PEOPLE V LACSON

RULING:
Having invoked rule Section 8, Rule 117 before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before
the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first
paragraph thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a
provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused
move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the
case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the
second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the express consent
of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently
asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same
offense or for an offense necessarily included therein. In this case, the respondent has failed to
prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when
Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the
prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. There
is as well no proof in the records that the public prosecutor notified the heirs of the victims of said
motion or of the hearing thereof on March 22, 1999. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal
Cases or file new Information for multiple murder against the respondent.
PANAGUITON, JR vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008
Facts:
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the
preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. On 15 March
1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the
complaint against Tongson for the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as
amended. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored,
or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993.
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint had already prescribed?
Ruling:
The offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office
of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the
prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses
they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. From the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit
with the Office of the City Prosecutor up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an
aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control.
After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995,
only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act
No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue
their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of
circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and
inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
People v Dumlao
G.R. No. 168918 March 2, 2009
Facts:
On 19 July 1991, an Amended Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging
respondents Dumlao and La’o, Aber P. Canlas, Jacobo C. Clave, Roman A. Cruz, Jr. and Fabian
C. Ver with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On 21 February 2005, Dumlao
filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
He stated that the prosecution’s main thrust against him was the alleged approval by the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Board of Trustees -- of which he was a member -
- of the Lease-Purchase Agreement entered into by and among the GSIS, the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and respondent La’o.
Issue:
Whether or not the facts charged against respondent do not constitute an offense.?
Ruling:
The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the prosecution’s sound assessment whether the
evidence before it can justify a reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense. The
presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties, and this presumption
can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. Indeed, appellant has
not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that appellant, a
Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboangueña, the guilty party
in appellant’s eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers
denied appellant equal protection of the laws. While all persons accused of crime are to be treated
on a basis of equality before the law, it does not follow that they are to be protected in the
commission of crime. It would be unconscionable, for instance, to excuse a defendant guilty of
murder because others have murdered with impunity. The remedy for unequal enforcement of
the law in such instances does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the expense of society
Soriano v People
G.R. No. 162336, February 1, 2010
Facts:
Soriano and his co-accused, in abuse of the confidence, reposed in them as RBSM officers,
allegedly caused the falsification of a number of loan documents, making it appear that one Enrico
Carlos filled up the same, and thereby succeeded in securing a loan and converting the loan
proceeds for their personal gain and benefit. An information was field against them. On June 8,
2001, petitioner moved to quash these information on two grounds: that the court had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged, and that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. On
the first ground, petitioner argued that the letter transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ constituted
the complaint and hence was defective for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of
Rules of Court, such as the statement of address of petitioner and oath and subscription. On the
second ground, he argued that a violation of DOSRI law requires the offender to obtain a loan
from his bank, without complying with procedural, reportorial, or ceiling requirements. On the other
hand, estafa under par. 1(b), Article 315 of the RPC requires the offender to misappropriate or
convert something that he holds in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to return the same.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion to quash the information is meritorious?
Ruling:
The petition is without merit. On the first issue, the BSP letter, taken together with the affidavits
attached thereto, comply with the requirements provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court. A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis of an affidavit of
any competent person, without the referral document, like the NBI-NCR Report, having been
sworn to by the law enforcer as the nominal complainant. On the second issue, the two information
against petitioner contain allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime of DOSRI violation and estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents. The information alleged that Soriano was the president of RBSM; that he was able to
indirectly obtain a loan from RBSM by putting the loan in the name of depositor Enrico Carlos;
and that he did this without complying with the requisite board approval, reportorial, and ceiling
requirements.
CEREZO V PEOPLE
G.R. No. 185230, June 01 2011
Facts:
On September 12, 2002, petitioner Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for libel against respondents
Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., and Vicente Afulugencia as well as Oscar Mapalo (Mapalo).
Finding probable cause to indict respondents, the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office filed the
corresponding Information against them before the RTC. In its resolution dated November 20,
2003, the OP-QC reversed its earlier finding and recommended the withdrawal of the Information.
Consequently, a Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information was filed before the RTC on
December 3, 2003. During the intervening period, specifically on November 24, 2003,
respondents were arraigned. All of them entered a not guilty plea.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the case is valid?
Ruling:
Once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the court.
In resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial court should not
rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. In this
case, it is obvious from the March 17, 2004 Order of the RTC, dismissing the criminal case, that
the RTC judge failed to make his own determination of whether or not there was a prima facie
case to hold respondents for trial. He failed to make an independent evaluation or assessment of
the merits of the case. The RTC judge blindly relied on the manifestation and recommendation of
the prosecutor when he should have been more circumspect and judicious in resolving the Motion
to Dismiss and Withdraw Information especially so when the prosecution appeared to be
uncertain, undecided, and irresolute on whether to indict respondents. By relying solely on the
manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the trial court
abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law.
CO vs. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS
G.R. No. 183994, June 30, 2014
Facts:
New Prosperity Plastic Products represented by Elizabeth Uy filed a complaint against William
Co for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Judge Esteban V. Gonzaga issued an Order dated
September 4, 2006 granting Co’s motion for permanent dismissal. Uy opposed the motion,
contending that the motion raised the same issues already resolved with finality by the Court.
Hon. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the RTC Branch 121 acted favorably on the petition,
annulling and setting aside the said order.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal case should be dismissed on the ground of violation of his right to
speedy trial?
Ruling:
First, Co’s charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is baseless. Obviously, he failed to
show any evidence that the alleged "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay in the trial was
attended with malice or that the same was made without good cause or justifiable motive on the
part of the prosecution. This Court has emphasized that "‘speedy trial’ is a relative term and
necessarily a flexible concept."26 In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was
violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings.27 The factors
to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right
or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.28 Surely, mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded
in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard must
be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.29 "While the Court recognizes the
accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we
cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified
postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the
right of the accused to speedy trial.
PEOPLE V DE LEON
G.R. No. 144052 - March 6, 2002
Facts:
Conrado de Leon was convicted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon for the crime of
murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. On October 30, 1995, the trial court issued a
warrant of arrest5 against the accused. Appellant was arrested on April 21, 19976 but his co-
accused, Andring de Leon and one John Doe, remained at large. When arraigned on July 3, 1997,
appellant pleaded7 not guilt. Denial and alibi are alleged by appellant. He faults the trial court for
having given probative value to the supposed dying declaration of the victim. The court a quo, he
adds, erred in giving too much weight and credence to the allegedly doubtful testimony of the
prosecution's principal witness.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in giving credence to the testimony of prosecution eyewitness?
Ruling:
Minor inconsistencies between sworn statements and testimonies do not affect the credibility of
witnesses. The assessment of these inconsistencies is best left to the discretion of the trial judge
who had the unique opportunity to observe their demeanor and conduct while they were testifying.
Appellant also faults De la Peña for having made an assertion in his Sworn Statement that was
inconsistent with his court testimony. In his Affidavit, the question "Bakit, talo-talo na ba tayo?"
supposedly came from him; in his testimony, he said that these words were uttered by his brother,
the victim. This inconsistency is minor and does not shatter the credibility of the witness and his
testimony. We have repeatedly held that minor disparities in the narration of witnesses do not
detract from their essential credibility, as long as their testimonies are coherent and intrinsically
believable on the whole, particularly29 when, as in this case, there is consistency in the narration
of the principal occurrence and in the positive identification of the accused. What is clear is that
the responsibility of appellant for the victim's death was indubitably established by both his Sworn
Statement and his testimony.