BMJV GE Bekämpfung-Rechtsextremismus-Hasskriminalität EN

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draft bill
of the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection
draft law to combat right-wing extremism and hate crimes
A. Problem and goal
On the Internet and especially in the so-called social media, an increasing brutalization of
communication can be observed. More and more often, persons express themselves in
general, but above all to socially and politically engaged persons in a way that violates the
applicable German criminal law and is characterized by strongly aggressive appearance,
intimidation and threat of criminal offences. This not only attacks the general right of
personality of those affected, but also attacks and questions the political discourse in the
democratic and pluralistic social order. Persons in the public eye and representatives active
for the community are, for example, after a political statement covered with defamatory
statements or death threats, or violence against them is called for. With these disrespectful
and degrading contents, which are often perceptible to the general public over a long period
of time, the inhibition threshold for further similar statements decreases. In this brutal
environment, it is already the case that certain opinions are no longer expressed out of
concern about such actions. This can even lead to people withdrawing completely from public
political discourse. This endangers the free exchange of opinions on the Internet and,
ultimately, freedom of opinion. To be able to express one's opinion freely, uninfluenced and
openly and to share it is an essential cornerstone of a democratic pluralistic society, which
the state must defend with the means at its disposal. This can be done through a variety of
measures.
Central to this is effective criminal prosecution, especially of hate crimes with a right-wing
extremist background, not only, but also in particular, when committing crimes on the
Internet.
The Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG), in force since 2017, is an important building block in
the fight against hate crime on the Internet. The path taken by the law to make social
networks more responsible than before has led to a large number of complaints about
criminal content being deleted after review. In addition to deletion, it is also necessary to
prosecute criminal content. Often, however, the law enforcement authorities do not become
aware of the criminal content deleted on a NetDG complaint, so that the posting of such
content remains without criminal consequences and is reinforced by the impression that the
Internet is developing into a lawless area. Therefore, the providers of social networks subject
to the NetzDG are to be obliged to report certain punishable contents to the Federal Criminal
Police Office so that criminal prosecution can be initiated from there by the responsible
criminal prosecution authorities.
Substantive criminal law must also be geared even more clearly than in the past to the
violations of rights associated with hate crimes, in particular through adapted offences and
intensified threats of punishment.
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Effective prosecution also requires that suspects can be identified and evidence secured. In
the Code of Criminal Procedure, the collection of inventory and traffic data is currently
explicitly regulated only for measures against telecommunications service providers. A
special regulation for the collection of data from telemedia service providers is still lacking.
This is now to be created.
The dissemination of child pornographic content continues to be a serious challenge, as the

Federal Government's report on the measures taken in 2018 for the purpose of deleting
telemedia offers with child pornographic content within the meaning of § 184b of the Criminal
Code also shows. Consistent criminal prosecution can help to dry up the market for such
products and thus prevent the further production of such misuse representations as well as
the danger that third parties may be encouraged to imitate them. This can make an important
contribution to protecting children from sexual abuse. For this reason, the obligation to report
should also apply to making child pornography content accessible.
The Federal Criminal Police Office Act (BKAG) contains so far only one authority of the
Federal Criminal Police Office to collect inventory data from telecommunications providers. In
view of the increasing use of telemedia services as opposed to telecommunications services,
it is urgently necessary to extend the provisions of § 10 BKAG to telemedia service providers
in order to perform the central office tasks under § 2 BKAG.
B. Solution
As a central innovation, the draft provides for the introduction of a reporting obligation for
providers of social networks within the meaning of § 1 (1) NetzDG, insofar as they do not fall
under the exclusion criterion of § 1 (2) NetzDG. Such providers should be obliged to set up a
system according to which certain criminal contents are to be reported to the Federal
Criminal Police Office. Only those contents are to be covered for which there are concrete
indications for the fulfilment of a criminal offence and which could have lasting negative
effects on the exercise of freedom of expression in so-called social media. In addition, the
accessibility of child pornographic content is recorded in order to dry up the trade in child
pornographic content and thus counteract the further production of such abuse
representations as well as the danger that third parties are encouraged to imitate it in the real
world. This should contribute to better protection of children against sexual abuse. The law
therefore provides for the introduction of the reporting obligation for certain criminal offences
from the catalogue of § 1 paragraph 3 NetzDG. The obligation to report also presupposes
that the providers are made aware of what they consider to be criminal content by means of a
complaint submitted by users in accordance with the NetzDG and that the providers come to
the conclusion after review that the content is criminal in the aforementioned sense. The case
of infringement is subject to a fine.
The draft also proposes to extend the list of offences in § 126 of the Criminal Code (StGB) -
disturbance of public peace through threats of criminal offences - to the effect that in future
the threat of a dangerous bodily injury (§ 224 StGB) may also be punishable. The scope of
application of § 140 StGB (reward and approval of criminal offences) is also to be extended
so that in future not only the approval of committed or attempted criminal offences will be
covered by the offence, but also the approval of criminal offences that have not yet been
committed.
Insulting statements made publicly or through the dissemination of writings (§ 11 Paragraph 3

StGB) shall in future be covered by a qualification in § 185 StGB and punishable by a
maximum of two years imprisonment.
In order to be able to take into account the increased injustice of a defamatory public
statement about persons standing in the political life of the people, irrespective of the level at
which they engage themselves politically, § 188 StGB (Evil Slander and Slander against
Persons of Political Life) makes it clear that this fact applies to acts against persons up to the
municipal level.
§ 241 StGB (threat) is extended to the effect that in future the threat of an unlawful act
against physical integrity or against an object of significant value will also be covered by the
offence. At the same time, the maximum penalty for the threat of a crime is increased from
one to two years imprisonment. In addition, a qualification offence, which provides for
imprisonment of up to three years as the maximum penalty, is to make it possible in future to
properly record the threat committed publicly or by the dissemination of writings (§ 11 (3)
StGB).
In § 46 StGB (Grundsätze der Strafzumessung), anti-Semitic motives of the perpetrator are

to be explicitly cited as a further example of inhuman motives and aims, which are to be
particularly taken into account in the sentencing.
In the Code of Criminal Procedure, the regulations on the collection of traffic and inventory
data from telecommunications service providers are to be extended to include measures for
telemedia service providers.
The above measures aim at a more intensive and effective prosecution, especially in the fight
against right-wing extremism and hate crime. In this area, however, the prosecution itself is
essentially the responsibility of the prosecuting authorities of the Länder.
C. alternatives
An alternative would be to maintain the current legal situation, which was perceived as
unsatisfactory.
An alternative regulatory proposal to the proposed amendments to §§ 188 and 241 of the
Criminal Code is contained in the draft of a new law adopted by the Federal Council on 29
November 2019 ... Act amending the Criminal Code - Improvement of the criminal-law
protection of persons standing in the political life of the people (Bundesratsdrucksache
418/19 (resolution)), the objective of which, shared by the Federal Government, is better
implemented in the way proposed here.
D. Budgetary expenditure excluding compliance

costs
None.
E. fulfillment effort
E.1 Fulfilment expenditure for citizens
No one.
E.2 Fulfilment burden for the economy

The compliance burden for the economy is still being

determined.
Of which bureaucratic costs from information duties

determined.
E.3 Fulfilment expenses of the

administration
The draft leads to compliance costs for the federal

government.
The fulfilment expenditure incurred by the Federal Administration is also still determined with
regard to the extended functions of the BKA.
F. Further costs
Additional costs in the core judicial area are to be expected only to a minor extent in the
countries.
Impacts on individual prices and the general price level, in particular on consumer prices, are
not to be expected.
Draft of the bill by the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer

Protection
draft law to combat right-wing extremism and hate crimes
From
the...
The Bundestag has passed the following law:
Article 1
Amendment of the Criminal Code
The Criminal Code in the version promulgated on 13 November 1998 (BGBl. I p. 3322), last
amended by Article 2 of the Act of 19 June 2019 (BGBl. I p. 844), shall be amended as
follows:
1. in section 46(2), second sentence, the word "xenophobic" shall be followed by a comma
and the word "xenophobic".
I inserted the word "anti-Semitic."
(2) In section 115(3), first sentence, the word "or" shall be replaced by a comma after the
words "of the civil protection service" and a comma and the words "of a medical emergency
service or an emergency room" shall be inserted after the words "of a rescue service".
3. in paragraph 126(1)(3), after the word 'one', the words 'dangerous' shall be replaced by
'dangerous'.
bodily injury (§ 224) or a" inserted.
4. § 140 shall be amended as

follows:
(a) in the part of the sentence preceding point 1, the word 'or' shall be inserted after the
word 'alternative' and the comma and the words 'after which it has been committed or
attempted in a punishable manner' shall be deleted after the words '§ 178'.
(b) point 1 shall be worded as follows:
"1. rewarded after it has been committed or tried in a punishable manner,

or".
5. in § 185, before the word "by means of" the words "publicly, by spreading of
(§ 11 paragraph 3) or".
6. the following second sentence shall be added to Section 188 (1): "The political life of the
people
reaches down to the municipal level."
7. 194 (1) shall be amended as follows:
(a) after the second sentence, the following

sentence is inserted
"In the cases of § 188, the offence is also prosecuted if the prosecution authority
considers intervention ex officio to be necessary because of the special public
interest in the prosecution.
(b) in the new fourth sentence, the words 'acts may' shall be replaced by the words 'acts
committed in accordance with
sentences 2 and 3".
Article 8(241) shall be amended as

follows:
(a) Paragraph 1 shall be preceded by the following

paragraph 1:
(1) "Anyone who threatens a person by committing an unlawful act against him or a person
close to him, against his physical integrity or against an object of significant value,
shall be punished with a custodial sentence of up to one year or with a fine." (2) ".
(b) the current paragraph 1 shall become paragraph 2 and the words "one year" shall be
replaced by the following
the words "two years".
(c) The current paragraph 2 shall become

paragraph 3.
(d) The following paragraph 4 is added:
(4) " If the offence is committed in public or by dissemination of writings (§ 11 paragraph 3),
in the cases referred to in paragraph 1 it shall be punishable by imprisonment for up
to two years or by a fine and in the cases referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 by
imprisonment for up to three years or by a fine.".
Article 2
Amendment of the Code of Criminal

Procedure
The Code of Criminal Procedure in the version promulgated on 7 April 1987 (BGBl. I p.
1074, 1319), last amended by Article 3 of the Act of 11 July 2019 (BGBl. I p. 1066), shall be
amended as follows:
1 In the table of contents, the information on § 100g is worded as follows:
"§ 100g Collection of traffic and usage data".
2 § 100g shall be amended as follows:
(a) The heading shall be worded as follows: "§ 100g Survey of traffic and traffic
data"
(b) Paragraph 1 is amended as follows:
(aa) the following sentence is inserted after the

first sentence:
"Under the conditions set out in sentence 1, data on use (§ 15 paragraph 1 of

the Telemedia Act) may be collected from those who make their own or third-
party telemedia available for use for business purposes or provide access to
such use.
(bb) in the new fifth sentence, after the word "traffic data", the words "and
Usage Data".
(c) in paragraph 5, after the word 'telecommunications services', the words 'or, in the
case of a service provider commercially providing telemedia for use or arranging access
to use' shall be inserted.
3. §100j shall be amended as

follows:
(a) Paragraph 1 is amended as follows:
(aa) Sentence 1 shall be worded as

follows:
"Insofar as this is necessary for the investigation of the facts of the case or the
determination of the place of abode of an accused person, information may be
requested
1. on the data collected pursuant to §§ 95 and 111 of the Telecommunications

Act (§ 113 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Telecommunications Act) from the
party providing or participating in telecommunications services on a commercial
basis, and
2. about the data collected according to § 14 of the German Telemedia Act (§

15a para. 1 sentence 1 of the German Telemedia Act) from the person who
holds his own or third-party telemedia for business use or arranges access to
such use."
bb) In sentence 2, the words "and § 15a paragraph 1 sentence 2 of the Telemedia
Act" shall be inserted after the words "§ 113 paragraph 1 sentence 2 of the
Telecommunications Act".
(b) In paragraph 2, the words 'and § 15a paragraph 1 sentences 3 and 4 of the
Telemedia Act' are inserted after the words '§ 113c paragraph 1 number 3 of the
Telecommunications Act'.
(c) in the first sentence of paragraph 5, after the word 'telecommunications services', the
words 'telecommunications services' shall be replaced by 'telecommunications services'.
or 'telemedia services'.
4. section 101a shall be amended as

follows:
(a) in paragraph 1, first sentence, in the first part before point 1, the following shall be
inserted after the word "Ver-
The words "and usage data" are inserted in the "Usage
data" field in the "Usage data" field.
(b) in paragraph 6, first sentence, after the word 'telecommunications', the words 'or
the affected users of the telemedia service".
5. in point 2 of the fifth subparagraph of Paragraph 101b(5), in the first part of the sentence
preceding subparagraph (a), the following words shall be inserted after the word
"traffic data", the words "and usage data" are inserted.
(6) In Section 374(1)(5), the words 'Section 241' shall be replaced by the words 'Section
241(1)'.
1 to 3" is replaced.
Article 3
Amendment of the Federal Criminal Police

Act
§ Section 10 of the Federal Criminal Police Act of 1 June 2017 (Federal Law Gazette I p.
1354; 2019 I p. 400) shall be amended as follows:
(1) Paragraph 1 is amended as follows:
(a) after the first sentence, the following sentence

is inserted
"Under the conditions of sentence 1, information on the data collected pursuant

to § 14 of the German Telemedia Act (§ 15a paragraph 1 sentence 1 of the
German Telemedia Act) may be requested from the person who provides his or
her own or third-party telemedia for business purposes or arranges access to
the same (§ 15a paragraph 1 sentence 1 of the German Telemedia Act).
b) In the new sentence 3, the words "or sentence 2" shall be inserted after the words
"sentence 1" and the words "and § 15a paragraph 1 sentence 2 of the Telemedia Act"
after the words "§ 113 paragraph 1 sentence 2 of the Telecommunications Act".
2. in paragraph 2, the words 'and Article 15a(1)(3) of the Telemediengesetz' shall be inserted
after the words 'Article 113(1)(3) of the Telekommunikati- onsgesetz'.
3. in paragraph 3, first sentence, 'sentence 2' is replaced by 'sentence 3
4. in paragraph 4, first sentence, 'sentence 2' shall be replaced by 'sentence 3
5. the following sentence shall be inserted after the first

sentence of paragraph 5:
"Sentence 1 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the person who commercially provides
his own or third party telemedia for use or arranges access to use.
Article 4
Amendment of the Telemedia Act
The Telemedia Act of 26 February 2007 (BGBl. I p. 179), as last amended by Article 11 of
the Act of 11 July 2019 (BGBl. I p. 1066), shall be amended as follows:
Article 1(14)(2) shall be worded as follows:
"2. By order of the competent authorities, the service provider may, in individual cases,
provide information on inventory data to the extent necessary to enforce intellectual
property rights.
2. the following section 15a shall be inserted after

section 15:
"„§ 15a
information procedure
(1) Whoever provides telemedia services on a business basis, participates in them or

arranges access to use them, may use the inventory data collected in accordance with §
14 paragraph 1 and the usage data collected in accordance with § 15 paragraph 1 in
accordance with this provision to fulfil information obligations vis-à-vis the bodies named
in paragraph 3. This also applies to inventory data, which is used to protect access to
terminal devices or to storage devices that are used in these terminal devices or in
separate locations. The data to be included in an information may also be determined on
the basis of an Internet protocol address assigned at a certain time; for this purpose,
usage data may also be automatically evaluated. All internal company data sources must
be taken into account for the provision of information.
2. Information may be supplied only to the extent that a body referred to in paragraph 3
requests it in text form in an individual case, specifying a legal provision allowing it to
collect the data referred to in paragraph 1, and this is necessary for one of the following
purposes:
1. to prosecute criminal offences or administrative offences,
2. to avert threats to public safety or order; or
3. for the fulfilment of the statutory tasks of the supervisory board and supervisory board
referred to in paragraph 3 numbers 3 and 4
of the named
places.
Data referred to in paragraph 1 may not be communicated to other public or private

bodies. In the event of imminent danger, the information may also be provided if the
request is not made in text form. In this case, the request must be confirmed without
delay in text form. The responsibility for the admissibility of the request lies with the
bodies requesting information.
3. The bodies referred to in paragraph 1

shall be
1. the persons responsible for prosecuting criminal offences or misdemeanours

authorities;
2. the measures necessary for the prevention of threats to public security or public order
permanent authorities;
3. the constitutional protection authorities of the Federal Government and the Länder, the
Military Administration
and the Federal Intelligence Service;
4. the authorities of the customs administration and the competent authorities under state
law, insofar as the collection of data is necessary for the performance of their auditing
duties pursuant to § 2 paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Undeclared Work Protection Act and for
the prevention and prosecution of related criminal offences and administrative offences.
(4) The person who provides telemedia services in a businesslike manner, who participates
o- who arranges access to the use thereof, must transmit the data to be informed
immediately and completely. The obligated parties shall maintain silence with regard to
the request for information and the provision of information vis-à-vis the data subjects
and third parties.
(5) Whoever provides or participates in telemedia services in a businesslike manner shall
take the necessary precautions for the provision of information in his area of
responsibility at his own expense. Whoever has more than 100,000 customers must
have a secure electronic interface available for the receipt of the requests for information
as well as for the provision of the associated information, which also guarantees that the
data cannot be transmitted by unauthorised persons without knowledge of the data. Each
request for information shall be checked by a responsible specialist for compliance with
the formal requirements set out in paragraph 2 and further processing of the request may
only be released after a positive result of the check has been obtained.".
3. the former § 15a shall become §

15b.
Article 5
Amendment of the Network Enforcement Act
The Network Enforcement Act of 1 September 2017 (BGBl. I p. 3352) is amended as

follows:
1 § 1 shall be amended as follows:
(a) The heading shall be worded as follows:
"„§ 1
Scope, definitions".
(b) In paragraph 2, the words '§§ 2 and 3' shall be replaced by the words '§§ 2 to 3a'.
(c) the following paragraph 4 is added:
"(4) A complaint about illegal content is any complaint about a content with the request for
the removal of the content or the blocking of access to the content, unless the
complaint is not made recognizably that an illegal content is present.
(2) In Article 3(2)(5), a semicolon shall be inserted after the word 'begründet' and the words
'the complainant shall be informed that he may file a criminal complaint and, if necessary, a
criminal complaint against the user for whom the content complained of has been stored and
on which websites he may obtain further information in this regard' shall be inserted.
3. the following section 3a shall be inserted
after section 3:
"„§ 3a
reporting
obligation
1. The provider of a social network shall maintain an effective procedure for reporting under
paragraphs 2 to 5.
(2) The provider of a social network must submit content to the Federal Criminal Police
Office as the central office for the purpose of enabling the prosecution of criminal
offences,
1. which have been reported to the provider in a complaint about illegal content
are,
2. which the provider has removed or to which he has blocked access, and
3. for which there are concrete indications that they are at least one of the following
facts
a) §§ 86, 86a, 89a, 91, 126, 129 to 129b, 130, 131 or 140 of the Penal Code
betzbuches,
b) § 184b in conjunction with § 184d of the Penal Code or
c) § 241 of the Criminal Code in the form of a threat with a homicide

criminal offence (§§ 211 or 212 of the Criminal
Code)
and are not justified.
(3) The provider of the social network shall immediately after having removed or blocked
access to a content check whether the conditions of paragraph 2 point 3 are met and
immediately thereafter transmit the content in accordance with paragraph 4.
(4) The transmission to the Federal Criminal Police

Office must be
1. the content and,

2. if available, the IP address including the port number that the user used when sharing
the content with other users or making it available to the public,
must be
included.
(5) Transmission to the Federal Criminal Police Office shall take place electronically to an
interface provided by the Federal Criminal Police Office.
(6) The provider of the social network shall inform the user for whom the content was stored
14 days after transmission to the Federal Criminal Police Office of the transmission
pursuant to subsection (4), first sentence, shall not apply if the Federal Criminal Police
Office orders within 14 days that the information is to be postponed due to the
endangerment of the investigative purpose, life, physical integrity or personal freedom of
a person or significant assets. In the case of the order pursuant to sentence 2, the
Federal Criminal Police Office shall inform the user of the transmission pursuant to
paragraph 4 as soon as this is possible without endangerment within the meaning of
sentence 2.
(7) The provider of a social network shall, at the request of the administrative authority
referred to in § 4, provide the administrative authority with information on how the
procedures for the transmission of content pursuant to paragraph 1 are structured and
how they are applied.
4. the following point 6a shall be inserted after paragraph 4(1)(6):

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"'6a. in contravention of Paragraph 3a(1), fails to present a procedure referred to therein

or presents it incorrectly.
"that
holds,
Article 6
coming into
effect
(1) Subject to paragraph 2, this Act shall enter into force on ... [insert: date of the first day of
the quarter following the announcement].
(2) Article 5 shall enter into force on ... [insert: date of the first day of the fourth calendar
month following the notice].
explanatory
memorandum
A. General part
I. Objectives and necessity of the regulations
The Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG), which came into force on 1 October 2017, is an
important step towards combating hatred on the Internet and concretizing the responsibilities
of providers of social networks in dealing with criminal hate content. The social networks with
at least two million registered users in Germany were obliged to set up user-friendly reporting
channels for the transmission of complaints about criminal content. The providers must report
every six months on the establishment and use of reporting channels and on complaint
management. The reports of these social networks so far show that a total of 1,796,046
reports were received from the first half of 2018 to the first half of 2019. The social networks
have deleted about 28 percent (mean value) of these. Beyond deletions, it is the
responsibility of the state to ensure that the authors of criminal content are also subject to
effective prosecution.
In the current communication and discussion culture on the Internet, it is not unusual to find a
poisonous and hateful tone, which in turn prevents other users from expressing their opinions
freely and openly for fear of becoming victims of hostility or threats. The great potential of
social networks to facilitate a broad discussion is thus reversed. The widespread impact of
hostility or threats on the Net reinforces their impact and has the potential to intimidate not
only those affected but also third parties. Another risk is that publicly expressed threats may
help to lower the threshold of inhibition to commit an offence by the author of the content or
by third parties who perceive the threat. Just how real this risk is can be seen in Germany
with the murder of Kassel's District President Walter Lübcke and the murder of two people in
the course of the assassination attempt on the synagogue in Halle.
Article 5 paragraph 1 of the Basic Law comprehensively protects the freedom of the individual
to disseminate opinions. This also applies if this happens in a pointed or aggressive form.
This protection of freedom of expression is the basis for the pluralistic and free political
discourse which is the basis of democratic society. However, there are also limits to the way
in which one can express one's opinion. If utterances contain threats or incitement of the
people, this is no longer covered by freedom of opinion. If the offences of the penal code are
fulfilled, the state has the duty to protect its citizens, on the one hand by causing the removal
of the content, on the other hand by enabling criminal prosecution. If the authors of criminal
content are shown through criminal proceedings that content such as death threats or
incitement to hatred is not tolerated by the rule of law and that they are personally
responsible for it, the discussion on the Internet can once again take place within the
framework of freedom of expression, which is indispensable as a fundamental value of
democracy.
The possibility of the transmission of criminal offences and the subsequent deletion of the
reported criminal content, which is anchored in the Network Enforcement Act, must be
followed by the initiation of criminal proceedings in cases involving massive interference in
public and often political discourse. In the case of certain offences aimed at this situation, the
State has, independently of a
The police have a special interest in prosecuting the perpetrator in order to enforce the rule of
law and the democratically set rules on the Internet.
The dissemination of child pornography content also calls for consistent criminal prosecution.
This can make an important contribution to drying up the market for child pornography. This
is intended to counteract the further production of such abuse representations and the danger
that third parties may be encouraged to imitate child pornography in the real world. This
should contribute to the best protection of children against sexual abuse.
In addition, it can be observed that the currently applicable provisions of the Criminal Code
are not always suitable to adequately cover all forms of the new dimensions of hate crime in
relation to publicly committed offences. Anti-Semitic crimes have also increased significantly
again in recent years (see II. for more details). Appropriate recording and sanctioning of such
acts - whether committed via or outside the Internet - are therefore part of an effective
prosecution of hate crimes, especially those with a right-wing extremist background.
Effective criminal prosecution further requires that the investigating authorities are informed
promptly of reported content that has been assessed as criminal by social networks and
deleted on the basis of this assessment. The effective initiation of investigations also includes
the communication of the IP address assigned to the author of the content. The provider of
the social network shall report the content and the IP address to a central office designated
by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and from there - if a criminal offence is detected -
to the locally responsible investigating authority. In order that the investigation work can be
commenced promptly by the competent investigating authority of the Länder, the BKA should
be able to request from the social network, if necessary, the user data necessary to identify
the originator when it establishes that criminal content is present, and should forward this
data to the competent state authorities or the competent state criminal investigation office. A
quick start of the investigation is necessary in order to secure evidence and to confront the
author with the punishability of his or her content as soon as possible after publication.
The new regulations in the Code of Criminal Procedure create a legally secure basis for the
retrieval of inventory and traffic data from telemedia service providers. At the same time, the
procedure and the rights of data subjects are clearly regulated. Until now, the collection of
status and traffic data was only specifically regulated in the Code of Criminal Procedure for
measures against telecommunications providers. This provision will now be extended to
telemedia service providers.
TWO. Essential content of the draft
As a central innovation, the draft provides for the introduction of a reporting obligation for
providers of social networks within the meaning of § 1 (1) NetzDG, insofar as they do not fall
under the exemption of § 1 (2) NetzDG. These providers are to be obliged to report certain
punishable contents to the Federal Criminal Police Office. There shall be a reporting
obligation if providers of social networks are made aware of what they consider to be criminal
content through a complaint submitted by their users in accordance with the NetzDG, if the
providers share the view that the content is punishable and if, on the basis of concrete
indications, there is an element of the offence which can have lasting negative effects on the
exercise of freedom of expression in social media. The reporting obligation of the social
network operators thus fits into the compliance system already established by the
introduction of the NetzDG, since the reporting obligation is linked to the difficult path and the
deletion obligation. Extensive restructuring of the operators of social networks is therefore
unnecessary.
When introducing the obligation to register, the freedom of the social network to choose a
profession and the user's right to informational self-determination on the one hand and the
state's interest in enforcing the rule of law on the Internet and not allowing virtual platforms to
become a legal vacuum on the other must be reconciled. The enforcement of the rule of law
also serves the freedom of opinion of all, since it ensures that everyone can express their
opinions on public platforms without fear of defamation and intimidation.
In accordance with this consideration, the law introduces the obligation to report certain
offences from the NetzDG catalogue which require state intervention because they are
serious cases involving the protection of fundamental values of our democracy: the obligation
concerns criminal content which lowers the threshold for committing particularly dangerous
offences and affects the public interest in publicly exchanging opinions without reprisals.
Being able to say and exchange opinions freely, uninfluenced and openly is a cornerstone of
the democratic pluralistic society that the state has to defend.
The draft therefore provides for a catalogue of criminal offences for which the criminal-law
punishment is of particular importance for the protection of the democratic and pluralistic
society. The imposition of a reporting obligation is justified both vis-à-vis and in consideration
of the fundamental rights of providers of social networks and vis-à-vis and in consideration of
the fundamental rights of users. In the context of the NetzDG, these are certain offences that
endanger the democratic constitutional state (third title of the first section of the Special Part
of the Criminal Code) as well as certain offences against public order (seventh section of the
Special Part of the Criminal Code). In addition, there are acts which, because of the danger
of lowering inhibition thresholds, represent a particular danger that the announcements
contained in them will be translated into acts. This particularly affects the case of the threat of
a homicide covered by § 241 StGB.
In order to dry up the market for child pornographic content in the long term and thus better
protect children against sexual abuse, the reporting obligation also applies to making child
pornographic content accessible (§ 184b in conjunction with § 184d of the Criminal Code).
With the offences mentioned it is necessary that providers of social networks and state
authorities work together to achieve a criminal prosecution of the authors of these contents.
The providers of social networks therefore have to transmit the content and the IP address
assigned to the user for whom the content was uploaded to a central office at the BKA in
addition to its deletion if they become aware of a punishable content within the scope of a
NetzDG complaint. The BKA will, after assessing whether the content is punishable by law,
request the data stored on the social network, insofar as it is necessary to identify the author,
and transmit this data to the responsible law enforcement authority in the countries. The
criminal prosecution authorities in the Länder then assume responsibility for criminal
prosecution themselves. Criminal penalties also serve indirectly to avert danger; they also
fulfil the legitimate expectation of those affected that the state will act to protect them and that
they will not be exposed to the threats without reacting.
If a social network fails to comply with its obligation to set up a procedure to guarantee the
reporting of content to the BKA, the Federal Office of Justice (BfJ) may impose a fine on the
network. This is intended to ensure compliance with the reporting obligation. At the same
time, the user whose content has been deleted and against whom criminal proceedings have
been initiated shall be informed of the transmission of his published content and IP address
after a regular 14-day period.
In order for the rule of law to be able to react appropriately to the forms of hate crime to be
found in social media, the draft also provides for an extension of the criminal offences
catalogue of § 126 StGB (disturbance of public peace by threat of criminal offences) to the
effect that in future the threat of a dangerous physical injury may also be punishable. The
scope of application of § 140 StGB (reward and approval of criminal offences) is also to be
extended so that in future not only the approval of committed or attempted criminal offences
will be covered by the offence, but also the approval of criminal offences that have not yet
been committed.
In order to enable the prosecution authorities to react appropriately to particularly serious

cases of insult on the Internet, offensive statements which are made publicly, i.e. can be
perceived by an indefinite number of persons who are not connected through personal
relationships, and also offensive statements which are disseminated through writings
(Section 11 (3) StGB) are to be covered in future by a qualification situation in Section 185
StGB. It provides that the offence may not be punishable by a maximum term of
imprisonment of only one year as in the basic offence, but by a maximum term of two years.
§ 188 StGB (slander and defamation against persons of the political life) does not protect
persons, who are active under the national level, with its in the minimum measure increased
and in the maximum measure up to five years of imprisonment punishing threat of
punishment according to prevailing opinion. In order to be able to take into account the
increased injustice of a defamatory public statement about such persons as well, § 188 StGB
will make it clear in the future that this fact is applicable to all politicians up to the municipal
level, i.e. including this level, if the act is connected with the position of the person concerned
in public life and the act is likely to make his or her public activities considerably more difficult.
§ 241 StGB (threat) is extended to the effect that in future the threat of an unlawful act
against physical integrity or against an object of significant value will also be covered by the
offence. At the same time, the maximum penalty for the threat of a crime is increased from
one to two years imprisonment. In addition, a qualification offence, which provides for
imprisonment of up to three years as the maximum penalty, is to make it possible in future to
properly record the threat committed publicly or by the dissemination of writings (§ 11 (3)
StGB).
In addition, medical personnel in medical emergency services and in emergency admissions

will in future be protected under criminal law in the same way as helpers of the fire brigade,
disaster control or a rescue service. They are therefore included in the scope of protection of
§ 115 paragraph 3 StGB, which regulates the equality of this group of persons with
enforcement officers. The fact is that the actual area of deployment and the risk situation of
medical personnel in emergency medical services and in emergency rooms are comparable
with those of the group of persons previously protected by that provision.
In addition, the catalogue of grounds for assessment of punishment in § 46 (2) sentence 2

StGB is to be explicitly supplemented by "anti-Semitic" motives. This amendment serves to
clarify and affirm the legal situation already in force, according to which anti-Semitic motives
at any rate fall under the wording "otherwise inhuman" grounds and must therefore in
principle be taken into account more severely when sentencing (cf. Bundestag printed matter
18/3007, p. 15 f.; MK-Miebach/Maier, StGB, 3rd edition 2016, § 46 marginal 187;
Schönke/Schröder-Kinzig, StGB, 30th edition 2019, § 46 marginal 15b; Cremer/Cobbinah,
StV 2019, 648, 650 subsume these motifs under the characteristic "racist"). The explicit
inclusion of these motives in the legislative text is justified primarily for the following reasons:
On the one hand, it takes into account the special historical responsibility that Germany has
due to the crimes of the National Socialist rulers of violence and arbitrariness. This
responsibility follows - as the Federal Constitutional Court emphasises - from the injustice
and horror that National Socialist rule brought to Europe and the world to such an
immeasurable extent in the years 1933 to 1945, and from the emergence of the Federal
Republic of Germany and its constitutional order, understood as a counter-draft to this (see
BVerfG, Beschluss vom 4. November 2009, 1 BvR 2150/08, para. 52, 64 f, 68, 85, bei juris).
At the centre of this injustice is in particular the mass murder of the European Jews in its
monstrous and unprecedented dimension and form (see Bundestag document 18/11970, p.
29, 19/444, page 1). Against this historical background, it is appropriate that the legislator
explicitly expresses its responsibility in the fight against anti-Semitism and sends a clear
signal against anti-Semitism and anti-Jewish tendencies at the level of simple punishment.
On the other hand, the clarifying addition is justified in view of the current development of
anti-Semitic hate crime. According to the statistical data of the "Kriminalpolizei lichen
Meldedienstes Politisch motivierte Kriminalität" (KPMD-PMK) in the area of hate crime, the
number of anti-Semitic crimes has risen significantly by more than 40 percent since 2013 (cf.
the case numbers of the publication on PMK 2018 - Entwicklung der Hasskriminalität 2001 -
2018, page 5, 2018: 1,799; 2017: 1,504; 2016: 1,468; 2015: 1,366; 2014: 1,596, 2013:
1,275), which can be accessed via www.bmi.de. Since 2015, there has also been a
significant increase in the number of preliminary proceedings initiated by the public
prosecutor's offices for offences with an anti-Semitic background - even beyond the offences
of making statements pursuant to §§ 86, 86a, 130, 131 of the Criminal Code (total figures for
2017: 1st quarter of 2017).858; 2016: 2,482; 2015: 2,083; 2014: 773; 2013: 691; survey of
the state justice administrations on proceedings concerning right-wing extremist/xenophobic
crimes in the Federal Republic of Germany - 2013 to 2017, available at
www.bundesjustizamt.de). At the same time, the vast majority of hate crimes committed in
the past two years after the police surveys were committed were xenophobic (2018: 7,701;
2017: 6,434), racist (2018: 1,725; 2017: 1.300) and even anti-Semitic (2018: 1,799; 2017:
1,504) crimes (cf. the publication on PMK 2018 - Hate Crime; multiple responses were
possible for a precise description of the motives). These three types of motivations - which
also stand in the way of further expansion tendencies in § 46 StGB - have by far the greatest
practical significance within hate crime. It is therefore consistent to explicitly mention all three
types in § 46 Paragraph 2 Sentence 2 StGB.
Finally, the addition once again underlines in concrete terms for anti-Semitic acts that the
investigating authorities must extend their investigations at an early stage to those motives
that are significant for determining the legal consequences (see already Bundestag printed
matter 18/3007, pp. 1 f. and 7).
This addition does not change the recording and importance of other "inhuman" motives and
goals of the perpetrator. Rather, it remains the case that motives for the offence which, for
example, are directed against sexual orientation or identity, against a handicap or against
social status (e.g. in the case of homeless people) are also covered by § 46 paragraph 2
sentence 2 of the Criminal Code, as are motives of the perpetrator which are hostile to Islam,
Christianity, antiziga nism or other motives directed against the religious attitude or ethnic
affiliation of the victim (see BVerfGE 2, 2 (2)). Bundestagsdrucksache 18/3007, p. 15, as well
as the 2017 extended sub-themes in the area of hate crime of the police PMK surveys).
The Federal Council's draft bill of 29 November 2019 on the ... The Act Amending the Criminal
Code - Attribution of Penalties for Anti-Semitic Offences (Bundesdrucksache 498/19 -
Beschluss) also provides for the explicit inclusion of "anti-Semitic" motives in section 46,
paragraph 2, sentence 2 of the Criminal Code.
III. alternatives
An alternative would be to maintain the current legal situation, which was considered
inadequate.
An alternative regulatory proposal to the proposed amendments to §§ 188 and 241 of the
Criminal Code is contained in the draft of a new law adopted by the Federal Council on 29
November 2019 ... Act amending the Criminal Code - Improvement of the criminal-law
protection of persons standing in the political life of the people (Bundesratsdrucksache
418/19 (Beschluss)).
The draft law aims to clarify that, in principle, all persons who are active at European, federal
or state level or at the level of an administrative unit formed for a sub-area of a state or a
local authority are persons standing in the political life of the people within the meaning of §
188 StGB (German Penal Code). With regard to the threat of a crime (§ 241 StGB), the
legislative proposal provides for a more severe penalty for acts under § 241 StGB which are
directed against persons in the political life of the people within the meaning of the new § 188
(3) StGB-E to be inserted, insofar as the act is connected with the position of the threatened
person in public life and is likely to complicate the public activities of the threatened person.
The amendment to § 188 (1) StGB proposed in the present draft law clarifies that certain
statements against persons who are politically active up to the municipal level are also
covered by the offence and thus takes the concern of the draft law of the Bundesrat into
account in another way. The proposed amendment to § 241 StGB goes beyond the
legislative proposal pending in the Bundesrat to the extent that it also covers the threat of the
commission of certain offences and also provides for an increased threat of punishment for
acts committed publicly or by the dissemination of writings (§ 11 (3) StGB) without it being
important whether the threatened person is in the political life of the people. A further
intensification of punishment for this group of persons under the restrictive conditions of §
188 StGB does not appear appropriate.
IV. legislative competence
For the amendment of the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, the legislative
competence of the Confederation follows from Article 74 paragraph 1 number 1 of the Basic
Law (judicial procedure, criminal law).
The Federal Government's legislative competence for amending the Federal Criminal Police
Act (BKAG) is derived from Article 73(1)(10) of the Basic Law.
The Telemedia Act is based on Article 74(1)(11) of the Basic Law (Law of the Economy). The
changes made here in the permissible data processing are borne by the relevant Annex
competence. The federal regulation is necessary in order to avoid legal fragmentation, in
particular with regard to the averting of dangers and the investigative powers of the criminal
prosecution authorities.
With regard to the amendment of the Network Enforcement Act, the legislative competence of
the Federation is derived from Article 74(1)(11) of the Basic Law (law of the economy), Article
74(1)(7) of the Basic Law (public welfare), as far as concerns of the protection of minors are
concerned, and Article 74(1)(1) of the Basic Law (criminal law) with regard to the provisions
on fines (Article 3(4)) and with regard to strengthening criminal enforcement in the network.
The reporting requirements to be introduced are linked to the existing compliance regulations
of the
NetzDG. In addition, the reporting obligations to be introduced support the protection

objective pursued when the NetzDG was introduced, which is directed against the
brutalisation of the debate culture in social networks by enabling criminal prosecution, so that
Article 74 (1) (1) of the Basic Law is also relevant. The legislative competence of the Federal
Government in the field of improving law enforcement in social networks is given, since here
the creation of equivalent living conditions in the Federal territory and the preservation of
legal and economic unity in the interest of the state as a whole with a federal regulation is
necessary (Article 72 paragraph 2 of the Basic Law). Uniform federal legislation in the field of
law enforcement in social networks will prevent living conditions within the Federal Republic
of Germany from diverging as serious hate crimes and other serious criminal content may not
be effectively prosecuted in every country and, as a result, the peaceful coexistence of a free,
open and democratic society may be at risk in countries without consistent persecution. The
regulations can also only be made by the federal legislator because there would otherwise be
a risk of legal fragmentation which would be unacceptable both in the interests of the
Federation and the Länder. A nationwide uniform design of law enforcement in social
networks guarantees the application of uniform standards irrespective of the location of the
providers of social networks and thus counteracts internal migration and a mutual
undercutting of the Länder to attract providers of social networks.
V. Compatibility with European Union law and international law

contracts
The reporting obligations provided for in the draft are compatible with European law. This
applies in particular to Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic
commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic commerce') (OJ L 178, 17.7.2000,
p. 1). Article 15(2) of that Directive provides that Member States may impose reporting and
information obligations on information society service providers in respect of suspected illegal
activities or information. Here too, the country of origin principle of Article 3(2) of the Directive
applies in principle, according to which Member States may not restrict the free movement of
information society services from another Member State for reasons falling within the
coordinated field. Article 3(4)(a) of Directive 2000/31/EC provides that Member States may
take appropriate measures to protect public order, in particular to prevent, investigate,
investigate and prosecute criminal offences, including the protection of minors and the fight
against racial, racial, religious or national hatred and against violations of human rights,
against service providers from other Member States.
Article 15(2) of Directive 2000/31/EC (e-commerce Directive) explicitly allows Member States
to impose obligations on information society service providers 'to inform without delay the
competent authorities of suspected illegal activities or information provided by users of their
service'. Point 28 of the EU Commission Recommendation of 1 March 2018 on effective
measures to be taken in dealing with illegal online content (C(2018) 1177 final) encourages
Member States to introduce on this basis reporting obligations by hosting providers of serious
criminal offences relating to knowledge acquired through content removal.
Even outside Article 15(2) of Directive 2000/31/EC (E-Commerce Directive) in Section 4 on

the liability of intermediaries, there is scope for corresponding national rules.
Article 3(2) of the e-commerce Directive contains a general prohibition on Member States
from restricting the free movement of information society services from another Member
State for reasons falling within the so-called coordinated field. According to Article 2(h)(i),
second indent, of the e-commerce Directive, this includes, inter alia, the requirements to be
fulfilled by a service provider with regard to the exercise of the activity of an information
society service, such as requirements concerning the conduct of the service provider,
requirements concerning the quality or content of the service and requirements concerning
the liability of the service provider. The reporting obligations for providers of social networks
proposed in the draft are also likely to be covered by this.
However, Article 3(4)(a)(i) of the E-Commerce Directive provides for an exception to the
general prohibition. This allows measures to be taken which are necessary for the following
reasons: "Protection of public order, in particular the prevention, investigation, detection and
prosecution of criminal offences, including the protection of minors and the fight against
incitement to hatred on grounds of race, sex, religion or nationality, and violations of the
human dignity of individuals. In this respect, the draft provides for obligations to report
evidence of criminal offences to the Federal Criminal Police Office following a deletion
decision. The purpose of the transfer is precisely to investigate, investigate and prosecute
criminal offences. In addition, the forwarding serves to defend against recognisable dangers
to life and limb, e.g. those affected by threats of homicide on the Internet. This also includes
the protection of the foundations of the basic democratic order through effective prosecution
in precisely these cases. The obligation to report child pornography content serves to protect
copyright.
The draft also fulfils the other requirements for exemption from the regulatory prohibition.
Article 3(4)(a)(ii) and (iii) of the e-commerce Directive requires that the measures relate to a
specific information society service which is specifically prejudicial to the abovementioned
protection objectives or constitutes a serious and grave risk of prejudice to those objectives
and that the measures are proportionate to those protection objectives. The reporting
obligations of large social networks regulated in the draft concern special services of the
information society and serve the investigation, clarification and prosecution of criminal
offences as well as the defence against serious dangers.
There is no need in the present case for the procedural steps required by Article 3(4)(b), 1st
and 2nd indents, of the e-commerce Directive, namely the request of the Member State in
which the service provider is established and the request of the European Commission.
Article 3(4)(b)(1) of the first indent of the e-commerce Directive does not affect steps taken in
criminal investigations. In addition, Article 3(5) of the e-commerce Directive allows an
exemption from the procedural requirements in order to allow immediate action. Immediate
action is urgently required for the effective prosecution of hate crimes under criminal law, but
also for the prevention of documented evidence of impending assaults on the life and limb of
those affected. The urgency of perceptible and effective prosecution in criminal online
incitement has once again become clear through recent acts, in particular the murder of
Kassel District President Walter Lübcke and the attack in Halle, combined with the murder of
a woman and a man from Halle. The danger, which cannot be excluded, of the concrete
implementation of the acts of violence propagated on the Internet requires immediate action
by the Member States to defend the rule of law and human dignity on the social platforms on
the Internet as well. Immediate action is also required with regard to child pornography, as
countless child pornographic contents are exchanged or made available on a daily basis.
Here, too, effective criminal prosecution is necessary to dry up the market and thus
counteract the sexual abuse of children.
The particular urgency also follows from the fact that incitements to hatred and serious
threats committed online are currently only reported to the prosecution authorities in the very
few cases in which they occur. Social networks have no corresponding legal obligations,
even if they are made aware of criminal offences through a complaint about illegal content
and if the networks themselves come to the conclusion that criminal content exists. Effective
voluntary commitments to this end have not been developed. Furthermore, there are no
indications that the behaviour of the networks has changed as a result of the EU
Commission's Communication of 28 September 2017 on dealing with illegal online content
and the encouragement to report it there (COM(2017) 555 final, Section 3.1). In the "Code of
Conduct on countering illegal hate speech online" initiated by the EU Commission, there is no
self-obligation on the part of the networks to report illegal activities. Such a thing is not
foreseeable either. Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10
March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual or media
services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) (OJ L 95, 15.4.2010, p. 1, L 263, p. 15), as
amended by Directive (EU) 2018/1808, also does not contain any introduction of notification
obligations for the video sharing platform services covered by it vis-à-vis the competent
authorities.
The planned scheme is subject to notification under Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for
the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information
Society services (OJ L 241, 17 September 2015, p. 1).
VI. legal consequences
1. legal and administrative simplification
Aspects of legal and administrative simplification are not affected by the draft.
2. sustainability aspects
The draft is in line with the Federal Government's guiding principles for sustainable
development in the sense of the German Sustainability Strategy. With the extension of
criminal law protection against insults and threats committed in public, in a meeting or
through the dissemination of writings, the creation of a sanction possibility for the approval of
significant criminal offences committed in this way and the extension of criminal law
protection to special groups of persons active in the general interest, the principle 5 of the
principles of sustainable development of the German sustainability strategy: "Maintaining and
improving social cohesion in an open society" is taken into account. The draft also serves the
objective of promoting non-discriminatory participation in social and political life and thus
serves the objective 10.2 of the United Nations Goals for Sustainable Development "to
empower all people by 2030, regardless of age, gender, disability, race, ethnicity, origin,
religion or economic or other status, to self-determination and to promote their social,
economic and political inclusion".
3. budgetary expenditure excluding compliance

costs
Budget expenditures without fulfilment expenditure are not to be expected for federation,
countries and municipalities by the draft.
4. settlement expenses
a) Fulfilment burden for citizens

No one.
(b) Fulfilment costs for the economy

determined.
(c) administrative compliance costs
The draft leads to compliance costs for the federal

government.
The fulfilment expenditure incurred by the Federal Administration is also still determined with
regard to the extended functions of the BKA.
5. other costs
Additional costs in the core judicial area are to be expected to a small extent from the federal
states. Impacts on individual prices and the general price level, in particular on consumer
prices, are not to be expected.
6. further legal consequences
The regulations will have no impact on consumers. They are gender-neutral and affect
women and men in the same way. No demographic effects are to be expected either.
VII. time limit; evaluation
The draft is intended to counter the general brutalization of the social climate. A time limit on
the rules would contribute to this longer-term objective. An evaluation does not appear
necessary in view of the low follow-up costs of the regulations.
B. Special part
Article 1 (Amendment of the Penal Code)
To number 1
For the reasons stated in the general part of the justification under II., § 46 Paragraph 2
Sentence 2 StGB is amended to the effect that in addition to the "racist" and "xenophobic"
motives already mentioned, "anti-Semitic" motives are also expressly mentioned as examples
of the "inhuman" motives and aims of a perpetrator, which must be taken into account in
particular when sentencing.
The interpretation of the term "anti-Semitic" can be based on existing definitions and
definitions. In particular, the definition of the issue by the Independent Expert Group on Anti-
Semitism can serve as a starting point. According to this, anti-Semitism is defined as "a
collective term for all attitudes and behaviors that attribute negative characteristics to
individuals, groups or institutions perceived as Jews on the basis of this affiliation"
(Bundestagsdrucksache 18/11970, p. 24). Such a case exists in particular if the aversion to a
Jewish person results from their classification as a Jewish religious group.
The working definition used by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IRHA),
which was taken note of by the Bundeska- binett on 20 September 2017 and whose
consideration was recommended in school and adult education as well as in judicial and
executive training, can also be used as a guide (cf. Bundestag document 19/484, page 30). It
reads: "Anti-Semitism is a certain perception of Jews that can express itself as hatred
towards Jews. Anti-Semitism is directed in word and deed against Jewish or non-Jewish
individuals and / or their property, as well as against Jewish institutions and religious
institutions"(www.holocaustrememb- rance.com/de/node/196). In the explanatory notes to
this definition, in which some examples are given for illustration purposes, there is also a
more precise statement on anti-Semitic crimes. Unless offences as such are already defined
by law as anti-Semitic offences (e.g. in some countries the denial of the Holocaust or the
dissemination of anti-Semitic material), offences are anti-Semitic if "the targets, whether
persons or objects - such as buildings, schools, prayer rooms and cemeteries - are chosen
because they are Jewish, perceived as such or associated with Jews".
Thus, as with other motives of "hate and prejudice crime", the characteristic feature is group-
related misanthropy, in which the alleged otherness of a group of persons is abused as
justification for violating the human dignity of the victims (see Bundestag document 18/3007,
page 15, 18/11970, page 28 et seq.). The background to the act is not so much personal,
situation-related motives but rather the overarching motivation of the exclusion, suppression
and discrimination of an entire group or community as a result of aversion, prejudice or
"hatred" (see again Bundestagsdrucksache 18/11970, page 30, as well as
Bundesratsdrucksache 498/19 - Beschluss, page 8, there also for the insertion of the addition
to the recognised principles of sentencing).
To number 2
The current legal situation protects helpers of the fire brigade, disaster control or a rescue
service, who are active in accidents, common danger or distress, against violence or threat of
violence (§ 115 paragraph 3 sentence 1, § 113 StGB), as well as against physical attacks (§§
115 paragraph 3 sentence 2, § 114 StGB) in the same way as enforcement officers.
Assistance providers of a medical emergency service and in emergency rooms do not enjoy
this protection so far, although the actual area of deployment of the groups of persons and
the circumstances are basically comparable. Willingness to use violence occurs increasingly
in emergency situations where patients, often accompanied by family members and other
persons, meet medical staff and conflicting interests have to be reconciled in an emotionally
charged atmosphere. In such situations, medical staff are required to make quick decisions,
even in emergencies, in order to prevent damage to the life and limb of patients. There is a
general interest in the unhindered and trouble-free organisation and proper operation of
outpatient emergency treatment as well as in the effective combating of a danger situation
that exists outside a hospital or emergency practice. With the extension of the circle of
persons covered by § 115 paragraph 3 StGB around persons providing assistance in a
medical emergency service and in emergency rooms, the previous, unjustified unequal
treatment with respect to persons already providing assistance is eliminated.
To number 3
The list of criminal offences in § 126 StGB is to be extended to include the threat of a
dangerous physical injury in accordance with § 224 StGB. Such acts can, which is also
reflected in the increased scope of punishment of § 224 StGB, be of considerable nature in a
similar way to the already mentioned serious bodily injury (§ 226 StGB). Also the
The threat of such an act may - depending on the manner of the threat - be likely to
significantly impair the state of general legal security and peaceful coexistence in society, as
well as the feeling of security founded on the confidence of the population in the continuation
of this state.
To number 4
According to § 140 StGB, the rewarding and approval of certain criminal offences is
punishable by law if the offence to which the rewarding and approval relates has been
committed or attempted in a punishable manner. The aim of the provision is to protect the
general public from the creation of a mental climate in which new offences of this kind can
flourish (cf. Schönke/Schröder/Sternberg-Lieben, 30th ed. 2019, StGB § 140 marginal 1). If,
however, it is a criminal offence that has not yet been committed or attempted in a punishable
manner, § 140 StGB is not applicable under the previous legal situation. The cases of future
criminal offences are today at least partially covered by § 111 StGB, which makes the public
demand for criminal offences punishable, and by § 241 StGB, which covers the threat with a
crime. The actions, namely the reward and approval on the one hand and the threatening and
threatening on the other hand, are not congruent, however, so that unjustly created gaps in
punishability arise. This becomes clear with the phenomenon that can be observed
particularly in social media that users approve of the commission of a future illegal act without
the act being threatened sufficiently concretely. If, for example, the user of a social network
under a political contribution of a writer expresses in a commentary that the writer "needs to
make a head shorter", this is usually just as unpunished today as the consent of other users
to this idea. For even a threat within the meaning of § 241 StGB, which requires that the
perpetrator offers the prospect of committing a crime dependent on his will
(Schönke/Schröder/Sternberg-Lieben/Eisele, StGB, 30th ed. 2019, § 241 para. 4), is usually
not present in such cases. Nevertheless, such approving statements are also likely to
considerably shake the state of general legal certainty if they are made in public, in a meeting
or by the dissemination of writings.
The draft therefore provides that the act of approving offences should be separated from the
requirement that the offence must have been committed or attempted in a punishable
manner. This opens up the possibility that the approval of a catalogue offence referred to in §
140 StGB may also be covered by the offence if it is a future offence. The perpetrator of the
approval does not have to be aware of all the concrete circumstances of the approved
catalogue act. It is rather sufficient if the perpetrator outlines the catalogue deed in its
essential features without knowing the details of the catalogue deed and acts in the
awareness that by his behaviour he approves a catalogue deed of a principal perpetrator not
necessarily known to him. Approval can also be given by an approval of such an act, in
particular by an announcement of the consent of the person making the statement, by which
he morally stands behind the perpetrator.
For the act of rewarding, on the other hand, the requirement that the offence must have been
committed or attempted in a punishable manner is maintained, since according to customary
usage, rewarding can only take place for already committed acts and there is no apparent
necessity to extend the punishability in this respect.
The insertion of the word "or" is an editorial clarification.
To number 5
The use of social media on the Internet makes it possible to make and perceive statements
within a very short time to an indefinite number of people,
which are mostly only connected by the use of the same communication platform. It can be
observed that in the supposed anonymity of the Internet and without social control,
statements with offensive content are increasingly made about other users or persons in the
public eye. These statements can often be retrieved by a large group of people over a long
period of time due to the limited possibilities of deletion and therefore weigh particularly
heavily on those affected. At the same time, they provide a breeding ground for imitating or
aggressive statements that go beyond what is already available, which can directly reach a
broad public and often trigger a reaction that confirms the statement. At the same time, this
lowers the inhibition threshold of those who have so far held back with insulting remarks,
which has led to an increase in defamatory comments. Against this background, the
maximum sentence of one year imprisonment provided for so far in the evidence does not
always appear to be sufficient. The amendment of the maximum penalty is intended to allow
courts to respond adequately to particularly serious cases of insult. For this purpose, the
threat of punishment for offences committed publicly or through the dissemination of writings
(§ 11 Paragraph 3 StGB) is equated with insult by means of assault and increased to
imprisonment of up to two years or a fine.
This includes statements which are made publicly, i.e. which can be perceived by a larger
group of persons who are indefinite in number and individuality or cannot be connected by
closer relationships (cf. Schönke/Schröder-Ei- sele/Schittenhelm, StGB, 30th edition 2019, §
186 marginal 19). If a corresponding statement on read access is placed on the Internet, the
act is publicly committed if the statement can be easily retrieved by the user
(Schönke/Schröder-Eisele/Schittenhelm op. cit.). Statements disseminated by writings (§ 11
Paragraph 3 StGB) are also covered. This can also include statements made to a certain
group of persons in closed user groups, at least if the person making the statement cannot
control the further dissemination by these persons (cf. Fischer, StGB, 66th Edition 2019, §
184b Rn. 15; BGHSt 13, 257, 258 [on the restrictive interpretation of the concept of
dissemination in § 130 StGB in the case of disclosure to an individual see BVerfG NJW 2012,
1498]; on the characteristic of the public in closed user groups see also BGH, judgment of 18
January 2012, 2 StR 151/11, in the case of juris marginal 13 f.). For the completion of the
variant of distribution on the Internet it is sufficient that a file containing a corresponding
statement has arrived on the Internet user's computer, whether in the volatile memory or on a
permanent storage medium, it being irrelevant whether the user has used the possibility of
accessing the data or whether the provider has transmitted the data (cf. BGHSt 47, 55, 59, in
the case of juris nos. 31, 33).
The proposed amendment is based on Articles 186 and 187 of the Criminal Code, which
already provide for a more severe penalty for offences committed publicly and through the
dissemination of writings (Article 11 (3) of the Criminal Code), and follows the underlying
principle that a gradation of the wrongful content of these offences is also offered within the
scope of the penalty.
The planned modernisation and further development of the concept of writing (§ 11

Paragraph 3 StGB) into a concept of content, as a task relating to the entire Criminal Code
and secondary criminal law, should remain subject to a separate legislative procedure (cf.
draft bill of the Federal Ministry of Justice and for consumer protection for a ... Act Amending
the Criminal Code - Modernisation of the Concept of Writing and Other Terms and Extension
of Criminality under Sections 86, 86a, 111 and 130 of the Criminal Code for Acts Abroad,
sent to Countries and Associations on 4 September 2019).
To number 6
Politicians who are active in public life are in the focus of attention when it comes to political
differences. In the Internet and especially in social networks, they are particularly affected by
defamatory statements, which are often made with great aggressiveness in the supposed
anonymity of the Internet, due to the high spreading effect and the limited possibilities for
deletion, and are thus hampered in their public activities. This applies not only to persons
who are active at federal or state level, but also to persons who are active in the Länder at
regional or local level, e.g. in rural districts, towns, municipalities, local districts or districts. §
188 StGB protects persons who are in the political life of the people. The interpretation of the
facts of the case has been limited by the case-law to the effect that the scope of protection of
the provision only covers persons who in a leading position deal with fundamental matters of
state, legislation, administration, constitution or international relations and in this function
have a substantial influence on public political life (see Fi- scher, StGB, 66th edition 2019, §
188 marginal 2, Schönke/Schröder-Eisele/Schittenhelm, StGB, 30th edition 2019, § 188
marginal 2 m. w.). N.). Persons who, for example, are politically active at municipal level are
denied considerable political influence (Schönke/Schröder-Ei- sele/Schittenhelm op. cit.). At
most exceptionally, if certain events have a supra-local political meaning, because they are
discussed in the population of the entire federal territory or at least of the entire Land and
thus become a political matter of "the people", the scope of application of § 188 StGB can be
opened (cf. OLG Frankfurt, Beschluss vom 12.02.1981 - 2 Ss 606/80). This restrictive
interpretation of § 188 StGB is, however, not necessarily prescribed by the wording of the
provision. On the contrary, the political life of the people can also include activities up to the
municipal level - for example also on the level of the rural districts, the cities, municipalities
and districts as well as on the level of administrative units regulated by state law, such as the
districts in the state of Berlin. Here, too, important work is done for the democratic
community. In addition, persons who are politically active in parts of a Land or at local level
may also be affected by defamatory statements related to their position in public life in the
same way as persons active at Land or federal level, and their public activities may be
impaired. This applies in particular to statements which, due to their dissemination via the
Internet, have a high degree of dissemination. The previous protection of these persons by
the application of §§ 186, 187 StGB (slander, defamation) with a maximum prison sentence
of up to two years also does not do justice to the importance of the local political honorary
office. The improvement of criminal law protection should take into account the increased
injustice of certain defamatory statements about persons who are politically engaged up to
the local level.
To number 7
§ Section 194 (1) StGB stipulates that the insult will only be prosecuted on application. The
provision also places the prosecution of defamation (§ 186 StGB) and libel (§ 187 StGB)
under the condition of the criminal complaint filed by the entitled person and thus also applies
to the provision of § 188 StGB to be amended. Especially statements with defamatory
content against politically active persons that are made publicly, e.g. on the Internet, are not
limited to the personal circle of the person concerned, but unfold an external effect that is
capable of permanently disturbing the sense of justice of the population. They can also
ultimately lead to other politically active persons withdrawing from the public debate or
refraining from a commitment to the community. Such an act should therefore also be able to
be prosecuted if the criminal complaint of the entitled person is not present, but the
prosecution is in the special public interest. The entitled person should, however, have the
possibility to appeal against the prosecution of
This is ensured by the fact that the right of objection provided for in the previous section 194
(1) sentence 3 of the Criminal Code for another case constellation also applies in these
cases.
To number 8
§ 241 StGB (Bedrohung) protects individual legal peace by protecting the trust of the
individual in his security guaranteed by law against particularly serious threats, and thus
represents the counterpart to § 126 StGB, which serves public legal peace (cf.
Schönke/Schröder/Eisele, 30th ed. 2019, StGB § 241 Rn. 2 m. w. N.). The offence of threat
has so far been limited to the threat of a crime. However, it has been shown that even a
threat of committing a crime that is not a crime can have a sensitive effect on the addressee.
Particularly in the case of threats with simple force, the children of the addressee or valuable
objects (e.g. vehicles, real estate) can significantly disrupt individual legal peace. Therefore,
the future threat of an unlawful act against physical integrity or against an object of significant
value is to be covered by the offence if this act is directed against the addressee or a person
close to him. The offence should be punishable by imprisonment for up to one year or a fine.
The threat with a crime, which is to be regulated in the future in § 241 paragraph 2 StGB, is to
be further distinguished from this. The legal consequences are to be tightened in such a way
that imprisonment of up to two years or a fine can be imposed in future. This is intended to
respond to the increasing brutalization in interpersonal dealings. For cases in which the
offence is committed publicly in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 3 or through the
dissemination of writings (§ 11 paragraph 3 StGB), § 241 paragraph 4 StGB provides for a
qualification which results in an increase of the upper penalty limit by one year of
imprisonment in each case. This takes account of the fact that such threats, which are
publicly committed, for example, via the Internet, have a considerably greater range and are
considerably more difficult to remove.
With regard to the terms "public" and "distribution of writings (§ 11 Paragraph 3)", reference is
made to the above comments on No. 4.
Article 2 (Amendment of the Code of Criminal

Procedure)
To number 1
This is a consequential editorial change: The table of contents must be supplemented to

reflect the extension of § 100g StPO-E to usage data of telemedia services (cf. the
explanatory memorandum to No. 2).
To number 2
The explicit collection of usage data within the meaning of the Telemedia Act (TMG) in §
100g StPO-E is intended to create a standard-clear and legally secure basis for the collection
of metadata from telemedia service providers.
The importance of telemedia services has grown steadily in recent years. They include social
networks as well as platforms and chat services. It can be observed that telemedia services
are increasingly replacing traditional telecommunications services. This development is not
yet sufficiently reflected by the StPO. Up to now, the investigation measures of the Code of
Criminal Procedure aimed at the digital environment have primarily been aimed at
telecommunications in the classical sense and at the corresponding providers. In particular,
there is so far no specific legal basis for the collection of metadata for telemedia services. So
far, these data have been compiled on the basis of
§100g StPO in conjunction with § 96 of the Telecommunications Act, insofar as the telemedia
service also consisted of the transmission of signals. In a judgment of 13 June 2019 (C-
193/18 [Google LLC v Federal Republic of Germany]), the European Court of Justice ruled
that it is not sufficient for signals to be transmitted for them to be classified as a
telecommunications service. What is required is that the telemedia service consists
predominantly or exclusively of the transmission of signals. The European Court of Justice
does not consider this condition to be met for e-mail services. The same should apply to chat
services. Even in the case of services which functionally represent an equivalent to
telecommunications services, a request for information can therefore no longer be based on
§ 100g StPO in its current version.
To the extent that no telecommunications exist (e.g. when using platforms), traffic data can
only be collected on the basis of Section 160 (1) StPO in conjunction with Section 15 TMG.
The question arises, however, as to whether the general clause on my investigation regulates
the conditions and limits of data collection sufficiently clearly. According to the double-door
model of the Federal Constitutional Court, a distinction must be made between data
exchange between data transmission by the sharing body and data retrieval by the
requesting body. The two corresponding interventions each require their own legal basis.
This legal basis must clearly regulate the conditions for transmission and the conditions for
collection. With regard to the collection of data by the criminal prosecution authorities, it is
doubtful whether § 160 StPO satisfies the requirements defined by the Federal Constitutional
Court in its ruling on the Federal Criminal Police Office and the cooperation of the Federation
and the Länder in criminal policy matters (BKAG) (ruling of 20.4.2016 - 1 BvR 966/09, 1 BvR
1140/09). What is required here is, in particular, a limitation of the intervention to sufficiently
important legal interests, a standard-clear design and a procedure that guarantees sufficient
transparency and control.
The extension of § 100g StPO to usage data according to § 15 paragraph 1 of the

Telemediengesetz creates a clear and proportionate legal basis for the collection of metadata
from telemedia service providers. The term usage data is defined in § 15 paragraph 1 of the
Telemedia Act.
The scope of application is limited to providers who offer telemedia services on a commercial
basis. As far as non-profit or purely private offers are concerned, paragraph 5 stipulates that
data collection is governed by the general rules.
The extension of the scope of application of § 100g StPO has the effect in particular that both
the requirements of § 100g StPO and the procedure regulated in § 100g StPO are applied in
the collection of usage data.
To number 3
Just as with the extension of § 100g StPO-E, the extension of § 100j StPO-E is intended to
create a legally secure basis for the collection of inventory data from telemedia providers.
Also with regard to the collection of inventory data, only the provision of information by
telecommunications service providers has been explicitly excluded. The justification for the
amendment of § 100g StPO therefore applies mutatis mutandis to the amendment of § 100j
StPO.
To number 4
This is a consequential editorial change.

To number 5
This is a consequential editorial change.
To number 6
The amendment to § 374 Paragraph 1 No. 5 StPO-E continues the amendments to § 241
StGB provided for in this draft. Even under the previous legal situation, the threat was an
offence that could be prosecuted by means of a private action, which in principle should not
change. Only if it concerns a threat according to § 241 paragraph 4 StGB in the version of
this bill, therefore a threat committed publicly or by the spreading of writings (§ 11 paragraph
3), a referral on the way of the private complaint should not be possible. This is particularly
true in view of the fact that such a threat, which has been publicly disclosed, for example, via
the Internet, has a much greater reach and is considerably more difficult to remove.
Article 3 (Amendment of the Federal Criminal Police Act)
For the Federal Criminal Police Office, an explicit authority to query inventory data within the
framework of the central office task is now being created. The increasing use of telemedia
services and thus the growing importance of these service providers in the clarification of
facts for the prevention and prosecution of criminal offences with cross-border, international
or considerable significance must also be reflected in the corresponding data collection
standards of § 10 BKAG. So far, these regulations only provide for an authority to collect
inventory data from telecommunications providers. There was no explicit authority standard
for inventory data retrieval from telemedia service providers. This gap is now to be closed.
Regarding Article 4 (Amendment of the Telemedia

Act)
Re number 1 (amendment § 14 TMG)
Together with the new regulation on the collection of usage and inventory data from
telemedia service providers in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the information procedure on
inventory and usage data from public authorities is also to be newly regulated. The new
regulatory location is § 15a Telemediengesetz (TMG) for both existing and usage data. The
regulations previously contained in Section 14 of the German Telemedia Act (TMG)
concerning the disclosure of data to public authorities will therefore be deleted. § 14 TMG
therefore regulates in paragraphs 2 to 5 only the provision of information in connection with
copyright infringements and the assertion of certain civil law claims.
Re number 2 (insertion § 15a TMG)
Due to the increasing use and importance of telemedia services, the collection of inventory
and usage data from telemedia service providers is of central importance for both law
enforcement and danger prevention. Nevertheless, the information procedure in the
Telemedia Act has so far only been regulated rudimentarily. In particular, there are no
regulations on information based on IP addresses, on the retrieval of passwords, on the
confidentiality of information and on the form of information retrieval. The lack of procedural
rules makes it difficult to obtain information from telemedia service providers because the
precise scope of their obligations is not sufficiently clear.
The new § 15a TMG therefore regulates the information procedure for telemedia service
providers anew. The regulation is based on § 113 TKG. Paragraph 1 makes it clear, first of
all, that the information is provided on the basis of an obligation and only vis-à-vis the parties
referred to in paragraph 3.
may be issued to the bodies referred to above. The regulation is expressly also extended to
passwords and thus reflects the regulation in § 100g paragraph 1 sentence 2 StPO. In
addition, the provision of information is regulated on the basis of IP address, which forms the
counterpart to § 100j paragraph 2 StPO.
Paragraph 2 provides that requests for information shall be made in text form. This ensures,
inter alia, that the legality of the request for information can be verified.
Paragraph 3 lays down rules concerning the competent authorities. Only authorities covered
by this regulation may collect data from telemedia service providers. This clear regulation
creates legal certainty for the parties involved.
The obligation of telemedia service providers to maintain silence regarding requests for
information is also expressly regulated. This does not mean that the person concerned or
third parties will not be informed. However, the information is based on the regulations of the
StPO and is provided by the authorities.
Paragraph 5 makes it clear that the costs are to be borne in accordance with the general
rules and by the service providers. An electronic interface will also be set up to ensure data
security.
On Article 5 (Amendment of the Network Enforcement Act)

Regarding No. 1 (amendment of § 1 NetzDG)
Regarding letter a
The newly worded heading makes it clear that § 1 now also contains a provision for the term
"complaint about unlawful contents" in addition to the definition of the scope of application in
paragraphs 1 to 3 in paragraph 4.
Regarding letter b
The addition to the exception in § 1 (2) makes it clear that the proposed obligation to register
applies to providers of social networks with at least two million registered users in Germany.
Since the reporting obligation is linked to the already established severity and deletion
procedures, which also only apply to providers of large social networks, the extension of the
exception rule is an expression of the linking of the reporting obligations to the existing
compliance regulations.
Regarding letter c
The NetzDG uses the term "complaint about illegal content" in various places (e.g. § 2
paragraph 2 numbers 2 and 3, § 3 paragraph 1 sentence 1). The new reporting obligation of
social network providers to the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) to be created in § 3a is
also to be linked to the complaint about illegal content. While the concept of unlawful content
is defined in § 1 paragraph 3, there is no explicit definition of the concept of complaint about
unlawful content.
(Such a definition is introduced now by § 1 paragraph 4, which clarifies the already today
valid legal condition again. Already today, the term is to be understood broadly and a
complaint with which the necessary deletion or blocking of a content is asserted is to be
understood in case of doubt as a complaint about illegal content (NetzDG complaint) and
must lead to an examination according to the standards of the NetzDG. Providers of social
networks cannot therefore restrict the scope of application of the Act by identifying only
certain, relatively hidden and complicated reporting channels as "NetzDG reporting channels"
and only the
complaints received there as "NetzDG complaints" and examine only this selected number of
complaints according to the standards of the NetzDG.
On the basis of the intended definition in § 1 Paragraph 4, it first emerges that a complaint
about illegal content is in any case any complaint that reaches the provider of the social
network via the mediation procedure set up specifically for this purpose (§ 3 Paragraph 1
Sentence 2). If a complaint is submitted about this procedure, it is intended to make it clear to
the complainant that there is unlawful content.
It should also be noted that complaints about illegal content that must be dealt with in
accordance with the provisions of the NetzDG (e.g. inclusion in the transparency reports
pursuant to § 2, review obligations pursuant to § 3 (2) (1)) are not necessarily limited to
reports that reach the provider via this procedure or reporting channel, i.e. also via the so-
called social network flagging channels. There is nothing to the contrary in section 3(1)
sentence 2 of the NetzDG. The provision ensures that the provider must provide a user-
friendly procedure at all in order to reach complaints about illegal content. It does not follow
from this that statements reaching him through other communication channels cannot be
such complaints.
Nor can the existence of a complaint about unlawful content depend on whether a complaint
actually and accurately reports a content for which the requirements pursuant to Section 1 (3)
NetzDG are objectively met or whether the complainant has reliable knowledge of this. The
law is based precisely on the assumption that only an examination of complaints about
unlawful content (§ 3 Paragraph 2 Number 1) can lead to a corresponding determination as
to whether a reported content is actually unlawful or not (cf. § 3 Paragraph 2 Number 1:
"whether the reported content [...] is unlawful and to be removed [...]").
Whether a complaint by the complainant constitutes a complaint about unlawful content thus
depends primarily on how this declaration is to be understood in the light of objective
considerations. In the literal sense ("complaints about [...] content") and taking into account
the purpose of the NetzDG, communications to social networks are already today "complaints
about illegal content", i.e. NetzDG complaints, if it becomes clear from these that, from the
point of view of the person reporting, a certain content distributed on the network must be
removed or access to it blocked.
Mit der Definition in § 1 Absatz 4 ist zugleich klargestellt, dass sich die Beschwerde über
rechtswidrige Inhalte auf einen konkreten Inhalt bezieht, d.h. inhaltsbezogen zu verstehen ist.
Aus diesem Grund kann eine äußerlich einheitliche Mitteilung bzw. ein äußerlich ein-
heitlicher Übermittlungsvorgang (z.B. E-Mail, ausgefülltes Formular) der Übermittlung meh-
rerer Beschwerden über rechtswidrige Inhalte im Sinne des NetzDG dienen.
Mit Blick auf die neu zu schaffende Meldepflicht nach § 3a wird durch die Begriffsdefinition
der „Beschwerde über rechtswidrige Inhalte“ sichergestellt, dass in den Fällen, in denen ein
Nutzer eine Beschwerde im Sinne des NetzDG absetzt, sich bei Löschung durch das sozi-
ale Netzwerk in jedem Fall die Prüfung der Meldepflicht anschließt. Der Maßstab, nach dem
die Löschung erfolgt – Community-Standards oder NetzDG-Katalog – ist für die sich an-
schließende Prüfung der Meldepflicht unerheblich.
Zu Nummer 2 (Änderung des § 3 NetzDG)
Die in § 3a zu schaffende Meldepflicht erstreckt sich auf die Straftatbestände, die in beson-
derer Weise den offenen Diskurs und die freie und bedrohungslose Auseinandersetzung zum
Ziel haben. Erfasst sind daher nicht die Straftatbestände der absoluten Antragsdelikte des §
1 Absatz 3 der Beleidigung (§ 185 StGB), der Verleumdung (§ 186 StGB), der üblen
- 32 - Bearbeitungsstand: 12.12.2019 15:28 Uhr
Nachrede (§ 187 StGB), bei denen das Gesetz ein Ersetzen des Strafantrags durch die
Annahme eines besonderen öffentlichen Interesses an der Strafverfolgung (Antragssurro-
gat) nicht vorsieht und des relativen Antragsdelikts der Verletzung des höchstpersönlichen
Lebensbereichs durch Bildaufnahmen (§ 201a StGB). Diese sind zwar im Katalog des § 1
Absatz 3 enthalten, jedoch im Regelfall als Antragsdelikte ausgestaltet, so dass es grund-
sätzlich dem Betroffenen obliegen soll zu entscheiden, ob eine Strafverfolgung stattfinden
soll oder nicht. Dadurch, dass die Meldepflicht nicht auf diese Straftatbestände erstreckt wird,
wird gewährleistet, dass die grundsätzliche Entscheidungshoheit des Betroffenen, ob die Tat
strafrechtliche Schritte nach sich ziehen soll, nicht durch die Einführung einer Mel- depflicht
unterlaufen wird.
In Fällen eines solchen Antragsdelikts sollen die Anbieter sozialer Netzwerke aber nach § 3
Absatz 2 Nummer 5 NetzDG-E die Pflicht haben, auf die Möglichkeiten der Strafanzeige (§
158 StPO) und gegebenenfalls eines erforderlichen Strafantrags (§ 77 ff. StGB) aus-
drücklich hinzuweisen. Dieser Hinweis soll gleichzeitig mit der Mitteilung des Anbieters des
sozialen Netzwerks über die Entscheidung erfolgen, einen beanstandeten Inhalt zu löschen
oder nicht zu löschen. Mit dem Hinweis über die Möglichkeiten zur Strafanzeige und erfor-
derlichenfalls zum Strafantrag soll den Betroffenen auch Hilfestellung bei der von frei zu
treffenden Entscheidung, ob durch den Strafantrag ein Ermittlungsverfahren eingeleitet wird,
gegeben werden. Die Informationspflicht knüpft an jegliche Form der Entscheidung des
sozialen Netzwerks an; sie besteht sowohl bei der Entscheidung zur Löschung als auch bei
der Entscheidung, nicht zu löschen. Im Fall, dass das soziale Netzwerk den gemeldeten
Inhalt nicht als strafbar ansieht und deshalb von einer Löschung absieht, dienen die Infor-
mationen auch dazu, dass der Nutzer, der den Inhalt gemeldet hat, seinerseits die Ermitt-
lungsbehörden informieren kann. Hierdurch ist gewährleistet, dass die Löschpraxis der so-
zialen Netzwerke keinen Einfluss auf die sich anschließende strafrechtliche Verfolgung hat.
Zu Nummer 3 (Einführung des § 3a NetzDG)
Zu Absatz 1
Die sozialen Netzwerke werden verpflichtet, ein Verfahren zur Sicherstellung der Erfüllung
von Meldepflichten einzurichten, die in Absatz 2 näher beschrieben werden. Die Verpflich-
tung knüpft an die bestehenden Compliance-Pflichten an und ergänzt diese, damit schwer-
wiegende strafbare Inhalte nicht mehr lediglich gelöscht werden, sondern deren Verfasser
strafrechtliche Verantwortung für die Inhalte übernehmen müssen. Die Einführung eines
Verfahrens zur Erfüllung der Meldepflicht im Einzelfall bildet auch die Grundlage für den neu
einzuführenden Ordnungswidrigkeiten-Tatbestand in § 4 Nummer 6a. Hierdurch wird zum
einen eine systemkonforme Ergänzung der bußgeldbewehrten Compliance-Pflichten erreicht
und zum anderen steht diese Sanktion auch im Einklang mit der sonstigen Rechts- ordnung.
Diese kennt eine strafbewehrte Pflicht zur Anzeige einer Straftat bislang gemäß § 138 StGB
in nur eng umgrenzten Ausnahmefällen. Die Meldepflicht aus diesem Gesetz erfasst eine
größere Anzahl von Fällen und Straftaten als der Katalog des § 138 StGB, so dass eine
Sanktion bei Verstoß gegen eine Meldung im Einzelfall als unangemessen erscheint. Bei
einem organisatorischen Versagen eines sozialen Netzwerkes ist ein Ord-
nungswidrigkeitsverfahren hingegen angemessen und erforderlich, um die Durchsetzung des
Strafrechts auch im Netz zu ermöglichen.
Zu Absatz 2 einleitender Satzteil
Die Meldung des Inhalts und der IP-Adresse dient der Ermöglichung der Strafverfolgung
durch die zuständigen Ermittlungs- und Justizbehörden der Länder. Die Übermittlung erfolgt
dafür zunächst an eine neu einzurichtende Zentralstelle beim BKA. Die Reichweite eines
Inhaltes im Internet ist nicht auf ein Bundesland oder das Gebiet der Bundesrepublik be-
schränkt. Zudem kann der strafbare Inhalt von jedem Ort abgesetzt werden, wodurch der
Tatort überall innerhalb oder außerhalb Deutschlands liegen kann. Eine Zuständigkeit einer
Strafverfolgungsbehörde – etwa am Wohnort des Verdächtigen – kann daher erst nach

weiteren Prüfungen bestimmt werden.
Zu Absatz 2 Nummer 1 und 2
Die Meldepflicht stellt für die Anbieter sozialer Netzwerke einen Eingriff in deren Recht auf
Berufsausübung nach Artikel 12 Absatz 1 des Grundgesetzes dar. Der Eingriff muss dabei
klar ausgestaltet werden. Hierzu wird die Meldepflicht an das bereits von den Betreibern
sozialer Netzwerke eingerichtete Beschwerdemanagement angeknüpft, wodurch die beste-
henden Strukturen genutzt werden können. Das für das Beschwerdemanagement einge-
setzte Personal ist nach den bereits bestehenden Compliance-Pflichten für die strafrechtli-
che Einschätzung eines Inhalts zuständig. Kommt der Anbieter nach der ihm obliegenden
Prüfung zu dem Schluss, dass ein Inhalt zu löschen ist, schließt sich nunmehr noch die
Prüfung an, ob die in diesem Gesetz benannten Straftatbestände, die die Meldepflicht aus-
lösen, erfüllt sind. Diese ergänzende Prüfung erweitert die Pflichten der sozialen Netzwerke
in vertretbarem Umfang und sichert gleichzeitig, dass schwerwiegende strafrechtliche In-
halte den Strafverfolgungsbehörden nicht entgehen und die Verfasser dadurch unberech-
tigterweise ihrer strafrechtlichen Verantwortung entkommen.
Zudem dient die Einschränkung auf gemeldete und gelöschte strafbare Inhalte dem Schutz
des Rechts auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung der Nutzer. Es werden nur die Inhalte an
die Zentralstelle beim BKA weitergegeben, die von einem Nutzer gemeldet wurden und
zudem vom Anbieter des sozialen Netzwerks als strafbar erkannt wurden. Es steht nicht zu
erwarten, dass die Anbieter zu viele Inhalte als strafbar melden. Die bei Einführung des
NetzDG geäußerte Befürchtung, dass es zu einem die Meinungsfreiheit verletzenden Over-
blocking komme, hat sich nach bisherigem Erkenntnisstand nicht bestätigt. Trotz hoher Mel-
dezahlen wird mit 28 % (Mittelwert) nur ein geringer Teil der gemeldeten Inhalte gelöscht, so
dass auch bei der Einführung einer Meldepflicht davon auszugehen ist, dass die Anbieter
ihrer Prüfpflicht gerecht werden und keine Inhalte weitergeben, die nicht strafbar sind oder
nicht unter den Katalog der meldepflichtigen Straftaten fallen
Zu Absatz 2 Nummer 3 einleitender Satzteil
Die Einführung einer Meldepflicht schränkt die Berufsausübungsfreiheit der Anbieter sozia-
len Netzwerke ein. Gleichzeitig stellt sie einen Eingriff in das Grundrecht der Inhalteverfas-
ser auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung dar. Diese Grundrechtseingriffe sind nur dann
gerechtfertigt, wenn der weitergeleitete Inhalt konkrete belastbare Anhaltspunkte dafür bie-
tet, dass der Tatbestand einer Katalogstraftat vorliegt. Eine Meldepflicht darf daher nicht
schon bei der reinen Möglichkeit der Tatbestandsverwirklichung ausgelöst werden, sondern
bedarf objektiver, nachprüfbarer und erkennbarer Indizien, die für jedermann die Verwirkli-
chung eines Katalogstraftatbestandes nahelegen. Eine Beschränkung der Meldepflicht auf
Fälle eines dringenden Tatverdachts hingegen würde für die Meldepflicht eine strenge ju-
ristische Bewertung im Einzelfall erfordern, die nicht den Anbietern sozialer Netzwerke,
sondern den Ermittlungs- und Strafverfolgungsbehörden obliegt. Die Anknüpfung der Mel-
depflicht an konkrete Anhaltspunkte schützt einerseits die betroffenen Grundrechte und ist
andererseits für die der Meldepflicht unterliegenden Anbieter sozialer Netzwerke auch um-
setzbar.
Voraussetzung für den Begriff der konkreten Anhaltspunkte sind objektive, nachprüfbare und
für jedermann erkennbare Indizien, die sich aus dem hochgeladenen Inhalt selbst oder den
weiteren erkennbaren Umständen ergeben. Weitergehende Ermittlungen zur Klärung von
Tatbestandsmerkmalen können den sozialen Plattformen nicht auferlegt werden.
Zu Absatz 2 Nummer 3 Buchstabe a und c
Die Einrichtung der Meldepflicht für soziale Netzwerke stellt einen Eingriff in die Berufsaus-
übungsfreiheit ihrer Anbieter und ebenso einen Eingriff in das Grundrecht auf informatio-
nelle Selbstbestimmung ihrer Nutzer dar. Beide Grundrechtseingriffe können im Rahmen der
Verhältnismäßigkeit nur zu Gunsten von Verfassungs- oder Rechtsgütern mindestens
gleichen Gewichts eingeschränkt werden. Ein solches Rechtsgut stellt die Verfolgung von
Straftaten dar. Dies gilt insbesondere für Straftaten, durch die eine unmittelbare oder mit-
telbare Gefährdung der demokratischen Grundordnung oder der öffentlichen Ordnung her-
vorgerufen wird.
Eine Erstreckung der Meldepflicht auf alle Fälle der gemeldeten und gelöschten Inhalte
erscheint aus Gründen der Verhältnismäßigkeit nicht geboten, zumal das System der An-
tragsdelikte – im NetzDG betrifft dies die §§ 185 bis 187, 201a StGB (Beleidigung, Verleum-
dung, üble Nachrede und Verletzung des höchstpersönlichen Lebensbereichs durch Bild-
aufnahmen) – zu berücksichtigen ist, wonach es grundsätzlich dem Geschädigten selbst
überlassen bleibt, die Voraussetzungen für die strafrechtliche Verfolgung zu schaffen oder
dies bewusst zu unterlassen. Dies gilt nicht nur bei absoluten, sondern auch bei relativen
Antragsdelikten wie § 201a StGB. Denn auch hier ist es in erster Linie dem Geschädigten
überlassen, die Voraussetzungen für die strafrechtliche Verfolgung zu schaffen. Nur wenn ein
besonderes öffentliches Interesse an der Strafverfolgung vorliegt, kann die Strafverfol-
gungsbehörde ein Einschreiten von Amts wegen für geboten halten (§ 205 Absatz 1 Satz 2
StGB).
Als Straftaten aus dem Katalog des § 1 Absatz 3 NetzDG, die eine Meldepflicht rechtferti-
gen, sind solche einzustufen, die eine gefährliche Wirkung auf das demokratische System
und die öffentliche Ordnung haben können. Diese Wirkung ist insbesondere im Hinblick auf
die große öffentliche Reichweite von sozialen Medien und deren Folgen für den demokra-
tischen und offenen Diskurs zu bewerten.
Der öffentliche Meinungsaustausch wird durch strafbare Inhalte in Form von beispielsweise
Volksverhetzung und Drohungen mit einem Tötungsdelikt oder solchen Aussagen gestört, die
entweder aufgrund ihres Inhalts, aufgrund ihrer Intensität und Grausamkeit oder aufgrund
ihrer möglichen Auswirkungen auf die Öffentlichkeit einen schädlichen Einfluss auf die
politische und öffentliche Diskussion in den sozialen Medien entfalten. Diese strafbaren
Inhalte vergiften die Gesprächskultur und verbreiten ein Klima der Angst und Einschüchte-
rung. Die Verfasser solcher strafbaren Inhalte verfolgen meist die Absicht, einen einschüch-
ternden Eindruck sowohl beim Adressaten zu hinterlassen als auch einen solchen in der
Öffentlichkeit zu erregen. Durch diesen beabsichtigten Zweck entsteht die Gefahr, dass der
Betroffene oder ein Dritter, der die öffentlich getätigte Aussage zufällig wahrnimmt, sich
davon abhalten lässt, am demokratischen Diskurs in den sozialen Medien weiter teilzuneh-
men.
Der Verfasser des strafbaren Inhalts zielt dabei nur auf den ersten Blick auf einen konkreten
Adressaten ab. Es geht vielmehr um die Nutzung des öffentlichen Raums zur Verhinderung
von Diskussionen, etwa durch massive Einschüchterungen. Diese Zielrichtung des Angriffs
auf den demokratischen, offenen und öffentlichen Diskurs rechtfertigt es, dass der Staat
unabhängig vom Tätigwerden des Betroffenen gegen den Täter strafrechtlich vorgeht.
Zu den Katalogtaten des § 1 Absatz 3 NetzDG zählen auch Taten, die verfassungswidrige
Organisationen, kriminelle oder terroristische Vereinigungen unterstützen und damit die de-
mokratische Grundordnung gefährden. Es handelt sich um § 86 StGB (Verbreiten von Pro-
pagandamitteln verfassungswidriger Organisationen), § 86a StGB (Verwenden von Kenn-
zeichen verfassungswidriger Organisationen), § 129 StGB (Bildung krimineller Vereinigun-
gen), §§ 129a und 129b StGB (Bildung terroristischer Vereinigungen). Zudem sind zu den in
den Katalog aufzunehmenden Straftaten solche zu zählen, die die Darstellung oder den
Aufruf zu schwersten Gewalttaten beinhalten), da deren öffentliche Darstellung eine Hemm-

schwelle herabsetzt und dadurch mittelbar deren Umsetzung in die Realität befürchten lässt.
Es handelt sich um § 89a StGB (Vorbereitung einer schweren staatsgefährdenden
Gewalttat), § 91 StGB (Anleitung zur Begehung einer schweren staatsgefährdenden Ge-
walttat), § 126 StGB (Störung des öffentlichen Friedens durch Androhung von Straftaten), §
140 StGB (Belohnung und Billigung von Straftaten) und § 241 StGB (Bedrohung) in Form des
speziellen Falls der Drohung mit einem Tötungsdelikt. Schließlich sind Delikte, die sich gegen
die demokratische Grundordnung und die öffentliche Ordnung richten, d. h. § 130 StGB
(Volksverhetzung) und § 131 StGB (Gewaltdarstellung), in den Katalog aufzunehmen
Manche Straftatbestände des § 1 Absatz 3 NetzDG werden von der Meldepflicht unter An-
legung des genannten Maßstabs nicht erfasst. Das betrifft die landesverräterische Fäl-
schung (§ 100a StGB), weil hier das Schutzgut nicht der öffentliche demokratische Diskurs
ist, sondern die äußere Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und ihre außenpoliti-
sche Handlungsfähigkeit. Dies gilt auch für den Tatbestand der öffentlichen Aufforderung zu
Straftaten gemäß § 111 StGB, weil dieser Straftatbestand auch bei sehr niederschwelli- gen
Straftaten wie etwa dem Erschleichen von Leistungen eingreift. Die Beleidigung von
Religionsgemeinschaften und Weltanschauungsvereinigungen nach § 165 StGB ist von der
Meldepflicht ebenfalls ausgenommen, weil dieser Tatbestand nicht in allen Fällen eine In-
tensität erreichen muss, die zu einer Gefährdung des demokratischen Diskurses führt. Bei
schwerwiegenden Fällen des § 111 StGB oder des § 165 StGB dürfen aber auch der Tat-
bestand der Störung des öffentlichen Friedens durch Androhung von Straftaten nach § 126,
der Bedrohung nach § 241 StGB mit einem Tötungsdelikt oder der Volksverhetzung nach §
130 Absatz 1 Nummer 2 StGB erfüllt sein, die der Meldepflicht unterliegt.
Der Bedrohungstatbestand des § 241 StGB erfasst neben der Drohung mit Tötungsdelikten,
die in den Katalog der Meldepflichten aufgenommen sind, auch die Bedrohung mit anderen
Verbrechen, z. B. einem Raub. Der Tatbestand betrifft das Schutzgut des individuellen
Rechtsfriedens und sollte daher mit Ausnahme der Fälle der Morddrohung keine Melde-
pflicht auslösen. Zudem unterfallen die schwerwiegenden Fälle der Bedrohung in Tele-
medien auch regelmäßig dem Tatbestand des § 126 StGB. Die Fälschung beweiserhebli-
cher Daten gemäß § 269 StGB sollte nicht von der Meldepflicht erfasst werden, da hierdurch
die Sicherheit und Zuverlässigkeit des Rechts- und Beweisverkehrs geschützt werden soll
und nicht der demokratische Diskurs.
Zu Absatz 2 Nummer 3 Buchstabe b
Durch die Zugänglichmachung kinderpornografischer Inhalte mittels Telemedien im Sinne

des § 184b in Verbindung mit § 184d StGB wird der Markt für diese Inhalte befeuert, denn die
Nachfrage nach den Inhalten weckt ein entsprechendes Angebot. Damit besteht die Gefahr,
dass Kinder zur Herstellung entsprechender Inhalte missbraucht werden. Außer- dem
besteht die Gefahr, dass kinderpornographische Inhalte Dritte zur Nachahmung in der realen
Welt anregen. Zum Schutz der Kinder vor sexuellem Missbrauch ist es berechtigt, auch die
Zugänglichmachung kinderpornographischer Inhalte in die Meldepflicht einzube- ziehen.
Das Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) erhält schon heute Hinweise auf kinderpornografische In-
halte im Netz. 96 Prozent aller Informationen aus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu inkri-
minierten Webadressen erhielt das BKA im Jahr 2018 von den inländischen Beschwerde-
stellen (jugendschutz.net, Hotline des eco-Verbandes der Internetwirtschaft e. V. (eco) und
Hotline der Freiwilligen Selbstkontrolle Multimedia-Diensteanbieter e. V. (FSM)). Insgesamt
5.951 Hinweise auf kinderpornografische Inhalte wurden im Jahr 2018 beim BKA und den
Beschwerdestellen erfasst (s. Bericht der Bundesregierung über die im Jahr 2018 ergriffe-
nen Maßnahmen zum Zweck der Löschung von Telemedienangeboten mit kinderpornogra-
fischem Inhalt im Sinne des § 184b des Strafgesetzbuchs, S. 9 und 16). Es ist davon aus-
zugehen, dass bei den sozialen Netzwerken, die nach § 3 NetzDG zu einem Beschwerde-
management verpflichtet sind, ein Vielfaches an Beschwerden über kinderpornografische
Inhalte eingehen. Allein die Transparenzberichte von YouTube und Twitter weisen bereits für
das erste Halbjahr 2019 zusammen knapp 50.000 Beschwerden über kinderpornografische
Inhalte aus, von denen rund 13.000 Inhalte entfernt oder gesperrt wurden. Um eine
konsequente Strafverfolgung zu ermöglichen, soll das BKA von den kinderpornografischen
Inhalten, die von den sozialen Netzwerken aufgrund einer Beschwerde gelöscht oder ge-
sperrt wurden, Kenntnis erhalten. Dies wird durch eine entsprechende Meldepflicht der so-
zialen Netzwerke erreicht.
Zu Absatz 2 Nummer 3 letzter Satzteil
Die Einschränkung auf nicht gerechtfertigte Taten entspricht der Vorgabe in § 1 Absatz 3
NetzDG.
Zu Absatz 3
Absatz 3 definiert den Zeitpunkt, wann die Meldung des sozialen Netzwerks an das BKA
erfolgen muss. Die Meldepflicht knüpft an die Pflicht des Anbieters eines sozialen Netz-
werks an, den beanstandeten Inhalt innerhalb der in § 3 Absatz 2 Nummer 2 und 3 genann-
ten Fristen zu entfernen oder den Zugang zu ihm zu sperren. Diese Fristen betragen für
offensichtlich rechtswidrige Inhalte 24 Stunden, für sonstige rechtswidrige Inhalte in der
Regel sieben Tage jeweils nach Eingang der Beschwerde. Hat der Anbieter den Inhalt ent-
fernt oder den Zugang zu ihm gesperrt, schließt sich die Prüfung an, ob gerade einer der in
Absatz 1 Nummer 3 genannten Straftatbestände erfüllt ist. Diese Prüfung und die Meldung
an das BKA müssen unverzüglich, d. h. ohne schuldhaftes Zögern, erfolgen.
Zu Absatz 4
Die Erstreckung der Meldepflicht auf die beim Upload verwendeten IP-Adresse und die ge-
nutzte Portnummer ist erforderlich, da die Meldung eines Inhalts allein eine effektive Straf-
verfolgung in der Regel nicht sicherstellt. In manchen Fällen mag bereits aus dem benutzten
User-Namen und dem übermittelten Inhalt eine Identifizierung des Urhebers möglich sein,
doch agieren viele Nutzer sozialer Plattformen nicht unter ihrem Klarnamen oder unter
Pseudonymen. Zudem bietet die Nutzung eines User-Namens durch eine Person keinen
hinreichenden Beweis für die Tatsache, dass die benannte Person auch Urheber des straf-
baren Inhalts ist. Zudem weisen zahlreiche Personen eine identische Kombination aus Vor-
und Nachnamen auf.
Zu Absatz 5
Die Meldung hat auf elektronischem Wege zu erfolgen über eine von der Zentralstelle des
BKA einzurichtende und dort zu definierende Schnittstelle.
Die weitergehende Umsetzung der Meldepflichten durch die Anbieter eines sozialen Netz-
werks bleibt deren Organisationshoheit überlassen.
Zu Absatz 6
Die Anbieter sozialer Netzwerke unterliegen grundsätzlich den datenschutzrechtlichen In-

formationsverpflichtungen nach Artikel 13 der Verordnung (EU) 2016/679 des Europäi- schen
Parlaments und des Rates vom 27. April 2016 zum Schutz natürlicher Personen bei der
Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten, zum freien Datenverkehr und zur Aufhebung der
Richtlinie 95/46/EG (Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, ABl. L 119 vom 4. Mai2016, S. 1, L 314
S. 72, L 127 vom 23. Mai 2018, S. 2). Hieran knüpfen die Rechte des Betroffenen zum
Widerspruch nach Artikel 21 der Verordnung (EU) 2016/679, das Recht auf Auskunft nach
Artikel 15 der Verordnung (EU) 2016/679 und das Recht auf Berichtigung, Löschung und
Einschränkung der Verarbeitung nach den Artikeln 16 bis 18 der Verordnung (EU) 2016/679
an.
Nach Maßgabe des Artikel 23 Absatz 1 Buchstabe d) der Verordnung (EU) 2016/679 kön-
nen diese Informationspflichten zur Verhütung, Ermittlung, Aufdeckung oder Verfolgung von
Straftaten eingeschränkt werden. Eine solche Einschränkung ist erforderlich, wenn aus Sicht
der zuständigen Behörden die konkrete Gefahren besteht, dass ein Täter durch die
Information, dass sein verfasster Inhalt und seine IP-Adresse weitergegeben wurden, seine
angekündigte Tat schneller als ursprünglich gedacht, z.B. zur Verhinderung einer Fest-
nahme, umsetzen wird. Dieser Fall wird die Ausnahme darstellen, so dass grundsätzlich eine
Informationspflicht der sozialen Netzwerke besteht. Diese wird aber für die Einschät- zung
des BKA für 14 Tage ausgesetzt, damit die Zentralstelle genügend Zeit für die Bewer- tung
des Sachverhalts und die Ermittlung der weiteren Nutzerdaten hat. Eine Frist von 14 Tagen
erscheint hierbei erforderlich und gleichzeitig angemessen im Hinblick auf die Ein-
schränkung des Informationsrechts des Betroffenen. Erhält der Anbieter eines sozialen
Netzwerks nach 14 Tagen keine Anordnung vom BKA, informiert es den Nutzer von der
Meldung seiner Daten (Inhalt und IP-Adresse). Kommt das BKA zur Überzeugung, dass eine
Zurückstellung der Informationspflicht bis zur Offenlegung des Verfahrens erforderlich ist,
geht die Informationspflicht auf das BKA über, weil nur von dort zu entscheiden ist, wann die
Informationspflicht erfüllt werden kann, ohne die Ermittlungen oder wesentliche Rechts- güter
zu gefährden.
Zu Absatz 7
Die Umsetzung der Meldepflichten durch die sozialen Netzwerke bleibt deren Organisati-
onshoheit überlassen. Um eine effektive Überprüfung durch die Verwaltungsbehörde zu
ermöglichen, enthält Absatz 7 eine Auskunftsermächtigung gegenüber dem sozialen Netz-
werk. Dies bietet einen Ausgleich dafür, dass die Transparenzberichte der sozialen Netz-
werke nach § 2 keine Angaben zu den Meldungen gegenüber BKA enthalten müssen. Der-
artige Angaben erschienen in den Transparenzberichten auch deplatziert, da sie Verhält-
nisse zwischen einer Behörde und einem Unternehmen betreffen. Im Einzelnen kann die
Verwaltungsbehörde, also BfJ, Auskunft verlangen, wie die Verfahren zur Meldung von In-
halten ausgestaltet sind und wie diese angewendet werden.
Zu Nummer 4 (Änderung des § 4 NetzDG)
Zur Durchsetzung der Meldepflichten bedarf es wie bei den anderen Compliance-Pflichten
einer bußgeldbewehrten Ordnungswidrigkeitsvorschrift. Eine Bußgeldsanktion knüpft hier
daran an, dass das soziale Netzwerk fahrlässig oder vorsätzlich kein wirksames Verfahren
eingerichtet hat, dass eine Meldung strafbarer Inhalte nach § 3a Absatz 2 im Einzelfall er-
möglicht. Im NetzDG finden sich bereits Bußgeldvorschriften für systemische Verstöße ge-
gen Compliance-Pflichten. Die Verletzung der Pflicht, ein Verfahren zur wirksamen Meldung
schwerwiegender strafbarer Inhalte einzurichten, ist mit den bereits bestehenden bußgeld-
bewährten Pflichten vergleichbar. Daher ist auch der Bußgeldrahmen des § 4 Absatz 2, 2.
Fall über den Verweis des § 30 Absatz 2 Satz 3 des Gesetzes über Ordnungswidrigkeiten mit
einer Bußgeldhöhe bis zu fünfzig Millionen € als angemessen anzusehen. Verletzt ein
soziales Netzwerk seine Pflicht zur Einrichtung eines wirksamen Verfahren zur Meldung
strafrechtlicher Inhalte, so wird der Entwicklung eines rechtswidrigen Zustandes im Netz
Vorschub geleistet. Dies ist aus Sicht des Staates und der betroffenen Nutzer des sozialen
Netzwerkes nicht hinnehmbar und bedarf daher eines erheblichen Bußgeldrahmens.
Zu Artikel 6 (Inkrafttreten)
Die Bestimmung regelt das Inkrafttreten. Die Frist von drei Monaten für das Inkrafttreten der
Meldepflichten wird als erforderlich, aber auch ausreichend angesehen, um den sozialen
Netzwerken einerseits und den betroffenen Bundes- sowie Landesbehörden andererseits
die strukturellen und personellen Anpassungen zu ermöglichen, um den sich aus den
Meldepflichten ergebenden Mehraufwand zu bewältigen.

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of the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection

draft law to combat right-wing extremism and hate crimes

A. Problem and goal

The dissemination of child pornographic content continues to be a serious challenge, as the

Insulting statements made publicly or through the dissemination of writings (§ 11 Paragraph 3

In § 46 StGB (Grundsätze der Strafzumessung), anti-Semitic motives of the perpetrator are

D. Budgetary expenditure excluding compliance

E.1 Fulfilment expenditure for citizens

E.2 Fulfilment burden for the economy

The compliance burden for the economy is still being

Of which bureaucratic costs from information duties

The compliance burden for the economy is still being

E.3 Fulfilment expenses of the

The draft leads to compliance costs for the federal

Draft of the bill by the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer

draft law to combat right-wing extremism and hate crimes

The Bundestag has passed the following law:

Amendment of the Criminal Code

4. § 140 shall be amended as

(b) point 1 shall be worded as follows:

"1. rewarded after it has been committed or tried in a punishable manner,

7. 194 (1) shall be amended as follows:

(a) after the second sentence, the following

Article 8(241) shall be amended as

(a) Paragraph 1 shall be preceded by the following

(c) The current paragraph 2 shall become

(d) The following paragraph 4 is added:

Amendment of the Code of Criminal

1 In the table of contents, the information on § 100g is worded as follows:

"§ 100g Collection of traffic and usage data".

2 § 100g shall be amended as follows:

(b) Paragraph 1 is amended as follows:

(aa) the following sentence is inserted after the

"Under the conditions set out in sentence 1, data on use (§ 15 paragraph 1 of

3. §100j shall be amended as

(a) Paragraph 1 is amended as follows:

(aa) Sentence 1 shall be worded as

1. on the data collected pursuant to §§ 95 and 111 of the Telecommunications

2. about the data collected according to § 14 of the German Telemedia Act (§

4. section 101a shall be amended as

Amendment of the Federal Criminal Police

(1) Paragraph 1 is amended as follows:

(a) after the first sentence, the following sentence

"Under the conditions of sentence 1, information on the data collected pursuant

3. in paragraph 3, first sentence, 'sentence 2' is replaced by 'sentence 3

4. in paragraph 4, first sentence, 'sentence 2' shall be replaced by 'sentence 3

5. the following sentence shall be inserted after the first

Amendment of the Telemedia Act

Article 1(14)(2) shall be worded as follows:

2. the following section 15a shall be inserted after

(1) Whoever provides telemedia services on a business basis, participates in them or

1. to prosecute criminal offences or administrative offences,

2. to avert threats to public safety or order; or

Data referred to in paragraph 1 may not be communicated to other public or private

3. The bodies referred to in paragraph 1

1. the persons responsible for prosecuting criminal offences or misdemeanours

3. the former § 15a shall become §

Amendment of the Network Enforcement Act

The Network Enforcement Act of 1 September 2017 (BGBl. I p. 3352) is amended as

1 § 1 shall be amended as follows:

(a) The heading shall be worded as follows: