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Behavioral Scientist

Cognitive Process Approaches to Decision-Making: Foreign Policy

Actors Viewed Psychologically
Ole R. Holsti
American Behavioral Scientist 1976 20: 11
DOI: 10.1177/000276427602000103

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Cognitive Process Approaches
to Decision-Making

Foreign Policy Actors

Viewed Psychologically

OLE R. HOLSTI
Duke University

Decision-making analysis in political science, especially its foreign policy

component, has often been dominated by approaches that conceptualize
the acting unit as a &dquo;unitary rational actor,&dquo; but many of the more
interesting studies of the past few years have pointed to several limitations
and inadequacies of such models. Norms and interactions within the
decision-making group may serve certain needs (emotional support,
feelings of solidarity, and the like) of group members. However, group
dynamics may also have some dysfunctional consequences for the quality
of decisions by inhibiting search or cutting it off prematurely, ruling out
the legitimacy of some options, curtailing independent analysis, and
suppressing some forms of intragroup conflict that might serve to clarify
goals, values, and options. Organizational norms, routines, and standard
operating procedures may shape and perhaps distort the structuring of
problems, channeling of mformation, utilization of expertise, and imple-
mentation of executive decisions. The consequences of bureaucratic

Author’s Note: I am grateful to Hayward Alker, Robert Axelrod, and

Matthew Bonham for useful comments and suggestions on a previous
version of this paper, and to the Ford Foundation and the Center for
Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences for support during the period
that early drafts were written.

[11]
[12] AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST

politics may significantly constrain the manner in which issues are defined,
the range of options that may be considered, and the manner in which
executive decisions are implemented by subordinates.
Although these studies of decision processes have identified important
limitations of rational choice models, there are also other constraints on
decision-making that may warrant investigation. The existence of &dquo;cogni-
tive constraints on rationality&dquo; is well established in the decision-making
literature, with implications that may be especially relevant for foreign
policy analysis. Because the decision-maker’s orientation to interpretation
of the political environment is mediated by his beliefs about social life, his
psychological environment may only imperfectly correspond to the &dquo;real&dquo;
or operational political environment.
Nor is it always fruitful to adopt the assumption of homogeneous
beliefs among decision-makers (i.e., the premise that for purposes of
foreign policy analysis the nation may be conceptualized as a unitary
actor). Some beliefs may be widely shared by top officials within the
polity, but even in an authoritarian state with a highly structured official
ideology (e.g., China or the USSR) there may be significant variations
within the elite group with respect to others.

BELIEFS, COGNITIVE PROCESSES,

AND FOREIGN POLICY’

It is generally recognized that an individual’s behavior is in large part

shaped by the manner in which he perceives, diagnoses, and evaluates his
physical and social environment. Similarly, it is recognized that in order to
experience and cope with the complex, confusing reality of the environ-
ment, individuals have to form simplified, structured beliefs about the
nature of their world. An individual’s perceptions, in turn, are filtered
through clusters of beliefs or &dquo;cognitive maps&dquo; of different parts of his
social and physical environment. The beliefs that comprise these maps
provide the individual with a more or less coherent way of organizing and
making sense out of what would otherwise be a confusing array of signals
picked up from the environment by his senses.2 Political leaders are no
different in this respect. Because policy situations are often characterized
by &dquo;structural uncertainty,&dquo;3 the cognitive maps of decision-makers may
be expected to be of more than passing interest.
The central role of cognitive factors in decision-making has long been
recognized (Simon, 1947; Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 1954, 1962; March
 Holsti / COGNITIVE PROCESS APPROACHES [13]

and Simon, 1958). Nevertheless, progress toward incorporating them into

empirical research has been relatively slow and uneven; students of
international politics and foreign policy, for example, have not achieved
consensus about the central relevance or utility of research on the belief

systems and cognitive processes of foreign policy leaders. Analysts who

take the affirmative side on this issue-in the sense that their research
designs either focus upon or at least leave room for the possible
importance of the cognitive aspects of decision-making-have been in a
minority. Although there are some indications of a change in this respect,
to date there has been a relative neglect of systematic research focusing on
the relationship between: belief systems; the manner in which such
complex cognitive tasks as diagnosis of the situation, search for policy
options, and evaluations are undertaken; choice behavior; and coping with
feedback resulting from the selected policy.
Limited systematic investigation of the linkages between beliefs and
decision-making characterizes not only the discipline as a whole, but also
the research of those who have found a congenial intellectual home in the
interstices between political science and psychology. A perusal of two
reviews of the foreign policy-international politics literature, undertaken
from a social-psychological perspective (Kelman, 1965; Etzioni, 1969; see
also the extensive bibliography in Knutson, 1972: 283-325), reveals that
public attitudes, images, and stereotypes; the effects of travel or personal
contacts; and other forms of cross-national interaction have received
considerable attention. The impact of such variables on decision-making
and policy outputs, however, may be somewhat limited and difficult to
trace. Research on foreign policy leaders and their beliefs, perceptions,
styles of information-processing, strategies for coping with uncertamty,
and the like have been a secondary area of concern, even among those
whose investigations are informed by theories, concepts, and data of a
psychological nature.
Although in recent years a cognitive approach to foreign policy analysis
has emerged as a vital area of inquiry,4it is nevertheless useful to consider
the basic arguments against this approach, for they may identify a number
of genuine difficulties that stand in the way of developing ngorous
theories and a cumulative body of empirical findings.’

CRITICAL REACTIONS TO EARLIER APPROACHES

Possibly contributing to the relative neglect of research on foreign

policy officials and their cognitions and perceptions is the continuing
[14] AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST

influence of critical reactions against previous efforts to deal with the

individual and his psychological traits as the central focus of analysis. Four
examples illustrate this observation.
1. The &dquo;war begins in the minds of men&dquo; approach achieved some
following after World War II, especially among behavioral scientists who
sought to apply the insights of their own disciplines toward the eradication
or amelioration of international conflict. The optimistic vision of an

almost infinitely malleable human nature and the tendency to ascribe

conflict largely to misunderstanding, lack of communication, inadequate
knowledge, or misperception were inviting targets for critical reaction
(Waltz, 1959).
2. Some approaches focused on the manner in which psychological
aberrations or pathological needs of decision-makers were projected into
the international arena. The examples of Hitler and Stalin seemed to
provide special relevance to this perspective. But, without denying that
attention to nonlogical aspects of personality may provide some insight
into the behavior of individual leaders, critics (Verba, 1961) questioned
whether such explanations were either sufficient or necessary for
understanding important international phenomena.
3. The &dquo;power school,&dquo; which reached a position of dominance
following World War II, was also rooted in psychological theories of
political man. It portrayed him as ambitious and egoistic or, in some
versions, as touched with original sin. This is not the place to evaluate
these visions of homo politicus. Suffice it to say thatglobal psychological
properties such as those posited by the &dquo;first image pessimists,&dquo; to use
Kenneth Waltz’ term, did not lend themselves very well to rigorous
empirical research. As in the case of the &dquo;war begins in the minds of men&dquo;
school, the &dquo;realist&dquo; approach was subject to trenchant critiques (Waltz,
1959; Hoffman, 1960) that cast doubt not only on the specific theories,
butt also on the more basic propositions that our understanding of
international politics and foreign policy could significantly be enhanced by
including the decision-maker, his belief system, and his cognitive processes
at the core of our analyses.
4. Decision-making approaches (Snyder, Bruck, Sapin, 1954, 1962;
Frankel, 1963) were in part a reaction to deficiencies of earlier theories.
The most prominent of these, the framework developed by Snyder and his
colleagues, placed the individual decision-maker-and his values, attitudes,
information, perceptions, and definition of the situation-at the center of
a complex network of organizational and other influences. After an
 Holsti / COGNITIVE PROCESS APPROACHES [15]

initially enthusiastic reception, this approach came under considerable

criticism. There is no need to rehash here the by now familiar arguments
of the critics (McClosky, 1956; Hoffman, 1960; Rosenau, 1967), but one
point is perhaps worth noting. The major empirical application of the
framework-the American decision to resist the invasion of South Korea
(Snyder and Paige, 1958; Paige, 1968)-made fairly extensive use of the
organizational and information variables of the scheme. It also explored in
some detail the internal and external setting of the decision. But less
attention was devoted to the belief systems and cognitive processes of
those involved in making the decisions.

THE RELEVANCE OF PSYCHOLOGY

It is no secret that many political scientists consider the analyses of

foreign policy and international politics undertaken by some psychologists
6
to be well-intentioned, but often of dubious realism and relevance.6
Questions have also been raised about the value of introducing the
premise, theories, concepts, and to some extent the methodologies of
other disciplines into the core of foreign policy analysis (Hoffman, 1960:
172). These objections take several forms. One is that the relevant
literature in psychology has emerged from the artificial settmg of the
laboratory, using subjects who are in some important respects quite unlike
foreign policy officials. Moreover, the laboratory subjects have usually
been engaged in problem-solving activities that bear only a faint likeness to
the complex cogmtive tasks that occupy political leaders, especially when
they are faced with awesome crisis decisions.
Some critics also question the wisdom of borrowing theories and
concepts from another discipline when psychologists themselves have
failed to achieve consensus on important questions about belief systems,
attitude change, and related concerns. Even prominent formulations such
as various &dquo;cognitive consistency theories&dquo;-approaches which share the

premise that man seeks congruence between lus behavior, beliefs, and
attitudes-have been the source of vigorous debate among advocates of
competmg explanations (Abelson et al., 1968; Insko, 1967). Why, then,
should students of foreign pohcy, rarely trained to deal critically with the
results of experimental research, add to their own burdens by introducing
the controversies of other disciplines into their work? Doing so may render
them no less vulnerable than the psychologist who assumes that the world
of international politics is merely his research laboratory writ large.
[16] AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST

Although these criticisms may overstate the difficulties, they are quite
correct in suggesting that indiscriminate borrowing from psychology is no
panacea. The starting point and the criterion of relevance should be the
substantive concerns of the foreign policy analyst rather than those of the
experimental psychologist. It is probably no accident that among the most
insightful studies of foreign policy by psychologists (de Rivera, 1968;
Janis, 1972) are those that have started with problems that emerge in a
foreign policy setting and then worked back toward the psychological
literature, rather than vice versa.

PARSIMONY

Perhaps the most widely articulated arguments against cognitive

approaches to foreign policy decision-making center on theoretical
parsimony and research economy. One can, it is asserted, account for more
of the variance in international behavior by starting at-and perhaps
limiting oneself to-other levels of analysis. Individual decision-maker
analyses are often deemed superfluous for one or more of several reasons.
One view is that role, institutional, and other constraints limit the area
within which a leader’s traits can affect policy. Another is that there is
little variance among leaders with respect to their decision-making
behavior in any given circumstances. The following selectively illustrate
the thesis that explanations centering on the cognitions and perceptions of
even the highest-ranking leaders are unlikely to extend our understanding

significantly.
I. Foreign policy decisions are made within complex bureaucratic
organizations that place severe constraints on the individual decision-
maker. Organizational memory, prior policy commitments, parochial
vested interests, standard operating procedures, normal bureaucratic
inertia, and conflict resolution by bargaining serve to restrict the impact
on the policy output of the leader’s beliefs or other cognitive traits and

processes. It should perhaps be noted, however, that a focus on

bureaucratic politics need not exclude a concern for belief systems. That
is, conflict and bargaining may develop as a result of divergent diagnoses
and prescriptions which derive, in turn, from different beliefs about the
nature of politics, the character of opponents, and the like-and these
differences may not be correlated perfectly with bureaucratic position.
Furthermore, a bureaucratic politics focus may be especially useful for
understanding the slippage between an executive decision and foreign
 Holsti / COGNITIVE PROCESS APPROACHES [17]

policy outputs which emerge from the process of implementing decisions,

but it may be less valuable for explaining the decision itself.
2. Foreign policy is the external manifestation of domestic institutions,
ideologies, and other attributes of the polity. The notion that political,
economic, and other internal institutions determine the nature of foreign
policy is an old one, and contemporary advocates of this position include
&dquo;hard line&dquo; analysts who attribute all Soviet or Chinese foreign policy
behavior to the imperatives of Marxism-Leninism and communist totalitar-
ianism. Many revisionist American historians adhere to a comparable
position-that the institutional requirements of capitalism are not only a
necessary but are also a sufficient explanation for the nature of American
foreign policy. Names and faces may change, interests and policies do not,
because they are rooted in more or less permanent structural features of
the polity (for a critique, see Holsti, 1974). It is assumed that there is a
homogeneity of beliefs not only within but also between organizations,
because the processes of political recruitment and political socialization
effectively suppress or eliminate all but the most trivial differences in
politically relevant beliefs.
3. Structural and other attributes of the international system shape and
constram policy choices to such an extent that this is the logical starting
point for most analyses (Singer, 1961). Many who adhere to this position
would concede that in order to explore the dynamics of the system it may
be desirable and necessary to conduct supplementary analyses of political
processes within the nation or possibly within its major institutions; few
would extend the argument to the point of analyzing cognitive processes
of even the highest-ranking leaders (see Singer, 1971: 19-20).
In summary, the argument is that by the time one has taken into
account systemic, societal, governmental, and bureaucratic constraints on
decision-makers, much of the variance in foreign policy-making has been
accounted for; attributes of the individual decision-maker are thus often

regarded as a residual category which may be said to account for the

unexplained variance. It is not wholly unfair to suggest that these
arguments are often the initial premises that guide, rather than the
considered conclusion that emerge from, systematic research. We are short
of comparative studies that might reveal the circumstances under which
alternative premises- for example, that &dquo;beliefs of foreign policy decision-
makers are central to the study of decision outputs and probably account
for more of the variance than any other single factor&dquo; (Shapiro and
Bonham, 1973: 161 )-might be applicable.
[18] AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST

However, there is a growing body of empirical research which indicates

that doing so may prove rewarding in circumstances when one or more of
the following conditions exists:7

(1) Nonroutine situations that require more than merely the application of
standard operating procedures and decision rules; for example, decisions to
initiate or terminate major international undertakings, including wars,
interventions, alliances, aid programs, and the like.
(2) Decisions made at the pinnacle of the government hierarchy by leaders who
are relatively free from organizational and other constraints-or who may at
least define their roles in ways that enhance their latitude for choice.

(3) Long-range policy planning, a task that inherently involves considerable

uncertainty and in which conceptions of &dquo;what is,&dquo; &dquo;what is important or
likely or desirable,&dquo; and &dquo;what is related to what&dquo; are likely to be at the core
of the political process.
(4) When the situation itself is highly ambiguous and is thus open to a variety of
interpretations. Uncertainty may result from a scarcity of information; from
information of low quality or questionable authenticity; or from information
that is contradictory or is consistent with two or more significantly different
interpretations, coupled with the absence of reliable means of choosing
between them.

(5) Circumstances of information overload in which decision-makers are forced

to use a variety of strategies (e.g., queuing, filtering, omission, reducing
categories of discnmination to cope with the problem).
(6) Unanticipated events in which initial reactions are likely to reflect cognitive
&dquo;sets.&dquo;
(7) Circumstances in which complex cognitive tasks associated with decision-
making may be impaired or otherwise sigmficantly affected by the various
types of stresses that impinge on top-ranking executives.

These categories are not mutually exclusive or exhaustive; nor is it

suggested that they are of relevance only for foreign policy decisions. It
has been noted, however, that &dquo;structural uncertainty&dquo; often characterizes
important foreign pohcy choice situations (Stembruner, 1968: 215-216;
cf. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 1962: 104). To the extent that this is more
frequently the case in international than in domestic situations, we might
expect that cognitive approaches would more often be apphcable in issues
of the former type.
Allison (1969, 1971) has persuasively demonstrated that any given
levels and units of analysis serve as beacons that guide and sensitize the
investigator to some bodies of data and potential explanations; they may
also be conceptual blinders, desensitizing him to evidence that might
 Holsti / COGNITIVE PROCESS APPROACHES [19]

support competing explanations. It is not altogether satisfactory to assert

that the choice of levels and units of analysis is merely a matter of taste or
theoretical preference. Nor is it always sufficient to assume that the higher
(systemic) levels of explanation establish the limits within which choices
are made, whereas lower ones serve to fill in the finer details; the different

foci may lead to significantly different explanations. What is needed is

rigorous comparative research that addresses itself to the issue, not in the
spirit of evangelism on behalf of one theoretical position or the other, but
rather in response to the question: for what range of research and policy
problems is any given perspective or combination of them likely to prove
necessary? Sufficient? What is the relative potency of various clusters of
independent variables on not only the decision-making process (Rosenau,
1966), but also on the substance and quality of the policy output?
We have relatively few such studies, but of the examples that come to
mind a number seem to provide support for greater attention to the beliefs
systems of policy-makers. (1) Rosenau’s (1968) research on the behavior
of U.S. senators toward Secretaries of State Acheson and Dulles indicated
that it was governed largely by role rather than personal or idiosyncratic
attributes. An imaginative reanalysis of the data revealed, however, that
preferences and &dquo;belief-sets&dquo; of the senators in fact yielded a more
powerful explanation for their behavior than did role (Stassen, 1972). (2)
Allison’s study of the Cuban missile crisis did not extend the analysis to a
consideration of a cognitive process model, but the potential value of
doing so was suggested in the conclusion (1971: 277). It seems a
reasonable hypothesis that such a study would have illuminated further
several aspects of the decision-making process in Washington-for example,
the early consensus that the Soviet missiles must be removed, the line-up
of &dquo;hawks&dquo; and &dquo;doves&dquo; on the most appropriate and effective means of
doing so, or the shifting of policy positions as new information became
available and new interpretations were adduced. Furthermore, whether or
not a leader (such as McNamara) defines a situation as a &dquo;crisis&dquo; depends
at least in part on basic beliefs about the political universe, and these will
not always correspond to or be predictable from his role. (3) Steinbruner’s
study of the proposed multilateral force (MLF) for NATO tested several
alternative conceptions of decision-making, and concluded that &dquo;it was the
cognitive process model which provided the best fit with the phenomena
observed&dquo; (Steinbruner, 1968: 538). As multiple objectives and uncer-
tainty characterize many occasions for foreign policy decisions, the
implications of the Steinbruner study would appear to extend well beyond
the MLF case (see Trotter, 1971; Lowenthal, 1972; Art, 1973).
[20] AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST

RELATING BELIEFS, DECISIONS, AND

FOREIGN POLICY ACTIONS

Some studies have been criticized for a failure to distinguish between

official and operational ideologies, and for being vulnerable to the charge
of having made unwarranted assumptions about direct linkages between
official ideologies and foreign policy actions (Singer, 1968: 145). These
criticisms are appropriately addressed to the danger that a cognitive
perspective will be employed in a somewhat simplistic manner-assuming,
for example, that beliefs constitute a set of decision rules that are
mechanically applied by policy-makers in a choice situation. The concern
is not wholly misguided because some analysts do in fact tend to assume a
one-to-one relationship between belief systems or operational codes and
foreign policy actions(cf. Strausz-Hupe et al., 1959).
The actual relationship is considerably more complex. First, in any
political system there will be a set of shared beliefs or &dquo;shared images&dquo;
(Halperin, 1974: 11-16). But especially in a pluralistic polity there may
also be variations in beliefs, and these differences may take on consider-
able importance as they are operative in any given decision-making
situation. This is precisely the reason for focusing on the individual
policy-maker, rather than assuming a homogeneity of beliefs among them.
It is thus possible to determine empirically the range of core beliefs that
are widely shared, as well as those on which there may be substantial
variation.
Second, it is not very fruitful to assume direct linkages between beliefs
and foreign policy actions, because the role beliefs play in policy-making is
likely to be a much subtler and less direct one. Rather than providing
direct guides to action, they are one of several clusters of intervening
variables that may shape and constrain decision-making behavior. They
may serve the policy-maker as a means of orienting him to the
environment; as a lens or prism through which information is processed
and given meaning; as a diagnostic scheme; as one means of coping with
the cognitive constraints on rationality; as a source of guidelines that may
guide or bound-but not necessarily determine-policy prescriptions and
choices. Thus, attention should be directed to the linkages between beliefs
and certain decision-making tasks that precede a decision-definition of
the situation, analysis, prescription, and the like. The manner in which
these tasks are performed is likely to establish the boundaries within which
the decision is made.
Third, it is important to recognize the distinction between decisions
and foreign policy actions. The bureaucratic politics literature has
 Holsti / COGNITIVE PROCESS APPROACHES [21]

illustrated the many potential sources of slippage between executive

decisions and the implementation of policy in the form of foreign policy
actions.

RESEARCH DIFFICULTIES

Finally, not theleast potent constraint has been the very real and
persistent problems of undertaking systematic empirical research. At a
time when the discipline itself was becoming more self-consciously
scientific, applying more stringent standards of theoretical rigor and
methodological sophistication, these problems have become increasingly
visible. One obvious difficulty is access to data. Unlike the analyst who can
index his variables with such measures as GNP per capita, arms budgets,
trade figures, votes in the UN General Assembly, or public opinion polls,
those interested in the beliefs of decision-makers have no yearbook to
which they can turn for comparable evidence, much less quantitative data
presented in standard units. One result is relatively limited agreement on
the appropriate categories into which to code whatever data are available.
A no less potent difficulty concerns transformation of available biographi-
cal, documentary, and other evidence into data that are both replicable
and directly relevant to the theoretical question at hand. Unlike figures on
budgets, trade, or voting, each data set developed for a cognitive process
study is likely to be used only once.
Although these arguments against expending considerable research
resources on the cognitive attributes and process of decision-makers are
not without some merit, the tentative conclusion is that their universal
validity is open to serious question. The existing literature is insufficient to
provide a definitive and compelling assessment, but there appears to be a
reasonable case in support of the following proposition: for important
classes of decisions, a cognitive process perspective is necessary-and not
just as a way of filling in details-although probably not sufficient. Put
somewhat differently, the proposition is that for some decisions a
cognitive process perspective is fundamental and should be at the starting
point of the analysis, rather than a luxury to be indulged in order to
reduce some of the variance unexplained by the other, more powerful
approaches.

COGNITIVE PROCESS RESEARCH

Existing studies are characterized by diversity in conceptualization,

sources of theory, research site, subject, and &dquo;data-making&dquo; (categories,
[22] AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST

coding rules, data analysis procedures) operations. They range from rather
traditional single-case analyses of specific leaders to efforts aimed at
developing computer simulations of cognitive processes (Abelson, 1971).
Research on belief systems and cognitive processes is suggestive and
eclectic rather than focused and cumulative. For an enterprise that is of
relatively recent interest within the discipline, and is still essentially in the
&dquo;pre-takeoff ’ stage, diversity is probably desirable, and, in any case,
inevitable. To expect anything other than a broad range of approaches is
to imply nothing less than the existence of a paradigmatic theory of
cognition and choice.
Underlying the variety, however, are two shared premises. First, there is
a general suspicion that simple S-R or &dquo;black box&dquo; formulations are

msufficient bases for understanding decision outputs, either of individuals

or nation-states. Second, it is assumed that the content and structure of

belief systems, information-processing styles, strategies for coping with

stress, and the like are systematically related to the manner in which
leaders perceive, diagnose, prescribe, and make choices, especially in
situations of uncertainty. Both shared and idiosyncratic attributes and
processes are of interest. For example, the premise that most, if not all,
persons experience predecisional and postdecisional pressures for cognitive
consistency, and for congruence between beliefs and behavior, mforms
many studies. But the propensity to favor one or another strategy for
coping with discrepancies between elements of the belief system, attitudes,
and behavior can vary widely across individuals, with potentially impor-
tant implications for decision-making behavior.
Diversity in the existing foreign policy literature can be described
briefly along several dimensions.

Theory. There is a wide range of &dquo;models&dquo; which, in turn, are informed

by different theoretical literatures and even different disciplines. These
include, but are not limited to, various &dquo;cognitive consistency&dquo; theories,
personality theory, communication theory, decision theory, as well as
many others.

Scope. Much of the existing research is focused on a single leader, but

some of it also deals with relatively large samples of elites (Burgess, 1967;
Putnam, 1973; Mennis, 1972; Semmel, 1972; Garnham, 1971); see also the
studies described in Raser’s (1966) review article. Moreover, some studies
are concerned with a single concept, cognitive task, or stage in policy-

making, whereas others can be described as efforts at developing or

cxploring the entire decision-making process, encompassing various types
 Holsti / COGNITIVE PROCESS APPROACHES [23]

of cognitive activities (Axelrod, 1972a, 1973; Shapiro and Bonham, 1973 ;

Holsti and George, 1975; Jervis, forthcoming).
Categories and concepts. Not only do analytical concepts vary widely;
even the language for describing them ranges from ordinary prose through
the formal notation of set theory.

Data. The studies draw upon vastly different empirical domains for data
and illustrations. At one end of the spectrum are detailed analyses of a
single decision-maker, based on interviews and/or content analyses of
primary documents and supplementary secondary sources. Jervis (forth-
coming) draws on the voluminous record of diplomatic history, as well as
reports of experimental research, to illustrate the relevance of existing
hypotheses, to generate new ones, and to demonstrate the limitations or
inapplicability of other explanations. Still other studies combine data from
real decision-makers with those from surrogates, including men and
machine simulations (Hermann and Hermann, 1967; Zinnes, 1966;
Bonham and Shapiro, 1973, forthcoming b).
A somewhat oversimplified summary of some existing studies appears
in Table 1. Although it is illustrative rather than comprehensive, the table
may serve some useful purpose in illustrating the relationship between
conceptions of the decision-maker (see Axelrod, 1972a), stages or tasks in
the decision-making process (see Brim et al., 1962: 1), theories, and
concepts. It also suggests that (1) decision-making, encompassing several
stages or tasks, is a shorthand label for a number of different cognitive
activities; (2) the literature abounds with a plethora of concepts which,
taken together, are marked by considerable overlap and something less
than complete consistency in usage; and (3) there is a small but growing
empirical literature (especially since 1965) that provides some basis for
optimism about research of this genre.

CONCLUSION
Aside from developing precise, communicable concepts and methods of
inquiry that ultimately lead to a cumulative literature, there remains the
longer-term task of integrating research on cognitive processes with other
conceptualizations of decision-making. Exaggerated claims on behalf of
these models are likely to be even less convincing than those made on
behalf of competing frameworks. It will not suffice to assume that foreign
policy decisions merely reflect the beliefs of any given leader or even
group of leaders. Hence, research on belief systems must ultimately be
embedded in a broader context, and the problems of linking and
[24]
[25]
[26] AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST

interrelating theories and concepts that are oriented to the individual

decision-maker-as are most of those in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1-to the
behavior of groups and organizations need to be addressed directly. Even
those who focus on crisis decisions that are made by a small and relatively
autonomous group of top-ranking leaders are likely to profit by exploring
possible linkages with models of group dynamics (Janis, 1972; George,
1974), and bureaucratic organizations (Allison, 1971; George, 1972;
Allison and Halperin, 1972; Halperin, 1974). Some of the more theoreti-
cally oriented approaches to comparative foreign policy also suggest a
broader context within which relative potency of leadership variables-
including the cognitions of decision-makers-can be assessed systematically
(Rosenau, 1966, 1970; M. Hermann, 1972, 1974).
Integration across levels is not an end in itself, however; nor is it likely
to occur unless we can identify specific questions, the answers to which
will require the analyst to focus directly on the linkages between processes
in various decision-making contexts. For example: (1) How does the
decision-maker define his cognitive tasks and needs; and how are these
satisfied, modified, or constrained by the small group or bureaucratic
organization? (2) What tensions exist between the decision-maker’s
cognitive style and role requirements; and how does he attempt to cope
with them? (3) What are cognitive concomitants of organizational
differences (Steinbruner, 1968: 500)? (4) What group processes are
associated with a premature bolstering of shared beliefs? With systematic
examination of decisional premises?
Similar questions may also be couched in normative or prescriptive
terms. Given an executive’s cognitive style, for example, what types of
interventions at the group or organizational level will increase the
probability that his cognitive needs are met? Will it increase the likelihood
that beliefs and decisional premises are subjected to critical analysis?
This list is by no means an exhaustive one. It merely illustrates a few of
the questions that relate to cognitive processes in decision-making, but
which can only be answered by considering also the broader context
within which policies are made.

NOTES

1 Observations and examples throughout the paper tend to be drawn from

studies of foreign policy decision-making Although circumstances under which
cognitive process models are useful may occur with greater frequency in the foreign
policy issue area, many of the observations on the utility, problems, and prospects of
 Holsti / COGNITIVE PROCESS APPROACHES [27]

this perspective would apply with equal force to decision-making in other issue areas
or in other political contexts (cf. Converse, 1964; Bennett, 1971; Cobb, 1973;
Kirkpatrick, 1975; Hammond, forthcoming).
2. Belief systems and cognitive processes should be distinguished from ideology
or mere policy preferences. &dquo;Belief system&dquo; refers to a more or less integrated set of

beliefs about man’s physical and social environment. Cognitive processes refer to
various activities associated with problem-solving, including perception, appraisal,
interpretation, search, information-processing, strategies for coping with uncertainty,
decision rules, verification, and the like. These cognitive activities are assumed to be
in an interactive relationship with the individual’s belief system as well as with the
environment.
3. Structural uncertainty describes circumstances in which &dquo;not only are
probability distributions not known (as in the constrained rational theories), but even
the possible states of the world are imperfectly specified&dquo; (Steinbruner, 1968: 216).
4. Recent studies advocating greater attention to decision-makers’ beliefs and
decisional premises, and doing so on the basis of empirical evidence, include Art
(1973), Steinbruner (1968, 1974), Stassen (1972), Krasner (1972), Ball (1974),
Cottam (forthcoming), and Lowenthal (1972). See also the essay by Cottam (1973).
Among broader assessments of alternative approaches to international politics,
compare Alker (1973) and Boulding (1972). The prominent foreign policy role
played by Henry A. Kissinger appears to have heightened interest in decision-makers’
beliefs. Among studies that deal with Kissinger’s beliefs are those by Brenner (1973),
Eldridge (1975), Graubard (1973), Hendricks (1975), Issak (1975), Landau (1972),
and Walker (1975).
5. Critiques of the premises, methodologies, or specific research results that have
been employed in or emerged from various cognitive process studies include Haas
(1967), Hilton (1969), Jervis (1969), Mueller (1969a, 1969b), Goldman (1971), and
Brodin et aL (1972).
6. See Kaplan (1968: 694-695). Prominent efforts by psychologists to deal with
problems of foreign policy and international politics include de Rivera (1968), Frank
(1967), Janis (1972), Kelman (1965), Klineberg (1964), Milburn (1972), Osgood
(1959b, 1962), Stagner (1967), and White (1970). Psychologists are themselves in
less than complete agreement about the relevance of their theories; see, for example,
the exchange between Ralph K. White (1971) and Fred Arnstein (1971).
7. Empirical support for this list may be found in many studies, including Art
(1973), Ball (1974), de Rivera (1968), C. Hermann (1969, 1972), Holsti (1967,
1972), Holsti and George (1975), Jams (1972), Jervis (1968, forthcoming), Krasner
(1972), Lowenthal (1972), May (1973), Milburn (1972), Paige (1968), Snyder and
Paige (1958), Stassen (1972), and Steinbruner (1968, 1974).

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