
prosecution witnessed to testify against him. We declared in People v. Parreno, 433 SCRA 591
(2004), that “the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime, when
2|Page
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
categorical, consistent, and without any ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on
the matter, prevails over alibi and denial. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BONIFACIO
DANDANON y ILIGAN a.k.a. “Boning,” G.R. No. 196258. September 28, 2015)
Accused-appellant's defense of alibi is also unconvincing. "For the defense of alibi to prosper,
'the accused must prove[:] (a) that he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime[;] and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene
of the crime' during its commission. 'Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of
access between the situs criminis and the location of the accused when the crime was
committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically
present at the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime was
committed."'41 As testified to by Roderick and even by accused-appellant himself, the commute
time from accused-appellant's house to the scene of the crime is only an hour and a half by
means of public transport or fifteen minutes by means of private transport. Thus, there is no
physical impossibility in the case at bar (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RODELIO LLOBERA Y
OFIZA, G.R. NO. 203066, AUGUST 5, 2015)
Anent Parba's alibi, the Court finds the same to be unavailing. It is well-settled that alibi as a
defense is inherently weak and unreliable owing to the fact that it is easy to fabricate and
difficult to disprove. To establish alibi, the accused must prove that: (a) he was present at
another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) it was physically impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime. ( PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. OSCAR PARBA Y
SOLON, G.R. No. 214506, October 19, 2015 )
Likewise, a distance of about two (2) kilometers, three (3) kilometers,or even five (5) kilometers
were consistently held not too far to preclude the possibility that the accused was present at
the locus criminis.Surely then, a distance of 100 meters, as in this case, is not the "physical
impossibility" contemplated to satisfy the defense of alibi.Moreover, considering its doubtful
nature, clear and convincing evidence must be submitted to support the alibi of an accused,
otherwise, it is considered negative, self-serving, and undeserving of weight in law. Thus, alibi
and denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of
the crime, especially in cases where the testimonies of the witnesses are categorical, consistent
and untainted by ill-will. ( PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. OSCAR PARBA Y SOLON G.R. No.
214506, October 19, 2015 )
Appellants’ alibi is also unavailing. For alibi to prosper, it does not suffice to prove that the
accused was at another place when the crime was committed, but it must also be shown that
there was physical impossibility for him to have been at the scene of the crime. Physical
imposiblity refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was when the crime
transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the
3|Page
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
two places. Appellant Allain testified that around 7:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. of July 16, 1998, he was
at Kit’s house, which was located around 100 meters away from their own house. On the other
hand, appellant Vergel testified that he passed by Kit’s house at past 8:00 p.m. and saw Allain
thereat. Notably, appellant Allain testified that AAA’s house is also 100 meters away from their
house. Thus, it would show that Kit’s house is also in the same vicinity where the crime was
committed. Hence, it was not physically impossible for the appellants to be at the locus criminis
at the time of the incident. . (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VERGEL ANCAJAS and ALLAIN**
ANCAJAS. G.R. No. 199270. October 21, 2015.)
An alibi, furthermore, deserves scant consideration in the face of a clear identification of the
accused. (PEOPLE VS. CUESTA, G.R. No. 217380, November 23, 2015)
In order for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has been somewhere
else during the commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it would have been
impossible for him to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene. (PEOPLE VS. BIALA,
G.R. No. 217975, November 23, 2015)
Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses who were not shown
to have any ill-motive to testify against the appellants. Between the categorical statements of
the prosecution eyewitnesses Java and Delos Reyes, on one hand, and the bare denial of the
appellant, on the other, the former must prevail. After all, an affirmative testimony is far
stronger than a negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible
witness. In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is also not enough to prove that the
accused was somewhere else when the offense was committed, but it must likewise be shown
that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the
place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. ZALDY SALAHUDDIN, G.R. No. 206291, January 18, 2016
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the petitioners must not only prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he was at another place at the time of the commission of the offense but that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Emilio himself admitted that
he was just one kilometer away from the crime scene when the incident happened during the
unholy hour of 1:00 a.m. of July 15, 2001. As such, Emilio failed to prove physical impossibility
of his being at the crime scene on the date and time in question. Just like denial, alibi is an
inherently weak defense that cannot prevail over the positive identification by the witnesses of
the petitioners as the perpetrators of the crime. In the present case, Emilio was positively
identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of the assailants. Moreover, alibi becomes less
credible if offered by the accused himself and his immediate relatives as they are expected to
make declarations in his favor, as in this case, where Emilio, his father and brother insisted that
the former was somewhere else when the incident occurred. For these reasons, Emilio's
4|Page
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
defense of alibi will not hold. (RONALD IBANEZ, EMILIO IBANEZ and DANIEL “BOBOT” IBANEZ
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 190798, JANUARY 27, 2016)
Appellant’s alibi fail to persuade. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove (a)
that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene during its commission. Physical
impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the
location of the accused when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he was so
far away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate
vicinity when the crime was committed. In this case, appellant failed to satisfy these
requirements. He was not able to satisfactorily establish his claims that he was in Orion, Bataan
during the time of the commission of the crime and that it was physically impossible for him to
be at or near the place of the crime. Aside from his own statement, appellant did not bother to
present other witnesses or any other proof to support his defense. His defense of alibi must
necessarily fail. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FEDERICO DE LA CRUZ y SANTOS, G.R. NO.
207389, FEBRUARY 17, 2016)
Now, in comparison to AAA’s positive and categorical testimony and her positive identification
of the appellant as her rapist, the appellant could only muster denial and alibi as his defenses.
As this Court has oft pronounced, both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses that
cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the
accused committed the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony, which has a ring of
truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to
prevail. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove that he was
somewhere else when the offense was committed and that he was so far away that it was not
possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or at its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission.39 In the case at bench, the appellant miserably failed to
prove that he was not at the scene of the crime on 28 August 2002. (PEOPLE VS GERASMIO,
G.R. No. 207098, July 08, 2015)
Denial; Defenses in Criminal Actions - This Court has invariably viewed with disfavor the
defense of denial. Denial is inherently a weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive
identification by the prosecution. Negative and self-serving denial deserves no weight in law
when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Such defense of denial, like frame-up,
is a common and standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BIENVENIDO MIRANDA y FELICIANO,
G.R. No. 209338. JUNE 29, 2015)
5|Page
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Denial and alibi, as defenses of an accused in a criminal case, have been consistently held as
inherently weak and which, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail
over the positive declarations of the victim. In general, a plea of denial and alibi is not given
much weight relative to the affirmative testimony of the offended party. The only exception to
this rule is where there is no effective identification, or where the identification of the accused
has been fatally tainted by irregularity and attendant inconsistencies. Same; Same; As for alibi,
such a defense would prosper only if the accused was able to prove that not only was he at
some other place when the crime was committed, but also that he could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime, or in its immediate vicinity, during its commission.-
Then, as for alibi, such a defense would prosper only if the accused was able to prove that not
only was he at some other place when the crime was committed, but also that he could not
have been physically present at the place of the crime, or in its immediate vicinity, during its
commission. Using such standards, Dinamling's alibi holds no water. Not only was his alleged
location at the time of commission, that is, the XXX Police Station where he was on duty, in the
same municipality as the crimes' place of commission, Dinamling himself also admitted that this
police station is just "two to three minutes" away from AAA's boarding house. Where the
accused admits that he was in the same municipality as the place where the offense occurred, it
cannot be said that it was physically impossible for him to have committed the crime, and his
defense of alibi cannot prosper. (RICKY DINAMLING v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
199522, JUNE 22, 2015)
To reiterate, the denial of the accused is a negative assertion that is weaker than the affirmative
testimony of the victim. It almost has no probative value and may be further discarded in the
absence of any evidence of ill motives on the part of the witness to impute so grave a wrong
against the accused. As for alibi, it is not given weight if the accused failed to demonstrate that
he was so far away and could not have been physically present at the scene of the crime and its
immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. (RICKY DINAMLING v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 199522, JUNE 22, 2015)
Additionally, accused-appellant's defense of denial is unconvincing. "[D]enial is intrinsically a

weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit
credibility. To be sure, it is negative, self-serving evidence that cannot be given evidentiary
weight greater than that of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Time-tested is
the rule that between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the negative
averments of the accused, the former indisputably deserves more credence and evidentiary
weight." (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RODELIO LLOBERA Y OFIZA, G.R. NO. 203066,
AUGUST 5, 2015)
6|Page
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
The appellant's only defense was to deny that he had sexually abused his daughter. This Court
has often stated that to be believed, denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of
nonculpability otherwise, it is purely self-serving and without merit. Here, appellant interposes
an extortion scheme masterminded by his eldest daughter, AAA. However, he did not present
any evidence to support his contention. Thus, in the face of a categorical testimony by BBB,
appellant's defense of denial must fail absent any evidence of his non-culpability. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE SALVADOR, G.R. No. 207815. JUNE 22, 2015)
Accused-appellant's defense, which is predicated on a bare denial, deserves scant consideration.

A bare denial is an inherently weak defense and has been invariably viewed by this Court with
disfavor, for it can be easily concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common standard line of
defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of RA 9165. And in the absence of any
intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such crime against the accused, the
presumption of regularity in the · performance of duty stands. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs
DATS MAMALUMPON y BAÑEZ, G.R. NO. 210452, AUGUST 26, 2015)
The lame defense of denial is all that appellant could offer against the prosecution evidence.
Denial is a negative and self-serving evidence that requires to be substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Otherwise, it will not overcome the
testimony of the prosecution witness/es who testified on affirmative matters. Except for the
testimonial assertion of appellant in the present case, no credible corroborating evidence was
presented by the defense to bolster his denial. Emelina's positive assertions that she handed to
appellant the money to be delivered to a money changer in Mabini, Manila, and that he did not
return the service motorcycle, prevail over the denial of the appellant. Appellant's admission
that he was at E. Gloria Money Changer shop in the morning of July 11, 2007 further served to
bolster the testimony of Emelina. (PEOPLE VS. ASAMUDDIN, G.R. No. 213913, September 2,
2015)
Accused-appellant's defense of denial, like alibi, is inherently weak and if uncorroborated, is

impotent. - In addition, accused-appellant's defense of denial, like alibi, is inherently weak and if
uncorroborated, is impotent. It constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be given
greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified on
affirmative matters. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIRAFLOR UGANIEL LERIO, G.R. No.
209039, December 09, 2015)
As between a positive and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth, on one hand, and a
bare denial, on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. - Appellant's defense of denial
and alibi are inherently weak and self-serving, especially if uncorroborated. Denial cannot
prevail over complainant's direct, positive and categorical assertion. As between a positive and
categorical testimony which has the ring of truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on the other,
7|Page
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
the former is generally held to prevail. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARK ANTHONY
ROAQUIN Y NAVARRO, G.R. No. 215201, December 09, 2015).
As between a positive and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth, on one hand, and a
bare denial, on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. - Appellant's defense of denial
and alibi are inherently weak and self-serving, especially if uncorroborated. Denial cannot
prevail over complainant's direct, positive and categorical assertion. As between a positive and
categorical testimony which has the ring of truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on the other,
the former is generally held to prevail. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARK ANTHONY
Greater weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution
witnesses than the accused's denial and explanation concerning the commission of the crime.-
Accused-appellant's defense of denial cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the
witnesses presented by the prosecution. As is wellsettled in this jurisdiction, greater weight is
given to the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than the
accused's denial and explanation concerning the commission of the crime. Based on the factual
findings of the RTC, the combined and corroborative testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution show that it was appellant herself who informed them of the existence of the job
vacancies in Japan and of the requirements needed for the processing of their applications. It
was properly established that it was accused-appellant who accompanied the private
complainants to undergo training and seminar conducted by a person who represented himself
as connected with the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA). Evidence
was also presented-that the private complainants, relying completely on accused-appellant's
representations, entrusted their money to her. Finally, since there were six (6) victims, the RTC
therefore did not commit any error in convicting accused-appellant of the charge of illegal
recruitment in large scale (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FE TORRES SOLINA A.K.A. MA FE
BAYLON GALLO, G.R. NO. 196784, JANUARY 13, 2016)
An assessment of the defenses of denial and alibi necessitates looking into the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies. Well-settled is the rule that in determining who between the
prosecution and defense witnesses are to be believed, the evaluation of the trial court is
accorded much respect for the simple reason that the trial court is in a better position to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they deliver their testimonies. As such, the findings
of the trial court is accorded finality unless it has overlooked substantial facts which if properly
considered, could alter the result of the case. (RONALD IBANEZ, EMILIO IBANEZ and DANIEL
“BOBOT” IBANEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 190798, JANUARY 27, 2016)
The trial and appellate courts were right in not giving probative value to petitioners' denial.
Denial is an intrinsically weak defense that further crumbles when it comes face-to-face with
the positive identification and straightforward narration of the prosecution witnesses.46
8|Page
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Between an affirmative assertion which has a ring of truth to it and a general denial, the former
generally prevails.47 The prosecution witnesses recounted the details of the crime in a clear,
detailed and consistent manner, without any hint of hesitation or sign of untruthfulness, which
they could not have done unless they genuinely witnessed the incident. Besides, the
prosecution witnesses could not have mistakenly identified the petitioners as Rodolfo's
perpetrators considering there is so much familiarity among them. The records are also bereft
of any indication that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by ill motives when they
testified against the petitioners. Thus, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.
(RONALD IBANEZ, EMILIO IBANEZ and DANIEL “BOBOT” IBANEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 190798, JANUARY 27, 2016)
The lower courts correctly rejected petitioner's defense of denial for being self-serving and
uncorroborated. Denial is inherently a weak defense which cannot outweigh positive testimony
of a prosecution witness. "A defense of denial which is unsupported and unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence becomes negative and self-serving, deserving no weight in law,
and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over convincing, straightforward and probable
testimony on affirmative matters." In the instant case, the defense of denial fails even more
when the petitioner's co-accused, Daguman, confirmed that the petitioner had every intent to
possess and was caught in actual possession of shabu. (ROBERTO PALO y DE GULA vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 192075, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
Where there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to
testify falsely against an accused, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists
and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence. (PEOPLE VS. ZABALA G.R. No.
203087. November 23, 2015)
The settled rule is that both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail
over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed
the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and
a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. In the case at bar,
the Court finds no compelling reason to depart from the findings of the trial court that, in light
of the positive and categorical testimony of AAA that accused-appellant raped her, the mere
denial of accused-appellant, without any corroborative evidence leaves the court with no option
but to pronounce a judgment of conviction. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO LAGBO
a.k.a. RICARDO LABONG y MENDOZA, G.R. NO. 207535, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
As to appellant's defenses of denial and alibi, the Court agrees with the trial and appellate
courts that the same deserve scant consideration. No jurisprudence in criminal law is more
settled than that alibi and denial, the most common defenses in rape cases, are inherently weak
and easily fabricated. As such, they are generally rejected. On the one hand, an accused's bare
denial, when raised against the complainant's direct, positive and categorical testimony, cannot
9|Page
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
generally be held to prevail. On the other hand, unless the accused establishes his presence in
another place at the time of the commission of the offense and the physical impossibility for
him to be at the scene of the crime, his acquittal cannot be properly justified. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. ELISEO D. VILLAMOR, G.R. NO. 202187, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
Apart from his weak and unconvincing defenses of denial and alibi, appellant further claimed
that the courts below should have considered the fact that AAA had a boyfriend during those
times of the alleged rape. The Court, however, finds such claim unmeritorious. It is not
uncommon for appellants accused of rape to shift the blame to another, particularly to the
victim's suitor or boyfriend. But that AAA had a boyfriend at the time of the incidents is
inconsequential and cannot be held to cast doubt on AAA's testimony. It has been consistently
held that no sane girl would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private
parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. While the weight of the
victim's testimony may be countered by physical evidence to the contrary or indubitable proof
that the accused could not have committed the rape, the testimony shall be accorded utmost
value in the absence of such countervailing proof. The fact that AAA had a boyfriend does not
necessarily exclude all possibilities of rape. In reality, it barely has anything to do with the
charges she had filed against appellant. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELISEO D. VILLAMOR,
G.R. NO. 202187, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
Probable Cause- In this case, assuming arguendo that Gomez's statements, as written in her
affidavit are indeed hearsay, there is nevertheless substantial basis to credit the same,
considering that she was a former Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer of DBI -a high-ranking
officer that may be privy to delicate transactions such as the purported "under the table" deal
involving private respondents. In this regard, it must be emphasized, that in determining the
elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts
sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondents are required, not absolute
certainty. Probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than
bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction. To reiterate, the validity of
the merits of a party's defense or accusations as well as the admissibility of testimonies and
evidences are better ventilated during the trial stage than in the preliminary stage. (PHILIPPINE
DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC) VS. CASIMIRO, G.R. No. 206866, September 2,
2015)
“Physical Impossibility”- Physical impossibility" refers to distance and the facility of access
between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed.
There must be demonstration that they were so far away and could not have been physically
10 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES v.DIONE BARBERAN AND DIONE DELOS SANTOS, G.R. No. 208759, June
22, 2016)
FELONIES
ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Intent; “Mens Rea” - The case of Villareal v. People is instructing. In that case, the Court
discussed that the RPC belongs to the classical school of thought. The criminal liability is thus
based on the free will and moral blame of the actor. The identity of mens rea - defined as a
guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent - is the predominant consideration.
In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means of
"dolo" or "malice". The Court further explained that the term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex
idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent. The element of intent is
described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the
purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds. On the other hand, the
term "felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart
or purpose. With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony
must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a
forbidden act. (VIRGINIA JABALDE Y JAMANDRON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
195224, June 15, 2016)
Death of the Accused Pending Appeal; Criminal Liability- In People v. Amistoso, the Court
explained that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Consequently, Renato's death on June 10,
2014 renders the Court's July 23, 2014 Resolution irrelevant and ineffectual as to him, and is
therefore set aside. Accordingly, the criminal case against Renato is dismissed. (PEOPLE vs.
DIONALDO G.R. No. 207949 September 9, 2015)
COMPLEX CRIMES AND COMPOSITE CRIMES
Special Complex Crimes; Rape With Homicide - Appellant was charged and convicted of rape
with homicide. The felony of rape with homicide is a special complex crime that is, two or more
11 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
crimes that the law treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a
single criminal impulse. In rape with homicide, the following elements must concur: (1) the
appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by
means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal
knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, the appellant killed a woman. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE BRONIOLA @ "ASOT"; G.R. No. 211027. JUNE 29, 2015)
Complex Crimes- In People v. Nelmida, the Court explained the concept of a complex crime as
defined in Article 4833 of the Revised Penal Code, thus: In a complex crime, two or more crimes
are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender
they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of
complex crime. The first is known as a compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as a complex crime proper, or when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of the first kind is
when a single bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs where
separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when
various victims expire from separate shot, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.
Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two
others, in firing successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their
respective firearms, intended to kill not only Norberto, but his entire family. When several
gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a group of people, it shows their
intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are committing not only one crime. What
appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime because as held
in People v. Nelmida, "each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms,
aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which
cannot give rise to a complex crime." (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IRENEO JUGUETA, G.R.
No. 202124, April 5, 2016)
Complex Crimes; Penalties; Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) states that in complex
crimes, “ the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period.” Thus in Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public
Documents, the prescribed penalties for Malversation and falsification should be taken account.
Under the RPC, the penalty for malversation of public funds or property if the amount involved
exceeds P22,000.00 shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua,
aside from perpetual special disqualification and fine equal to amount of funds malversed or
property embezzled. On the other hand, penalty of prision maror and fine of P5,000.00 shall be
imposed for falsification commited by public officer. Considering that malversation is more
12 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
serious offense, the imposable penalty or malversation of Public Funds thru Falsication of
Official/Public Documents if the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 is reclusion perpetua, it
being the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of “reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LUZVIMINDA VALDEZ G.R. No.
216007, December 8, 2015).
CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
Self-Defense. Basic is the rule that in every criminal case, the burden of proving the guilt of the
accused falls upon the prosecution which has the duty of establishing all the essential elements
of the crime. However, in cases where the accused interposes the justifying circumstance of self-
defense, this prosecutorial burden is shifted to the accused who himself must prove all the
indispensable ingredients of such defense, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The presence or absence of
these essential elements deals with factual matters which are best left to the discretion of the
trial court to ascertain. As the Court has repeatedly emphasized in many cases, the trial court is
in a better position to determine the credibility of witnesses having heard and observed
firsthand their behavior and manner of testifying during trial. Thus, the reviewing court is
generally bound by the trial court's findings where no substantial reason exists that would
justify a reversal of the assessments and conclusions drawn by the latter. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. NESTOR ROXAS y CASTRO, G.R. NO. 218396, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
Self-defense, when invoked as a justifying circumstance, implies the admission by the accused
that he committed the criminal act. Generally, the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused that he was in
fact innocent. When the accused, however, admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon him
to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. Well-settled is
the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to
the defense. (PEOPLE US. SAMSON, G.R. No. 214883, September 2, 2015)
To invoke self-defense, in order to escape criminal liability, it is incumbent upon the accused to
prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following requisites under the
second paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC, viz.: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity
13 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person defending himself. (PEOPLE US. SAMSON, G.R. No. 214883, September 2, 2015)
After taking into account the location and the number of stab wounds sustained by the victim,
the accused-appellant's claim of self-defense further crumbles. To reiterate, the first stab blow
hit Severino's back jibing with Vicente's assertion that the former was stabbed from behind.
Then, when the victim was totally caught by surprise with the initial attack, the second and third
stab blows were delivered. Additionally, the number of wounds suffered by Severino invalidates
the accused-appellant's allegation that he was only defending himself for the number of
wounds inflicted are rather demonstrative of deliberate and criminal intent to end the life of the
victim. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NESTOR ROXAS y CASTRO, G.R. NO., FEBRUARY 10,
2016)
Case law has established that in invoking self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, the
onus probandi is shifted to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the
elements of the justifying circumstance, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (b) the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. (RAFAEL NADYAHAN vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 193134, MARCH 2, 2016)
Self-Defense; Unlawful Aggression. Among the requisites of self-defense, the most important
that needs to be proved by the accused, for it to prosper, is the element of unlawful aggression.
It must be proven first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded. There can be no self-
defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful
aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense. When the Court speaks of unlawful
aggression, it is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury,
upon a person. There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts the life,
limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense in actual or imminent danger. There must be
actual physical force or actual use of a weapon. It is present only when the one attacked faces
real and immediate threat to his life. It must be continuous, otherwise, it does not constitute
aggression warranting self-defense. (PEOPLE US. SAMSON, G.R. No. 214883, September 2,
2015)
In order for self-defense to be appreciated, accused-appellant must be able to prove by clear

and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. An accused who invokes self-
defense has the burden to prove all the aforesaid elements, the most important of which is
unlawful aggression. Being the basic requirement in a plea of self-defense, unlawful aggression
14 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded, whether complete or
incomplete. No self-defense can exist without unlawful aggression since there is no attack that
the accused will have to prevent or repel. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERNIE INCIONG y
ORENSE, G.R. No. 213383, JUNE 22, 2015)
Unlawful aggression is the condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstances of self-
defense and defense of a relative. Here, we agree with the CA that there was no unlawful
aggression on the part of De Leon. Randolf himself testified that he hit De Leon because he
thought that De Leon was with the man who punched him and not because he was threatened
by De Leon's gun. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 205316. JUNE
29, 2015)
The accused who pleads self-defense admits the authorship of the crime. The burden of proving
self-defense rests entirely on him, that he must then prove by clear and convincing evidence the
concurrence of the following elements of self-defense, namely: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The most
important of all the elements is unlawful aggression, which is the condition sine qua non for
upholding self-defense as a justifying circumstance. Unless the victim committed unlawful
aggression against the accused, self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, should not be
appreciated, for the two other essential elements of self-defense would have no factual and
legal bases without any unlawful aggression to prevent or repel. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
ALFREDO DULIN y NARAG, G.R. No. 171284. JUNE 29, 2015)
Unlawful aggression as the condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense is aptly described
in People v. Nugas. 661 SCRA 159 (2011), as follows: Unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful
aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of
unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in
real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an
imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three
elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or
assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or
assault must be unlawful. Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful
aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression
means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively
determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means
an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively
strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a
motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude
15 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered,
accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. ALFREDO DULIN y NARAG, G.R. No. 171284. JUNE 29, 2015)
Self-Defense; Unlawful Aggression ; Retaliation. Contrary to the trial court's assessment" she
did not show aggression towards her husband when she pushed him after he pointed the knife
away from her. She was, in fact, manifesting a passive attitude towards him when she just stood
her ground, with the knife in hand, asking him not to come near her. It would have been a
different story if Gerry, after dropping the knife, walked away and Cristina still went after him. If
that were the case, she could not assert self-defense. She was no longer acting in self-defense
but in retaliation for the earlier aggression. Retaliation is inconsistent with self-defense and in
fact belies it. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased
when the accused attacked him; while in self-defense the aggression still existed when the
aggressor was injured by the accused. (PEOPLE US. SAMSON, G.R. No. 214883, September 2,
2015)
We uphold the finding and holding of the CA. Batulan, albeit the initial aggressor against Dulin,
ceased to be the aggressor as soon as Dulin had dispossessed him of the weapon. Even if
Batulan still went after Dulin despite the latter going inside the house of Danao, where they
again grappled for control of the weapon. the grappling for the weapon did not amount to
aggression from Batulan for it was still Dulin who held control of the weapon at that point.
Whatever Dulin did thereafter - like stabbing Batulan with the weapon - constituted retaliation
against Batulan. In this regard, retaliation was not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the
aggression that the victim started already ceased when the accused attacked him, but in self-
defense, the aggression was still continuing when the accused injured the aggressor. As such,
there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Batulan to justify his fatal stabbing by Dulin.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALFREDO DULIN y NARAG, G.R. No. 171284. JUNE 29, 2015)
Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed. The requisite of reasonable necessity of the
means employed is met if the person invoking self-defense used a weapon or a manner
equivalent to the means of attack used by the aggressor. The reasonable necessity of the self-
defense utilized by an accused is to defend himself "depends upon the nature or quality of the
weapon, the physical condition, the character, the size and other circumstances of the
aggressor; as well as those of the person who invokes self-defense; and also the place and the
occasion of the assault." Moreover, the nature and location of wounds are considered
important indicators whether or not to disprove a plea of self-defense. (PEOPLE US. SAMSON,
G.R. No. 214883, September 2, 2015)
16 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
The fact that Gerry was no longer armed does not negate the reasonableness of the means
employed by Cristina. Perfect equality between the weapon used by the one defending himself
and that of the aggressor is not required. What the law requires is a rational equivalence, in the
consideration of which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to
which the accused is exposed, and the instinct more than reason, that moves or impels his
defense; and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but upon
the imminent danger of such injury. (PEOPLE US. SAMSON, G.R. No. 214883, September 2,
2015)
Lack of Sufficient Provocation. The last requisite to be considered is lack of sufficient

provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The Court cannot sustain the trial
court's observation that it was Cristina who provoked her husband when she suddenly pushed
him. Her shoving him cannot be considered a sufficient provocation proportionate to the act of
aggression. She merely capitalized on a window of opportunity, when her husband removed the
knife away from her throat, to save herself from what she had perceived to be a danger to her
life. Anybody, in her situation would have acted in the same reasonable way. (PEOPLE US.
SAMSON, G.R. No. 214883, September 2, 2015)
Self-Defense; Flight. Likewise weakening accused-appellant's contention that he acted in self-

defense was his behavior immediately after the incident. In the case at bar, the accused-
appellant himself admitted that upon seeing the victim lying on the ground, he boarded a jeep
to go to his sister's place in San Pascual, Batangas before moving to Bicol where he hid from the
authorities for several years. The accused-appellant's flight negates his plea of self-defense and
indicates his guilt. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NESTOR ROXAS y CASTRO, G.R. NO. 218396
FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Accident; Elements of. The defense invoked Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code
to release the accused-appellant from criminal liability. Pursuant to said provision, the essential
requisites of accident as an exempting circumstances are: (1) a person is performing a lawful
act; (2) with due care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without fault
or intention of causing it. A close scrutiny of the transcripts of stenographic notes would reveal
that the accused-appellant was not performing a lawful act at the time Auria was stabbed. This
17 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
can be gathered from the narration of the accused-appellant during cross-examination

conducted by Prosecutor Percival Dolina. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL MACAL y
BOLASCO, GR No. 211062, January 13, 2016
Impulse of Uncontrollable Fear. To begin with, "acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear"
is not among the mitigating circumstances enumerated in Article 13 of the RPC, but is an
exempting circumstance provided under Article 12 (6) of the same Code. Moreover, for such a
circumstance to be appreciated in favor of an accused, the following elements must concur: (a)
the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (b) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (c) the
fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed. For such defense to
prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and
of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the
act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. (ADINA B. MANANSALA vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 215424, December 09, 2015)
Insanity - To completely evade culpability, Verdadero raises insanity as a defense claiming that
he had suffered a relapse of his schizophrenia. Under Article 12 of the RPC, an imbecile or an
insane person is exempt from criminal liability, unless the latter had acted during a lucid
interval. The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved for there is a presumption
that the acts penalized by law are voluntary. (SOLOMON VERDADERO y GALERA vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 216021, MARCH 2, 2016)
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between

fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. 19 A showing that an
accused is suffering from a mental disorder, however, does not automatically exonerate him
from the consequences of his act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability. (SOLOMON VERDADERO y GALERA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO.
216021, MARCH 2, 2016)
In raising the defense of insanity, Verdadero admits to the commission of the crime because
such defense is in the nature of a confession or avoidance.23 As such, he is duty bound to
establish with certainty that he was completely deprived, not merely diminished, of intelligence
at the time of the commission of the crime. Failing which, Verdadero should be criminally
punished for impliedly admitting to have stabbed Romeo to death. Proving insanity is a tedious
task for it requires an examination of the mental state of the accused. In People v. Opuran24 the
Court explained how one's insanity may be established, to wit: Since insanity is a condition of
the mind, it is not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man can know what is going on
in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be measured and
18 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
judged by his behavior. Thus, the vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts, by
means of which we read the thoughts, motives, and emotions of a person, and then determine
whether the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. Insanity is evinced by a
deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in language and
conduct. Xxx Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which
may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to
conclude that the accused was insane based on his own perception; or is qualified as an expert,
such as a psychiatrist. (SOLOMON VERDADERO y GALERA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
NO. 216021, MARCH 2, 2016)
Indeed, the grant of absolution on the basis of insanity should be done with utmost care and
circumspection as the State must keep its guard against murderers seeking to escape
punishment through a general plea of insanity. The circumstances in the case at bench,
however, do not indicate that the defense of insanity was merely used as a convenient tool to
evade culpability. The Court notes that at the very first opportunity, Verdadero already raised
the defense of insanity and remained steadfast in asserting that he was deprived of intelligence
at the time of the commission of the offense. He no longer offered any denial or alibi and,
instead, consistently harped on his mental incapacity. Unlike in previous cases32 where the Court
denied the defense of insanity as it was raised only when the initial defense of alibi failed to
prosper, Verdadero's alleged insanity was not a mere afterthought. (SOLOMON VERDADERO y
GALERA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 216021, MARCH 2, 2016)
In exonerating Verdadero on the ground of insanity, the Court does not totally free him from the
responsibilities and consequences of his acts. Article 12(1) of the RPC expressly states that
"[w]hen an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony, the court
shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus
afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the
same court." Instead of incarceration, Verdadero is to be confined in an institution where his
mental condition may be addressed so that he may again function as a member of society. He
shall remain confined therein until his attending physicians give a favorable recommendation
for his release. (SOLOMON VERDADERO y GALERA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO.
216021, MARCH 2, 2016)
In appreciating insanity in favor of Verdadero, the Court absolves him from criminal
responsibility. He is, nevertheless, responsible to indemnify the heirs of Romeo for the latter's
death. An exempting circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist,
but the accused is freed from the criminal liability. (SOLOMON VERDADERO y GALERA vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 216021, MARCH 2, 2016)
19 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Passion or Obfuscation. In imposing the correct penalty, however, the Court has to consider
the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13(6). of the RPC, because
Jabalde lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power. There
is passion or obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of
passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful
as to overcome reason. For passion and obfuscation to be considered a mitigating circumstance,
it must be shown that: (1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was
committed by the intended victim; (2) the crime was committed within a reasonable length of
time from the commission of the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the accused's
mind; and (3) the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of
lawlessness or revenge. With her having acted under the belief that Lin had killed her daughter,
Jabalde is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. (VIRGINIA
JABALDE Y JAMANDRON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016)
Privileged Mitigating Circumstances; Incomplete Self-Defense. Pursuant to Article 69 of the

Revised Penal Code, the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense reduces
the penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law. For this purpose, the accused
must prove the existence of the majority of the elements for self-defense, but unlawful
aggression, being an indispensable element, must be present. Either or both of the other
requisites may be absent, namely: reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it, or the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALFREDO DULIN y NARAG, G.R. No. 171284. JUNE 29, 2015)
Privileged Mitigating Circumstances; Minority. As the crime of rape was committed by two
persons, the imposable under Article 266(B) of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to
death. Pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, if the penalty prescribed by law is
composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be imposed if neither mitigating
nor aggravating circumstances are present in the commission of the crime. Since no aggravating
circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the leser penalty of reclusion perpetua is
imposable. Appellant Allain was only 17 years old when he committed the crime; he is,
therefore, entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Aritcle 68(2) of
the Revised Penal Code which provides that the penalty to be imposed upon a person under 18
but above 15 shall be the penalty next lower than prescribed by the law, but always in the
20 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
proper period. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VERGEL ANCAJAS and ALLAIN** ANCAJAS.
G.R. No. 199270. October 21, 2015.)
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Before a qualifying circumstance may be taken into consideration, it must be proved with equal
certainty as that which establishes the commission of the crime. It is not only the central fact of
killing that must be proved beyond reasonable doubt; every qualifying or aggravating
circumstance alleged to have been present and to have attended such killing, must similarly be
shown by the same degree of proof. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,v. APOLONIO "TOTONG"
AVILA Y ALECANTE, G.R. No. 201584, June 15, 2016)
Evident Premeditation. It bears stressing that the Information for murder instituted in this case
alleged only two aggravating/qualifying circumstances in support thereof, to wit: evident
premeditation and treachery. But, as correctly found by both the RTC and the CA – with which
finding we are in full accord – the aggravating/qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation
did not attend the killing of the deceased Corazon because there is no evidence at all that the
killing was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the decision to carry out the criminal
intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. In fact, the prosecution
here has adduced no evidence at all to show that sufficient time had lapsed before appellant
decided or determined to commit the crime; nor that appellant, by some convincing act or
action, had indeed clung to his determination to kill the victim; let alone that sufficient time had
indeed lapsed or transpired between the decision to kill and its actual execution, to allow
appellant time or opportunity to reflect upon the consequences of his act. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. FEDERICO DE LA CRUZ y SANTOS, G.R. NO. 207389, FEBRUARY 17, 2016)
The essence of evident premeditation, on the other hand, is that the execution of the criminal
act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. For it to be
appreciated, the following must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung
to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution
to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. As aptly pointed out by the Office of
the Solicitor General, the trial court conceded that the specific time when the accused
determined to commit the crime, and the interval between such determination and execution,
21 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
cannot be determined. After a careful review of the records, the Court agrees with the CA’s
finding that no evidence was adduced to prove the first and third elements of evident
premeditation. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZALDY SALAHUDDIN, G.R. No. 206291,
January 18, 2016)
To establish evident premeditation, there must be proof of (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his
determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome
the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its warnings. The essence of
premeditation is that the execution of the act was preceded by reflection during a period of
time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. When it is not shown as to how and when the plan
to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation
cannot be considered. It must be based on external acts and must not be merely suspected.
There must be a demonstration of outward acts of a criminal intent that is notorious and
manifest. The prosecution failed to satisfy the requisites of evident premeditation. The records
contain no evidence regarding the planning and preparation of the killing of Janjoy. It was
likewise not shown that accused-appellant clung to his detemiination to kill Janjoy. In fact, the
only thing established by the prosecution witness' testimony was accused-appellant's plan to kill
Rovic Vasquez, not Janjoy Vasquez. Thus, it cannot be said that accused-appellant had a
preconceived plan to kill Janjoy. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,v. APOLONIO "TOTONG" AVILA Y
ALECANTE, G.R. No. 201584, June 15, 2016)
Abuse of Superior Strength. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in
the commission of the crime. The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim
does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there
being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim. Mere superiority in
numbers is not indicative of the presence of this circumstance. The evidence must establish that
the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this
advantage. The prosecution failed to adduce evidence of a relative disparity in age, size and
strength, or force, except for the showing that there were two assailants present when the
crime was committed. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,v. APOLONIO "TOTONG" AVILA Y
ALECANTE, G.R. No. 201584, June 15, 2016)
It is discernible that respondents took advantage of their superior strength or otherwise
employed means to weaken petitioner’s defense. With this qualifying circumstance, there is
22 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
ample basis for pursuing respondents’ prosecution for murder, albeit not in its consummated
stage. (MARASIGAN Y DE GUZMAN V. FUENTES, G.R. NO. 201310, JANUARY 11, 2016)
Aggravating Circumstances; Pregnancy For this crime, pregnancy or the presence of the
woman's child are aggravating circumstances which increase the imposable penalty, thus, they
must be alleged and proven with competent evidence for the penalty to be properly imposed. It
is true that the fact of AAA's incomplete abortion or miscarriage does not establish any of the
crime's elements, as indeed the information itself did not allege the same. However, from the
fact of miscarriage one may logically derive the fact of AAA's pregnancy, which is an aggravating
circumstance for the crime and which is alleged as such in the information. The pregnancy is
proven by AAA's unrebutted testimony as well as by the medical certificate that she presented
in the course of such testimony to show that she was indeed hospitalized and suffered an
"incomplete abortion secondary to the mauling." (RICKY DINAMLING v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 199522, JUNE 22, 2015)
The single circumstance of pregnancy aggravates the accused's liability and automatically raises
his penalty to the maximum period of the penalty prescribed, per Section 6 of RA No. 9262 and
Article 64(3) of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals
are to be modified. The maximum penalty should be derived from prisi6n mayor in its maximum
period, which, again, is imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. And
again, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum should be derived from the
penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional. Therefore, the new penalty to be
imposed shall be imprisonment of six (6) years prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12)
years of prision mayor as maximum. The rest of the penalties, like the imposition or the
petitioner of a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) and the order for him to
undergo psychological counseling, as upheld by the appellate court, are hereby affirmed. (RICKY
DINAMLING v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 199522, JUNE 22, 2015)
To take advantage of superior strength is to purposely use excessive force, out of proportion to
the means of defense available to the person attacked. We agree with the CA that the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present in this case. As aptly pointed out by the
CA, De Leon was already helpless when he was repeatedly attacked with a gas tank. Appellants
clearly used excessive force against the already unarmed and defenseless De Leon. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 205316. JUNE 29, 2015)
23 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and
(specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the I defense which the
offended party might make. The requisites of treachery are: (1) The employment of means,
method, or manner of execution which will ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive
or retaliating acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (2) deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method or
manner of execution. A finding of existence of treachery should be based on "clear and
convincing evidence". The first shot was fired from behind a closed door, catching the victim by
surprise. The second shot to the victim's head was fired immediately after the door was forced
open by the accused-appellant. Such manner of execution of the crime ensured the safety of
accused-appellant from retaliation and afforded the victim no opportunity to defend herself.
Thus, We hold that the circumstance of treachery should be appreciated, qualifying the crime to
Murder. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,v. APOLONIO "TOTONG" AVILA Y ALECANTE, G.R. No.
201584, June 15, 2016)
Similarly, treachery as a qualifying circumstance was correctly appreciated. Treachery is present
when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In this case, a
credible eyewitness account established that accused-appellant, upon meeting Lumbera by the
roadside, suddenly fired a sumpak against the latter, leaving him unable to defend himself or
evade the attack. The assault on Lumbera ensured that accused-appellant would be able to
consummate the crime without risk to his own person, hence, the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. Finally, with regard to the use of an unlicensed firearm, a circumstance alleged in the
information, the Court shall no longer delve upon its significance in this case, the same not
having been appreciated by the courts a quo. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERNIE INCIONG y
ORENSE, G.R. No. 213383, JUNE 22, 2015)
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially
ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. Two conditions must concur in order for treachery to be appreciated, namely: one,
the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and two, said means,
methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant.
Treachery, whenever alleged in the information and competently and clearly proved, qualifies
the killing and raises it to the category of murder. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALFREDO
DULIN y NARAG, G.R. No. 171284. JUNE 29, 2015)
24 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning, or is done in a swift,
deliberate and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or to escape, without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. The
mode of attack must not spring from the unexpected turn of events. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. ALFREDO DULIN y NARAG, G.R. No. 171284. JUNE 29, 2015)
As held in People v. Fallorina, the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on
an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his part. Minor children, who by
reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. When an adult person
illegally attacks a child, treachery exists. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IRENEO JUGUETA,
G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016)
As to the finding of treachery, we affirm the rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The
RPC, in Article 14(16), defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms
in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. "There are two (2) conditions that must concur for treachery to exist, to wit: (a) the
employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself
or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was deliberately and consciously
adopted. 'The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in
a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim [with]
no chance to resist or escape."' (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RODELIO LLOBERA Y OFIZA,
G.R. NO. 203066, AUGUST 5, 2015)
The mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to treachery. The essence of treachery is
that the attack is deliberate and without warning and is done in a swift and unexpected way,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim with no chance to resist or escape.
Thus, even frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected[,] and the victim
is unarmed. In the case at bar, treachery is evident. For one, "[t]he use of a xxx shotgun against
[an] unarmed [victim] is undoubtedly treacherous, as it denies the [victim] the chance to fend
off the offender." For another, the fact that accused-appellant hid first and then blindsided the
victim shows his conscious effort to adopt a deliberate attack which affords no warning to the
victim (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RODELIO LLOBERA Y OFIZA, G.R. NO. 203066, AUGUST
5, 2015)
The CA likewise aptly held that even if the death penalty were still in effect, the imposable
penalty would be reclusion perpetua, since abuse of superior strength can no longer be
appreciated as a separate aggravating circumstance in this case. When the circumstance of
abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. Since
there no longer exists any aggravating circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, in
accordance with Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, it being the lesser penalty
25 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
between the two indivisible penalties for the crime of murder, which is reclusion perpetua to
death. (THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RANDY BANEZ y BAYLON and RAMIL BANEZ y
BAYLON, and FELIX RUFINO, G.R. No. 198057, September 21, 2015)
There was alevosia or treachery in accused-appellant’s killing of Paceño. For treachery to qualify
the act of killing t murder, two elements must concur: (1) the culprit employed means,
methods, and forms of execution which tended directly and specially to insure the offender’s
safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, which means that
no opportunity was given the latter to do so; and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the
particular means, method, or form of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is a
swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the
part of the victim. Treachery is never presumed but must be proven with moral certainty like the
offense itself. In the instant case, accused-appellant’s treachery us evident in the following
circumstances: (a) he armed himself with a gun; (b) he consciously boarded the same multicab
with Paceño and sat across the latter; (c) Paceño was unarmed and unaware of any impending
attack against him; (d) without any provocation, accused-appellant suddenly pulled out his gun,
and aimed and shot Paceño twice in the head, leaving the latter with no means to defend
himself, much less retaliate. The qualifying circumstance of treachery was properly alleged in
the Information. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BONIFACIO DANDANON y ILIGAN a.k.a.
“Boning,” G.R. No. 196258. September 28, 2015)
In this case, the trial court correctly ruled that the fatal shooting of Atty. Segundo was attended
by treachery because appellant shot the said victim suddenly and without any warning with a
deadly weapon, thus: x x x Atty. Segundo G. Sotto, Jr., who was driving his jeep with his teenage
niece as passenger sitting on his right side on the front seat, was totally unaware that he will be
treacherously shot just 200 meters away from his residence. He was unarmed and was not given
any opportunity to defend himself or to escape from the deadly assault. After he was hit when
the gunman fired the first two shots at him and his niece and after he lost control of his jeep
which bumped an interlink wire fence and stopped, he was again shot three times by the
gunman. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZALDY SALAHUDDIN, G.R. No. 206291, January 18,
2016)
The fact that the shooting of the three victims had occurred in quick succession fully called for a
finding of the attendance of treachery in the attacks against all the victims. Montegrico, Tamanu
and Paleg were drinking together outside their bunkhouse prior to the shooting when the
accused suddenly appeared from the rear of the dump truck, walked towards their table and
shot Montegrico without any warning. That first shot was quickly followed by more shots. In
that situation, none of the three victims was aware of the imminent deadly assault by the
26 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
accused, for they were just enjoying their drinks outside their bunkhouse. They were unarmed,
and did not expect to be shot, when the accused came and shot them. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, v. MARIANO OANDASAN, JR., G.R. No. 194605, June 14, 2016)
The attack was mounted with treachery because the two conditions in order for this
circumstance to be appreciated concurred, namely: (a) that the means, methods and forms of
execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or to
retaliate; and (b) that such means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and
consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person. The essence of treachery lay
in the attack that came without warning, and was swift, deliberate and unexpected, affording
the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victims no chance to resist, or retaliate, or escape,
thereby ensuring the accomplishment of the deadly design without risk to the aggressor, and
without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v.
MARIANO OANDASAN, JR., G.R. No. 194605, June 14, 2016)
What was decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to
defend themselves or to retaliate. Jurisprudence has been illustrative of this proposition. In
People v. Flora, for instance, treachery was appreciated as an attendant circumstance in the
killing of two victims, and in the attempted killing of a third victim, warranting the conviction of
the accused for two murders and attempted murder, notwithstanding that although the accused
had first fired at his Intended victim, he had missed and had instead hit the two other victims,
with the Court observing that the three victims were all nonetheless "helpless to defend
themselves." In a nother illustrative ruling, People v. Pinto, Jr., treachery was held to attend the
three killings and the wounding of a fourth victim because the attack was sudden and the
victims were defenseless; hence, the killings were murders, and the wounding frustrated
murder. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. MARIANO OANDASAN, JR., G.R. No. 194605, June 14,
2016)
As to the finding of treachery, we affirm the rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The
RPC, in Article 14(16), defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms
in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. "There are two (2) conditions that must concur for treachery to exist, to wit: (a) the
employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself
or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was deliberately and consciously
adopted. 'The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in
27 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim [with]
no chance to resist or escape." (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODELIO LLOBERA Y OFIZA,
G.R. No. 203066, August 05, 2015)
"The mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to treachery. The essence of treachery is
that the attack is deliberate and without warning and is done in a swift and unexpected way,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim with no chance to resist or escape.
Thus, even frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected[,] and the victim
is unarmed. In the case at bar, treachery is evident. For one, "[t]he use of a xxx shotgun against
[an] unarmed [victim] is undoubtedly treacherous, as it denies the [victim] the chance to fend
off the offender." For another, the fact that accused-appellant hid first and then blindsided the
victim shows his conscious effort to adopt a deliberate attack which affords no warning to the
victim. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODELIO LLOBERA Y OFIZA, G.R. No. 203066, August
05, 2015)
As for the qualifying circumstance of treachery, paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the
execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. (PEOPLE V. SALIBAD Y DILO, G.R. No. 210616, [November 25, 2015])
Two conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely (a) the employment of means of
execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the
means or method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted. (PEOPLE VS. ZABALA
G.R. No. 203087. November 23, 2015)
Even if the attack is frontal but sudden and unexpected, giving no opportunity for the victim to
repel it or defend himself; there would be treachery. (PEOPLE VS. ZABALA G.R. No. 203087.
November 23, 2015)
Treachery is never presumed and “it is required that the manner of attack must be shown to
have been attended by treachery as conclusive as the crime itself.” (PEOPLE VS. CUESTA, G.R.
No. 217380, November 23, 2015)
From the pronouncement in Cirera v. People, 730 SCRA 27 (2014), it is apparent that treachery
cannot be appreciated if the victim’s position was accidental and the accused acted impulsively.
The means of attack should have been deliberately and consciously adopted by accused.
(PEOPLE VS. CUESTA, G.R. No. 217380, November 23, 2015)
28 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in its execution which tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might
make. At this point, it bears to emphasize that the stabbing was not preceded by any argument
between the victim and the accused-appellant. So, when the accused-appellant surreptitiously
approached the victim from behind, the latter had no inkling nor reason to believe that his life
was in danger. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NESTOR ROXAS y CASTRO, G.R. NO. 218396,
FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
On account of the fact that Severino was just casually conversing with Vicente at that time, his
defenses were down. Naturally, Severino was too stunned by the suddenness of the first stab
blow at his back. As a result, the victim could no longer recover from the initial attack and the
other two stab blows inflicted made it more difficult for Severino to defend himself or retaliate.
This is precisely the essence of treachery wherein the attack must be deliberate and without
warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. Further, the strategy employed by the
accused-appellant in carrying out the attack guaranteed that he will not be exposed to any risk
which may arise from the defense the victim might make. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
NESTOR ROXAS y CASTRO, G.R. NO. 218396, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
We are likewise convinced that the killing was qualified by treachery. "There is treachery when
the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." "The essence of
treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected
manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape." In this case, appellant’s sudden attack on Corazon inside her apartment amply
demonstrates that treachery was employed in the commission of the crime. Corazon could not
have been aware that her life was in imminent danger inside the comforts of her own home.
When appellant barged in, Corazon was having coffee with Joan totally unaware that she would
be attacked inside the confines of her own house. When appellant grabbed her neck and
stabbed her in the back, Corazon was afforded no chance to defend herself and retaliate or
repel the attack. Although she struggled, such was not enough to protect or extricate her from
the harm posed by appellant. Undoubtedly, the CA correctly held that the crime committed was
murder under Article 248 of the RPC in view of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. All told,
Corazon was unaware of the imminent danger on her life, and was not in a position to defend
herself. Verily, treachery attended the commission of the crime. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. FEDERICO DE LA CRUZ y SANTOS, G.R. NO. 207389, FEBRUARY 17, 2016)
29 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
One of the circumstances which qualifies the killing to Murder is the existence of treachery.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.In People v. Gunda,it was explained that when the attack against an unarmed victim is so
sudden and unexpected that he had no inkling of what the assailant was about to do, there is
treachery. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. OSCAR PARBA Y SOLON, G.R. No. 214506, October
19, 2015 )
As found by the Court of Appeals, treachery attended the shooting against Judge Velasco, thus:
Gilbert was shown to have shot the deceased, Judge Velasco. The victim was hit three (3) times
while on board a motorcycle at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening. Judge Velasco was
approaching his house while coming from a birthday party when he was shot. He was unarmed
and accompanied by Garabato, his wife, and Christopher Iway. Clearly, Judge Velasco was
unaware of any attack that Gilbert planned against him. To ensure the success of his criminal
design, Gilbert, with the aid of an unidentified person, fired at the victim three (3) times. What
existed in this case was such a sudden and unexpected attack and without warning on an
unsuspecting victim, depriving Judge Velasco of any real chance to defend himself, and thereby
ensuring, without risk, of its commission . What is decisive is that the execution of the attack,
without the slightest provocation from the victim, who was unarmed, made it impossible for the
victim to defend himself or to retaliate. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GILBERT CABALLERO Y
GARSOLA, G.R. No. 210673, June 29, 2016)
We agree with the CA in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance. The essence of

treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the victim
of any chance to defend himself. Here, Randy witnessed that it was Villariez who shot his father
at the back. Enrique, deep in thought while listening to the burial service, was unprepared and
had no means to put up a defense. Enrique was shot unexpectedly which insured the
commission of the crime without risk to Villariez. This treacherous act qualified the killing to
murder. (PEOPLE VS. VILLARIEZ, G.R. No. 211160, September 2, 2015)
Use of Deadly Weapon. As to Roberto, we affirm the imposition of reclusion perpetua for each
of the crimes committed. Under Article 266-B of RA. No. 8353, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death shall be imposed whenever the crime of rape is committed through the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons. In this case, it was sufficiently alleged in the Information
and proven during trial that the crime was committed by Roberto together with Don Juan and
Bombasi. Since neither applicable aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attended the
commission of the crime, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties which is reclusion perpetua
30 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
shall be imposed to Roberto pursuant to Article 63 of the penal code. (PEOPLE VS. HIDALGO,
G.R. No. 203313, September 2, 2015)
Use of a motor vehicle Meanwhile, the use of a motor vehicle is aggravating when it is used
either to commit the crime or to facilitate escape, but not when the use thereof was merely
incidental and was not purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the offense or to render
the escape of the offender easier and his apprehension difficult. In People v. Herbias, the Court
held: The use of motor vehicle may likewise be considered as an aggravating circumstance that
attended the commission of the crime. The records show that assailants used a motorcycle in
trailing and overtaking the jeepney driven by Saladio after which appellant’s back rider
mercilessly riddled with his bullets the body of Jeremias. There is no doubt that the motorcycle
was used as a means to commit the crime and to facilitate their escape after they accomplished
their mission.
Special Aggravating Circumstances; Illegal Possession of Unlicensed Firearm. The Supreme

Court has clarified that there is no need to present the firearm itself to prove the existence of
an unlicensed firearm.— The Court has clarified that there is no need to present the firearm
itself to prove the existence of an unlicensed firearm. People v. Narvasa is instructive on this
matter, viz.:. . . In People v. Lualhati, this Court merely stated that the existence of the firearm
must be established; it did not rule that the firearm itself had to be presented as evidence.
Thus, in People v. Orehuela, the Court held that the existence of the firearm can be
established by testimony, even without the presentation of the said firearm. (PEOPLE V.
SALIBAD Y DILO, G.R. No. 210616, [November 25, 2015])
Notably, the term unlicensed firearm includes the unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the
commission of the crime, under Section 5 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8294. Assuming arguendo
that the actual firearm used by appellant was licensed, he still failed to prove that he was so
authorized to use it by the duly licensed owner. The prosecution having proven that appellant
was not issued a firearms license or permit to carry or permit to transport firearms, the burden
of evidence is then shifted to appellant to prove his authorization to use the firearm. All told,
the trial court correctly appreciated the presence of the said aggravating circumstance in
imposing the penalty against appellant. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZALDY SALAHUDDIN,
G.R. No. 206291, January 18, 2016)
31 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
ABSOLUTORY CAUSE
Absolutory Cause; Elements of. Article 247 is an absolutory cause that recognizes the
commission of a crime that for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty
imposed. The defense must prove the concurrence of the following elements: (1) that a legally
married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person; (2) the he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and (3)
that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or
she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse. Among the three elements, the
most vital is that the accused-appellant must prove to the court that he killed his wife and her
paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter. Having admitted the
stabbing, the burden of proof is shifted to the defense to show the applicability of Article 247.
As disclosed by the accused-appellant, when he saw Auria with a man, the two were just seated
beside each other and were simply talking. Evidently, the absolutory cause embodied in Article
247 is not applicable in the present case. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL MACAL y
BOLASCO, GR No. 211062, January 13, 2016)
PERSONS LIABLE AND DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION
PRINCIPALS, ACCOMPLICES AND ACCESSORIES
Principal by Inducement - The conviction of a person as a principal by inducement requires (1)

that the inducement be made with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and
(2) that such inducement be the determining cause of the commission by the material executor.
As applied, the Sandiganbayan would have been correct in holding petitioner criminally liable if
he indeed made the utterance immediately before the shooting incident. However, this Court is
not inclined to believe that petitioner indeed made the declaration that started the fray. The
court a quo failed to take note of substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of star
prosecution witnesses Patam and Ronnel Bawalan. These contradictions refer not only to minor
details but even to the facts constituting important aspects of the case, seriously eroding the
weight of the evidence of the prosecution, and casting reasonable doubt on the culpability of
petitioner Ambagan. (ALBERT G. AMBAGAN, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos.
204481-82, October 14, 2015.)
32 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Accomplices. Under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, an accomplice is one who, without
being a principal either by direct participation, or by inducement, or by indispensable
cooperation, cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. It
would violate the constitutional right of the petitioner to be informed of the charge brought
against him if he were held criminally responsible for Saganay's act or omission on the basis that
Saganay had been his agent in the transaction. In other words, the importer or consignee
should not be held criminally liable for any underdeclaration or misdeclaration made by the
broker unless either a conspiracy between them had been alleged and proved, or the
Prosecution sufficiently established that the importer had knowledge of and actively
participated in the underdeclaration or misdeclaration. Indeed, to allow the act or omission of
Saganay to bind the petitioner would be unacceptable under the principle of res inter alias
acta embodied in Section 28,40Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. (ALVIN MERCADO VS.PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 167510, JULY 8, 2015)
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL
Conspiracy As a rule, conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused. However, it is
required that said acts must clearly manifest a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design
to commit a crime. The concurrence of will and common intent or design to commit a crime is
not clearly manifest in the present case. The charge of conspiracy simply does not hold water.
No convincing evidence was presented to show how the respondents conspired to commit the
crime. We find no credible proof that links or gives unifying purpose to the respondents'
individual acts. Without such proof, we cannot conclude with moral certainty that they
conspired, connived, and mutually helped one another to commit the crime. These acts, on
their own and nothing more, do not support the allegation of conspiracy (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 197953, AUGUST 05, 2015)
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it; it may be alleged as a mode of committing a
crime or as constitutive of the crime itself. It need not be shown by direct proof of an
agreement of the parties to commit the crimeas it can be inferred from the acts of the accused
which clearly manifest a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESS VS SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 197953, AUGUST 05, 2015)
33 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Conspiracy exists when the acts of the accused demonstrate a common design towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose. In this case, the acts of Roberto, Don Juan and
Bombasi clearly demonstrated unity of action to have carnal knowledge of AAA: (1) Both
Roberto and Bombasi tied AAA's hands at her back, while a handkerchief was already tied in her
mouth; (2) Both men turned AAA around, touched her body and started to take her clothes off;
(3) Roberto succeeded in undressing AAA, went on top of her and placed his penis inside her
vagina; (4) After satisfying his lust, Roberto got off from AAA and Bombasi took his tum and
inserted his penis inside AAA's vagina; (5) After Bombasi, Don Juan went on top of MA, kissed
her shoulders and lips and also inserted his penis inside AAA's vagina; (6) When they were
satiated in their sexual desires, the three accused untied the rope binding AAA and threatened
to cut off her tongue and kill her family in case she would tell them what happened.
Unmistakably, these acts demonstrated a concerted effort to rape AAA. Since there was a
conspiracy between Roberto, Don Juan and Bombasi, the act of one of them was the act of all
and the three of them are equally guilty of all the crimes of rape committed against AAA.
(PEOPLE VS. HIDALGO, G.R. No. 203313, September 2, 2015)
The commission of the specific acts charged against Villariez constitutes the offense charged in
the Information. The prosecution's failure to establish conspiracy due to the death of a
coconspirator and the dismissal of the case against another coconspirator does not defeat the
conviction of the accused for the offense charged and proven during the trial. (PEOPLE VS.
VILLARIEZ, G.R. No. 211160, September 2, 2015)
We find the presence of conspiracy in this case between the appellants. Under Article 8 of the
Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused
before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be
enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made
by evidence of a chain of circumstances. The prosecution had established that appellants held
AAA’s hands, and when she tried to shout, appellant Allain covered her mouth with a
handkerchief and appellant Vergel punched her in the abdomen which caused her to lose
consciousness. It is fundamental for conspiracy to exist that there must be unity of purpose and
unity in the execution of the unlawful objective which were present in this case. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES vs. VERGEL ANCAJAS and ALLAIN** ANCAJAS. G.R. No. 199270. October 21,
2015.)
Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be direct because conspiracy may
be implied or inferred from their acts. (PEOPLE VS. ZABALA G.R. No. 203087. November 23,
2015)
34 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it; it may be alleged as a mode of committing a
crime or as constitutive of the crime itself. It need not be shown by direct proof of an
agreement of the parties to commit the crime as it can be inferred from the acts of the accused
which clearly manifest a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime.
More significant, conspiracy as a basis for conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral
certainty. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, it is, nonetheless,
required to be proved by clear and convincing evidence by showing a series of acts done by
each of the accused in concert and in pursuance of a common unlawful purpose. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN (2ND DIVISION), G.R. No. 197953, August 05, 2015)
As a rule, conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused. However, it is required that
said acts must clearly manifest a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a
crime. The concurrence of will and common intent or design to commit a crime is not clearly
manifest in the present case. The charge of conspiracy simply does not hold water. No
convincing evidence was presented to show how the respondents conspired to commit the
crime. We find no credible proof that links or gives unifying purpose to the respondents'
individual acts. Without such proof, we cannot conclude with moral certainty that they
conspired, connived, and mutually helped one another to commit the crime. These acts, on
their own and nothing more, do not support the allegation of conspiracy. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN (2ND DIVISION), G.R. No. 197953, August 05, 2015)
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
crime and decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence consisting of acts,
words, or conduct of the alleged conspirators before, during and after the commission of the felony to
achieve a common design or purpose.- Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged conspirators before, during
and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose. Proof of the agreement
does not need to rest on direct evidence, as the agreement may be inferred from the conduct of the
parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense.
Corollarily, it is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an
explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal
objective is to be carried out. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JERRY PEPINO Y RUERAS AND PRECIOSA
GOMEZ Y CAMPOS, G.R. NO. 174471, JANUARY 12, 2016)
We discern no showing from this allegation that Magcamit extorted money from Jaen, or that
he was among those who took part in the division of the money allegedly extorted from Jaen.
For conspiracy to exist, it must be proven or at least inferred from the acts of the alleged
perpetrator before, during, and after the commission of the crime. It cannot simply be surmised
that conspiracy existed because Magcamit was part of the team that took part in the buy-bust
35 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
operation which resulted in Jaen's arrest. In other words, respondents failed to pinpoint
Magcamit's participation in the extortion that would make him administratively liable.After
evaluating the totality of evidence on record, we find that the records are bereft of substantial
evidence to support the conclusion that Magcamit should be held administratively liable for
grave misconduct; Magcamit was dismissed from the service based on evidence that had not
been disclosed to him. By affirming this dismissal, the CA committed a grave reversible error.
(MAGCAMIT VS. INTERNAL AFFAIRS SERVICE – PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY G.R.
NO. 198140, JANUARY 25, 2016)
Petitioner averred that respondents Calilan and Lindo took hold of each of his arms while
respondent Fuentes was about to strike him with a hollow block. It is, therefore, apparent that
all three of them acted out of a common design as is indicative of a conspiracy.- In this case,
petitioner averred that respondents Calilan and Lindo took hold of each of his arms while
respondent Fuentes was about to strike him with a hollow block. It is, therefore, apparent that
all three of them acted out of a common design as is indicative of a conspiracy. We sustain the
conclusion of Undersecretary Malenab-Hornilla that there is basis for prosecuting respondents
for murder in its attempted, and not in its frustrated, stage. (MARASIGAN Y DE GUZMAN V.
FUENTES, G.R. NO. 201310, JANUARY 11, 2016)
Both the RTC and CA correctly appreciated the presence of conspiracy. Conspiracy presupposes
unity of purpose and unity of action towards the realization of an unlawful objective among the
accused. Its existence can be inferred from the individual acts of the accused, which if taken as a
whole are in fact related, and indicative of a concurrence of sentiment. In this case, conspiracy
was manifested in the spontaneous and coordinated acts of the accused, where two of them
delivered the initial attack on Rodolfo by stoning, while another struck him with a shovel and
the third held him so that the other two can simultaneously stab Rodolfo. It was only when
Rodolfo laid helpless on the ground and had lost consciousness that the accused hurriedly left
the scene. This chain of events leading to the commission of the crime adequately established a
conspiracy among them. (RONALD IBANEZ, EMILIO IBANEZ and DANIEL “BOBOT” IBANEZ vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 190798, JANUARY 27, 2016)
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement regarding the commission
of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of a prior meeting between the perpetrators to
discuss the commission of the crime is not necessary as long as their concerted acts reveal a
common design and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one is the act of all.18 Here, the
three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of Norberto together, each
with his own firearm. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to identify and prove that it is the
bullet particularly fired from appellant's firearm that killed the children. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. IRENEO JUGUETA, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016)
36 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
PENALTIES
Penalties - Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e. one [1] day to ten [10] days)
when only mitigating circumstance is present in the case. Accordingly, with the Indeterminate
Sentence Law being inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not exceeding one year, Jabalde
shall suffer a penalty of one (1) day to ten (10) days of arresto menor. (VIRGINIA JABALDE Y
JAMANDRON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016)
In a catena of similar cases where the accused failed to perfect their appeal on their respective
judgments of conviction, the Court corrected the penalties imposed, notwithstanding the
finality of the decisions because they were outside the range of penalty prescribed by law.
There is thus, no reason to deprive herein petitioner of the relief afforded the accused in the
aforesaid similar cases. Verily, a sentence which imposes upon the defendant in a criminal
prosecution a penalty in excess of the maximum which the court is authorized by law to impose
for the offense for which the defendant was convicted, is void for want or excess of jurisdiction
as to the excess. (ROGER ALLEN BIGLER vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LINDA SUSAN
PATRICIA E. BARRETO, G.R. NO. 210972, MARCH 2, 2016)
Reclusion Perpetua; Parole. Section 3 of RA No. 9346 provides, "(p)ersons convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by
reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE BRONIOLA @
"ASOT"; G.R. No. 211027. JUNE 29, 2015)
Prescription of Penalties - As early as 1952, in Infante v. Provincial Warden of Negros

Occidental, the Court already opined that evasion of service of sentence is an essential element
of prescription of penalties. Later, Tanega v. Masakayan, et al. expounded on the rule that the
culprit should escape during the term of imprisonment in order for prescription of penalty
imposed by final sentence to commence to run, thus: x x The period of prescription of penalties-
so the succeeding Article 93 provides - "shall commence to run from the date when the culprit
should evade the service of his sentence." (RODOLFO BASILONIA v. HON. DELANO F. VLLLARUZ,
G.R. Nos. 191370-71, August 10, 2015)
As early as 1952, in Infante v. Provincial Warden of Negros Occidental, 92 Phil 310, the Court
already opined that evasion of service of sentence is an essential element of prescription of
penalties. Later, Tanega v. Masakayan, et al., 19 SCRA 564 (1967), expounded on the rule that
the culprit should escape during the term of imprisonment in order for prescription of penalty
imposed by final sentence to commence to run, thus: x x x The period of prescription of
penalties – so the succeeding Article 93 provides – "shall commence to run from the date when
37 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
the culprit should evade the service of his sentence (RODOLFO BASILONIA VS. HON. DELANO,
G.R. NO. 191370. AUGUST 10, 2015).
Death Penalty. Since the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act
No. 9346, the lower courts properly imposed the penalty oireclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole for each count of rape. - Considering that accused-appellant committed rape qualified
by the twin circumstances of minority and relationship, the proper penalty to be imposed is
death. Since the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346,
the lower courts properly imposed the penalty oireclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole for each count of rape. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO PATEÑO
DAYAPDAPAN, G.R. No. 209040, December 09, 2015).
RA 7659 or An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that
Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes; Damages – for crimes where the
imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an ordinary aggravating circumstance
but due to the prohibition to impose the death penalty, the actual penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, the latest jurisprudence pegs the amount of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱100,0000.00 as moral damages. For the qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or the
ordinary aggravating circumstances present, the amount of ₱100,000.00 is awarded as
exemplary damages aside from civil indemnity and moral damages. Regardless of the
attendance of qualifying aggravating circumstance, the exemplary damages shall be fixed at
₱100,000.00. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IRENEO JUGUETA, G.R. No. 202124, April 5,
2016)
PRINCIPLES (INCLUDE R.A. NO. 9346 – ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY
IN THE PHILIPPINES)
RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines- With the
enactment of RA 9346 the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. It provides that in lieu
of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC. As a result, the death penalty can
no longer be imposed. Instead, they have to impose reclusion perpetua. Despite this, the
principal consideration for the award of damages, following the ruling in People v. Salome
and People v. Quiachon, is "the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of
its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender." Essentially, despite
38 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346, the imposable penalty
as provided by the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must be used as the basis
for awarding damages and not the actual penalty imposed. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
IRENEO JUGUETA, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016)
RA 9346; RA 7659; Summary of Imposable Penalties and Awards of Damages - In summary:
I. For those crimes like, Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional Mutilation, Infanticide, and other
crimes involving death of a victim where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
b. Attempted:
ii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

39 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
b. Attempted:
II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely attempted:
40 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely attempted:
III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where death, injuries, or
sexual abuse results, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages will depend on
the penalty, extent of violence and sexual abuse; and the number of victims where the penalty
consists of indivisible penalties:
The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime committed. In other
complex crimes where death does not result, like in Forcible Abduction with Rape, the civil
indemnity, moral and exemplary damages depend on the prescribed penalty and the penalty
imposed, as the case may be.
IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide, Robbery with Rape, Robbery with
Intentional Mutilation, Robbery with
41 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Arson, Rape with Homicide Kidnapping with Murder, Carnapping with Homicide or Carnapping
with Rape, Highway Robbery with Homicide, Qualified Piracy, Arson with Homicide, Hazing with
Death, Rape, Sodomy or Mutilation and other crimes with death, injuries, and sexual abuse as
the composite crimes, where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the
penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua although death did not occur.
1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds125 and could have died if not for a timely
medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
42 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua.
2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not for a timely
medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
In Robbery with Physical Injuries, the amount of damages shall likewise be dependent on the
nature/severity of the wounds sustained, whether fatal or non-fatal.
The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the robber/s or
perpetrator/s are themselves killed or injured in the incident.1âwphi1
Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise apply, and that for every
additional rape committed, whether against the same victim or other victims, the victims shall
be entitled to the same damages unless the other crimes of rape are treated as separate crimes,
in which case, the damages awarded to simple rape/qualified rape shall apply.
V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible
penalties, i.e., Homicide, Death under Tumultuous Affray, Infanticide to conceal the dishonour of
the offender, Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and
Unintentional Abortion, etc.:
1.1 Where the crime was consummated:
43 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes where there are no
stages, i.e., Reckless Imprudence and Death under tumultuous affray:
a. Frustrated:
b. Attempted:
If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not alleged in the
Information, in addition to the above mentioned amounts as civil indemnity and moral
damages, the amount of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages for consummated; ₱30,000.00 for
frustrated; and ₱20,000.00 for attempted, shall be awarded.
VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua and death
occurs in the course of the rebellion, the heirs of those who died are entitled to the following:
B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the rebellion and could
have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
44 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is
presented in court, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IRENEO JUGUETA, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016)
EXECUTION AND SERVICE (INCLUDE P.A. NO. 968 – PROBATION LAW; AND R.A. NO. 9344 –
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT)
Execution and Service; Penal Colonist - The conferment by the Director of Corrections of a
colonist status to petitioner did not operate to reduce the latter's sentence. Section 5 of Act No.
2489 is clear and unambiguous: "[p]risoners serving sentences of life imprisonment receiving
and retaining the classification of penal colonists or trusties will automatically have the
sentence of life imprisonment modified to a sentence of thirty years when receiving the
executive approval for this classification upon which the regular credit now authorized by law
and special credit authorized in the preceding paragraph, for good conduct, may be made."
(RUBEN E. TIU v. HON. NATIVIDAD G. DIZON,G.R. No. 211269, June 15, 2016)
Retroactivity of Laws; Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006- With the passage of Republic
Act No. 9344 (RA. No. 9344) known as "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006" on 28 April
2006, the provision on retroactivity applies insofar as it favors the persons guilty of a felony. This
is despite the fact that the accused is no longer a minor at the time his conviction is
promulgated. The intent of RA. No. 9344 is the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict
with the law even if he/she has already exceeded the age limit of 21 years, so long as he/she
committed the crime when he/she was still a child. He/she shall be entitled to the right to
restoration'; rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with RA. No. 9344 in order that
he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the
community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction is not material. What is important is that the offense was committed
when the accused was still of tender age. (PEOPLE VS. HIDALGO, G.R. No. 203313, September
2, 2015)
45 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Suspended Sentence; Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 - Section 38 of RA No. 9344
provides that when the child below 18 years of age who committed a crime and was found
guilty, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence even if
such child has reached 18 years or more at the time of judgment. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. VERGEL ANCAJAS and ALLAIN** ANCAJAS. G.R. No. 199270. October 21, 2015.)
Although suspension of sentence still applies even if the child in conflict with the law is already
18 years of age or more at the time of the judgment of conviction was rendered, however, such
suspension is only until the minor reaches the maximum age of 21 as provided under Section 40
of RA No. 9344, to wit: SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. – If the
court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict
with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to
comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict
with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment. If said child in conflict
with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court
shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution
of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a specified period or until the child
reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VERGEL
ANCAJAS and ALLAIN** ANCAJAS. G.R. No. 199270. October 21, 2015.)
“Youthful Offenders”; Discernment – In Madali, et al. v People, 595 SCRA 274 (2009), we held
that discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. In this case, it
was established that appellant Allain acted with discernment as shown by his act of covering
AAA’s mouth with a handkerchief to prevent her from shouting and conspired with appellant
Vergel in raping AAA. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VERGEL ANCAJAS and ALLAIN**
ANCAJAS. G.R. No. 199270. October 21, 2015.)
46 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITIES (IN CRIMINAL CASES)
Civil Liability - Elementary is the rule that every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable. We said in one case: It bears repeating that "an offense as a general rule causes
two (2) classes of injuries - the first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is
sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty and the second is the
personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated thru
indemnity, which is civil in nature." (Ramos v. Gonong, 72 SCRA 559). As early as 1913, this
Court in US. v. Heery (25 Phil. 600) made it clear that the civil liability of the accused is not part
of the penalty for the crime committed. It is personal to the victim. x x x. Under Article 112 of
the RPC, civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of the Code shall be
extinguished in the same manner as other obligations, in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Law. Since the Civil Code is the governing law, the provisions of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, particularly Section 6, Rule 39 thereof, is applicable. It states:LSection 6. Execution by
motion or by independent action. - A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it
is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived
judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and
thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. (RODOLFO BASILONIA v.
HON. DELANO F. VLLLARUZ, G.R. Nos. 191370-71, August 10, 2015)
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to several distinct civil liabilities on
the part of the offender. If the conduct constitutes a felony, the accused may be held civilly
liable under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code (ex delicto). This particular civil liability due
the offended party is rooted on facts that constitute a crime. Otherwise stated, civil liability
arises from the offense charged. It is not required that the accused be convicted to be entitled
to civil liability based on delict. As long as the facts constituting the offense charged are
established by preponderance of evidence, civil liability may be awarded. Moreover, the civil
liability based on delict is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action. (PAZ T. BERNARDO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
182210, OCTOBER 5, 2015)
The same act or omission, however, may also give rise to independent civil liabilities based on
other sources of obligation. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: (a) law;
(b) contracts; (c) quasi-contracts; and (d) quasi-delicts. Among these are the civil liabilities for
intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil Code and for quasi-delicts under Article
2176 of Civil Code. For conduct constituting defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, the Civil
47 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Code likewise grants the offended party the right to institute a civil action independently of the
criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Thus, it is entirely possible for one to be free
from civil ability directly arising from a violation of the penal law and to still be liable civilly
based on contract or by laws other than the criminal law. Such civil actions may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the criminal action,
subject however, to the caveat that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission. (PAZ T. BERNARDO, SUBSTITUTED BY HEIRS, MAPALAD G. BERNARDO,
EMILIE B. KO, MARILOU B. VALDEZ, EDWIN T. BERNARDO AND GERVY B. SANTOS VS. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 182210, OCTOBER 5, 2015)
As a general rule, the death of an accused pending appeal extinguishes her criminal liability and
the corresponding civil liability based solely on the offense (delict). The death amounts to an
acquittal of the accused based on the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence in
her favor, which can be overcome only by a finding of guilt — something that death prevents
the court from making. In a sense, death absolves the accused from any earthly responsibility
arising from the offense — a divine act that no human court can reverse, qualify, much less
disregard. The intervention of death of the accused in any case is an injunction by fate itself so
that no criminal liability and the corresponding civil liability arising from the offense should be
imposed on him. (PAZ T. BERNARDO, SUBSTITUTED BY HEIRS, MAPALAD G. BERNARDO, EMILIE
B. KO, MARILOU B. VALDEZ, EDWIN T. BERNARDO AND GERVY B. SANTOS VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 182210, OCTOBER 5, 2015)
Civil Liability; Interest Rates - In line with recent jurisprudence, interest of 6% per annum shall
be charged on all the items of the civil liability fixed and imposed herein, computed from the
date of the finality of this decision until the items of the civil liability shall be fully paid. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALFREDO DULIN y NARAG, G.R. No. 171284. JUNE 29, 2015)
Independent Civil Liability - The independent civil liabilities, however, survive death and an
action for recovery therefore may be generally pursued but only by filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This
separate civil action may be enforced against the estate of the accused. (PAZ T. BERNARDO VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 182210, OCTOBER 5, 2015)
Civil Liability in Criminal Cases; Civil Indemnity in case of Death - It is again timely to raise the
civil indemnity for death arising from crime or quasi-delict. We start by reminding that human
life, which is not a commodity, is priceless. The value of human life is incalculable, for no loss of
life from crime or quasi-delict can ever be justly measured. Yet, the law absolutely requires
48 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
every injury, especially loss of life, to be compensated in the form of damages. For this purpose,
damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an
injury sustained, or, as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences that the law imposes
for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. As such, damages refer to the
amount in money awarded by the court as a remedy for the injured. Although money has been
accepted as the most frequently used means of punishing, deterring, compensating and
regulating injury throughout the legal system, it has been explained that money in the context
of damages is not awarded as a replacement for other money, but as substitute for that which is
generally more important than money; it is the best thing that a court can do. Regardless, the
civil indemnity for death, being compensatory in nature, must attune to contemporaneous
economic realities; otherwise, the desire to justly indemnify would be thwarted or rendered
meaningless. This has been the legislative justification for pegging the minimum, but not the
maximum, of the indemnity. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. MARIANO OANDASAN, JR., G.R.
No. 194605, June 14, 2016)
On April 5, 2016, the Court promulgated its decision in People v. Jugueta (G.R. No. 202124),
whereby it adopted certain guidelines on fixing the civil liabilities in crimes resulting in the
death of the victims taking into proper consideration the stages of execution and gravity of the
offenses, as well as the number of victims in composite crimes. Other factors were weighed by
the Court. In the case of murder where the appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetna, the Court
has thereby fixed P75,000.00 for moral damages, P75,000.00 for exemplary damages, and
P75,000.00 for civil indemnity as the essential civil liabilities,- in addition to others as the
records of each case will substantiate. Hence, we impose herein the same amounts for such
items of damages in each count of murder. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. MARIANO
OANDASAN, JR., G.R. No. 194605, June 14, 2016)
Civil Indemnity - We observe that the lower courts failed to award civil indemnity and moral
damages in this case. Civil indemnity is awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty. On the other hand, moral damages is
warranted. Under Article 2217 of the New Civil Code, moral damages include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar injury. There
is no doubt that Haitao suffered physical, mental and emotional trauma over the kidnapping of
Tan and her two-year old son. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPO1 CATALINO GONZALES, JR.,
G.R. NO. 192233, FEBRUARY 17, 2016)
Turning now to the awards for civil indemnity, and for actual, exemplary and moral damages
made by the CA, we believe that certain modifications are in order. Based on prevailing
49 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
jurisprudence, the awards for civil indemnity and for moral damages in favor of Corazon’s heirs
should be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.20 The CA also correctly upgraded the award
of exemplary damages from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
FEDERICO DE LA CRUZ y SANTOS, G.R. NO. 207389, FEBRUARY 17, 2016)
Civil Indemnity ex delicto - It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a
fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate. In our jurisdiction, civil
indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or compensation
to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a
sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person
dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also
ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
IRENEO JUGUETA, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016)
Civil Indemnity; Moral Damages - Civil indemnity in automatically imposed upon the accused
without need of proof other than the fact of the commission of murder or homicide; while
moral damages is awarded for the mental anguish suffered by the heirs of the deceased.
Following the latest jurisprudence, we increase the amounts awarded for civil indemnity and
moral damages from P50, 000.00 to P75, 000.00, while sustaining the award of exemplary
damages in the amount of P30, 000.00. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BONIFACIO
DANDANON y ILIGAN a.k.a. “Boning,” G.R. No. 196258. September 28, 2015)
Loss of Earning Capacity; Formula - This Court likewise sustains the award of actual damages in
the amount of P74,800.00, which represents actual expenses incurred for the burial of Corazon;
indeed the defense agreed to pay this sum during the trial. Nevertheless, this Court must
correct the CA's computation relative to the loss of earning capacity. The proper formula for the
computation of recoverable damages for loss of earning capacity is as follows: Net Earning
Capacity= life expectancy x [gross annual income - living expenses] = 2/3 [80-age of the victim at
time of death] x [gross annual income - 50% of gross annual income] = 2/3 [80-49 years] x
[P67,320.00-P33,660.00] = 20.6666667 x P33,660.00 = P695,640.00. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. FEDERICO DE LA CRUZ y SANTOS, G.R. NO. 207389 FEBRUARY 17, 2016)
Being guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the murder of Paceño, qualified by treachery, without
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, accused-appellant was correctly sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. The RTC ordered accused-appellant to pay Paceño’s heirs an award for loss
50 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
of earning capacity. Such an award is computed in accordance with the following formula: Net
Earning Capacity = remaining life expectancy [2/3 (80 – age at death)] x Gross Annual Income
(GAI) – Living Expenses (50% of GAI). (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BONIFACIO DANDANON
y ILIGAN a.k.a. “Boning,” G.R. No. 196258. September 28, 2015)
Damages; Death due to a crime - As to the award of the damages, "[w]hen death occurs due to
a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of
the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages;
and (5) temperate damages." (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODELIO LLOBERA Y OFIZA, G.R.
No. 203066, August 05, 2015)
We modify though the monetary awards imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages. (PEOPLE v. GUTING G.R. No.
205412, September 09, 2015)
To be able to claim damages for loss of earning capacity despite the non-availability of
documentary evidence, there must be oral testimony that: (a) the victim was self-employed
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws and judicial notice was taken of
the fact that in the victim's line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or (b) the victim
was employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws. (PEOPLE v. GUTING G.R. No. 205412, September 09, 2015)
51 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
PART II.
REVISED PENAL CODE (BOOK II)
A. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
Resistance to a Person in Authority

The laying of hands or using physical force against agents of persons in authority when not
serious in nature constitutes resistance or disobedience under Article 151, and not direct assault
under Article 148 of the RPC. This is because the gravity of the disobedience to an order of a
person in authority or his agent is measured by the circumstances surrounding the act, the
motives prompting it and the real importance of the transgression, rather than the source of the
order disobeyed. The pushing of IO1 Mangili is not of such serious defiance to be considered
direct assault, but is resistance nonetheless. (People v. Breis y Alvarado , G.R. No. 205823,
[August 17, 2015])
B. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
Copyright Infringement
Accordingly, the commission of any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 49 without the copyright owner’s consent constituted actionable copyright
infringement. In Columbia Pictures v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 144 (1996), the Court has
empathically declared: Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and
occupied by the owner of the copyright, and therefore, protected by law, and infringement of a
copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this connection, consists in the doing by any
person, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do
which is conferred by the statute on the owner of the copyright. (MICROSOFT CORPORATION
VS ROLANDO MANANSALA and/or MEL MANANSALA, doing business as DATAMAN TRADING
COMPANY and/or COMIC ALLEY. G.R. No. 166391. October 21, 2015. )
52 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Presidential Decree No. 49 thereby already acknowledged the existence of computer programs
as works or creations protected by copyright. To hold, as the CA incorrectly did, that the
legislative intent was to require that the computer programs be first photographed, photo-
engraved, or pictorially illustrated as a condition for the commission of copyright infringement
invites ridicule. – Presidential Decree No. 49 thereby already acknowledged the existence of
computer programs as works or creations protected by copyright. Such interpretation of Section
5(a) of Presidential Decree No. 49 defied logic and common sense because it focused on terms
like “copy”, “multiply”, and “sell”, but blatantly ignored terms like “photographs”, “photo-
engravings”, and “pictorial illustration”. Had the CA taken the latter words into proper account,
it would have quickly seen the absurdity of its interpretation. (MICROSOFT CORPORATION VS
ROLANDO MANANSALA and/or MEL MANANSALA, G.R. No. 166391. October 21, 2015. )
The mere sale of the illicit copies of the software programs was enough by itself to show the
existence of probable cause for copyright infringement. There was no need for the petitioner to
still prove who copied, replicated, or reproduced the software programs. Indeed, the public
prosecutor and the DOJ gravely abused their discretion in dismissing the petitioner’s charge for
copyright infringement against the respondents for lack of evidence. There was grave abuse of
discretion because the public prosecutor and the DOJ acted whimsically or arbitrarily in
disregarding the settled jurisprudential rules on finding the existence of probable cause to
charge the offender in court. Accordingly, the CA erred in upholding the dismissal by the DOJ of
the petitioner’s petition for review. (MICROSOFT CORPORATION VS ROLANDO MANANSALA
and/or MEL MANANSALA, October 21, 2015. )
Falsification by Public Officers

The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any
public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a
document by committing any of the following acts: 4. Making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts; x x x x. Reduced to its elements, a violation under this provision requires
that:L(1) The offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(2) He has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of
the facts narrated by him; and (3) The facts narrated by him are absolutely false. The
prosecution must likewise prove that the public officer or employee had taken advantage of his
official position in making the falsification. The offender is considered to have taken advantage
of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in
the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he
53 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
falsifies. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN (2ND DIVISION), G.R. No. 197953,
August 05, 2015)
In falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea
of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of a public document,
what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN (2ND DIVISION), G.R.
No. 197953, August 05, 2015)
The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any
public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a
document by committing any of the following acts:x x x x 4. Making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts; x x x x. Reduced to its elements, a violation under this provision requires that:
(1) The offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (2)
He has a legal obligation to disclose the truth ofthe facts narrated by him; and (3) The facts
narrated by him are absolutely false. The prosecution must likewise prove that the public officer
or employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification. The offender
is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make
or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official
custody of the document which he falsifies (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS SANDIGANBAYAN,
G.R. NO. 197953, AUGUST 05, 2015).
In falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea
of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of a public document,
what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 197953,
AUGUST 05, 2015).
C. CRIMES COMMITED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
Direct Bribery
As already stated, Apelo was accused of committing the crime of Direct Bribery, which has the
following elements: (a) that the accused is a public officer; (b) that he received directly or
54 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (c) that such gift, present or promise
has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a
crime, or to refrain from doing something which Is his official duty to do; and (d) that the crime
or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer. (PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC) VS. CASIMIRO, G.R. No. 206866, September 2, 2015)
Corruption of Public Officials
Cu and Zate were accused of committing the crime of Corruption of Public Officials, the
elements of which are as follows: (a) that the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or
presents to a public officer; and (b) that the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents
are given to a public officer under circumstances that will make the public officer liable for
direct bribery or indirect bribery. (PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC) VS.
CASIMIRO, G.R. No. 206866, September 2, 2015)
Malversation
Malversation may be committed by appropriating public funds or property; by taking or
misappropriating the same; by consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, by
permitting any other person to take such public funds or property; or by being otherwise guilty
of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property. - Malversation may be
committed by appropriating public funds or property; by taking or misappropriating the same;
by consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, by permitting any other person to take
such public funds or property; or by being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property. For a prosecution of the crime to prosper, concurrence
of the following elements must be satisfactorily proved: (a) the offender is a public officer, (b) he
has custody or control of the funds or property by reason of the duties of his office, (c) the
funds or property are public funds or property for which he is accountable, and, most
importantly, (d) he has appropriated, taken, misappropriated or consented, or, through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. (DOMINGO G.
PANGANIBAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 211543, December 09, 2015.
To have custody or control of the funds or property by reason of the duties of his office, a public
officer must be a cashier, treasurer, collector, property officer or any other officer or employee
who is tasked with the taking of money or property from tie public which they are duty-bound
55 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
to keep temporarily until such money or property are properly deposited in official depository
banks or similar entities; or until they shall have endorsed such money or property to other
accountable officers or concerned offices. - Public respondent correctly ruled that petitioner
was a public officer, satisfying the first element of the crime of malversation of public funds or
property. However, public respondent erroneously ruled that petitioner had custody or control
of the funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; that the funds or property are
public funds or property for which he was accountable; and that he had consented, or, through
abandonment to take them. To have custody or control of the funds or property by reason of
the duties of his office, a public officer must be a cashier, treasurer, collector, property officer or
any other officer or employee who is tasked with the taking of money or property from tie
public which they are duty-bound to keep temporarily until such money or property are
properly deposited in official depository banks or similar entities; or until they shall have
endorsed such money or property to other accountable officers or concerned offices. Petitioner
was not shown to have been such public officer, even temporarily, in addition to his main duties
as mayor. Needless to say, he was not accountable for any public funds or property simply
because it never became his duty to collect money or property from the public. Therefore,
petitioner could not have appropriated, taken, misappropriated or consented, or, through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. (DOMINGO G.
PANGANIBAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 211543, December 09, 2015)
The erroneous information against the accused was exacerbated when the public respondent
went on to convict the accused for malversation under Article 217 despite the contrary
documentary proof and the testimonies of witnesses both of the prosecution and defense
during trial, showing a properly issued cash advance. - Had the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon made the correct information and subsequent amended information,
the charge should have been failure of accountable officer to render accounts under Art. 218 of
the Revised Penal Code, not malversation of public funds or property under Art. 217. Article 218
provides as follows: Art. 218. Failure of accountable officer to render accounts. — Any public
officer, whether in the service or separated therefrom by resignation or any other cause, who is
required by law or regulation to render account to the Insular Auditor, 32 or to a provincial
auditor and who fails to do so for a period of two months after such accounts should be
rendered, shall be punished by prision correctional in its minimum period, or by a fine ranging
from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both. The erroneous information against the accused was
exacerbated when the public respondent went on to convict the accused for malversation under
Article 217 despite the contrary documentary proof and the testimonies of witnesses both of
the prosecution and defense during trial, showing a properly issued cash advance. (DOMINGO
G. PANGANIBAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 211543, December 09, 2015).
56 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Failure of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts

Petitioner's full liquidation of his cash advance by means of an arrangement allowed by the COA
ultimately translated into a legal avoidance of violation of Art. 218. And even granting that it
was malversation which petitioner was alleged to have committed, it has been ruled that good
faith is a valid defense in a prosecution for malversation of public funds as it would negate
criminal intent on the part of the accused. Petitioner's full liquidation of his cash advance by
means of an arrangement allowed by the COA ultimately translated into the good faith he
interposed as a defense. The felony of malversation of public funds being one which involves
breach of the public trust that is uniformly punished whether committed through dolo or culpa,
defenses relative thereto are to be rightfully accorded strict and close scrutiny. (DOMINGO G.
PANGANIBAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 211543, December 09, 2015).
D. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray
The elements of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray are as follows: (a) that there be several
persons; (b) that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting
and attacking each other reciprocally; (c) that these several persons quarrelled and assaulted
one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (d) that someone was killed in the course of
the affray; (e) that it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (f) that the
person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be identified.
Based on case law, a tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several
persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some
person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. (GUILLERMO
WACOY y BITOL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 213792, JUNE 22, 2015)
Parricide
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and
(3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
57 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The
key element in Parricide - other than the fact of killing - is the relationship of the offender to the
victim. All the elements are present in this case. Jose, the victim, was killed by accused-
appellant, his own son. Accused-appellant's birth certificate, which was presented before the
RTC, establishes that accused-appellant was the legitimate son of Jose and Flora. (PEOPLE v.
GUTING G.R. No. 205412, September 09, 2015)
Damages; Civil Indemnity. Civil indemnity is automatically awarded upon proof of the fact of
death of the victim and the commission by the accused-appellant of the crime of parricide.
Current jurisprudence sets civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00. As such, the Court finds
it necessary to increase the civil indemnity awarded by the trial and appellate courts from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL MACAL y BOLASCO, GR
No. 211062, January 13, 2016)
Penalties The crime of Parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion

perpetua to death. With one mitigating circumstance, namely, voluntary surrender, and no
aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused-
appellant was proper. (PEOPLE v. GUTING G.R. No. 205412, September 09, 2015)
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that the impossible penalty for parricide is
reclusion perpetua to death. With the enactment of Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, the imposition
of the penalty of death is prohibited. Likewise significant is the provision found in Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code stating that in the absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances
in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. Applying theses to the case
at bar and considering that there are no mitigating and aggravating circumstances [resent, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed by the RTC and CA. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL MACAL y BOLASCO, GR No. 211062, January 13, 2016)
Homicide
The Court, in Villanueva v. Caparas, 689 SCRA 679 (2013) held that the following elements must
be proven to sustain a conviction for homicide: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed
him without any justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had the intention to kill, which is
presumed; and (4) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of
murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. (ALBERT G. AMBAGAN, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 204481-82, October 14, 2015.)
58 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
The crime of Homicide is defined and penalized under Article 249 of the RPC, which reads: Art,
249, Homicide,-Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding
article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal. The
elements of Homicide are the following: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him
without any justifying circumstance; (c) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed;
and (d) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of Murder, or by that
of Parricide or Infanticide. (GUILLERMO WACOY y BITOL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
No. 213792, JUNE 22, 2015)
Intent to Kill - Jurisprudence instructs that such provision should only apply where the crime
committed is different from that intended and where the felony committed befalls a different
person (error in personae); and not to cases where more serious consequences not intended by
the offender result from his felonious act (praeter intentionem), as in this case. It is well-settled
that if the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively
presumed. In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is Homicide because with
respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results
following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof.
(GUILLERMO WACOY y BITOL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 213792, JUNE 22, 2015)
Be that as it may, the penalty for the crime of Homicide must be imposed in its minimum period
due to the presence of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a
wrong under Article 13(3) of the RPC in favor of Wacoy and Quibac, as correctly appreciated by
the CA. In determining the presence of this circumstance, it must be considered that since
intention is a mental process and is an internal state of mind, the accused's intention must be
judged by his conduct and external overt acts. In this case, the aforesaid mitigating circumstance
is available to Wacoy and Quibac, given the absence of evidence showing that, apart from
kicking and punching Aro on the stomach, something else had been done; thus, evincing the
purpose of merely maltreating or inflicting physical harm, and not to end the life of Aro.
(GUILLERMO WACOY y BITOL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 213792, JUNE 22, 2015)
Frustrated Homicide; Elements of - The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused
intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the
victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance;
and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, is present.39 There being no prior determination by both the trial and
appellate courts of any qualifying circumstance that would elevate the homicide to murder, the
Court will simply limit its discussion to the first two elements. In ascertaining whether intent to
59 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
kill exists, the Court considers the presence of the following factors: (1) the means used by the
malefactors; (2) the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the
conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4)
the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused.
(RONALD IBANEZ, EMILIO IBANEZ and DANIEL “BOBOT” IBANEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 190798, JANUARY 27, 2016)
The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal
wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying
circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
present.39 There being no prior determination by both the trial and appellate courts of any
qualifying circumstance that would elevate the homicide to murder, the Court will simply limit
its discussion to the first two elements. In ascertaining whether intent to kill exists, the Court
considers the presence of the following factors: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the
nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the
malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the
circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. (RONALD
IBANEZ, EMILIO IBANEZ and DANIEL “BOBOT” IBANEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
NO. 190798, JANUARY 27, 2016)
Homicide; Penalties; Reclusion Temporal - Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
the imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Article 50 of the same Code states
that the imposable penalty upon principals of a frustrated crime shall be the penalty next lower
in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony. Hence, frustrated homicide
is punishable by prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances present in this case, the minimum penalty to be meted
on the petitioners should be anywhere within the range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years of prision correccional and the maximum penalty should be taken from the medium
period of prision mayor ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Thus, the
imposition by the CA of imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is proper. (RONALD IBANEZ,
EMILIO IBANEZ and DANIEL “BOBOT” IBANEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO.
190798, JANUARY 27, 2016)
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term should be that which could be
properly imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and the minimum should be within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC. When neither aggravating
60 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
nor mitigating are present, the penalty prescribed by law shall be in its medium period. (PEOPLE
VS. CUESTA, G.R. No. 217380, November 23, 2015)
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes for the crime of homicide the penalty of
reclusion temporal, the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.
Under Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law.
There being an incomplete self-defense, the penalty should be one (1) degree lower or from
reclusion temporal to prision mayor to be imposed in its minimum period considering the
presence of one ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender pursuant to Article
64(2). (RAFAEL NADYAHAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 193134, MARCH 2, 2016)
Murder
To be convicted of murder, the following must be established: (1) a person was killed; (2) the
accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; and (4) the killing neither constitutes
parricide nor infanticide. In this case, the foregoing elements of the crime of murder were duly
established. De Leon was killed. Appellants killed him. De Leon's killing was attended by abuse
of superior strength, one of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248(1) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. De Leon's killing is not parricide or infanticide. In fact, appellants do
not dispute the first, second and fourth elements. They merely questioned the second element,
the presence of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 205316. JUNE 29, 2015).
Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a
person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or
evident premeditation. The essence of treachery is the sudden attack by the aggressor without
the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to
defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor.
Two conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely, (a) the employment of means of
execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the
means or method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. ZALDY SALAHUDDIN, G.R. No. 206291, January 18, 2016)
"The elements of murder that the prosecution must establish are[:] (1) that a person was killed;
(2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
61 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the [RPC]; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or
infanticide." All these elements have been proven in the case at bar. The death of Cristituto
Biona, Jr. is evidenced by a certificate of death duly presented in court.31 Also, accused-appellant
and the victim not being related to each other and the victim not being an infant, the killing
here does not come within the definition of parricide or of infanticide (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. RODELIO LLOBERA Y OFIZA, G.R. NO. 203066, AUGUST 5, 2016).
In order to convict a person charged with the crime of Murder, the prosecution must establish
the following elements beyond reasonable doubt: (a) that a person was killed; (b) the accused
killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned
in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) the killing does not constitute Parricide or Infanticide. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OSCAR PARBA Y SOLON, Accused-Appellant. G.R.
No. 214506, October 19, 2015 )
The essential elements of murder are the following: (a) that a person was killed; (b) that the
accused killed him; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. All elements are
extant therein. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BONIFACIO DANDANON y ILIGAN a.k.a.
“Boning,” G.R. No. 196258. September 28, 2015)
The elements of murder are: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing
was with the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (4) the killing neither constitutes parricide or infanticide.
(PEOPLE V. SALIBAD Y DILO, G.R. No. 210616, [November 25, 2015])
To wit: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed that person; (c) that the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (d) the killing was
neither parricide nor infanticide. (PEOPLE VS. ZABALA G.R. No. 203087. November 23, 2015)
The elements of murder that the prosecution must establish are: (1) that a person was killed; (2)
that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the killing is not
parricide or infanticide. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GILBERT CABALLERO Y GARSOLA, G.R.
No. 210673, June 29, 2016)
"The elements of murder that the prosecution must establish are[:] (1) that a person was killed;
(2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the [RPC]; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or
infanticide." (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODELIO LLOBERA Y OFIZA, G.R. No. 203066,
August 05, 2015)
62 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Attempted Murder - As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code states that a felony is attempted when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance. In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent
to kill on the part of appellant as shown by the use of firearms, the words uttered during, as well
as the manner of, the commission of the crime. The Court thus quotes with approval the trial
court’s finding that appellant is liable for attempted murder, viz.: In the case at bar, the
perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony of murder first by suddenly stripping
off the wall of their house, followed by successive firing at the intended victims when Norberto
Divina refused to go out of the house as ordered by them. If only there were good in aiming
their target, not only Mary Grace and Claudine had been killed but surely all the rest of the
family would surely have died. Hence, perpetrators were liable for Murder of Mary Grace Divina
and Claudine Divina but for Multiple Attempted Murder for Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina,
Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. But as [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta was the only one
charged in this case, he alone is liable for the crime committed. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. IRENEO JUGUETA, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016)
"Double Murder" and "Multiple Attempted Murder" - The facts, as alleged in the Information
in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial, show that appellant is guilty of 2 counts
of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the victims was not the result of
a single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same vein, appellant is also
guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted Murder in
Criminal Case No. 7702-G. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IRENEO JUGUETA, G.R. No.
202124, April 5, 2016)
Murder; Penalties - Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for
the crime of murder qualified by treachery is reclusion perpetua to death. Since there were no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances that attended the commission of the crime, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is imposed on the accused-appellant in accordance with Article 63,
paragraph 2 of the same Code. Therefore, the Court affirms the penalty imposed by the RTC and
the CA. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NESTOR ROXAS y CASTRO, G.R. NO. 218396,
FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
Villariez is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. As for damages, the CA, in conformity with recent jurisprudence,
63 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
properly awarded these amounts: (1) P75,OOO as civil indemnity; (2) P75,OOO as moral
damages; (3) P30,OOO as exemplary damages; and (4) P25,OOO as temperate damages.
Moreover, the amounts of damages awarded are subject to interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. (PEOPLE VS. VILLARIEZ, G.R. No.
211160, September 2, 2015
Parole - The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances attendant to the crime, the trial court and the appellate court
correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, following Article 63(2) of the RPC. Such
shall be without eligibility for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. RODELIO LLOBERA Y OFIZA, G.R. No. 203066, August 05, 2015)
Rape
It has become fundamental in rape cases that no woman of sound mind would be willing to
publicize her grueling experience and risk the ordeal of interrogation, were it not for the
purpose of vindicating her honor. The victim’s willingness and courage to face the interrogation
and medical examination is a silent but eloquent proof of the truth.
An essential element of the crime of rape is the existence of force and intimidation inflicted by
the perpetrator upon the victim. In the instant case, the moral ascendancy of the accused-
appellant takes the place of the element of force and intimidation. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs RICARDO BACUS, G.R. NO. 208354, AUGUST 26, 2015)
Contrary to the appellant’s claim, the presence of the victim’s father in the room does not
negate the commission of the crime. Rape can be committed even in places where people
congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a house where there are
other occupants, and even in the same room where other members of the family are also
sleeping. It is not impossible or incredible for the members of the victim’s family to be in deep
slumber and not to be awakened while a sexual assault is being committed. It is settled the lust
is not a respecter of time or place and rape is known to happen in the most unlike places.
(PEOPLE vs. ALEXANDER BANGSOY, GR No. 204047, January 13, 2016)
At any rate, it is not proper to judge by adult norms of behavior the actions of children who
have undergone traumatic experiences. Certainly, a child - more so in the case of AAA who is
suffering from mild mental retardation - cannot be expected to act like an adult or do what may
be expected of mature people under similar circumstances. We disagree with the appellant's
64 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
insistence that the initial reluctance of AAA to reveal the assault tainted her credibility. , Young
girls usually conceal their ordeal because of threats made by their assailants. In this case, the
records showed that the appellant threatened to kill AAA if she would reveal the incident to
others (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALEXANDE “SANDER” BANGSOY, G.R. NO. 204047,
JANUARY 13, 2016)
Rape is committed: 1.) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances: a) Through force, threat or intimidation; b) When the offended party is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority; and d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. The
prosecution must prove that (1) the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant and (2)
that the same was accomplished under any of the above enumerated circumstances. Inasmuch
as the crime of rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, it is usually
only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse.
Therefore, in a prosecution for rape, the cre-dibility of the victim is almost always the single
most important issue to deal with. Thus, if the victim’s testimony meets the test of credibility,
the accused can justifiably be convicted on the basis of this testimony; otherwise, the accused
should be acquitted of the crime. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VERGEL ANCAJAS and
ALLAIN** ANCAJAS. G.R. No. 199270. October 21, 2015.)
This Court has stated that under Article 266-A of the RPC there are two ways by which the crime
of rape may be committed: by sexual intercourse or by sexual assault. Rape by sexual
intercourse is defined under Article 266-A (1) where it is committed by a man who shall have
carnal knowledge with a woman under a certain set of circumstances enumerated in the
provision. When a person is found guilty of rape by sexual intercourse, the perpetrator is
ordinarily punished by reclusion perpetua. Rape by sexual assault, on the other hand, is
committed by any person who, under the same set of circumstances in Article 266-A(1), inserts
his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the
genital or anal orifice of another person. Article 266-A(2) provides: ART. 266-A. Rape, When and
How Committed. - Rape is committed - x x x x 2. By any person who, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by
inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into
the genital or anal orifice of another person. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE SALVADOR,
G.R. No. 207815. JUNE 22, 2015)
For the prosecution of rape to prosper, the following elements must be proved: (1) the accused
had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) said act was accomplished (a) through the use of
force, threat or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented. (PEOPLE VS.
HIDALGO, G.R. No. 203313, September 2, 2015)
65 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Appellants’ argument that AAA’s conduct after the alleged sexual assault, i.e., washing her
bloodied panty and maong pants, and washing her private part, are not the normal behavior of
a woman who had just been raped deserves scant consideration. It is not accurate to say that
there is a typical reaction or norm of behavior among rape victims. On the contrary, people
react differently to emotional stress and no standard form of behavior can be anticipated of a
rape victim following her defilement. What is notable in the records was the fact that after she
had regained consciousness at 1 o’clock in the morning of July 17, 1998, she immediately went
back to her employers’ house and narrated to them what the appellants had done to her, later
reported the rape incident to the police and underwent a physical examination of her private
parts. Her actions indeed showed her desire to obtain justice for what appellants did to her.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VERGEL ANCAJAS and ALLAIN** ANCAJAS. G.R. No. 199270.
October 21, 2015.)
The same narration was repeated by AAA on cross-examination and any minor discrepancies are
negligible. As to the finding of healed and not fresh lacerations, it will not negate the
commission of rape. It is settled that medical evidence is merely corroborative, and is even
dispensable, in proving the crime of rape. AAA's injuries are reflected in the medico-legal report,
particularly the presence of vaginal bleeding and multiple abrasions on her right arm. That
appellant succeeded to have carnal knowledge of AAA with the use of force and without her
consent consummates the crime of rape. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARK ANTHONY
To determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by three
well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the
accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in
the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution;
and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. QUIRINO BALMES Y CLEOFE, G.R. No. 203458, June 06, 2016)
Sexual congress with a girl under 12 years old is always rape. In this type of rape, force and
intimidation are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether
carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will
of her own on account of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her
presumed incapacity to discern evil from good. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RENATO B.
SUEDAD, G.R. No. 211026, June 27, 2016)
To determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by three
well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the
accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to
66 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in
the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution;
and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Accordingly, in
resolving rape cases, the primordial or single most important consideration is almost always
given to the credibility of the victim's testimony. When the victim's testimony is credible, it may
be the sole basis for the accused person's conviction since, owing to the nature of the offense,
in many cases, the only evidence that can be given regarding the matter is the testimony of the
offended party. A rape victim's testimony is entitled to greater weight when she accuses a close
relative of having raped her, as in the case of a daughter against her father. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. ROGER GALAGATI, G.R. No. 207231, June 29, 2016)
The statutory provisions relevant to the case are Article 266-A and Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, which provide: Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed
- 1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances: a. Through force, threat or intimidation; b. When the offended party is deprived
of reason or is otherwise unconscious; c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. Xxx Article 266-B. Penalties. -
Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Xxx The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: 1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years
of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim. x
x x The elements of the offense charged are that: (a) the victim is a female over 12 years but
under 18 years of age; (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent
of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either through force,
threat or intimidation; or when she is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by
means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority. Neither the presence nor use of
a deadly weapon nor the employment of physical violence by the accused upon the victim are
essential to a finding that force or intimidation existed at the time the rape was committed.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGER GALAGATI y GARDOCE, G.R. No. 207231, June 29,
2016)
The elements necessary to sustain a conviction of rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force,
threat or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
( c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
VINCENT GARRIDO y ELORDE, G.R. No. 191258, July 8, 2015)
67 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
In the case of rape, a review begins with the reality that rape is a very serious accusation that is
painful to make; at the same time, it is a charge that is not hard to lay against another by one
with malice in her mind. Because of the private nature of the crime that justifies the acceptance
of the lone testimony of a credible victim to convict, it is not easy for the accused, although
innocent, to disprove his guilt.24 We are mindful that the lone testimony of the rape victim is
sufficient to sustain conviction. However, the probative value of the victim's testimony should
be measured against the evidence for the defense and must be carefully evaluated.25 Thus, the
court has the duty to scrutinize with caution the testimony of the victim to rule a conviction.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VINCENT GARRIDO y ELORDE, G.R. No. 191258, July 8, 2015)
Accused-appellant is charged with rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. For
conviction to be had in the crime of rape, the following elements must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act
was accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or
is demented. (PEOPLE vs. ARCEO, G.R. No. 208842, November 10, 2015)
For the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution has the burden to prove that (1) the offender
had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished the act through force, threat or
intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was
under 12 years of age or was demented. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's ruling on the veracity of AAA's testimony. The Court finds no reason to overturn the
factual findings of the lower courts. AAA consistently identified the accused-appellant as the
perpetrator of the sexual abuse against her and she unequivocally testified on the manner with
which the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her. (PEOPLE vs. REMEDIOS, G.R. No.
211056, November 10, 2015)
An information is intended to inform an accused of the accusations against him and, as such, it
must embody the essential elements of the crime charged by setting forth the facts and
circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused, so that he can
properly prepare for and undertake his defense. It is not necessary, however, for information to
allege the date and time of the commission of the crime with exactitude, unless time is an
essential ingredient of the offense. (PEOPLE VS. BIALA, G.R. No. 217975, November 23, 2015)
AAA, who was then four years old at the time of the molestation, was not expected to be
knowledgeable about sexual intercourse and every stage thereof. The fact that she claimed that
accused-appellant rubbed his penis against her vagina did not mean that there was no
penetration. Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual bodily connections
with a woman. This explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates
the rape. As such, a mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act already constitutes consummated rape. In the present case, AAA
68 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
testified that she felt pain when accused-appellant "rubbed his penis [against her] vagina." This
Court has held that rape is committed on the victim's testimony that she felt pain. In fact, AAA
still felt severe pain in her vagina when she was being given a bath by her mother after her
molestation. This kind of pain could not have been the result of mere superficial rubbing of
accused-appellant's sex organ with that of the victim. Such pain could be nothing but the result
of penile penetration sufficient to constitute rape. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICTOR P.
PADIT, G.R. NO. 202978, FEBRUARY 1, 2016)
Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. x
x x x The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: 1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years
of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO LAGBO a.k.a. RICARDO LABONG, G.R. NO. 207535,
FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
This Court has held that it takes much more for a young lass to fabricate a story of rape, have
her private parts examined, subject herself to the indignity of a public trial and endure a lifetime
of ridicule. Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of psychological
depravity for a young woman, like AAA, to concoct a story which would put her own father for
the most of his remaining life to jail and drag herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of
shame. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO LAGBO , G.R. NO. 207535, FEBRUARY 10,
2016)
The elements of Rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (b) said carnal knowledge was accomplished through force, threat or intimidation.
The gravamen of Rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will. On the other hand,
Statutory Rape under Article 266-A (1) (d) is committed by having sexual intercourse with a
woman below twelve (12) years of age regardless of her consent, or lack of it, to the sexual act.
Proof of force, threat, or intimidation, or consent of the offended party is unnecessary as these
are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively
presumed when the victim is below the age of twelve (12). The law presumes that the offended
party does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual
act. Thus, to sustain a conviction for statutory rape, the prosecution must establish the
following: (a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the accused; and (c) the sexual
intercourse between the accused and the complainant. The foregoing acts of Rape shall be
qualified pursuant to Article 266-B (1) of the RPC if: (a) the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age; and (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent
of the victim. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GODOFREDO COMBOY y CRONICO, G.R. NO.
218399, MARCH 2, 2016)
69 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
In this regard, it has been long settled that "a young girl would not concoct a sordid tale of a
crime as serious as rape at the hands of her very own father, allow the examination of her
private part, and subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive
were other than a fervent desire to seek justice. Hence, there is no plausible reason why AAA
would testify against her own father, imputing to him the grave crime of rape, if this crime did
not happen," as in this case. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GODOFREDO COMBOY y
CRONICO, G.R. NO. 218399, MARCH 2, 2016.)
In the case at bar, the Court agrees with the finding of the courts a quo that the prosecution was
able to prove that Comboy: (a) had carnal knowledge of her without her consent on two (2)
separate occasions, the first occurring sometime in 2006 and the second in February 2008; and
(b) attempted to have carnal knowledge of her on May 17, 2009, but was stopped by a reason
other than his own desistance, i.e., BBB's intervention. Suffice it to say that Comboy's flimsy
defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of AAA
identifying him as the perpetrator of the crimes. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GODOFREDO
COMBOY y CRONICO, G.R. NO. 218399, MARCH 2, 2016)
AAA’s trustworthy account proved all the elements of rape as defined under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such
act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12 years of age. 26 The appellant in this
case had sexual intercourse with AAA, which he accomplished through force, that is, with the
use of a knife he threatened to kill AAA to make her succumb to his bestiality. Indubitably, the
appellant committed the crime of rape against AAA. (PEOPLE VS GERASMIO, G.R. No. 207098,
July 08, 2015)
Here, even though the result of AAA’s physical examination conducted in September 2002
showed that she was already five and a half months pregnant at that time, it does not
necessarily follow that the appellant could not have authored the 28 August 2002 rape against
her. Contrary to appellant’s view, AAA’s pregnancy is immaterial to the issue since pregnancy is
not an essential element of the crime of rape. So, whether the child whom the rape victim
bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is
important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the
latter’s will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful
manner. As long as the elements of rape are present and proven by the prosecution, the
accused could be adjudged guilty thereof notwithstanding the attendance of other matters that
are completely irrelevant to the crime. (PEOPLE VS GERASMIO, G.R. No. 207098, July 08, 2015)
Victims of a heinous crime, such as rape, cannot be expected to act within reason or in
accordance with society’s expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a standard rational
reaction to an irrational experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot be expected to
70 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
act as usual in an unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of a human

mind placed under emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a standard
reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of them had to cope with
different circumstances. (PEOPLE VS GERASMIO, G.R. No. 207098, July 08, 2015)
Regaspi likewise claims that it is unbelievable that he would attack AAA in a public place. Rape
cases, however, are not always committed in seclusion. It is settled that lust is no respecter of
time or place, and rape defies constraints of time and space. He also points out that AAA did not
seem to have offered any resistance during the supposed ordeal. For two (2) hours, there was
no indication that she tried to punch, bite or scratch the accused. She never shouted or cried for
help. But the lack of resistance on the part of the complainant is not inconsistent with a claim of
rape. Lack of resistance does not automatically mean that the complainant consented to the
sexual act, especially when the accused had intimidated said person into submission. Here, AAA
was not only intimidated but likewise rendered unconscious. True, there was no test conducted
to determine that AAA was indeed drugged, but this is of little relevance as the same is not an
indispensable element in a prosecution for rape. It is sufficient that the prosecution was able to
prove that AAA had been sedated by Regaspi at the time the latter had carnal knowledge of her.
(PEOPLE VS. REGASPI, G.R. No. 198309, September 7, 2015)
Rape; Consummation - Appellant, however, only confesses to having had an ejaculation near
AAA's female anatomy but denies having sexual contact or intercourse with AAA. He asserts that
the absence of hymenal lacerations supports his statements. The Court rebuffs this defense of
denial. Aside from being weak, it is self-serving evidence which pales in comparison to AAA's
and BBB 's clear narration of facts and positive identification of appellant. Moreover, the Court
disbelieves that appellant could only have had a spontaneous ejaculation without having done
other acts to bring about the same. The medical findings of AAA's hyperemia at both her labial
folds, the tenderness at her hymenal area and the presence of spermatozoa evidence that
sexual contact did occur. Mere spanking of AAA's female anatomy could not have caused these
conditions. The Court also has said often enough that in concluding that carnal knowledge took
place, full penetration of the vagina] orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of
the hymen necessary; the mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. To be precise, the
touching of the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum by the penis constitutes
consummated rape. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELPEDIO CASTANAS Y ESPINOSA, G.R. No.
192428, April 20, 2016)
Rape; Guiding Principles - Jurisprudence lay down the following guidelines in evaluating the
testimony of the victim. First, while an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is
71 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
Second, in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and lastly,
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. VINCENT GARRIDO y ELORDE, G.R. No. 191258, July 8, 2015)
Rape; Mental Retardates - Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape
under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended.-For a charge of rape under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the prosecution must prove that (1) the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force,
threat or intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she
was under 12 years of age or was demented. Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental
retardate is rape under the aforesaid provisions of law. Proof of force or intimidation is not
necessary, as a mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to
be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental
retardation of the latter. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALEXANDER “SANDER” BANGSOY,
G.R. NO. 204047, JANUARY 13, 2016)
Rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside,
within school premises, inside a house where there are other occupants, and even in the same
room where other members of the family are also sleeping.-Contrary to the appellant's claim,
the presence of the victim's father in the room does not negate the conunission of the crime.
Rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside,
within school premises, inside a house where there are other occupants, and even in the same
room where other members of the family are also sleeping. It is not impossible or incredible for
the members of the victim's family to be in deep slumber and not to be awakened while a
sexual assault is being committed. It is settled that lust is not a respecter of time or place and
rape is known to happen in the most unlikely places; (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
ALEXANDER “SANDER” BANGSOY, G.R. NO. 204047, JANUARY 13, 2016)
Rape Through Sexual Assault Clearly then, rape can be committed either through sexual
intercourse or by sexual assault. Rape by sexual assault is committed under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 and through any of the means enumerated under
paragraph 2 of Article 266-A. The gravamen of rape through sexual assault is ''the insertion of
the penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another
72 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
person's genital or anal orifice." It is also called "instrument or object rape" or "gender-free
rape." (CARRERA VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 217804, September 2, 2015)
As a matter of settled jurisprudence, when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect
all that is necessary to show that she has been raped and her testimony alone is sufficient if it
satisfies the exacting standard of credibility and consistency needed to sustain a conviction.
Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy, not generally attempted save in secluded or dark
places. By the distinctive nature of rape cases, their prosecution usually commences on the
word and conviction usually rests solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim, if credible,
natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Thus,
the victim's' credibility becomes the primordial consideration in the resolution of rape cases.
(CARRERA VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 217804, September 2, 2015)
Petitioner's pretense that the prosecution failed to establish that he employed force upon AAA
in committing the sexual assault deserves scant consideration. Indeed, AAA testified that the
petitioner had to hold both of her arms and drag her toward the church, where the actual
assault was committed. All the while, she tried to set herself free but was unsuccessful. Surely
the mix of the adverted acts of the petitioner constitute, as aptly observed by the CA, the force
contemplated in the law. The absence of visible bruises, scratches or contusion on the body, if
this be the case, is in context of little moment. External signs of physical injuries on the victim is
not an element of the crime of rape, and their absence, without more, does not necessarily
negate the commission of rape. (CARRERA VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 217804, September 2, 2015)
In accordance with Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty for the offense of rape by sexual assault
is one degree lower than that imposed for rape by sexual intercourse, or prisi6n mayor. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from
the full range of the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law, which is prison
correccional, and the maximum of which shall come from the proper penalty that could be
imposed under the RPC. Thus, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of four (4) years,
two (2) months, and one (1) day of prison correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prisi6n mayor, as maximum. The civil liability imposed by the CA is likewise affirmed, in
line with People v. Crisostomo, 715 SCRA 99 (2014), the prevailing jurisprudential guide on the
matter. (CARRERA VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 217804, September 2, 2015)
Unlike rape by sexual intercourse, Article 266·B prescribes prision mayor as the penalty if found
guilty of rape by sexual assault or reclusion temporal if there are qualifying circumstances
present. In both cases either in rape by sexual intercourse or rape by sexual assault, only the
fact of penetration need be established under either. It must be stated though that under rape
by sexual intercourse, there must be proof that his penis touched the labia of the victim or slid
73 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
into her female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, to ensure his
conviction. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE SALVADOR, G.R. No. 207815. JUNE 22, 2015)
In this case, the crime committed was rape through sexual assault. It having been established
that BBB was under 18 years of age at the time of the crime and that appellant is her father, a
qualifying circumstance, the proper penalty to be imposed should be reclusion temporal. We
are, therefore, constrained to modify the penalty imposed by the CA since it imposed the
penalty suited for the crime of qualified rape by sexual intercourse as opposed to qualified rape
by sexual assault. In this respect, the penalty that must be imposed is an indeterminate penalty
of nine (9) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE SALVADOR,
G.R. No. 207815. JUNE 22, 2015)
Rape; Sweetheart Theory. appellant admitted having sexual intercourse with "AAA" at the
latter's house although he claimed that the sexual intercourse was consensual since they were
lovers. The Court cannot subscribe to appellant's "sweetheart" theory and exculpate him from
the charge. For one, such claim is self-serving since it was not substantiated by the evidence on
record. And even if "AAA" and appellant were sweethearts, this fact does not necessarily negate
rape. As has been consistently ruled, "a love affair does not justify rape, for the beloved cannot
be sexually violated against her will." "[L]ove is not a license for lust" More importantly, what
destroyed the veracity of appellant's "sweetheart" defense are "AAA's" credible declaration that
he is not her sweetheart and her vehement denial that he courted her. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. JOHNLIE LAGANGGA Y DUMPA, G.R. No. 207633, December 09, 2015).
Simple Rape ; Penalty – The trial court properly appreciated minority, which was pleaded in the
Information, as an aggravating circumstance. According to MMM's birth certificate, she was 12
years and 8 months old at the time of the rape. Said document was offered and presented in
evidence by the prosecution. Nevertheless, "the presence of an aggravating circumstance
cannot serve to raise the penalty to be imposed [because] simple rape is punishable by the
single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, that penalty shall, pursuant to the first
paragraph of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, be imposed regardless of any modifying
circumstance that might have attended the commission of the crime. (PEOPLE vs. ARCEO, G.R.
No. 208842, November 10, 2015)
Statutory Rape. The elements of statutory rape are found in the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353, which reads: Article 266-A. Rape, When and How
74 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Committed. — Rape is Committed — 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances: x x x x d) When the offended party is under twelve
(12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present. As regards this provision, we have previously held that: When the offended party is
under 12 years of age, the crime committed is "termed statutory rape as it departs from the
usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is carnal knowledge of a woman below
12 years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal
knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her
own on account of her tender years." (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL REBANUEL Y
NADERA, G.R. No. 208475, June 08, 2016)
This Court has consistently held that "rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape."
What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12)
years old. Thus, force, intimidation and physical evidence of injury are not relevant
considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal
knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her
own on account of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed
incapacity to discern good from evil. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JAIME BRIOSO ALIAS
TALAP-TALAP, G.R. No. 209344, June 27, 2016)
Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below twelve (12) years of age
regardless of her consent, or the lack of it to the sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation, or
consent is unnecessary. These are not elements of statutory rape as the absence of free consent
is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of twelve. At that age, the law
presumes that the victim does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent
consent to the sexual act. To convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution
carries the burden of proving; (1) the age of the complainant; (2) the identity of the accused;
and (3) the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant. Full penile
penetration of the female genitalia is likewise not required because carnal knowledge is simply
the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
v. LORETO SONIDO Y CORONEL, G.R. No. 208646, June 15, 2016)
Conviction will therefore lie, regardless of proof of force or intimidation provided sexual
intercourse is proven. Force, threat, or intimidation are not elements of statutory rape,
therefore proof thereof is unnecessary. But if the woman is 12 years of age or over at the time
75 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
she was violated, sexual intercourse must be proven and also that it was done through force,
violence, intimidation or threat. (PEOPLE VS. BIALA, G.R. No. 217975, November 23, 2015)
It is unreasonable to demand a standard rational reaction to an irrational experience, especially

from a young victim. It is inaccurate to say that there is a standard reaction or norm of
behaviour among rape victims because each rape situation is different and dependent on
various circumstances. (PEOPLE VS. BIALA, G.R. No. 217975, November 23, 2015)
When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age, the crime committed is termed
statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape.33 What the law punishes
is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years of age.34 In the instant case, there is no
dispute that AAA was four years of age when the crime was committed. Resultantly, accused-
appellant was charged and proven guilty of statutory rape. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
VICTOR P. PADIT, G.R. NO. 202978, FEBRUARY 1, 2016)
Sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate with a mental age of below twelve
(12) years old constitutes statutory rape.-Sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental
retardate with a mental age of below 12 years old constitutes statutory rape. Notably, AAA was
also below 12 years old at the time of the incident, as evidenced by the records showing that
she was born on March 1, 1993; (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALEXANDE “SANDER”
BANGSOY, G.R. NO. 204047, JANUARY 13, 2016)
Statutory Rape ; Penalty - Statutory rape, penalized under Article 266 A (1), paragraph (d) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, carries
the penalty of reclusion perpetua unless attended by qualifying circumstances defined under
Article 266-B. In the instant case, as the victim, AAA, is below seven (7) years old, specifically
four (4) years old at the time of the crime, the imposable penalty is death. The passage of
Republic Act No. 9346 debars the imposition of the death penalty without declassifying the
crime of qualified rape as heinous. Thus, the appellate court correctly reduced the penalty from
death penalty to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
v. EMETERIO MEDINA Y DAMO, G.R. No. 214473, June 22, 2016)
Statutory rape, penalized under Article 266 A (1), paragraph (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, carries the penalty of reclusion
perpetua unless attended by qualifying circumstances defined under Article 266-B. The
prosecution only gave proof of AAA's age at the time of the crime but did not substantiate the
allegation of kinship between AAA and appellant. There being no qualifying circumstance, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, imposed by the RTC, affirmed by
76 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
the Court of Appeals, is proper. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LORETO SONIDO Y CORONEL,
G.R. No. 208646, June 15, 2016)
As to the penalty, Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended, provides that the death penalty shall be
imposed if the victim is a child below seven years old. However, following Republic Act No.
9346,35 the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly imposed upon accused-appellant the penalty
of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death, but it should be specified that it is without eligibility for
parole, as the RTC did not state it in the dispositive portion of its Decision. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. VICTOR P. PADIT, G.R. NO. 202978, FEBRUARY 1, 2016)
Incestuous Rape –As the Court ruled in People v. Oriliosa, 433 SCRA 689 (2004)in incestuous
rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not be employed where the overpowering
moral influence of the father would suffice. The moral and physical dominion of the father is
sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires. (PEOPLE vs. REMEDIOS, G.R.
No. 211056, November 10, 2015)
Qualified Rape; Elements of - Rape is qualified when the following elements of the offense
charged are present: (a) the victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age; (b) the
offender is a parent, [an] ascendant, [a] stepparent, [a] guardian, [a] relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and
(c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either through force, threat or intimidation;
or when [the victim] is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of
fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HENRY
CALADCADAN, G.R. No. 205378. September 23, 2015)
Accussed-appellant’s argument that rape was imposable due to the presence of AAA’s siblings is
also bereft of merit. Rape is not a respecter of place or time. “It is not necessary that the place
where the rape is committed be isolated. “ “There have been too many instances when rape
was committed under circumstances as indiscreet and audacious as a room full of family
members sleeping side by side. – Accussed-appellant’s argument that rape was imposable due
to the presence of AAA’s siblings is also bereft of merit. Rape is not a respecter of place or time.”
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HENRY CALADCADAN, G.R. No. 205378. September 23, 2015)
BBB’s act of immediately reporting the crime once he became convinced that it was accused-
appellant who rape their daughter certainly adds credibility to the account. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. HENRY CALADCADAN, G.R. No. 205378. September 23, 2015)
77 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
For one to be convicted of qualified rape, at least one (1) of the aggravating / qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, must
be alleged in the information and duly proved during trial. (PEOPLE VS. BIALA, G.R. No. 217975,
November 23, 2015)
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death penalty shall be imposed when
the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim. In the present case, however, the relationship of the
appellant to the victim was not alleged. Nonetheless, the Information averred that AAA was a
mental retardate and that the appellant knew ofthis mental retardation. These circumstances
raised the crime from statutory rape to qualified rape or statutory rape in its qualified form
under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. Since the death penalty cannot be imposed in
view of Republic Act No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the
Philippines), the CA correctly affirmed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole imposed by the RTC on the appellant; (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALEXANDRE
“SANDER” BANGSOY, G.R. NO. 204047, JANUARY 13, 2016)
Article 266-B of the same Code provides that rape is qualified when certain circumstances are
present in its commission, such as when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.24 Hence,
for a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary elements
of (1) sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and without consent; and in order to
warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements that (4) the victim is under
eighteen years of age at the time of the rape, and (5) the offender is a parent (whether
legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELISEO D.
VILLAMOR, G.R. NO. 202187, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
Qualified Rape; Minority and Relationship – AAA was 16 years old when she was raped in
March 2004. The fact of the victim’s age was duly substantiated by her Birth Certificate which
was formally offered in evidence and marked as Exhibit “A.” Further, the offender, herein
accused-appellant Bacus is AAA’s father. Such fact of relationship between the offender and the
offended party was likewise supported by the Birth Certificate of the latter and corroborated by
the testimonies of the former. Therefore, as aptly held by the RTC and correctly affirmed by the
appellate court, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, for which he is to
78 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the death penalty under
Section 2 of R.A. No. 9346. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs RICARDO BACUS, G.R. NO. 208354,
AUGUST 26, 2015)
Under Article 266- B of the RPC, rape is punishable by death when the victim is under eighteen
(18) years of age and the offender is a parent of the victim. As a special qualifying circumstance
for raising the penalty of rape to death, the minority of the victim and her relationship to the
offender must be alleged in the criminal complaint or information, and proved conclusively and
indubitably as the crime itself. The two Informations jointly alleged minority and relationship. As
a matter of fact, accused-appellant admitted during pretrial that AAA is his daughter. Her birth
certificate showing that AAA was only 16 years old at the time of the rape incident was likewise
offered in evidence by the prosecution. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HENRY CALADCADAN,
G.R. No. 205378. September 23, 2015)
The age of AAA and her relationship to the accused-appellant qualify the rape committed
against her. Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides: Art. 266-B. Penalties. - x x x The
death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances: 1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. In
this case, the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were specifically alleged in
the information against the accused-appellant. Thereafter, the prosecution offered in evidence
the birth certificate of AAA, which proved that she was born on September 25, 1988. Thus, AAA
was only 14 years old when the rape incident took place on March 2, 2003. The birth certificate
likewise stated that the accused-appellant Bienvenido Saramosing Remedios is the biological
father of AAA, which fact he likewise admitted during the trial of the case. (PEOPLE vs.
REMEDIOS, G.R. No. 211056, November 10, 2015)
Article 266-B of the RPC provides that rape is qualified when certain circumstances are present
in its commission, such as when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Hence, in a conviction
for qualified rape, the prosecution must prove that (1) the victim is under eighteen years of age
at the time of the rape, and (2) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or
adopted) of the victim. In other words, it is the concurrence of both the minority of the victim
and her relationship with the offender that will be considered as a special qualifying
circumstance, raising the penalty to the supreme penalty of death. Thus, it is imperative that
the circumstance of minority and relationship be proved conclusively and indubitably as the
crime itself; otherwise, the crime shall be considered simple rape warranting the imposition of
79 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
the lower penalty of reclusion perpetual. If, at trial, both the age of the victim and her
relationship with the offender are not proven beyond reasonable doubt, the death penalty
cannot be imposed. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REMAN SARIEGO, G.R. NO. 203322,
FEBRUARY 24, 2016)
In this case, while it is undisputed that AAA is the daughter of appellant, her minority was not
conclusively established. In People v. Prunaa, the Court laid down the following controlling
guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance:
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we hereby
set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a
qualifying circumstance. 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an
original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. 2. In the absence of a
certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents, such as baptismal certificate and school
records which show the date of birth of the victim, would suffice to prove age. 3. If the
certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member
of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a. If the
victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 7 years old; b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 12 years old; c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age
and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. 4. In the absence of a
certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives
concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly
and clearly admitted by the accused. 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the
age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence
regarding age shall not be taken against him. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REMAN
SARIEGO, G.R. NO. 203322, FEBRUARY 24, 2016)
In this case, We find that the prosecution was able to prove that Tuando had sexual intercourse
with AAA, the then 13 year old daughter of his common-law wife, against her will. The
prosecution was able to present the evidence to support conviction for qualified rape: that (1)
the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim under 18 years of age at the time of rape; (2)
said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force, when he boxed her hand while inserting
his penis into AAA's private organ, (b) through the threat of killing AAA's family and (c) through
intimidation being the common-law spouse of the victim's mother. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL YAMON TUANDO, G.R NO. 207816, FEBRUARY 24, 2016)
The concurrence of both the minority of the victim, as proven by her birth certificate, and her
relationship with her offender, qualified the rape raising the penalty to death. In People v. Floro
80 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Barcela, 723 SCRA 647 (2014), it is essential, as in this case, that both circumstances must be
alleged in the criminal complaint or information and proven as the crime itself. We find
credibility with AAA's narration that she was raped by Tuando. It was when the victim's senses
were weakened by dizziness that the accused laid her on top of the bed. He undressed the
victim, kissed her and inserted his penis inside the victim's private organ despite appeals and
struggle against the act. Not just the victim but her entire family was threatened with death if
she would expose the commission of the offense. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL
YAMON TUANDO, G.R NO. 207816, FEBRUARY 24, 2016)
As testified to by the accused, he and BBB were common-law spouses living under the same
roof with the children of the latter, including AAA. After four years, he now claims before this
Court that upon his separation from BBB, he entered into a romantic relationship, this time with
the minor daughter of his former partner. When the trial judge asked the accused if he found
nothing wrong with his relationship with a minor, he answered negatively. It is hard for this
Court to fathom that a minor, a 13-year old child-woman, would enter into a relationship with a
man thrice her age and worse, a former common-law spouse of her own mother. It is even
absurd, if not disturbing, to even entertain the thought that a child like AAA, who has been
living with her step father, the accused, since she was 9 years old, would freely consent to
sexual intercourse with the accused in their own home. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL
YAMON TUANDO, G.R NO. 207816, FEBRUARY 24, 2016)
No young girl such as AAA would concoct a sordid tale, on her own or through the influence of
her mother BBB or even his brother CCC, and undergo the ordeal of having her private parts
examined by a medical doctor, of being questioned by NBI operatives about the details of how
she was raped by Tuando, then eventually being subjected to the stigma and embarrassment of
a public trial, if her motive was other than a fervent desire to seek justice. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL YAMON TUANDO, G.R NO. 207816, FEBRUARY 24, 2016)
There is ample basis to conclude that AAA's resumption to normal life after the commission of
rape cannot be taken against her. A victim's reaction after a harrowing experience, especially in
a crime of rape, is subjective and not everyone responds in the same way. There is no standard
form of behavior that can be anticipated of a rape victim following her sexual abuse. People
respond differently to emotional stress, particularly minor children subjected to such level of
emotional trauma. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL YAMON TUANDO, G.R NO. 207816,
FEBRUARY 24, 2016)
Qualified Rape ; Penalty - Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended,
the imposable penalty for qualified rape is death. With the effectivity, however, of Republic Act
81 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
(RA) No. 9346, the imposition of the supreme penalty of death has been prohibited. (PEOPLE
VS. BIALA, G.R. No. 217975, November 23, 2015)
As to the penalty, Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended, provides that the death penalty shall be
imposed if the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender, among others, is the
victim's parent. However, following Republic Act No. 9346, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
correctly imposed upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death,
without eligibility for parole. Likewise, the RTC correctly awarded in AAA's favor the amounts of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages. An award of civil indemnity ex
delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape, and moral damages may be
automatically awarded in rape cases without need of proof of mental and physical suffering. The
CA, in turn, correctly modified the RTC ruling by increasing the award of exemplary damages
from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00. Exemplary damages are also called for, by way of public
example, and to protect the young from sexual abuse. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
RICARDO LAGBO a.k.a. RICARDO LABONG, G.R. NO. 207535, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death shall be imposed when the
victim of rape is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. However, upon the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 934630 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty in the Philippines, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, in lieu of death penalty, shall be imposed on
Tuando. Hence, the Court affirms the imposition of penalty meted by the Court of Appeals.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL YAMON TUANDO, G.R NO. 207816, FEBRUARY 24,
2016)
Qualified Rape; Damages - The award of damages should be modified pursuant to the ruling in
People v. Gamboa, 706 SCRA 508 (2013). We hold that AAA is entitled to P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P100, 000 as moral damages, and P100, 000 as exemplary damages for each count of
rape. All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HENRY CALADCADAN,
G.R. No. 205378. September 23, 2015
In People v. Gambao, 706 SCRA 508 (2013), the Supreme Court (SC) set the minimum indemnity
and damages where facts warranted the imposition of the death penalty, if not for prohibition
thereof by Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, as follows: (J) PlOO,OOO.OO as civil indemnity; (2)
PlOO,OOO.OO as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs
no proof; and (3) PlOO,OOO.OO as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.-In
82 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
People v. Gambao, 706 SCRA 508 (2013), the Court set the minimum indemnity and damages
where facts warranted the imposition of the death penalty, if not for prohibition thereof by R.A.
No. 9346, as follows: (1) PlOO,OOO.OO as civil indemnity; (2) PlOO,OOO.OO as moral damages
which the victim VOL. 780, JANUARY 13, 2016 567 People vs. Bangsoy is assumed to have
suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3) PlOO,OOO.OO as exemplary damages to set an
example for the public good. We thus increase the awarded civil indemnity from P75,000.00 to
PlOO,OOO.OO; moral damages from P75,000.00 to PlOO,OOO.OO; and the exemplary damages
from P30,000.00 to PlOO,OOO.OO (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALEXANDER “SANDER”
As to the award of damages, the Supreme Court (SC), deems it proper to increase the same in
consonance with its ruling in People vs. Gamboa, 706 SCRA 508 (2013), where the amounts of
indemnity and damages were increased when the proper penalty for the crime committed by
the accused was death but was not imposed because of the enactment Republic Act (RA) No.
9346, setting the minimum thereof, as follows: P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as
moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. (PEOPLE VS. BIALA, G.R. No. 217975,
November 23, 2015)
Pursuant to our recent rulings in People v. Gambao32 and recently by People v. Colentava,33 we
modify the award of damages to AAA from P75, 000.00 to P100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 to P100,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 to P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages, for qualified rape. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL YAMON TUANDO, G.R NO.
207816, FEBRUARY 24, 2016)
Carnal Knowledge with a mental retardate - Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental
retardate is rape under the aforesaid provisions of law. Proof of force or intimidation is not
necessary, as a mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to
be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental
retardation of the latter. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RUBEN DELA ROSA, G.R. No. 206419,
June 01, 2016)
The Court has held in a long line of cases that if the mental age of a woman above twelve years
is that of a child below twelve years, even if she voluntarily submitted to the bestial desires of
the accused, or even absent the circumstances of force or intimidation or the fact that the
victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, the accused would still be liable for
rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 8353. The rationale is that if sexual intercourse with a victim under twelve years of age
is rape, then it should follow that carnal knowledge of a woman whose mental age is that of a
83 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
child below twelve years would also constitute rape.(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RUBEN
DELA ROSA, G.R. No. 206419, June 01, 2016)
Hymenal Laceration; Not an Element of the Crime - The healed laceration on the victim's
hymen does not serve to acquit appellant either. Hymenal laceration is not an element of
statutory rape, as long as there is enough proof of entry of the male organ into the labia of the
pudendum of the female organ of the offended party who is below 12 years of age. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL REBANUEL Y NADERA, G.R. No. 208475, June 08, 2016)
The lack of hymenal injuries does not mean that no sexual abuse took place.-We find no merit in
the appellant's contention that the absence of lacerations in the victim's hymen negated sexual
intercourse. The rupture of the hymen is not an essential and material fact in rape cases; it only
further confirms that the vagina has been penetrated and damaged in the process. Additionally,
in the present case, the genital examination on AAA was conducted on May 17, 2005, or more
than one year after the rape took place. At any rate, Dr. Marjorie Rebujio, Medical officer III at
the Benguet General Hospital, clarified that the lack of hymenal injuries does not mean that no
sexual abuse took place. Dr. Rebujio further explained that the hymen could heal fast and that it
could go back to its normal structure; (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALEXANDE “SANDER”
This Court, in a number of cases, has affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape despite the
absence of laceration on the victim's hymen, since medical findings suggest that it is possible for
the victim's hymen to remain intact despite repeated sexual intercourse.29 It has been
elucidated that the strength and dilatability of the hymen varies from one woman to another,
such that it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse. In any case,
this Court has previously stated that a medical examination and a medical certificate, albeit
corroborative of the commission of rape, are not indispensable to a successful prosecution for
rape.30 Moreover, it is settled that the absence of physical injuries or fresh lacerations does not
negate rape, and although medical results may not indicate physical abuse or hymenal
lacerations, rape can still be established since medical findings or proof of injuries are not
among the essential elements in the prosecution for rape.31 In the present case, the credible
disclosure of AAA that accused-appellant raped her is the most important proof of the
commission of the crime. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO LAGBO a.k.a. RICARDO
LABONG, G.R. NO. 207535, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
AAA positively identified appellant as the person who raped her. She testified in a
straightforward and clear manner that appellant, whose house was just located at the back of
their house, called her to babysit his one year old son. When AAA entered appellant's house, he
84 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
closed the door, kissed her, removed her clothing and then his own clothes and then inserted
his penis into her vagina, and it was painful. AAA's claim of sexual intercourse was corroborated
by the medical report of Dr. Camarillo which showed the presence of a deep healed laceration
at 7 o'clock position which was assessed to be three weeks to two months old which was caused
by an insertion of an erected penis or a hard or blunt object. Hymenal lacerations, whether
healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible defloration. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. ALLAN RODRIGUEZ y GRAJO, G.R. NO. 208406, FEBRUARY 29, 2016)
Full Penetration and Hymenal Laceration - While indeed AAA's medical examination did not
show traces of injuries or lacerations, the rule is settled that hymenal lacerations are not an
element of rape. In concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal
orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere
touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is
sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. To be precise, the touching of the labia majora or the
labia minora of the pudendum by the penis constitutes consummated rape. Herein, AAA
unflinchingly testified that appellant "inserted his penis but it was not fully inserted though it
was pressed very hard x x x;" and that she did feel appellant's male anatomy inside her female
anatomy but the latter pulled it out "hurriedly." The examining physician confirmed that any
abrasion caused by the incident could have healed in the intervening period as female genitalia
are very vascular. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LORETO SONIDO Y CORONEL, G.R. No.
208646, June 15, 2016)
Testimony of Victim - Time and again, this Court has held that when the offended party is
young and an immature girl, as in this case, who has lived her whole life in a faraway island
wherein almost all residents know everybody, courts are inclined to lend credence to her
version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability, but also the shame
and embarrassment to which they would be exposed, if the matter about which they testified
were not true. No young girl would usually concoct a tale of defloration; publicly admit having
been ravished and her honor tainted; allow the examination of her private parts; and undergo
all the trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial, had
she not in fact been raped and been truly moved to protect and preserve her honor, and
motivated by the desire to obtain justice for the wicked acts committed against her. Indeed in a
rural setting the shame of rape is on the victim, not on the accused. And it will haunt the family
of the victim for a long time. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DIONE BARBERAN AND DIONE
DELOS SANTOS, G.R. No. 208759, June 22, 2016)
85 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Lack of Resistance - From the direct testimony of AAA, she explained that she was not able to
resist or cry help from her relatives since Barberan held her hands and covered her mouth while
De los Santos was raping her. After De los Santos, Barberan took his turn and raped her. She did
not have sufficient energy to resist the physical restraint employed by two men as she was
immobilized by fear and shock. Lack of physical resistance, to emphasize, is not an essential
element of the crime of rape. A victim should never be faulted for her lack of resistance to any
forms of crime particularly as grievous as rape. Failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance
does not make voluntary the victim's submission to the perpetrator's lust. Besides, physical
resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman involuntarily succumbed to the
lust of an accused; it is not an essential element of rape. Rape victims react differently when
confronted with sexual abuse. Thus, the law does not impose upon the private complainant the
burden of proving resistance. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DIONE BARBERAN AND DIONE
DELOS SANTOS, G.R. No. 208759, June 22, 2016)
Delay in Reporting Case - Delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an indication of a

fabricated charge and does not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant. It is
likewise settled in jurisprudence that human reactions vary and are unpredictable when facing a
shocking and horrifying experience such as sexual assault, thus, not all rape victims can be
expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. In the instant case, AAA,
being only four (4) years old at the time that she was violated and threatened with death if she
reports the incident, would naturally be cowed into silence because of fear for her life. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JAIME BRIOSO ALIAS TALAP-TALAP, G.R. No. 209344, June 27, 2016)
As to AAA’s delay in reporting the rape incident until BBB noticed the changes in her physical
appearance, the same can be attributed to her tender age and to the threat made upon her
person by the appellant. Even if the appellant was not always around, the fact that he is her
uncle and he lives nearby is more than enough to cause fear on AAA since he could make good
of his threat at anytime. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals, AAA’s failure to report the rape
incident is not an indication of fabricated charges. If she did not become pregnant she would
not have revealed the humiliating, painful experience she suffered in the hands of someone
whom she may have regarded as a father. (PEOPLE VS GERASMIO, G.R. No. 207098, July 08,
2015)
Athis Court has pronounced in Rondina v. People,35 ill motives become inconsequential if there
is an affirmative and credible declaration from the rape victim, which clearly establishes the
liability of the accused. In this case, AAA categorically identified the appellant as her ravisher.
Her account of the incident was given credence by both lower courts to which this Court
conforms. Thus, the appellant’s flimsy allegation of ill motive is immaterial. Besides, no woman
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and submit
86 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
herself to public humiliation and scrutiny via an open trial, if her sordid tale was not true and
her sole motivation was not to have the culprit apprehended and punished. (PEOPLE VS
GERASMIO, G.R. No. 207098, July 08, 2015)
By declaring that the appellant inserted his penis into her vagina, the victim said all that was
necessary to prove rape. Also, it is well settled that medical findings of injuries in the victim's
genitalia are not essential to convict the appellant of rape. Hymenal lacerations are not an
element of rape. What is essential is that there was penetration, however slight, of the
labia minora, which circumstance was proven beyond doubt in this case by the testimony of
AAA.37 Moreover, Dr. Faciol clarified that after 8 to 10 days from the time the victim was raped
there would no longer be any indication or manifestation of rape on the victim’s vagina. 38 This
would precisely explain the lack of any injury on AAA’s genitalia. (PEOPLE VS GERASMIO, G.R.
No. 207098, July 08, 2015)
Flight an Indication of Guilt - Mention-worthy is appellant's immediate flight from his home
shortly after the incident and his evasion of arrest for more than six (6) years. Jurisprudence has
repeatedly declared that flight is an indication of guilt. The flight of an accused, in the absence
of a credible explanation, would be a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be
established for a truly innocent person would normally grasp the first available opportunity to
defend himself and assert his innocence. In the case at bar, appellant's flight incontestably
evidenced guilt. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EMETERIO MEDINA Y DAMO, G.R. No. 214473,
June 22, 2016)
Evidence. - Neither does AAA's silence on the incident nor failure to shout or wake up her
siblings affect her credibility. The Court had consistently found that there is no uniform behavior
that can be expected from those who had the misfortune of being sexually molested. While
there are some who may have found the courage early on to reveal the abuse they experienced,
there are those who have opted to initially keep the harrowing ordeal to themselves and
attempted to move on with their lives. This is because a rape victim's actions are oftentimes
overwhelmed by fear rather than by reason. The perpetrator of the rape hopes to build a
climate of extreme psychological terror, which would numb his victim into silence and
submissiveness. In fact, incestuous rape further magnifies this terror for the perpetrator in
these cases, such as the victim's father, is a person normally expected to give solace and
protection to the victim. Moreover, in incest, access to the victim is guaranteed by the blood
relationship, magnifying the sense of helplessness and the degree of fear. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. ELISEO D. VILLAMOR, G.R. NO. 202187, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
87 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
In resolving rape cases, the Court has always given primordial consideration to the credibility of
the victim's testimony. In fact, since rape is a crime that is almost always committed in isolation,
usually leaving only the victims to testify on the commission of the crime, for as long as the
victim's testimony is logical, credible, consistent and convincing, the accused may be convicted
solely on the basis thereof. In this case, the courts below expressly found that AAA testified in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, evincing her credibility. As
reproduced in the CA Decision, AAA's testimony during her direct examination clearly
recounted, in detail, the series of events that transpired during the alleged incidents. Indeed,
unless there appears certain facts or circumstances of weight and value which the lower court
overlooked or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the
case, the trial court's conclusions on the credibility of witnesses in rape cases are generally
accorded great weight and respect, and at times even finality. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
REMAN SARIEGO, G.R. NO. 203322, FEBRUARY 24, 2016)
The best evidence to prove the age of a person is the original birth certificate or certified true
copy thereof, and in their absence, similar authentic documents may be presented such as
baptismal certificates and school records. If the original or certified true copy of the birth
certificate is not available, credible testimonies of the victim's mother or a member of the
family may be sufficient under certain circumstances. In the event that both the birth certificate
or other authentic documents and the testimonies of the victim's mother or other qualified
relative are unavailable, the testimony of the victim may be admitted in evidence provided that
it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REMAN
SARIEGO, G.R. NO. 203322, FEBRUARY 24, 2016)
Indeed, qualifying circumstances must be proved beyond reasonable doubt just like the crime
itself. In view of the prosecution's failure to establish AAA's minority with absolute certainty and
clearness, the Court cannot sustain appellant's conviction for the crime of rape in its qualified
form. Consequently, appellant should only be convicted of the crime of simple rape, the penalty
for which is reclusion perpetua. Additionally, the damages awarded by the courts below should
also be modified in line with prevailing jurisprudence. Thus, the award of civil indemnity must
be reduced to P50,000.00, while the award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 shall
be maintained. In addition, there shall be an award of exemplary damages in the amount of
P30,000.00. Said amounts shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of
this judgment until fully paid. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REMAN SARIEGO, G.R. NO.
203322, FEBRUARY 24, 2016)
Rape can be established by the sole testimony of the victim that is credible and untainted with
serious uncertainty. With more reason is this true when the medical findings supported the
testimony of the victim, as in this case. When the victim's testimony of her violation is
88 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
corroborated by the physical evidence of penetration, there is sufficient foundation for

concluding that there was carnal knowledge. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALLAN
RODRIGUEZ y GRAJO, G.R NO. 208406, FEBRUARY 29, 2016)
Acts of Lasciviousness
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate penalty must be
taken from the full range of the penalty next lower in degree, that is arresto mayor, which
ranges from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. Absent any modifying
circumstance attendant to the crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is to be taken
from the medium period of prision correccional, ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. (PEOPLE VS. BIALA, G.R. No. 217975,
November 23, 2015)
Slight Physical Injuries
When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended parly for labor or of the required
medical attendance; or when there is no proof as to the period of the offended party's
incapacity for labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical
injuries. (VIRGINIA JABALDE Y JAMANDRON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 195224,
June 15, 2016)
E. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty,
coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect the same. The crime of
serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also of
detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. When deprivation of liberty
89 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
occurs under any of the circumstances listed under Article 267, paragraph 4 is present, the
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is consummated. (PEOPLE V. DE GUZMAN Y
YANZON, G.R. No. 214502, [November 25, 2015])
The prescribed penalty for kidnapping a minor under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua to death. - The prescribed penalty
for kidnapping a minor under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua to death, to wit: Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. — Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other
manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. x x x
x 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female, or a public officer. Since neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances
attended the commission of the felony, the RTC properly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, together with the accessory penalty provided by law. The Court of Appeals also
correctly modified the amount of the award of exemplary damages in conformity with
prevailing jurisprudence. Finally, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
MIRAFLOR UGANIEL LERIO, G.R. No. 209039, December 09, 2015).
The prosecution has established the elements of kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4 of
the Revised Penal Code, to wit: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or
detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his or her liberty; (3) the act of
detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female
or a public officer. The prosecution has adequately and satisfactorily proven that accused-
appellant is a private individual; that accused-appellant took one-month old baby Justin Clyde
from his residence, without the knowledge or consent of, and against the will of his mother;
and that the victim was a minor, one-month old at the time of the incident, the fact of which
accused-appellant herself admitted. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIRAFLOR UGANIEL
LERIO, G.R. No. 209039, December 09, 2015)
It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in
an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him of his liberty in any manner. For there
to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Its essence is the
actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the
accused to effect such deprivation. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JERRY PEPINO Y RUERAS
AND PRECIOSA GOMEZ Y CAMPOS, G.R. NO. 174471, JANUARY 12, 2016)
Kidnapping; Elements of. We have held that the following elements must be established by
the prosecution to obtain a conviction for kidnapping, viz.: (a) the offender is a private
90 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his
liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the
offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts
for more than three days; (2) it is committed by simulating public authority; (3) any serious
physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or threats to kill him are
made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained, is a minor, a female, or a public officer. If the
victim is a minor, or is kidnapped or detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the
duration of detention becomes immaterial. The essence of kidnapping is the actual
deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused
to effect such deprivation. (PEOPLE V. DE GUZMAN Y YANZON, G.R. No. 214502, [November
25, 2015])
The Elements of Kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1)
the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner
deprives the latter of his or her liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4)
the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public officer; (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. MUEL A. MAGNO G.R. No. 206972, December 2, 2015)
Kidnapping; Penalties - Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic
Act (RA) No. 7659, states that when the victim is killed or dies as consequence of the detention
or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed. –There is no dispute that rape was committed against AAA considering that her
hymen had fresh laceration and the edges are sharp, reddened and edematous (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. MUEL A. MAGNO G.R. No. 206972, December 2, 2015)
Kidnap for Ransom; Elements - In prosecuting a case involving the crime of kidnapping for
ransom, the following elements must be established: (i) the accused was a private person; (ii) he
kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty; (iii) the
kidnapping or detention was illegal; and (iv) the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JAY GREGORIO Y AMAR @ "JAY," G.R. No. 194235, June 08,
2016)
Based on the prosecution's evidence, each of the accused-appellants, plus Jojo, had intentional,
direct, and substantial participation in Jimmy's kidnapping for ransom. Jimmy's abduction, his
being taken to and holed up in a house in Ilocos Norte under guard, the ransom demand and
negotiation, and finally, the ransom payout, which all happened in a span of six days, took
planning and coordination among accused-appellants and Jojo. Accused-appellant Efren, in
particular, was among the four men who abducted Jimmy in Meycauayan, Bulacan on October
91 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
8, 2002. Accused-appellant Efren also kept guard over Jimmy for six days in Dingras, Ilocos
Norte. Therefore, accused-appellant Efren could not be a mere accomplice as his presence at
the scene/s of the crime was definitely more than just to give moral support; his presence and
company were indispensable and essential to the perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JAY GREGORIO Y AMAR @ "JAY," G.R. No. 194235, June 08,
2016)
In prosecuting a case involving the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, the prosecution must
establish the following elements: (i) the accused was a private person; (ii) he kidnapped or
detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty; (iii) the kidnapping or
detention was illegal; and (iv) the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom. A painstaking
review of the present case clearly shows that all the aforestated elements were proven in the
criminal case on review. The testimony of Cordero sufficiently established the commission of the
crime and both the accused-appellants' culpability. He positively identified in and out of court
accused-appellants Vicente and Devincio as two of his abductors. As the kidnap victim, a private
individual, Cordero's positive identification of both accused-appellants - as two of several men
who abducted him from the gate of his house, who brought him to a hut somewhere in the
south, who chained him to a bed, who essentially deprived him of liberty without lawful cause
for four days, and, which deprivation of his liberty was for the purpose of extorting ransom from
his family -collectively establish the crime of kidnapping for ransom as the actions of both the
accused-appellants were certain and clear, and their intent was explicit and made known to
Cordero himself. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE LUGNASIN and DEVINCIO
GUERRERO, G.R. NO. 208404, FEBRUARY 24, 2016)
The elements of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, are as follows: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his
liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which
is extorting ransom for the release of the victim. Time is not a material ingredient in the crime
of kidnapping. As long as all these elements were sufficiently established by the prosecution, a
conviction for kidnapping is in order. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPO1 CATALINO
GONZALES, JR., G.R. NO. 192233, FEBRUARY 17, 2016)
The CA is correct in its observation that at the time accused-appellant received the ransom
money, the crime of kidnapping was still continuing, since both victims were still being illegally
detained by the kidnappers.33While his receipt of the ransom money was not a material
element of the crime, it was nevertheless part of the grand plan and was in fact the main reason
for kidnapping the victims.34 Ransom is money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the
redemption of a captured person or persons; or payment that releases from captivity. 35Without
ransom money, the freedom of the detained victims cannot be achieved. The positive
identification of accused-appellant constitutes direct, and not merely circumstantial,
evidence.(PEOPLE VS. OCTA, G.R. No. 195196,July 13, 2015)
92 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Accused-appellant's contention that he was convicted based only on circumstantial evidence

deserves scant consideration. We agree with the conclusion of the CA that "[Corpuz] testified
that she gave the ransom money to accused-appellant, and as the trial court declared, his act of
receiving the ransom money is sufficient conspiratorial act in the commission of the kidnapping
for ransom. The positive identification of the accused-appellant then constitutes direct
evidence, and not merely circumstantial evidence. .(PEOPLE VS. OCTA, G.R. No. 195196,July 13,
2015)
Kidnapping for Ransom; Civil Indemnity; Moral Damages; Exemplary Damages; In the case
of People v. Gambao, 706 SCRA 508 (2013), (also for kidnapping for ransom), the Supreme Court
(SC) set the minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the imposition of the
death penalty if not for prohibition thereof by Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, as follows: (1)
Pl00,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) Pl00,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to
have suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3) Pl00,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an
example for the public good.- In the case of People v. Gambao, 706 SCRA 508 (2013), (also for
kidnapping for ransom), the Court set the minimum indemnity and damages where facts
warranted the imposition of the death penalty if not for prohibition thereof by R.A. No. 9346, as
follows: (1) Pl00,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) Pl00,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is
assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3) Pl00,000.00 as exemplary damages
to set an example for the public good. These amounts shall earn interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of the Court's Resolution until fully paid.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JERRY PEPINO Y RUERAS AND PRECIOSA GOMEZ Y CAMPOS,
G.R. NO. 174471, JANUARY 12, 2016)
Kidnapping; Corpus Delicti - Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime which may
be proved by the testimony of the witnesses who saw it. The corpus delicti in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom is the fact that an individual has been in any manner deprived of his
liberty for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. To prove the
corpus delicti, it is sufficient for the prosecution to be able to show that (1) a certain fact has
been proven — say, a person has died or a building has been burned; and (2) a particular person
is criminally responsible for the act. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPO1 CATALINO
GONZALES, JR., G.R. NO. 192233, FEBRUARY 17, 2016)
93 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
F. CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
Estafa
The elements of Estafa under this provision are as follows: (1) the offender's receipt of money,
goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) misappropriation
or conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the
money or property; (3) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (4) demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or property
received. In the case of Pamintuan v. People, 621 SCRA 538 (2010), the Court had the
opportunity to elucidate further on the essence of the aforesaid crime, as well as the proof
needed to sustain a conviction for the same, to wit: The essence of this kind of Estafa is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the entity to
whom a return should be made. The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote the act of
using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of Cheng us. People devoting
it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's own use
includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of
the property of another without right. In proving the element of conversion or
misappropriation. a legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to
deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of
their whereabouts (PAZ CHENG Y CHU VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 174113,
JANUARY 13, 2016).
Estafa by Means of Deceit; Elements - The elements of estafa by means of deceit as defined
under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC are as follows: (1) that there must be a false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (2) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
(3) that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (4) that as a result thereof, the offended
party suffered damage. (CORAZON D. ISON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 205097,
June 08, 2016)
"The false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud, it being essential that such false statement or representation
constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induces the offended party to part with his
money. In the absence of such requisite, any subsequent act of the accused, however fraudulent
94 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
and suspicious it might appear, cannot serve as basis for prosecution for estafa under the said
provision. (CORAZON D. ISON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 205097, June 08, 2016)
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Ison
misrepresented herself as the owner of the fishponds and entered into the Contract to Sell
without authority from Col. Vergara. It was likewise not amply established that the private
complainants were completely unaware of the pertinent facts concerning the fishponds'
ownership. Hence, the essential element of reliance upon the misrepresentation, which should
have induced the private complainants to part with their money, is wanting. Inevitably, the
Court is constrained to uphold the presumption of innocence in Ison's favor and acquit her. A
perusal of Col. Vergara's Affidavit yields the following observations. First, he, in fact, asked Ison
to look for a buyer of the fishponds, albeit no written document was issued and the extent of
the given authority was not discussed. Second, Col. Vergara did not explicitly deny that he
granted Ison the authority to sign any contract considering that the latter still remains to be the
registered owner of the fishponds. Third, in the December of 2004 meeting held in Tropical Hut,
Col. Vergara exhibited little interest as shown by his early departure and his utterance to the
effect that Ison and the private complainants should settle the matter among themselves.
Fourth, Col. Vergara, being the owner of the fishponds and the one who would sustain the most
damage as a result of any unauthorized sale, never filed any complaint, criminal or otherwise,
against Ison. Col. Vergara's disinterest in filing a complaint or testifying against Ison militates
against the private complainants' claim that Ison had no authority to enter into the transaction.
(CORAZON D. ISON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 205097, June 08, 2016)
Syndicated Estafa; Elements of - Under Section 1 of P.D. 1689, there is syndicated estafa if the
following elements are present: 1) estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315
and 316 of the RPC was committed; 2) the estafa or swindling was committed by a syndicate of
five or more persons; and 3) the fraud resulted in the misappropriation of moneys contributed
by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon[s]," or farmers
associations or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public. (DELIA L.
BELITA vs. ANTONIO S. SY, G.R. No. 191087 June 29, 2016)
Third Element - With respect to the third and last element of syndicated estafa, petitioners
claim that P.D. 1689 only applies if the defrauded parties are rural banks,
cooperatives, samahang nayons, or farmers' associations. We agree with the Justice Secretary's
holding in his 19 June 2008 Resolution wherein he ruled that PD 1689 applies to corporations
operating on funds solicited from the public. The law is explicit that it covers defraudations or
misappropriation of funds solicited by corporations from the general public. IBL is such
95 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
corporation. The operative phrase is "funds of corporations should come from the general
public." IBL is apparently engaged in the real estate business. Its funds come from buyers of the
properties it sells. In sum, we find that there is probable cause to indict petitioners for the crime
of syndicated estafa under P.D. 1689, in relation to Article 315, 4th par., [2][a] of the RPC. (DELIA
L. BELITA vs. ANTONIO S. SY, G.R. No. 191087 June 29, 2016)
Estafa; Penalties - Pursuant to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed for
estafa in which the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00 is
prision correctional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period (i.e., four
years, two months and one day to eight years); if the amount of the fraud exceeds P22,000.00,
the penalty thus prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period, and one year shall be
added for each additional P10,000.00 provided the total penalty imposed shall not exceed 20
years. Considering that the penalty does not consist of three periods, the prescribed penalty is
divided into three equal portions, and each portion shall form a period,31 with the maximum
period being then imposed.32 However, the floor of the maximum period - six years, eight
months and 21 days - is fixed in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, or of any showing
of the greater extent of the evil produced by the crime,33 to which is then added the
incremental penalty of one year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, or three years in
all. The resulting total penalty is nine years, eight months and 21 days of prision mayor, which
shall be the maximum of the indeterminate sentence. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
MARISSA BAYKER, G.R. NO. 170192, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
Theft.
Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential elements of the crime of theft are:
(1) the taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was
done with intent to gain; (4) the taking away was done without the consent of the owner; and
(5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against person or force
upon things. (GUILBEMER FRANCO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 191185,
FEBRUARY 1, 2016)
96 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Theft; Penalties The basic penalty when the value of the stolen item exceeded P22,000.00 is the
maximum period of the penalty of prisi6n mayor in its minimum and medium periods which is
eight (8) years, 8 months and one (J) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor. The basic penalty
when the value of the stolen item exceeded P22,000.00 is the maximum period of the penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods which is 8 years, 8 months and 1 day to 10
years of prision mayor. To determine the additional years of imprisonment, the difference after
deducting P22,000.00 shall be divided by PlO,OOO.OO, disregarding any amount less than
PIO,OOO.OO. The amount of cash stolen by appellant is Pl,077,995.00. Thus, 105 years shall be
added to the basic penalty. However, the penalty for Simple Theft cannot go beyond 20 years of
reclusion temporal, and such will be the sentence of appellant if he committed Simple Theft.
(PEOPLE VS. ASAMUDDIN, G.R. No. 213913, September 2, 2015)
Qualified Theft. The elements of Qualified Theft committed with grave abuse of confidence are
as follows:
1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owners consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things; [and]
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO T.
CRUZ, G.R. No. 200081, June 08, 2016)
For the successful prosecution for Qualified Theft committed with grave abuse of confidence,
the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt the following elements: (1) taking of
personal property; (2) that the said property belongs to another; (3) that the said taking be
done with intent to gain; (4) that it be done without the owner's consent; (5) that it be
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon
things; and (6) that it be done with grave abuse of confidence. (PEOPLE VS. ASAMUDDIN, G.R.
No. 213913, September 2, 2015)
To qualify the crime of simple theft to qualified theft, the crime of theft must be committed
with grave abuse of confidence.All of the elements for qualified theft are present in this case.
Proceeding from the fact that Boquecosa was, on the dates of the crime, a sales clerk and vault
custodian of the Pawnshop, she admitted having pawned the missing pieces of jewelry. The act,
of course, presupposes a previous taking of the items. (People v. Boquecosa, G.R. No. 202181,
[August 19, 2015])
97 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against; or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without
the latter’s consent. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from
the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation (MARIA PAZ
FRONTRERAS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 190583 December 7, 2015)
Qualified Theft; Carnapping; Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor
vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender
gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. In Roque v.
People, 444 SCRA 98 (2004), the Court ruled that qualified theft may be committed even when
the personal property is in the lawful possession of the accused prior to the commission of the
felony. The concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same, the
holding in Roque v. People equally applies to carnapping. Hence, in People v. Bustinera, 431
SCRA 284 (2004), appellant, who was hired as taxi driver, was found goilty of carnapping under
R.A. No. 6539 after he failed to return the Daewoo Racer taxi assigned to him by the cab
company where he was employed. (PEOPLE VS. ASAMUDDIN, G.R. No. 213913, September 2,
2015)
Qualified Theft; Carnapping; Intent to Gain; The subsequent recovery of the stolen motorcycle
will not preclude the presence of the third element. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important
consideration is the intent to gain or animus lucrandi. Intent to gain is an internal act presumed
from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle which the appellant failed to overcome with
evidence to the contrary. Verily, the mere use of the thing unlawfully taken constitutes gain.
Appellant is thus guilty of the crime of carnapping under R.A. No. 6539. (PEOPLE VS.
ASAMUDDIN, G.R. No. 213913, September 2, 2015)
Intent to Gain; Intent to gain can be deduced from the petitioners possession of the foregoing
pawn tickets which were surrendered, together with the redemption payment by their
respective pledgors (MARIA PAZ FRONTRERAS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 190583
December 7, 2015)
Qualified Theft; Penalty - The penalty for qualified theft is based on the value of the property
stolen, which in this case is P97,984.00. To compute for the imposable penalty, we must first
take the basic penalty for theft, which is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to
98 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
be imposed in the maximum period, that is, eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
ten (10) years of prision mayor. To determine the additional years of imprisonment to be added
to the basic penalty, the amount of P22,000.00 is deducted from P97,984.00, which leaves a
difference of P75,984.00. This amount is then divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount
less than P10,000.00. The resulting quotient of 7 is equivalent to 7 years, which is added to the
basic penalty.(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO T. CRUZ, G.R. No. 200081, June 08,
2016)
The penalty for Qualified Theft is two degrees higher under Article 310 of the Revised Penal
Code, thus appellant was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. However, appellant is
disqualified under R.A. No. 9346, in relation to Resolution No. 24-4-10 to avail the benefits of
parole. (PEOPLE VS. ASAMUDDIN, G.R. No. 213913, September 2, 2015)
In this case, because Cruz committed qualified theft, his penalty is two degrees higher than the
penalty for simple theft, which is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods to be
imposed in its maximum period or eighteen (18) years, two (2) months, and twenty-one (21)
days to twenty (20) years, which shall be added to the resulting quotient of 7 years. The
resulting sum shall then be the imposable penalty. Thus, the range of the imposable penalty is
twenty-five (25) years, two (2) months, and twenty-one (21) days to twenty-seven (27) years.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO T. CRUZ, G.R. No. 200081, June 08, 2016)
Moreover, as the crime committed is qualified theft, we do not apply the rule in simple theft
that the maximum penalty cannot exceed twenty (20) years. The penalty for qualified theft has
no such limitation. His penalty exceeds twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, the penalty that
should be imposed, therefore, is reclusion perpetua. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
EDGARDO T. CRUZ, G.R. No. 200081, June 08, 2016)
G. CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS
Bigamy.
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contact a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
99 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
proper proceedings. For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove
all of the following elements: [first,] that the offender has been legally married; [second,] that
the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; [third,] that he
contracts a second of subsequent marriage; and [lastly’] that the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. (NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, GR No. 207406, January 13, 2016)
Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime
of bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal Code becomes useless. “[A]ll that an adventurous
bigamist has to do is to . . . contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by
simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void
for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first.” Further, “[a] party may even enter
into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite – usually the marriage obtaining a judicial
declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void.” (NORBERTO
A. VITANGCOL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR No. 207406, January 13, 2016)
Marriage License; Fourth Element. The fourth requisite – the marriage license – is issued by the
local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides. The
marriage license represents the state’s involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. To prove that a marriage was solemnized
without a marriage license, “the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the
local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.” (NORBERTO A.
VITANGCOL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR No. 207406, January 13, 2016)
H. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR (INCLUDE ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR 08-2008 RE:

GUIDELINES IN THE OBSERVANCE OF A RULE OF PREFERENCE IN THE IMPOSITION OF
PENALTIES IN LIBEL CASES, JANUARY 25, 2008)
Libel.
To determine actual malice, a libelous statement must be shown to have been written or
published with the knowledge that it is false or in reckless disregard of whether it is false or
not.- To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegation of a
100 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of
the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not
in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an
intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.16 Malice is bad faith or bad motive and it is the
essence of the crime of libel.17 To determine actual malice, a libelous statement must be shown
to have been written or published with the knowledge that it is false or in reckless disregard of
whether it is false or not.18 Reckless disregard of what is false or not means that the defendant
entertains serious doubt as to the truth of the publication or possesses a high degree of
awareness of its probable falsity. (MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and PHILIP ARREZA PICHAY, G.R. NO. 219603,
JANUARY 26, 2016)
The Revised Penal Code provides that: "Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible
for the same. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of
a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof." The provision did not
distinguish or graduate the penalty according to the nature or degree of the participation of the
persons involved in the crime of libel. It is basic in statutory construction that where the law
does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Accordingly, we cannot distinguish Pichay's
criminal liability from the others' criminal liability only because he was the president of the
company that published the libelous articles instead of being their author. Pichay's criminal
liability was the same as that of the others, such that he was even meted the same penalty as
that imposed on the author of the libelous articles. The crime of libel would not even be
consummated without his participation as publisher of the libelous articles. One who furnishes
the means for carrying on the publication of a newspaper and entrusts its management to
servants or employees whom he selects and controls may be said to cause to be published what
actually appears, and should be held responsible therefor, whether he was individually
concerned in the publication or not. (MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and PHILIP ARREZA PICHAY, G.R. NO. 219603,
JANUARY 26, 2016)
Libel; Jurisdiction and Venue. "Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place
where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an
essential element of jurisdiction. This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given
that Article 360 [of the RPC], as amended [by Republic Act No. 436354], specifically provides for
the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases," 55 to wit:
Article 360. Persons responsible. - x x x The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of
written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or
separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of
101 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
the commission of the offense. (MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. PHILIP PICCIO, G.R.
No. 203370, April 11, 2016)
Generally speaking, "the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is
limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed
and first published. (MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. PHILIP PICCIO, G.R. No. 203370,
April 11, 2016)
Libel; Moral Turpitude; Disqualification of Candidates .- Contrary to Pichay's argument, the

imposition of a fine does not determine whether the crime involves moral turpitude or not. In
Villaber v. Commission on Elections, 369 SCRA 126 (2001), we held that a crime still involves
moral turpitude even if the penalty of imprisonment imposed is reduced to a fine. In Tulfo v.
People, 565 SCRA 283 (2008), we explained that a fine was imposed on the accused since they
were first time offenders. Having been convicted of the crime of libel, Pichay is disqualified
under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code for his conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude. (MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and PHILIP ARREZA PICHAY, G.R. NO. 219603, JANUARY 26, 2016)
Under Section 12, the disqualification shall be removed after the expiration of a period of five
years from his service of sentence. In Teves v. Comelec, 587 SCRA 1 (2009), we held that the
five-year period of disqualification would end only on 25 May 2010 or five years from 24 May
2005, the day petitioner paid the fine he was sentenced to pay in Teves v. SandiganbayanM 447
SCRA 309 (2004). In this case, since Pichay served his sentence when he paid the fine on 17
February 2011, the five-year period shall end only on 16 February 2016. Thus, Pichay is
disqualified to become a Member of the House of Representatives until then. Considering his
ineligibility due to his disqualification under Section 12, which became final on 1 June 2009,
Pichay made a false material representation as to his eligibility when he filed his certificate of
candidacy on 9 October 2012 for the 2013 elections. Pichay's disqualification under Section 12 is
a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. (MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and PHILIP ARREZA PICHAY, G.R. NO. 219603, JANUARY 26, 2016)
Oral defamation or slander
Oral Defamation or Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. It is
defined as "the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his
102 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood.” The elements of oral defamation are:
(1) there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, status or circumstances; (2) made orally; (3) publicly; (4) and maliciously; (5) directed
to a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead; (6) which tends to cause dishonour,
discredit or contempt of the person defamed. Oral defamation may either be simple or grave. It
becomes grave when it is of a serious and insulting nature. An allegation is considered
defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to
dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who
is dead. To determine whether a statement is defamatory, the words used in the statement
must be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that
they were used and understood in another sense.It must be stressed that words which are
merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse
however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a
basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact
that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself. (ENRIQUE G.
DE LEON VS.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SPO3 PEDRITO L. LEONARDO, G.R. NO. 212623,
JANUARY 11, 2016)
It is a rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the
part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony.- Whether the offense committed is
serious or slight oral defamation, depends not only upon the sense and grammatical meaning of
the utterances but also upon the special circumstances of the case, like the social standing or
the advanced age of the offended party. "The gravity depends upon: (1) the expressions used;
(2) the personal relations of the accused and the offended party; and (3) the special
circumstances of the case, the antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the
offender, which may tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. In particular, it is a
rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of
the offended party constitutes only a light felony." (ENRIQUE G. DE LEON VS.PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND SPO3 PEDRITO L. LEONARDO, G.R. NO. 212623, JANUARY 11, 2016)
The Court finds that even though SPO3 Leonardo was a police officer by profession, his
complaint against De Leon for oral defamation must still prosper. It has been held that a public
officer should not be too onion-skinned and should be tolerant of criticism. The doctrine,
nevertheless, would only apply if the defamatory statement was uttered in connection with the
public officer’s duty. (ENRIQUE G. DE LEON VS.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SPO3 PEDRITO
L. LEONARDO, G.R. NO. 212623, JANUARY 11, 2016)
Oral defamation or slander; Constructive Criticism; When one makes commentaries about the
other's performance of official duties, the criticism is considered constructive, then aimed for
the betterment of his or her service to the public.- One of man's most prized possessions is his
103 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
integrity. There lies a thin line between criticism and outright defamation. When one makes
commentaries about the other's performance of official duties, the criticism is
considered constructive, then aimed for the betterment of his or her service to the public. It is
thus, a continuing duty on the part of the public officer to make room for improvement on the
basis of this constructive criticism in as much as it is imperative on the part of the general public
to make the necessary commentaries should they see any lapses on the part of the public
officer. In this case, however, the criticism was more destructive than constructive and, worse, it
was directed towards the personal relations of the parties. (ENRIQUE G. DE LEON VS.PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND SPO3 PEDRITO L. LEONARDO, G.R. NO. 212623, JANUARY 11, 2016)
Calling him "walanghiya" and "mangongotong na pulis" was evidently geared towards his
reputation as a private individual of the community.- Their altercation and De Leon's subsequent
defamation were not in connection with SPO3 Leonardo's public duties. Taking into account the
circumstances of the incident, calling him "walanghiya" and "mangongotong na pulis" was
evidently geared towards his reputation as a private individual of the community. Thus, the
defamation committed by De Leon, while only slight in character, must not go unpunished.
(ENRIQUE G. DE LEON VS.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SPO3 PEDRITO L. LEONARDO, G.R.
NO. 212623, JANUARY 11, 2016)
104 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
PART IV. SPECIAL LAWS
1. ANTI-CHILD ABUSE LAW (R.A. NO. 7610, AS AMENDED)
Children The victim is 16 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. Under
Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 7610, "children" refers to "persons below eighteen (18) years of age or
those over but unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition.”(MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y MARUHOM, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
206513, October 20, 2015 )
“Child Abuse”, defined - In the recent case of Bongalon v. People, the Court expounded the
definition of "child abuse" being referred to in R.A. No. 7610. In that case, therein petitioner
was similarly charged, tried, and convicted by the lower courts with violation of Section 10(a),
Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. The Court held that only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse, otherwise,
it is punished under the RPC, to wit: Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC
and the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped
Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within
the purview of the above-quoted provisions. The records did not establish beyond reasonable
doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and
dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass
Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the
moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the
personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson
and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the
crime of child abuse. (VIRGINIA JABALDE Y JAMANDRON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
No. 195224, June 15, 2016)
The laying of the hands on Lin was an offshoot of Jabalde's emotional outrage after being
informed that her daughter's head was punctured, and whom she thought was already dead. In
fact, her vision got blurred and she fainted. When she returned into consciousness, she sat on
her chair in front of the board for about five to ten minutes. It would be unforeseeable that
105 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Jabalde acted with cruelty when prosecution's witness herself testified that the abrasions
suffered by Lin were just "mildly inflicted." If Jabalde indeed intended to abuse, maltreat and
injure Lin, she would have easily hurt the 7-year-old boy with heavy blows. (VIRGINIA JABALDE
Y JAMANDRON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016)
As a mother, the death of her child, who has the blood of her blood, and the flesh of her flesh, is
the most excruciating idea that a mother could entertain. The spontaneity of the acts of Jabalde
against Lin is just a product of the instinctive reaction of a mother to rescue her own child from
harm and danger as manifested only by mild abrasions, scratches, or scrapes suffered by Lin,
thus, negating any intention on inflicting physical injuries. Having lost the strength of her mind,
she lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse. In fine, the essential
element of intent was not established with the prescribed degree of proof required for a
successful prosecution under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. (VIRGINIA JABALDE Y
JAMANDRON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016)
There could be no other conclusion, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational
consent to any lascivious act, taking into account the constitutionally enshrined State policy to
promote the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being of the youth, as well as,
in harmony with the foremost consideration of the child's best interests in all actions concerning
him or her. This is equally consistent with the with the declared policy of the State to provide
special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development; provide sanctions for
their commission and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of and crisis
intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation, and discrimination. Besides, if it was the
intention of the framers of the law to make child offenders liable only of Article 266-A of the
RPC, which provides for a lower penalty than R.A. No. 7610, the law could have expressly made
such statements. (MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y MARUHOM, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
No. 206513, October 20, 2015 )
Anti-Child Abuse Law; Sexual Abuse - Under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610, a child is
deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under
the coercion or influence of any adult. This statutory provision must be distinguished from Acts
of Lasciviousness under Articles 336 and 339 of the RPC. As defined in Article 336 of the RPC,
Acts of Lasciviousness has the following elements:(1) That the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness;r2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances : A. By
106 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
using force or intimidation; or b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or c.When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) That the offended
party is another person of either sex. Article 339 of the RPC likewise punishes acts of
lasciviousness committed with the consent of the offended party if done by the same persons
and under the same circumstances mentioned in Articles 337 and 338 of the RPC, to wit: 1. if
committed against a virgin over twelve years and under eighteen years of age by any person in
public authority, priest, home-servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any
capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the woman; or 2. if committed by
means of deceit against a woman who is single or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but
under eighteen years of age. (MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y MARUHOM, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015 )
Notably, a child is considered as sexually abused under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 when he or
she is subjected to lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. Intimidation
need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to
intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. The law does
not require physical violence on the person of the victim; moral coercion or ascendancy is
sufficient. (MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y MARUHOM, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
206513, October 20, 2015 )
Sexual abuse under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 has three essential elements: (1) The accused
commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) The said act is performed with
a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) The child xxx is
below 18 years old. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs RICARDO BACUS, G.R. NO. 208354,
AUGUST 26, 2015)
Article 226-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, punishes inserting of the penis into another person's
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person if the victim did not consent either it was done through force, threat or intimidation; or
when the victim is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent
machination or grave abuse of authority as sexual assault as a form of rape. However, in
instances where the lascivious conduct is covered by the definition under R.A. No. 7610, where
the penalty is reclusion temporal medium, and the act is likewise covered by sexual assault
under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, which is punishable by prision mayor, the offender
should be liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, where the law provides
for the higher penalty of reclusion temporal medium, if the offended party is a child victim. But
if the victim is at least eighteen (18) years of age, the offender should be liable under Art. 266-A,
par. 2 of the RPC and not R.A. No. 7610, unless the victim is at least eighteen (18) years and she
107 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
is unable to fully take care of herself or protect herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation
or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition, in which case, the
offender may still be held liable for sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610.(MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y
MARUHOM, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015 )
Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse; Penalties — Under Section 5, Article III of RA
7610, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed on those who commit acts of lasciviousness with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse. Notwithstanding the fact that RA 7610 is a special law, the
petitioner in this case may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. In applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor in its
medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Thus, the CA correctly imposed
the indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
(PINLAC Y RESOLME V. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 197458, [November 11, 2015])
Lascivious Conduct. Section 2(h) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7610
defines lascivious conduct as follows: The intentional touching, either directly or through
clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any
object into the genitalia, anus or mouth of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex,
with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
In accord with the definition stated and applying the same in the instant case, accused-
appellant’s intentional act of touching AAA’s vagina after undressing her on the 30th of
December 2004 amounts to a lascivious conduct. To determine the penalty due to accused-
appellant, in conformity with the penalty meted out by law, the relationship of the perpetrator
with the victim and the latter’s age must also be taken into account. In the present case, it has
been duly substantiated with evidence and testimonies that the perpetrator of the lascivious
conduct is the father of the victim. Supported likewise by proof is the age of the victim at the
time of the incident. As testified to by the victim herself, she was 17 years old at the time the
lascivious conduct was committed against her, thus establishing her minority. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs RICARDO BACUS, G.R. NO. 208354, AUGUST 26, 2015)
2. ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (R.A. NO. 3019, AS AMENDED)

108 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act – As already stated, the individual respondents were
accused of violating Section 3€ of RA 3019, the elements of which are as follows: (a) that the
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a
private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue
injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions. In the same vein, they were likewise
charged with violation of Section 3(g) of the same law, which has the following elements: (a)
that the accused is a public officer; (b) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf
of the government; and (c) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government. Notably, private individuals may also be charged with
violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 if they conspired with the public officers. (PCGG vs. MA.
MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ, G.R. No. 194159. October 21, 2015.)
Violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 requires that there be injury caused by giving unwarranted
benefits, advantages or preferences to private parties who conspire with public officers. Its
elements are: (1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy
with them; (2) that said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of
their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they caused undue injury to
any party, whether the Government or a private party; (4) that such injury is caused by giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) that the public officers
have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. (PCGG vs.
MA. MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ, G.R. No. 194159. October 21, 2015.)
Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 does not require the giving of unwarranted benefits, advantages or
preferences to private parties who conspire with public officers, its core element being the
engagement in a transaction or contract that is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government. The elements of the offense are: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he
entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract
or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. (PCGG vs. MA.
MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ, G.R. No. 194159. October 21, 2015.)
Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. In every prosecution for the violation of
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, the State must prove the following essential elements, namely:
109 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;

2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence in the discharge of his functions and;
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
The first element was present, for Giangan was indisputably a government official at the time of
the alleged commission of the offense charged. (TEOFILO GIANGAN, et al. vs PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 169385, AUGUST 26, 2015)
Conformably with the foregoing, we find that the Sandiganbayan erred in ruling that Giangan
and his co-accused had acted with gross bad faith and manifest impartiality when they removed
the wooden posts of the fence of Bernadas. On the contrary, their actuations evinced good
faith. We note that it was not at all disputed that access through the road had long been
permitted even by the owner and her predecessor. In that context, Giangan as the barangay
chairman acted upon the honest and sincere belief that he was then summarily abating the
nuisance that a regular user of the obstructed road had just reported to him. A further
indication of the good faith of Giangan was the turning over of the wooden posts to the police
station, manifesting that the accused were acting within the scope of their authority. Good faith
means honest, lawful intent; the condition of acting without knowledge of fraud, and without
intent to assist in a fraudulent or otherwise unlawful scheme. Also, the act complained of was
rendered inconsistent with the manifest partiality and bad faith that the law punished. (TEOFILO
GIANGAN, et al. vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 169385, AUGUST 26, 2015)
Manifest Partiality. The Sandiganbayan further erred in finding the presence of manifest
partiality on the basis that there had been other allegedly illegal constructions that the accused
did not similarly remove in their capacities as barangay officials. Bias should still not be imputed
against them because they were acting on the complaint against the inconvenience brought
about by the obstruction erected on the access road. Manifest partiality should be inferred only
if there was a clear showing that there had been others who had been bothered by the similar
allegedly illegal constructions and had complained, but the accused, in their capacities as
barangay officials, did not deal with such complaint with the same alacrity. Indeed, in People v.
Atienza, 673 SCRA 470 (2012), the Court affirmed the findings of the Sandiganbayan that there
was no manifest impartiality or bad faith on the part of the accused public officials where the
evidence adduced did not show that they had favored other persons similarly situated.
(TEOFILO GIANGAN, et al. vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 169385, AUGUST 26, 2015)
All private respondents were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The essential
elements of such crime are as follows: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging
110 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with
such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable
negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the
discharge of his functions. (PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC) VS.
CASIMIRO, G.R. No. 206866, September 2, 2015)
3. ANTI-PLUNDER ACT (R.A. NO. 7080, AS AMENDED)
Plunder — The law on plunder provides that it is committed by "a public officer who acts by
himself or in connivance with . . . ." The term "connivance" suggests an agreement or consent to
commit an unlawful act or deed with another; to connive is to cooperate or take part secretly
with another. It implies both knowledge and assent that may either be active or passive. Since
the crime of plunder may be done in connivance or in conspiracy with other persons, and the
Information filed clearly alleged that Enrile and Jessica Lucila Reyes conspired with one another
and with Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, then it is unnecessary
to specify, as an essential element of the offense, whether the ill-gotten wealth amounting to at
least P172,834,500.00 had been acquired by one, by two or by all of the accused. In the crime of
plunder, the amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by each accused in a conspiracy is immaterial
for as long as the total amount amassed, acquired or accumulated is at least P50 million. It is
not sufficient to simply allege that the amount of ill-gotten wealth amassed amounted to at
least P50 million; the manner of amassing the ill-gotten wealth—whether through a
combination or series of overt acts under Section 1(d) of RA No. 7080—is an important element
that must be alleged.
Plunder is the crime committed by public officers when they amass wealth involving at least P50
million by means of a combination or series of overt acts. Under these terms, it is not sufficient
to simply allege that the amount of ill-gotten wealth amassed amounted to at least P50 million;
the manner of amassing the ill-gotten wealth — whether through a combination or series of
overt acts under Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080 — is an important element that must be alleged.
When the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it refers to at least two (2) acts falling
111 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
under different categories listed in Section 1, paragraph (d) of R.A. No. 7080 [for example, raids
on the public treasury under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (1), and fraudulent
conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Section 1, paragraph (d),
subparagraph (3)].
To prove plunder, the prosecution must weave a web out of the six (6) ways of illegally amassing
wealth and show how the various acts reveal a combination or series of means or schemes that
reveal a pattern of criminality.—Plunder is a crime composed of several predicate criminal acts.
To prove plunder, the prosecution must weave a web out of the six ways of illegally amassing
wealth and show how the various acts reveal a combination or series of means or schemes that
reveal a pattern of criminality. The interrelationship of the separate acts must be shown and be
established as a scheme to accumulate ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P50 million.
Plunder thus involves intricate predicate criminal acts and numerous transactions and schemes
that span a period of time. Naturally, in its prosecution, the State possesses an "effective
flexibility" of proving a predicate criminal act or transaction, not originally contemplated in the
Information, but is otherwise included in the broad statutory definition, in light of subsequently
discovered evidence. The unwarranted use of the flexibility is what the bill of particulars guards
against. (ENRILE vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 213455, [August 11, 2015])
4. ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ACT (R.A. NO. 9208)

Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 - In this case, the assailed RTC Order was a patent nullity
for being rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
Significantly, the present case involves public interest as it imputes violations of RA 9208, or the
"Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003," a crime so abhorrent and reprehensible that is
characterized by sexual violence and slavery. Accordingly, direct resort to a certiorari petition
sans a motion for reconsideration is clearly sanctioned in this case. (VINSON D. YOUNG vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R NO. 213910, FEBRUARY 3, 2016)
5. ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT (R.A. NO. 9262)
112 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Acts; Elements of - The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: x x x x (i)
Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor children or access to the woman's child/children. From the
aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of RA No. 9262, the elements of the crime
are derived as follows: (1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children; (2) The
woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a
common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or
living within or without the family abode; (3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child
mental or emotional anguish; and (4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of
minor children or access to the children or similar such acts or omission (RICKY DINAMLING v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 199522, JUNE 22, 2015)
Psychological Violence. The law defines psychological violence as follows: Section 3(a) x x x x C.
"Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or
emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity.
It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse
of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form
or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to
custody and/or visitation of common children. Psychological violence is an element of violation
of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological
violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the
effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological
violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the
acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional
anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal
to this party. All of this was complied with in the case at bar. (RICKY DINAMLING v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 199522, JUNE 22, 2015)
Neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the actual physical violence done by the
perpetrator are necessary to prove the essential elements of the crime as defined in Section 5(i)
of RA No. 9262. The only exception is, as in the case at bar, when the physical violence done by
the accused is alleged to have caused the mental and emotional suffering; in which case, such
113 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
acts of physical violence must be proven. In this instance, the physical violence was a means of
causing mental or emotional suffering. As such, whether or not it led to actual bodily injury, the
physical violence translates to psychological violence since its main effect was on the victim's
mental or emotional well-being. In the case at bar, petitioner Dinamling's acts of publicly
punching, kicking and stripping AAA of her pants and underwear, although obvious acts of
physical violence, are also instances of psychological violence since it was alleged and proven
that they resulted in AAA's public ridicule and humiliation and mental or emotional distress. The
clear, unrebutted testimony of the victim AAA, as to the physical violence done on her as well as
to the mental and emotional suffering she experienced as a result thereof, suffices to prove such
facts. (RICKY DINAMLING v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 199522, JUNE 22, 2015)
As earlier discussed, the focus of this particular criminal act is the causation of nonphysical
suffering, that is, mental or emotional distress, or even anxiety and social shame or dishonour
on the offended party, and not of direct bodily harm or property damage which are covered by
the other sub-sections of the law's provision. The use of physical violence, whether or not it
causes physical or property harm to the victim, falls under Section 5(i) only if it is alleged and
proven to have caused mental or emotional anguish. Likewise, the physical injuries suffered are
similarly covered only if they lead to such psychological harm. Otherwise, physical violence or
injuries, with no allegation of mental or emotional harm, are punishable under the other
provisions of the law. (RICKY DINAMLING v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 199522,
JUNE 22, 2015)
6. BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (B.P. BLG. 22)
Bouncing Checks Law- There are two (2) ways of violating BP 22: (1) by making or drawing and
issuing a check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that the check is
not sufficiently funded; and (2) by having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank at
the time of issue but failing to do so to cover the full amount of the check when presented to
the drawee bank within a period of ninety (90) days. (JORGE B. NAVARRA, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 203750, June 06, 2016)
114 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Bouncing Checks Law; Elements - The elements of BP 22 under the first situation, pertinent to
the present case, are: r(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account
or for value; (2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment; and (3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. (JORGE B. NAVARRA, v. PEOPLE OF THE
In order to successfully hold an accused liable for violation of BP 22, the following essential
elements must be present: "(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment."33 "Of the three (3) elements, the
second element is the hardest to prove as it involves a state of mind. Thus, Section 2 of BP 22
creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which, however, arises only after
it is proved that the issuer had received a written notice of dishonor and that within five days
from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its
payment. (CHUA VS PEOPLE, G.R. No. 196853, July 13, 2015)
Nature and coverage. The State criminalized such practice because it was deemed injurious to
public interests and was found to be pernicious and inimical to public welfare. It is an offense
against public order and not an offense against property. It likewise covers all types of checks,
and even checks that were issued as a form of deposit or guarantee were held to be within the
ambit of BP 22. For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of
the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. (JORGE B. NAVARRA, v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 203750, June 06, 2016)
It must be pointed out that the denials proffered by Atty. Salvado cannot belie the dishonor of
the checks. His strained explanation that the checks were mere securities cannot be
countenanced. Of all people, lawyers are expected to fully comprehend the legal import of
bouncing checks. In Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986), the Court ruled that the
gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check;
that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because
115 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. (ENGEL
PAUL ACA vs. ATTY RONALDO P. SALVADO, A.C. NO. 10952, JANUARY 26, 2016)
Notice of Dishonor. Similarly in the present case, there is no way to ascertain when the five-day
period under Section 22 of BP 22 would start and end since there is no showing when Chua
actually received the demand letter dated November 30, 1993. The MeTC cannot simply
presume that the date of the demand letter was likewise the date of Chua’s receipt thereof.
There is simply no such presumption provided in our rules on evidence. In addition, from the
inception of this case Chua has consistently denied having received subject demand letter. He
maintains that the paper used for the purported demand letter was still blank when presented
to him for signature and that he signed the same for another purpose. Given Chua’s denial, it
behooved upon the prosecution to present proof of his actual receipt of the November 30, 1993
demand letter. However, all that the prosecution did was to present it without, however,
adducing any evidence as to the date of Chua’s actual receipt thereof. It must be stressed that
‘[t]he prosecution must also prove actual receipt of [the notice of dishonor] because the fact of
service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the
accused."37 "The burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence.
Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. In criminal cases, however,
the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for B.P. Blg. 22 cases,
there should be clear proof of notice"38 which the Court finds wanting in this case. (CHUA VS
PEOPLE, G.R. No. 196853, July 13, 2015)
It may not be amiss to add at this point that out of the 54 cases for violation of BP 22 filed
against Chua, 22 involve checks issued on November 30, 1993 or thereafter. Hence, the lower
courts grievously erred in convicting Chua for those 22 cases on the basis of a purported
demand letter written and sent to Chua prior to the issuance of said 22 checks. Checks can only
be dishonored after they have been issued and presented for payment. Before that, dishonor
cannot take place. Thus, a demand letter that precedes the issuance of checks cannot constitute
as sufficient notice of dishonor within the contemplation of BP 22. It is likewise significant to
note that aside from the absence of a date, the signature of Chua appearing on the questioned
November 30, 1993 demand letter is not accompanied by any word or phrase indicating that he
affixed his signature thereon to signify his receipt thereof. Indeed, "conviction must rest upon
the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for
the defense."45 In view of the foregoing, the Court cannot accord the demand letter dated
November 30, 1993 any weight and credence. Consequently, it cannot be used to support
Chua’s guilt of the offenses charged. (CHUA VS PEOPLE, G.R. No. 196853, July 13, 2015)
116 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Malum Prohibitum; Intent is immaterial- What BP 22 punishes is the mere issuance of a

bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance. For to determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms
and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the public's faith in the stability and
commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in
banking communities. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum; it is
simply the commission of the act that the law prohibits, and not its character or effect, that
determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is
completely immaterial. (JORGE B. NAVARRA, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 203750,
June 06, 2016)
Presumption of Knowledge - When the first and third elements of the offense are present, as in
this case, BP 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element exists. Thus, the
maker's knowledge is presumed from the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds. The
clear import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds under the following conditions: (1) the presentment within ninety (90)
days from date of the check, and (2) the dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make
arrangements for payment in full within five (5) banking days from notice. Here, after the checks
were dishonored, HSBC duly notified Reynolds of such fact and demanded for the payment of
the full amount of said checks, but the latter failed to pay. (JORGE B. NAVARRA, v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 203750, June 06, 2016)
Penalties. The court may thus impose any of the following alternative penalties against an
accused found criminally liable for violating BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less than 30 days,
but not more than one year; or (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the
check, and shall in no case exceed P200,000.00; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment. The
discretion to impose a single (imprisonment or fine) or conjunctive (fine and imprisonment)
penalty pertains to the court. If fine alone is the penalty imposed, the maximum shall be double
the amount of the face value of the rubber check which in no case should exceed P200,000.00.
(JULIE S. SUMBILLA v. MATRIX FINANCE CORPORATION, G.R. No. 197582. JUNE 29, 2015)
Administrative Circular 12·2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for
violations of Batas Pambansa (BP) Bilang 22.Anent the alleged violation of Vaca v. Court of
Appeals, 298 SCRA 656 (1998), and Administrative Circular No. 12·2000 that supposedly limited
to fine the imposable penalty for violation of BP 22, and without any subsidiary imprisonment,
suffice it to quote the clarifications in Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, issued on February
117 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
14, 2001: x x x queries have been made regarding the authority of Judges to 1. Impose the
penalty of imprisonment for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; and 2. Impose subsidiary
imprisonment in the event that the accused, who is found guilty of violating the provisions of
B.P. Big. 22, is unable to pay the fine which he is sentenced to pay considering that
Administrative Circular No. 12·2000 adopted the rulings in Eduardo Vaca v. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 131714, 16 November 1998, 298 SCRA 656) and Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines
(G.R. No. 130038, 18 September 2000) as a policy of the Supreme Court on the matter of the
imposition of penalties for violations of B.P. BIg. 22, without mentioning whether subsidiary
imprisonment could be resorted to in case of the accused's inability to pay the fine. The clear
tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties
provided for in B.P. Big. 22. The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility
of imprisonment for violators of B.P. Big. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind
the law. Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the
application of the penal provisions of B.P. Big. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the
offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate
penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the
imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that
imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not
be deemed a hindrance. It is, therefore, understood that 1. Administrative Circular 12-2000 does
not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P Big. 22; x x x x 3. Should
only a fine be imposed and tile accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to
the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment. (JULIE S.
SUMBILLA v. MATRIX FINANCE CORPORATION, G.R. No. 197582. JUNE 29, 2015)
In like manner, the issue of whether BP 22 violates Section 20 of Article III of the Constitution
which proscribes imprisonment as a punishment for not paying a debt was already settled in the
negative in Lozano v. Martinez. Pertinent portions of the Decision in the Lozano case read: Has
BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt? x x x The
gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or
a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to
pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of
worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public
interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order. x x x x In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a
valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt. (JULIE S. SUMBILLA v. MATRIX FINANCE CORPORATION, G.R. No.
197582. JUNE 29, 2015)
118 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
“Transitory or Continuing Crimes” It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are categorized
as transitory or continuing crimes, meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and
requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in
another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have
been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court
taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or
transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in
part committed. (ARMILYN MORILLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND RICHARD
NATIVIDAD, G.R. No. 198270, December 09, 2015)
Jurisdiction. There is no denying, therefore, that the court of the place where the check was
deposited or presented for encashment; can be vested with jurisdiction to try cases involving
violations of BP 22. Thus, the fact that the check subject of the instant case was drawn, issued,
and delivered in Pampanga does not strip off the Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant
case for it is undisputed that the subject check was deposited and presented for encashment at
the Makati Branch of Equitable PC IBank. The MeTC of Makati, therefore, correctly took
cognizance of the instant case and rendered its decision in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.
(ARMILYN MORILLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND RICHARD NATIVIDAD, G.R. No.
198270, December 09, 2015)
Bouncing Checks Law; Civil Liability - In B.P. 22 cases, the criminal action shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil actions, Instead of instituting two separate cases, only a single
suit is filed and tried. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets, which had been
packed with B.P. 22 because creditors used the courts as collectors. (PAZ T. BERNARDO, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 182210, OCTOBER 5, 2015)
Chua’s acquittal, however, does not entail the extinguishment of his civil liability for the
dishonored checks.46 "An acquittal based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
preclude the award of civil damages."47 For this reason, Chua must be directed to testitute See
the total amount of the face value of all the checks subject of the case with legal interest at the
rate of 12% per annum reckoned from the time the said checks became due and demandable
up to June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid. (CHUA VS PEOPLE,
G.R. No. 196853, July 13, 2015)
119 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
7. COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT (R.A. NO. 9165)
7.1 ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS
In Valleno v. People, 688 SCRA 343 (2013), the Court ruled that - In order for prosecution for
illegal possession of a dangerous drug to prosper, there must be proof that (1) the accused was
in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such
possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of
being in possession of the drug. The prosecution has duly established all these elements. By
virtue of a search warrant, PO1 Veloso found three packets of suspected shabu in one of the
rooms of accused-appellant’s house. (ALBERT G. AMBAGAN, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 204481-82, October 14, 2015.)
Parenthetically, in illegal possession of dangerous drugs, such as shabu, the elements are: (1)
the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2)
such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the said drug. These elements are also present in this case. PICI Chica testified that after the
appellant sold him shabu, another plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance was
recovered by Chairman Cruz from appellant at the time of his arrest. This too was marked as
"MCC BFM B" weighing at approximately 0.0759 gram and submitted to the crime laboratory for
analysis, and was positively found to contain shabu. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
BIENVENIDO MIRANDA y FELICIANO, G.R. No. 209338. JUNE 29, 2015)
For illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the prosecution mustestablish the
following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to
be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely
and consciously possessed the drug. All the elements were established in this case. Incident to
his lawful arrest, when he was frisked three (3) plastic packets containing traces of white
crystalline substance, later on found to be traces of a dangerous drug, was taken from his
possession. In a number of cases, it has been declared that mere possession of a regulated drug
120 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possendi sufficient to convict an
accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession - the onus probandi is shifted to
the accused, of knowledge or animus possidendi. Mere possession of the prohibited substance
and the burden of proof is upon accused-appellant to show that he has a license or permit
under law to possess the prohibited drug. The accused-appellant failed to explain his possession
of the prohibited drug. Accused-appellant was misled in his belief that the burden to prove the
lack of license or permit to possess the prohibited drug lies with the prosecution. (PEOPLE vs.
ASIGNAR, G.R. No. 206593, November 10, 2015)
For the successful prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs the following essential
elements must be established: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is
identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (c) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS POSADA, GR No. 196052, September 2, 2015)
To successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following

elements must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. In the case at bench, the prosecution
was able to establish with moral certainty the guilt of the accused-appellants for the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Accused-appellants were caught in actual possession of
the prohibited drugs during a valid search of their house. It bears stressing that aside from
assailing the validity of the search, accused-appellants did not deny ownership of the illegal
drugs seized. They have not proffered any valid defense in the offense charged for violation of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V PUNZALAN
,G.R. No. 199087, [November 11, 2015])
To secure a conviction for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, the concurrence of the
following elements must be established by the prosecution: (1) the accused is in possession of
an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession
is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
(ROBERTO PALO y DE GULA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 192075, FEBRUARY 10,
2016)
To sustain a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements
must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object identified to be a
prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
121 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
accused freely and consciously possessed said drug. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOAN
SONJACO Y STA. ANA, G.R. No. 196962, June 08, 2016)
Illegal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia During a Party; Elements of.- After a review of the
records of the case, the Court holds that Piad was properly convicted of the crime of illegal sale
of dangerous drugs. It was proven that, on April 23, 2005, the police went to his house to
conduct a buy-bust operation; that PO1 Arevalo acted as the poseur-buyer; and that when PO1
Arevalo gave the marked money to Piad, the latter handed to him a small plastic sachet. A
laboratory examination confirmed that the plastic sachet contained 0.05 gram of shabu. Clearly,
all the elements of the said crime were established. The prosecution was also able to prove that
Piad committed the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. When he was arrested in
flagrante delicto, he was asked about the source of his drugs. He then brought out a metal box,
which contained two (2) more sachets. It was confirmed in a laboratory test that these sachets
contained 0.06 gram of shabu. With respect to the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs during a party and the crime of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia during a party, the
prosecution also established that after the arrest of Piad, the team found Villarosa, Carbo and
Davis sitting on the floor and surrounded by one (1) heat-sealed sachet and two (2) unsealed
sachets. A laboratory report showed that these sachets contained a total of 0.03 gram
of shabu. The said persons were also found with an aluminum foil, a tooter and disposable
lighters, which were considered drug paraphernalia. As correctly held by the RTC, the elements
of such crimes were proven because there was a proximate company of at least two (2) persons
without any legal authority to possess the illicit items, citing Section 14 of R.A. No. 9165.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PIAD, G.R. NO. 213607, JANUARY 25, 2016)
Constructive Possession – The three packets of shabu were found not on accused-appellant’s
person but on top of a cabinet divider inside her room. Accused-appellant was deemed to have
been in constructive possession of the packets of shabu because they were under her control
and management. “[C]onstructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and
control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place
where it is found.” Accused-appellant is not authorized by law to possess the shabu. Mere
possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession
– the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or animus
possidendi. Accused-appellant’s bare denials will not suffice to overcome the presumption of
knowledge. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIET PANCHO, G.R. No. 206910, October 14,
2015.)
122 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
The non-presentation of the barangay tanods is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. The
more relevant testimonies are those of the members of the raiding team who testified that they
recovered packets of shabu from accused-appellant’s house. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
JULIET PANCHO, G.R. No. 206910, October 14, 2015.)
Animus Possidendi - Mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any
satisfactory explanation of such possession. The burden of evidence to explain the absence of
animus possidendi rests upon the accused, and this, in the case at bar, the appellant failed to
do. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOAN SONJACO Y STA. ANA, G.R. No. 196962, June 08,
2016)
Mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation of
such possession.The burden to explain the absence of animus possidendi rests upon the
accused, and in the case at bar, this the appellant failed to do. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
ALEX MENDEZ RAFOLS, G.R. No. 214440, June 15, 2016)
Illegal Possession of Shabu; Penalties - Appellant was also caught in possession of 0.19 gram of
shabu. The crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs is punished under Section 11,
paragraph 2(3), Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, which provides an imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities
of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONALDO CASACOP y AMIL, GR No. 210454, January 13, 2016)
7.2 ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS
In a catena of cases, this Court laid down the essential elements to be duly established for a
successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs or prohibited
123 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
drugs, like shabu, under Section 5, Article II of the Republic Act No. 9165, to wit: (1) the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and payment therefor. Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer
and the receipt of the marked money by the seller successfully consummate the buy-bust
transaction. What is material, therefore, is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
RONWALDO LAFARAN Y ACLAN, G.R. No. 208015, October 14, 2015.)
Conviction is proper in prosecutions involving illegal sale of dangerous drugs if the following
elements are present: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereto. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. BIENVENIDO MIRANDA y FELICIANO, G.R. No. 209338. JUNE 29, 2015)
In order to survive the test for a successful prosecution of cases of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, the prosecution must be able to: 1) establish the essential elements of the crime – (a) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the sale, and (b) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor; and 2) strictly follow the seizure and custody
procedure provided under Seection 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 and Section 91(a) of the IRR.
(CHRISTOPHER DELA RIVA y HORARIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 212940,
September 16, 2015)
In the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer
and the receipt by the seller of the marked money consummate the illegal transaction. In the
case at bar, the sale was not consummated since there was no receipt of the consideration. IA1
Natividad arrested Asislo immediately after the latter opened one of the sacks loaded with
bricks of marijuana. It was also admitted that the agents did not prepare marked money for the
buy-bust operation. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN ASISLO y MATIO, G.R. No. 206224,
January 18, 2016)
It was settled in People v. Hoble that "possession of prohibited drugs, coupled with the fact that
the possessor is not a user thereof, cannot indicate anything else but the intention to sell,
distribute or deliver the prohibited stuff." In an earlier case, the Court considered three plastic
bags of marijuana leaves and seeds as considerable quantity of drugs, such that possession of
similar amount of drugs and the fact that the accused is not a user of prohibited drugs clearly
demonstrates his intent to sell, distribute and deliver the same. In the case at bar, Asislo was
found in possession of 110 kilograms of dried marijuana leaves contained in five sacks and a
plastic bag, and that his drug test yielded negative result. The following circumstances strongly
indicate that he has the intention to sell, distribute, deliver or transport the said marijuana.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN ASISLO y MATIO, G.R. No. 206224, January 18, 2016)
124 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
"In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be duly
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court
of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence." The dangerous drug itself constitutes the
very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence beyond reasonable doubt plus the
fact of its delivery and/or sale are both vital and essential to a judgment of conviction in a
criminal case.20 And more than just the fact of sale, "[o]f prime importance therefore x xx is
that the identity of the dangerous drug be likewise established beyond reasonable doubt.
(PEOPLE V. HAVANA, G.R. NO. 198450, JANUARY 11, 2016)
For a successful prosecution of an offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following
essential elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus
delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were
identified. Implicit in all these is the need for proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of the confiscated prohibited or regulated drug as
evidence. The narcotic substance itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the
fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. ( PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v.
ENRICO MIRONDO Y IZON, G.R. No. 210841, October 14, 2015 )
The elements that must be established to sustain convictions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs
are settled: In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must
first be established: (1) prod that the transactions or sale took place; and (2) the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. (HOWARD LESCANO y CARREON vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR No. 214490, January 13, 2016)
For a successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs under
Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, all the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and
the receipt of the marked money by the seller successfully consummate the buy-bust
transaction. What is material, therefore, is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, as evidence. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. LEE QUIJANO ENAD, G.R. NO. 205764, FEBRUARY 3, 2016)
Appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove the legitimacy of the operation
considering the absence of any document that would prove that there was indeed a report by
the confidential informant of the police officers. Yet, nowhere in his appellant's brief did he
provide any basis, jurisprudential or otherwise, to support his conclusions that these alleged
lapses are fatal to his prosecution. In fact, as aptly ruled by the CA, the recording of marked
money used in a buy-bust operation is not one of the elements for the prosecution of sale of
illegal drugs. Neither is it required that the confidential informant put his tip down in writing.
For as long as the sale of the prohibited drug is adequately proven, the recording or non-
125 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
recording thereof in an official record will not necessarily lead to an acquittal. (PEOPLE vs.
DALAWIS, G.R. No. 197925, November 9, 2015)
For a successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A.
9165, the following elements must be satisfied: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. In the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the delivery of the illicit drug to the
poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money consummate the illegal
transaction. What matters is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the prohibited drug, the corpus delicti, as evidence. In this
case, the Court believes'and so-holds that all the requisites for the illegal sale of shabu were
met. As demonstrated by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the supporting
documents they presented and offered, the identities of the buyer, the seller, the prohibited
drug, and the marked money, have all been proven by the required quantum of
evidence.(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAUL AMARO Y CATUBAY ALIAS "LALAKS," G.R. No.
207517, June 01, 2016)
For a successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs under
Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165; the following elements must be present: (1) the identities of
the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment for it. What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. In the case at bar, it is readily
apparent that no sale was consummated as the consideration, much less its receipt by accused-
appellant, were not established. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. MICHAEL KURT JOHN
BULAWAN Y ANDALES, G.R. No. 204441, June 08, 2016)
In the prosecution of a case of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the
prosecution is able to establish the following essential elements: (1) the identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and its payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The delivery of the illicit
drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully
consummate the buy-bust transaction. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOHN HAPPY DOMINGO
Y CARAG, G.R. No. 211672, June 14, 2016)
The presence of the following elements required for all prosecutions for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs has been duly established in the instant case: (1) proof that the transaction or
sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as
evidence. Appellant was apprehended, indicted and convicted by way of a buy-bust operation, a
form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and
capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. The commission of the offense
126 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, merely requires the consummation of the selling
transaction which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. The crime
is consummated at once at the point when the police officer has gone through the operation as
a buyer whose offer was accepted by the accused, followed by the delivery of the dangerous
drugs to the former. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICO ENRIQUEZ Y CRUZ, G.R. No. 214503,
June 22, 2016)
Illegal Sale of Shabu. In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must
be sufficiently proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs DATS MAMALUMPON y BAÑEZ, G.R. NO. 210452, AUGUST 26, 2015)
In order to establish the crime of illegal sale of shabu, the prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable doubt (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the identity of the object and the
consideration of the sale; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and of the payment for the thing.
It is thus imperative that proof of the transaction or sale be established together with the
presentation of the corpus delicti in court. (PEOPLE VS. CARRERA, G.R. No. 215731. September
2, 2015)
For the successful prosecution of the illegal sale of shabu, only the following elements are
essential: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What is material is proof
that the sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation of evidence of the seized item,
as part of the corpus delicti. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and receipt by
the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. (PEOPLE vs.
ASIGNAR, G.R. No. 206593, November 10, 2015)
In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be sufficiently
proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the things sold and the payment therefor. The Court finds that all
elements for illegal sale were duly established with accused-appellant having been caught in
flagrante delicto selling shabu through a buy-bust operation conducted by the buy-bust team of
PO3 Palabay. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEL SAPITULA y PACULAN, G.R. NO. 209212,
FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be present: (a) the
identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (b) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the thing. It is material to establish that the
transaction or sale actually took place, and to bring to the court the corpus delicti as
127 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
evidence. Proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal prosecutions for the sale of illegal drugs
demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus delicti, the body of
crime whose core is the confiscated illicit drug. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO
YEPES, G.R. No. 206766, April 6, 2016)
The reason for this the Court elucidated in People v. Tan, to wit: [B]y the very nature of anti-
narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as
informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heron can be planted in pockets
or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals,
the possibility of abuse is great." Thus, the courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in
trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for
drug offenses. Needless to state, the lower court should have exercised the utmost diligence
and prudence in deliberating upon accused-appellants guilt. It should have given more serious
consideration to the pros and cons of the evidence offered by both the defense and the State
and many loose ends should have been settled by the trial court in determining the merits of
the present case. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO YEPES, G.R. No. 206766, April 6,
2016)
For the successful prosecution of a case for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must
be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore. On the other hand, in prosecuting a
case for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified as a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
drug. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONALDO CASACOP y AMIL, GR No. 210454, January 13,
2016)
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, Consummation - The commission of the offense of illegal sale
of dangerous drugs, like shabu, merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction
which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. The crime is already
consummated once the police officer has gone through the operation as a buyer whose offer
was accepted by the accused, followed by the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the former.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOAN SONJACO Y STA. ANA, G.R. No. 196962, June 08, 2016)
“Marked Money” In the prosecution of a case of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the absence
of marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as long as the
sale of dangerous drug is adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is
presented before the court.Neither law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of any
money used in the buy-bust operation. What is material is the proof that the transaction or
128 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
sale took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. In the
instant case, the prosecution was able to establish the consummated transaction between the
poseur-buyer and accused-appellants. (PEOPLE V. AKMAD Y ULIMPAIN, G.R. No. 195194,
[November 25, 2015])
Lack of consideration In the case at bar, there is more reason to acquit accused-appellant of
the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs as the prosecution was not able to prove that there
was even a consideration for the supposed transaction. The prosecution claimed that that there
was prior negotiation between the confidential informant and accused-appellant. The
prosecution, however, failed to adduce any evidence of such prior negotiation. In fact, nothing
can be gained from the records and from the testimonies of the witnesses as to how the
supposed confidential informant conducted the alleged negotiation with accused-appellant.
Thus, there is no proof of the offer to purchase dangerous drugs, as well as the promise of the
consideration. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. MICHAEL KURT JOHN BULAWAN Y ANDALES,
G.R. No. 204441, June 08, 2016)
Penalties – it has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that . accused-appellant
sold shabu. Under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the penalty of life imprisonment
to death and fine ranging from P500,000.00 to Pl,000,000.00 shall be imposed upon any person,
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to
another, distribute dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all
species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved. Thus, the Court of
Appeals correctly imposed ·the penalty of life imprisonment and the fine of P500,000.00.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs DATS MAMALUMPON y BAÑEZ, G.R. NO. 210452, AUGUST 26,
2015)
Accused-appellant's guilt having been established beyond reasonable doubt, we likewise affirm
the penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA. Under the law, the offense of illegal sale of shabu
carries with it the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00), regardless of the quantity
and purity of the substance. Thus, the RTC and CA were within bounds when they imposed the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONWALDO LAFARAN Y ACLAN, G.R. No. 208015, October
14, 2015.)
129 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
7.3 ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DRUG PHARAPHERNALIA
The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other

paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 are: (1)
possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or
intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any
dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such possession is not authorized by law.In this case, the
prosecution has convincingly established that Saraum was in possession of drug paraphernalia,
particularly aluminum tin foil, rolled tissue paper, and lighter, all of which were offered and
admitted in evidence. (Saraum vs. People G.R. No. 205472, January 25, 2016)
Penalties;-- Section 12, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 provides that the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one(1) days to four (4) years and a fine ranging
from Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person, who unless authorized by law, shall possess or have under his/her control any
equipment, instrument, apparatus and any other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking,
consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONALDO CASACOP y AMIL, GR No. 210454, January 13, 2016)
7.4 DISTRIBUTING PROHIBITED DRUGS
While we agree with the CA that appellant is still liable for an offense under R.A. No. 9165, we
disagree with its conclusion that appellant is guilty of illegal possession of a prohibited drug. We
previously held that Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 punishes acts in addition to selling
prohibited drugs. We stated: It must be emphasized that appellants were charged with selling,
trading, delivering, giving away, dispatching in transit and transporting dangerous drugs under
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The charge was not limited to selling. Said section
punishes not only the sale but also the mere act of delivery of prohibited drugs after the offer to
buy by the entrapping officer has been accepted by the seller. In the distribution of prohibited
drugs, the payment of any consideration is immaterial. The mere act of distributing the
prohibited drugs to others is in itself a punishable offense. (PEOPLE VS. CARRERA, G.R. No.
215731. September 2, 2015)
130 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
We note that accused-appellants were charged with selling, trading, delivering, giving away,
dispatching in transit and transporting dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165. The charge was not limited to the selling of dangerous drugs. The aforesaid provision of
law punishes not only the sale but also the mere act of delivery of prohibited drugs after the
offer to buy by the entrapping officer has been accepted by the seller. In the distribution of
prohibited drugs, the payment of any consideration is immaterial. The mere act of distributing
the prohibited drugs to others is in itself a punishable offense.(PEOPLE V. AKMAD Y ULIMPAIN,
G.R. No. 195194, [November 25, 2015])
7.5 ILLEGAL DELIVERY OF PROHIBITED DRUGS
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides that the penalty of life imprisonment to death and
a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos (P500,OOO.OO) to ten million pesos
(PlO,OOO,OOO.OO) shall be imposed upon any person who shall be found guilty of illegal
delivery of a prohibited drug. (PEOPLE VS. CARRERA, G.R. No. 215731. September 2, 2015)
7.6 ILLEGAL TRANSPORTATION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS
To transport a dangerous drug is to "carry or convey [it] from one place to another." For an
accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove its essential element: the
movement of the dangerous drug from one place to another. (THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. CRISTY DIMAANO Y. TIPDAS, G.R. NO. 174481, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
The essential element of the charge of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs is the
movement of the dangerous drug from one place to another. As defined in the case of People v.
Mariacos, "transport" means "to carry or convey from one place to another.” There is no
definitive moment when an accused "transports" a prohibited drug. When the circumstances
establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there
should be no question as to the perpetration of the criminal act. The fact that there is actual
conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed. In the
instant case, records established beyond any doubt that accused-appellant Asislo was found in
131 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
possession of the sacks containing marijuana, and was arrested while in the act of delivering or
transporting such illegal drugs to Natividad, the poseur-buyer, at the agreed place in Dontogan,
Green Valley, Baguio City, near a certain "car wash." (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN
ASISLO y MATIO, G.R. No. 206224, January 18, 2016)
We agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of attempting to transport dangerous drugs. The prosecution proved the
essential element of the crime; accused-appellant would have successfully moved 13.96 grams
of methamphetamine hydrochloride from Manila to Cebu had she not been apprehended at the
initial check-in area at the Manila Domestic Airport Terminal 1. The prosecution need not
present the airline ticket to prove accused-appellant's intention to board an aircraft; she
submitted herself to body frisking at the airport when 13.96 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride was found in her person. (THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRISTY DIMAANO
Y. TIPDAS, G.R. NO. 174481, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE
It is settled that the failure to strictly follow the directives of Section 21, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 is not fatal and will not necessarily render the items confiscated inadmissible. What is
important is that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved. The
succession of events in this case show that the items seized were the same items tested and
subsequently identified and testified to in court. We thus hold that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the drugs seized from the accused-appellants were duly proven not to have been
compromised. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS POSADA, GR No. 196052, September 2, 2015)
Evidently, the law itself lays down exceptions to its requirements. Thus, noncompliance with the
above mentioned requirements is not fatal. In fact it has been ruled time and again that
noncompliance with Section 21 of the IRR does not make the items seized inadmissible.
Substantial compliance thereof is sufficient. "What is essential is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused." Here, the records reveal that the police
officers substantially complied with the process of preserving the integrity of the seized shabu.
The chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the
evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of the seized
drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BIENVENIDO MIRANDA y FELICIANO, G.R. No. 209338. JUNE 29, 2015)
132 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
There are links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation, to wit:
(1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the illegal drug seized to the investigating officer; (3)
the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and (4) the turnover and submission of the illegal drug from the forensic chemist
to the court. (PEOPLE vs. MAMMAD G.R. No. 198796 September 16, 2015)
Non-compliance with the procedure outlined in Section 21, Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165
shall not render void and invalid such seizure as long as the arresting officers successfully
preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items Here, while it is true that
the police officers failed to make an inventory and take photographs, the prosecution was able
to prove, however, that the sachet of shabu confiscated during the buy-bust operation was the
same item presented and identified before the court. They were able to maintain the integrity
of the seized drug and establish that the links in the chain of custody were not compromised.
After seizure of the subject specimen, the authorities went to the police station where PO2
Panlilio immediately marked it with "MSP/LBT", which stands for his initials and that of Tampoy.
He then turned it over to the police investigator, PO1 Darwin Pua. Thereafter, PO1 Pua prepared
the letter request for laboratory examination dated August 5, 2004. PO2 Ronald Adona then
submitted the seized shabu to the crime laboratory, which was received by the Forensic
Chemical Officer, Engineer Leonard M. Jabonillo. After examination, the submitted substance
tested positive for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, as reflected in Chemistry
Report No. D-732-2004. (PEOPLE vs. MAMMAD G.R. No. 198796 September 16, 2015)
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 has been amended by R.A. No. 10640 (An Act to Further Strengthen
the Anti-Drug Campaign of the Government, Amending for the Purpose Section 21 of Republic
Act No. 9165, Otherwise Known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”).
Considering that the buy-bust incident in this case transpired on April 28, 2009 and the old law
was favorable to the accused, the Court shall be guided by the earlier version of Section 21 and
its corresponding IRR. (CHRISTOPHER DELA RIVA y HORARIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 212940, September 16, 2015)
The chain of custody is divided into four links; first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of
the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover
of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the
forensic chemist to the court. (CHRISTOPHER DELA RIVA y HORARIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 212940, September 16, 2015)
133 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
In the case at bench, the prosecution breached the first link right away when the buy-bust team
failed to immediately mark the seized drugs, conduct a physical inventory and photograph the
same after the arrest of the accused and the confiscation of the seized drugs. The law requires
that the marking, physical inventory and photograph be conducted at the nearest police station
or at least nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures. Additionally, the law requires that the said procedure must be done in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof. Surprisingly, the PDEA agents in this case failed to
observe the proper procedures. (CHRISTOPHER DELA RIVA y HORARIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 212940, September 16, 2015)
Accused-appellant cites as an irregularity the failure of the prosecution to present photographs

of the seized items and that there were no representatives from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ) during the conduct of the inventory of the seized items. The Implementing Rules
and Regulations of Section 21(a) of R.A. No. 9165 offer some flexibility when a proviso added
that “non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items.” (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIET PANCHO, G.R. No. 206910, October 14,
2015.)
In People v. Salvador, 715 SCRA 617 (2014), the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the failure to
submit in evidence the required physical inventory of the seized drugs and the photograph, as
well as the absence of a member of the media or the Department of Justice (DOJ), pursuant to
Section 21, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, is not fatal and will not render an accused’s
arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. “What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and [the] evidentiary value of the seized items,
as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.”
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIET PANCHO, G.R. No. 206910, October 14, 2015.)
The failure of the members of the raiding team to deliver the seized items to the judge who
issued the warrant becomes immaterial because records show that the chain of custody is
intact. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIET PANCHO, G.R. No. 206910, October 14, 2015.)
This Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in
reality it is not, “as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.” The most
important factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
134 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. RONWALDO LAFARAN Y ACLAN, G.R. No. 208015, October 14, 2015.)
The chain of custody is not established solely by compliance with the prescribed physical
inventory and the presence of the enumerated persons. The Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R. A. No. 9165 on the handling and disposition of seized dangerous drugs states:
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
said items. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONWALDO LAFARAN Y ACLAN, G.R. No. 208015,
October 14, 2015.)
This Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody rule, a method of authenticating
evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. This would
include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in
the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity
for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. (PEOPLE V. PUNZALAN, G.R. No.
199087, [November 11, 2015])
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs
or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping
to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item
shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping
and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANITA
MIRANDA y BELTRAN, G.R. No. 205639, January 18, 2016)
The chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the
drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court.- The
chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the
drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PIAD, G.R. NO. 213607, JANUARY 25, 2016)
135 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
It must be established with unwavering exactitude that the dangerous drug presented in court
as evidence against the accused is the same as that seized from him in the first place.- It must
be established with unwavering exactitude that the dangerous drug presented in court as
evidence against the accused is the same as that seized from him in the first place. The chain of
custody requirement performs this function in that in ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. (PEOPLE V. HAVANA, G.R. NO. 198450,
JANUARY 11, 2016)
In many cases, this Court has held that "while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in
reality it is not, as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain." Since the law
itself provided exceptions to its requirements., the non-compliance with Section 21 of the IRR is
not fatal and does not make the items seized inadmissible. The most important factor is "the
preservation of the integrity and the evidential value of the seized items as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN ASISLO y MATIO, G.R. No. 206224, January 18, 2016)
Although Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates that the apprehending team must
immediately conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph them, non-
compliance therewith is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground and as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team. While nowhere in the prosecution evidence show the "justifiable ground"
which may excuse the police operatives involved in the buy-bust operation from making the
physical inventory and taking a photograph of the drug paraphernalia confiscated and/or seized,
such omission shall not render Saraum's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
as inadmissible in evidence. Said "justifiable ground" will remain unknown in the light of the
apparent failure of Saraum to specifically challenge the custody and safekeeping or the issue of
disposition and preservation of the subject drug paraphernalia before the trial court. He cannot
be allowed too late in the day to question the police officers' alleged non-compliance with
Section 21 for the first time on appeal. (SARAUM VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 205472, JANUARY 25,
2016)
The chain of custody rule requires the identification of the persons who handled the confiscated
items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or
drug paraphernalia from the time they were seized from the accused until the time they are
presented in court. (SARAUM VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 205472, JANUARY 25, 2016)
While the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is
almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.Thus, failure to strictly comply with
Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render an accused person's arrest
illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. (SARAUM VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO.
205472, JANUARY 25, 2016)
The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items.In this case, the prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and
136 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
evidentiary value of the confiscated drug paraphernalia had not been compromised because it
established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized items from the time they were
first discovered until they were brought to the court for examination. Even though the
prosecution failed to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the drug
paraphernalia, this will not render Saraum's arrest illegal or the items seized from him
inadmissible. There is substantial compliance by the police as to the required procedure on the
custody and control of the confiscated items. The succession of events established by evidence
and the overall handling of the seized items by specified individuals all show that the evidence
seized were the same evidence subsequently identified and testified to in open court. (SARAUM
VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 205472, JANUARY 25, 2016)
In the prosecution of a case for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the primary consideration is to
ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs have been preserved from the time
they were confiscated from the accused until their presentation as evidence in court. The
prosecution must establish with moral certainty that the specimen submitted to the crime
laboratory and found positive for dangerous drugs, and finally introduced in evidence against
the accused was the same illegal drug that was confiscated from him. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN ASISLO y MATIO, G.R. No. 206224, January 18, 2016)
"[W]hile the chain of custody should ideally be perfect [and unbroken], in reality it is not, ‘as it is
almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.’" As such, what is of utmost importance
"is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be
used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused." In the case at bench, this Court finds
it exceedingly difficult to believe that the integrity and evidentiary value of the drug have been
properly preserved by the apprehending officers. The inexplicable failure of the police officers
to testify as to what they did with the alleged drug while in their respective possession resulted
in a breach or break in the chain of custody of the drug. In some cases, the Court declared that
the failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony of key witnesses to establish a sufficiently
complete chain of custody of the shabu plus the irregular manner which plagued the handling
of the evidence before the same was offered in court, whittles down the chances of the
government to obtain a successful prosecution in a drug-related case. (PEOPLE V. HAVANA, G.R.
NO. 198450, JANUARY 11, 2016)
The alleged apprehending team after the alleged initial custody and control of the drug and
after immediately seizing and confiscating the same, never ever made a physical inventory of
the same, nor did it ever photograph the same in the presence of the appellant from whom the
alleged item was confiscated.-Apart from the utter failure of the prosecution to establish an
unbroken chain of custody, yet another procedural lapse casts further uncertainty about the
identity and integrity of the subject shabu. We refer to the non-compliance by the buy-bust
team with the most rudimentary procedural safeguards relative to the custody and disposition
of the seized item under Section 21(1),26 Article II of RA 9165. Here, the alleged apprehending
team after the alleged initial custody and control of the drug, and after immediately seizing and
137 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
confiscating the same, never ever made a physical inventory of the same, nor did it ever
photograph the same in the presence of the appellant from whom the alleged item was
confiscated. There was no physical inventory and photograph of the item allegedly seized from
appellant. Neither was there any explanation offered for such failure. (PEOPLE V. HAVANA, G.R.
NO. 198450, JANUARY 11, 2016)
While the Supreme Court in certain cases has tempered the mandate of strict compliance with
the requisite under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, such liberality, as stated in the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) can be applied only when the evidentiary value and
integrity of the illegal drug are properly preserved as we stressed in People vs. Guru 684 SCRA
544.-While this Court in certain cases has tempered the mandate of strict compliance with the
requisite under Section 21 of RA 9165, such liberality, as stated in the Implementing Rules and
Regulations can be applied only when the evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drug are
properly preserved as we stressed in People v. Guru. In the case at bar, the evidentiary value and
integrity of the alleged illegal drug had been thoroughly compromised. Serious uncertainty is
generated on the identity of the item in view of the broken linkages in the chain of custody. In
this light, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty accorded the buy-
bust team by the courts below cannot arise. (PEOPLE V. HAVANA, G.R. NO. 198450, JANUARY
11, 2016)
The essence of the chain of custody rule is to make sure that the dangerous drug presented in
court as evidence against the accused is the same dangerous drug recovered from his or her
possession.- the prosecution must prove the corpus delicti18 which in drug-related cases refers
to the dangerous drug itself, in this case, shabu. As repeatedly ruled by this Court, the identity,
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti are properly preserved for as long as the
chain of custody of the same are duly established. The essence of the chain of custody rule is to
make sure that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the
same dangerous drug recovered from his or her possession. (ROBERTO PALO y DE GULA vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 192075, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
The prosecution must establish the unbroken chain of custody of the seize item — As held in
People of the Philippines v. Edwin Dalawis y Hidalgo: “The rule on chain of custody expressly
demands the identification of the persons who handle the confiscated items for the purpose of
duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from
the time they are seized from the accused until the time they are presented in court. Moreover,
as a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of
an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain,
from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that
every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it
138 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next linjv in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change
in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.”(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAUL AMARO Y CATUBAY ALIAS
"LALAKS," G.R. No. 207517, June 01, 2016)
In cases involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
prosecution must prove "the existence of the prohibited drug[.]" "[T]he prosecution must show
that the integrity of the corpus delicti has been preserved," because "the evidence involved —
the seized chemical — is not readily identifiable by sight or touch and can easily be tampered
with or substituted." To show that "the drugs examined and presented in court were the very
ones seized [from the accused]," testimony as to the "chain of custody" of the seized drugs must
be presented. Chain of custody is: the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements
and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were
made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. (THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRISTY DIMAANO Y. TIPDAS, G.R. NO. 174481, FEBRUARY 10,
2016)
The procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of the seized dangerous drugs is
outlined in Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165,
which states: (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]The last part of the aforequoted
provision stated the exception to the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOHN HAPPY DOMINGO Y CARAG, G.R. No.
211672, June 14, 2016)
139 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
The Court ( SC ) notes that there were nagging questions about the post-examination custody
that were left unanswered by the prosecution evidence, particularly, as to who exercised
custody and possession of the specimen after the chemical examination and how it was
handled, stored and safeguarded pending its presentation as evidence in court. The failure of
the prosecution to provide details pertaining to the said post-examination custody of the seized
item created a gap in the chain of custody which again raised reasonable doubt on the
authenticity of the corpus delicti. ( PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ENRICO MIRONDO Y IZON,
G.R. No. 210841, October 14, 2015 )
Appellant notes the absence of evidence which shows that the buy-bust operation was
exercised in coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) or the barangay
authorities, and the failure of the police officers to properly identify and to physically conduct
an inventory of the seized items in his presence, as mandated by Section 21, Paragraph 1, Article
II of RA No. 9165 which provides: Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA
shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.}It bears stressing however, that failure to
strictly comply with the foregoing procedure will not render an arrest illegal or the seized items
inadmissible in evidence in view of the qualification permitted by Section 21 (a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165, to wit: (a) The apprehending
officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office
of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
140 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
said items[.] Thus, it has been held that for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved pursuant to the chain of custody rule, non-compliance with
Section 21 of RA No. 9165 does not automatically render illegal the arrest of an accused or
inadmissible the items seized. The rule on chain of custody expressly demands the identification
of the persons who handle the confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the
authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they are
seized from the accused until the time they are presented in court. Moreover, as a method of
authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it
was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change
in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. (PEOPLE vs. DALAWIS, G.R. No. 197925, November 9, 2015)
In addition to the inventory made of the seized items, the prosecution was able to prove an
unbroken chain of custody of the illegal drug from its seizure and marking to its submission to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for analysis, to the identification of the same during the trial of the
case. Indeed no photographs of the illegal drug were presented in court despite PO2 Cruz's
assertion that they have been taken although he explained that they went missing. Yet we find
that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the dangerous drug seized from appellant were
duly proven by the prosecution to have been properly preserved. The identity, quantity and
quality of the same were untarnished. As long as the chain of custody is unbroken, even though
the procedural requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not faithfully observed, the
guilt of the appellant will not be affected. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICO ENRIQUEZ Y
CRUZ, G.R. No. 214503, June 22, 2016)
The PDEA agents who apprehended appellants did not deviate from the procedure prescribed
by law and regulations. Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA 9165 provides the procedure to
be followed in the seizure and custody of dangerous drugs: 1) The apprehending team having
initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. This is
implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)of RA
9165, which reads: (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
141 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
same in the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (People v. Breis y Alvarado , G.R. No.
205823, [August 17, 2015])
To be admissible in evidence, the prosecution must be able to present through records or

testimony, the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time these were seized from the
accused by the arresting officers; turned over to the investigating officer, forwarded to the
laboratory for determination of their composition; and up to the time these are offered in
evidence.— Although ideally the prosecution should offer a perfect chain of custody in the
handling of evidence, "substantial compliance with the legal requirements on the handling of
the seized item" is sufficient. This Court has consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers
failed to strictly comply with the requirements under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such
procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in evidence. What
is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. In other words, to be admissible in evidence, the prosecution must be able to present
through records or testimony, the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time these
were seized from the accused by the arresting officers; turned-over to the investigating officer;
forwarded to the laboratory for determination of their composition; and up to the time these
are offered in evidence. For as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, as in this case,
even though the procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not
faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected.(PEOPLE V. AKMAD Y
ULIMPAIN, G.R. No. 195194, [November 25, 2015])
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of
bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Accused-appellants bear
the burden of showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome
the presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and the
presumption that public officers properly discharged their duties. Accused-appellants in this
case failed to present any plausible reason to impute ill motive on the part of the arresting
officers. Thus, the testimony of PO3 Navarette deserves full faith and credit. In fact, accused-
appellants did not even question the credibility of the apprehending officers. Nor did they
present any reason why the apprehending would fabricate a story to arrest them. They simply
142 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
anchored their appeal on denial and the alleged broken chain of the custody of the seized
drug. We have previously ruled that the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been
invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a
common and standard defense ploy in most prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act. (PEOPLE V. AKMAD Y ULIMPAIN, G.R. NO. 195194, [November 25, 2015])
"This Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in
reality it is not, 'as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.' The most
important factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items as they will be used to determine the guilt or [the] innocence of the accused. Hence, the
prosecution's failure to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the seized
drugs[,] as required under [Section] 21[, Article II of the IRR] of [R.A.] No. 9165, will not render
the accused's arrest illegal or the items seized from [him] inadmissible." The chain of custody is
not established solely by compliance with the prescribed physical inventory and photographing
of the seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated persons. The IRR of R.A. No. 9165 on the
handling and disposition of seized dangerous drugs states: Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.](People v. Bolo y
Franco, G.R. No. 200295, [August 19, 2015])
The failure of the prosecution to conduct a physical inventory and take photograph of the seized
item does not ipso facto render inadmissible in evidence the items seized. There is a proviso in
the implementing rules stating that when it is shown that there exist justifiable grounds and
proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have been preserved, the seized
items can still be used in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. (PEOPLE OF THE
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission
of the exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. To show an unbroken link in the chain of
custody, the prosecution’s evidence must include testimony about every link in the chain, from
the moment the item was seized to the time it is offered in court as evidence, such that every
person who handled the evidence would acknowledge how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it
was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The same
witness would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in
the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have its
possession. It is from the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which a
reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as
143 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
that seized from the accused. (LUIS DERILO y GEPOLEO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
No. 190466, April 18, 2016)
Section l(b) of DDB Regulation No. I, Series of 2002, defines chain of custody as follows: b.
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs
or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping
to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item
shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping
and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.](PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
BIENVENIDO MIRANDA y FELICIANO, G.R. No. 209338. JUNE 29, 2015)
The Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1 Series of 2002, defines chain of custody as duly
recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant
sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure or
confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping, to presentation in court or
destruction.- The Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1 Series of 2002, defines chain of
custody as duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure or confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping, to
presentation in court or destruction. (PEOPLE V. HAVANA, G.R. NO. 198450, JANUARY 11, 2016)
Non-compliance of Section 21, effect of - Anent the supposed failure to comply with the
procedures prescribed by Section 21 of R.A. 9165, jurisprudence has it that non-compliance
with these procedures does not render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust
operation. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items because the same will be utilized in ascertaining the guilt or innocence
of the accused. The chain of custody requirement ensures the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items in order to remove unnecessary doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence. In addition to the inventory made of the seized items, the prosecution
was able to prove an unbroken chain of custody of the illegal drugs from their seizure and
marking to their submission to the Southern Police District Crime Laboratory for analysis, to the
identification of the same during the trial of the case. As long as the chain of custody is
unbroken, even though the procedural requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not
faithfully observed, the guilt of the appellant will not be affected. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
v. JOAN SONJACO Y STA. ANA, G.R. No. 196962, June 08, 2016)
144 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
It has been ruled time and again that non-compliance with Section 21 of the IRR does not make
the items seized inadmissible. What is imperative is "the preservation of the integrity and the
evidential value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the determination of the
guilt or innocence of the accused." In this case, the chain of custody can be easily established
through the following link: (1) PO1 Blones marked the seized sachet of shabu handed to him by
SPO1 Toring with "ECB-04-19-05." Nothing in the records will show that SPO1 Toring yielded, at
any instance, possession of the subject sachet to another person, after he acquired custody
thereof from the civilian informant on their way to the police station until he gave it to PO1
Blones for marking; (2) the letter-request for laboratory examination of the seized item
marked "ECB-04-19-05" was signed by Police Superintendent Anthony Lao Obenza; (3) the said
request and the marked item seized, which were personally delivered by PO1 Blones and SPO1
Toring, were duly received by the PNP Crime Laboratory; (4) Chemistry Report No. D-491-
2005 confirmed that the marked item seized from appellant was methylamphetamine
hydrochloride; and (5) the marked item was offered in evidence. (People v. Cayas, G.R. No.
215714 , [August 12, 2015])
The purpose of Section 21 is "to [protect] the accused from malicious imputations of guilt by
abusive police officers[.]" Nevertheless, Section 21 cannot be used to "thwart the legitimate
efforts of law enforcement agents." "Slight infractions or nominal deviations by the police from
the prescribed method of handling the corpus delicti [as provided in Section 21] should not
exculpate an otherwise guilty defendant." Thus, "substantial adherence" to Section 21 will
suffice, and, as section 21 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act provides: [N]on-compliance with [the] requirements [of Section 21] under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items[.] (THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRISTY
DIMAANO Y. TIPDAS, G.R. NO. 174481, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
Non-compliance by the apprehending team with Section 21 of R.A. 9165 is not fatal as long as
(1) there is justifiable ground therefor and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team.28 In this
case, although a physical inventory of the bag of marijuana seized from appellant was made in
the presence of a representative from the media and an elective public official at the PDEA
Office, the prosecution offered no justification why a DOJ representative was not present and
why the same item was not photographed. Significantly, the integrity and evidentiary value of
the drugs seized from appellant was not preserved by the apprehending team because the
prosecution failed (a) to identify who actually placed the marking "LQE" thereon, (b) to show
that it was marked in the presence of the appellant, and (c) to prove the chain of custody of the
said item from the crime scene until it reached the crime laboratory. (PEOPLE OF THE
145 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Substance must be sealed in a plastic container - What we can deduce from I01 dela Cerna's
testimony is the fact that the seized item was not placed in a plastic container and sealed upon
confiscation. As sworn to by PSI Erma Condino Salvacion, the forensic chemist who conducted
the laboratory test on the seized item, what she tested were "suspected Marijuana leaves
wrapped in a magazine paper with markings 'RDC-D'." Also, when the said item was presented
in open court for identification, it was still wrapped in magazine paper. In People v. Habana, as
reiterated in People v. Martinez, et al., we ruled that: “If the substance is not in a plastic
container, the officer should put it in one and seal the same. In this way the substance would
assuredly reach the laboratory in the same condition it was seized from the accused. Further,
after the laboratory technician tests and verifies the nature of the substance in the container, he
should put his own mark on the plastic container and seal it again with a new seal since the
police officer's seal has been broken. At the trial, the technician can then describe the sealed
condition of the plastic container when it was handed to him and testify on the procedure he
took afterwards to preserve its integrity. If the sealing of the seized substance has not been
made, the prosecution would have to present every police officer, messenger, laboratory
technician, and storage personnel, the entire chain of custody, no matter how briefly one's
possession has been. Each of them has to testify that the substance, although unsealed, has not
been tampered with or substituted while in his care.” In the case at bar, as the seized substance
was not sealed, the prosecution should have presented all the officers who handled said
evidence from the time it left the person of the accused to the time it was presented in open
court. The prosecution did not. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. MICHAEL KURT JOHN
BULAWAN Y ANDALES, G.R. No. 204441, June 08, 2016)
The Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish the identity and integrity of the corpus
delicti of the offense charged. In People v. Torres, we held that the identity of the prohibited
drug must be proved with moral certainty. It must also be established with the same degree of
certitude that the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item
offered in court as exhibit. In this regard, paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R. A. No. 9165
(the chain of custody rule) provides for safeguards for the protection of the identity and
integrity of dangerous drugs seized. However, this Court has also said that while the chain of
custody should ideally be perfect, in reality it is not "as it is almost always impossible to obtain
an unbroken chain." The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused. In the case at bar, the chain of custody of the seized alleged marijuana was not
sufficiently established, thereby casting doubt on the identity and integrity of the supposed
evidence. Time and again, this Court has held that "the failure to establish, through convincing
proof, that the integrity of the seized items has been adequately preserved through an
146 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
unbroken chain of custody is enough to engender reasonable doubt on the guilt of an accused, x
x x A conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. MICHAEL KURT JOHN BULAWAN Y ANDALES, G.R. No. 204441,
June 08, 2016)
We have stated that strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required for the
prosecution of illegal sale because of the illegal drug's unique characteristic rendering it
indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either
by accident or otherwise. It is thus important that the "chain of custody," provided under
Section 21(1), Article II ofR.A. No. 9165 and Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (lRR) of R.A. No. 9165, be established to allay any suspicion of tam· pering. In a
buy-bust operation, the failure to conduct a physical inventory and to photograph the items
seized from the accused will not render his arrest illegal or the items confiscated from him
inadmissible in evidence as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the said items have
been preserved. (PEOPLE VS. CARRERA, G.R. No. 215731. September 2, 2015)
We have recognized that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165 may not always be possible under field conditions. As the IRR states, "noncompliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items." These lapses, however, must be
recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary
value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved. It is thus the prosecution's
burden to prove justifiable cause. (PEOPLE VS. CARRERA, G.R. No. 215731. September 2, 2015)
“Marking”—What IO1 Mangili did in the bus upon seizure of the drugs was to mark the same,
which is not to be confused with taking the physical inventory. Marking is not a requirement
of RA 9165 or its IRR, but has been held to be an initial stage in the chain of custody. (PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES VS BREYS Y ALVARADO, G.R. No. 205823, [August 17, 2015])
Although the seized items were marked only at the police station and not during the actual
apprehension and seizure, in People v. Loks, we held that the "marking of the seized [substance]
immediately upon . . . arrival at the police station qualified as a compliance with the marking
requirement." (PEOPLE VS BOLO Y FRANCO, G.R. No. 200295, [August 19, 2015])
It is likewise true that the seven smaller sachets inside the two plastic sachets were not
initialled. Nevertheless, the marking of the corpus delicti as a means to preserve its identity
should be done only "as far as practicable."99 In this case, only the two outer sachets could be
marked because the two sachets were heat-sealed.100 The two outer sachets would have to be
opened for the seven smaller sachets to be marked. This would have contaminated the
147 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
specimen. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRISTY DIMAANO Y. TIPDAS, G.R. NO. 174481,
FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
The fact that the apprehending officer marked the plastic sachet at the police station, and not at
the place of seizure, did not compromise the integrity of the seized item. Jurisprudence has
declared that "marking upon immediate confiscation" contemplates even marking done at the
nearest police station or office, of the apprehending team. Neither does the absence of a
physical inventory nor the lack of photograph of the confiscated item renders the same
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items as these would be used in determining the guilt or innocence of the
accused. (ROBERTO PALO y DE GULA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 192075,
FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
As the first step in the chain of custody, "marking" means the placing by the apprehending
officer or the police poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the dangerous drug seized.
It is meant to ensure that the objects seized are the same items that enter the chain and are
eventually offered in evidence, as well as to protect innocent persons from dubious and
concocted searches, and the apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of
evidence.16 While Section 21 of R.A. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify a
time frame for marking or the place where said marking should be done, the chain of custody
rule requires that the marking should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator,
and (2) immediately upon confiscation.17 Marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates
even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team.18 In this case,
the prosecution evidence failed to convincingly show who between P/Insp. Bañares, as poseur-
buyer, and P/Insp. Demauro, as back-up and arresting officer, marked the bag of marijuana
seized from appellant with the initials "LQE" dated "08-14-2005" at the PDEA Office. (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEE QUIJANO ENAD, G.R. NO. 205764, FEBRUARY 3, 2016)
The failure to immediately mark the confiscated shabu after its seizure does not affect its
integrity. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs DATS MAMALUMPON y BAÑEZ, G.R. NO. 210452,
AUGUST 26, 2015)
Unquestionably, the immediate marking of the seized drugs is the first and the most crucial
point in the custodial links. The significance of this link was elaborately discussed in the recent
case of People of the Philippines v. Beverly Alagarme v Citoy, 751 SCRA 17 (2015).
(CHRISTOPHER DELA RIVA y HORARIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 212940,
September 16, 2015)
148 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Under the current Section 21, noncompliance of the requirements shall not render void and
invalid such seizures and custody over said items as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. It must be
stressed, however, that the noncompliance must be for the “justifiable grounds.” In this case,
the PDEA agents failed to convince the Court that they had justifiable reasons not to
immediately and strictly comply with the provisions of the law so as to comply with the chain of
custody requirement. (CHRISTOPHER DELA RIVA y HORARIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 212940, September 16, 2015)
“Marking Upon Immediate Confiscation” - It bears underscoring that law and its implementing
rules in fact are silent on the matter of the marking of the seized items. Consistency with the
"chain of custody" rule however requires that the marking should be done (1) in the presence of
the apprehended violator and (2) immediately upon confiscation. These requirements were
complied with the marking of the seized items in appellant's presence at the PDEA office. Dir.
Ortiz explained that the marking had to be made there to ensure his men's safety as there were
only six (6) of them who effected the arrest in a slum area. Marking upon immediate
confiscation has been interpreted to include marking at the nearest police station, or herein, the
office of the apprehending team. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALEX MENDEZ RAFOLS, G.R.
No. 214440, June 15, 2016)
We stress that the marking of the seized drugs or other related items is crucial in proving the
unbroken chain of custody in drug-related prosecutions.37 As the first link in the chain of
custody, the marking is of vital importance because succeeding handlers of the dangerous drugs
or related items will use the marking as reference. Also, the marking of the evidence serves to
separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the
time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal
proceedings, thus preventing switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence. In other
words, the marking immediately upon confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or
related items is indispensable in the preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value. (LUIS
DERILO y GEPOLEO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 190466, April 18, 2016)
Here, testimonies clearly point to SPO1 Calupit, PO2 Lobrin and an unnamed receiving officer as
key persons who handled the seized items. The prosecution, therefore, should have asked these
persons to testify regarding the circumstances under which they handled the subject items. For
one thing, it is unclear who actually brought the plastic sachets to the crime laboratory for
examination. It is likewise unclear who received the confiscated plastic sachets at the PNP Crime
Laboratory or what happened to the specimens after the initial field test conducted by SPO1
Usi. This is particularly relevant, considering that the confirmatory laboratory examination – the
149 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
more reliable test compared to the initial field test – was only conducted a day after the alleged
seizure of the items. Similarly, there is no record of who exercised custody and possession of the
drug specimens after they were examined by P/Inspt. Clemens and before they were presented
before the court. All told, the totality of these circumstances – the failure to mark the plastic
sachets, the discrepancy in the weight, and the uncertainty of the individuals who handled the
seized items – broke the chain of custody and tainted the integrity of the shabu ultimately
presented as evidence before the trial court. Given that the prosecution failed to prove the
indispensable element of corpus delicti, the petitioner must be acquitted on the ground of
reasonable doubt. (LUIS DERILO y GEPOLEO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 190466,
April 18, 2016)
Substantial Compliance in handling of evidence sufficient - Although ideally the prosecution

should offer a perfect chain of custody in the handling of evidence, "substantial compliance with
the legal requirements on the handling of the seized item" is sufficient. 9 This Court has
consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the
requirements under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not
render the items seized inadmissible in evidence. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOHN HAPPY
DOMINGO Y CARAG, G.R. No. 211672, June 14, 2016)
Integrity of the evidence - It is clear from the foregoing that the substance marked, tested and
offered in evidence was the same item seized from accused-appellant. We have previously ruled
that as long as the state can show by record or testimony that the integrity of the evidence has
not been compromised by accounting for the continuous whereabouts of the object evidence at
least between the time it came into the possession of the police officers until it was tested in
the laboratory, then the prosecution can maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOHN HAPPY DOMINGO Y
CARAG, G.R. No. 211672, June 14, 2016)
Physical Inventory and Photographing - Section 21(1) requires at least three (3) persons to be
present during the physical inventory and photographing. These persons are: first, the accused
or the person/s from whom the items were seized; second, an elected public official; and third,
a representative of the National Prosecution Service. There are, however, alternatives to the
first and the third. As to the first (i.e., the accused or the person/s from whom items were
seized), there are two (2) alternatives: first, his or her representative; and second, his or her
counsel. As to the representative of the National Prosecution Service, a representative of the
media may be present in his or her place. Section 21 speels out matters that ate imperative.
150 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
“Even the doing of acts which ostensibly approximate compliance but do not actually comply
with the requirements of Section 21 does not suffice.” This is especially so when the
prosecution claims that the seizure of drugs and drug paraphernalia is the result of carefully
planned operations, as is the case here. .” (HOWARD LESCANO y CARREON vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, GR No. 214490, January 13, 2016)
Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, leaves room for
deviating from its own requirements. It includes a proviso stating that “noncompliance of
[sic]these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.” However, the prosecution
failed to establish the existence of any such justifiable grounds. If at all, its own claims that the
buy-bust operation was carefully conceived of and carried out make its position even more
dubious. These claims are all the more reason to expect that Section 21(1) shall be complied
with meticulously. (HOWARD LESCANO y CARREON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR No.
214490, January 13, 2016)
Presumption of regularity - The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved
unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered
with. Accused-appellant bear the burden of showing that the evidence was tampered or
meddled with in order to overcome the presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by
public officers and the presumption that public officers properly discharged their duties. Here,
accused-appellant failed to convince the Court that there was ill motive on the part of the
arresting officers. Thus, the testimony of PO1 Eclipse deserves full faith and credit. Accused-
appellant did not even question the credibility of the apprehending officers. He simply insisted
that the civilian informant had an ax to grind against his brother for the latter's failure to repair
the cell phone. It is unbelievable that the apprehending officers would go to the extent of
fabricating a story just to have a reason to arrest accused-appellant and get back at the latter's
brother. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOHN HAPPY DOMINGO Y CARAG, G.R. No. 211672,
June 14, 2016)
Buy-Bust Operations – As to the issue of the non-participation of the PDEA in the buy-bust
operation, suffice it to say that coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement
before police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that Section 86 of
Republic Act No. 9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, Philippine National Police,
and the Bureau of Customs to maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug related
matters," the provision does not, by so saying, make PDEA’s participation a condition sine qua
non for every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an in flagrante arrest
151 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which police authorities may rightfully
resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the PDEA. A buy-bust
operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. RONWALDO LAFARAN Y ACLAN, G.R. No. 208015, October 14, 2015.)
It bears stressing that the sale of the illegal drugs in this case was brought about by a buy-bust
operation - a form of entrapment that is resorted to for trapping and capturing criminals. It is
legal and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided
due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken. Time and again, this Court has
ruled that a buy-bust operation is employed to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BIENVENIDO MIRANDA y FELICIANO, G.R. No. 209338. JUNE
29, 2015)
It must be emphasized, at this point, that for a successful prosecution of offenses involving the
illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, all of
the following elements must be satisfied: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object
of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor.
Succinctly stated, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the
marked money by the seller successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. What is
material, therefore, is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti, as evidence. (PEOPLE vs. DALAWIS, G.R. No. 197925,
November 9, 2015)
Buy-bust operations are recognized in this jurisdiction as a legitimate form of entrapment of the
persons suspected of being involved in drug dealings. In the prosecution of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation, there must be a concurrence of all the elements of the
offense: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. The prosecution must also prove the
illegal sale of the dangerous drugs and present the corpus delicti in court as evidence. (PEOPLE
VS. CARRERA, G.R. No. 215731. September 2, 2015)
The Supreme Court held in People vs. Abedin that coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency is not an indispensable requirement before police authorities may carry
out a buy-bust operation; in fact, even the absence of coordination with the PDEA will not
invalidate a buy-bust operation.- We held in People v. Abedin16 that coordination with the PDEA
is not an indispensable requirement before police authorities may carry out a buy-bust
operation; that in fact, even the absence of coordination with the PDEA will not invalidate a
buy-bust operation. Neither is the presentation of the informant indispensable to the success in
prosecuting drug-related cases. Informers are almost always never presented in court because
of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police. Unless their testimony is
absolutely essential to the conviction of the accused, their testimony may be dispensed with
152 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
since their narrations would be merely corroborative to the testimonies of the buy-bust team.
(PEOPLE V. HAVANA, G.R. NO. 198450, JANUARY 11, 2016)
It is material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug that the drug, which is
the corpus delicti, be presented as evidence in court. Hence, the identity of the prohibited drug
must be established without any doubt. Even more than this, what must also be established is
the fact that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is the same substance offered
in court as exhibit. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures
that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. ANITA MIRANDA y BELTRAN, G.R. No. 205639, January 18, 2016)
The testimonial evidence of the prosecution could not even be sure about the number of
sachets seized from accused-appellant and to whom it was first handed to by PO2 Ariño. PO2
Ariño testified that he handed it to PO3 Ilagan at the police station who in turn testified that he
received three (3) sachets from both PO2 Ariño and PO2 Lapura. PO2 Lapura said that he gave
two (2) sachets to SPO4 dela Cruz who had been remained at his original post. SPO4 dela Cruz
however stated that at the barangay hall where he had been staying the whole time, PO2 Ariño
handed him three (3) sachets. These are confusing testimonies of witnesses who are themselves
confused. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO YEPES, G.R. No. 206766, April 6, 2016)
Evidently, there are material inconsistencies between and among the testimonies of the police
officers raising doubts whether an entrapment operation had indeed been made; and serious
questions regarding the integrity of the corpus delicti if truly there had been a buy-bust
operation. Considering that the police asset was not presented, the evidence against accused-
appellant consists solely of PO2 Ariño's declaration that there was a buy-bust operation
conducted on a drug-pusher who turned out to be accused-appellant. It is PO2 Ariño's positive
declaration versus accused-appellant's denial. While law enforcers enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional
right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot, by itself constitute proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. And although the defense of denial may be weak, courts should not
at once look at them with disfavor as there are situations where an accused may really have no
other defenses which, if established to be truth, may tilt the scales of justice in his favor,
especially when the prosecution evidence itself is weak. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
EDUARDO YEPES, G.R. No. 206766, April 6, 2016)
Links that Must be Established in the Chain of Custody in a Buy-Bust Situation - The links that
must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation are as follows: (1) the seizure
and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer; (2) the turnover of the illegal drug seized to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover by
the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
153 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
and (4) the turnover and submission of the illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court.
Here, the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the first three links in the
chain of custody. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEE QUIJANO ENAD, G.R. NO. 205764,
FEBRUARY 3, 2016)
The Court has ruled in People v. Enriquez, SCRA 337 (2013) that the links that must be
established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation are: first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer, second,
the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer,
third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEL
SAPITULA y PACULAN, G.R. NO. 209212, FEBRUARY 10, 2016)
The links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation are as follows:
(1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; (3) the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the turnover and submission of the seized
and marked illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court.(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
RAUL AMARO Y CATUBAY ALIAS "LALAKS," G.R. No. 207517, June 01, 2016)
Denial; Frame-up—Appellants' defenses of denial and frame-up were disbelieved by both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals. It is a settled rule that the evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and
attitude under grilling examination. We find no reason to deviate from this rule. The defenses of
denial and frame-up cannot prevail over the positive and categorical assertions of the PDEA
agents who were strangers to appellants and against whom no ill-motive was established.
Further, such defenses failed to overcome the documentary and physical evidence presented by
the prosecution. (People v. Breis y Alvarado , G.R. No. 205823, [August 17, 2015])
The result of the laboratory examination confirmed the presence of methylamphetamine

hydrochloride or shabu on the white crystalline substance inside the plastic sachet received
from accused-appellant. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by
the seller of the marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction. This was
further corroborated by the presentation of the marked money in evidence. (PEOPLE OF THE
154 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Procedure on Seizure and Custody of Drugs - We find that the RTC and the Court of Appeals
failed to consider the serious infirmity of the buy-bust team's non-observance of the rules of
procedure for handling illegal drug items, particularly the requirement of an inventory and
photographs of the same. In illegal drugs cases, the identity of the drugs seized must be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that required arriving at a finding of guilt.
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ENRIQUE MIRANDA, JR. Y PAÑA, G.R. No. 206880, June 29,
2016)
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs embodied in Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165 ensures the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized. The provision requires that
upon seizure of the illegal drug items, the apprehending team having initial custody of the drugs
shall (a) conduct a physical inventory of the drugs and (b) take photographs thereof (c) in the
presence of the person from whom these items were seized or confiscated and (d) a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice and any elected public official (e)
who shall all be required to sign the inventory and be given copies thereof. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. ENRIQUE MIRANDA, JR. Y PAÑA, G.R. No. 206880, June 29, 2016)
Strict Compliance of Procedure - The Court has emphasized the import of Section 21 as a
matter of substantive law that mandates strict compliance. The Congress laid it down as a safety
precaution against potential abuses by law enforcement agents who might fail to appreciate the
gravity of the penalties faced by those suspected to be involved in the sale, use or possession of
illegal drugs. Only by such strict compliance may the grave mischiefs of planting or substitution
of evidence and the unlawful and malicious prosecution of the weak and unwary that the law
intended to prevent may be eliminated. Under the principle that penal laws are strictly
construed against the government and liberally in favor of the accused, stringent compliance
therewith is fully justified. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ENRIQUE MIRANDA, JR. Y PAÑA,
G.R. No. 206880, June 29, 2016)
Herein, the requirements of physical inventory and photograph-taking of the seized drugs were
not observed. This noncompliance raises doubts whether the illegal drug items used as evidence
in both the cases for violation of Section 5 and Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 were the same ones
that were allegedly seized from appellants. Patently, the apprehending team never conducted
an inventory nor did they photograph the seized drugs in the presence of the appellants or their
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or an elective official
either at the place of the seizure, or at the police station. In People v. Gonzales, this Court
acquitted the accused based on reasonable doubt for failure of the police to conduct an
155 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
inventory and to photograph the seized plastic sachet. We explained therein that "the omission
of the inventory and the photographing exposed another weakness of the evidence of guilt,
considering that the inventory and photographing-to be made in the presence of the accused or
his representative, or within the presence of any representative from the media, Department of
Justice or any elected official, who must sign the inventory, or be given a copy of the inventory,
were really significant stages of the procedures outlined by the law and its IRR." (PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. ENRIQUE MIRANDA, JR. Y PAÑA, G.R. No. 206880, June 29, 2016)
Corpus Delicti - Corpus delicti is the actual commission by someone of the particular crime
charged. In illegal drugs cases, it refers to illegal drug itself. When the courts are given reason to
entertain reservations about the identity of the illegal drug item alleged seized from the
accused, the actual crime charged is put into serious question. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
ENRIQUE MIRANDA, JR. Y PAÑA, G.R. No. 206880, June 29, 2016)
Since the corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the dangerous drugs itself, proof
beyond reasonable doubt that the seized item is the very same object tested to be positive for
dangerous drugs and presented in court as evidence is essential in every criminal prosecution
under R.A. 9165. Because the existence of the dangerous drug is crucial to a judgment of
conviction, it is indispensable that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with the
same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt to ensure that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. To this end, the
prosecution must establish the unbroken chain of custody of the seized item. (PEOPLE OF THE
For prosecutions involving dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug itself constitutes the corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. It is of paramount importance that the identity of the dangerous
drug be so established, along with the elements of the offense charged. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt in these cases demands an unwavering exactitude that the dangerous drug
presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same as that seized from him. (LUIS
DERILO y GEPOLEO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 190466, April 18, 2016)
Corpus delicti is the "actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged." In illegal
drug cases, it refers to the illegal drug item itself. When there are reservations about the identity
of the illegal drug item allegedly seized from the accused, the actual commission of the crime
charged is put into serious question and courts have no alternative but to acquit on the ground
of reasonable doubt. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO YEPES, G.R. No. 206766, April
6, 2016)
156 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Informants – It has oft been held that the presentation of an informant as witness is not
regarded as indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a drug-dealing accused. As a rule,
the informant is not presented in court for security reasons, in view of the need to protect the
informant from the retaliation of the culprit arrested through his efforts. Thereby, the
confidentiality of the informant’s identity is protected in deference to his invaluable services to
law enforcement. Only when the testimony of the informant is considered absolutely essential
in obtaining the conviction of the culprit should the need to protect his security be disregarded.
In the present case, as the buy-bust operation was duly witnessed by SPO2 Aro and PO3 Pera,
their testimonies can take the place of that of the poseur-buyer. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. RONWALDO LAFARAN Y ACLAN, G.R. No. 208015, October 14, 2015.)
8. INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (R.A. 4103, AS AMENDED)
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), the maximum term of the penalty that may be
imposed on petitioner is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the Revised Penal Coded (RPC). On the other hand, the minimum term of the
penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the
offense. The court then has the discretion to impose a minimum penalty within the range of the
penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending
circumstances are considered. The imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty
next lower to that is prision correctional. Prision correctional ranges from six (6) months and 0ne
(1) day to six (6) years; hence the minimum penalty can be any period within this range. As for
the maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium period,
there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Prision mayor in its medium period
ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 10 years. (NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR No. 207406, January 13, 2016)
9. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE (P.D. 1829)
157 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
The factual allegations in the Information, as duly proved during trial, show that the petitioners'
acts actually constituted a violation of Section 1 (b) above. First, the Information duly alleges all
the essential elements of the crime of obstruction of justice under Section 1 (b). The factual
allegations in the Information clearly charge the accused of taking and carrying away the truck
so that it could not be used as evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in favor of
the government as a tool or instrument of the crime. In the present case, the truck that carried
the undocumented lumber serves as material evidence that is indispensable in the criminal
investigation and prosecution for violation of P.D. 705. Particularly, the truck is an indispensable
link to the persons involved in the illegal possession/transportation of the seized lumber as the
permit for the transportation of the lumber necessarily involves the truck and the lumber.
According to DENR forest ranger Rogelio Pajimna, the transport of lumber should be covered
with supporting documents that should be in the possession of the transporter. (Padiernos y
Quejada v. People, G.R. No. 181111, [August 17, 2015])
10. PROBATION LAW (P.D. 968, AS AMENDED)
On October 5, 1985, Section 4 was subsequently amended by P.D. No. 1990. Henceforth, the
policy has been to allow convicted and sentenced defendant to apply for probation within the
15-day period for perfecting an appeal. As modified, Section 4 of the Probation Law now reads:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. - Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application by said defendant within
the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem
best; Provided, that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.Probation may be granted
whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for
probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal.An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
(MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y MARUHOM v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 206513,
October 20, 2015 )
158 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Verily, Section 4 of the Probation Law provides that the application for probation must be filed
with the trial court within the 15-day period for perfecting an appeal. The need to file it within
such period is intended to encourage offenders, who are willing to be reformed and
rehabilitated, to avail themselves of probation at the first opportunity. If the application for
probation is filed beyond the 15-day period, then the judgment becomes final and executory
and the lower court can no longer act on the application for probation. On the other hand, if a
notice of appeal is perfected, the trial court that rendered the judgment of conviction is
divested of any jurisdiction to act on the case, except the execution of the judgment when it has
become final and executory. In view of the latest amendment to Section 4 of the Probation Law
that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
an appeal from the judgment of conviction," prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and
probation as mutually exclusive remedies because the law is unmistakable about it. Indeed, the
law is very clear and a contrary interpretation would counter its envisioned mandate. Courts
have no authority to invoke "liberal interpretation" or "the spirit of the law" where the words of
the statute themselves, and as illuminated by the history of that statute, leave no room for
doubt or interpretation. To be sure, the remedy of convicted felons who want to avail of the
benefits of probation even after the remedy of an appeal is to go to the Congress and ask for
the amendment of the law. To surmise a converse construal of the provision would be
dangerously encroaching on the power of the legislature to enact laws and is tantamount to
judicial legislation. (MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y MARUHOM v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
No. 206513, October 20, 2015 )
It was obvious then, as it is now, that the accused in Colinares should not have been allowed the
benefit of probation. As I have previously stated and insisted upon, probation is not a right
granted to a convicted offender; it is a special privilege granted by the State to a penitent
qualified offender, who does not possess the disqualifications under Section 9 of P.D. No. 968, as
amended. Likewise, the Probation Law is not a penal law for it to be liberally construed to favor
the accused.(MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y MARUHOM v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
206513, October 20, 2015 )
To note, what Section 4 of the Probation Law prohibits is an appeal from the judgment of
conviction, which involves a review of the merits of the case and the determination of whether
the accused is entitled to acquittal. However, under the recommended grounds for appeal
which were enumerated earlier, the purpose of the appeal is not to assail the judgment of
conviction but to question only the propriety of the sentence, particularly the penalty imposed
or the crime for which the accused was convicted, as the accused intends to apply for probation
upon correction of the penalty or conviction for the lesser offense. If the CA finds it proper to
modify the sentence, and the penalty finally imposed by the appellate court is within the
probationable period, or the crime for which the accused is eventually convicted imposes a
probationable penalty, application for probation after the case is remanded to the trial court for
159 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
execution should be allowed.(MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y MARUHOM v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015 )
Probation should not be granted to the accused in the following instances:1. When the accused
is convicted by the trial court of a crime where the penalty imposed is within the probationable
period or a fine, and the accused files a notice of appeal; and2. When the accused files a notice
of appeal which puts the merits of his conviction in issue, even if there is an alternative prayer
for the correction of the penalty imposed by the trial court or for a conviction to a lesser crime,
which is necessarily included in the crime in which he was convicted where the penalty is within
the probationable period.Both instances violate the spirit and letter of the law, as Section 4 of
the Probation Law prohibits granting an application for probation if an appeal from the
sentence of conviction has been perfected by the accused. (MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y
MARUHOM v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015 )
160 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
OTHER SPECIAL LAWS
"ANTI-CATTLE RUSTLING LAW OF 1974."
Presidential Decree No. 533 defines cattle-rustling as: Section 2. Definition of terms - The
following terms shall mean and be understood to be as herein defined: c. Cattle rustling is the
taking away by any means, method or scheme, without the consent of the owner/raiser, of any
of the abovementioned animals whether or not for profit or gain, whether committed with or
without violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things. It includes the
killing of large cattle, or taking the meat or hide without the consent of the owner/raiser. (ARIEL
LOPEZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 212186, June 29, 2016)
Elements of - The elements of cattle-rustling are: (1) large cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to
another; (3) the taking is done without the consent of the owner or raiser; (4) the taking is done
by any means, method or scheme; (5) the taking is done with or without intent to gain; and (6)
the taking is accomplished with or without violence or intimidation against persons or force
upon things. (ARIEL LOPEZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 212186, June 29, 2016)
Not all of the elements of cattle-rustling were proven by the prosecution. The carabao
transported by petitioner and Alderete was not sufficiently proven to be the same carabao
owned by Mario and Teresita Perez.Alderete's description of the carabao is too generic.
Alderete did not mention any distinguishing mark on the carabao that petitioner allegedly stole.
In other cases involving cattle-rustling, the identity of the stolen cattle was proven with
certainty because of distinguishing marks on the cattle. (ARIEL LOPEZ v. PEOPLE OF THE
TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE; SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE; SMUGGLING
Under Section 2530 (a) and (k)33 of the TCCP, the forfeiture of a vehicle, vessel or aircraft is
anchored on its being used unlawfully in the transport of contraband or smuggled articles into
or from any Philippine port. Consequently, the determination of the legality of the forfeiture of
the M/V Don Martin was necessarily contingent on whether the customs authorities had validly
and properly seized the shipment of 6,500 sacks of rice on account of the rice being smuggled.
161 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
Given this logical correlation, the CTA could not be divested of its jurisdiction to determine the
legality of the forfeiture of the rice. (M/V "DON MARTIN" VOY 047 v. HON. SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, G.R. No. 160206, July 15, 2015)
To warrant forfeiture, Section 2530(a) and (f) of the TCCP requires that the importation must
have been unlawful or prohibited. According to Section 3601 of the TCCP: "[a]ny person who
shall fraudulently import or bring into the Philippines, or assist in so doing, any article, contrary
to law, or shall receive, conceal, buy, sell, or in any manner facilitate the transportation,
concealment, or sale of such article after importation, knowing the same to have been imported
contrary to law, shall be guilty of smuggling. (M/V "DON MARTIN" VOY 047 v. HON. SECRETARY
OF FINANCE, G.R. No. 160206, July 15, 2015)
A craft engaged in the coastwise and interisland trade was one that carried passengers and/or
merchandise for hire between ports and places in the Philippine Islands51 Under Section 902 of
the TCCP, the right to engage in the Philippine coastwise trade was limited to vessels carrying a
certificate of Philippine registry,52 like the M/V Don Martin.53 To legally engage in coastwise
trade, the vessel owner must further submit other documents, like the bill of lading and
coastwise manifest,54 documents that were also presented by the petitioners during the
forfeiture proceedings.55 In the absence of any showing by the respondents that the vessel was
licensed to engage in trade with foreign countries and was not limited to coastwise trade, the
inference that the shipment of the 6,500 sacks of rice was transported only between Philippine
ports and not imported from a foreign country became fully warranted. (M/V "DON MARTIN"
VOY 047 v. HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, G.R. No. 160206, July 15, 2015)
In unlawful importation, also known as outright smuggling, goods and articles of commerce are
brought into the country without the required importation documents, or are disposed of in the
local market without having been cleared by the BOC or other authorized government agencies,
to evade the payment of correct taxes, duties and other charges. Such goods and articles do not
undergo the processing and clearing procedures at the BOC, and are not declared through
submission of import documents, such as the import entry and internal revenue declaration.
(BUREAU OF CUSTOMS VS DEVANADERA G.R. No. 193253 September 8, 2015
Technical Smuggling. In various fraudulent practices against customs revenue, also known as
technical smuggling, on the other hand, the goods and articles are brought into the country
through fraudulent, falsified or erroneous declarations, to substantially reduce, if not totally
avoid, the payment of correct taxes, duties and other charges. Such goods and articles pass
through the BOC, but the processing and clearing procedures are attended by fraudulent acts in
order to evade the jkm payment of correct taxes, duties, and other charges. Often committed by
means of misclassification of the nature, quality or value of goods and articles, undervaluation
in terms of their price, quality or weight, and misdeclaration of their kind, such form of
smuggling is made possible through the involvement of the importers, the brokers and even
162 | P a g e
CRIMINAL
2015-2016
some customs officials and personnel. (BUREAU OF CUSTOMS VS DEVANADERA G.R. No.
193253 September 8, 2015)
The Court holds that private respondents cannot be charged with unlawful importation under
Section 3601 of the TCCP because there is no allegation in the BOC's complaint-affidavit to the
effect that they committed any of the following acts: (1) fraudulently imported or brought into
the Philippines the subject petroleum products, contrary to law; (2) assisted in so doing; or (3)
received, concealed, bought, sold or in any manner facilitated the transportation, concealment
or sale of such goods after importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to
law. (BUREAU OF CUSTOMS VS DEVANADERA G.R. No. 193253 September 8, 2015)
Neither could private respondents be charged with various fraudulent practices against customs
revenue under Section 3602 of the TCCP as the above allegations do not fall under any of the
following acts or omissions constituting such crime/s: (1) making or attempting to make any
entry of imported or exported article: (a) by means of any false or fraudulent invoice,
declaration, affidavit, letter, paper or by any means of any false statement, written or verbal; or
(b) by any means of any false or fraudulent practice whatsoever; or (2) knowingly effecting any
entry of goods, wares or merchandise, at less than the true weight or measures thereof or upon
a false classification as to quality or value, or by the payment of less than the amount legally
due; or (3) knowingly and wilfully filing any false or fraudulent entry or claim for the payment of
drawback or refund of duties upon the exportation of merchandise; or (4) making or filing any
affidavit, abstract, record, certificate or other document, with a view to securing the payment to
himself or others of any drawback, allowance or refund of duties on the exportation of
merchandise, greater than that legally due thereon. (BUREAU OF CUSTOMS VS DEVANADERA
G.R. No. 193253 September 8, 2015)
163 | P a g e

Criminal Law Case Principles-1

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Исходное описание:

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Criminal Law Case Principles-1

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

CRIMINAL

2017 USJ-R CENTRAL BAR

MAY 2015- JUNE 2016

PART I. REVISED PENAL CODE (RPC) BOOK I

FUNDAMENTAL AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL LAW

Additionally, accused-appellant's defense of denial is unconvincing. "[D]enial is intrinsically a

Accused-appellant's defense, which is predicated on a bare denial, deserves scant consideration.

Accused-appellant's defense of denial, like alibi, is inherently weak and if uncorroborated, is

ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

COMPLEX CRIMES AND COMPOSITE CRIMES

CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY

In order for self-defense to be appreciated, accused-appellant must be able to prove by clear

Lack of Sufficient Provocation. The last requisite to be considered is lack of sufficient

Self-Defense; Flight. Likewise weakening accused-appellant's contention that he acted in self-

can be gathered from the narration of the accused-appellant during cross-examination

Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between

Privileged Mitigating Circumstances; Incomplete Self-Defense. Pursuant to Article 69 of the

We agree with the CA in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance. The essence of

Special Aggravating Circumstances; Illegal Possession of Unlicensed Firearm. The Supreme

PERSONS LIABLE AND DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION

PRINCIPALS, ACCOMPLICES AND ACCESSORIES

Principal by Inducement - The conviction of a person as a principal by inducement requires (1)

CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL

Prescription of Penalties - As early as 1952, in Infante v. Provincial Warden of Negros

RA 9346; RA 7659; Summary of Imposable Penalties and Awards of Damages - In summary:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

ii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

i. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00