FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 205307, January 11, 2018 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. EDUARDO GOLIDAN Y COTO-ONG,

FRANCIS NACIONALES Y FERNANDEZ, AND TEDDY OGSILA Y TAHIL, ACCUSED, EDUARDO
GOLIDAN Y COTO-ONG AND FRANCIS NACIONALES Y FERNANDEZ, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before this Court is an appeal of the April 25, 2012 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02430, which affirmed with modification the August 18, 1999 Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Baguio City, in Criminal Case Nos. 13971-R, 13972-
R and 13973-R finding accused-appellants Eduardo Golidan (Golidan) and Francis Nacionales
(Nacionales), and their co-accused Teddy Ogsila (Ogsila) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes of rape with homicide, murder, and frustrated murder.

Records show that on September 5, 1995 Assistant City Prosecutor Elmer M. Sagsago filed
three separate Informations, approved by City Prosecutor Erdolfo V. Balajadia, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City against appellants Golidan, Nacionales, Ogsila, and
a certain "John Doe," for rape with homicide, murder, and frustrated murder of Elizabeth Leo,
Namuel Aniban, and Cherry Mae Bantiway, respectively. The pertinent portions of said
Informations are quoted below:

1. Rape With Homicide

That on or about the 20th day of January, 1995, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually aiding one another, entered the house of ELIZABETH LEO and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, that is, by beating her on her head and different parts of her
body, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously lie and succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of said Elizabeth Leo and on the occasion of said forcible carnal
knowledge and by reason of the same force and violence applied on the person of Elizabeth
Leo, the said Elizabeth Leo suffered intracranial hemorrhage as a result of skull fracture
which directly resulted to her death.[3]

2. Murder
That on or about the 20th day of January, 1995, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually aiding one another, by means of treachery and with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hit [NAMUEL] ANIBAN, a one-
year old baby boy, with a hard object on his head, thereby inflicting upon the latter:
Intracranial hemorrhage as a result of skull fracture which directly caused his death.[4]

3. Frustrated Murder

That on or about the 20th day of January, 1995, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually aiding one another, being then armed with solid object and with intent to kill
and by means of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and strike with a weapon CHERRY MAE BANTIWAY, a girl ten (10) years of age,
thereby inflicting upon the latter severe injuries, which could have caused her death were it
not for the timely medical at[t]endance extended to her, thus performing all the acts of
execution which could have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but which
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independendent of the will of the
accused, that is, the aforesaid timely medical assistance extended to Cherry Mae
Bantiway.[5]

In the August 18, 1999 Decision, the RTC quoted the undisputed facts from the People's
Memorandum, which we reproduce below:

Based upon the evidence submitted in Court, both by the Prosecution and by the defense,
certain facts and propositions are not disputed and may therefore be considered as admitted.
These include the circumstances of the persons of the victim, the time and place of the
commission of the crime, and those antecedent to the commission of the crime.

Thus, it is undisputed that the deceased Namuel Aniban was the one-year-old son of
Jennyline Aniban who is in turn the daughter of Muriel Bantiway. The baby Namuel and his
mother Jennyline Aniban live in a house some distance away from that of Muriel Bantiway.
Cherry Mae, who was then 8 years old at the time of incident, is a granddaughter of Muriel
Bantiway. Cherry Mae had been living with her grandmother since she was 2 years old.
Cherry Mae suffers from cerebral palsy which affects her movements which is why her
grandmother Muriel Bantiway hires a babysitter to watch over her. At the time of the incident,
the baby sitter was one named Elizabeth Leo.
At about 7:30 in the morning of January 20, 1995, Muriel Bantiway left her house and walked
to the house of her daughter Jennyline Aniban in order to fetch her grandson Namuel. This
was because Jennyline was then studying. She brought the baby Namuel to her residence. At
about 8:00 she went to work and left behind inside the house her two grandchildren, the baby
Namuel, Cherry Mae, and the baby sitter Elizabeth Leo.

Jennyline Aniban did not however go to school but studied her lessons. At past 10:00,
Jennyline Aniban decided to proceed to her mother's house in order to breast feed her baby
Namuel. When she entered the house, she went straight to the sala and saw Cherry Mae lying
on her side facing the wall of a room. Cherry Mae turned to her and tried to tell her
something. It was then she saw, through the transparent curtain separating the bedroom
from the sala, the exposed legs of Elizabeth Leo.

She entered the bedroom and saw Elizabeth Leo lying naked on her back. There was blood
on the head and vagina of Elizabeth Leo and her nipples were cut. Beside Elizabeth Leo was
the baby Namuel who was lying face down. When Jennyline turned him over, she saw his
exposed brains and blood oozing from his nose. It was then that she screamed and ran out of
the house to call for her husband.

She passed by the house of [appellant] Nacionales, located just 15 meters above the house of
Muriel Bantiway. She was screaming and continued running until she found her husband and
relayed what she saw. Her husband then ran towards the house of Muriel Bantiway with
Jennyline following him. Jennyline was still screaming. When they reached the house,
Jennyline continued screaming for help. Two of their neighbors whose houses were some 50
meters away arrived and they were those who called for the police who arrived around 11:00
A.M.

The responding policemen found and recovered a bottle of coke litro and wooden ashtray
from the bed where Elizabeth Leo and the baby Namuel were found. Both were stained with
blood. Human semen was also found at the tip of the bottle.

Autopsy was conducted on the bodies of Elizabeth Leo and Namuel Aniban. The results of
the autopsy on Elizabeth Leo showed that she suffered a total of 13 external injuries on her
head and different parts of her body. Of the 13 injuries, it was determined that 10 were fatal.
All were inflicted by a blunt instrument, such as a bottle of coke litro. The cause of her death
was determined to be [I]ntracranial Hemorrhage.
The autopsy further revealed that she was raped as seminal fluid was found inside the
vaginal canal and that the one litro Coca-Cola bottle was forcibly jabbed inside her vagina. It
was ascertained that the sexual intercourse could have occurred while she was still alive.

As for the baby Namuel, he sustained a total of seven external injuries located on the face
and head caused possibly by a blunt object or instrument. He died due to Intracranial
[H]emorrhage as a result of skull fracture.

The child Cherry Mae was rushed to the hospital due to her own injuries. She suffered two
external injuries on her head which were fatal. She was confined for 13 days and was
discharged on [February] 2, 1995.[6]

EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION

Jennyline Aniban (Jennyline) testified that at the time of the incident, the babysitter had only
been hired for five days. Her mother, Muriel Bantiway (Muriel), would regularly fetch her
grandson Namuel from Jennyline's house so that the babysitter could take care of him while
Jennyline was in school. Jennyline's house in San Carlos Heights, Baguio City is about 60
meters away from Muriel's house. On the day of the incident, Jennyline thought of going to
school but instead decided to study at home. At around 10:00 a.m., she dropped by Muriel's
house to check on her son, and that was when she discovered the crime.[7]

Muriel, the grandmother of the victims Namuel and Cherry Mae, corroborated Jennyline's
testimony. Muriel testified that before the incident, at around 7:30 in the morning of January
20, 1995, Muriel went to Jennyline's house to fetch her grandson in order for the babysitter,
Elizabeth Leo, to take care of him because Jennyline had to attend school. When Muriel left
her house for work, she saw four men in front of the house of the appellant Francisco
Nacionales (Nacionales), who is her neighbor, with Edgar Loma-ang (Loma-ang), and the
other appellant, Teddy Ogsila (Ogsila), who were drinking and laughing. At around noontime,
her other grandson Domingo went to her workplace and informed her that Elizabeth Leo had
been found dead. She rushed home to discover that her grandson Namuel was also killed.
She looked for Cherry Mae and was informed that the child had been brought to the hospital.
When asked about the physical condition of Cherry Mae, Muriel answered that Cherry Mae
was impaired by polio and could not walk, but had found a way to be mobile by using her
right hand to support her body and her legs and buttocks to move forward. Muriel testified
that prior to the incident, Cherry Mae could communicate with her through words and
utterances. After the tragedy, however, Cherry Mae had to be brought to the Baguio General
Hospital where she was confined for three weeks, and her condition had considerably
changed. Cherry Mae could not move her body because her arms had been twisted, aside
from being strangled and hit on the head. Muriel said she did not know the appellants until
the police was able to piece together their investigation with the help of Cherry Mae, who was
the lone eyewitness to the crimes.
Muriel stated that she witnessed how Cherry Mae identified the persons who had killed and
raped Elizabeth Leo, murdered Namuel, and wounded her, on three occasions: February 10,
1995; February 21, 1995; and June 10, 1995. On February 10, 1995, Cherry Mae identified
appellants Nacionales and Ogsila at the Baguio Police Station. On June 10, 1995, 13
photographs were presented to Cherry Mae at the Child and Family Services (CFS) and she
was able to identify Nacionales, Ogsila, and Golidan. When asked what the appellants did,
Cherry Mae answered, pointing to the picture of Golidan, "paatong auntie" and then pointing
to the picture of Nacionales,"pakpak bote coke pipit auntie" and lastly, pointing to the picture
of Ogsila, "pakpak kayo ashtray baby."[8]

Sharon Flores, a resident of San Carlos Heights, Baguio City, testified that at about 10:00 in
the morning of January 20, 1995, appellant Golidan peeped at their door and asked where her
husband was. Golidan appeared to be drunk as his eyes were red, and he left after Sharon
told him that her husband was not around. Sharon further testified that she heard loud music
coming from the house of appellant Nacionales the night before the incident.[9]

Senior Police Officer (SPO) 3 Pablo Undalos (SPO3 Undalos) testified that when Cherry Mae
saw appellant Nacionales at the police station on February 10, 1995, Cherry Mae mumbled the
word "uyong" and pressed her head on her grandmother's abdomen. He observed that
Cherry Mae showed fear and hatred against Nacionales. Ogsila was presented to Cherry Mae,
and she had the same reaction and mumbled the same word. On February 21, 1995, the date
scheduled for the second line-up, Cherry Mae tried to lift her right hand, trembling, and again
mumbled the word "uyong" upon seeing the pictures of Nacionales and Ogsila.[10]

SPO3 Ray Ekid (SPO3 Ekid) of the Baguio City Police testified that on the same morning after
the discovery of the incident, he responded to the incident after he received a call from the
base operator. When he investigated the surrounding area, he knocked on the door of
Nacionales and asked if the latter had heard any sound or commotion from the Bantiway's
residence, and who was with him in the house. Nacionales answered "wala po kaming
naririnig" and said that his father was with him. SPO3 Ekid testified that he observed that
Nacionales smelled of liquor. SPO3 Ekid then saw Nacionales's father hanging clothes
outside. SPO3 Ekid asked Nacionales's father if the latter heard any sound or commotion
from his neighborhood and the father answered that he had heard shouts and a cry of a
woman earlier.[11]

Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. (Dr. Hernandez), a medical doctor specializing in neuro-surgery
and the treatment of injuries or illnesses of the central nervous system, was presented as a
prosecution witness regarding the frustrated murder case involving Cherry Mae. Dr.
Hernandez testified that Cherry Mae had a glasgou-coma scale of eight, which meant a severe
head injury; that he noted a large contusion hematoma in the left occipital area of the child,
which could have caused Cherry Mae's death if not properly treated; and that he observed
that when he first saw Cherry Mae on January 20, 1995, she was in a fearful state and was
non-communicative.[12]

Dr. Vladimir Villasenor (Dr. Villasenor), the Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory who conducted the autopsy on the cadavers of Elizabeth and
Namuel, testified that Elizabeth sustained 13 external injuries, all of which were caused by a
blunt instrument. There were multiple injuries on the head which caused her death. Her left
kidney was likewise ruptured. Dr. Villasenor also noted an extensive injury on the hymen of
the victim which could have been caused by a large object inserted into the hymen, like a
one-liter Coca-Cola bottle. As there were no previous lacerations, it was confirmed that
Elizabeth was still a virgin when she was raped and killed. Regarding Namuel, Dr. Villasenor
noted that the one-year- old victim had seven injuries on the head resulting to fractures in the
skull and lacerations of the brain.[13]

Dr. Divina R. Martin Hernandez (Dr. Divina Hernandez), a neurologist, was presented as a
prosecution witness to show Cherry Mae's competence to testify in court and on what the
latter would be able to recall regarding the incident where she herself was a victim. She said
that Cherry Mae was brought to her office by an aunt and a social worker for her to examine
Cherry Mae's ability and adequacy to testify in court. Dr. Divina Hernandez said that cerebral
palsy is a disease of the brain characterized by non-progressive motor impairment and that
persons afflicted with this disease usually walk with an abnormality, but they are fairly
intelligent, can perceive and make known their perception. Dr. Divina Hernandez conducted a
neurological examination of Cherry Mae consisting of an evaluation of her capacity to talk
and to identity common objects, a cerebral function test, an examination of her cranial
nerves, and an examination of her motor and sensory system and other cerebral functions.
Dr. Divina Hernandez said that "Cherry [Mae] can talk but with much difficulty; she has only
the tendency to say the last syllables of words; she could express with very much difficulty
(although) it takes her a long time to say the words; she can identify common objects in the
clinic x x x; she can identify people around her like her social worker and she was able to
recognize me."[14] Dr. Hernandez said that Cherry Mae recalled that she had a playmate, a
young boy, and remembers that he was hit on the head and described it by saying "napakpak
sa ulo," which are things and events which a child in Cherry Mae's condition would be
incapable of concocting or manipulating.[15]

On February 10, 1995, at the Baguio Police Station, according to Muriel, it was the first time
that Cherry Mae identified the appellants Nacionales and Ogsila, when she was made to face
them with the other suspects. SPO3 Undalos observed that the 10-year-old victim showed
fear and hatred against Nacionales when she was made to face him, and mumbled "uyong."
When Ogsila was turned to face Cherry Mae, she showed the same reaction, pressed herself
against Muriel's abdomen, and mumbled the same word. Loma-ang was also brought in front
of Cherry Mae, who showed no reaction.[16]

On February 21, 1995, at the Baguio Police Station, Cherry Mae, for the second time, was
asked to identify the people who entered their house on the day of the incident. The police
presented five pictures to her, including those of Ogsila, Nacionales, and Loma-ang. Again,
Cherry Mae positively identified Ogsila and Nacionales when the police showed their photos
to the child. She tried to lift her right hand, trembling, and again mumbled "uyong." With
respect to the remaining photos including Loma-ang, she showed no reaction.[17]

On June 10, 1995, at the CFS, once again, Cherry Mae was asked by SPO3 Ekid to identify the
people who entered their house on January 20, 1995. City Councilor Richard Cariño, a lawyer
and member of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), and Assistant Prosecutor Elizabeth
Hernandez, were with him at that time. SPO3 Ekid presented 27 pictures to Cherry Mae, who
pointed to the photographs of appellants Golidan, Nacionales, and Ogsila. SPO3 Ekid
gathered and shuffled the pictures and when he asked Cherry Mae for the second time, she
again pointed to the pictures of the appellants. SPO3 Ekid then showed Cherry Mae 10
pictures and the latter was able to identify the appellants Nacionales, Ogsila, and Golidan.[18]

Jennyline narrated that her niece, lone survivor Cherry Mae Bantiway, pointed at the
photographs of appellants Golidan, Nacionales and Ogsila during the picture line up
conducted at the CFS as the ones who entered Muriel's house. At the CFS, Cherry Mae was
shown more than 10 pictures pasted on a board and she was able to identify the appellants.
Jennyline was also present during the line up at the Fiscal's Office.[19]

Atty. Cariño testified that he was present at the CFS on June 10, 1995 to help in the
investigation of the case. When he tried to talk to Cherry Mae, it appeared that the child was
able to comprehend and communicate audibly, albeit with a little stutter. She was asked the
question "itodom man no sinno ti nangpakpak kinka" and one of her answers was "pinakpak
na ti ulok,"[20] while mentioning the names of the victims. The third time she was asked to
identify pictures which were pasted on a white board, Cherry Mae again pointed to the
appellants.[21]

Assistant City Prosecutor Elmer Sagsago testified on the circumstances of the preliminary
investigation he conducted on August 1, 1995. In the presence of appellants' lawyers, a line
up consisting of 11 persons was constituted, after which Cherry Mae identified appellants
Golidan, Ogsila, and Nacionales. Upon the request of defense counsel, a second line up was
made, this time in a different order, and again Cherry Mae identified appellants as the ones
who entered their house on January 20, 1995.[22]

Thus, Cherry Mae Bantiway was called to testify in court, but because of her inability to
communicate and move her muscles, the RTC ordered the Department of Social Welfare and
Development, the Baguio General Hospital, and the Sacred Heart Hospital of the St. Louis
University, through their respective psychiatric departments, to provide the RTC with a list of
their experts from among whom the parties shall choose someone to assist Cherry Mae in
her testimony. From among the names submitted, the prosecution and defense agreed to
engage the services of Dr. Marie Sheridan Milan and Dr. Elsie Caducoy of the Baguio General
Hospital.[23]

On July 10, 1996, in open court, Cherry Mae identified appellants Ogsila, Nacionales, and
Golidan from a line up composed of 10 persons, as the ones who entered their house on
January 20, 1995. Cherry Mae pointed to appellant Nacionales as the one who struck her and
Elizabeth Leo, and to appellant Ogsila as the one who struck one-year-old Namuel Aniban.
When asked who went on top of Elizabeth Leo, Cherry Mae pointed to appellant Golidan.[24]

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE:

1. Eduardo Golidan

According to Josephine Golidan, the wife of appellant Golidan, when she, with her two
children, left for Tabuk, Kalinga on January 18, 1995, he stayed behind in Baguio to wait for
the merchandise they were going to sell in Tabuk. On the following day, as narrated by Julia
Golidan, his mother, appellant Golidan helped her tend their store at Lakandula St., Baguio
City until January 22, 1995.

Appellant Golidan stated that on January 20, 1995, at about 7:00 in the morning, he left San
Carlos Heights to open the stall of his mother. For the entire day, he helped his mother and
his aunt Virginia to sell their goods. The same happened until the morning of January 22,
1995, then, he left for Tabuk in the afternoon and arrived on January 23, 1995.

SPO3 Diosdado Danglose (SPO3 Danglose) testified that he was informed by Joel Colcoli
(Colcoli) that he had seen a man wearing blood- stained shoes riding a jeepney on January
22, 1995. On January 25, 1995, a certain Sharon Flores told SPO3 Danglose and other police
officers that Golidan, who appeared to be drunk, passed by their house looking for her
husband. Afterwards, SPO3 Danglose went to the house of the appellant's mother who
confirmed that her son had gone to Tabuk to fetch his wife and children. The police officers
planned to go to Tabuk to invite Golidan to their office; however, on January 26, 1995, at
about 3:00 in the morning, Golidan arrived in Baguio City from Tabuk to get some stocks. He
was informed by his sister that he is a suspect in the San Carlos Heights case. At about 6:00
of the same morning, the appellant went to see SPO4 Joseph Supa (SPO4 Supa) together
with his wife and mother. They arrived at the police station at 7:00 in the morning. The police
officers asked Golidan to remove his shirt and pants and they found no scratches. In the
afternoon of the same day, they brought the appellant to the Hospital for possible
identification by the lone survivor, Cherry Mae; however, when he was presented in front of
the child, she did not respond, just stared at them, and shook her head.[25]
On February 9, 1995, again, Golidan was presented to Cherry Mae at the police station, but
the child said "a-an" and shook her head.[26]

2. Francis Nacionales

Appellant Nacionales testified that in the evening of January 19, 1995, he was at the Pitstop
Restaurant on Assumption Road, Baguio City together with Renato Rosario (Rosario),
Angeline Bautista (Bautista), and Edgar Loma-ang (Loma-ang). After an hour, they
accompanied Loma-ang to the jeepney stop, then, the three of them went to the house of
Nacionales. Bautista and Nacionales talked in the music room until the following morning. On
January 20, 1995, at about 6:00 in the morning, Rosario and Bautista went home, then, at
around 11:00 a.m., Nacionales was awakened by his stepsister, Natalia Obena, who asked for
fare to go to the market. After a while, Loma-ang and Bautista arrived at the house of the
appellant and after about ten to fifteen minutes, PO1 Ruben Porte (PO1 Porte) knocked at the
door and asked Nacionales and Loma-ang to remove their t- shirts in order to look for
scratches and blood stains, but found none. The two of them, with Bautista, went to the
house of the Bantiways to see what happened.[27]

On February 9, 1995, at the police station, Nacionales with the other appellants were
presented to Cherry Mae but there was no positive identification coming from the latter. In
addition, as narrated by Loma-ang, Muriel asked Cherry Mae, "sino ti nag uyong dita?" and
the latter replied, "haan. " On the following day, Loma-ang and Nacionales, for another time,
was presented to Cherry Mae and again she said, "haan" which means “no/”[28]

Teddy Ogsila

According to the testimony of appellant Ogsila, on January 19, 1995, he spent the evening
drinking beer and playing darts with Philip Romero (Romero) and Melvin Gison (Gison) at the
Junkyard Bar on Kisad Road, Baguio City. They went home at 10:00 the next morning as
confirmed by Gison and corroborated by the appellant's brother, Pablito Ogsila, Jr., who was
then working as a waiter in the said Bar.

On January 20, 1995, at about 10:00 in the morning, Jesus Gison, father of Melvin Gison,
came knocking at the door of the house of the Ogsilas, looking for his son. Appellant Ogsila
offered Jesus Gison a cup of coffee and woke Melvin up. After the Gisons left, Ogsila did his
chores while Romero was at the room listening to music. Ogsila said he did not leave their
house in the morning of January 20, 1995. On February 8, 1995, he went to San Carlos
Heights to get his shoes which Nacionales borrowed.

On February 9 and 10, 1995, Ogsila, with the other appellants and Loma-ang, were presented
to the lone survivor at the police station. On both occasions, Cherry Mae did not identify
them and uttered the words "a-an."[29]

On August 18, 1999, the RTC found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt, in a
Judgment that contained the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Francis Nacionales, Teddy Ogsila,
and Eduardo Golidan GUILTY of the crimes as charged, and in:

Criminal Case No. 13971-R for Rape with Homicide, each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death and to pay the amount of P50,000.00 each as moral damages and P75,000.00 each as
indemnity to the heirs of the victim Elizabeth Leo;

Criminal Case No. 13972-R for Murder, each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and each to indemnify the heirs of Namuel Aniban in the amount of P100,000.00;

Criminal Case No. 13973-R for Frustrated Murder, each is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision correccional to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal and each to pay the amount of P50,000.00 to the victim
Cherry Mae Bantiway.

The accused Francis Nacionales, Teddy Ogsila, and Eduardo Golidan are ORDERED to be
immediately transferred to the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila.[30]

The case went on automatic review to this Court. The accused- appellant Ogsila filed his Brief
on September 28, 2000, with the following assignment of errors:

I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION'S PRINCIPAL WITNESSES, NAMELY, CHERRY MAE BANTIWAY, SPO3 RAY
EKID, SPO3 PABLO UNDALOS, AND DR. DIVINA R. MARTIN HERNANDEZ - MOST
ESPECIALLY CHERRY MAE BANTIWAY, WHO WAS NOT EVEN COMPETENT TO TESTIFY;

II.

THE COURT A QUO CONVICTED ACCUSED OGSILA NOT ON THE BASIS OF THE STRENGTH
OF THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE BUT ON THE "WEAKNESS" OF HIS EVIDENCE;

III.

MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING OGSILA DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.[31]

Nacionales, for his part, alleged the following errors:

I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT FRANCIS NACIONALES WAS NOT AT
THE SCENE OF THE CRIME ON JANUARY 20, 1995;

II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT FRANCIS NACIONALES WAS NOT
IDENTIFIED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS BY THE LONE SURVIVING WITNESS CHERRY MAE
BANTIWAY WHEN HE WAS PRESENTED TO HER BY THE POLICE INVESTIGATORS OF
BAGUIO CITY;

III.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FRANCIS

NACIONALES ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.[32]
Golidan submitted the following assignment of errors on appeal:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDS (sic) BASED SOLELY
ON THE UNCORROBORATED DOUBTFUL TESTIMONY OF A LONE ALLEGED WITNESS
WHO, UNDER HER PHYSICAL CONDITION MAY NOT QUALIFY AS A WITNESS UNDER THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT;

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN SUMMARILY CONCLUDING THAT EACH OF THE
ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF ALL THE CHARGES WHERE THERE IS NO PROOF WHATSOEVER,
DIRECT NOR CIRCUMSTANTIAL TO SUPPORT THE ALLEGATION OF CONSPIRACY;

III.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN PROCEEDING TO RENDER A JUDGMENT OF

CONVICTION IN THE MIDST OF ITS OWN PRONOUNCEMENTS OF DOUBT AND, IN THE
PRESENCE OF INDUBITABLE PROOFS SHOWING THAT THE ACCUSEDS (SIC), ESPECIALLY
EDUARDO GOLIDAN ARE INNOCENT;

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ADHERING TO THE TIME HONORED
REQUIREMENT (IN CRIMINAL CASES) OF "PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT” VIS-A-
VIS THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;

V.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE FACTS THAT THE
RIGHTS OF SUSPECT ACCUSED-APPELLANT EDUARDO GOLIDAN WAS NOT OBSERVED
AND THAT, HE WAS NOT ASSISTED BY COUNSEL DURING THE INVESTIGATIONS.[33]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as the representative of the State on appeal, filed a
consolidated brief for the appellee. The OSG argued that there is an existence of conspiracy,
which is proven by the common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful
purpose of the appellants. In this case, the appellants cooperated with each other in such a
way as to achieve their criminal plan.

While the appellants invoked Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130, contending that Cherry Mae is
not a competent witness, the OSG countered that the prosecution was able to prove that
Cherry Mae was a competent witness through the testimony of Dr. Divina Hernandez. Thus,
the prosecution established that Cherry Mae is incapable of telling a lie and could not be
influenced by others; that the lone survivor was not capable of concocting events or
manipulating facts, as these would entail motive, which is something Cherry Mae could not
have due to her condition.

Therefore, the OSG concluded that Cherry Mae was telling the truth when she positively
identified the appellants. The OSG claimed that the appellants failed to show that the persons
who had supposedly conditioned Cherry Mae's mind had an ulterior motive to pin them
down, and so her testimony should be given full weight and credit. The OSG added that the
reason why Cherry Mae failed to identify the appellants on January 26, 1995, February 9, 1995
and February 10, 1995 was because the child was still physically and mentally weak from the
incident. The period from January 20, 1995 up to the aforementioned dates is not enough to
let the victim recover from the injury inflicted by the perpetrators. On said dates, Cherry Mae
was still very weak, could hardly move her body, and needed the assistance of her
grandmother.[34]

The OSG alleged that the appellants' alibi cannot prevail over their positive identifications
made by Cherry Mae because the former failed to adduce sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene.

On September 21, 2004, this Court transferred the instant case to the Court of Appeals
through a resolution, which reads:
Conformably with the decision promulgated on 7 July 2004 in G.R. Nos. 147678-87, entitled
The People of the Philippines vs. Efren Mateo y Garcia, modifying the pertinent provisions of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule
122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125 and any other rule insofar as they provide
for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution
of the Supreme Court en banc, dated 19 September 1995, in "Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court" in cases similarly involving the death penalty, pursuant to the Court's power to
promulgate rules of procedure in all courts under Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution,
and allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals before such cases are elevated
to this Court, the Court Resolved to TRANSFER these cases to the Court of Appeals, for
appropriate action and disposition.[35]

On April 25, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the Judgment of the
RTC but with modifications. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby AFFIRMED with
the following modifications:

1) In Criminal Case No. 13971-R, each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without the benefit of parole. Appellants are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the amount
of Php 75,000.00 as moral damages, Php 100,000.00 as civil indemnity, and Php 50,000.00 as
exemplary damages to the heirs of Elizabeth Leo;

2) In Criminal Case No. 13972-R, each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without the benefit of parole and to pay jointly and severally the amount of Php 50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, Php 50,000.00 as moral damages, and Php 30,000.00 as exemplary damages
to the heirs of Namuel Aniban;

3) In Criminal Case No. 13973-R, each is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Appellants are ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, Php 40,000.00 as moral damages, Php 30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and Php
25,000.00 as temperate damages to Cherry Mae Bantiway; and

4) Appellants are further ordered to pay interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision.[36]
We agree with the ruling and reasoning of the Court of Appeals, subject to modifications of
the penalties as provided by the latest jurisprudence, to be discussed below.

The Court of Appeals, at the outset, affirmed that the lone survivor, Cherry Mae Bantiway, is a
competent witness although she is suffering from cerebral palsy, citing the rule that any child
can be a competent witness if he/she can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his/her
perception to others and of relating truthfully facts respecting which he/she is examined. The
Court of Appeals held that even if Cherry Mae has cerebral palsy, she can still perceive and
make known her perception, as per Dr. Hernandez's explanation in her testimony, which is
quoted below:

Q:

You said that what you saw in Cherry Mae Bantiway was typical of...?

A:

Cerebral palsy, Sir.

Q:

Will you please explain to us what kind of a sickness or diseases (sic) is this?

A:

Cerebral palsy is a disease of the brain characterized by a non-progressive motor imperment

(sic), non-progressive means to say it will not become worst and it is solely focused on the
motor system movement, Sir.

xxxx

Q:

In other words, Dra. this (sic) patient's (sic) can still perceive and make known their
perception?

A:
Yes, Sir.

Q:

This is brain damage which involves the motor nerves?

A:

The motor system, Sir.

Q:

And aside from the motor system the brain is functioning?

A:

Yes, Sir.

Q:

In other words, the damage of the brain is not total?

A:

Yes, Sir"

xxxx

"Q:

You said that you made this examination, did you find out whether she has the ability to
recall the events that happen (sic) in the past?

A:

Yes, Sir.
Q:

You know you've been told that this particular patient was the victim of violence, is that
correct?

A:

Yes, Sir.

Q:

And in accordance with your examination, did you find out whether she can recall some
events which happened when injuries were inflicted on her?

A:

I only asked her if she had a playmate and she said she has a playmate a young boy, and
where is he now because I did not like to get it from her really like to lead her into a question
but I asked her whether she had a playmate and she said yes and where was your playmate
now, he's not there anymore and what happen (sic) to him she called her baby "ading" and
where is he now she told me that he was hit on the head, Sir.

Q:

How did she tell you?

A:

She told me "napakpak sa ulo" and she even gestured but that's all, I did not like to deal more
or other things, Sir.

Q:

In other words Dra it was obvious at the time that she could recall some incident that
happened?

A:

Yes, Sir.
Q:

Now this patient Cherry Bantiway Dra in your opinion was she capable of concocting events
or manipulating facts considering her mental condition?

A:

No, Sir.[37]

The Court of Appeals found no compelling reason to overturn the RTC decision because
there is no clear basis that the latter erred in finding that Cherry Mae is a competent witness.
The Court of Appeals stressed that the trial judge is in the best position to determine the
competence as well as the credibility of Cherry Mae as a witness since the trial judge has the
unparalleled opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the
various indicia available but not reflected in the record. On the allegation that Cherry Mae is
mentally retarded as opined by Dr. Francisco Hernandez, the Court of Appeals held that this
is insufficient reason to disqualify a witness, for a mental retardate who has the ability to
make perceptions known to others can still be a competent witness.

Regarding appellants' allegations that Cherry Mae was not able to identify them in the initial
stages of the investigation, the Court of Appeals stated that at the time of these initial
confrontations at the hospital and at the police station, Cherry Mae had just survived from the
incident where there were brutal killings and where she herself had sustained a fatal wound
on her head. As such, the Court of Appeals noted that the condition of the child, being
already afflicted with cerebral palsy, was aggravated by the head injuries inflicted on her, not
to mention the state of shock and fear she might have been experiencing at that time. Thus,
the Court of Appeals considered that the purported non-identification by child of the
appellants at the initial stages of the investigation is of no moment and is not fatal to the
prosecution's case.[38]

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that where there is no evidence to show any improper
motive on the part of the prosecution witness to testify falsely against the accused or to
falsely implicate him/her in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that the
testimony is worthy of full faith and credence. In the case at bar, there is no showing that the
witnesses for the prosecution had any motive to testify falsely against the appellants.

Anent the issue of conspiracy, the Court of Appeals stated that for collective responsibility to
be established, it is not necessary that conspiracy be proven by direct evidence or prior
agreement to commit the crime nor is it essential that there be proof of previous agreement
to commit a crime. Conspiracy may logically be inferred from acts and circumstances
showing the existence of a common design to commit the offense charged. It is sufficient
that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. Due to conspiracy, the
act of one is the act of all.[39] Furthermore, conspiracy exists when, at the time of the
commission of the offense, the malefactors had the same purpose and were united in their
action.[40]
The Court of Appeals emphasized that the prohibition against custodial investigation
conducted without the assistance of counsel does not extend to a person in a police line up.
This particular stage of an investigation where a person is asked to stand in a police line up
has been held to be outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel because it
involves a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory in nature. It has
been held that identification without the presence of counsel at a police line up does not
preclude the admissibility of in-court identification.

As regards the appellants' defense of alibi, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the same
crumbles in the face of the positive identification made by Cherry Mae. For alibi to prosper, it
is not enough for the accused to prove that he/she was elsewhere when the crime was
committed, but he/she must also demonstrate that it would be physically impossible for
him/her to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. In the case at bar, aside
from the positive identification made by Cherry Mae, several witnesses saw the appellants in
the vicinity of San Carlos Heights, Baguio City in the morning of January 20, 1995. Thus, it
goes without saying that it was not physically impossible for the appellants to be at the scene
of the crime.

We find and so hold that the above pronouncements of the Court of Appeals, which affirm the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, have basis both in fact and in law, and the assailed
decision does not contain reversible error, contrary to the appellants' allegations.

As a general rule, this Court upholds factual findings of the RTC when affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, as the appreciation of the evidence adduced by the parties is their primary
responsibility. It is, moreover, the province of the lower court to determine the competency of
a witness to testify.

In People v. Magbitang,[41] we held:

Secondly, Magbitang's contention that CCC, being a child of tender age, was not a competent
witness because his testimony was filled with inconsistencies and suffered from
improbabilities was unfounded.

Under the Rules of Court, a child may be a competent witness, unless the trial court
determines upon proper showing that the child's mental maturity is such as to render him
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which he is to be examined and of relating the
facts truthfully. The testimony of the child of sound mind with the capacity to perceive and
make known the perception can be believed in the absence of any showing of an improper
motive to testify. Once it is established that the child fully understands the character and
nature of an oath, the testimony is given full credence. x x x. (Citations omitted.)
Regarding the evaluation of a witness's testimony, we have ruled in People v. Hermosa[42] in
this wise:

[T]he trial court's evaluation of the testimony of a witness is accorded the highest respect
because of its direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and to determine if
they are telling the truth or not. This opportunity enables the trial judge to detect better that
thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by
the reviewing court. Thus, the trial judge's evaluation of the competence and credibility of a
witness will not be disturbed on review, unless it is clear from the records that his judgment
is erroneous. (Citations omitted.)

In this case, the trial court found sufficient basis to consider the testimony of Cherry Mae
Bantiway, unique though it may have been because of her condition, to be valid. The court
invited expert witnesses to testify on the nature of cerebral palsy and the capacity of one who
has it, specifically Cherry Mae, to perceive events surrounding her and to express them. The
trial court was able to see consistency in the child's testimony, specifically in her positive
identification of the appellants.

The appellants in Hermosa likewise impugned the testimony of the child witness on the
ground that she did not immediately tag them as the culprits but the Court held that the
failure to immediately reveal the identity of the perpetrator of a felony will not necessarily
impair the credibility of a witness.[43]

The Rule on the Examination of a Child Witness, A.M. No. 004-07-SC, became effective on
December 15, 2000. The first three sections of this Rule provide as follows:

SECTION 1. Applicability of the Rule. — Unless otherwise provided, this Rule shall govern the
examination of child witnesses who are victims of crime, accused of a crime, and witnesses
to crime. It shall apply in all criminal proceedings and non-criminal proceedings involving
child witnesses.

SECTION 2. Objectives. — The objectives of this Rule are to create and maintain an
environment that will allow children to give reliable and complete evidence, minimize trauma
to children, encourage children to testify in legal proceedings, and facilitate the
ascertainment of truth.

SECTION 3. Construction of the Rule. — This Rule shall be liberally construed to uphold the
best interests of the child and to promote maximum accommodation of child witnesses
without prejudice to the constitutional rights of the accused.
The lower court had already decided this case as of August 18, 1999, so this Rule was not
applied during trial. However, we are discussing its relevant provisions because of the
flexibility given to the courts in examining child witnesses under this Rule. In fact, under
Section 20, the court may allow leading questions in all stages of examination of a child if the
same will further the interests of justice. This Court reiterated that the rule was formulated to
allow children to give reliable and complete evidence, minimize trauma to children,
encourage them to testify in legal proceedings and facilitate the ascertainment of truth.[44]

This Court recently explained the rationale behind this rule in People v. Esugon,[45] where it
was stated:

That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness
with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased.
Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000),
every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden
of proof lies on the party challenging the child's competency. Only when substantial doubt
exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish
truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu
proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.

The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province of the trial court. All
questions bearing on the credibility of witnesses are best addressed by the trial court by
virtue of its unique position to observe the crucial and often incommunicable evidence of the
witnesses' deportment while testifying, something which is denied to the appellate court
because of the nature and function of its office. The trial judge has the unique advantage of
actually examining the real and testimonial evidence, particularly the demeanor of the
witnesses. Hence, the trial judge's assessment of the witnesses' testimonies and findings of
fact are accorded great respect on appeal. In the absence of any substantial reason to justify
the reversal of the trial court's assessment and conclusion, like when no significant facts and
circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is
generally bound by the former's findings. The rule is even more stringently applied if the
appellate court has concurred with the trial court. (Citations omitted.)

Furthermore, this Court has applied flexibility in the consideration of evidence in child abuse
cases. As we observed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis[46]:

Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness is expressly recognized as an

exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the admission of the hearsay testimony of a
child describing any act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal
proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by the
adverse party. The admission of the statement is determined by the court in light of specified
subjective and objective considerations that provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the
child witness. These requisites for admission find their counterpart in the present case under
the above- described conditions for the exercise of flexibility in the consideration of
evidence, including hearsay evidence, in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance
cases. (Citations omitted.)
The above pronouncement may also be found in People v. Santos,[47] where the Court held:

The trend in procedural law is to give a wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over
the questioning of a child witness. Under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rules on Examination of a
Child Witness, child witnesses may testify in a narrative form and leading questions may be
allowed by the trial court in all stages of the examination if the same will further the interest
of justice. It must be borne in mind that the offended party in this case is a 6-year old minor
who was barely five when she was sexually assaulted. As a child of such tender years not yet
exposed to the ways of the world, she could not have fully understood the enormity of the
bestial act committed on her person. Indeed —

Studies show that children, particularly very young children, make the "perfect victims." They
naturally follow the authority of adults as the socialization process teaches children that
adults are to be respected. The child's age and developmental level will govern how much
she comprehends about the abuse and therefore how much it affects her. If the child is too
young to understand what has happened to her, the effects will be minimized because she
has no comprehension of the consequences. Certainly, children have more problems in
providing accounts of events because they do not understand everything they experience.
They do not have enough life experiences from which to draw upon in making sense of what
they see, hear, taste, smell and feel. Moreover, they have a limited vocabulary. x x x.
(Citations omitted.)

We likewise affirm the finding of conspiracy. As the Court of Appeals stated, conspiracy need
not be proven by direct evidence, for conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the
accused in accomplishment of a common unlawful design.[48] The Court of Appeals held that
there is no doubt that conspiracy was shown in the instant case from the concerted actions
of the accused-appellants. The surviving victim testified regarding the specific acts
perpetrated by the appellants against her and the other victims, which show a unity of
purpose and sentiment, and a concerted effort on the part of the appellants to commit the
gruesome crimes.

The defense of denial and alibi, as held by the Court of Appeals, is weak compared to the
positive identification of the appellants as the perpetrators.[49] Alibi and denial, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law.[50] Where there is the least possibility of the presence of the
accused at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold water.[51] In this matter, the Court has
consistently ruled as follows:

The Court has considered the defense of denial and alibi put up by the accused, but finds
them relatively weak and insufficient to overcome the positive and categorical identification
of the accused as perpetrators. The rule is that the defense of denial, when unsubstantiated
by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving and merits no weight in law
and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who
testified on affirmative mattes.[52] (Citations omitted.)
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the defense of denial and alibi to be
insufficient to overthrow the prosecution's evidence against the appellants, who failed to
prove that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime when the
incidents occurred.

Applying prevailing jurisprudence which has increased the amount of awards for damages in
criminal cases to show not only the Court's, but all of society's outrage over such crimes and
wastage of lives,[53] we hereby modify the monetary awards as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 13971-R for Rape with Homicide, where the penalty imposed is death but
reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, because of Republic Act No.
9346, in addition to the Php100,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the Court of Appeals, each
accused-appellant is sentenced to pay jointly and severally to the heirs of Elizabeth Leo: the
amounts of Php100,000.00 as moral damages and Php100,000.00 as exemplary damages;

In Criminal Case No. 13972-R for Murder, each accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay jointly and severally the amounts of
Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php75,000.00 as moral damages, and Php75,000.00 as
exemplary damages plus temperate damages of Php50,000.00 to the heirs of Namuel Aniban;
and

In Criminal Case No. 13973-R, for Frustrated Murder, each accused-appellant is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate sentence often (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Each accused-appellant is ordered to pay, jointly and severally, Php50,000:00 as civil
indemnity, and the amounts of Php50,000.00 as moral damages and Php50,000.00 as
exemplary damages to Cherry Mae Bantiway.

WHEREFORE, for want of merit, this appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 25, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02430, which affirmed with modification
the August 18, 1999 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Baguio City, in
Criminal Case Nos. 13971-R, 13972-R, and 13973-R finding accused- appellants Eduardo
Golidan (Golidan) and Francis Nacionales (Nacionales) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes of rape with homicide, murder, and frustrated murder, is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION as to the above-mentioned amount of monetary awards.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Peralta,[*] Del Castillo, and Tijam, JJ., concur.

[*] Per Raffle dated January 8, 2018.

[1] Rollo, pp. 2-53; penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez with Associate Justices
Normandie B. Pizarro and Ramon A. Cruz concurring.

[2] CA rollo, pp. 141-185; penned by Judge Antonio C. Reyes.

[3] Id. at 35.

[4] Id. at 36.

[5] Id. at 37.

[6] Id. at 142-143.

[7] Rollo, p. 6.

[8] Id. at 9.

[9] Id.

[10] Id. at 10.

[11] Id. at 11.

[12] CA rollo, pp. 153-154.

[13] Id. at 154.

[14] Id. at 155-156.

[15] Id.

[16] Rollo, p. 10.

[17] Id.

[18] Id. at 11-12.

[19] Id. at 7.

[20] CA rollo, p. 150.

[21] Rollo, p. 13.

[22] Id.

[23] CA rollo, p. 156.

[24] Rollo, p. 16.

[25] Id. at 16-19.

[26] Id. at 17.

[27] Id. at 20. Nacionales's testimony was corroborated by Bautista, Remedios Nacionales,
Natalia Obena, and Loma-Ang.

[28] Id. at 21-22.

[29] Id. at 22-23.

[30] CA rollo, pp. 184-185.

[31] Id. at 203.

[32] Id. at 351.

[33] Id. at 417-418.

[34] Id. at 537.

[35] Id. at 599.

[36] Rollo, pp. 51-52.

[37] Id. at 29-31.

[38] Id. at 32-33.

[39] Citing People v. Pacaña, 398 Phil. 869, 881 (2000).

[40] People v. Hermosa, 417 Phil. 132, 148 (2001).

[41] G.R. No. 175592, June 14, 2016, 793 SCRA 266, 273-274.

[42] Supra note 40 at 141-142.

[43] Id. at 145.

[44] People v. Ilogon, G.R. No. 206294, June 29, 2016, 795 SCRA 201, 211.

[45] 761 Phil. 300, 311 (2015). See also People v. Rama, 403 Phil. 155, 174-175 (2001); People
v. Gajo, 384 Phil. 347, 356 (2000).

[46] 621 Phil. 536, 616-617 (2009).

[47] 532 Phil. 752, 764 (2006), citing People v. Gaudia, 467 Phil. 1025, 1039 (2004).

[48] People v. Bermas, 369 Phil. 191, 232 (1999).

[49] People v. Bagsit, 456 Phil. 623, 632 (2003).

[50] Esqueda v. People, 607 Phil. 480, 497 (2009).

[51] Lumanog v. People, 644 Phil. 296, 404 (2010).

[52] People v. Teñoso, 637 Phil. 595, 610 (2010).

[53] People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, 788 SCRA 331.

Today is Sunday, December 15, 2019home

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 200148 June 4, 2014

RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG, Petitioner,

vs.

TERESITA D. RIVERA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

For review is the instant Petition1 filed by Ramon A. Syhunliong (Syhunliong) seeking the
reversal of the Decision2 rendered on July 11, 2011 and Resolution3 issued on January 6,
2012 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 110335. The CA set aside the Orders
dated December 4, 20084 and June 18, 20095 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 84, which denied the Motion to Dismiss/Quash on Jurisdictional Challenge6
(Motion to Quash) filed by the herein respondent, Teresita D. Rivera (Rivera), in Criminal Case
No. Q-07-147802, an action for libel.

Antecedents

Syhunliong and Rivera are respectively the private complainant and defendant in Criminal
Case No. Q-07-147802. Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and Development
Corporation (BANFF) and likewise owns interests in construction, restaurant and hospital
businesses. On the other hand, Rivera used to be the Accounting Manager of BANFF. She
was hired in September of 2002 with a monthly salary of Php 30,000.00.

About three years after, Rivera, citing personal and family matters, tendered her resignation
to be effective on February 3, 2006. However, Rivera actually continued working for BANFF
until March of the same year to complete the turn over of papers under her custody to
Jennifer Lumapas (Lumapas), who succeeded her.

Sometime in April of 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to request for the payment of her
remaining salaries, benefits and incentives. Lumapas informed Rivera that her benefits would
be paid, but the check representing her salaries was still unsigned, and her incentives were
put on hold by Syhunliong.7

On April 6, 2006, at around 11:55 a.m., Rivera sent the following text message to one of
BANFF’s official cellular phones held by Lumapas:
I am expecting that[.] [G]rabe talagasufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha nglast pay ko. I
don’t deserve this [because] I did my job when I [was] still there. God bless ras[.]8 [S]ana
yung pagsimba niya, alam niya real meaning.9 (Italics ours)

Minutes later, Rivera once again texted another message, which reads:

Kailangan release niya lahat [nang] makukuha ko diyanincluding incentive up to the last
datena nandyan ako para di na kami abot sa labor.10 (Italics ours)

Subsequently, on December of 2006, Rivera filed before the National Labor Relations
Commission a complaint against Syhunliong for underpaid salaries, 13th to 16th month and
incentive pay, gratuities and tax refund in the total sum of Php 698,150.48.11

On April 16, 2007,12 pending the resolution of the aforecited labor case, Syhunliong
instituted against Rivera a complaint for libel, the origin of the instant petition. The
information, dated June 21, 2007, charged Rivera with the following:

That on or about the 6th day of April, 2006, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
with malicious intent of impeaching the honor, virtue, character and reputation of one
RAMON A. SYHUNGLIONG [sic] and with evident intent of exposing the complainant to public
dishonor, discredit, contempt and ridicule, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and maliciously publish in the form of text messages and/or caused to be publish[ed] the
following defamatory statements through the company’s cellular phone, to wit:

xxxx

that with the said text message, the said accused meant and intended to convey as in fact
she did mean and convey, malicious and offensive insinuations and imputations that tends
[sic] to destroy the good name and reputation of Ramon Syhunliong, with no good or
justifiable motive but solely for the purpose of maligning and besmirching the good name,
honor, character and reputation of the said complainant and to expose it, as in fact [he] was
exposed to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, to the damage and prejudice of said
offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.13
Rivera filed a Motion to Quash14 the aforequoted information. She argued that the text
message, which was the subject of the libel complaint, merely reflected the undue stress she
had suffered due to the delay in the release of her unpaid salaries, benefits and incentives.
Further, the facts charged in the information did not constitute the crime of libel as the
elements of malice and the making of defamatory imputation for public consumption were
wanting. Her text message was not prompted by ill will or spite, but was merely sent as part
of her duty to defend her own interests.

During the arraignment on October 11, 2007, Rivera entered a plea of not guilty.15

The Orders of the RTC

On December 4, 2008, the RTC issued an Order16 denying Rivera’s Motion to Quash on these
grounds:

[T]he grounds raised by [Rivera] in the motion to quash [are] evidentiary in nature[,] which
can only be threshed out in a full blown hearing to determine if said [t]ext message falls
squarely within the parameters of "Privileged Communication" or the elements of Article 353
of the Revised Penal Code [are] not fully established by the Prosecution’s evidence.

The Rule on Criminal Procedure in the prosecution of any felony or offense requires only the
existence of probable cause in order to indict an accused of the crime charged. x x x
[P]robable cause was established seasonably during the preliminary investigation. [Rivera]
should have participated during the preliminary investigation or filed a Motion for re-
investigation [if] she was not accorded such right and raised these grounds, before she
enter[ed] her plea during arraignment.

The Supreme Court ruled that "[i]t should be noted that the libelous material [or text] must be
viewed as a whole. In order to ascertain the meaning of [the] published article [or text
message], the whole of the article must be considered, each phrase must be construed in the
light of the entire publication."

The Supreme Court held that "writing [or texting] to a person other than the person defamed
is sufficient to constitute publication, for the person to whom the letter [text message] is
addressed is a third person in relation to its writer and the person defamed therein. In this
case, the wife of the complainant[,] who received the unsealed letter[,] is held a third person
to whom the publication is made.[ ]17 (Citations omitted)

The RTC thereafter issued an Order18 on June 18, 2009 denying Rivera’s motion for
reconsideration to the foregoing. Citing Lu Chu Sing and Lu Tian Chiong v. Lu Tiong Gui,19
the RTC explained that the privileged character of a communication merely does away with
the presumption of malice. However, the plaintiff is not precluded from proving the existence
of such malice. The RTC once again concurred with the Public Prosecutor’s finding that there
was probable cause to indict Rivera for having ascribed to Syhunliong the possession of a
vice or defect, or for having committed an act, tending to cause dishonor or discredit to the
latter’s name.

Rivera challenged the orders issued by the RTC through a Petition for Certiorari20 filed
before the CA. Quoting Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), she emphasized that
"every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown," except in "a private communication
made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty."21
Citing Brillante v. Court of Appeals,22 Rivera enumerated the requisites, compliance with
which would make a statement fall within the purview of a qualified privileged
communication, viz: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social
duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may
either be his own or of the one [for] whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to
an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the
power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are
made in good faith and without malice.23 Rivera likewise stressed that under Sections 3(a)24
and 9,25 Rule 11726 of the Rules of Court, an accused may move to quash the information
even after arraignment if the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense. She thus
concluded that the text message she sent to Lumapas was in the nature of a qualified
privileged communication, it being merely an expression of her legitimate grievances over
the delay in the release of her unpaid salaries and other entitlements. Rivera texted Lumapas
because the latter was in the best position to help expedite the release of the checks. Rivera
had no intent to injure anyone’s reputation. Lastly, Rivera labeled as erroneous the RTC’s
declaration regarding the necessity of a full blown trial since facts sufficient for the
resolution of the case were allegedly already extant in the records. The CA Ruling

On July 11, 2011, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision27 directing the dismissal of
the information for libel filed against Rivera. The CA favorably considered her argument that
when the facts in an information fail to charge an offense, the said ground can be invoked by
the accused in a motion to quash filed even after arraignment. The CA likewise explained
that:

The focal issue to the parties in the present case is whether the facts charged in the
information[,]as well as the undeniable facts appearing on the record[,] show that an offense
of libel has been committed. Our criminal law convincingly provide us with a definition of
libel – It is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect ... or any act,
omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or
contempt of ... a person. x x x.

The first procedural requisite in the determination of the existence of libel is whether there is
a defamatory imputation. The history of the law on libel abounds in examples of utterances or
statements that are not necessarily considered libelous because they are a [sic] mere
expression[s] of an [sic] opinion[s] of a [sic] person[s] in connection with a [sic] plea[s] or
grievance[s]. Libel is inherently a limitation on the liberty of speech and press freedom, and
must be construed in a manner that does not trench upon constitutionally protected
freedoms.

x x x There can be libel only if the words used are calculated to induce the hearer or reader to
suppose and understand them as impeaching the honesty, virtue or reputation of another.
The question is not what the writer or speaker meant by his words but what they convey to
those who heard or read them.

xxxx

We can break up the text message of [Rivera] to [Lumapas] into three parts. The utterance is
mercifully short so that it could not be difficult to infer the whole sense and understanding of
the message from the standpoint of Lumapas to whom the message was conveyed. In
context, [Rivera] was seeking payment of her wage claims consequent to her resignation and
receiving [BANFF’s] response through Lumapas. [Rivera] retorted with three things in her
message to Lumapas – (1) that she suffered a lot in collecting her last pay from [BANFF]
Grabe talaga sufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha ng lastpay ko.[;] (2) that she does not
deserve to suffer this way [because she] did [her] job when [she was] still there[;] and (3)
turning to [Syhunliong] himself [she] said – God bless ras[.] [S]ana yung pagsimba niya, alam
niya real meaning.

If libel is to be understood as an imputation of a crime, vice or defect to another, there can be

no libel in the first two of the three statements which announced only the sufferings, albeit
undeserved[,] of [Rivera]. The proposition gets to be dicey in the third statement because
now she makes a distinct reference to [Syhunliong][,] [b]ut is the imputation defamatory? We
hesitate to reach this conclusion, and all doubts in criminal law, we are basically taught, must
be resolved in favor of the accused. To articulate the legal wisdom, [Rivera] has the right to
express an opinion in a matter in which she has an undeniable interest.
[Rivera said] in the last part of the text that [Syhunliong] should understand the real meaning
of the masswhen he goes to attend it. It is in this tail end of the message that [Syhunliong] is
mentioned. But what is conveyed by the words ["]sana alam niya real meaning?[ ] Does it
impute a crime, vice or defect in [Syhunliong], either directly or by way of innuendo? But the
innuendo can only be explanatory of a libelous imputation and cannot alter the sense of the
words claimed to be libelous. If the publication is not actionable per se, an innuendo cannot
make it so, and if the publication is actionable per se, the innuendo would not even be
necessary.

We hold that the text message is not actionable libel. It does not serve to cast a shadow on
[Syhunliong’s]character and integrity[,] there being no direct and personal imputation of a
venality to him. At best, the statement that [Syhunliong] should understand the meaning of
the mass suggests that [Syhunliong] should be more compassionate and caring to the
employee. But is being the converse of compassionate and caring suggestive of a vice or
defect in the person alluded to? We do not think so. Otherwise, even courts should be
exposed to contempt and ridicule for reaching at times decisions in favor of capital and
against labor. x x x To follow the intent of the message as ordinarily conveyed by the words
and the context in which they are said, it can only suggest the intention of [Rivera] to
describe [Syhunliong] as strict and selfish. But[,] there are legitimate reasons why a person
who acts in the interest of the employer may appear strict and selfish to the other side. One
may have to be so to protect the interest of his company and, indeed, the outcome of the
labor case vindicates the stand of [Syhunliong] against giving [Rivera] the claims she sought
after.

A responsible officer whose decisions may affect the fortunes of others and who is faced
with criticism such as in this case should not be so onion-skinned as to react through the
criminal law. Instead, he should use methods of discussion and persuasion to dispel the
misgivings over his decisions. He should, in particular, explain through the same source that
told him of the comment why [BANFF]cannot satisfy all [of Rivera’s] claims.

x x x The matter contained in the text message is privileged communication under Article 354
of the Revised Penal Code which [negates] the existence of malice in – a private
communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, [moral] or
social duty. x x x It was Lumapas who told her of the stand of [Syhunliong] on the matter of
her wage claims, and her reaction through the text message may be deemed a part of her
duty to seek redress of her grievances through the same source. She was speaking in
response to duty and not out of an intent to injure the reputation of the person who claims to
be defamed. There was no unnecessary publicity of the message beyond the necessity of
conveying it to the party concerned.28 (Citations omitted and italics supplied)

The CA denied Syhunliong’s motion for reconsideration to the above through the herein
assailed Resolution29 dated January 6, 2012.
Issues and Arguments of the Parties

Undaunted, Syhunliong now presents to this Court the issues of whether or not: (a) the trial
court’s denial of a motion to quash information may be validly assailed through a special civil
action for certiorari; (b) Rivera may validly question the denial of her motion to quash before
the CA after voluntarily allowing herself to be arraigned even during the pendency of such
motion to quash; (c) the CA may validly review on certiorari what was, at best, an error of
judgment made by the RTC; (d) the CA correctly ruled that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute the offense of libel; and (e) the CA committed reversible error in
ordering the outright dismissal of Criminal Case No. Q-07-147802 on the putative ground that
the allegedly libelous text messages were privileged communication.30

In support of the petition, Syhunliong cites Soriano, et al. v. People, et al.31 where the Court
declared that in assailing the denial of a motion to quash an information, the accused should
not file a special civil action for certiorari. Instead, the accused should enter a plea, go to trial
sans prejudice to present the special defenses he or she had invoked in the motion to quash,
and if an adverse decision is rendered, file an appeal therefrom.

Syhunliong further avers that Rivera was arraigned on October 11, 2007. Section 1, Rule 117
of the Rules of Court clearly provides that the accused may only be allowed to file a motion to
quash at any time before entering a plea. In Rivera’s case, she had already voluntarily
entered a plea;

hence, it was tantamount to an effective abandonment of her motion to quash.

It is also Syhunliong’s argument that the CA improperly arrogated unto itself the power to
review the Public Prosecutor and RTC’s uniform finding of the existence of probable cause.
Even if it were to be assumed that the RTC erred in its disposition, it was a mistake of
judgment and not of jurisdiction.

Syhunliong also refutes the CA’s finding that the facts charged in the information did not
constitute the crime of libel. The text message was apparently an indictment of his
personality and character since it portrayed him as a hypocrite.

Lastly, Syhunliong invokes People v. Judge Gomez32 which enunciated the doctrine that in a
libel case, the privileged nature of a communication is not a ground for a motion to quash,
but is merely a matter of defense to be proven during the trial.
In Rivera’s Comment,33 she reiterates the arguments in the Motion to Quash filed with the
RTC. Additionally, she contends that the RTC no longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance of
Syhunliong’s complaint. The text message was sent on April 6, 2006.Per Syhunliong’s
narration in the instant petition, his complaint was filed on August 18, 2007,34 beyond the
one year prescriptive period for instituting actions for libel provided for in Articles 9035 and
9136 of the RPC.

Further, the ground that the facts charged in the information did not constitute an offense
can be raised even after arraignment and is broad enough to cover within its ambit lack of
probable cause. This, the court can re-assess in the exercise of its inherent power of judicial
review.

Rivera also laments that she was deprived of due process and of the opportunity to submit
countervailing evidence during preliminary investigation.

Our Ruling

There is no merit in the instant petition.

Prescription had set in.

Syhunliong raised five issues before this Court, but the Court’s resolution of the same would
be a superfluity in the light of Rivera’s unrefuted averment that prescription had set in before
the complaint for libel was instituted.

In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,37 the Court, partially quoting People v. Moran,38 stressed the
reason behind and the character of prescription of penal offenses, to wit:

"Here the State is the grantor, surrendering by act of grace its rights to prosecute, and
declaring the offense to be no longer the subject of prosecution. The statute is not a statute
of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a
certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offence; x x x that from henceforth[,] he may
cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out.
Hence[,] it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant,
not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but
because the very existence of the statute, is a recognition and notification by the legislature
of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed
and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt. Independently of these views, it
must be remembered that delay in instituting prosecutions is not only productive of expense
to the State, but of peril to public justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere
natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be
prompt, and that statutes, enforcing such promptitude should be vigorously maintained.
They are not merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by the State upon itself, to exact
vigilant activity from its subalterns, and to secure for criminal trials the best evidence that
can be obtained."

Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny petitioner the benefits accruing from the
liberal construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes. Prescription emanates from the
liberality of the State. x x x Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the grantee
thereof, the accused.39 (Italics supplied)

In the case at bar, it is extant in the records that Syhunliong filed his complaint against Rivera
more than one year after the allegedly libelous message was sent to Lumapas. Whether the
date of the filing of the complaint is April 16, 2007 or August 18, 2007,40 it would not alter the
fact that its institution was made beyond the prescriptive period provided for in Article 90 of
the RPC. The Court finds no persuasive reason why Rivera should be deprived of the benefits
accruing from the prescription of the crime ascribed to her.

People v. Castro,41 on the other hand, is instructive anent the effect in criminal proceedings
of the failure of an accused to raise prescription as a ground in a motion to quash an
information, viz:

Does the failure of the accused to move to quash before pleading constitute a waiver to raise
the question of prescription at a later stage of the case?

A case in point is People vs. Moran, 44 Phil., 387. x x x [T]he court ruled that the crime had
already prescribed holding that this defense can not [b]e deemed waived even if the case had
been decided by the lower court and was pending appeal in the Supreme Court. The
philosophy behind this ruling was aptly stated as follows: "Although the general rule is that
the defense of prescription is not available unless expressly set up in the lower court, as in
that case it is presumed to have been waived and cannot be taken advantage of thereafter,
yet this rule is not always of absolute application in criminal cases, such as that in which
prescription of the crime is expressly provided by law, for the State not having then the right
to prosecute, or continue prosecuting, nor to punish, or continue punishing, the offense, or
to continue holding the defendant subject to its action through the imposition of the penalty,
the court must so declare."

And elaborating on this proposition, the Court went on to state as follows:

"As prescription of the crime is the loss by the State of the right to prosecute and punish the
same, it is absolutely indisputable that from the moment the State has lost or waived such
right, the defendant may, at any stage of the proceeding, demand and ask that the same be
finally dismissed and he be acquitted from the complaint, and such petition is proper and
effective even if the court taking cognizance of the case has already rendered judgment and
said judgment is merely in suspense, pending the resolution of a motion for a
reconsideration and new trial, and this is the more so since in such a case there is not yet
any final and irrevocable judgment."
The ruling above adverted to squarely applies to the present case. Here, the rule provides
that the plea of prescription should be set up before arraignment, or before the accused
pleads to the charge, as otherwise the defense would be deemed waived; but, as was well
said in the Moran case, this rule is not of absolute application, especially when it conflicts
with a substantive provisions of the law, such as that which refers to prescription of crimes.
Since, under the Constitution, the Supreme Court has only the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleadings, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law, and
cannot cover substantive rights (section 13, article VIII, of the Constitution), the rule we are
considering cannot be interpreted or given such scope or extent that would come into
conflict or defeat an express provision of our substantive law. One of such provisions is
article 89of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the prescription of crime has the
effect of totally extinguishing the criminal liability. And so we hold that the ruling laid down in
the Moran case still holds good even if it were laid down before the adoption of the present
Rules of Court.42 (Italics supplied)

While Castro is an old jurisprudence, it still finds application in the case at bench in view of
Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which in essence partially provides that the defense
of extinction of criminal action or liability, e.g., prescription, is not deemed waived even if the
accused had not raised the same in a motion to quash. In Rivera’s case, the issue of
prescription is raised in her comment to the instant petition before this Court. Syhunliong
does not specifically refute Rivera’s averment, thus, it is deemed admitted.

In sum, even if the Court were to sustain Syhunliong’s stance that Rivera availed of the
wrong remedy when she resorted to filing a petition for certiorari before the CA to assail the
RTC orders denying the motion to quash, the result would only prove circuitous. Even if the
trial proceeds and an adverse decision is rendered against Rivera, she can appeal the same,
but the CA and this Court would still be compelled to order the dismissal of the information
on account of prescription of the crime.1âwphi1

Prescription of the crime is already a compelling reason for this Court to order the dismissal
of the libel information, but the Court still stresses that the text message which Rivera sent to
Lumapas falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication.

"The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in good faith on
any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a
duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding duty."43

In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged
communication under Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person
who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication,
or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to
whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior,
having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection
sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without
malice.44

In the case at bar, it was Lumapas who informed Rivera of either the delay or denial of the
latter's claims for payment of salaries, benefits and incentives by Syhunliong. Rivera
expressed through the subject text message her grievances to Limapas. At that time,
Lumapas was the best person, who could help expedite the release of Rivera's claims.

Prescinding from the above, the Court thus finds no error in the CA' s declaration that
Rivera's text message falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged communication since
she "was speaking in response to duty [to protect her own interest] and not out of an intent
to injure the reputation"45 of Syhunliong. Besides, "[t]here was no unnecessary publicity of
the message beyond [that] of conveying it to the party concerned."46

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision rendered on July 11, 2011
and Resolution issued on January 6, 2012 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110335
ordering the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84, to dismiss the information for
libel filed by Ramon A. Syhunliong against Teresita D. Rivera are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justic

G.R. No. 145225 April 2, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
SALVADOR GOLIMLIM @ "BADONG", appellants.
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On appeal is the Decision1 of June 9, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
Branch 65 in Criminal Case No. 241, finding appellant Salvador Golimlim alias "Badong" guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape, imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and holding
him civilly liable in the amount of ₱50,000.00 as indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
The Information dated April 16, 1997 filed against appellant reads as follows:

That sometime in the month of August, 1996, at Barangay Bical, Municipality of Bulan,
Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the
above-named accused, armed with a bladed weapon, by means of violence and intimidation,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge of one Evelyn
Canchela against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.

Contrary to law.2

Upon arraignment on December 15, 1997,3 appellant, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged.

The facts established by the prosecution are as follows:

Private complainant Evelyn G. Canchela (Evelyn), is a mental retardate. When her mother,
Amparo Hachero, left for Singapore on May 2, 1996 to work as a domestic helper, she
entrusted Evelyn to the care and custody of her (Amparo’s) sister Jovita Guban and her
husband Salvador Golimlim, herein appellant, at Barangay Bical, Bulan, Sorsogon.4

Sometime in August 1996, Jovita left the conjugal residence to meet a certain Rosing,5 leaving
Evelyn with appellant. Taking advantage of the situation, appellant instructed private complainant to
sleep,6 and soon after she had laid down, he kissed her and took off her clothes.7 As he poked at her
an object which to Evelyn felt like a knife,8 he proceeded to insert his penis into her vagina.9 His lust
satisfied, appellant fell asleep.

When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what appellant did to her. Jovita, however, did not believe
her and in fact she scolded her.10

Sometime in December of the same year, Lorna Hachero, Evelyn’s half-sister, received a letter from
their mother Amparo instructing her to fetch Evelyn from Sorsogon and allow her to stay in
Novaliches, Quezon City where she (Lorna) resided. Dutifully, Lorna immediately repaired to
appellant’s home in Bical, and brought Evelyn with her to Manila.

A week after she brought Evelyn to stay with her, Lorna suspected that her sister was pregnant as
she noticed her growing belly. She thereupon brought her to a doctor at the Pascual General
Hospital at Baeza, Novaliches, Quezon City for check-up and ultrasound examination.

Lorna’s suspicions were confirmed as the examinations revealed that Evelyn was indeed
pregnant.11 She thus asked her sister how she became pregnant, to which Evelyn replied that
appellant had sexual intercourse with her while holding a knife.12

In February of 1997, the sisters left for Bulan, Sorsogon for the purpose of filing a criminal complaint
against appellant. The police in Bulan, however, advised them to first have Evelyn examined.
Obliging, the two repaired on February 24, 1997 to the Municipal Health Office of Bulan, Sorsogon
where Evelyn was examined by Dr. Estrella Payoyo.13 The Medico-legal Report revealed the
following findings, quoted verbatim:

FINDINGS: LMP [last menstrual period]: Aug. 96 ?

Abd [abdomen]: 7 months AOG [age of gestation]

 FHT [fetal heart tone]: 148/min

Presentation: Cephalic

Hymen: old laceration at 3, 5, 7, & 11 o’clock position14

On the same day, the sisters went back to the Investigation Section of the Bulan Municipal Police
Station before which they executed their sworn statements.15

On February 27, 1997, Evelyn, assisted by Lorna, filed a criminal complaint for rape16 against
appellant before the Municipal Trial Court of Bulan, Sorsogon, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6272.

In the meantime or on May 7, 1997, Evelyn gave birth to a girl, Joana Canchela, at Guruyan, Juban,
Sorsogon.17

Appellant, on being confronted with the accusation, simply said that it is not true "[b]ecause her mind
is not normal,"18 she having "mentioned many other names of men who ha[d] sexual intercourse with
her."19

Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, by the present appealed Decision, convicted appellant as
charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Salvador Golimlim having been found guilty
of the crime of RAPE (Art. 335 R.P.C. as amended by RA 7659) beyond reasonable doubt is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to indemnify the
offended party Evelyn Canchela in the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and another
P50,000.00 as moral damage[s], and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.20

Hence, the present appeal, appellant assigning to the trial court the following errors:

I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
CONTRADICTORY AND IMPLAUSIBLE TESTIMONY OF EVELYN CANCHELA, A
MENTAL RETARDATE, [AND]

II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.21

Appellant argues that Evelyn’s testimony is not categorical and is replete with contradictions, thus
engendering grave doubts as to his criminal culpability.

In giving credence to Evelyn’s testimony and finding against appellant, the trial court made the
following observations, quoted verbatim:

1) Despite her weak and dull mental state the victim was consistent in her claim that her
Papay Badong (accused Salvador Golimlim) had carnal knowledge of her and was the
author of her pregnancy, and nobody else (See: For comparison her Sworn Statement on p.
3/Record; her narration in the Psychiatric Report on pp. 47 & 48/Record; the TSNs of her
testimony in open court);
 2) She remains consistent that her Papay Badong raped her only once;

3) That the contradictory statements she made in open court relative to the details of how
she was raped, although would seem derogatory to her credibility and reliability as a witness
under normal conditions, were amply explained by the psychiatrist who examined her and
supported by her findings (See: Exhibits F to F-2);

4) Despite her claim that several persons laid on top of her (which is still subject to question
considering that the victim could not elaborate on its meaning), the lucid fact remains that
she never pointed to anybody else as the author of her pregnancy, but her Papay Badong.
Which only shows that the trauma that was created in her mind by the incident has remained
printed in her memory despite her weak mental state. Furthermore, granting for the sake of
argument that other men also laid on top of her, this does not deviate from the fact that her
Papay Badong (the accused) had sexual intercourse with her.22

The trial judge’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses’ testimonies is, as has repeatedly been
held by this Court, accorded great respect on appeal in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on
its part, it having had the advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial evidence
including the demeanor of the witnesses.23

In the present case, no cogent reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure from the findings of
the trial court with respect to the assessment of Evelyn’s testimony.

That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render her testimony
bereft of truth.

Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:

SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. – Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to
others, may be witnesses.

xxx

SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. – The following

persons cannot be witnesses:

(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such
that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;

(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the
facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.

In People v. Trelles,24 where the trial court relied heavily on the therein mentally retarded private
complainant’s testimony irregardless of her "monosyllabic responses and vacillations between
lucidity and ambiguity," this Court held:

A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness,
her mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that
intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the
 competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable
narrative of the matter testified to.25

It can not then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness, depending on his or
her ability to relate what he or she knows.26 If his or her testimony is coherent, the same
is admissible in court.27

To be sure, modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify
a witness. As observed by McCormick, the remedy of excluding such a witness who may be the only
person available who knows the facts, seems inept and primitive. Our rules follow the modern trend
of evidence.28

Thus, in a long line of cases,29 this Court has upheld the conviction of the accused based mainly on
statements given in court by the victim who was a mental retardate.

From a meticulous scrutiny of the records of this case, there is no reason to doubt Evelyn’s
credibility. To be sure, her testimony is not without discrepancies, given of course her
feeblemindedness.

By the account of Dr. Chona Cuyos-Belmonte, Medical Specialist II at the Psychiatric Department of
the Bicol Medical Center, who examined Evelyn, although Evelyn was suffering from moderate
mental retardation with an IQ of 46,30 she is capable of perceiving and relating events which
happened to her. Thus the doctor testified:

Q: So do you try to impress that although she answers in general terms it does not
necessarily mean that she might be inventing answers – only that she could not go to the
specific details because of dullness?

A: I don’t think she was inventing her answer because I conducted mental status
examination for three (3) times and I tried to see the consistency in the narration but very
poor (sic) in giving details.

xxx

Q: May we know what she related to you?

A: She related to me that she was raped by her uncle ‘Tatay Badong’. What she mentioned
was that, and I quote: ‘hinila ang panty ko, pinasok ang pisot at bayag niya sa pipi ko’. She
would laugh inappropriately after telling me that particular incident. I also tried to ask her
regarding the dates, the time of the incident, but she could not really…. I tried to elicit those
important things, but the patient had a hard time remembering those dates.

Q: But considering that you have evaluated her mentally, gave her I.Q. test, in your honest
opinion, do you believe that this narration by the patient to you about the rape is reliable?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Why do you consider that reliable?

A: Being a (sic) moderately retarded, I have noticed the spontaneity of her answers during
the time of the testing. She was not even hesitating when she told me she was raped once at
 home by her Tatay Badong; and she was laughing when she told me about how it was done
on (sic) her. So, although she may be inappropriate but (sic) she was spontaneous, she was
consistent.

Q: Now, I would like to relate to you an incident that happened in this Court for you to give us
your expert opinion. I tried to present the victim in this case to testify. While she testified that
she was raped by her uncle Badong, when asked about the details, thereof, she would not
make (sic) the detail. She only answered ‘wala’ (no). I ask this question because somehow
this seems related to your previous evaluation that while she gave an answer, she gave no
detail. Now, I was thinking because I am a man and I was the one asking and the Judge is a
man also. And while the mother would say that she would relate to her and she related to
you, can you explain to us why when she was presented in court that occurrence, that event
happened?

A: There are a lot of possible answers to that question; one, is the court’s atmosphere itself.
This may have brought a little anxiety on the part of the patient and this inhibits her from
relating some of the details relative to the incident-in-question. When I conducted my
interview with the patient, there were only two (2) of us in the room. I normally do not ask this
question during the first session with the patient because these are emotionally leading
questions, and I do not expect the patient to be very trusting. So, I usually ask this type of
questions during the later part of my examination to make her relax during my evaluation. So
in this way, she will be more cooperative with me. I don’t think that this kind of atmosphere
within the courtroom with some people around, this could have inhibited the patient from
answering questions.

xxx

Q: What if the victim is being coached or led by someone else, will she be able to answer the
questions?

A: Yes, she may be able to answer the questions, but you would notice the inconsistency of
the answers because what we normally do is that we present the questions in different ways,
and we expect the same answer. This is how we try to evaluate the patient. If the person,
especially a retarded, is being coached by somebody, the answers will no longer be
consistent.

Q: You also mentioned a while ago that the answers given by the patient, taken all in all,
were consistent?

A: Yes, sir.31 (Underscoring supplied)

As noted in the above-quoted testimony of Dr. Belmonte, Evelyn could give spontaneous and
consistent answers to the same but differently framed questions under conditions which do not
inhibit her from answering. It could have been in this light that Evelyn was able to relate in court,
upon examination by a female government prosecutor and the exclusion of the public from the
proceedings, on Dr. Belmonte’s suggestion,32 how, as quoted below, she was raped and that it was
appellant who did it:

Q: Lorna Hachero testified before this Court that you gave birth to a baby girl named
Johanna, is this true?

A: (The witness nods, yes.)

 xxx

Q: Who is the father of Johanna?

A: Papay Badong

Q: Who is this Papay Badong that you are referring to?

A: The husband of Mamay Bita.

Q: Is he here in court?

A: He is here.

Q: Please look around and point him to us.

A: (The witness pointing to the lone man sitting in the first row of the gallery wearing a
regular prison orange t-shirt who gave his name as Salvador Golimlim when asked.)

Q: Why were you able to say that it is Papay Badong who is the father of your child
Johanna?

A: Because then I was left at Mamay Bita’s house, although I am not there now.

Q: And that house where you were left is also the house of your Papay Badong?

A: Yes ma’am.

Q: What did Salvador Golimlim or your Papay Badong do to you that’s why you were able to
say that he is the father of your child?

A: I was undressed by him.

xxx

Q: What did you do after you were undressed?

A: I was scolded by the wife, Mamay Bita.

Q: I am referring to that very moment when you were undressed. Immediately after your
Papay Badong undressed you, what did you do?

xxx

A: He laid on top of me.

Q: What was your position when he laid on top of you?

A: I was lying down.

Q: Then after he went on top of you, what did he do there?

A: He made (sic) sexual intercourse with me.

Q: When you said he had a (sic) sexual intercourse with you, what did he do exactly?

A: He kissed me.

Q: Where?

A: On the cheeks (witness motioning indicating her cheeks).

Q: What else did he do? Please describe before this Honorable Court the sexual intercourse
which you are referring to which the accused did to you.

A: ‘Initoy’ and he slept after that.

(to Court)

Nevertheless, may we request that the local term for sexual intercourse, the word
‘Initoy’ which was used by the witness be put on the record, and we request judicial notice of
the fact that ‘initoy’ is the local term for sexual intercourse.

xxx

Q: What did you feel when your Papay Badong had sexual intercourse with you?

A: I felt a knife; it was like a knife.

Q: Where did you feel that knife?

A: I forgot.

Q: Why did you allow your Papay Badong to have sexual intercourse with you?

A: I will not consent to it.

xxx

Q: Did you like what he did to you?

A: I do not want it.

Q: But why did it happen?

A: I was forced to.

xxx
 Q: Did you feel anything when he inserted into your vagina when your Papay Badong laid on
top of you?

A: His sexual organ/penis.

Q: How did you know that it was the penis of your Papay Badong that was entered into your
vagina?

A: It was put on top of me.

Q: Did it enter your vagina?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

xxx

Q: Madam Witness, is it true that your Papay Badong inserted his penis into your vagina or
sexual organ during that time that he was on top of you?

A: (The witness nods, yes.)33 (Underscoring supplied)

Appellant’s bare denial is not only an inherently weak defense. It is not supported by clear and
convincing evidence. It cannot thus prevail over the positive declaration of Evelyn who convincingly
identified him as her rapist.34

In convicting appellant under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
7659 (the law in force when the crime was committed in 1996), the trial court did not specify under
which mode the crime was committed. Under the said article, rape is committed thus:

ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua or death.

xxx

It is settled that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes statutory rape
which does not require proof that the accused used force or intimidation in having carnal knowledge
of the victim for conviction.35 The fact of Evelyn’s mental retardation was not, however, alleged in the
Information and, therefore, cannot be the basis for conviction. Such notwithstanding, that force and
intimidation attended the commission of the crime, the mode of commission alleged in the
Information, was adequately proven. It bears stating herein that the mental faculties of a retardate
being different from those of a normal person, the degree of force needed to overwhelm him or her is
less. Hence, a quantum of force which may not suffice when the victim is a normal person, may be
more than enough when employed against an imbecile.36

Still under the above-quoted provision of Art. 335 of the Rev ised Penal Code, when the crime of
rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
In the case at bar, however, although there is adequate evidence showing that appellant indeed
used force and intimidation, that is not the case with respect to the use of a deadly weapon.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 65
in Criminal Case No. 241 finding appellant, Salvador Golimlim alias "Badong," GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of rape, which this Court finds to have been committed under paragraph 1, Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, and holding him civilly liable therefor, is hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 217426, December 04, 2017

ST. MARTIN POLYCLINIC, INC., Petitioner, v. LWV CONSTRUCTION

CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated July 11, 2014 and the
Resolution3 dated February 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 125451, which affirmed
with modification the Decision4 dated December 15, 2011 and the Order dated May 25, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 211 (RTC) in SCA Case No. MC11-879 (Civil Case No. 21881), and
thereby ordered herein petitioner St. Martin Polyclinic, Inc. (petitioner) to pay respondent LWV Construction
Corporation (respondent) temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00.

The Facts

Respondent is engaged in the business of recruiting Filipino workers for deployment to Saudi Arabia.5 On the
other hand, petitioner is an accredited member of the Gulf Cooperative Council Approved Medical Centers
Association (GAMCA) and as such, authorized to conduct medical examinations of prospective applicants for
overseas employment.6

On January 10, 2008, respondent referred prospective applicant Jonathan V. Raguindin (Raguindin) to
petitioner for a pre-deployment medical examination in accordance with the instructions from GAMCA.7 After
undergoing the required examinations, petitioner cleared Raguindin and found him "fit for employment," as
evidenced by a Medical Report8 dated January 11, 2008 (Medical Report).9

Based on the foregoing, respondent deployed Raguindin to Saudi Arabia, allegedly incurring expenses in the
amount of P84,373.41.10 Unfortunately, when Raguindin underwent another medical examination with the
General Care Dispensary of Saudi Arabia (General Care Dispensary) on March 24, 2008, he purportedly
tested positive for HCV or the hepatitis C virus. The Ministry of Health of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(Ministry of Health) required a re-examination of Raguindin, which the General Care Dispensary conducted
on April 28, 2008.11 However, the results of the re-examination remained the same, i.e., Raguindin was
positive for HCV, which results were reflected in a Certification12 dated April 28, 2008 (Certification). An
undated HCV Confirmatory Test Report13 likewise conducted by the Ministry of Health affirmed such finding,
thereby leading to Raguindin's repatriation to the Philippines.14

Claiming that petitioner was reckless in issuing its Medical Report stating that Raguindin is "fit for
employment" when a subsequent finding in Saudi Arabia revealed that he was positive for HCV, respondent
filed a Complaint15 for sum of money and damages against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 60 (MeTC). Respondent essentially averred that it relied on petitioner's
declaration and incurred expenses as a consequence. Thus, respondent prayed for the award of damages in
the amount of P84,373.41 representing the expenses it incurred in deploying Raguindin abroad.16

In its Answer with compulsory counterclaim,17 petitioner denied liability and claimed that: first, respondent
was not a proper party in interest for lack of privity of contract between them; second, the MeTC had no
jurisdiction over the case as it involves the interpretation and implementation of a contract of
employment; third, the action is premature as Raguindin has yet to undergo a post-employment medical
examination following his repatriation; and fourth, the complaint failed to state a cause of action as the
Medical Report issued by petitioner had already expired on April 11, 2008, or three (3) months after its
issuance on January 11, 2008.18

The MeTC Ruling

In a Decision19 dated December 17, 2010, the MeTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent and ordered
petitioner to pay the amount of P84,373.41 as actual damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs
of suit.20

At the onset, the MeTC held that it had jurisdiction over the case, since respondent was claiming actual
damages incurred in the deployment of Raguindin in the amount of P84,373.41.21 It further ruled that
respondent was a real party in interest, as it would not have incurred expenses had petitioner not issued the
Medical Report certifying that Raguindin was fit to work.

On the merits, the MeTC found that respondent was entitled to be informed accurately of the precise
condition of Raguindin before deploying the latter abroad and consequently, had sustained damage as a
result of the erroneous certification.22 In this relation, it rejected petitioner's contention that Raguindin may
have contracted the disease after his medical examination in the Philippines up to the time of his
deployment, there being no evidence offered to corroborate the same.23

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC, contending,24 among others, that respondent failed to comply
with the requirements on the authentication and proof of documents under Section 24,25 Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, considering that respondent's evidence, particularly the April 28, 2008 Certification issued by
the General Care Dispensary and the HCV Confirmatory Test Report issued by the Ministry of Health, are
foreign documents issued in Saudi Arabia.

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision26 dated December 15, 2011, the RTC dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed the MeTC
Decision in its entirety.27 Additionally, the RTC pointed out that petitioner can no longer change the theory of
the case or raise new issues on appeal, referring to the latter's argument on the authentication of
respondent's documentary evidence.28

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration29 was denied in an Order30 dated May 25, 2012. Dissatisfied,
petitioner elevated the case to the CA.31

The CA Ruling

In a Decision32 dated July 11, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision, with the modification deleting the
award of actual damages and instead, awarding temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00.33

The CA held that petitioner failed to perform its duty to accurately diagnose Raguindin when it issued its
Medical Report declaring the latter "fit for employment", considering that he was subsequently found
positive for HCV in Saudi Arabia.34 Further, the CA opined that the Certification issued by the General Care
Dispensary is not a public document and in such regard, rejected petitioner's argument that the same is
inadmissible in evidence for not having been authenticated. Moreover, it remarked that petitioner's own
Medical Report does not enjoy the presumption of regularity as petitioner is merely an accredited
clinic.35 Finally, the CA ruled that petitioner could not disclaim liability on the ground that Raguindin tested
positive for HCV in Saudi Arabia after the expiration of the Medical Report on April 11, 2008, noting that the
General Care Dispensary issued its Certification on April 28, 2008, or a mere seventeen (17) days from the
expiration of petitioner's Medical Report.36 Hence, the CA concluded that "it is contrary to human experience
that a newly-deployed overseas worker, such as Raguindin, would immediately contract a serious virus at
the very beginning of a deployment."37

However, as the records are bereft of evidence to show that respondent actually incurred the amount of
P84,373.41 as expenses for Raguindin's deployment, the CA deleted the award of actual damages and
instead, awarded temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00.38

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration,39 which the CA denied in a Resolution40 dated
February 27, 2015; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not petitioner was negligent in issuing
the Medical Report declaring Raguindin "fit for employment" and hence, should be held liable for damages.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is granted.

I.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done acting on a
petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts but reviews only questions of
law.41 Thus, in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may generally be put into issue. This
rule, however, admits of certain exceptions, such as "when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible"; or "when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based."42 Finding a confluence of certain exceptions in this case, the general rule that only legal
issues may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court would not
apply, and the Court retains the authority to pass upon the evidence presented and draw conclusions
therefrom.43

II.

An action for damages due to the negligence of another may be instituted on the basis of Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

The elements of a quasi-delict are: (1) an act or omission; (2) the presence of fault or negligence in
the performance or non-performance of the act; (3) injury; (4) a causal connection between the
negligent act and the injury; and (5) no pre-existing contractual relation.44

As a general rule, any act or omission coming under the purview of Article 2176 gives rise to a cause of
action under quasi-delict. This, in turn, gives the basis for a claim of damages.45 Notably, quasi-delict is one
among several sources of obligation. Article 1157 of the Civil Code states:

Article 1157. Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts.

However, as explained by Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) in his opinion in Alano v.
Magud-Logmao46 (Alano), "Article 2176 is not an all-encompassing enumeration of all actionable
wrongs which can give rise to the liability for damages. Under the Civil Code, acts done in
violation of Articles 19, 20, and 21 will also give rise to damages."47 These provisions - which were
cited as bases by the MTC, RTC and CA in their respective rulings in this case - read as follows:

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

"[Article 19], known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in the performance of
one's duties."48 Case law states that "[w]hen a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with
the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would [then] be
proper."49 Between these two provisions as worded, it is Article 20 which applies to both willful and
negligent acts that are done contrary to law. On the other hand, Article 21 applies only to willful acts
done contra bonos mores.50

In the Alano case, Justice Leonen aptly elaborated on the distinctive applications of Articles 19, 20 and 21,
which are general provisions on human relations, vis-a-vis Article 2176, which particularly governs quasi-
delicts:

Article 19 is the general rule which governs the conduct of human relations. By itself, it is not the basis of an
actionable tort. Article 19 describes the degree of care required so that an actionable tort may arise when it
is alleged together with Article 20 or Article 21.

Article 20 concerns violations of existing law as basis for an injury. It allows recovery should the act
have been willful or negligent. Willful may refer to the intention to do the act and the desire to achieve the
outcome which is considered by the plaintiff in tort action as injurious. Negligence may refer to a situation
where the act was consciously done but without intending the result which the plaintiff considers as
injurious.

Article 21, on the other hand, concerns injuries that may be caused by acts which are not necessarily
proscribed by law. This article requires that the act be willful, that is, that there was an intention to do the
act and a desire to achieve the outcome. In cases under Article 21, the legal issues revolve around whether
such outcome should be considered a legal injury on the part of the plaintiff or whether the commission of
the act was done in violation of the standards of care required in Article 19.

Article 2176 covers situations where an injury happens through an act or omission of the defendant. When
it involves a positive act, the intention to commit the outcome is irrelevant. The act itself must not be a
breach of an existing law or a pre-existing contractual obligation. What will be considered is whether
there is "fault or negligence” attending the commission of the act which necessarily leads to the outcome
considered as injurious by the plaintiff. The required degree of diligence will then be assessed in relation to
the circumstances of each and every case.51 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, with respect to negligent acts or omissions, it should therefore be discerned that Article 20 of the
Civil Code concerns "violations of existing law as basis for an injury", whereas Article 2176
applies when the negligent act causing damage to another does not constitute "a breach of an
existing law or a pre-existing contractual obligation."

In this case, the courts a quo erroneously anchored their respective rulings on the provisions of Articles 19,
20, and 21 of the Civil Code. This is because respondent did not proffer (nor have these courts mentioned)
any law as basis for which damages may be recovered due to petitioner's alleged negligent act. In its
amended complaint, respondent mainly avers that had petitioner not issue a "fit for employment" Medical
Report to Raguindin, respondent would not have processed his documents, deployed him to Saudi Arabia,
and later on - in view of the subsequent findings that Raguindin was positive for HCV and hence, unfit to
work - suffered actual damages in the amount of P84,373.41.52 Thus, as the claimed negligent act of
petitioner was not premised on the breach of any law, and not to mention the incontestable fact that no pre-
existing contractual relation was averred to exist between the parties, Article 2176 - instead of Articles 19,
20 and 21 - of the Civil Code should govern.

III.

Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury.53

As early as the case of Picart v. Smith,54 the Court elucidated that "the test by which to determine the
existence of negligence in a particular case is: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act
use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence."55 Corollary thereto, the Court stated that "[t]he
question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be
always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular
case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value x x x: Reasonable men govern their conduct
by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to
be, omniscient of the future. Hence[,] they can be expected to take care only when there is
something before them to suggest or warn of danger."56

Under our Rules of Evidence, it is disputably presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and
that private transactions have been fair and regular.57 In effect, negligence cannot be presumed, and
thus, must be proven by him who alleges it.58 In Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc.:59

[T]he negligence or fault should be clearly established as it is the basis of her action. The burden of proof is
upon [the plaintiff]. Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that "burden of proof is the duty of a
party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of
evidence required by law." It is then up for the plaintiff to establish his cause of action or the defendant to
establish his defense. Therefore, if the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was damaged
because of the negligent acts of the defendant, he has the burden of proving such negligence. It
is even presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. The quantum of proof required
is preponderance of evidence.60 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The records of this case show that the pieces of evidence mainly relied upon by respondent to establish
petitioner's negligence are: (a) the Certification61 dated April 28, 2008; and (b) the HCV Confirmatory Test
Report.62 However, these issuances only indicate the results of the General Care Dispensary and Ministry of
Health's own medical examination of Raguindin finding him to be positive for HCV. Notably, the examination
conducted by the General Care Dispensary, which was later affirmed by the Ministry of Health, was
conducted only on March 24, 2008, or at least two (2) months after petitioner issued its Medical
Report on January 11, 2008. Hence, even assuming that Raguindin's diagnosis for HCV was correct, the
fact that he later tested positive for the same does not convincingly prove that he was already under the
same medical state at the time petitioner issued the Medical Report on January 11, 2008. In this regard, it
was therefore incumbent upon respondent to show that there was already negligence at the time the
Medical Report was issued, may it be through evidence that show that standard medical procedures were
not carefully observed or that there were already palpable signs that exhibited Raguindin's unfitness for
deployment at that time. This is hardly the case when respondent only proffered evidence which
demonstrate that months after petitioner's Medical Report was issued, Raguindin, who had already been
deployed to Saudi Arabia, tested positive for HCV and as such, was no longer "fit for employment".

In fact, there is a reasonable possibility that Raguindin became exposed to the HCV only after his medical
examination with petitioner on January 11, 2008. Based on published reports from the World Health
Organization, HCV or the hepatitis C virus causes both acute and chronic infection. Acute HCV infection is
usually asymptomatic,63 and is only very rarely associated with life-threatening diseases. The incubation
period64 for HCV is two (2) weeks to six (6) months, and following initial infection, approximately 80%
of people do not exhibit any symptoms.65 Indisputably, Raguindin was not deployed to Saudi Arabia
immediately after petitioner's medical examination and hence, could have possibly contracted the same only
when he arrived thereat. In light of the foregoing, the CA therefore erred in holding that "[h]ad petitioner
more thoroughly and diligently examined Raguindin, it would likely have discovered the existence of the HCV
because it was contrary to human experience that a newly-deployed overseas worker, such as Raguindin,
would immediately have contracted the disease at the beginning of his deployment"66

While petitioner's Medical Report indicates an expiration of April 11, 2008, the Court finds it fitting to clarify
that the same could not be construed as a certified guarantee coming from petitioner that Raguindin's
medical status at the time the report was issued on January 11, 2008 (i.e., that he was fit for employment)
would remain the same up until that date (i.e., April 11, 2008). As earlier intimated, the intervening period
could very well account for a number of variables that could have led to a change in Raguindin's condition,
such as his deployment to a different environment in Saudi Arabia. If at all, the expiration date only means
that the Medical Report is valid - and as such, could be submitted - as a formal requirement for overseas
employment up until April 11, 2008; it does not, by any means, create legal basis to hold the issuer
accountable for any intervening change of condition from the time of issuance up until expiration. Truly,
petitioner could not be reasonably expected to predict, much less assure, that Raguindin's medical status of
being fit for employment would remain unchanged. Thus, the fact that the Medical Report's expiration date
of April 11, 2008 was only seventeen (17) days away from the issuance of the General Care Dispensary's
April 28, 2008 Certification finding Raguindin positive for HCV should not - as it does not - establish
petitioner's negligence.

IV.

At any rate, the fact that Raguindin tested positive for HCV could not have been properly established since
the courts a quo, in the first place, erred in admitting and giving probative weight to the Certification of the
General Care Dispensary, which was written in an unofficial language. Section 33, Rule 132 ofthe Rules of
Court states that:

Section 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. - Documents written in an unofficial

language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or
Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such
translation prepared before trial.67

A cursory examination of the subject document would reveal that while it contains English words, the
majority of it is in an unofficial language. Sans any translation in English or Filipino provided by respondent,
the same should not have been admitted in evidence; thus their contents could not be given probative
value, and deemed to constitute proof of the facts stated therein.

Moreover, the due execution and authenticity of the said certification were not proven in accordance with
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:

Section 20. Proof of private document. - Before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

(c) Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed
to be.

Notably, the foregoing provision applies since the Certification does not fall within the classes of public
documents under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court68 - and hence, must be considered as private. It
has been settled that an unverified and unidentified private document cannot be accorded
probative value.69 In addition, case law states that "since a medical certificate involves an opinion of
one who must first be established as an expert witness, it cannot be given weight or credit
unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. It is precluded
because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine
the person to whom the statements or writings are attributed. Its executor or author should be presented as
a witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question its contents. Being mere
hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the medical certificate renders its contents suspect and of
no probative value,"70 as in this case.

Similarly, the HCV Confirmatory Test Report issued by the Ministry of Health of Saudi Arabia should have
also been excluded as evidence. Although the same may be considered a public document, being an alleged
written official act of an official body of a foreign country,71 the same was not duly authenticated in
accordance with Section 24,72 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. While respondent provided a
translation73 thereof from the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos, Bureau of External Relations, Office
of the President, the same was not accompanied by a certificate of the secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in Saudi Arabia, where the record is kdept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.74

To be sure, petitioner - contrary to respondent's contention75 - has not changed its theory of the case by
questioning the foregoing documents. As petitioner correctly argued, it merely amplified its defense76 that it
is not liable for negligence when it further questioned the validity of the issuances of the General Care
Dispensary and Ministry of Health. In Limpangco Sons v. Yangco77, the Court explained that "[t]here is a
difference x x x between a change in the theory of the case and a shifting of the incidence of the emphasis
placed during the trial or in the briefs." "Where x x x the theory of the case as set out in the pleadings
remains the theory throughout the progress of the cause, the change of emphasis from one phase of the
case as presented by one set of facts to another phase made prominent by another set of facts x x x does
not result in a change of theory x x x".78 In any case, petitioner had already questioned the validity of these
documents in its Position Paper79 before the MeTC.80 Hence, there is no change of theory that would
preclude petitioner's arguments on this score.

All told, there being no negligence proven by respondent through credible and admissible evidence,
petitioner cannot be held liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code as above-discussed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated July 11, 2014 and the Resolution
dated February 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 125451 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and a NEW ONE is entered, DISMISSING the complaint of respondent LWV Construction
Corporation for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 234156, January 07, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-

Appellee, v. EMMANUEL OLIVA Y JORJIL, BERNARDO
BARANGOT Y PILAIS AND MARK ANGELO MANALASTAS Y
GAPASIN, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
 PERALTA, J.:

This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated May 31, 2017 dismissing Emmanuel Oliva y
Jorjil, Bernardo Barangot y Pilais and Mark Angelo Manalastas y Gapasin's appeal, and affirming the
Decision2 dated October 28, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Makati City, convicting
appellants of Violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.

The facts follow.

The Chief of Station Anti-Illegal Drugs - Special Operations Task Group (SAID-SOTG), on January 23, 2015,
received a report regarding the sale of dangerous drugs by a certain "Manu" in Barangay Cembo, Makati City
and its nearby areas. As such, a buy-bust operation was planned and after coordination with the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), a buybust team was formed wherein Police Officer 3 (PO3) Luisito
Marcelo was designated as the poseur-buyer and given a P500.00 bill as marked money, and PO1 Darwin
Catabay as back-up. Thereafter, the buy-bust team proceeded to the exact location of "Manu" after it was
confirmed by the confidential informant.

When they arrived at the target area, the confidential informant pointed to appellant Oliva as "Manu," the
seller of dangerous drugs; thus, PO3 Marcelo and the confidential informant approached the said appellant.
PO3 Marcelo was introduced by the confidential informant to appellant Oliva as a buyer who wanted to buy
P500.00 worth of shabu. PO3 Marcelo handed appellant Oliva the marked money after the latter demanded
payment. Appellant Oliva then showed PO3 Marcelo four (4) transparent plastic sachets with white
crystalline substance and asked the latter to choose one. Meanwhile, two (2) other persons, appellants
Barangot and Manalastas were also at the target area to buy shabu. Appellants Barangot and Manalastas,
and PO3 Marcelo each took one sachet from the four sachets that appellant Oliva showed.

Upon receiving the dangerous drug, PO3 Marcelo immediately scratched his chin, which is the pre-arranged
signal to his back-up that the transaction has been completed. Subsequently, PO3 Marcelo grabbed
appellants Oliva and Barangot and, thereafter, PO1 Catabay appeared and arrested appellant Manalastas.

The police officers conducted a body search on appellant Oliva and it yielded another sachet containing
white crystalline substance, the marked money and two (2) more pieces of P500.00 bills. Eventually,
appellants Oliva, Barangot and Manalastas were arrested and brought to the barangay hall where an
inventory was conducted and on the basis thereof, an inventory report was prepared. The confiscated items
were then marked and photographed, and a request for laboratory examination was accomplished and the
seized items were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory. The substance found inside the sachets were all
tested positive for the. presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

Thus, an Information for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was filed against appellant Oliva,
that reads as follows:

On the 24th day of January 2015, in the City of Makati, Philippines, accused, not being authorized by law and
without the corresponding license and prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell, deliver and distribute zero point six (0.06) gram of white crystalline substance containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, contained in one (1) small transparent plastic
sachet, in consideration of Php500.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Also, in three informations, appellants Oliva, Barangot and Manalastas were separately charged with
violation of Section 11 of the said law, thus:

Crim. Case No. 15-196

(against appellant Oliva)

On the 24th day of January 2015, in the City of Makati, the Philippines, accused, not being authorized by law
to possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug and without the corresponding prescription, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession zero point ten (0.10) gram of white
crystalline substance containing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Crim. Case No. 15-197

(against appellant Barangot)

On the 24th day of January 2015, in the City of Makati, the Philippines, accused, not being authorized by law
to possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug and without the corresponding prescription, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession zero point five (0.05) gram of white
crystalline substance containing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Crim. Case No. 15-198

(against appellant Manalastas)

On the 24th day of January 2015, in the City of Makati, the Philippines, accused, not being authorized by law
to possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug and without the corresponding prescription, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession zero point three (0.03) gram of white
crystalline substance containing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Upon arraignment, appellants, with the assistance of counsel, entered pleas of "not guilty" on all charges.

All appellants used denial as a defense.

According to appellant Oliva, on January 21, 2015, around 10:30 in the evening, he was in front of a
neighbor's house when several armed men, riding in motorcycles, stopped by and invited him to go with
them. When he refused to go, one of the armed men pointed a gun at him, handcuffed him, and forcibly
took him to the SAID-SOTG office where he was detained.

On the other hand, appellant Barangot maintained that on January 22, 2015, around 2:30 in the morning,
he was having a drinking spree with one Mel and Nonoy when several men barged inside the house and
arrested them. They were then brought to the SAID-SOTG office where they were detained, and
subsequently, freed after Mel and Noy paid the police officers for their release.

Appellant Manalastas also denied committing the offense charged against him and claimed that on the same
date, he was inside his room sleeping, when he was suddenly roused by loud noises causing him to go
outside and check the commotion. He saw armed men inside his house and, thereafter, the latter took him,
his mother, a certain Bong, Ronald, Abby and two (2) boarders to the SAID-SOTG office where they were all
detained.

The RTC found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged against them and were
sentenced as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 15-195, the court finds the accused, Emmanuel Oliva y Jorjil, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 and sentences each of them
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).

2. In Criminal Case Nos. 15-196 to 15-198, the court finds the accused, Emmanuel Oliva y Jorjil, Bernardo
Barangot y Pilais and Mark Angelo Manalastas y Gapasin, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violation of Section 11, Article II, RA. No. 9165 and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).
The period of detention of the accused should be given full credit.

Let the dangerous drugs subject matter of these cases be disposed of in the manner provided by law.

The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to transmit the plastic sachets containing shabu subject matter of
these cases to the PDEA for said agency's appropriate disposition.

SO ORDERED.7

The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the appellants.

The CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.8
The CA ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the key elements for illegal possession and sale of
dangerous drugs, and that the bare denials of the appellants cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of
the police officers. It also held that the failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted
the required physical inventory and take the photograph of the objects confiscated does not ipso
facto render inadmissible in evidence the items seized.

Hence, the present appeal.

Appellants assigned the following errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES'
INCREDULOUS TESTIMONIES.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED DESPITE THE POLICE OFFICERS' NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9165 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED DRUGS DESPITE THE POLICE
OFFICERS' FLAWED MANNER IN THE CONDUCT OF INVENTORY AND MARKING THE SAME.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH EVERY LINK IN THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE ALLEGEDLY
SEIZED ITEMS.9

Appellants argue that it is difficult to believe the testimonies of the police officers because it is impossible for
appellants to engage in drug transactions in the middle of the street, under broad daylight, and in the
presence of strangers. They also claim that the arresting officers failed to immediately conduct a physical
inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused, their representative
or counsel, a representative of the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who are required to sign the copies of the inventory. Thus, according to appellants, the prosecution
failed to establish every link in the chain of custody of the seized items.

The appeal is meritorious.

Under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No, 9165 or illegal sale of prohibited drugs, in order to be convicted of the
said violation, the following must concur:

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor.10

In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the sale transaction actually happened and that "the
[procured] object is properly presented as evidence in court and is shown to be the same drugs seized from
the accused."11

Also, under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or illegal possession of dangerous drugs the following
must be proven before an accused can be convicted:

[1] the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs; [2] such possession was not authorized by law; and
[3] the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous drugs.12

In both cases involving illegal sale and illegal possession, the illicit drugs confiscated from the accused
comprise the corpus delicti of the charges.13 In People v. Gatlabayan,14 the Court held that it is of
paramount importance that the identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable doubt; and
that it must be proven with certitude that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is exactly the
same substance offered in evidence before the court. In fine, the illegal drug must be produced before the
court as exhibit and that which was exhibited must be the very same substance recovered from the
suspect.15 Thus, the chain of custody carries out this purpose "as it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed."16

To ensure an unbroken chain of custody, Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 specifies:

(1) The apprehending team having in trial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
of R.A. No. 9165 provides:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items[.]

On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 1064017 was approved to amend R.A. No. 9165. Among other modifications, it
essentially incorporated the saving clause contained in the IRR, thus:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution
Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally That noncompliance of these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and
custody over said items.

In her Sponsorship Speech on Senate Bill No. 2273, which eventually became R.A. No. 10640, Senator
Grace Poe admitted that "while Section 21 was enshrined in the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act to
safeguard the integrity of the evidence acquired and prevent planting of evidence, the application of said
Section resulted in the ineffectiveness of the government's campaign to stop increasing drug addiction and
also, in the conflicting decisions of the courts."18 Specifically, she cited that "compliance with the rule on
witnesses during the physical inventory is difficult. For one, media representatives are not always available
in all corners of the Philippines, especially in more remote areas. For another, there were instances where
elected barangay officials themselves were involved in the punishable acts apprehended."19 In addition,
"[t]he requirement that inventory is required to be done in police station is also very limiting. Most police
stations appeared to be far from locations where accused persons were apprehended."20

Similarly, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III manifested that in view of the substantial number of acquittals in
drug-related cases due to the varying interpretations of the prosecutors and the judges on Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165, there is a need for "certain adjustments so that we can plug the loopholes in our existing
law" and "ensure [its] standard implementation."21 In his Co-Sponsorship Speech, he noted:

Numerous drug trafficking activities can be traced to operations of highly organized and powerful local and
international syndicates. The presence of such syndicates that have the resources and the capability to
mount a counter-assault to apprehending law enforcers makes the requirement of Section 21(a)
impracticable for law enforcers to comply with. It makes the place of seizure extremely unsafe for the proper
inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs.

xxxx

Section 21(a) of RA 9165 needs to be amended to address the foregoing situation. We did not realize this in
2002 where the safety of the law enforcers and other persons required to be present in the inventory and
photography of seized illegal drugs and the preservation of the very existence of seized illegal drugs itself
are threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of drug syndicates at the place of seizure. The place
where the seized drugs may be inventoried and photo tographed has to include a location where the seized
drugs as well as the persons who are required to be present during the inventory and photograph are safe
and secure from extreme danger.

It is proposed that the physical inventory and taking of photographs of seized illegal drugs be allowed to be
conducted either in the place of seizure or at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending law
enforcers. The proposal will provide effective measures to ensure the integrity of seized illegal drugs since a
safe location makes it more probable for an inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs to be properly
conducted, thereby reducing the incidents of dismissal of drug cases due to technicalities.

Non-observance of the prescribed procedures should not automatically mean that the
seizure or confiscation is invalid or illegal, as long as the law enforcement officers could
justify the same and could prove that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are not tainted. This is the effect of the inclusion in the proposal to amend the phrase
"justifiable grounds." There are instances wherein there are no media people or
representatives from the DOJ available and the absence of these witnesses should not
automatically invalidate the drug operation conducted. Even the presence of a public local
elected official also is sometimes impossible especially if the elected official is afraid or
scared.22

The foregoing legislative intent has been taken cognizance of in a number of cases. Just recently, This Court
opined in People v. Miranda:23

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 - provide that the said
inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA
9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized
items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team. Tersely put, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly
comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and the IRR does not ipso
facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the
prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for noncompliance;
and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
In People v. Almorfe, the Court stressed that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must
explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence
had nonetheless been preserved. Also, in People v. De Guzman, it was emphasized that the justifiable
ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these
grounds are or that they even exist.24

Under the original provision of Section 21, after seizure and confiscation of the drugs, the apprehending
team was required to immediately conduct a physically inventory and photograph of the same in the
presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, (2) a representative from the media and (3) the DOJ, and (4) any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. It is
assumed that the presence of these three persons will guarantee "against planting of evidence and frame
up," i.e., they are "necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination proceedings from any taint of
illegitimacy or irregularity."25 Now, the amendatory law mandates that the conduct of physical inventory and
photograph of the seized items must be in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public official,
and (3) a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.

In this case, the absence of a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media during the
inventory of the seized items was not justifiably explained by the prosecution. A review of the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes does not yield any testimony from the arresting officers as to the reason why there was
no representative from the DOJ or the media. The only one present to witness the inventory and the
marking was an elected official, Barangay Captain Evelyn Villamor. Neither was there any testimony to show
that any attempt was made to secure the presence of the required witness.

In People v. Angelita Reyes, et al.,26 this Court enumerated certain instances where the absence of the
required witnesses may be justified, thus:

x x x It must be emphasized that the prosecution must able to prove a justifiable ground in omitting certain
requirements provided in Sec. 21 such as, but not limited to the following: 1) media representatives are not
available at that time or that the police operatives had no time to alert the media due to the immediacy of
the operation they were about to undertake, especially if it is done in more remote areas; 2) the police
operatives, with the same reason, failed to find an available representative of the National Prosecution
Service; 3) the police officers, due to time constraints brought about by the urgency of the operation to be
undertaken and in order to comply with the provisions of Article 12527 of the Revised Penal Code in the
timely delivery of prisoners, were not able to comply with all the requisites set forth in Section 21 of R.A.
9165.

The above-ruling was further reiterated by this Court in People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro,28 thus:

The prosecution never alleged and proved that the presence of the required witnesses was not obtained for
any of the following reasons, such as: (1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a
remote area;·(2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an
immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected
official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to
secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and elected public official within the period required
under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Could prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face
the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug
operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the
presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.

Certainly, the prosecution bears the burden of proof to show valid cause for non-compliance with the
procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended.29 It has the positive duty to demonstrate
observance thereto in such a way that, during the proceedings before the trial court, it must initiate in
acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations from the requirements of the law.30 Its failure to
follow the mandated procedure must be adequately explained and must be proven as a fact in accordance
with the rules on evidence. The rules require that the apprehending officers do not simply mention a
justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground in their sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on the
steps they took to preserve the integrity of the seized item.31 A stricter adherence to Section 21 is required
where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is miniscule since it is highly susceptible to planting, tampering, or
alteration.32

Thus, this Court finds it appropriate to acquit the appellants in this case as their guilt has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt. The resolution of the other issues raised by appellants is no longer
necessary.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 31, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 08121 dismissing appellants' appeai and affirming the Decision dated October 28, 2015 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati City is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Appellants Emmanuel Oliva y
Jorjil, Bernardo Barangot y Pilais, Mark Angelo Manalastas y Gapasin are ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ORDERED IMMEDIATELY
RELEASED from detention, unless they are confined for any other lawful cause. Let entry of final judgment
be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections and the Superintendent
of the New Bilibid Prisons, for immediate implementation. Said Director and Superintendent
are ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) working days from receipt of this Decision the action
he/she has taken.

G.R. No. 216014, March 14, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDWIN SANCHEZ

Y SALVO A.K.A. "DADA," Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

This resolves the appeal1 assailing the Court of Appeals July 14, 2014 Decision2 in CA-GR.
CR-HC No. 05387 that affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant Edwin Sanchez y Salvo
(Sanchez) for illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs. He was found to have sold 0.215
grams and possessed an additional 0.211 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu."3
Two (2) Informations for violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act were filed
against Sanchez before the Regional Trial Court, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro. The
accusatory portion of the Information for illegal sale of dangerous drugs punished under Section
54 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act provides:

That on or about the 10th day of August 2008, at around 3:30 in the afternoon, more or less, at
Sitio Calawang, Barangay Lumangbayan, City of Calapan[,] Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any legal authority, nor
corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell, deliver, transport or distribute to a poseur-buyer, methamp[het]amine hydrochloride (shabu),
a dangerous drug, weighing 0.215 [grams], more or less.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

On the other hand, the accusatory portion of the Information for the possession of dangerous
drugs punished under Section 116 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act states:

That on or about the 10th day of August 2008, at around 3:30 in the afternoon, more or less, at
Sitio Calawang, Barangay Lumangbayan, City of Calapan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any legal authority nor
corresponding license or prescription, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully, and feloniously
has in his possession, custody and control, one (1) small heat-sealed plastic sachet containing
methamp[het]amine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, weighing 0.211 [grams], more or
less.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

During arraignment, accused Sanchez pleaded not guilty to both charges. Trial then ensued.8

Police Senior Inspector Rhea Fe dela Cruz Alviar (P/S Insp. Alviar), Punong Barangay Cresente
Mendoza, Jr. (Punong Barangay Mendoza), Intelligence Officer 1 Kathleen Diocampo (IO1
Diocampo), Intelligence Officer 1 Mario Riñopa (IO1 Riñopa), and Department of Justice
representative Pedro Magnaye (Magnaye) testified for the prosecution.9 Taken together, their
testimonies tended to prove the following version of the facts.
On August 10, 2008, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency Regional Office IV-B organized
a buy-bust operation after receiving a tip that a certain "Dada" from Laguna was selling "shabu"
in Barangay Lumangbayan, Calapan City. Under the plan of action, IO1 Diocampo would act as
the poseur-buyer and IO1 Riñopa would be the arresting officer. Two (2) P500.00 bills with the
poseur-buyer's initials, "KCD," were then prepared as marked money.10

IO1 Diocampo and the confidential informant then boarded a tricycle while the rest of the buy-
bust team rode a Toyota Revo that closely followed them. At the target area in Sitio Calawang,
Barangay Lumangbayan, IO1 Diocampo and the confidential informant positioned themselves in
front of a bungalow. The rest of the buy-bust team were in the nearby parked Toyota Revo.11

At about 3:30p.m., a man in a brown shirt and khaki pants arrived and approached the
confidential informant and IO1 Diocampo, disguised as the poseur-buyer, who was introduced as
"Kat-Kat."12 The man then asked for the money first and so IO1 Diocampo reached for her
pocket and showed the man the marked P500.00 bills.13

The man then handed IO1 Diocampo a heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance, saying, ''Okay yan. Panalo yan! Kung gusto mo kunin mo na rin yung isa
pa rito at magdagdag ka ng isang libo."14

IO1 Diocampo then paid the man with the marked money and executed the pre-arranged signal
to the buy-bust team by putting on sunglasses.15

IO1 Riñopa and the rest of the buy-bust team rushed to the scene and arrested the man who
turned out to be accused Sanchez. After informing Sanchez of his constitutional rights, IOI
Riñopa conducted a body search and retrieved the marked money from him. Another plastic
sachet was likewise retrieved from the accused.16

Accused Sanchez was then brought to the barangay hall where the seized items were marked
"1KCD" and "2KCD"17 by IO1 Diocampo,18 "KCD" being her initials. The seized items were
then inventoried in the presence of Punong Barangay Mendoza of Barangay Lumangbayan and
Magnaye.19
IO1 Diocampo personally delivered the seized items to the Regional Crime Laboratory. P/S Insp.
Alviar examined the specimen, confirming that the seized items contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu."20

The lone witness for the defense was accused Sanchez, who testified to the following version of
the facts.

Accused Sanchez was a native of Laguna and was brought to Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro by
an unnamed live-in partner to visit the latter's parents.21

By August 10, 2008, he and his live-in partner had been in Calapan City for eight (8) days. In the
afternoon of the same day, he was having a drinking session with five (5) other men22 in a
"kubol" by the roadside when armed persons approached him and invited him to the office of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.23

Accused Sanchez voluntarily went with the agents to the office of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency where he filled out forms and provided some basic personal information.24

After about an hour, after showing Sanchez two (2) P500.00 bills and two (2) small plastic
sachets, an agent declared accused Sanchez to be under arrest, and he was taken to the barangay
hall of Lumangbayan where the documents he earlier filled out were signed by Punong Barangay
Mendoza and Magnaye.25

The agents returned accused Sanchez to the office of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.
Later that night, accused Sanchez was brought to the provincial police camp where he and the
agents stayed for about two (2) hours.26

Accused Sanchez was again returned to the office of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
where he was detained for 16 days before he was finally transferred to the provincial jail.27
In the Joint Decision28 dated November 8, 2011, Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of
Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro found for the prosecution and convicted accused Sanchez of the
crimes charged. The trial court found that the prosecution proved the elements of the crime of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, i.e., the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale,
and the consideration; and the delivery of the thing sold and payment for it.29 The trial court
believed IO1 Diocampo's testimony on how she acted as poseur-buyer, paying the marked
money to accused Sanchez in exchange for a sachet of methamphetamine hydrochloride.30

The trial court likewise found that the elements of possession of dangerous drugs were duly
proven, i.e., "(1) the accused [was] in possession of an item or object . . . identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession [was] not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug."31 In addition to the sachet sold to IO1 Diocampo, another
sachet containing methamphetamine hydrochloride was recovered from accused Sanchez after he
was frisked. Accused Sanchez had no authority to possess the prohibited drug, which he freely
and consciously carried in his pocket.32

With respect to the chain of custody of the seized item, the trial court found that an unbroken
chain was established. Upon confiscation by IO1 Riñopa, the sachets were turned over to IO1
Diocampo, who marked the sachets with her initials. IO1 Diocampo then personally delivered
the items to the crime laboratory for testing.33 Finally, the trial court disregarded accused
Sanchez's defense of denial and "frame up" given the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses.34

The dispositive portion of the trial court's November 8, 2011 Decision read:

A C C O R D I N G L Y, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

In CR-08-9262, this Court finds accused EDWIN SANCHEZ y SALVO GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime [of sale of dangerous drugs] and in default of any
modifying circumstances attendant, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS,
with the accessory penalties provided by law and with credit for preventive imprisonment
undergone, if any. The 0.215 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) subject matter
of this case is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of in
accordance with law.
In CR-08-9263, this Court finds the accused EDWIN SANCHEZ y SALVO GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime [of possession of dangerous drugs] and in default of
any modifying circumstances attendant, hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as MINIMUM to
FIFTEEN (15) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as MAXIMUM and to pay a fine in tlte amount of
P300,000.00, with the accessory penalties provided by law and with credit for preventive
imprisonment undergone, if any. The 0.211 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu)
subject matter of this case is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be
disposed of in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.35 (Emphasis in the original)

Accused-appellant Sanchez filed before the Court of Appeals an appeal,36 which, however, was
denied in its July 14, 2014 Decision.37

The Court of Appeals focused on the issue of chain of custody and echoed the trial court's
finding of an unbroken chain. Despite the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies on where the
seized items were marked, the Court of Appeals said that these inconsistencies "[did] not impair
the credibility of the police witnesses."38 What is important is that, as adequately established,
there was an "unbroken and continuous possession of the . . . shabu, from the moment of seizure
up to the time they were delivered to the laboratory and later presented in court."39 The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals July 14, 2014 Decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 08 November
2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.40

Accused-appellant Sanchez filed a Notice of Appeal41 to which the Court of Appeals gave due
course in its August 19, 2014 Resolution.42

In its February 25, 2015 Resolution,43 this Court noted the records forwarded by the Court of
Appeals. The parties were then ordered to file their supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within
30 days from notice.

In their respective manifestations, the People of the Philippines44 and accused-appellant

Sanchez45 informed this Court that they would no longer file supplemental briefs.

Accused-appellant Sanchez maintains that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He specifically assails the inconsistent testimonies of IO1 Diocampo and IO1
Riñopa on where the seized items were marked. IO1 Diocampo testified that the sachets were
marked at the barangay hall, while IO1 Riñopa recalled marking the sachets at the place of the
arrest. With this discrepancy, the prosecution allegedly failed to establish the "very crucial first
link in the chain of custody"46 of the corpus delicti, impairing its integrity and evidentiary
value.47

The People of the Philippines counters that the discrepancy of testimonies on where the seized
items were marked is a "minor" detail that "does not change the fact that ... accused-appellant
[Sanchez] was positively identified as the seller of prohibited drugs; and ... the chain of custody
of the seized drugs was established by the prosecution."48

The principal issue for resolution is whether or not the prosecution has established the elements
of the crimes of sale and possession of dangerous drugs. Subsumed in this issue is whether or
not an unbroken chain of custody of the seized items was established considering the
differing testimonies on where the items were marked.

This appeal must be dismissed.

The sale of dangerous drugs is punished under Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act, thus:

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and

Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. —
The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of
opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of
such transactions.

The elements of the crime of selling dangerous drugs are: first, "the identity[ies] of the buyer and
the seller, the object, and the consideration; and [second,] the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor."49
On the other hand, possession of dangerous drugs is punished under Section 11 of the same
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, which partly provides:

Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. —

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be
graduated as follows:

....

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging
from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of ...
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited
to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly
introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity
possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of
marijuana.

The elements of possession of dangerous drugs are: first, "the actual possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug";50 second, "such possession is not authorized
by law";51 and third, "the accused freely or consciously possessed the said drug."52

The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of both crimes
charged.

As for the sale of dangerous drugs, IO1 Diocampo recounted how she posed as "Kat-Kat" and
bought a sachet of shabu from accused-appellant Sanchez in exchange for a total of P1,000.00.53
Thus, her testimony establishes the elements of: the identities of the buyer, the seller, and the
object and the consideration; and the delivery of the shabu and the payment for it.

IO1 Diocampo further testified that apart from the sachet sold to her, another sachet containing
0.211 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride was obtained from accused-appellant
Sanchez,54 establishing the prosecution's case for possession of dangerous drugs. Accused-
appellant Sanchez had no authority to possess shabu, a dangerous drug he freely and consciously
possessed.

The defenses of denial and "frame up" do not convince. Accused- appellant Sanchez failed to
prove any ill motive on the part of the apprehending officers so as to incriminate him for such
heinous crimes of sale and possession of dangerous drugs.55 To prove that he was not doing
anything illegal when he was arrested, accused-appellant Sanchez could have presented in court
the persons he was allegedly drinking with when agents of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency supposedly came, yet he did not.
In addition, although the testimonies differed on where the seized items were marked, the
prosecution has sufficiently demonstrated that this discrepancy did not affect the integrity or
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti.56 IO1 Diocampo testified that she marked the items with
"1KCD" and "2KCD" in the presence of accused-appellant Sanchez.57 This testimony was
corroborated by IO1 Riñopa. The inventory of the items was done in the presence of Punong
Barangay Mendoza and Department of Justice representative Magnaye. IO1 Diocampo then
personally brought the seized items to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory where
the items tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The apprehending officers more
than substantially complied with the chain of custody rule under Section 21 of Republic Act No.
9165, which, before amendment by Republic Act No. 10640, provided:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA
Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath
by the forensic laboratory examliner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the
receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the
completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be
provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the
forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued on the
completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours[.]
In sum, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant
Sanchez. There was no error in his conviction for the crime of sale of dangerous drugs with a
corresponding penalty of life imprisonment and fine of P500,000.00.58

As for the crime of possession of dangerous drugs, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act59
provides that it is punishable with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years and a fine of at least P300,000.00 if the weight of the dangerous drug found in the
accused's possession is less than five (5) grams. A sachet with 0.211 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride was found in the possession of accused- appellant Sanchez. The penalty of
imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to fifteen (15) years
and one (1) day as maximum60 and a fine of P300,000.00 meted on accused-appellant Edwin
Sanchez y Salvo is in order.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals July 14, 2014 Decision in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 05387 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., J., (Chairperson)

A.M. No. P-11-2979 November 18, 2014

[formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3352-P]

ELLA M. BARTOLOME, Complainant,

vs.
ROSALIE B. MARANAN, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 20,
IMUS, CAVITE, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This administrative matter started through the sworn affidavit complaint1 in the vernacular, dated
December 16, 2009, that Ella M. Bartolome (complainant) filed against Rosalie B. Maranan
[respondent, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus, Cavite], charging
her with extortion, graft and corruption, gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a court
employee.
The complainant alleged that the respondent asked money from her in the amount of ₱200,000.00,
which was later reduced to ₱160,000.00, to facilitate the filing of her case for annulment of marriage.
She further alleged that the respondent undertook to have the case decided in her favor without the
need of court appearances during the proceedings of the case. For a clear and complete picture of
the accusations against the respondent, we quote verbatim the pertinent portions of the
complainant’s narration of the incidents that gave rise to the filing of the present administrative
complaint –

xxxx

2. Na noong October 21, 2009 nakilala ko si ROSALIE MARANAN na isang stenographer sa

Regional Trial Court ng Imus, Cavite. Nasabihan ko siya ng aking kagustuhan na magsampa ng
annulment of marriage case. Agad niya akong inalok at pinangakuan na kaya niyang ipasok ang
aking annulment case sa RTC, Br. 20, Imus, Cavite kung saan siya nagtratrabaho. Noong una ang
hinihingi niya sa akin ay halagang TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱200,000.00) pero
humingi ako sakanya ng discount at pumayag siya sa ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS
(₱160,000.00). Ako po ay naengganyo na magtiwala sa kanya dahil nangako siya na siya na ang
bahala sa lahat. May kausap na daw siyang abogado na pipirma sa petisyon koat di ko na daw
kailangan pang umappear sa korte. Sinabi niya na malakas daw siya sa judge at sa fiscal at siya
lang daw ang pinapayagan na magpasok ng mga aaregluhin na kaso sa kanilang korte. Sinabi niya
din na kasama na sa ₱160,000.00 ang para sa judge at sa fiscal kaya siguradong maaaprubahan
ang aking annulment case sa mabilis na panahon. Kasama po ng Affidavit Complaint na ito ang
transcript at ang SIM Carday aking ipadadala kapag ako ay makasigurado na ang Korte Suprema ay
poprotektahan ang mga ebidensya laban kay MARANAN sapagkat rito lahat nakatagon (sic) ang
mga text messages at nakarecord lahat ng calls nitong si ROSALIE MARANAN sa akin na
nagpapatunay ng panghihingi niya sa akin ng pera at pangako na aaregluhin niya ang aking
annulment of marriage case. Ang cellphone number po na nagaappear dito sa SIM ay kay
ROSALINA MARANAN, ang numero niya ay 09175775982. Maaaring nagpalit na ng numero ang
inirereklamo ko kung kaya’t maganda rin na ipag-utos ang pag-alam ng detalye mula sa Globe
Telecoms kung saan post-paid subscriber ang may-ari ng numero na iyan. [Emphasis supplied]

To put an end to the respondent’s extortion activities, the complainant decided to report the matter to
the police authorities. During the entrapment operation conducted by police officers of Imus Police
Station, the respondent was apprehended inside the premises of the RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite,
in the act of receiving the money from the complainant.

In support of her allegations, the complainant attached to her affidavit-complaint the transcribed
electronic communications (text messages) between her and the respondent;2 a copy of an
Electronic Psychiatric History form given to her by the respondent for her to accomplish in filing the
petition for annulment of marriage;3 a copy of the Imus Police Station Blotter showing that the
respondent was apprehended during the entrapment operation conducted by police officers of Imus
Police Station on November 11, 2009 at 2:40 p.m.;4 and a versatile compact disc (VCD) containing
the video taken during the entrapment operation conducted against the respondent.5

The Court, in a 1st Indorsement6 dated March 19, 2010, required the respondent to comment onthe
complaint against her.

In her Comment dated May 27, 2010,7 the respondent denied the accusations against her. She
alleged her belief that Bartolome is a fictitious name as the affidavit-complaint does not indicate the
complainant’s exact address. She asserted that her detention at Imus Police Station does not prove
her culpability since no actual criminal charges were filed against her. She claimed that the lapse of
six (6) months from the time of the alleged incident indicates that the complaint is pure and simple
harassment orchestrated by a lawyer or litigant who has a grudge against her and who wants to
publiclybesmirch her reputation. In support of her defense, the respondent mentioned that even
Judge Fernando L. Felicen (Judge Felicen), Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite
interceded for her release from detention.

On July 29, 2010, the complainant sent a letter to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA),8 without indicating her address, alleging that she has to constantly change residence
because unidentified persons had been seen in their neighborhood asking questions about her. She
has also been receiving text messages from the respondent telling her that her complaint would only
be dismissed because she knows people in the Supreme Court. The respondent also threatened
retaliation against her after the case is terminated. The complainant further claimed that the pieces
of evidence she submitted are sufficient to prove the respondent’s anomalous activities, and prayed
for the immediate resolution of her complaint.

Based on the complainant’s pleadings and evidence, the OCA, (through then Deputy Court
Administrator Nimfa C. Vilches and OCA Chief of Legal Office Wilhelmina D. Geronga) submitted its
Report to the Court dated May 9, 2011,9 finding enough evidence to prove the respondent’s
involvement in anomalous activities and recommending that –

1) OCA IPI No. 10-3352-P be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;

2) respondent Rosalie B. Maranan, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch20,
Imus, Cavite, be found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service; and

3) respondent Maranan be immediately DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of

retirement benefits except her accrued leave credits, and withperpetual disqualification from
employment in any government agencies or instrumentalities, including government owned
and controlled corporations.

In a Resolution dated September 5, 2011,10 the Court required the parties to manifest whether they
were willing to submit their case for resolution on the basis of the pleadingsfiled. The respondent
filed her Manifestation dated November 17, 201111 submitting the case for resolution by the Court.
She reiterated her complete innocence and "vigorous" and "vehement" denial ofthe allegations
against her. She insisted that the present complaint against her is plain and simple harassment and
a vexatious suit by the complainant who either has a grudge against her or must have been used by
another person with a grudge against her. All she did was tosecure the services of a lawyer at the
complainant’s request; this act, she claimed, does not constitute graft and corruption, gross
misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a court employee and extortion.

The complainant did not respond to our September 5, 2011 Resolution as it was returned unserved
on her. Wenevertheless considered the case submitted for resolution considering her letter of July
16, 2010 praying for the immediate resolution of her complaint.

In our Internal Resolution dated December 7, 2011,12 we resolved to refer the complaint to the OCA
for evaluation, report and recommendation.

The OCA responded through its Memorandum of July 16, 2012,13 finding that the pieces of evidence
on record establish the guilt of the respondent on the charges of Gross Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service filed against her. It recommended that the respondent
be found guilty of the offenses charged and be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of
retirement benefits except her accrued leave credits and with perpetual disqualification from
employment in any government agency.

The Court fully agrees with the OCA’s recommendation.

The respondent’s bare denial cannot overcome the evidence supporting the complainant’s
accusation that she demanded money on the promise that she would facilitate the annulment of her
(complainant’s) marriage. The respondent’s actions from the time the complainant started
communicating with her on October 21, 2009 and thereafter through a series of messages they
exchanged via SMS,14 until the entrapment operation on November 11, 2009, showed that the
complaint is indeed meritorious. The respondent’s text messages sent to the complainant
corroborate that she promised to expedite – in exchange for a monetary consideration of
₱160,000.00 and that she would provide the lawyer who would file the annulment case – the
complainant’s annulment case once it is filed:15

21/19/09 8:40pm

Sino po to

21/10/09 8:53pm

Sino nagrefer sayo sakin ano pangalan?

21/10/09 8:54pm

San mo nakuha # ko

21/10/09 9:05pm

Ako rin magbibigay lawyer sayo

21/10/09 9:13pm

D kaba tlaga makakatawag ngayon

21/10/09 9:18pm

Ako n lang tatawag sayo kc mahirap ang txt lang

21/10/09 9:24pm

Tawag n lng ako ha

21/10/09 9:49pm

Natitiwala ako sayo ha dahil hindi lahat pinagbibigyan namin. Sally n lang tawag mo sakin
nagtataka lng kc ako kanina kc buong buong buo yung txt ng name ko e.

21/10/09 9:51pm
 Ay sorry mali pala sabi ko sayo 160k pala singil namin

22/10/09 10:05am

Gud am. Ano pwede k bukas

22/10/09 10:25am

ls txt bak naghihintay po kme

22/10/09 10:51am

Bukas lng available si atty

22/10/09 10:56am

Sana kung makakagawa ka daw paraan bukas kahit 40k n lng muna down tapos 3pm bukas

22/10/09 11:04am

Ok pero d kita pilipilit ha nasayopa din and decision yan ang sakin lng kc nagmamadali k at
tsaka yun ang free time ng lawyer ha

22/10/09 11:11am

Ella pakihusto mo n daw pala 50k at ibabayad daw mua sa psychiatrist at osg kahit sa
susunod n lng daw yung sa kanya

22/10/09 1:09pm

The complainant described the respondent as an influence peddler in the courts of Imus, Cavite who
acts as a conduit to judges, prosecutors and private law practitioners.

In her comment to the complaint,the respondent admitted that "she suggested to the complainant the
name of a lawyer friend, Atty. Renante C. Bihasa (Atty. Bihasa), and forwarded to her the cell phone
number of this lawyer so that theycould discuss the case." While she was in detention at Imus Police
Station, she called Atty. Bihasa, who told her that he was on his way and assured her that he had
already asked his lawyer friends to assist her. Atty. Bihasa arrived at about five o’clock in the
afternoon. As it was already beyond office hours, she was told by Atty. Bihasa of the possibility that
she would be detained pending investigation. Atty. Bihasa returned the following day and was joined
by Judge Felicen and her officemates. Judge Feliceninterceded in her behalf that she begiven
permission by the police officers to leave her detention in order to take a bath and change clothes.
She was granted permission, with the full guaranty of Judge Felicen that she would return.16

In an affidavit17 dated May 28, 2010, Atty. Bihasa corroborated the respondent’s allegations. In his
affidavit, he narrated that upon receiving a call from the respondent that she was being detained, he
immediately called up two (2) of his lawyer friends based at Imus, Atty. Wilfredo P. Saquilayan and
Atty. Jose Emmanuel Montoya, to assist the respondent. As he arrived at Imus Police Station at
around past four o’clock in the afternoon, he told the respondent of the probability of her detention
until formal charges were filed against her. According to him, "[he] took it upon [himself] to assist[the
respondent] on that date and accompanied her while the police officers of Imus PNP were doing
their routine work on suspects."

Atty. Bihasa further narrated thaton the next day at about five o’clock in the afternoon, he went
backto Imus Police Station to wait for the complainant. After a few hours, the respondent’s co-
workers, including Judge Felicen arrived. They waited for the complainant until seven o’clock in the
evening but she failed to come. Only the complainant’s lawyer arrived who informed the police
investigator that the complainant cannot come out of fear because of the death threats she
received.18

The concern that Atty. Bihasa and Judge Felicen showed to the respondent while under detention at
Imus PNP Station gives rise to the suspicion that they have knowledge and tolerate the respondent’s
anomalous activities. The respondent’s text messages to the complainant support this suspicion:19

At tsaka alam mo naman nakailang appointment n tayo sa abogado hiyang hiya nga ako
kahapon e

7/11/09 3:13pm

Tawagan ko muna si judge kung pwede pa kami tumanggap hanggang wed

7/11/09 3:15pm

Try ko lng

7/11/09 3:25pm

Hanggang Tuesday na lg tayo after nun nxt year na. Yan ang sabi

7/11/09 3:28pm

Sayang kc ang haba n ng time mo dp natuloy sabi ko naman sayo e kapag inabot ng
naghigpit dn pwede none appearance. Yun nagan nagpatulong sakin kahapon lng tumawag
yun d sana nagka sabay n kayo

7/11/09 3:59pm

Ok po mit po tayo bukas 10 am sinabi ko napo kay atty. Tnx po. See you po

Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence, subject to certain

conditions. "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations,
text messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other
electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.20 It
may be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the communications or
has personal knowledge thereof.21 In the present case, we have no doubt regarding the
probative value of the text messages as evidence in considering the present case. The complainant,
who was the recipient of the text messages and who therefore has personal knowledge of these text
messages, identified the respondent as the sender through cellphone number 09175775982. The
respondent herself admitted that her conversations with the complainant had been thru SMS
messaging and thatthe cellphone number reflected in the complainant’s cellphone from which the
text messages originated was hers. She confirmed that it was her cellphone number during the
entrapment operation the Imus Cavite Police conducted22

Sally:

Halika dito sa office, sa clerk of court. Pupunta ka ngayon? O sige, sige, pupunta ka ngaun?
Ah sige OK, salamat! Ang number ko …

Lalaki:

Ibigay ko sa kanya?

Sally:

Oo, ang number ko ay 09175775982, ok thank you.

The complainant submitted two (2) copies of the VCD23 containing pictures taken during the
entrapment conducted by the Imus Cavite Police on November 11, 2009.24

Under Section 1, Rule 11 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, audio, photographic and video evidence of
events, acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown, presented or displayed to
the court and shall be identified, explained or authenticated by the person who made the recording
or by some other person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.

We viewed the VCD and the video showed the actual entrapment operation. The complainant
herself certified that the video and text messages are evidence of her complaint against the
respondent, "Sapat at malinaw ang lahat ng ebidensya na kasama ng aking reklamo na
nagpapatunay na totoo lahat ang nakasaad sa aking reklamo. Kitang kita sa video at sa mga text
messages niya ang kanyang modus operandi at paggamit niya ng pwesto sa gobyerno upang
makapanghingi ng malaking pera sa mga inosenteng tao." It is also well to remember that in
administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.25 A.M. No.
01-7-01-SC specifically provides that these rules shall be liberally construed to assist the parties in
obtaining a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.

The Court totally agrees with the OCA’s finding that the respondent is guilty of grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The respondent’s assertion that Bartolome is a
fictitious name because the complainant has not stated in her complaint her exact address is
preposterous in light of the evidence of direct personal and text message contacts between them. In
the absence of supporting evidence, the claim that the complaint against her is pure and simple
harassment orchestrated by persons with grudge against her, is mere conjectural allegation.

As a public servant, nothing less than the highest sense of honesty and integrity is expected of the
respondent at all times.26 She should be the personification of the principle that public office is a
public trust.27 The respondent unfortunately fell extremely short of the standards that should have
governed her life as a public servant. By soliciting money from the complainant, she committed a
crimeand an act of serious impropriety that tarnished the honor and dignity of the judiciary and
deeply affected the people’s confidence in it. She committed an ultimate betrayal of the duty to
uphold the dignity and authority of the judiciary by peddling influence to litigants, thereby creating the
impression that decision can be bought and sold.28 The Court has never wavered in its vigilance in
eradicating the socalled "bad-eggs" in the judiciary.29 We have been resolute in our drive to discipline
and, if warranted, to remove from the service errant magistrates, employees and even Justices of
higher collegiate appellate courts for any infraction that gives the Judiciary a bad name. To stress
our earnestness in this pursuit, we have, in fact, been unflinching in imposing discipline on errant
personnel or in purging the ranks of those undeserving to remain in the service.30

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Rosalie B. Maranan, Court Stenographer Ill, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service and is accordingly DISMISSED from the service, with prejudice to re-
employment in any government agency including government-owned or controlled corporations. Her
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits are ordered forfeited. This decision shall be
1âwphi1

immediately executory.

The Court further Resolves to REQUIRE Judge Fernando L. Felicen, Regional Trial Court, Branch
20, Imus, Cavite and Atty. Renante C. Bihasa, to file their Comments on their alleged participation in
the anomalous activities of the respondent, within fifteen ( 15) days from notice. This directive is
without prejudice to the investigation of all or selected employees and officials of the Branch, who
may have participated in anomalous transactions relating to annulment of marriage.

The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to submit to this Court, within thirty (30)
days, a list of the annulment of marriage decisions of Judge Fernando L. Felicen for the past ten (10)
years, indicating therein the judgments made and the names of participating lawyers and
prosecutors.

The Office of the Chief Attorney shall analyze the submitted data, including the records of and the
proceedings in the listed cases, and recommend to the Court the actions it should take in the event a
pattern of corruption involving annulment of marriage cases emerges. The Office of the Chief
Attorney is given ninety (90) days from receipt of the Office of the Court Administrator's list, within
which to submit its recommendations to the Court.

The Office of the Court Administrator shall likewise refer this administrative case and its records to
the Ombudsman for whatever action it may take within its jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. P-09-2668, February 24, 2015

ASTORGA AND REPOL LAW OFFICES, REPRESENTED BY ATTY.

ARNOLD B. LUGARES, Complainant, v. ALEXANDER D. VILLANUEVA,
SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 60, MAKATI
CITY, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This administrative Complaint1 was filed by Astorga and Repol Law Offices against Alexander D. Villanueva,
Sheriff IV of Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City. Complainant Astorga and Repol Law Offices
is a professional law practice partnership, represented by Atty. Arnold B. Lugares.2

Astorga and Repol Law Offices charged Alexander D. Villanueva (Sheriff Villanueva) with “willful neglect of
duty [and] serious misconduct [in office] due to graft and corruption [or] extortion with a prayer that a
penalty of dismissal . . . [or] other appropriate sanctions be meted against him.”3
Astorga and Repol Law Offices represented FGU Insurance Corporation in a Complaint for damages filed
against NEC Cargo Services, Inc.4 The Complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City and
raffled to Branch 66 presided by Judge Ricardo R. Rosario.5 On August 23, 2004, Judge Ricardo R. Rosario
issued a Decision in favor of FGU Insurance Corporation.6 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant NEC Cargo
Services, Inc., ordering the latter to pay the plaintiff [FGU Insurance Corporation] the following:

1. the amount of P1,942,285.19 with legal interest thereon from June 21, 2001 until the whole amount
is fully paid;
2. attorney’s fees amounting to P70,000.00; and
3. costs of suit.7

NEC Cargo Services, Inc. and Albert Tamayo, a third-party defendant-appellant, appealed the Decision
before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the Appeal in its Resolutions dated July 20, 2005
and December 20, 2005. These Resolutions became final and executory.8

The Writ of Execution dated July 10, 2006 was issued by Atty. Marjorie M. de Castro, Branch Clerk of Court
of Branch 66 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. On September 19, 2008, Presiding Judge Joselito C.
Villarosa (Judge Villarosa) issued the Order granting Astorga and Repol Law Offices’ Motion to Appoint
Special Sheriff. Sheriff Villanueva was assigned to execute the Decision.9

On October 29, 2008, Sheriff Villanueva and Atty. Arnold B. Lugares (Atty. Lugares) started coordinating
with each other for the execution of the Decision.10 They agreed to meet on November 24, 2008 allegedly
“to discuss the service of the Notice[s] of Garnishment.”11

On November 24, 2008 at 8:54 a.m.,12 Sheriff Villanueva allegedly sent a text message to Atty. Lugares.
The message said, “Nagcoffee break lang sir, antay nio lng muna ako dyan sir, gd. day.”13

At around 10:00 a.m., Atty. Lugares met with Sheriff Villanueva on the 10th floor of the Makati City Hall.14

During the meeting, Sheriff Villanueva allegedly demanded P8,000.00 to execute the Decision.15 He
allegedly stated: “[S]ayang lang ang pagod ko dito, kung wala naman tayong makokolekta”16 and “E wala
pang 50% ang magagarnish natin diyan eh.”17 Atty. Lugares informed Sheriff Villanueva that this was part
of his job, and he should not demand money from him. Sheriff Villanueva allegedly lowered the price to
P5,000.00. They agreed to meet on Wednesday, November 26, 2008 at 8:00 a.m., to serve the Notices of
Garnishment.18

On November 25, 2008, Sheriff Villanueva sent a text message at 4:27 p.m. to Atty. Lugares. The text
message was the following: “Cge po sir magCALL na kau ngayon.”19 Atty. Lugares called Sheriff Villanueva
on his cellular phone to confirm their appointment.20 In the morning of November 26, 2008, Atty. Lugares
sent a text message to Sheriff Villanueva to remind him of their appointment.21 At 7:23 a.m., he replied,
“Dala mo ba mga colors?”22 Atty. Lugares asked Sheriff Villanueva what he meant by “colors.”23 At 7:29
a.m., he replied, “Hauz pa po, nagcoffee breakfast lng, un legal fees kako kung dala mo?”24 Atty. Lugares
told Sheriff Villanueva to proceed with the meeting.25 At 7:44 a.m., he replied, “Bka puede bukas nlng sir,
nag insist ang mga tga ChinaTrust mamya.”26

Atty. Lugares insisted that they proceed with the garnishment since it was Sheriff Villanueva who set the
appointment.27 At 8:45 a.m., Sheriff Villanueva replied: “Patawagin mo nga c atty. astorga dto sa mobil
phone ko para magconfirm tau sa legal fees.”28

At 8:51 a.m., Sheriff Villanueva allegedly sent this text message to Atty. Lugares: “Padala mo nlng khit
lunch time un legal fees, khit kmi na bhala magpaserve nina shf. Flora.”29 Atty. Lugares then assumed that
since Sheriff Villanueva was not given the amount of P5,000.00 he demanded, the issuance of the Notices of
Garnishment did not take place.30

In his Comment,31 Sheriff Villanueva countered that the Complaint “stemmed from a Writ of Execution dated
July 10, 2006 . . . originally assigned to Sheriff Leodel N. Roxas[.]”32 This Writ of Execution was served on
NEC Cargo Services, Inc., and personal properties or office equipment found inside NEC Cargo Services,
Inc.’s office were levied.33 However, prior to the scheduled auction sale on July 19, 2006, Mr. Narciso E.
Calaton filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim.34 FGU Insurance Corporation “failed to post [the] indemnity
bond in favor of the third-party claimant.”35 Thus, the Writ of Execution was returned unsatisfied.36

On October 21, 2008, Sheriff Villanueva was ordered to implement the Writ of Execution.37 The Sheriff’s
Return38 dated November 5, 2008 was returned unsatisfied because there were no other properties that
could be subject to execution that could be levied upon, besides the shares of stocks registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission with Stocks Cert. Reg. No. A199703734.39

According to Sheriff Villanueva, Atty. Lugares allegedly approached him and asked whether it was possible
to garnish the individual stock certificates of NEC Cargo Services, Inc.40 Sheriff Villanueva alleged that he
consulted with his fellow Deputy Sheriffs about how to proceed. This led to Sheriff Villanueva meeting with
the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff Atty. Engracio M. Escasiñas, Jr. (Atty. Escasiñas) and Judge
Villarosa, then Presiding Judge of Branch 66 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.41

Sheriff Villanueva claimed that he was advised not to garnish the individual stocks since Rule 39, Section 9
of the Revised Rules of Court provided that the sheriff or officer may only levy on debts and credits, such as
bank deposits, financial interests, royalties, and commissions, but not on stock certificates. He allegedly
advised Atty. Lugares that he might be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.42

Sheriff Villanueva denied any attempt to extort money from Atty. Lugares. He alleged that if he had met
with Atty. Lugares, it would only be out of courtesy due to the latter’s persistence to garnish the stocks.43

Sheriff Villanueva stated that Atty. Lugares offered him money as a “token of gratitude”44 if the garnishment
of the stocks would take place.45 He denied all imputations of bribery alleged by Atty. Lugares and stated
that Atty. Lugares was filing these charges against him to harass him.46

Further, Sheriff Villanueva maintained that he would not risk being sanctioned or disciplined for a mere
P8,000.00, after having served government for 18 years, 14 of which he served as a Deputy Sheriff. He
alleged that Atty. Lugares had shown him a copy of the Complaint-Affidavit before it was even filed before
the Office of the Court Administrator as a threat to ensure that the garnishment would proceed.47

In his Reply-Affidavit,48 Atty. Lugares raised that Sheriff Villanueva concocted a legal issue on the propriety
of the execution to distract the Office of the Court Administrator from the real issue.49

According to Atty. Lugares, he wanted Sheriff Villanueva to send Notices of Garnishment to NEC Cargo
Services, Inc.’s incorporators. The unpaid subscriptions on NEC Corporation’s stocks were debts and credits
that could be subjected to garnishment.50

Atty. Lugares alleged that Sheriff Villanueva prepared these Notices of Garnishment. These notices were not
served because Atty. Lugares refused to pay the P5,000.00 Sheriff Villanueva demanded.51

According to Atty. Lugares, there were no “illegal wishes”52 on his part. If he made these alleged “illegal
wishes,” Sheriff Villanueva should not have prepared the Notices of Garnishment, scheduled their service on
November 26, 2008, or inquired about the address of the garnishee, American Wire, Inc.53 He denied
approaching Sheriff Villanueva before the filing of the Complaint since the Order dated December 12, 2008
appointing a Special Sheriff had already been filed. This was prior to Sheriff Villanueva’s receipt of the
Complaint on December 15, 2008.54

The Office of the Court Administrator recommended this case for re-docketing as a regular administrative
matter.55 Further, the Court Administrator recommended the referral of the Complaint to Executive Judge
Maria Cristina J. Cornejo (Executive Judge Cornejo) of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for
investigation and submission of her Report and Recommendation.56 The First Division of this court approved
the recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator in the Resolution57 dated July 29, 2009.58

Executive Judge Cornejo began the investigation.59 When she was appointed to the Sandiganbayan, Judge
Tranquil Salvador, Jr. (Judge Salvador) took over the investigation.60

In his Investigation Report and Recommendation,61 Judge Salvador recommended the dismissal of the
Complaint. This was due to Atty. Lugares’ alleged desistance to testify on the contents of his Complaint.
According to Judge Salvador, Atty. Lugares failed to prove his allegations with substantial evidence.62

In its Memorandum63 dated March 29, 2011, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended the
dismissal of the Complaint for lack of evidence. It found that Atty. Lugares’ failure to prosecute the case
invited suspicion that the Complaint was not filed with sincerity of purpose, or that a settlement was reached
to cover up his misconduct. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Atty. Lugares should
show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for filing an unfounded Complaint against Sheriff
Villanueva.64

In the Resolution65 dated June 22, 2011, this court adopted the recommendations of the Office of the Court
Administrator by dismissing the case and requiring Atty. Lugares to show cause.66

Atty. Lugares filed a Compliance with Motion for Reconsideration67 where he manifested that he was willing
to prosecute the case. He alleged that “he was not furnished . . . a copy of the Investigation Report of Judge
Salvador.”68 He claimed that no amicable settlement was reached with Sheriff Villanueva and that he had no
improper motive in filing this case.69 He attached as annexes70 the photographs of the text messages that
Sheriff Villanueva sent him.

In the Resolution71 dated March 5, 2012, this court recalled the Resolution dated June 22, 2011 dismissing
the administrative Complaint for lack of evidence and ordered the case to be reopened. This court further
ordered Executive Judge Benjamin T. Pozon (Executive Judge Pozon) of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City to conduct an investigation on the administrative Complaint.72

The parties, particularly Atty. Lugares, were directed to attend the hearings73 and submit their respective
memoranda.74 In the hearings, Atty. Lugares failed to present the text messages that he sent to Sheriff
Villanueva from his phone.75 These outgoing text messages were automatically deleted since his phone could
only store a hundred messages at a time.76

The parties submitted their respective memoranda to Executive Judge Pozon. In his Memorandum,77 Atty.
Lugares reiterated his allegations regarding Sheriff Villanueva’s willful neglect of duty and graft and
corruption.78 He stated that since Sheriff Villanueva himself prepared the Notices of Garnishment, there was
nothing illegal or improper about his request.79 According to Atty. Lugares, Sheriff Villanueva “thwarted the
Decision by refusing to execute it. He was able to set at naught all the hardships and labor of the plaintiff,
Presiding Judge, Justices, lawyers and other court officers and employees in litigating the case.”80

In his Memorandum,81 Sheriff Villanueva asserted that Atty. Lugares had no personality to complain since
there “was no written specific authorization for [him] to file this administrative complaint[.]”82 Further,
Sheriff Villanueva maintained that the “legal fees” that were being demanded from Atty. Lugares were
payments required by the Office of the Clerk of Court, Cashier’s Section.83 The “legal fees” pertained to the
amount of ?100.00 per Notice of Garnishment with the subsequent charge of 3.5% interest of the total
amount to be paid to the Office of the Clerk of Court.84 Sheriff Villanueva alleged that Atty. Lugares “never
paid the required legal fees with the Office of the Clerk of Court[.]”85

In his Report and Recommendation,86 Executive Judge Pozon concluded that Sheriff Villanueva did not
commit gross neglect of duty.87 He stated that Atty. Lugares was not able to provide evidence to
substantiate his claim that Sheriff Villanueva did not perform his duty.88 On the other hand, Sheriff
Villanueva was able to provide the affidavit of Atty. Escasiñas, Jr., confirming that when Sheriff Villanueva
met with Atty. Lugares, it was to ensure the execution of the Decision.89

Executive Judge Pozon relied on the testimony and affidavit of Sheriff Villanueva, particularly that of the
meeting with Judge Villarosa who discouraged him from executing the Writ of Execution.90

Executive Judge Pozon stated that “colors” in Sheriff Villanueva’s text message “Dala mo na yung colors?”
pertained to the legal fees and not to a claim to extort money from Atty. Lugares. He found that the use of
“colors” could not automatically be construed to pertain to something illegal.91

Executive Judge Pozon stated that upon his examination of the purported text messages, he found that
these could not be construed as evidence that Sheriff Villanueva extorted money.92 Since Atty. Lugares’
outgoing text messages to Sheriff Villanueva were not presented as evidence, the text messages from
Sheriff Villanueva served as the sole evidentiary basis for Atty. Lugares’ allegations.93 Atty. Lugares’ failure
to show and verify the text messages he sent meant that the charges were bereft of evidence.94 Hence,
Executive Judge Pozon ordered that the Complaint be dismissed for lack of evidence.95 He submitted his
Report and Recommendation to the Office of the Court Administrator.96

The issue is whether respondent Sheriff Alexander D. Villanueva is guilty of misconduct due to willful neglect
of duty and corruption or extortion.

After a review of the records and the evidence, this court must reverse the findings of Executive Judge
Pozon. Respondent should be subject to disciplinary sanctions.

In Sison-Barias v. Rubia97:

The findings of fact of an investigating justice [or judge] must be accorded great weight and finality similar
with the weight given to a trial court judge’s since an investigating justice [or judge] personally assessed
the witnesses’ credibility. However, this rule admits of exceptions.

In J. King & Sons Company, Inc. v. Judge Hontanosas, Jr., this court held:
Such findings may be reviewed if there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the
lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered,
would alter the result of the case. Among the circumstances which had been held to be justifiable reasons
for the Court to re-examine the trial court or appellate court’s findings of facts are, when the interference
made is manifestly mistaken; when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and when the
finding of fact of the trial court or appellate court is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by evidence on record.98 (Citations omitted)

A review of the facts is called for when the finding of a lack of administrative liability is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence, but an examination of the record shows that there is evidence to support the
allegations.99 Even if respondent is initially exculpated based on an alleged lack of evidence to support the
allegations, this court can still conduct its own assessment of the evidence on record and impose the
corresponding administrative liability.100

Respondent’s neglect to faithfully

execute his duties as Sheriff is
supported by substantial evidence.

In Executive Judge Pozon’s Report and Recommendation, he stated that Atty. Lugares failed to provide
evidence showing that respondent committed the actions alleged in the Complaint. His exculpation of
respondent from liability was primarily based on the fact that Atty. Lugares was unable to present his
outgoing text messages:

COURT:

For the Court, Atty. Lugares.

Now, you have marked several text messages all coming from the
respondents.

WITNESS:[Atty. Lugares]
 A: Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

And as a matter of fact, even up to the present, these text messages are
still saved in your cell phone?

WITNESS:

A: Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

How about the messages coming from you that took or answered by
respondent thru his own text messages, did you also save those text
messages?

WITNESS:

A: Your Honor, with regard to the out coming messages, my cell phone only
has that setting to 100 messages, it was overtime [sic] deleted, Your
Honor, automatically.

COURT:

Overtime [sic] deleted. So you did not intentionally delete it?

WITNESS:

A: I did not, Your Honor.

COURT: So whenever it reaches a certain maximum number of text messages, it

is automatically erased?

WITNESS:

A: Yes, Your Honor, that’s a setting in my cell phone, Your Honor.

COURT:

That is your claim. So, in short, even if we look at your text to your cell
phone, we will no longer see these text messages coming from you?

WITNESS

A: Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

As far as you can remember, Atty. Lugares, who, between you and
respondent started sending text messages regarding this intimidation?

WITNESS
 A: It was him first, Your Honor.101

Contrary to Executive Judge Pozon’s position, however, Atty. Lugares was able to prove that respondent
committed actions that warrant administrative liability.

In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is that of substantial evidence. In Menor v.
Guillermo:102

Administrative proceedings are governed by the substantial evidence rule. Otherwise stated, a finding of
guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial
evidence that the respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint. Substantial evidence is such
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The
standard of substantial evidence is justified when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is
responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even
preponderant.103 (Citations omitted)

There is substantial evidence to support Atty. Lugares’ allegation of neglect of duty.

In previous administrative cases involving other court personnel, text messages were admitted as evidence
and given probative value by this court.104 In those cases, the court considered the content of the text
messages and the identification of the person sending them as substantial evidence to prove the commission
of administrative offenses.

Atty. Lugares was able to present the text messages he received in his cellular phone. He attached
photographs of the screen of his cellular phone, showing the messages as they were received. He submitted
respondent’s calling card105 that contained the same phone number seen in the text messages. Through this
calling card, he was able to prove that respondent was the source of the text messages. Respondent denied
meeting with Atty. Lugares, but he never denied sending the text messages to him.

The content of the text messages from respondent and the circumstances within which they were made
constitute substantial evidence that justify the finding of administrative liability. The presentation of text
messages that Atty. Lugares sent to respondent is not necessary.

Respondent’s text messages sent to Atty. Lugares show an actual evasion of duty to implement the Writ of
Execution. The contents of the text messages sufficiently prove his manifest refusal to properly implement
the Writ of Execution.

Among the text messages presented by Atty. Lugares, Exhibit “V”106 states that respondent sent Atty.
Lugares the following text message: “Nka pag Shf. return na ako dyan sa kaso na yan, bhala ka sa gusto mo
mangyari.”107 Respondent Sheriff Villanueva sent this text message at 9:06 a.m. on November 26, 2008.108

That text message is evidence that respondent did not undertake his duty to implement the Writ of
Execution. In his Reply, Atty. Lugares correctly stated that a cursory execution of the Sheriff’s Return did
not excuse respondent from faithfully implementing the Writ of Execution. A writ of execution continues to
be effective during the period within which a judgment may be enforced by motion,109 which is within five
(5) years from the entry of judgment.110 After the lapse of the five (5) year period, the judgment may be
revived and executed before it is barred by the statue of limitations.111 The failure to execute the judgment
could result in years of protracted litigation. Thus, the Sheriff must exert the necessary effort to ensure that
the judgment is duly executed.

Atty. Lugares sought to have the Notices of Garnishment served on the NEC Cargo Services, Inc.’s
shareholders in order to garnish their unpaid subscriptions on their respective shares of stocks. If the
service of the notices had been carried out in good faith, Atty. Lugares would not need to file an Ex-Parte
Motion to Appoint Special Sheriff, which would lead to the appointment of Sheriff de Castro to serve the
Notices of Garnishment anew.

Finally, respondent’s neglect is made evident when the Sheriff tasked to replace him was able to discharge
his duties without incident. Respondent revealed during his testimony that unlike him, Special Sheriff Fermin
de Castro was able to serve the Notices of Garnishment:

ATTY.
LUGARES:
Q: And you are also aware, Mr. Witness, that sheriff De Castro was able to
comply with the request of the plaintiff’s counsel, to serve the Notices
of Garnishment. You are aware of that, because you in fact annexed
his reports to your pleadings, is that correct?

WITNESS:

A: Reading upon the return, the sheriff’s report of sheriff Fermin De

Castro, were all negative results.

ATTY.
LUGARES:

Q: Yes, but the negative results of the Notices of Garnishment is [sic]

another matter from the non-service thereof, Mr. Witness. So my
question is; [sic] you are aware of what sheriff Fermin De Castro has
done?

WITNESS:

A: Yes, sir.112

Thus, respondent’s failure to show that he did the necessary steps to implement the Writ of Execution in
good faith cannot be tolerated by this court. Respondent violated Canon IV, Sections 1 and 6 of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel:

SECTION 1. Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with diligence. They shall
commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their office during working hours.

....

SEC. 6. Court personnel shall expeditiously enforce rules and implement orders of the court within the limits
of their authority.

“When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the
contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its
mandate.”113 “The Court has said time and again that a sheriff’s duty in the execution of a writ is purely
ministerial; he is to execute the order of the court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion whether to
execute the judgment or not.”114 “[T]he officers charged with the delicate task of the enforcement and/or
implementation of the same must, in the absence of a restraining order, act with considerable dispatch so as
not to unduly delay the administration of justice[.]”115

For violating the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and for failing to perform his duties as a Sheriff in an
expeditious manner, respondent must be held liable for willful neglect of duty.

There is substantial evidence

to support the allegation of
extortion.
In addition to finding that respondent neglected his duty, this court finds that he is guilty of extortion.

Atty. Lugares alleged that during the meeting of November 24, 2008, respondent demanded P8,000.00 to
execute the Decision.116 After Atty. Lugares had refused, respondent said, “[S]ayang lang ang pagod ko
dito, kung wala naman tayong makokolekta”117 and “E wala pang 50% ang magagarnish natin diyan eh.”118

Respondent’s allegation that the Complaint against him stemmed from an illegal request by Atty. Lugares
seeks to diminish Atty. Lugares’ credibility. However, this allegation does not disprove Atty. Lugares’
allegations. In response to respondent’s allegation, he was able to prove that his intention was to serve the
Notices of Garnishment on the stockholders. There can be no ill motive that may be interpreted from Atty.
Lugares’ request to be assisted by respondent.

Respondent’s consultations with Atty. Escasiñas and Judge Villarosa do not negate or disprove the allegation
that he made the alleged statements and committed extortion during the meeting of November 24, 2008.
When confronted with the allegation that he extorted from Atty. Lugares during the meeting, respondent
only offers a bare denial without providing any contradictory evidence. With “respondent’s bare denial vis-a-
vis the positive testimonies of the witnesses, the latter should prevail.”119

Adding greater weight to Atty. Lugares’ allegations are the text messages he presented as evidence. These
text messages demonstrate willingness to secure some favor or concession in order for respondent to
proceed with implementing the Writ of Execution promptly.

Executive Judge Pozon stated that the use of the term “colors” in the text messages did not show an
attempt to demand money from Atty. Lugares and the law firm he represented. This court cannot uphold the
finding of Executive Judge Pozon.

The usage of the term “colors” as a reference to certain “legal fees” that were demanded by respondent has
no legal basis. The term “colors” is not found in Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which provides for the
procedure by which orders or decisions of the courts are executed. A thorough examination of the records,
the Rules of Court and other applicable rules, and issuances or circulars governing the conduct of execution
proceedings further reveals that there is, indeed, no basis for the use of this term in relation to the duties of
a Sheriff.

Atty. Lugares’ narration of the purpose of the term “colors” provides basis for his claim of extortion. Neither
respondent nor his counsel attempts to explain the use of the term, undoubtedly due to its dubious origin.

Respondent sent another text message where he told Atty. Lugares to facilitate a conversation between the
former and Atty. Astorga, one of the partners of complainant law firm. Atty. Lugares presented evidence
showing that on November 26, 2008 at 8:45 a.m., respondent sent this text message:120 “Patawagin mo
nga c atty. astorga dto sa mobil phone ko para magconfirm tau sa legal fees.”121

Respondent was already coordinating with Atty. Lugares for the service of the notices on the stockholders of
NEC Cargo Services, Inc. His demand for communication with Atty. Astorga could only lead to the
reasonable conclusion that respondent sought some other favor or concession to execute the Decision. By
necessary implication, respondent refused to implement the Writ of Execution until these “legal fees” or
“colors” were settled.

A refusal to coordinate with Atty. Lugares and a terse proposal to talk to Atty. Astorga regarding the
payment of “legal fees” support the conclusion that respondent unjustly refused to implement the Writ of
Execution, absent the consideration of settling certain “legal fees” or “colors.”

In his Memorandum to Executive Judge Pozon, respondent raised as a defense that the “legal fees” he was
asking for were official payments to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City. However, respondent did not raise this as a defense in the first and only Comment filed on February
27, 2009 before the Office of the Court Administrator, or in any of the earlier proceedings before Executive
Judge Cornejo or Judge Salvador. The belated nature of this defense is suspicious, considering that it should
have been raised at the earliest possible opportunity by respondent.
With regard to the alleged non-payment of these so-called “legal fees,” Atty. Lugares categorically stated
that all pertinent fees for execution had already been paid.122 This was why they were allowed to proceed
with the execution. Since respondent alleged non-payment of these fees as a defense, he had the burden to
prove that these were the “legal fees” he was pertaining to in the text messages.

Further, respondent was inconsistent in his testimony before Executive Judge Pozon. He admitted receiving
the Writ of Execution on October 21, 2008,123 and he did not deny sending a text message124 to Atty.
Lugares on the same date:

ATTY .
LUGARES:
I’m showing Exhibit “A”, which read as follows: “Gd. am atty. Lugares,
this is shf. villanueva re: FGU writ br. 66 rtc. Can you arrange a
meeting asap sir?” This was sent October 29, 2008. Exhibit “B”,
another text message coming from you: “Check ko lng atty. L. kung
nsa vicinity na kau po?” This was sent October 29, 2008 1:10 pm.,
then this was followed by another text message coming from you, “Sir
proceed lng kau dto sa br. 144 rtc 10f Courtrm.” . . . Then on Exhibit
“D”, sent on October 29, 2008 a [sic] 2:59 pm, you sent another text
message, stating: “No atty. Lugares. walang Cert. true copy un
Decision sa akin.”

. ...

So my question is; [sic] if you did not coordinate with the plaintiff’s
counsel, how come you sent this [sic] text messages?125

Despite the existence of these text messages and respondent’s failure to deny them, respondent still denied
meeting with Atty. Lugares at any time after being assigned to implement the Writ of Execution:126

WITNESS:

A: At first, Atty. Arnold Lugares is the first one who initiates the meeting.
That text messages was [sic] sent because we don’t have any other
way to arrange a meeting, but he was the one who first like the
meeting to take place with regards to the Notice of Garnishment
among incorporators.

ATTY.
LUGARES:

Q: So now, Mr. Witness, what you are stating that that [sic] you have
coordinated with plaintiff’s counsel before your execution of the
November 5, 2008 sheriff’s return?

WITNESS

A: What date was this [sic] text messages?

ATTY.
LUGARES:

October 29, 2008.

WITNESS:

A: There were text messages and the sheriff’s return has nothing to do
with each other. At first, we were duty bound to do our duties to serve
the writ of execution at the defendant’s location.

ATTY.
LUGARES:

Q: Mr. Witness, you will agree with me that you met with the plaintiff’s
counsel and Atty. Escasinas to discuss certain matters regarding the
writ of execution?

WITNESS:

A: I can’t remember that moment wherein Atty. Escasinas and Atty.

Lugares and I, met.

ATTY.
LUGARES:

Q: So you will deny that there was a meeting held?

WITNESS:

A: None whatsoever.

ATTY.
LUGARES:

Q: And you would also not admit that you led the plaintiff’s counsel Atty.
Lugares at the 10th floor to discuss something in connection with the
service of the Notice of Garnishment?

WITNESS:

A: None whatsoever.

ATTY.
LUGARES

Q: What about your request for some amount of money, would you deny
that?

RET. JUDGE VILLANUEVA:

 Your Honor, we have denied that and I think that is improper for
cross-examination, to elicit from the mouth of the witness an answer
which is incriminating, Your Honor.

ATTY.
LUGARES:

But he took the witness stand, Your Honor.

COURT:

Well, I will allow that.

....

ATTY.
LUGARES:

Are you denying that you requested money from the plaintiff’s
counsel?

WITNESS:

A: Sir, we are [sic] raised by our father to be good citizen [sic] and
responsible at [sic] that duties.

ATTY.
LUGARES:

Q: So what is your answer?

WITNESS:

A: I never demanded whatsoever.

ATTY.
LUGARES:

Q: And you did not demand any fee for the Notice of Garnishment?

WITNESS:

A: Only legal fees for the Notices of Garnishments.

ATTY.
LUGARES:

Q: Now, do you confirm, Mr. Witness, that you actually scheduled a

meeting with the plaintiff’s counsel in order to serve the Notices of
Garnishments for this case?

WITNESS:
 A: I am not aware of the notice of garnishment itself. I am only aware of
the fact that you eagerly want the arrangement meeting with me on
that day.

ATTY.
LUGARES:

Q: And you in fact agreed to set the meeting in order to serve the notice
of garnishment?

WITNESS:

A: I told you I am not aware of the notice of garnishment to be served

among incorporators.

ATTY.
LUGARES:

Q: So you are denying that that [sic] you have set a meeting with the
plaintiff’s counsel in order to serve the notice of garnishment? Is it a
yes or a no?

WITNESS:

A: No.

ATTY.
LUGARES:

Q: So there was no such arrangement?

WITNESS:

A: No.127

As seen in the records of the proceedings before Executive Judge Pozon, respondent categorically denied
making any demand for money. However, a perusal of the records of the other proceedings contradicts his
claim. In the proceedings before Executive Judge Cornejo, Atty. Lugares testified regarding the events that
led to the filing of the Complaint against respondent:

COURT:

Ano ang exactly ang demand sa iyo?

(addressed to Atty. Lugares)

Atty.
Lugares:

P8,000.00.

COURT:
 No, no, how was the demand made?

Atty.
Lugares:

After our meeting with Atty. Escasinas, Atty. Escasinas said, to proceed
with the execution and the Sheriff led me to the staircase instead of us just
talking at his table just outside the office of Atty. Escasinas, tapos sinabi
niya na nagdemand siya sa akin ng P8,000.00 para sa services niya para
sa execute [sic] ng decision. And he further stated, “Sayang naman ang
pagod ko dito kung wala naman tayong makukulekta e wala pang 50% na
magagarnish natin diyan.” That is number 6 of our Complaint/Affidavit so I
replied to him and explained to him that this is his job and he should not
demand for money in exchange for two weeks job, that is why he lowered
his price to P5,000.00. Despite that he is insisting that I should give it to
him at that very instant or not later than the afternoon of that date
November 24, 2008, otherwise, the Notice of Garnishment would not push
through. That was his exact demand, your Honor. In fact, we coordinated,
your Honor. . . .

COURT:

So what happened to the Notice of Garnishment dito? Wala?

Atty.
Lugares:

Sa time niya, wala hong nangyari kasi ayaw na niya kumilos, e.128

During these proceedings before Executive Judge Cornejo, the counsel for respondent was his father, Atty.
Candido Villanueva (Atty. Villanueva), who made several statements binding on the defense of respondent:

Atty. Villanueva:
We deny that he demanded money. That is your allegation.

Atty. Lugares:

Yes, defendant always deny [sic] matters. We are used to that. We can
prove that.

Atty. Villanueva:

To demand is to extort by to intimidate you to give money. It never

happened that way as you alleged. He said, you insinuated, “may dala ka
bang ganito?” He must be a young idealistic lawyer but we who are all in
the profession, you know how to deal with this [sic] people.

....

Atty. Villaneuva:
 Actually, what happened here, despite your allegation na mayroon demand
or insinuation of money, hindi ka naman nagbigay kahit isang pera. Walang
damage except your thinking that it tarnishes the administration of justice,
a Sheriff should not do that. Well, I agree with you but it is a question of
pag-aaralan yung circumstances paano nangyari. Pero ang issue sa kaso
mo hindi ka pa nakakasingil dun sa defendant, sa mga officers. Kawawa
naman itong, in the course of trying to collect from the defendant, naiipit
itong mga low salaried employee dun sa ano, I agree with you we have to
clean up the judiciary pero baka naman we are being too harsh against
them or you misinterpret their words to mean they are after money when
actually they are not. Kasi pag ikaw ang magdedemand nang service ng
writ of execution, you have to pay to the Sheriff certain amount, di
ba?129 (Emphasis supplied)

In his defense of respondent, Atty. Villanueva elaborated on what he alleged to be Atty. Lugares’ motives for
filing the Complaint:

Atty. Villanueva:
Ang nakikita ko sa kaso, I think counsel is being so self-righteous, “I want
to clean-up the judiciary.” Ganyan, ganyan. “Itong mga taong ganito
kailangan weed-out from the service.” E, ang liit na bagay na ito, hindi ka
nga nahingian nang kahit isang pera at saka yung nagpapa-serve talaga ng
Writ of Execution, may binabayaran sa Sheriff’s Office nang service ng Writ
of Execution, wala ka pa rin nabayaran dun.

Atty. Lugares:

Sino nagsabi po? We are already paid with that.

Atty. Villanueva:

Sa service nitong Writ of Execution?

Atty. Lugares:

Opo, sa unang Sheriff, nabayaran na namin yung Writ of Execution kaya

nakapag-proceed siya, e.

Atty. Villanueva:

Kung nagpapa-serve ka ng Writ of Execution, talagang may binabayaran?

Atty. Lugares:

Nabayaran na po lahat. Kaya po kami may appointment that morning para

dun sa transportation niya, wala nang gastos, ako na mismos [sic] ang
magsasama sa kanya duon. So there is no need to give P8,000.00. Kasi
ang premise po niya, e, “Magbigay ka nang P8,000.00 which he lowered to
P5,000.00, kung hindi hindi matutuloy ang service nang Notice of
 Garnishment na iyan.” Hindi na nga natuloy, tapos ang dahilan niya nasa
Marikina area siya.

Atty. Villanueva:

Hindi ka naman napilitan magbigay kahit piso, ayaw mo talagang magbigay

dahil masama nga yun, di ba?

Atty. Lugares:

Pero ang point dito bakit siya nagdedemand?

Atty. Villanueva:

Sa makatuwid, walang [sic] talagang na [sic] material damage sa iyo na

nagbigay ka and somebody else enriched himself with your money, wala,
except that you did not like the attitude of the Sheriff na “Bakit siya
hihihingi [sic] eh, dapat trabahuin niya, di ba ganun?”130 (Emphasis
supplied)

Counsel for respondent stated that, since no exchange of money took place and no one was enriched, then
no extortion or bribery took place. Further, counsel for respondent raised as a defense that respondent did
not “intimidate” Atty. Lugares to give a certain amount to execute the Decision.

Respondent’s defense directly contradicts his own abject denials that any meeting took place between him
and Atty. Lugares regarding the payment of “legal fees.” Respondent and his counsel cannot deny the
occurrence of any meeting while asserting that Atty. Lugares did not pay respondent any money when that
meeting took place. The sheer inconsistency of these two positions casts serious doubts on respondent’s
defense against the allegations in the Complaint. Respondent cannot expect to evade liability by relying on
two contradictory arguments.

Taking all these findings in consideration, there is substantial evidence to support Atty. Lugares’ allegations
that respondent demanded the amount of ?8,000.00 to serve the Notices of Garnishment. Respondent’s
bare denials and conflicting positions cannot counter Atty. Lugares’ consistent narrative of facts.

Respondent is guilty of gross

misconduct and must be dismissed
from the service.

Having found substantial evidence to prove Atty. Lugares’ allegations, respondent must be held accountable
by this court. He has failed to uphold the high standard of integrity required by a position in the judiciary.
He has violated Canon 1, Sections 1 and 2 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel:

CANON I
FIDELITY TO DUTY

SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not use their official position to secure unwarranted benefits, privileges or
exemptions for themselves or for others.

SEC. 2. Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit or
implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.
Respondent has been found guilty of soliciting money from litigants in order to execute his duties as a
Sheriff. This deplorable behavior in some court personnel must be stopped. In Villahermosa, Sr. v. Sarcia:131

The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel requires that court personnel avoid conflicts of interest in
performing official duties. It mandates that court personnel should not receive tips or other remunerations
for assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the
judiciary. “The Court has always stressed that all members of the judiciary should be free from any whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in the judicial branch but also to their behavior outside the
court as private individuals, in order that the integrity and good name of the courts of justice shall be
preserved.” Court personnel cannot take advantage of the vulnerability of party-litigants.

....

Indeed, “[a]s a court employee, [one] should be more circumspect in [one’s] behavior and should [steer]
clear of any situation casting the slightest of doubt on [one’s] conduct.”132 (Citations omitted)

Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct. Sison-Barias defined gross misconduct:

Respondents in this case failed to subscribe to the highest moral fiber mandated of the judiciary and its
personnel. Their actions tainted their office and besmirched its integrity. In effect, both respondents are
guilty of gross misconduct. This court defined misconduct as “a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.” In
Camus v. The Civil Service Board of Appeals, this court held that “[m]isconduct has been defined as ‘wrong
or improper conduct’ and ‘gross’ has been held to mean ‘flagrant; shameful’. . . . This Court once held that
the word misconduct implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.”133 (Citations omitted)

Thus, respondent must face the full consequences of his actions. This court will not abandon its
responsibility in exacting the highest amount of integrity from those within its ranks. Respondent must be
dismissed from the service.

Araza v. Garcia and Judge Tan v.

Paredes justify the dismissal of
respondent from the service.

In previous administrative cases, this court has dismissed Sheriffs who violated their duty to faithfully
execute the courts’ decisions.

In Araza v. Garcia,134 this court dismissed respondent Sheriff Marlon Garcia from service.135 He refused to
conduct an inventory of the property seized from the judgment debtor.136 He told the spouse of complainant
Wilfredo Araza that no inventory would be conducted until the latter paid the assisting sheriff the amount of
P1,000.00.137 This court held that respondent Sheriff Marlon Garcia should be liable for his actions:

As regards the fact that respondent Garcia asked from complainant one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos to be
given to assisting sheriff respondent Nicolas A. Tonga, the evidence showed that complainant refused to give
the amount demanded. However, complainant directly gave P1,000.00 to Rustom Galicia who prepared the
inventory of materials seized. Such act of asking complainant for money intended for “assisting” sheriff
Tonga was virtually an extortion. The sheriff assigned by the court was not authorized on his own, to
appoint an “assisting” sheriff or a “technical” adviser. Decidedly, it was in violation of Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 31-90.138 (Citations omitted)

In Judge Tan v. Paredes,139 this court dismissed respondent Sheriff Henry G. Paredes for demanding the
amount of P10,000.00 from the plaintiff to execute the decision:

The OCA found Sheriff Paredes liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty for failure to comply with the
provisions of Section 9, Rule 141. Contrary to the findings of Judge Tomaneng, records showed that Mrs.
Mijares testified that Sheriff Paredes demanded and asked P10,000. Further, the OCA noted that this was
the first case against the sheriff who had been with the judiciary for twenty-seven years.

We agree with the findings of the OCA, concerning the charges against Sheriff Paredes. Under Section 9,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court [now Rule 141, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, as revised by Administrative
Matter No. 04-2-04-SC, effective August 16, 2004], the sheriff is required to secure the court’s prior
approval of the estimated expenses and fees needed to implement the court process. The requesting party
shall deposit such amount with the Clerk of Court. These expenses shall then be disbursed to the executing
Sheriff subject to his liquidation within the same period for rendering a return on the process or writ. Any
unspent amount shall be refunded to the party who made the deposit.

In the implementation of a writ of execution, only the payment of sheriff’s fees may be received by sheriffs.
Sheriffs are not allowed to receive any voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of
their duties. To do so would be inimical to the best interests of the service because even
assuming arguendo such payments were indeed given and received in good faith, this fact alone would not
dispel the suspicion that such payments were made for less than noble purposes. Corollary, a sheriff cannot
just unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant without observing the proper procedural steps,
otherwise, it would amount to dishonesty or extortion.140 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In Araza, respondent Sheriff Marlon Garcia was found guilty of violating the provisions of Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 31-90 concerning sheriffs and the fees that may be provided to them. In Judge
Tan, respondent Sheriff Henry G. Paredes was found guilty of violating the same provision, which was
incorporated into the Rules of Court under Rule 141 by Administrative Matter No. 00-2-01-SC.141 Presently,
the rules governing fees that may be provided to the sheriff are stated in Rule 141, Section 10 of the Rules
of Court:142

With regard to sheriff’s expenses in executing writs issued pursuant to court orders or decisions or
safeguarding the property levied upon, attached or seized, including kilometrage for each kilometer of
travel, guards’ fees, warehousing and similar charges, the interested party shall pay said expenses in an
amount estimated by the sheriff, subject to the approval of the court. Upon approval of said estimated
expenses, the interested party shall deposit such amount with the clerk of court and ex-officio sheriff, who
shall disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to effect the process, subject to liquidation within
the same period for rendering a return on the process. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the
party making the deposit. A full report shall be submitted by the deputy sheriff assigned with his return, and
the sheriff’s expenses shall be taxed as costs against the judgment debtor. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, respondent violated not only the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel but also Rule 141, Section 10 of
the Rules of Court. He failed to implement the Writ of Execution. He failed to get the approval of the court in
demanding “colors” and “legal fees” from Atty. Lugares.

The similarities among Araza, Judge Tan, and this case cannot be ignored. All three cases involve the refusal
of the Sheriff to faithfully implement the Writ of Execution. They involve the demand of a sum of money by
the Sheriff tasked with the implementation of the Writ of Execution. Even if respondent did not actually
receive any money from Atty. Lugares, it is the practice of demanding money that this court seeks to end.

In Villahermosa, this court found that to its dismay, “it has received many complaints from party-litigants
against court employees extorting money from them.”143 This court must take decisive action in its efforts to
ensure that the judiciary is free from any hint of corruption.

The role that Sheriffs play in the dispensation of justice is pivotal. They serve as the agents to ensure that
arduous and painstaking court proceedings will result in a final execution. It is incumbent upon them to act
in a manner fitting of the dignity of their office as employees of the judiciary. Respondent failed to subscribe
to this solemn duty. To deter similar cases of gross misconduct, this court is mandated to impose a sanction
befitting his administrative liability.

WHEREFORE, respondent Sheriff Alexander D. Villanueva is found GUILTY of willful neglect of duty and
serious misconduct due to graft and corruption and extortion and is DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to his re-employment in any
branch or service of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
This Resolution is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 178497, February 04, 2014

EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner, v. GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT.

GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN.
DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES
FELICIANO, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR
CALDERON, Respondents.

[G.R. No. 183711]

EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner, v. GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT.

GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN.
DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES
FELICIANO, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR
CALDERON, Respondents.

[G.R. No. 183712]

EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner, v. GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT.

GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, LT. COL.
MELQUIADES FELICIANO, AND LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 183713]

EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner, v. CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED

FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR.;
COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY, LT. GEN.
ALEXANDER YANO; AND CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR., Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Resolution all the pending incidents in this case, specifically:

(a) The determination of the relevance and advisability of the public disclosure of
the documents submitted by respondents President Gloria Macapagal–Arroyo,
Lt. Gen. Romeo P. Tolentino, Maj. Gen. Juanito Gomez, Maj. Gen. Delfin Bangit,
Lt. Col. Noel Clement, Lt. Col. Melquiades Feliciano, Director General Oscar
Calderon, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.; Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Lt.
 Gen. Alexander Yano; and Chief of the Philippine National Police, Director
General Avelino Razon, Jr. to this Court per paragraph III (i) of the fallo of our
July 5, 2011 Resolution; and

(b) The Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela1 (together with sealed
attachments) filed by petitioner Edita T. Burgos praying that the Court: (1)
order the persons named in the sealed documents impleaded in CA–G.R. SP
No. 00008–WA and G.R. No. 183713; (2) issue a writ of Amparo on the basis of
the newly discovered evidence (the sealed attachments to the motion); and (3)
refer the cases to the Court of Appeals (CA) for further hearings on the newly
discovered evidence.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

A. The Court’s June 22, 2010 Resolution

These incidents stemmed from our June 22, 2010 Resolution referring the present case to the Commission
on Human Rights (CHR) as the Court’s directly commissioned agency, tasked with the continuation of the
investigation of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos’ abduction with the obligation to report its factual findings and
recommendations to this Court. This referral was necessary as the investigation by the Philippine National
Police–Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP–CIDG), by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) Provost Marshal, and even the initial CHR investigation had been less than complete. In all of them,
there were significant lapses in the handling of the investigation. In particular, we highlighted the PNP–
CIDG’s failure to identify the cartographic sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five
abductors of Jonas, based on their interview with the eyewitnesses to the abduction.

In this same Resolution, we also affirmed the CA’s dismissal of the petitions for Contempt and issuance of a
Writ of Amparo with respect to President Macapagal–Arroyo who was then entitled, as President, to
immunity from suit.

The March 15, 2011 CHR Report

On March 15, 2011, the CHR submitted to the Court its Investigation Report on the Enforced Disappearance
of Jonas Burgos (CHR Report), in compliance with our June 22, 2010 Resolution. On the basis of the
gathered evidence, the CHR submitted the following findings: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

Based on the facts developed by evidence obtaining in this case, the CHR finds that the enforced
disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos had transpired; and that his constitutional rights to life
liberty and security were violated by the Government have been fully determined.

Jeffrey Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang have witnessed on that fateful day of April 28, 2007 the
forcible abduction of Jonas Burgos by a group of about seven (7) men and a woman from the
extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall,
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.

xxx

The eyewitnesses mentioned above were Jeffrey Cabintoy (Jeffrey) and Elsa Agasang (Elsa), who at the
time of the abduction were working as busboy and Trainee–Supervisor, respectively, at Hapag Kainan
Restaurant.
In his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Jeffrey had a clear recollection of the face of HARRY AGAGEN
BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors, apart from the faces of the two abductors in the
cartographic sketches that he described to the police, after he was shown by the Team the pictures in the
PMA Year Book of Batch Sanghaya 2000 and group pictures of men taken some years thereafter.

The same group of pictures were shown to detained former 56th IB Army trooper Edmond M.
Dag–uman (Dag–uman), who also positively identified Lt. Harry Baliaga, Jr.
Daguman’s Sinumpaang Salaysay states that he came to know Lt. Baliaga as a Company
Commander in the 56th IB while he was still in the military service (with Serial No. 800693, from
1997 to 2002) also with the 56th IB but under 1Lt. Usmalik Tayaban, the Commander of Bravo
Company. When he was arrested and brought to the 56th IB Camp in April 2005, he did not see Lt. Baliaga
anymore at the said camp. The similar reaction that the pictures elicited from both Jeffrey and Daguman did
not pass unnoticed by the Team. Both men always look pensive, probably because of the pathetic plight
they are in right now. It came as a surprise therefore to the Team when they could hardly hide their smile
upon seeing the face of Baliaga, as if they know the man very well.

Moreover, when the Team asked how certain Jeffrey was or [sic] that it was indeed Baliaga that he saw as
among those who actually participated in Jonas’ abduction. Jeffrey was able to give a graphic description
and spontaneously, to boot, the blow by blow account of the incident, including the initial positioning of the
actors, specially Baliaga, who even approached, talked to, and prevented him from interfering in their
criminal act.

A Rebel–returnee (RR) named Maria Vita Lozada y Villegas @KA MY, has identified the face of the female in
the cartographic sketch as a certain Lt. Fernando. While Lozada refuses to include her identification of Lt.
Fernando in her Sinumpaang Salaysay for fear of a backlash, she told the Team that she was certain it was
Lt. Fernando in the cartographic sketch since both of them were involved in counter–insurgency operations
at the 56th IB, while she was under the care of the battalion from March 2006 until she left the 56th IB
Headquarters in October 2007. Lozada’s involvement in counter–insurgency operations together with Lt.
Fernando was among the facts gathered by the CHR Regional Office 3 Investigators, whose investigation
into the enforced disappearance of Jonas Joseph Burgos was documented by way of an After Mission Report
dated August 13, 2008.

Most if not all the actual abductors would have been identified had it not been for what is
otherwise called as evidentiary difficulties shamelessly put up by some police and military
elites. The deliberate refusal of TJAG Roa to provide the CHR with the requested documents does
not only defy the Supreme Court directive to the AFP but ipso facto created a disputable
presumption that AFP personnel were responsible for the abduction and that their superiors
would be found accountable, if not responsible, for the crime committed. This observation finds
support in the disputable presumption “That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.”
(Paragraph (e), Section 3, Rule 131 on Burden of Proof and Presumptions, Revised Rules on Evidence of the
Rules of Court of the Philippines).

In saying that the requested document is irrelevant, the Team has deemed that the requested
documents and profiles would help ascertain the true identities of the cartographic sketches of
two abductors because a certain Virgilio Eustaquio has claimed that one of the intelligence
operatives involved in the 2007 ERAP 5 case fits the description of his abductor.

As regards the PNP CIDG, the positive identification of former 56th IB officer Lt. HARRY A.
BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors has effectively crushed the theory of the CIDG
witnesses that the NPAs abducted Jonas. Baliaga’s true identity and affiliation with the military
have been established by overwhelming evidence corroborated by detained former Army trooper
Dag–uman.

For lack of material time, the Commission will continue to investigate the enforced disappearance of Jonas
Burgos as an independent body and pursuant to its mandate under the 1987 Constitution. Of particular
importance are the identities and locations of the persons appearing in the cartographic sketches; the
allegations that CIDG Witnesses Emerito G. Lipio and Meliza Concepcion–Reyes are AFP enlisted personnel
and the alleged participation of Delfin De Guzman @ Ka Baste in the abduction of Jonas Burgos whose case
for Murder and Attempted Murder was dismissed by the court for failure of the lone witness, an army man of
the 56th IB to testify against him.

Interview with Virgilio Eustaquio, Chairman of the Union Masses for Democracy and Justice
(UMDJ), revealed that the male abductor of Jonas Burgos appearing in the cartographic sketch
was among the raiders who abducted him and four others, identified as Jim Cabauatan, Jose
Curament, Ruben Dionisio and Dennis Ibona otherwise known as ERAP FIVE.

Unfortunately, and as already pointed out above, The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) turned down the
request of the Team for a profile of the operatives in the so–called “Erap 5” abduction on the ground of
relevancy and branded the request as a fishing expedition per its Disposition Form dated September 21,
2010.

Efforts to contact Virgilio Eustaquio to secure his affidavit proved futile, as his present whereabouts cannot
be determined. And due to lack of material time, the Commission decided to pursue the same and determine
the whereabouts of the other members of the “Erap 5” on its own time and authority as an independent
body.2 ChanRobles Vi rtual awlib rary

B. The Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution

On July 5, 2011, in light of the new evidence and leads the CHR uncovered, we issued a Resolution: (1)
issuing anew a Writ of Habeas Corpus and referring the habeas corpus petition to the CA; (2) holding in
abeyance our ruling on the merits of the Amparo aspect of the case; referring back the same to
the CA in order to allow Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. and the present Amparo respondents to file their
Comments on the CHR Report; and ordering Lt. Baliaga to be impleaded as a party to
the Amparo petition; and (3) affirming the dismissal of the petitioner’s petition for Contempt, without
prejudice to the re–filing of the contempt charge as may be warranted by the results of the subsequent CHR
investigation. To quote the exact wording of our Resolution:

WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the foregoing reasons, we RESOLVE to: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

I. IN G.R. NO. 183711 (HABEAS CORPUS PETITION, CA–G.R. SP No. 99839)

II. ISSUE a Writ of Habeas Corpus anew, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals
who shall immediately refer the writ to the same Division that decided the habeas corpus petition;

III. ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. impleaded in CA–G.R. SP No. 99839 and G.R. No. 183711,
and REQUIRE him, together with the incumbent Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines; the
incumbent Commanding General, Philippine Army; and the Commanding Officer of the 56th IB,
7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army at the time of the disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, Lt.
Col. Melquiades Feliciano, to produce the person of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos under the terms the
Court of Appeals shall prescribe, and to show cause why Jonas Joseph T. Burgos should not be
released from detention;

IV. REFER back the petition for habeas corpus to the same Division of the Court of Appeals which shall
continue to hear this case after the required Returns shall have been filed and render a new decision
within thirty (30) days after the case is submitted for decision; and

V. ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of
the Philippine Army to be impleaded as parties, separate from the original respondents impleaded in
the petition, and the dropping or deletion of President Gloria Macapagal–Arroyo as party–
respondent.

IN G.R. NO. 183712 (CONTEMPT OF COURT CHARGE, CA–G.R. SP No. 100230)

e. AFFIRM the dismissal of the petitioner’s petition for Contempt in CA–G.R. SP No. 100230, without
prejudice to the re–filing of the contempt charge as may be warranted by the results of the subsequent CHR
investigation this Court has ordered; and
f. ORDER the dropping or deletion of former President Gloria Macapagal–Arroyo as party–respondent, in
light of the unconditional dismissal of the contempt charge against her.

IN G.R. NO. 183713 (WRIT OF AMPARO PETITION, CA–G.R. SP No. 00008–WA)

g. ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., impleaded in CA–G.R. SP No. 00008–WA and G.R. No. 183713, without
prejudice to similar directives we may issue with respect to others whose identities and participation may be
disclosed in future investigations and proceedings;

h. DIRECT Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., and the present Amparo respondents to file their Comments on the CHR
report with the Court of Appeals, within a non–extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
Resolution.

i. REQUIRE General Roa of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, AFP; the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our June 22, 2010 Resolution; and then Chief of Staff, AFP, Gen. Ricardo
David, (a) to show cause and explain to this Court, within a non–extendible period of fifteen (15) days from
receipt of this Resolution, why they should not be held in contempt of this Court for their defiance of our
June 22, 2010 Resolution; and (b) to submit to this Court, within a non–extendible period of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of this Resolution, a copy of the documents requested by the CHR, particularly:

1) The profile and Summary of Information and pictures of T/Sgt. Jason Roxas
(Philippine Army); Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force); M/Sgt.
Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force); an alias T.L. – all reportedly assigned with
Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines – and 2Lt. Fernando, a lady officer involved in the counter–
insurgency operations of the 56th IB in 2006 to 2007;

2) Copies of the records of the 2007 ERAP 5 incident in Kamuning, Quezon City
and the complete list of the intelligence operatives involved in that said covert
military operation, including their respective Summary of Information and
individual pictures; and

3) Complete list of the officers, women and men assigned at the 56th and
69th Infantry Battalion and the 7th Infantry Division from January 1, 2004 to
June 30, 2007 with their respective profiles, Summary of Information and
pictures; including the list of captured rebels and rebels who surrendered to the
said camps and their corresponding pictures and copies of their Tactical
Interrogation Reports and the cases filed against them, if any.

These documents shall be released exclusively to this Court for our examination to determine
their relevance to the present case and the advisability of their public disclosure.

j. ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army to be impleaded as parties, in representation of their respective organizations, separately
from the original respondents impleaded in the petition; and the dropping of President Gloria Macapagal–
Arroyo as party–respondent;

k. REFER witnesses Jeffrey T. Cabintoy and Elsa B. Agasang to the Department of Justice for admission to
the Witness Protection Security and Benefit Program, subject to the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981;
and

l. NOTE the criminal complaint filed by the petitioner with the DOJ which the latter may investigate and act
upon on its own pursuant to Section 21 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.3

C. The Court’s August 23, 2011 Resolution

On August 23, 2011, we issued a Resolution resolving among others:

(a) to NOTE the Explanation separately filed by Brigadier Gen. Gilberto Jose C.
Roa, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo A. David, Jr., AFP
(ret.), and Rear Admiral Cornelio A. dela Cruz, Jr., AFP;

xxx

(c) to LIMIT the documents to be submitted to this Court to those assigned at the
56th Infantry Battalion (IB) from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, and
to SUBMIT these materials within ten (10) days from notice of this
Resolution, without prejudice to the submission of the other documents
required under the Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution, pertaining to those
assigned at the other units of the AFP, should the relevance of these
documents be established during the Court of Appeal’s hearing;

(d) to REQUIRE the submission, within ten (10) days from notice of this
Resolution, of the Summary of Information and individual pictures of the
intelligence operatives involved in the ERAP 5 incident, in compliance with the
Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution;

(e) to REQUIRE the submission, within ten (10) days from notice of this
Resolution, of the profile and Summary of Information and pictures of an alias
T.L., reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of the Intelligence
Service of the AFP and of a 2Lt. Fernando, a lady officer in the counter–
insurgency operations of the 56th IB in 2006 to 2007, in compliance with the
Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution.4
The Respondents’ September 23, 2011 Manifestation and Motion

On September 23, 2011, the respondents submitted a Manifestation and Motion in compliance with the
Court’s August 23, 2011 Resolution. Attached to this Manifestation and Motion are the following
documents: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

a. The Summary of Information (SOI) of the officers and enlisted personnel of the 56th IB, 7th ID from
January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007;
 b. The Summary of Information (SOI) of the intelligence operatives who were involved in the ERAP 5
incident; and
c. The Summary of Information (SOI) of 2Lt. Fernando, who was a member of the 56th IB, 7th ID.5

D. The Court’s September 6, 2011 Resolution

On August 19, 2011, the petitioner filed a Manifestation and a Motion for Clarificatory Order praying among
others that she be allowed to examine the documents submitted to the Court pursuant to paragraph III (i)
of the Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution. In our September 6, 2011 Resolution, we resolved, among others,
to:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

(3) DENY the petitioner’s request to be allowed to examine the documents

submitted to this Court per paragraph (i) of the fallo of our July 5, 2011
Resolution, without prejudice to our later determination of the relevance and
of the advisability of public disclosure of those documents/materials;6
E. The Court’s October 11, 2011 Resolution

On October 11, 2011, we issued a Resolution requiring the CHR to secure Virgilio Eustaquio’s affidavit, and
to submit a report of its ongoing investigation of Jonas’ abduction, viz:

(1) REQUIRE the Commission on Human Rights to undertake all available

measures to obtain the affidavit of witness Virgilio Eustaquio in connection with
his allegation that one of the male abductors of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos,
appearing in the cartographic sketch, was among the “raiders” who abducted
him and four others, identified as Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament, Ruben
Dionisio and Dennis Ibona (otherwise known as the “ERAP FIVE”);

(2) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights to submit to this Court, within thirty
(30) days from receipt of this Resolution, a Report, with its recommendations
of its ongoing investigation of Burgos’ abduction, and the affidavit of Virgilio
Eustaquio, if any, copy furnished the petitioner, the Court of Appeals, the
incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and the PNP–CIDG, and all the present
respondents before the Court of Appeals.7
F. The Court’s November 29, 2011 Resolution

On November 2, 2011, we received a letter dated October 28, 2011 from Commissioner Jose Manuel S.
Mamauag, Team Leader, CHR Special Investigation Team, requesting photocopies of the following
documents: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

i. SOI of the officers and enlisted personnel of the 56th IB, 7th ID from January 1, 2004 to June 30,
2007;
ii. SOI of the intelligence operatives who were involved in the ERAP 5 incident; and
iii. SOI of 2Lt. Fernando who was a member of the 56th IB, 7th ID.8

In our November 29, 2011 Resolution, we denied the CHR’s request considering the confidential nature of
the requested documents and because the relevance of these documents to the present case had not been
established. We referred the CHR to our July 5, 2011 Resolution where we pointedly stated that these
documents shall be “released exclusively to this Court for our examination to determine their relevance to
the present case and the advisability of their public disclosure.”9

We held that “[w]e see no reason at this time to release these confidential documents since their relevance
to the present case has not been established to our satisfaction. It is precisely for this reason that we issued
our October 24, 2011 Resolution and directed the CHR to submit to this Court, within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the Resolution, a Report with its recommendations of its ongoing investigation of Jonas Burgos’
abduction, and the affidavit of Virgilio Eustaquio, if any. Simply stated, it is only after the CHR’s faithful
compliance with our October 24, 2011 Resolution that we will be able to determine the relevance of the
requested documents to the present case.”10

G. The March 20, 2012 CHR Progress Report and Eustaquio’s Affidavit

On March 20, 2012, the CHR submitted its Progress Report detailing its efforts to secure the affidavit of
witness Eustaquio in relation with his allegation that one of the male abductors of Jonas, appearing in the
cartographic sketch, was among the raiders who abducted him and four others, identified as Jim Cabauatan,
Jose Curament, Ruben Dionisio and Dennis Ibona (otherwise known as the “ERAP FIVE”). Attached to this
Report is Eustaquio’s sworn affidavit dated March 16, 2012, which pertinently stated:

1. I was one of the victims in the abduction incident on May 22, 2006 otherwise known as ERAP 5 and
because of that, we filed a case with the Ombudsman against Commodore Leonardo Calderon, et
al., all then ISAFP elements, docketed as OMB–P–C–06–04050–E for Arbitrary Detention, Unlawful
Arrest, Maltreatment of Prisoners, Grave Threats, Incriminatory Machination, and Robbery.

2. On March 16, 2012, I was approached again by the CHR Special Investigation Team regarding the
information I have previously relayed to them sometime in September 2010 as to the resemblance
of the cartographic sketch of the man as described by the two eyewitnesses Elsa Agasang and
Jeffrey Cabintoy in the abduction case of Jonas Burgos;

3. I can say that the male abductor of Jonas Burgos appearing in the cartographic sketch is among the
raiders who abducted me and my four other companions because the cartographic sketch almost
exactly matched and/or resembled to the cartographic sketch that I also provided and described in
relation to the said incident at my rented house in Kamuning, Quezon City on May 22, 2006.

4. I am executing this affidavit voluntarily, freely and attest to the truth of the foregoing.11
cralaw red

H. The March 18, 2013 CA Decision

On March 18, 2013, the CA issued its decision pursuant to the Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution referring
the Amparo and Habeas Corpus aspects of the case to the CA for appropriate hearings and ruling on the
merits of the petitions.

Petition for Habeas Corpus

The CA held that the issue in the petition for habeas corpus is not the illegal confinement or detention of
Jonas, but his enforced disappearance. Considering that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance, the
present case is beyond the ambit of a petition for habeas corpus.

Petition for the Writ of Amparo

Based on its finding that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance, the CA concluded that the present
case falls within the ambit of the Writ of Amparo. The CA found that the totality of the evidence supports the
petitioner’s allegation that the military was involved in the enforced disappearance of Jonas. The CA took
note of Jeffrey Cabintoy’s positive identification of Lt. Baliaga as one of the abductors who approached him
and told him not to interfere because the man being arrested had been under surveillance for drugs; he also
remembered the face of Lt. Baliaga – the face he identified in the pictures because he resembles his friend
Raven. The CA also held that Lt. Baliaga’s alibi and corroborative evidence cannot prevail over Cabintoy’s
positive identification, considering especially the absence of any indication that he was impelled by hatred or
any improper motive to testify against Lt. Baliaga. Thus, the CA held that Lt. Baliaga was responsible and
the AFP and the PNP were accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jonas.

Based on these considerations, the CA resolved to:

1) RECOGNIZING the abduction of Jonas Burgos as an enforced disappearance
covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;

2) With regard to authorship,

a) DECLARING Maj. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. RESPONSIBLE for the enforced

disappearance of Jonas Burgos; and

b) DECLARING the Armed Forces of the Philippines and elements of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, particularly the Philippine
Army, ACCOUNTABLE for the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos;

3) DECLARING the Philippine National Police ACCOUNTABLE for the conduct of

an exhaustive investigation of the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos. To
this end, the PNP through its investigative arm, the PNP–CIDG, is directed to
exercise extraordinary diligence to identify and locate the abductors of Jonas
Burgos who are still at large and to establish the link between the abductors of
Jonas Burgos and those involved in the ERAP 5 incident.

(4) DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Director General of the Philippine National Police, and their
successors, to ensure the continuance of their investigation and coordination on
the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos until the persons found responsible
are brought before the bar of justice;

(5) DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights to continue with its own
independent investigation on the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos with
the same degree of diligence required under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
and

(6) DIRECTING the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police to extend full assistance to the Commission on Human Rights in the
conduct of the latter’s investigation.

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Director General, Philippine National Police and the
Chairman, Commission on Human Rights are hereby DIRECTED to submit a quarterly report to this Court
on the results of their respective investigation.
The filing of petitioner’s Affidavit–Complaint against Maj. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., et al. before the Department
of Justice on June 9, 2011 is NOTED. Petitioner is DIRECTED to immediately inform this Court of any
development regarding the outcome of the case.12

The Respondent’s April 3, 2013 Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The Solicitor General, in behalf of the public respondents (the AFP Chief of Staff and the PNP Director
General), filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the March 18, 2013 CA decision. The motion made the
following submissions:

5. x x x[T]he Director General, PNP, respectfully takes exception to the Honorable Court’s findings that the
PNP, specifically the CIDG, “failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in the conduct of its investigation.” x x
x [T]hat this Honorable Court arrived at a conclusion different from that of the CIDG, or accorded different
credence to the statements of the witnesses presented by the parties, does not necessarily translate to the
CIDG’s failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.

6. The Chief of Staff, AFP also takes exception to the Honorable Court’s findings that the “Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General should be held accountable for Jonas
Burgos disappearance for failing to exercise extraordinary diligence in conducting an internal investigation
on the matter. The unwillingness of the respondent officers of the 56th IB to cooperate in the investigation
conducted by the CHR is a persuasive proof of the alleged cover up of the military’s involvement in the
enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos.”

The AFP and the Philippine Army conducted a thorough investigation to determine the veracity of the
allegations implicating some of its officers and personnel. After the conduct of the same, it is the conclusion
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Army, based on the evidence they obtained, that
Jonas Burgos has never been in custody.

7. The Chief of Staff, AFP, also respectfully takes exception to the finding of the Honorable Court
“recognizing the abduction of Jonas Burgos as an enforced disappearance.”

xxx

That the Honorable Court found a member of the Philippine Army or even a group of military men to be
responsible for the abduction of Jonas Burgos, does not necessarily make the same a case of “enforced
disappearance” involving the State. There is dearth of evidence to show that the government is involved.
Respondent Baliaga’s alleged participation in the abduction and his previous membership in the 56th Infantry
Battalion of the Philippine Army, by themselves, do not prove the participation or acquiescence of the
State.13ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary

I. The CA Resolution dated May 23, 2013

On May 23, 2013, the CA issued its resolution denying the respondents’ motion for partial reconsideration.
The CA ruled that as far as the PNP was concerned, its failure to elicit leads and information from Cabintoy
who witnessed Jonas’ abduction is eloquent proof of its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in the
conduct of its investigation. As far as the AFP was concerned, the CA held that the fact that Lt. Baliaga of
the Philippine Army was positively identified as one of the abductors of Jonas, coupled with the AFP’s lack of
serious effort to conduct further investigation, spoke loudly of the AFP leadership’s accountability.

To date, the respondents have not appealed to this Court, as provided under Section 19 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo.14

J. The Petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela dated April 1, 2013

On April 1, 2013, the petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela asking the Court to: (1) order
the persons named in the sealed documents to be impleaded in CA–G.R. SP No. 00008–WA and G.R. No.
183713; (2) issue a writ of Amparo on the basis of the newly discovered evidence (the sealed attachment to
the motion); and (3) refer the cases to the CA for further hearing on the newly discovered evidence.

The petitioner alleged that she received from a source (who requested to remain anonymous) documentary
evidence proving that an intelligence unit of the 7th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army and 56th Infantry
Battalion, operating together, captured Jonas on April 28, 2007 at Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth
Avenue, Quezon City. This documentary evidence consists of: (1) After Apprehension Report dated April 30,
2007; (2) Psycho Social Processing Report dated April 28, 2007; and (3) Autobiography of Jonas. The
petitioner also claimed that these are copies of confidential official reports on file with the Philippine Army.

i. After Apprehension Report dated April 30, 2007

This report is a photocopy consisting six pages dated April 30, 2007, addressed to the Commanding Officer,
7MIB, 7ID, LA, Fort Magsaysay, NE. The report detailed the planning and the objective of apprehending
target communist leaders, among them, one alias “Ramon” who was captured at Ever Gotesco Mall,
Commonwealth, Quezon City on April 28, 2007 by joint elements of the 72 MICO and S2, 56th IB. This report
also listed the names of the military personnel belonging to task organization 72 MICO and 56th IB who
conducted the operation.

ii. Psycho Social Processing Report dated April 28, 2007

This report details Jonas’ abduction and “neutralization”; the results of his interrogation and the intelligence
gathered on his significant involvements/activities within the CPP/NPA/NDF organization.

iii. Undated Autobiography

This autobiography narrates how Jonas started as a student activist, his recruitment and eventual ascent in
the CPP/NPA as an intelligence officer.

K. The Court’s April 11, 2013 Resolution

In our April 11, 2013 Resolution, the Court resolved to require the respondents to Comment on the
petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela and its attachments, within ten (10) days from
receipt of the Resolution. In the same Resolution, the Court: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

(1) required BGen. Roa and Lt. Gen. Emmanuel T. Bautista to fully comply with the
terms of Section III (i) of the dispositive portion of our July 5, 2011 Resolution
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution;

(2) required Lt. Gen. Emmanuel T. Bautista to submit a written assurance within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Resolution that the military personnel
listed in the submitted After Apprehension Report can be located and be served
with the processes that the Court may serve;

(3) issued a Temporary Protection Order in favor of the petitioner and all the
members of her immediate family;
(4) directed the DOJ and the NBI to provide security and protection to the
petitioner and her immediate family and to submit a confidential memorandum
on the security arrangements made;

(5) directed the NBI to coordinate and provide direct investigative assistance to the
CHR as it may require pursuant to the authority granted under the Court’s June
22, 2010 Resolution.15
i. The respondents’ Comment from the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela dated June 6, 2013

On June 6, 2013, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their comments on the
petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.

First, the respondents alleged that the documents submitted by the petitioner do not exist in the concerned
military units’ respective records, nor are they in the custody or possession of their respective units. To
support their allegations, the respondents submitted the following:

a. Certification dated May 29, 2013 from Maj. Gen. Gregorio Pio P. Catapang, Jr. Commander,
7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army stating that the documents16 submitted by the petitioner “do
not exist nor in the possession/custody of this Headquarters.”

b. Certification dated May 29, 2013, from Lt. Col. Louie D.S. Villanueva, Assistant Chief of Staff, Office
of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, G1, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army stating that
the documents submitted by the petitioner “could not be found nor do they exist in the records of
this Command.”

c. Certification dated May 24, 2013 from Lt. Col. Bernardo M. Ona, Commanding Officer, 56th Infantry
Battalion, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army stating that the documents submitted by the
petitioner “do not exist at this unit.”

d. Certification dated May 24, 2013 from 1Lt. Donal S. Frias, Acting Commanding Officer, 72nd Military
Intelligence Company, 7th Military Intelligence Battalion, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army
stating that the documents submitted by the petitioner “do not exist at the records or in the
possession of this unit.”17

The respondents also submitted the affidavits of Lt. Col. Melquiades Feliciano, Maj. Allan M. Margarata and
Cpl. Ruby Benedicto, viz:
a. In his June 3, 2013 Affidavit, Col. Feliciano stated:

1. That I was assigned as Battalion Commander of 56th Infantry Division, 7th Infantry Division, PA last
17 January 2007 to 17 August 2007.

2. That I was showed a photocopy of the After Apprehension Report dated 30 April 2007 wherein
members of 56th IB, 7ID, PA were included therein.

3. I vehemently oppose to (sic) the existence of the said document and the participation of my men
listed thereat. There were no military operations that I have authorized or approved regarding Jonas
Burgos. The contents thereof are false and utter fabrication of facts.

b. In his May 31, 2013 Affidavit, Maj. Margarata stated:

1. That I was assigned at 72nd Military Intelligence Company (72MICO), 7th Infantry Division, PA from
01 July 2006 to 01 July 2008.
 2. That I was showed a photocopy of the Psycho–Social Processing Report dated 28 April 2007 and
After Apprehension Report dated 30 April 2007, both of which purportedly came from 72MICO,
7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army and that on the last page of the Pyscho–Social Processing
Report appears my name therein.

3. I vehemently oppose to (sic) the existence of the said documents and the implication of my name in
the said documents. The contents thereof are purely a product of wild imagination. I have never
seen such document until now.

4. I can only surmise that these are plainly a fishing expedition on the part of Mrs. Edita Burgos. A
ploy to implicate any military personnel especially those belonging to the 7th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army.

c. In her May 31, 2013 Affidavit, Cpl. Benedicto stated:

1. That I was never assigned at 72nd Military Intelligence Company, 7th Infantry Division, PA.

2. That I was showed a photocopy of the Psycho–Social Processing Report dated 28 April 2007 and
After Apprehension Report dated 30 April 2007, both of which purportedly came from 72MICO,
7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army and that on the last page of the Psycho–Social Processing
Report appears my name therein.

3. I vehemently oppose to (sic) the existence of the said documents and the implication of my name in
the said documents. The contents thereof are false and utter fabrication of facts. How can I ever be
at 72MICO if I was never assigned thereat.

4. I have never been an interrogator in my entire military service. I have never been a member of any
operation which involves the name of Jonas Burgos or any other military operation for that matter. I
have never seen such document until now.

5. Furthermore, I have never worked with Maj. Allan Margarata or of his unit, 72MICO.18

Second, the respondents note that none of the documents submitted by the petitioner were signed; a writ
of Amparo cannot be issued and the investigation cannot progress on the basis of false documents and false
information.

Lastly, the respondents argue that since the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and CHR are conducting
their own investigations of the case, the petitioner’s motion at this point is premature; the proceedings to be
conducted by the CA will be at the very least redundant.

ii. The Respondents’ Compliance dated June 7, 2013

On June 7, 2013, the respondents, through the Office of Judge Advocate General, complied with our April
11, 2013 Resolution by submitting the following documents:

a. Profile/Summary of Information (SOI) with pictures of the personnel of 56th Infantry Battalion (IB),
69th IB, and 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army (PA). These documents were submitted by the
7th ID in sealed nine (9) small and three (3) big boxes (total of twelve (12) sealed boxes);

b. Investigation Report of the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) on the
2007 “ERAP 5” incident in Kamuning, Quezon City; Profile/Summary of Information (SOI) with
pictures of the Intel Operatives involved in the “ERAP 5” incident; and certification issued by the
Command Adjutant of ISAFP concerning T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army), Cpl. Maria Joana
Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), an alias T.L., all
reportedly assigned with the Military Intelligence Group 15 of the Intelligence Service, AFP (MIG 15,
ISAFP). These documents were submitted by ISAFP in a sealed envelope;
 c. Profile/Summary of Information (SOI) with a picture of 2LT Fernando PA. This document was
submitted by Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, G1, PA in a sealed envelope;

d. A certification issued by 56IB and 69IB, 7ID, PA concerning captured/surrendered rebels;

e. A certification stating the present location and whereabouts of military personnel listed in the
submitted After Apprehension Report, dated April 30, 2007, allegedly identified as members of the
Task Organization –72 MICO and 56th IB with the inclusion of four (4) separate certifications from
Commander, 7ID, PA, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, G1, 7ID, PA, Commanding
Officer, 72 MICO, and 56Ib, 71ID, PA, respectively, stating the non–existence of the following
documents: Psycho–Social Processing Report dated 28 April 2007; After–Apprehension Report dated
30 April 2007; Autobiography of Jonas Burgos; and Picture of Jonas Burgos;

f. Affidavit of Compliance of General Emmanuel T. Bautista, AFP, the Chief of Staff, assuring that the
active military personnel mentioned in the purported apprehension report can be located at their
given locations and be served with the processes that may be issued by the Honorable Court.19

OUR RULING

A. On the relevancy and disclosure of the documents submitted to this Court per paragraph III(i)
of the fallo of our July 5, 2011 Resolution

The directive for the submission of the above–mentioned documents arose from our determination in our
June 22, 2010 Resolution that the PNP–CIDG failed to identify the cartographic sketches of two (one male
and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas, based on their interview with eyewitnesses to the abduction.
For this reason, the Court directly commissioned the CHR to continue the investigation of Jonas’ abduction
and the gathering of evidence.

Based on its March 15, 2011 Report, the CHR uncovered a lead – a claim made by Eustaquio, Chairman of
the Union Masses for Democracy and Justice, that the male abductor of Jonas appearing in the cartographic
sketch was among the raiders who abducted him and four others, known as the “ERAP FIVE.”

This prompted the CHR to request copies of the documents embodied in par. III(i) of the fallo of the Court’s
July 5, 2011 Resolution from General Gilberto Jose C. Roa of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, AFP.
Gen. Roa initially denied this request but eventually complied with the Court’s directive of July 5, 2011 to
submit the documents via the September 23, 2011 Manifestation and Motion and the June 7, 2013
Compliance. In the same July 5, 2011 Resolution, the Court made it plain that these documents shall be
released exclusively to the Court for its examination to determine their relevance to the present case and
the advisability of their public disclosure.

Pursuant to the Court’s October 11, 2011 Resolution, the CHR submitted its March 20, 2012 Progress Report
on its continuing investigation of Jonas’ abduction. Attached to this Progress Report was Virgilio Eustaquio’s
sworn affidavit stating that: (1) he was one of the victims of the abduction incident on May 22, 2006,
otherwise known as the “ERAP FIVE” incident; (2) as a result of this incident, they filed a case with the
Ombudsman against Commodore Leonardo Calderon and other members of the Intelligence Service, AFP
(ISAFP) for arbitrary detention, unlawful arrest, maltreatment of prisoners, grave threats, incriminatory
machination and robbery; and (3) the male abductor of Jonas appearing in the cartographic sketch shown to
him by the CHR was among the raiders who abducted him and his four companions because it resembled
the cartographic sketch he described in relation to the ERAP FIVE incident on May 22, 2006.

After reviewing the submissions of both the respondents20 and the CHR21 pursuant to the Court’s July 5,
2011, August 23, 2011 and October 11, 2011 Resolutions, we resolve to grant the CHR access to these
requested documents to allow them the opportunity to ascertain the true identities of the persons depicted
in the cartographic sketches.

At this point, we emphasize that the sworn affidavit of Eustaquio (that attests to the resemblance of one of
Jonas’ abductors to the abductors of the ERAP FIVE) constitutes the sought–after missing link that
establishes the relevance of the requested documents to the present case. We note that this lead may help
the CHR ascertain the identities of those depicted in the cartographic sketches as two of Jonas’ abductors
(one male and one female) who, to this day, remain unidentified.

In view of the sensitive and confidential nature of the requested documents, we direct the Clerk of Court of
the Supreme Court to allow the duly–authorized representatives of the CHR to inspect the requested
documents in camera within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution. The documents shall be examined
and compared with the cartographic sketches of the two abductors of Jonas, without copying and without
bringing the documents outside the premises of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court. The
inspection of the documents shall be within office hours and for a reasonable period of time sufficient to
allow the CHR to comprehensively investigate the lead provided by Eustaquio.

To fully fulfill the objective of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, further investigation using the standard of
extraordinary diligence should be undertaken by the CHR to pursue the lead provided by Eustaquio. We take
judicial notice of the ongoing investigation being conducted by the Department of Justice (DOJ), through the
NBI, on the disappearance of Jonas.22 In this regard, we direct the NBI to coordinate and provide direct
investigative assistance to the CHR as the latter may require, pursuant to the authority granted under the
Court’s June 22, 2010 Resolution.

For this purpose, we require the CHR to submit a supplemental investigation report to the DOJ, copy
furnished the petitioner, the NBI, the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and the PNP–CIDG, and all the
respondents within sixty days (60) days from receipt of this Resolution.

B. On the Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela

After reviewing the newly discovered evidence submitted by the petitioner and considering all the
developments of the case, including the March 18, 2013 CA decision that confirmed the validity of the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo in the present case, we resolve to deny the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte
Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.

We note and conclude, based on the developments highlighted above, that the beneficial purpose of the Writ
of Amparo has been served in the present case. As we held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,23 the writ merely
embodies the Court’s directives to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address
the enforced disappearance of an individual. The Writ of Amparo serves both a preventive and
a curative role. It is curative as it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators through the
investigation and remedial action that it directs.24 The focus is on procedural curative remedies rather than
on the tracking of a specific criminal or the resolution of administrative liabilities. The unique nature
of Amparo proceedings has led us to define terms or concepts specific to what the proceedings seek to
achieve. In Razon Jr., v. Tagitis,25 we defined what the terms “responsibility” and “accountability” signify in
an Amparo case. We said:

Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the
remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases
against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the
measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance.26 ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the series of calculated directives issued by the Court
outlined above and the extraordinary diligence the CHR demonstrated in its investigations resulted in the
criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. We take judicial notice of the fact that the Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, Branch 216, has already found probable cause for arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga and has
ordered his arrest in connection with Jonas’ disappearance.27

We also emphasize that the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision already ruled with finality on the entities
responsible and accountable (as these terms are defined in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis) for the enforced
disappearance of Jonas. In its March 18, 2013 decision, the CA found, by substantial evidence, that Lt.
Baliaga participated in the abduction on the basis of Cabintoy’s positive identification that he was one of the
abductors of Jonas who told him not to interfere because the latter had been under surveillance for drugs. In
the same Decision, the CA also held the AFP and the PNP accountable for having failed to discharge the
burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance of Jonas. Thus, the CA
issued the following directives to address the enforced disappearance of Jonas:

(1) DIRECT the PNP through its investigative arm, the PNP–CIDG, to identify and
locate the abductors of Jonas Burgos who are still at large and to establish the
link between the abductors of Jonas Burgos and those involved in the ERAP 5
incident;

(2) DIRECT the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Director General of the Philippines National Police, and their successors, to
ensure the continuance of their investigation and coordination on the enforced
disappearance of Jonas Burgos until the persons found responsible are brought
before the bar of justice;

(3) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights to continue with its own independent
investigation on the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos with the same
degree of diligence required under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;

(4) DIRECT the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police
to extend full assistance to the Commission on Human Rights in the conduct of
the latter’s investigation; and

(5) DIRECT the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Director
General, Philippine National Police and the Chairman, Commission on Human
Rights to submit a quarterly report to the Court on the results of their
respective investigation.28

We note that the respondents did not appeal the March 18, 2013 CA decision and the May 23, 2013 CA
resolution denying their motion for partial reconsideration.

Based on the above considerations, in particular, the final ruling of the CA that confirmed the validity of the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo and its determination of the entities responsible for the enforced
disappearance of Jonas, we resolve to deny the petitioner’s prayer to issue the writ of Amparo anew and to
refer the case to the CA based on the newly discovered evidence. We so conclude as the petitioner’s request
for the reissuance of the writ and for the rehearing of the case by the CA would be redundant and
superfluous in light of: (1) the ongoing investigation being conducted by the DOJ through the NBI; (2) the
CHR investigation directed by the Court in this Resolution; and (3) the continuing investigation directed by
the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision.

We emphasize that while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo accords the Court a wide latitude in crafting
remedies to address an enforced disappearance, it cannot (without violating the nature of the writ
of Amparo as a summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief) grant remedies that would complicate
and prolong rather than expedite the investigations already ongoing. Note that the CA has already
determined with finality that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance.

We clarify that by denying the petitioner’s motion, we do not thereby rule on the admissibility or the merits
of the newly discovered evidence submitted by the petitioner. We likewise do not foreclose any investigation
by the proper investigative and prosecutory agencies of the other entities whose identities and participation
in the enforced disappearance of Jonas may be disclosed in future investigations and proceedings.
Considering that the present case has already reached the prosecution stage, the petitioner’s motion should
have been filed with the proper investigative and prosecutory agencies of the government.

To expedite proceedings, we refer the petitioner’s motion, this Resolution and its covered cases to the DOJ
for investigation, for the purpose of filing the appropriate criminal charges in the proper courts against the
proper parties, if warranted, based on the gathered evidence. For this purpose, we direct the petitioner to
furnish the DOJ and the NBI copies of her Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, together with the
sealed attachments to the Motion, within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution.

As mentioned, we take judicial notice of the ongoing investigation by the DOJ, through the NBI, of the
disappearance of Jonas. This DOJ investigation is without prejudice to the Office of the Ombudsman’s
exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the investigation of the criminal aspect of this case should the case
be determined to be cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.29

As we direct below, further investigation for purposes of the present proceedings shall continue to be
undertaken by the CHR, in close coordination with the NBI, for the completion of the investigation under the
terms of our June 22, 2010 Resolution and the additional directives under the present Resolution.

As a final note, we emphasize that our ROLE in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to determine whether
an enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is responsible or accountable; and to define
and impose the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.

As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case with the
CA’s final determination of the persons responsible and accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jonas
and the commencement of criminal action against Lt. Baliaga. At this stage, criminal, investigation and
prosecution proceedings are already beyond the reach of the Writ of Amparo proceeding now before us.

Based on the above developments, we now hold that the full extent of the remedies envisioned by the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo has been served and exhausted.Considering the foregoing, the CourtRESOLVES to:

(1) DENY petitioner Edita Burgos’ Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela;

(2) REFER the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, this
Resolution and its covered cases to the Department of Justice for
investigation for the purpose of filing the appropriate criminal charges in the
proper courts against the proper parties if such action is warranted by the
gathered evidence. The referral to the Department of Justice is without
prejudice to the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its primary jurisdiction
over the investigation should the case be determined to be cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan;
(3) DIRECT the petitioner to furnish the Department of Justice and the National
Bureau of Investigation copies of her Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela, together with the sealed attachments to the Motion, within five (5)
days from receipt of this Resolution;

(4) DIRECT the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court to allow the duly–authorized
representatives of the Commission on Human Rights to inspect the requested
documents in camera within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution. For
this purpose, the documents shall be examined and compared with the
cartographic sketches of the two abductors of Jonas Burgos without copying
and bringing the documents outside the premises of the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the Supreme Court. The inspection of the documents shall be
conducted within office hours and for a reasonable period of time that would
allow the Commission on Human Rights to comprehensively investigate the
lead provided by Virgilio Eustaquio;

(5) DIRECT the National Bureau of Investigation to coordinate and provide direct
investigative assistance to the Commission on Human Rights as the latter may
require, pursuant to the authority granted under the Court’s June 22, 2010
Resolution.

(6) REQUIRE the Commission on Human Rights to submit a supplemental

investigation report to the Department of Justice, copy furnished the petitioner,
the National Bureau of Investigation, the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police and the Philippine National
Police–Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, and all the respondents,
within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Resolution.

(7) DECLARE this Writ of Amparo proceeding closed and terminated, without
prejudice to the concerned parties’ compliance with the above directives and
subject to the Court’s continuing jurisdiction to enforce compliance with this
Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS
DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN.
JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ,
MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN
PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated 26 August 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA — a petition that was commenced jointly under the
Rules on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In its decision,
the Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs of
amparo and habeas data but denied the latter’s prayers for an inspection order, production order
and return of specified personal belongings. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby grants Petitioner the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.

Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or causing the distribution to the
public of any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to Petitioner’s
Melissa C. Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas; alleged ties to the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to the
complained incident. Petitioner’s prayers for an inspection order, production order and for the return
of the specified personal belongings are denied for lack of merit. Although there is no evidence that
Respondents are responsible for the abduction, detention or torture of the Petitioner, said
Respondents pursuant to their legally mandated duties are, nonetheless, ordered to
continue/complete the investigation of this incident with the end in view of prosecuting those who are
responsible. Respondents are also ordered to provide protection to the Petitioner and her family
while in the Philippines against any and all forms of harassment, intimidation and coercion as may
be relevant to the grant of these reliefs.3

We begin with the petitioner’s allegations.

Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent.4 While in the United States, petitioner enrolled in
an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States
of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member.5 During the course of her immersion, petitioner
toured various provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join
members of BAYAN-Tarlac6 in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future
medical mission.7

In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(₱15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard
disk, IPOD,8 wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines.9

After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo
(Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo
(Mr. Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.10 At around 1:30 in the
afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of
someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they open up.11
Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered
petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face down.12 The armed men were all in civilian
clothes and, with the exception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.13

Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up on her and tied her
hands.14 At this juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already
blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her
name.15 Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards the van—
bruising her arms, legs and knees.16 Once inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded,
petitioner was able to see the face of one of the armed men sitting beside her.17 The van then sped
away.

After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped.18 Petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered to
alight.19 After she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of the Communist
Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated from her
companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail cell from the sound of its metal
doors.20 From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing
and some construction bustle.21 She inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort
Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.22

What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture.23 The thrust of the
interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to
"the fold."24 The torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating the
petitioner.25

Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds even in her
sleep.26 Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath, during
which she became acquainted with a woman named "Rose" who bathed her.27 There were also a
few times when she cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her surroundings.28

Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of three of her
interrogators who introduced themselves to her as "Dex," "James" and "RC."29 "RC" even told
petitioner that those who tortured her came from the "Special Operations Group," and that she was
abducted because her name is included in the "Order of Battle."30

On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncle’s house in Quezon
City.31 Before being released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a
SIM32 card, a slip of paper containing an e-mail address with password,33 a plastic bag containing
biscuits and books,34 the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes.35 Petitioner was also
sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen
to her and her family.36

Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular phone
given to her.37 Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of
her family, petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card.

Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing
government files or records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the
Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009.38 Petitioner impleaded public
officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on
the belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner
likewise included in her suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC."39
The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined from harming or even
approaching petitioner and her family; (2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of detention
areas in the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to
produce documents relating to any report on the case of petitioner including, but not limited to,
intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and
subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the records of the
respondents any document pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name
which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner her journal, digital
camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch,
sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and her ₱15,000.00 cash.40

In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the case to the
Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action.41 The Resolution also
directed the respondents to file their verified written return.42

On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return of the Writs43 on behalf of
the public officials impleaded as respondents.

We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents.

The public respondents label petitioner’s alleged abduction and torture as "stage managed."44 In
support of their accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as
contained in the Special Report45 of the La Paz Police Station. In the Special Report, Mr. Paolo
disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner and her companions instructed him and
his two sons to avoid leaving the house.46 From this statement, the public respondents drew the
distinct possibility that, except for those already inside Mr. Paolo’s house, nobody else has any way
of knowing where petitioner and her companions were at the time they were supposedly
abducted.47 This can only mean, the public respondents concluded, that if ever there was any
"abduction" it must necessarily have been planned by, or done with the consent of, the petitioner and
her companions themselves.48

Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate49 of the petitioner, as actually belying her claims
that she was subjected to serious torture for five (5) days. The public respondents noted that while
the petitioner alleges that she was choked and boxed by her abductors—inflictions that could have
easily produced remarkable bruises—her Medical Certificate only shows abrasions in her wrists and
knee caps.50

For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very authenticity of petitioner’s
alleged abduction and torture, more so any military or police involvement therein. Hence, public
respondents conclude that the claims of abduction and torture was no more than a charade
fabricated by the petitioner to put the government in bad light, and at the same time, bring great
media mileage to her and the group that she represents.51

Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public respondents insist
on the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data petition based on the following grounds: (a) as
against respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular, because of her immunity from
suit,52 and (b) as against all of the public respondents, in general, in view of the absence of any
specific allegation in the petition that they had participated in, or at least authorized, the commission
of such atrocities.53
Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth
behind the allegations of the petitioner.54 In both the police and military arms of the government
machinery, inquiries were set-up in the following manner:

Police Action

Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30 o’clock in the afternoon of 19
May 2009, when Barangay Captain Michael M. Manuel came to the La Paz Municipal Police Station
to report the presence of heavily armed men somewhere in Barangay Kapanikian.55 Acting on the
report, the police station launched an initial investigation.56

The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo, who informed the investigators
of an abduction incident involving three (3) persons—later identified as petitioner Melissa Roxas,
Juanito Carabeo and John Edward Jandoc—who were all staying in his house.57 Mr. Paolo disclosed
that the abduction occurred around 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon, and was perpetrated by about eight
(8) heavily armed men who forced their way inside his house.58 Other witnesses to the abduction
also confirmed that the armed men used a dark blue van with an unknown plate number and two (2)
Honda XRM motorcycles with no plate numbers.59

At 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a Flash Message to the
different police stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an effort to track and locate the van and
motorcycles of the suspects. Unfortunately, the effort yielded negative results.60

On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in a Special Report61 that was
transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial Office, headed by public respondent P/S Supt. Rudy
Lacadin (Supt. Lacadin). Public respondent Supt. Lacadin, in turn, informed the Regional Police
Office of Region 3 about the abduction.62 Follow-up investigations were, at the same time, pursued.63

On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of the Regional
Police Office for Region 3, caused the creation of Special Investigation Task Group—CAROJAN
(Task Group CAROJAN) to conduct an in-depth investigation on the abduction of the petitioner,
Carabeo and Jandoc.64

Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of background examinations on the
victims of the purported abduction, in order to reveal the motive behind the abduction and, ultimately,
the identity of the perpetrators.65 Task Group CAROJAN also maintained liaisons with Karapatan and
the Alliance for Advancement of People’s Rights—organizations trusted by petitioner—in the hopes
of obtaining the latter’s participation in the ongoing investigations.66 Unfortunately, the letters sent by
the investigators requesting for the availability of the petitioner for inquiries were left unheeded.67

The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN had been detailed in the
reports68 that it submitted to public respondent General Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the
Philippine National Police. However, as of their latest report dated 29 June 2009, Task Group
CAROJAN is still unable to make a definitive finding as to the true identity and affiliation of the
abductors—a fact that task group CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of her
fellow victims, to cooperate in their investigative efforts.69

Military Action

Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense, first came to know about the
alleged abduction and torture of the petitioner upon receipt of the Resolution of this Court directing
him and the other respondents to file their return.70 Immediately thereafter, he issued a
Memorandum Directive71 addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, ordering the latter, among
others, to conduct an inquiry to determine the validity of the accusation of military involvement in the
abduction.72

Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent General Victor S. Ibrado, the AFP
Chief of Staff, sent an AFP Radio Message73 addressed to public respondent Lieutenant General
Delfin N. Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit), the Commanding General of the Army, relaying the order to cause
an investigation on the abduction of the petitioner.74

For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public respondent Lt. Gen.
Bangit instructed public respondent Major General Ralph A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the
Commander of the 7th Infantry Division of the Army based in Fort Magsaysay, to set in motion an
investigation regarding the possible involvement of any personnel assigned at the camp in the
purported abduction of the petitioner.75 In turn, public respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva tapped the
Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th Infantry Division, to conduct the investigation.76

On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division released an Investigation Report77 detailing
the results of its inquiry. In substance, the report described petitioner’s allegations as "opinionated"
and thereby cleared the military from any involvement in her alleged abduction and torture.78

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision,79 the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the petitioner’s version
that she was indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for five (5) straight days. The appellate
court noted the sincerity and resolve by which the petitioner affirmed the contents of her affidavits in
open court, and was thereby convinced that the latter was telling the truth.80

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the public respondents that the
abduction of the petitioner was "stage managed," as it is merely based on an unfounded speculation
that only the latter and her companions knew where they were staying at the time they were forcibly
taken.81 The Court of Appeals further stressed that the Medical Certificate of the petitioner can only
affirm the existence of a true abduction, as its findings are reflective of the very injuries the latter
claims to have sustained during her harrowing ordeal, particularly when she was handcuffed and
then dragged by her abductors onto their van.82

The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against the security of the
petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of "RC" to contact and monitor her, even after she was
released.83 This threat, according to the Court of Appeals, is all the more compounded by the failure
of the police authorities to identify the material perpetrators who are still at large.84 Thus, the
appellate court extended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by directing the public
respondents to afford protection to the former, as well as continuing, under the norm of extraordinary
diligence, their existing investigations involving the abduction.85

The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy of the
petitioner, noting the existence of "records of investigations" that concerns the petitioner as a
suspected member of the CPP-NPA.86 The appellate court derived the existence of such records
from a photograph and video file presented in a press conference by party-list representatives Jovito
Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which allegedly show the petitioner participating
in rebel exercises. Representative Alcover also revealed that the photograph and video came from a
female CPP-NPA member who wanted out of the organization. According to the Court of Appeals,
the proliferation of the photograph and video, as well as any form of media, insinuating that petitioner
is part of the CPP-NPA does not only constitute a violation of the right to privacy of the petitioner but
also puts further strain on her already volatile security.87 To this end, the appellate court granted the
privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating the public respondents to refrain from distributing to
the public any records, in whatever form, relative to petitioner’s alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or
pertinently related to her abduction and torture.88

The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that the military or
any other person acting under the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the
abduction and torture of the petitioner.89 The appellate court stressed that, judging by her own
statements, the petitioner merely "believed" that the military was behind her abduction.90 Thus, the
Court of Appeals absolved the public respondents from any complicity in the abduction and torture of
petitioner.91 The petition was likewise dismissed as against public respondent President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity from suit.92

Accordingly, the petitioner’s prayers for the return of her personal belongings were
denied.93 Petitioner’s prayers for an inspection order and production order also met the same fate.94

Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.

AMPARO

A.

Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public respondents from any
responsibility in her abduction and torture.95 Corollary to this, petitioner also finds fault on the part of
Court of Appeals in denying her prayer for the return of her personal belongings.96

Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried out, as well as the
sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in detention, as these were
detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court, are already sufficient evidence to
prove government involvement.97

Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to
implicate the high-ranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her
amparo petition.98 Thus, petitioner seeks from this Court a pronouncement holding the respondents
as complicit in her abduction and torture, as well as liable for the return of her belongings.99

Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings

It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility
as the justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate,
if not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes
liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an
amparo petition.100

The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,101 which was the first to examine command responsibility in the
context of an amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico
notes that:102

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of
war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms,
means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the
armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict."103 In
this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions
of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,104 foreshadowing the present-day precept of
holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss
in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode
of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes
committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators105 (as opposed to
crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the orginal, underscoring supplied)

Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of

individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or
administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious
reason lies in the nature of the writ itself:

The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the
appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address
specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.106 While
the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced
disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired—the writ does not, by so doing, fix
liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative
under the applicable substantive law.107 The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo
writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo:108

x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires
only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action
to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will
require full and exhaustive proceedings.109(Emphasis supplied)

It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an
amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders
on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect
acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleaded—not actually on the basis of
command responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. In
Razon v. Tagitis,110 the distinct, but interrelated concepts of responsibility and accountability were
given special and unique significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to wit:

x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to
have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a
measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate
criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the
other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level
of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.

Responsibility of Public Respondents

At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in impleading the
public respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility on their part, based on her assumption
that they, in one way or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture.111

To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government agents who were
behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the circumstances surrounding her
abduction and torture—i.e., the forcible taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license
plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and the
infliction of physical abuse—which, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced
disappearances are being practiced by the military or other state forces.112

Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort Magsaysay—a
conclusion that she was able to infer from the travel time required to reach the place where she was
actually detained, and also from the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard while
thereat.113

We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire
reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was
detained at Fort Magsaysay.

First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those
surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient
weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. We opine that insofar as the
present case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand as substantial evidence of the
involvement of the government.

In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of
military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence
that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct
evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based
on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true
identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy
inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain.

In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits,114 the
cartographic sketches115 of several of her abductors whose faces she managed to see. To the mind
of this Court, these cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest
certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioner’s abductors. Unfortunately for the
petitioner, this potential has not been realized in view of the fact that the faces described in such
sketches remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of any military or police
personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be part of either the military or the police
chain of command.

Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately
established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she was detained and
by the sounds that she heard while thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to take
the estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on its face—not only because they were
made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a mere sojourner
in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach it is in
itself doubtful.116 With nothing else but obscure observations to support it, petitioner’s claim that she
was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.
In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors were actually
affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the military or the police organizations. Neither does
the evidence at hand prove that petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp Fort Magsaysay to
the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually impossible to
determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact committed with the
acquiescence of the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a
pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made.

Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings

This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal belongings.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the petitioner by reason of the failure
of the latter to prove that the public respondents were involved in her abduction and torture.117 We
agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, but not entirely with the reason used to support it.
To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her belongings is doomed to
fail regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents responsible for the
abduction of the petitioner.

In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the
petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a
substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been fixed
in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not
determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding.118

But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact
that a person’s right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric of
property rights—which are no longer protected by the writ of amparo.119 Section 1 of the Amparo
Rule,120 which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property
rights.

B.

The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her prayer for an
inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.121

Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in petitioner’s
ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the
military camp at Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a contrary stance would be
equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was never intended by the Amparo Rule in
providing for the interim relief of inspection order.122 Contrary to the explicit position123 espoused by
the petitioner, the Amparo Rule does not allow a "fishing expedition" for evidence.

An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a
petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision.124 A basic
requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected
is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo
Rule does not require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is,
nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a
party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner
failed to do.
Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make out a
prima facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot
be ordered. An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves,
unreliable and doubtful.

HABEAS DATA

As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas
data, by enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public
any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioner’s
"alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture." Though not
raised as an issue in this appeal, this Court is constrained to pass upon and review this particular
ruling of the Court of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us, an error infecting the grant.

For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals in granting the privilege of
the writ of habeas data, We quote hereunder the relevant portion125 of its decision:

Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports and reports on the
investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually
expunged from the records. Petitioner claimed to be included in the Government’s Order of Battle
under Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political opponents against whom false criminal charges were
filed based on made up and perjured information.

Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before Us, Ex-army general
Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and Pastor Alcover of the Alliance for Nationalism and
Democracy party-list held a press conference where they revealed that they received an information
from a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the organization, that Petitioner was a communist rebel.
Alcover claimed that said information reached them thru a letter with photo of Petitioner holding
firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD of the training exercises.

Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioner’s denial that she was the person in said video, there were
records of other investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate her right to
privacy. Without a doubt, reports of such nature have reasonable connections, one way or another,
to petitioner’s abduction where she claimed she had been subjected to cruelties and dehumanizing
acts which nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of her alleged membership in the CPP-
NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to be continuously made available to the public,
Petitioner’s security and privacy will certainly be in danger of being violated or transgressed by
persons who have strong sentiments or aversion against members of this group. The unregulated
dissemination of said unverified video CD or reports of Petitioner’s alleged ties with the CPP-NPA
indiscriminately made available for public consumption without evidence of its authenticity or veracity
certainly violates Petitioner’s right to privacy which must be protected by this Court. We, thus, deem
it necessary to grant Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis supplied).

The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most
especially the right to informational privacy of individuals.126 The writ operates to protect a person’s
right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.

Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is
the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.127 This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do.
The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no evidence on
record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy
of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would have
violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and
other reports about the petitioner’s ties with the CPP-NPA, was not adequately proven—considering
that the origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by
the appellate court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and
Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the public
respondents had access to such video or photograph.

In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public
respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form,
reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA,"
appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from
distributing something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have.

Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually responsible for
the abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the existence of reports being
kept in violation of the petitioner’s right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature.

For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of
the writ of habeas data.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE

Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate insufficiency to impute any form
of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, revealed two important things that can guide
Us to a proper disposition of this case. One, that further investigation with the use of extraordinary
diligence must be made in order to identify the perpetrators behind the abduction and torture of the
petitioner; and two, that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its Constitutional
mandate to "investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to
provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights,"128 must be tapped in order to
fill certain investigative and remedial voids.

Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken

Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not able to adduce
substantial evidence proving her allegations of government complicity in her abduction and torture,
may be attributed to the incomplete and one-sided investigations conducted by the government
itself. This "awkward" situation, wherein the very persons alleged to be involved in an enforced
disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by law to investigate
the matter, is a unique characteristic of these proceedings and is the main source of the "evidentiary
difficulties" faced by any petitioner in any amparo case.129

Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguard—requiring the
"respondent who is a public official or employee" to prove that no less than "extraordinary diligence
as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of
duty."130 Thus, unless and until any of the public respondents is able to show to the satisfaction of the
amparo court that extraordinary diligence has been observed in their investigations, they cannot
shed the allegations of responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect.
With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was not
fully observed in the conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at bar.

A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN shows modest effort on
the part of the police investigators to identify the perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said
reports are replete with background checks on the victims of the abduction, but are, at the same
time, comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the investigators have been taking to ascertain
the authors of the crime. Although conducting a background investigation on the victims is a logical
first step in exposing the motive behind the abduction—its necessity is clearly outweighed by the
need to identify the perpetrators, especially in light of the fact that the petitioner, who was no longer
in captivity, already came up with allegations about the motive of her captors.

Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on the cooperation or
non-cooperation of the petitioner—who, they claim, was less than enthusiastic in participating in their
investigative efforts.131 While it may be conceded that the participation of the petitioner would have
facilitated the progress of Task Group CAROJAN’s investigation, this Court believes that the
former’s reticence to cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not to explore other
means or avenues from which they could obtain relevant leads.132 Indeed, while the allegations of
government complicity by the petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as adequate evidence
before a court of law—they are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable investigative leads that must
be pursued and verified, if only to comply with the high standard of diligence required by the Amparo
Rule in the conduct of investigations.

Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJAN’s reports still failed to
explain why it never considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolo—who, along with the
victims, is a central witness to the abduction. The reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in any
attempt to obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the abductors or, at the very least, of the
one who, by petitioner’s account, was not wearing any mask. 1avvphi1

The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the sketches included
in petitioner’s offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed out, were prepared under the direction of, and
first submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latter’s independent investigation on the abduction and
torture of the petitioner.133 But as mentioned earlier, the CHR sketches remain to be unidentified as
of this date.

In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that further investigation under
the norm of extraordinary diligence should be undertaken. This Court simply cannot write finis to this
case, on the basis of an incomplete investigation conducted by the police and the military. In a very
real sense, the right to security of the petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy because of the
deficient investigation that directly contributes to the delay in bringing the real perpetrators before the
bar of justice.

To add teeth to the appellate court’s directive, however, We find it fitting, nay, necessary to shift the
primary task of conducting further investigations on the abduction and torture of the petitioner upon
the CHR.134 We note that the CHR, unlike the police or the military, seems to enjoy the trust and
confidence of the petitioner—as evidenced by her attendance and participation in the hearings
already conducted by the commission.135 Certainly, it would be reasonable to assume from such
cooperation that the investigations of the CHR have advanced, or at the very least, bears the most
promise of advancing farther, in terms of locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus, vital
for a final resolution of this petition. From this perspective, We also deem it just and appropriate to
relegate the task of affording interim protection to the petitioner, also to the CHR.
Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as follows—

1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation
regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the
norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify
the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as
their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioner’s abduction and
torture.

2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor,
and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the
ongoing investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its
personnel records circa the time of the petitioner’s abduction and torture, subject to
reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.

3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this
Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of
its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the
records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.

4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days
from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding
recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during
her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this
Court.

Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of monitoring
compliance with the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent reports or
recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents
responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall
submit its own report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The Court of Appeals will
continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby render a decision:

1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for the return of her personal belongings;

2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for an inspection of the detention areas
of Fort Magsaysay.

3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice, however, to any
modification that this Court may make on the basis of the investigation reports and
recommendations submitted to it under this decision.

4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as follows—

a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency tasked with
conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner.
Accordingly, the Commission on Human Rights shall, under the norm of
extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify
the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as
 well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioner’s
abduction and torture.

b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his

successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the
Commission on Human Rights, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy
of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioner’s abduction and torture,
subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.

c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his
successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her
representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations,
other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90)
days from receipt of this decision.

d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the Court
of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports
on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and (b) to provide or
continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the
Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court.

5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the following purposes:

a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the
CHR;

b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the CHR,

the abduction and torture of the petitioner was committed by persons acting under
any of the public respondents; and on the basis of this determination—

c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the report and
recommendation of the Commission on Human Rights—its own report, which shall
include a recommendation either for the DISMISSAL of the petition as against the
public respondents who were found not responsible and/or accountable, or for the
APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL MEASURES, AS MAY BE ALLOWED BY THE
AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against those
found responsible and/or accountable.

Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer for
any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.

Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No.
00036-WRA that are not contrary to this decision are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 188163, October 03, 2017

LT. SG. MARY NANCY P. GADIAN, Petitioner, v. ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. VICTOR IBRADO;
PHILIPPINE NAVY FLAG OFFICER IN COMMAND VICE-ADMIRAL
FERDINAND GOLEZ; COL. JOEL IBAÑEZ-CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
WESTERN MINDANAO COMMAND; LT. COL. ANTONIO DACANAY,
MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL OFFICER OF THE WESTERN
MINDANAO COMMAND; RETIRED LT. GEN. EUGENIO CEDO, FORMER
COMMANDER OF THE WESTERN MINDANAO COMMAND, Respondents

G.R. No. 188195

GEN. VICTORS. IBRADO, AFP; VICE ADMIRAL FERDINAND S. GOLEZ,

PN; COL. JOEL IBAÑEZ, PA; AND LTC ANTONIO DACANAY,
PA, Petitioners, v. NEDINA GADIAN-DIAMANTE, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

For consideration are the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari separately brought against the
decision promulgated on June 15, 2009 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00034
entitled Nedina Gadian-Diamante v. Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Victor Ibrado,
Philippine Navy Flag Officer In Command Vice Admiral Ferdinand Golez, Col. Joel Ibañez Chief of Staff of the
Western Mindanao Command (WESTMINCOM), Lt. Col. Antonio Dacanay - Management and Financial Officer
of the WESTMINCOM, Retired Lt. Gen. Eugenio Cedo Former Commander of the WESTMINCOM,1 whereby
the CA disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds and directs that -

(a) petitioner has established by substantial evidence that there is threat to life, liberty and security to the
aggrieved party, Lt. SG Mary Nancy Gadian and thus, she is entitled to the benefits of a protection order
under A.M. No. 07-9-12 SC (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo).

The Secretary of National Defense is hereby directed to extend the protection to the aggrieved party by
adopting necessary measures and employing such personnel to ensure no impairment of the right of the
aggrieved party, Lt. SG Mary Nancy P. Gadian to life, liberty and security;

(b) for lack of basis, petitioner's prayer that respondents be directed to refrain from issuing or carrying out
any threat to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, Lt. SG Mary Nancy P. Gadian, is denied; and

(c) respondent General Ibrado shall comply strictly with his undertaking to provide material facts of the
investigation conducted by the Flag Officer of the Philippine Navy and the Commander of the WESTMINCOM
pursuant to his directive issued on May 26, 2009 relative to the circumstances of the threats to the life,
liberty and security of the aggrieved party, Lt. SG Mary Nancy P. Gadian, and to bring those responsible,
including military personnel, if shown to have participated or had complicity in the commission of the acts
complained of, to the courts of justice.

Within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision, a report of the results of the investigation shall be
submitted to the Court.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally on the Secretary of National Defense.

SO ORDERED.
 Antecedents

On May 19, 2009, Nedina Gadian-Diamante, the respondent in G.R. No. 188195, alleging herself as the
older sister of Lt. SG Mary Nancy P. Gadian (Lt. SG Gadian), brought in this Court a petition for the issuance
of a writ of amparo in behalf of the latter, impleading as respondents various officers of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP), including then AFP Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Victor Ibrado (Gen. Ibrado). The petition was
docketed as G.R. 187652.2 On May 21, 2009, the Court issued the writ of amparo, and directed the CA to
hear and decide the petition.3

On May 22, 2009, the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP) manifested to the
Court their willingness to provide sanctuary to Lt. SG Gadian.4

The case, meanwhile docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00034, was heard in the CA. The initial hearing took place
in the CA on May 28, 2009 but Lt. SG Gadian asked for time to submit evidence to support her allegations.
The preliminary conference and summary hearing actually proceeded on June 5, 2009. The parties
stipulated on the testimonies of psychologist Dr. Lopez, and Roy Lirazan and Armando Matutina, Lt. SG
Gadian's companions. After the issues were defined and agreed upon, the evidence of the parties were
respectively received.

Lt. SG Gadian's Evidence

Lt. SG Gadian was a commissioned officer of the Philippine Navy. At the time material to this case, she
served as the Officer-In-Charge of the Civil Military Operations (CMO) Fusion Cell for the RP-US Balikatan
Exercises 2007. As such, she was responsible for the allocation of Balikatan funds and the planning and
preparation of the Civil Military Operations component of the RP-US Balikatan Exercises 2007. Balikatan
CMO Task Group (BK CMOTG) was formed for this purpose.5

For funding, Lt. SG Gadian asked for assistance from her immediate supervisor Lt. Col. Bajunaid Abid who
reported to the General Headquarters (GHQ) through Lt. Col. Steve Crespillo (Lt. Col. Crespillo). They
learned that the Balikatan Exercises 2007 had an approximate budget of P40 to P46 Million. They requested
P4 Million to support the requirements of BK CMOTG.6

Out of the P4 Million approved budget, Lt. Col. Crespillo secured only P2.7 Million, and delivered P2.3 million
thereof to BK CMOTG on two separate occasions, specifically on February 25, 2008 and March 3, 2008. The
funds were turned over to Ms. Tessie Beldad, the fund custodian, but Lt. Col. Crespillo retained
P400,000.00. Later, Ms. Beldad told Lt. SG Gadian that only P1.3 Million were actually turned over to her,
for which she signed an acknowledgment report, pursuant to Lt. Col. Crespillo's instructions, despite the
original plan being for him to distribute the funds personally to the participants. Lt. SG Gadian then
accompanied Lt. Col. Crespillo to the office of Col. Joel Ibañez (Col. Ibañez) where they started to talk about
funding problems, to which Lt. Col. Crespillo replied: Meron akong dalang konti, sir. Ms. Tessie Beldad was
still required by Col. Buena of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations to submit receipts
covering the disbursement of funds.7

On February 14, 2007, the CMO held the opening ceremony where the funds for food allowance were
distributed to the participants.

In May 2007, Lt. SG Gadian was asked about the status of the funds during the staff conference presided by
Col. Ibañez. When she reported that the funds had been distributed to the recipients who were grateful for
the support, Col. Ibañez shouted: You are not authorized to distribute the funds! You should tell the people
at GHQ that they should follow the proper channel! She was then required to submit a fund utilization
report, but Lt. Col. Crespillo told her not to submit the report to Col. Ibañez because only the Exercise
Directorate could require them to submit such report.8

Thereafter, at the behest of Retired Lt. General Eugenio Cedo (Gen. Cedo) to the Office of the Inspector
General, Lt. SG Gadian was investigated for: (a) lavish spending; (b) misuse of funds; and (c) willful
disobedience. She was placed on floating status until her transfer to the Philippine Navy in January 2008.
The Philippine Navy Efficiency and Separation Board took jurisdiction of her case upon the recommendation
of AFP Investigation General Lt. Gen. Bocobo. In January 2009, Gadian was arraigned and pleaded not guilty
to the charges. She was absolved from liability by prosecution witnesses. The case was submitted for
decision in April 2009.9

Lt. SG Gadian went on official ordinary leave from April 9 to May 21, 2009. On April 13, 2009, she received
a message through text and email requiring her to report to Manila. She flew to Manila on April 14, and
attended the hearing on April 15. On April 16, 2009, she filed her resignation from the AFP effective May 1,
2009.10

Fearing for her life after her resignation, Lt. SG Gadian went into hiding. On May 11, 2009, her sister sought
the help of Archbishop Angel Lagdameo of Jaro, Iloilo City by delivering Lt. SG Gadian's letter appealing for
help from the church, media, and all sectors of society. On May 13, 2009, Lt. SG Gadian and her sister were
interviewed by different media outlets on the alleged misuse of RP-US Balikatan Exercises 2007 funds.11

Since then, Lt. SG Gadian received text messages from concerned individuals warning her that people were
conducting surveillance at their house. Two attempts were even made to 'snatch' her en route to the hearing
in Manila. All these were testified to by her family members and people who were with her throughout her
struggle.12

An apprehension order was released for Lt. SG Gadian's arrest, along with a "48 hour ultimatum" for her
surrender. Again, concerned individuals told her that there was a verbal shoot to kill order to silence her.
She was also not unaware of other unsolved cases similar to the case of Ensign Philip Andrew Pestaño's
death after giving information of his superior's engagement in drugs, illegal logging and gun running.13

The AFP's Evidence

For their part, respondents General Ibrado, Vice Admiral Ferdinand Golez, Col. Ibañez and Lt. Col. Antonio
Dacanay admitted that Lt. SG Gadian had been assigned to WESTMINCOM as its Deputy of the CMO. They
confirmed that she had taken charge of and supervised the activities of BK CMOTG; that a total of P2.7
Million was turned over to her but she did not inform General Cedo, then the Commander of WESTMINCOM,
of the receipt and utilization of the fund. According to them, she acted on her own in disposing the
fund.14 Gen. Cedo then constituted a committee to investigate, but she did not appear and instead
questioned its jurisdiction because the fund had come from General Headquarters. The committee concluded
that she had utilized the fund for its intended purpose, but without the approval of Gen. Cedo, and that she
had falsely declared the actual amount of her accommodation based on the receipt (difference of
P2,500.00).

The Office of the Inspector General recommended that Lt. SG Gadian return the balance of P2,500.00 for
her hotel stay; that she be reprimanded by her Commander according to Article 105 of the Articles of War
for violation of Article 97 of the Articles of War, or conduct prejudicial to the good order and military
discipline; and that she be reassigned to the Philippine Navy.15

The AFP Chief of Staff ordered a reinvestigation, however, to look into the matter of technical malversation
and insubordination.16 Pending resolution of her case, Lt. SG Gadian filed an application for ordinary leave,
and later on tendered her resignation from the service effective May 1, 2009.

Lt. SG Gadian's resignation was not processed due to lack of requisite enclosures and justifications, and
because of the pending case. As a consequence, the AFP declared her absent without leave (AWOL), leading
to her being dropped from the rolls as a deserter on May 2, 2009. The apprehension order was issued
against her pursuant to standard procedures.17

Aggrieved, Lt. SG Gadian, through her sister, filed the petition for the writ of amparo in this Court, alleging
perceived threats to her life, liberty and security from the AFP. As earlier stated, the petition was referred to
the CA for further proceedings.

In the CA, the parties stipulated on the following issues:

(a) whether or not there is [a] threat to aggrieved party's life, liberty and security
and sufficiency of proof thereof;

(b) in the affirmative, whether or not there is [a] link between the threat to the
life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party and, any or all, of the
respondents; and

(c) whether or not the aggrieved party is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for] in the
Petition.18
Lt. SG Gadian then made public appearances with media coverage giving statements about the conduct of
RP-US Balikatan Exercises 2007. She explained that she had resorted to the writ of amparo because of
perceived threats to her life, liberty and security. She incorporated her claims of the threats in her affidavit,
wherein she detailed the text messages she had received about "people who were tracking, conducting
casing and surveillance" of her place, and the presence of plain-clothes men at their house looking for her
and her children. Her statements were corroborated by witnesses, including members of her family and
friends who had accompanied her.19

The respondents denied knowledge of any existing threats against Lt. SG Gadian's life, but did not present
controverting evidence. On his part, respondent Gen. Cedo averred that he had had no participation in the
issuance of the apprehension order and the shoot-to-kill order against her; and that he had retired from the
service in September 2007 and had not been interested in her whereabouts.20

Decision of the CA

The CA promulgated its assailed decision on June 15, 2009.21

In its decision, the CA observed that receiving messages through SMS warning of a shoot-to-kill order
against a person was not alarming; that, however, the situation became different when the person
threatened was a junior officer of the AFP who had exposed anomalies regarding the conduct of military
exercises involving the country and the United States of America, and the expose could involve senior
officers of the AFP; that the situation was complicated when unidentified persons had knocked at the door of
the house where Lt. SG Gadian lived without expressing the purpose of their visit, and, in addition, when
there was an attempt to abduct; that such circumstances only proved that there had really been an actual
threat to her life, liberty and security.22

Yet, the CA noted that Lt. SG Gadian had not established the authorship of the threats against her; that her
affidavit did not implicate any of the respondents in the making of the threats; that although her father and
sister had testified about men who had been making inquiries of her whereabouts, they had not attributed
any overt act to the men that would suffice to deduce the clear intent to harm her; and that her two
companions at the time the attempts to snatch her occurred did not identify any person in particular to be
responsible.23

The CA concluded that Lt. SG Gadian had presented substantial evidence to prove the existence of a threat
on her life, liberty and security but had not established the source of the threats; that then Secretary of
National Defense Gilbert C. Teodoro (Defense Secretary Teodoro) should be deemed the appropriate person
to extend protection to her as the aggrieved party inasmuch as he had executive supervision over the AFP
even he did not engage in actual military directional operations;24 and that respondent AFP Chief of Staff
General Ibrado (Ret.) had also undertaken to cause the investigation of the alleged threats on her life, and
the surrounding circumstances involved in her allegations.25
The parties then respectively appealed. On her part, respondent filed her petition for review on certiorari on
June 22, 2009 (G.R. 188163),26 while Gen. Ibrado, et al. filed their own petition for review on certiorari on
June 23, 2009 (G.R. 188195).27 The appeals were consolidated.

Issues

Lt. SG Gadian assails the CA's ruling ordering then Secretary of National Defense Teodoro to provide
protection to her, insisting that said official was biased in favor of the military hierarchy as borne out by the
statement he had made during the Navy's anniversary celebration,28 to wit:

We are hoping the court will be careful in reviewing the petition and the circumstances behind it as well as
granting such relief as this could affect the chain of command and the implementation of the disciplinary
system in the military.

Lt. SG Gadian argues that although the Department of National Defense (DND) was civilian in character, the
protection could only be extended to her through DND's military personnel.29 Hence, she asks that the
AMRSP be instead allowed to continue providing protection and sanctuary to her; and that the Court
provides all means necessary to AMRSP, specifically the accreditation of it as a private institution or person
capable of keeping and securing the aggrieved party under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

On their part, the AFP and Gen. Ibrado, et al. assail the CA for not dismissing the petition for the writ
of amparo despite the CA having found no evidence showing that they were the authors of the alleged
threat.30

The following issues are to be dealt with, namely: (a) Was the issuance of the writ of amparo warranted by
the circumstance?; and (2) Assuming that there had really been threats against Lt. SG Gadian, who was in
the best position to protect her - the Secretary of National Defense or the AMRSP?

Ruling of the Court

The appeals have no merit.

A writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy to provide immediate judicial relief for the
protection of a person's constitutional right to life and liberty.31 When a person is consumed by fear for her
life and liberty that it completely limits her movement, the writ may be issued to secure her. Note, however,
that the source of this fear must be valid and substantiated by circumstances, and not mere paranoia. Thus,
in resolving the necessity of issuing a writ of amparo and the corresponding protection order, the courts
must look at the overall circumstance surrounding the applicant and respondents.

Moreover, the writ of amparo is both preventive and curative. It is preventive when it seeks to stop the
impunity in committing offenses that violates a person's right to live and be free. It is curative when it
facilitates subsequent punishment of perpetrators through an investigation and action.32 Thus, the writ
of amparo either prevents a threat from becoming an actual violation against a person, or cures the violation
of a person's right through investigation and punishment.

The CA has correctly determined the existence of the justification to warrant the issuance of the writ
of amparo in favor of Lt. SG Gadian, stating:

In brief, prior to the filing of the present Petition, petitioner and aggrieved party's evidence of threat to the
latter's life, liberty and security are their receipt of short messaging service or text messages warning them
of the giving of "shoot to kill order." Taken alone, such messages may not lead a reasonable mind to
consider seriously the existence of threat to life, liberty and security but when receipt of such messages
come at a time when claims of anomalies in the holding of military exercises participated in by a foreign
country affecting several individuals and involving significant amount of money are being announced
publicly, the situation differs, The aggrieved party is a junior officer in the military, with the rank of the
lieutenant senior grade. The anomalies reported refer to the conduct of military exercises involving the
Philippines and United States of America. The officers claimed to be involved are officers far more senior
than the aggrieved party. There is a claim of the aggrieved party that she has resigned from her
commission, an act which could be viewed, rightfully or wrongfully, as intended to evade the restrictions of
military discipline.

Evidence was likewise presented that after public announcements were made by aggrieved party about the
said anomalies, unidentified persons came to their house in Polomolok, South Cotabato asking for
information about the aggrieved party and her family. No mention was made that the purpose of their visit
was to serve a legal process, such as arrest warrant.

After the present petition was filed, an attempt to abduct the aggrieved party, to be attested to [sic] by
Armando Matutina and Roy Lirazan, was committed.

The Court finds these sufficient to establish for purposes of the present proceedings, threat to life, liberty
and security of the aggrieved party. Threat or intimidation must be viewed in the light of the perception of
the victim at the time of the commission of the crime, not by any hard and fast rule.33

While it is conceded that Lt. SG Gadian's life was in actual danger, the possibility of danger must be
acknowledged to exist. The reason, as she claims, was her expose of the Balikatan Funds anomaly.
Consequently, she has hereby sought a preventive writ of amparo.

Yet, as the CA also pointed out, Lt. SG Gadian did not exactly know who had threatened her, and merely
points towards the general direction of the military as the source of the threats. The uncertainty about the
identities of the individuals who had knocked at her home, or who had conducted surveillance in her
neighborhood, or who had even attempted to snatch her during her boat trip cannot be glossed over in
order to immediately hold the leadership of the AFP in suspicion of complicity. Indeed, to do so would
convert the proceedings into an unwarranted witch-hunt that could unfairly implicate many in the country's
military service.

Moreover, we note that the AFP declared Lt. SG Gadian a deserter because her resignation had not been
accepted due to deficiencies that she did not rectify or fill. Under the regulations of the AFP, the declaration
could most likely be not entirely unwarranted because she had apparently opted to quit her post and go into
hiding. Her being a commissioned officer of the AFP called for the application of the Articles of War against
her.34 The military discipline that still applied to her then treated her as a deserter who was subject to
apprehension even during a time of peace. Her going into hiding constituted abandonment of her post
regardless of her reasons for doing so.

The choice Lt. SG Gadian made was to leave the military service in order to expose an irregularity. The AFP
could justifiably consider her leaving as an act of cowardice and insubordination. For this reason, Defense
Secretary Teodoro's observation that her conduct would affect the chain of command in the AFP as an
organization could not be dismissed as unfounded.

It is noteworthy that the AFP already conducted its own investigation of the misuse of the Balikatan Fund.
Despite the grant of the petition for the writ of amparo brought at her instance, Lt. SG Gadian still opted not
to participate in that investigation. Such attitude could only reveal the lack of sincerity of her resort to the
recourse of amparo.

Nonetheless, it becomes necessary for the Court to deal with the willingness and ability of the AMRSP to
provide protection and sanctuary to persons like Lt. SG Gadian who seek protection after filing their petitions
for the writ of amparo.

Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the persons or agencies who may provide protection to the aggrieved
parties and any member of the immediate family are limited to government agencies, and accredited
persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety, but in respect of the latter, they
should be accredited in accordance with guidelines still to be issued.35 Conformably with the rule, the CA
observed that the only official with the capacity to provide protection to Lt. SG Gadian at that time was
incumbent Defense Secretary Teodoro considering that the AMRSP, despite being her personal choice, was
not yet an accredited agency in the context of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

Although the CA did not err in its observation, the Court feels that the AMRSP, which had manifested its
willingness and readiness to give sanctuary to Lt. SG Gadian, could have been a viable provider of protection
and sanctuary to her. The viability of the AMRSP, or of any other private or religious organization or person
so disposed into taking a petitioner like Lt. SG Gadian under its protection, should not be dismissed or
ignored only because of the lack of accreditation, but should have been fully determined by hearing the
AMRSP thereon. The lack of accreditation should not have hindered but instead invited the holding of the
hearing. Indeed, the matter of protection and sanctuary should be of foremost consideration by the court
because the personal and immediate concern of the petitioner whose life and liberty were under threat was
exactly her temporary protection. The CA as the court hearing her petition for the writ of amparo, if satisfied
by the qualifications of the AMRSP, could have effectively entrusted her temporary protection to the still-to-
be accredited AMRSP given the latter's willingness and capability to provide her the sanctuary she needed.
To repeat, the lack of accreditation required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which can follow, should be
a lesser concern.

In this regard, we advert to the following insights provided by Justice Leonen during the deliberations, to
wit:

Liberty and security are ultimately personal. No amount of admonition by another can undo a person's
rational, well-founded fear. In petitions for the issuance of writs of amparo, it is well-within an aggrieved
party's right to avail of protection through private persons and organizations. Precisely because the writ
of amparo is a liberty-promoting mechanism, the aggrieved party's preferences must be upheld, to the
extent practicable. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo imposes no compulsion or even an order of preference
between public and private entities. As far as the Rule is concerned, the only requirement is that the private
person or entity through whom the aggrieved party seeks to be protected is accredited by this Court.
Uncertainty as to the identity of the persons responsible for threats against the aggrieved party's liberty and
security are not grounds for curtailing the aggrieved party's liberty to choose.

The Court of Appeals then should not have undercut Lt. SG Gadian's resort to the Association of Major
Religious Superiors of the Philippines or to another person or institution of her choosing. Even as the
Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines may have yet to secure accreditation, it was not
for the Court of Appeals to consummately foreclose Lt. SG Gadian's choice as to who shall be protecting her.
Certainly, the Court of Appeals could have been more deferential to Lt. SG Gadian's liberty to choose. It
could have extended to the Association a reasonable period to obtain accreditation, and enabled Lt. SG
Gadian to identify an alternative in the interim. If the Association is ultimately found wanting, the Court of
Appeals could have still enabled Lt. SG Gadian to name her preferred substitute. It could have taken better,
more enfranchising, precautions.

We recognize that as of today the danger to the life and security of Lt. SG Gadian had already ceased, if not
entirely disappeared. Although summoned to appear at the AFP's investigation of her expose, she voluntarily
chose not to despite the institutional assurances for her personal safety. The AFP then declared her on
AWOL status as of April 22, 2009, and dropped her from the roster as a deserter on May 2, 2009 following
her unexplained failure to report to her mother unit.36 Worth noting, too, is that the individuals to whom she
had attributed the threats to her life and liberty had since retired from active military service. These
circumstances are supervening events that have rendered the resolution on the merits of the consolidated
appeals moot and academic, that is, to still continue with the resolution when no practical consequence will
be achieved or ensured is pointless and of no utility. Moot and academic cases cease to present any
justiciable controversies by virtue of supervening events.37 The courts of law will not determine moot
questions,38 because it is unnecessary for the courts to indulge in academic declarations.39

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES these consolidated appeals for being now moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.