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aa le a Rae ie TT aim CT ESL AhAbAbhhMhhaAasAhnaaahsaaaaad. AAMAAhAhAhhhaAahaaaasahaaaad, TVW VV VW VV VV VV VT VV VV VV VV AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA, AAAAAasshhsssssssassadad. AAbAbAhAhhshshsahsasAsaasasaaad. AAAAAAAAAAAAAAasaaaaaad, AAhAbAAAhsahshshsaaasasssaaad. AAAAAAshshsAbshhasssasaaada. AAhhhhahsahshhahsssahsaaaadd, AAAAAhAhhAAhAhaAaAssaaaaad, MAAAAbAAhshshaAaAshssaasasassAadad. AAhhbahshsahsasassssassadad, MAAhhhhahhshshsasAahsaahasaadad, AAAAAAAAAAhAhAaaAasAahaaad. MAAhhAbhhshshsbshsassssssadd, MAAAhAbAAshshashssssssassadd. AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA, ITTY WAR PACIFIC Bogining in December 1941 with Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor and tho British possessions of Malaya and the Philippines, the war in the Pace played out across a vast area of Asia andthe Pacitc regjon. It would come toa devastating conclusion in August 1945, when the Unites States droped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities, ‘of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, leaving more than 120,000 people dead, ‘Trough expert features, stunning photography and in-depth battle maps, this book explores some ofthe Pace Theato’s Key battles ‘and campaigns, from the decisive naval battle of Midway to one ofthe bloodiest battles of Word War Il~the Ali invasion of Okinawa. We'l ‘also uncover the culture of sacrifice and nationhood behind Japan's kamikaze pilots, invoduce some ofthe heroes ofthe conf, and ‘explore how the bomb that changed the world was bom. 4 L FUTURE 4 r WAR PACIFIC ist RY WAR (SS TLS ett) vs Cita e VALS Cee ae nC 016 JAPAN 1937: A STATE OF WAR COR nee ec Cee ee eee ee merited! DO SaaS SIL eee es attack on Pearl Harbor began months before the Sens [PAC eV ae) ORL UO) Dae un eee ee a Pune C2 laa CVS 0 Seg ee Oe eee Oe ee ns aa ei ey a CY ERS ae gave) eed CUTTS aa ele OU as) AUS task force sought to cripple the Japanese Cee cca) STNG Despite an overwhelming advantage in numbers, the ee ee aa AUSTRALIA'S THIN GREEN LINE eee ee cn ee last line of defence: citizen soldiers rey Emel OP UCLe Re Operation Watchtower wrested the Pacific island of eRe EMta CN) a aE id Bea Reece) his Marines across a pior swept by enemy fire to Ce ec) Ur Or 7 Uy (3) THE Ce 082 STATE OF PLAY: 1944 ce ens 084 THE BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF Dees U7 aR ea Ce ee oon CT aon US Marines mounted one final assault on Japanese Cee eon nd a ey ee ‘The hero New Jersey champion boxer BSTC Ve Smee) aCe ee ere een Ran) mission to halt the American landings on Okinawa bee DY DALY Ce ene Ray Cec S| * BPI a ae) Seg ee ed BX Tsar 13310) (am) 000) US bombing raids on the capital of Imperial Pee ee BPs UO Ue ee arduous 82 days forthe Allies to claim victory pM Ze Sn that would never be needed Pe a aed The development and use of the atomic bomb ‘against Japan during World War Il changed the Ceca pO Rema alts Da as Dee THE WAR FOR THE PACIFIC SPRAWLED OVER A GIGANTIC OCEANIC see NMS Scie, \e see eG ACe bea Ne Rae) sau oa ela SL ae aac acre Cee) Con eee ad peaereariosiea pet ecm ree rrr SrCaneNtten to erect net CVU Uy Co sUr ern et ete tc mony EOC Sey Ce ree ns Pree cenrty re ry earns Detect caplet oe inlantee tetris renee ee ee en error Peis ca nunmets eeee an eA Scere cerry De ee cea aca cee eee ee pasournesinng sinner nt tunt rhe Praag pease aad Ltenieae tae eased Fiecenieetinn inner nirnirseny eee ar Por eye eee enone Eerreereeranre aareterereieerinert re Poe mae eterna Pimemrmnen irene tt Peer geen ameter a rd poet Renee Perit ereres et eee tr cea CaN peer a eres BETIO ISLAND, TARAWA ATOLL, aris Peeters rere ote arate Eten nen intone ts praetor Earlene er pane peony Ponies Brena ere ris Poo trririamans Peer coe re ferent Pore unsure Pare eterno ceo panera nee ree est St ets Cea PY Frese er cree oC eee eee ey Ey eceererheorienatr sear peepee! parepenmeninr rine ment r ces Pee eaaterea teva on Peer enn Tetons Eavoinageemercer or uyeronerinenenye rie BATTLE OF THE ana 19-20 JUNE 1944 ~ PHILIPPINE SEA, Eater raat ss enna eae ears Pee aT ay poco ad Coe ai eet re Cees Paver evoe re aned cee erties oor oie on erry errs Pageant Pee eee aay Teton et ene eee asc oer erence eee pier peterinrmenimra teeters ere eC Peepers Peerrerurrenectet Expenner rent Reena en i ern en ener plstepapreice drartrtadborneriinyr rsa inven yieroattpueg Semis tr tetrrer iery Sere ee ts SUN ‘APRIL - 22 JUNE 1945 ~ Cron ne oe kare noes Report eerie ena ene poset PTE OF HIROSHIMA Prvciacre Pose pas eres Sink but hoe no igh Ceca entree foe er eheraeraat Ti “4 a PVG: Peay Ck!1SO OFFENSIVE AS THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC BEGINS Catan AaB Seed ee Ley ee Dees CO BCA eam Ge Intoxicated by visions of imperial conquest, Japan's Se Re ee to subdue China and plunder its resources 024 JAPAN'S FIRST STRIKE ey Se en a Sy (cP eases OR UC UUeL Le) More than any other individual, Yamamoto was Cee Deg 034 THE FALL OF SINGAPORE The sun began to set on the British Empire in 1942 with a humiliating defeat where thousands Ce acy Fry JAPAN ATTACKS. STATE OF PLAY: 1941 JAPANESE IMPERIALISM CONTINUES ITS MARCH, CULMINATING IN THE DEVASTATING ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR uring the late 19th and early 2oth centures, te island nation fof Japan undergoes a swit transformation from a feudal society to an industraised ‘litany and economic power. ts burgeoning ambitions to achieve hegemony in Asia ard the Pai, tele in natural resources for Japanese oops cccupy French Indochina Placing them perlously cose tothe ol feids and other natural resources ofthe Dutch East Indies. President Franklin Roosevelt orders an ‘embargo af ol, sap ron, machinery, and other ‘commosites to Japan ané freezes Japanese assets in the United States. Along wt the {embargo comes an ultimatum fem the United States to wthoraw al of te Japanese woop MARIANAS 1S”, from the asian continent tapes ye aturnn of 194%, Japan stands at a potiza and mitary erssroos. Prime Minister Hide To, also amar genera auaM leads the nation to war rather than acquiesce ‘to American demands whl losing honour ana substantial tertorial gains. n November, plans fora preemptive naval air srike against the US Pcie Fleet at Pea Harbor and other military installations in Hawai, are st in motion, ana Japanese planes attack without warsing on 7 Decomber, plunging the United States into Worta War STATE OF PLAY: 1944 annealed TROPIC OF 2O1REISS L Cer ries PALUKRA, ae FANNING te ts e CHRISTMAS |. bus. (wanebe ie TaRYIS t SMARCK ARCH ae, Seat HHoENix| is. im Re vodinal en - PPKLAY | : MARRUESAS IS. : SMTA Geach wanlnics Is. r Sunonccanke "Santa CRUZ I. suayes OY MANS IS oo Be v toast SAMOA IS. NeW HEBRIDES Tuausa) se ay, AMERICAN SAMOA oe ral Sea errors]. AP age Pea a 7 TUAMOF Wow . q One, SOCIETY iS. fy suB Tks. oo Paul “+t ARGHIPELAGO. . § TONGA I Pe : eT es i new'taioomn |.” STOMA | cong: e oe ee rue: : 3 TROPIC GF CAPRICORN + DUCIE Le ] TUBUALausTAAL IS. PITCAIRN 1 eee ee: ~ oe “NORFOLK | en 15 Cy ae ABT a sara ler aig oon INTOXICATED BY VISIONS OF IMPERIAL CONQUEST, JAPAN’S FANATICAL MILITARISTS LAUNCHED A GENOCIDAL CAMPAIGN TO SUBDUE CHINA AND PLUNDER ITS RESOURCES LE eae or ent eer eee a eee ete Cee erat acne ten Cece een eo heer ener one ae ere eee ie Pree ly Sear eet Ce ota cared id te rr Doo eer tet eer reer aca ean rue meet aA Cee eee as pe en ey eee ear reas eto arent Great Powers nt until mader times, at least. DREAMS OF AN EMPIRE ee ee en td centr et atc rot Cy pene Pero eee ocean Teenie neu ean cee eee es ey ae aed aiinane pieentnverced Ce erecta tReet ees Pen ern See er eee cee treet see ay to accept reo trade — a rude awakening for Peer ery ec eens eee ena Ricae ecto Ce eect rt were abght once more, The First Sino-Japanese Meee een Suerte ae eres eee peninsula for good ~ granted ‘independence! ee eens ee Piers pies Manchura was now within Japan's grasp. The Cae Ue egy CE eaor ene teenies eet rere ree et eee eae eay Bees pemearcen at eae ca Ey 10 Taushima, Japan's sheer fighting prowess Cr ee ree gee oan eee Dean eee eu ag ear g a eke ote tees Japan's latest trurph against a larger creme eran man ee epeat cat After he war, ke the decrenk Qing Dynasty gee een) eet to unravel ina torturous decline that cimaxed Pues erent eel eee ee eee re) ener ee eens tener) Eo OR ae ue Bee enone rete ere ene eee eee Poe eee es eeiteetm te eee) eee ta) rr aa ree et ye toa Peer net penne Ts eee ey enemas ee eee) Prieto steerer ee ocd Sree oe ey further Japanese gain into its main val's Pee enor) Pe tne) ean ree oy Cr eet Sr ee Re Sena er on eae AN INDUSTRIAL UTOPIA ea Er) Meaty Tannery ete | Ce ane eeiocas Spat eeran eten Seat ty Par eer eee eae ete) ener erent Re Nee ern the tundra and tiga, and tothe west was Poe ers Bere ces PR nee ees Pet ees Cer ate rs) pee eee Acted Panett eee aie ee ae eM TS) Me Coa eRe) me) EXP Reon La roo re e Rea Reco ALLL) tall So ola Cel} eed ee enter eee ay eneiree ert The problem was the only eer Serer eet Poteet mi Cee! Pe entire Perec icererete a single ambiguous crisis would Bt SUT aa VISA ST TTD Tl] a et end Cee ose minerals and vast tracts of arable land were Coenen ee ae eee) Proto eens ‘attendant recklessness and ostentation, Ponce enn Su eet eet ern ee) Pon iern ecm rarrcrity reece tierce ey eta een cree Lemar Pe eer ne eat ad the Ming Dynasty and ruled China atts height eae eee ay ra et ae could not take it, however, since this Would ee oo See ote een ta Core sontos alogeay eer eerie ets Pomc ery ey er eee eee) peeter eens Perrinronneertae yy eerie ere ett) en es pone oe eerie ny ceo eealeteoiea Pete ees erie ce Petree tae) eer ee enone pee Neer eee Pores a Hag Sea TT Ey 20 De etd Coe eee Se ahs According to Louis Livingston Seaman, MO eee een a se eed ey ttn eee ee Benes etn Cc er ae Pee ree eer em eee} eee ecto neers eae eer eee Pre an Rioters Tee ae) recs eee reid eee eet eae gt ree See ee ern eos Sree rer ener es ‘thus gving China one more chance to ‘ut her ieee ae oe eee ees rice ee ae ee eer eos eer en eee] eee rs ee ear coh Perhaps something that was beyond eae erent en eres ee eet ed Inthe ensuing decades, they tumed itinto a ea ean rn ee Manchuria's importance to Japan's progress Peper neta ary tar Pe ae eet ran coerce me ere eens Leer eed eee cs Ce et meds Let nn oy ee eeeren ty Sete anor ne ee the country was anything but such to jst ts em cece rr cs ett ere cs as Ae FROM COLONIALS TO Craik ee ete) rer tenn eee ear Roe epee ete tos ee ee aa) Taciturn, single-minded and a ine CMe |e ae) OA) oriental Spartan and the unwitting Eleni romeo) T EMAL Coles} Ce ee eas eee ee Pen eee eet ee eee ene eee rs er eens eer eran en arn) upbringing At 1.6 mete tall with peo eysight and a ee eee ay hard worker with simple tastes. Serving as military attaché Serer aero ) Pe Ue aed i eee ons Seen rere eee rc nets tai peer errant strains was the ambiguous exstence of te cones Despite its ominous name, the Kwantung oe eee en oa ene eer nee a Peranter eee eine era ee ene eee itappears the Kwentung Army's distance from Loe re eet eee es Csi eed Peer Caen Manchuria was inconclusive, but three years eo re freeman eats ea Tet cet pera ee ets ee eee | ee eee, tt eas CC ey Be are tee ponies re ee was China's weakness. The Republican Era oe eee cree eae e ta the Kuomintang government only had nominal contol of China and warlords ran fefdoms that Ree) ee aC ee nea Scene etter erate et remenn ry Petit ine ar erent Coates! Se aero Se oer renmece esa) creer ie emery eet ete RSS bata Nt ocean trad ‘atonal character before Word Wer Is that eee Tene ce ere ta ny ec eee eet at ee eT erncr) rennet Pon ert ee eee ers een eee NES Teta Ta SR ETT SEO TaN TELM ATR Ro la CU TEL MEANT THATTHE IMPERIAL JAPANESE Sea TCT a JAPAN 1937: A STATE OF WAR Salle pole laaT eM Ale MeN LAMAN) 9A I MAO ALCS military compensated with sheer numbers equipped with a vast selection of European arms aN Brat Cet ee tr a Perera ey ean Seer) Sate with the massive Natonal and run ike ther European rh nesenic trian parent veneer amma Pay eee ae area peimotureny EQUIPMENT aceon Pe iieren eierenren Secret aay octet Pesaneeeeerer tind Porenerhy roy Peet ere porinces Ifthe Chinese ad one advantage eerie nies merry an Er eieonec reine ite pee eerste fee ieee are ers Eoromar veneer near ecuet rare ot ete ei istrelltd eerste tetany eortsenet sires ee ee cen ee Rd ees ene eee Tae) ‘the government before Japan could fll its realising an unassalabe Japanese empire was ros once ee rr Coors me eer NOT hee cg Ce Ore ay eae Rs mee Preparations for tis momentous struggle nn cae teat gone ae mm ee egy gee ee een eats Taek ee ers Od was apparent a campaign was being waged efficient fighting machine witha vast arsenal Pee Ce a eer) ee a ey eee oo ee Peer reat the branch, taining was exacting, harsh and Tee Os rece Peer enter any ene eee rnc ‘was punished, beaten and humiliated by his ET et Pi ee eae Cone erent ay Pre 22 Pee ae cay nes eee Pret ‘grenade dscharger for intermediate ranges a5 piper ae eben s Alethal variety of machine guns and mortars oor Seo err meen es Serta T er eee caer ‘By comparison in 1937 the Kuomintang’s enn Se eric perc eee een easing ee eens ete Ronee pe eae Perret) eee es ae eee ea ae eater aN reentrant ere a ee reel elo ne rete oe reese ean tar enna Pome on eke TEL STEN SY SS Tae NU) SST at eae eater ces ere rr See ee ts Eee ee peer Poeorie care ete rs Se ce eer Ts ees enna eee rer oe ne ert’ Pater ote ina re ete erent) ee en Sua en Se ere eee ea eee Pre Er PU Ra aa inom tt Peer erent pee eee ets ee peri Perr erences Perera eC ny ee ae eee aa LY Cert mers Peer coer! near eae eee ey en rors ‘The resulting three-month bate for Seamer oa seC) eater cern a ere eer ere eee eC aT nes ets) received a rude awakening. The Chinese could ut up a tremendous fight and rising Japanese eerie reenact coment eee ae od aera erin slowed in the cy fighting, but the NRA's losses ee eee ert renee een eee ee ed Ct a ec a Creer ad Ce eernntncet Pe ae) eee eee ete ee eran) eee et eee Prac ter eet Cuore cca en eee eon neers What folomed was a gim and baffing period Ce ee ee THE RAPE OF NANKING From 13 December until the end of January ee er ee ny Smentec eee ere pee es eet ented Ce ian eon peer ace Ce ceeretenenetts ‘Soon the king began. What has astounded Ceerascstess econtiy Sen ee ee eer re ea re testimonies on Nanking during the fst two Ree acetate Cee ot Seer Magee and George Fitch, the head ofthe local Siocon ear ec as Sie acre mie ee eee ee eee ‘as many as they cout ene nnn re) ere ec Cae ete ean eee etter Teer evr eee eo eat Se ane Se ere rent new of were taken away by solders,” Ftch See ead Toi eter ens en erate ty ere aes re ee eee eeenre renee mts Semen Sa ee ee opens Petre er beeen tee ec eres CNet en cany Smee a) ee eee ey Pert rei ca tes Ea ec ene cet oe eee tried to save, "He was one ofa gang of some rere caret nies Pe ae es er ees Sern einer Pernt PoE etn nt set Seas ee ere Perce cere emer eaten eit ng Peers coer ee ee Peed tee en Selierately smothered bythe brute to stop its ee ee cee eet oer Poa entertain Pera rater errs Seats Cer eee en asd Sera ere mec sy Perec rt artes Seen eee eer Peer eat een countryside - the Japanese bumed ever village ee eed have endured are lergey estimated statistics. eer ec ame tory Preteens 41,200 men and women everyday fr six weeks, Pec eee ees eee es erie a retren reent td rae Pree eed ena C oy enn ta ees Roe ear Reet Seer The UA aso looted Nanking, but the value of ce een cea face ofthis camage, the mistaken bombing of Cet ee eae JAPAN 1937: A STATE OF WAR ee nen eens ey Pe es ue ISTE) renee ans ae) eee ny een ce eer eee ee) eter a er ess Peer nT Marchukuo. But the consequences were de. Cee ene) erty Se ere ery ete cae ana) eater iene eee! Roeser ees Pees eou teats Peer nrsietinen Cee een? eer ne amin fate was sealed on 9 August 1945 when two Pe error ed Peete rns oes ea Pen er et Be cer eteer eon Seen ontagration none of the bellgerents could Pe! Pry FIRST STRIKE st before sunrise on Sunday 7 December 194; ‘the wind, ready to launch a powerful sting force of 353 airat 'Nagumno'sfagship, Akal, and er consort, Koga, Sor, Hr, Stokke and Zukoku, set in motion the maraucing strike force that ‘would plunge the Paci into World War I Its target was the US Naw’s Pact Fleet, which was anchored at Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu in the tertory of Hawai. Other US Navy ‘sx acraft carers ofthe imperial Japanese Navy's First ‘Nic Fleetunder the command of Vice ‘Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, turned ito ‘ana Army installations onthe island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Filo, Belows Field, Ewa Marine Corps Air Station, and the naval aie stations fat Kaneohe and on Ford island in the heart of Peart Harbor ere tobe hit 25 wal ‘The opening blow was intended to cripple the American miltarypresonco inthe Pai: allow the Japanese armed forces to seize ‘and consoldate strategic gars thoughout the region: and bring the Unite States goverment tothe negotiating table where ‘apan would dictate tavourable Terms of ‘an armistice. To that end, the Pea Harbor ‘aid was co-ordinated with attacks on the Noi a aaa DEPENDS ON THIS BATTLE. EVERYONE SS CT SOOO tos TN-CHIEF OF THE COMBINED FLEET JAPAN ATTACKS, “BOLSTERED BY THE BRITISH SUCCESS, THE STAFF OF THE COMBINED FLEET BEGAN WITH RENEWED PURPOSE IN JANUARY 1941, TO PLAN FOR JUST SUCH A BOLD STROKE” Philippines, Wake Island, Midway Atl and Malay. The gambit was all or nothing for Japan, [Athough Senior lapanese commanders were Confident of swit victory, atleast some of thom acknowledges that a prolonged war with the United States was a daunting prospect ‘considering the industrial might and resources atthe disposal oftheir adversary. Years of fing miltarism and imperialism in Japan had Places the island nation on a colon course ‘ith the United States, a proeminent power in the Paci since the Spanish-American War Japan's provocative mitary moves on the Asian mainland, paricuany the occupation of ‘the Chinese region of Manchuria an later of French Indochina, had brought the two rations to loggereads, While negotiations were Continuing, most observers on ether sie of the Pecfe beloved war was inevitable THE BRITISH INFLUENCE [Apr onthe evening prior tothe Pearl Harbor stack, Nagumo ordered all hands aboard the Anag! fo attention, He solemnly read a message from Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander inchiot ofthe Combined Fleet. “The rise o fa (ofthe empire depends on this battle, Everyone ‘Yamamoto meant the communication not only as an encouragement to the Japanese Sailor and armen, but also as homage to aval esprit de corps. During the decades preceding World Wer Il, the Imperial lapanese Navy had embarked on lengthy program of ‘expansion, modemising and modeling sot fon the finest naval traction In the word — the British Royal Navy. The message from ‘Yamamoto echoed one simiay flashed by ‘Admiral Horatio Nelson, one of the greatest heroes inthe history athe Royal Navy rir to the epic battle of Trafalgar in 1805, Japanese respect for the Royal Navy ran «cep. Since the tun of the 20th century, some vessels ofthe imperial feet had actualy been Constructed in Bish and French shipyards, while Japanese training. operational standards, Uniforms and rank insignia were similar to those ofthe Brtish, Flowing the outbreak of war in Europe, the Royal Navy again served a a role mode! forthe Japanese. On the night of L1 November 1840, Fairey Sworaish torpedo bombers ofthe Flest JAPANESE RAIDER ROUTE Tesi mperial Japanese Navy arcraft cares andthe escotng shins ofthe Ft lot departed the Air rm flew from the deck ofthe aircraft cartier HMS tlustrous in the Mediterranean Sea and attached the Italian naval anchorage at Taranto ‘he 21 obsolescent British biplanes sank one Italian battleship and damaged two others. For the Japanese, the dea ofa preemptive raid on Pearl Harbor had been discussed, tested during war games and shelved several frond waters of te Kure Isanas on 26 Novem 1941, sling northern route wel aay rom sands ‘merch shipping lanes and maintaining set radio sence. Row seas end termftent hea en Soaked the warships atimes as they tuned southeast tonads poet 370 klometres rath f Oahu auch he ‘aerial ste force that devastated Peat Harbor on 7 December. Sars once JAPAN'S FIRST STRIKE Mg Set Z or we Japanese armed forces Ronee cen BAS Pa A es Rarer eat Ss Std eT ea ras ay Ree eect eee it ate! Beier hare icad ENGINE NAVIGATION DLs aaa UTS) 3a a TORPEDOES Eeaesaeene etter PN te Na ey Presi Ser ra eee ce Pe eos teetee or ered eee arson eines a 7 a HANGAR DECKS JAPAN ATTACKS, times during the years between the werd wars However, bolstered by the Bish success, the staff ofthe Combined Fleet began, in January 41941, to plan for just uch a bold stoke, LUeutenant Commanaer Minoru Genda, one of the best known and most respected aviators in the Japanese armed forces, had observed American carirs operating in a unified, single strike force and attended war games in 1936, during whien an offensive scenario against Pearl Harbor had ended in simulated disaster sible fora carrer taskforce to, ull deliver a stunning blow against an enemy Reet at anchor 1s Japanese alrrat care strength reached sufficient levels to suppor a Pea Harbor tack, Yamamoto inetructed Amira Takara Onishi, chet of staff athe Eleventh Ai Feet, to order Genda to evaluate the potential fr success with, special attention tothe feasbilty of the operation, method of execution and the forces tebe used” Yamamoto was reluctant to go to war with the US, nowever he strongly beloved that a substantial and successful fist strike atthe Pecfi Fleet was the only option to bring such a confit to a rapid and favourable conclusion for Japan Die somber crow mt ‘Yamamoto’ assertion that Pear! Harbor shouldbe Japan's target actually reversed ‘wadtional thinking atthe highest command loves within th Imperia Nayy. Although the ‘army nad been active onthe Asian continent, ‘aval doctrine had previously assumed Gefensive posture. In the autumn of 1940, ‘Yamamoto’ assertion became an utimatum, He eventually teatened to resign if senior ‘commanders within the Combined Fleet refused te suppor the proposal By the folowing August the basic plan fo the Peat! Harbr attack had been approved, The six atroratt carers ofthe st lr Fleet were to be ‘Sccompaniee by an armada of two batiships, two neavy cruisers, a light eriser, nine estroyer, three submarines and eight tankers “a total of 31 vessels ~saling from thelr rendezvous point at Hitokeppu Bay in the Kure Islands, The fleet was to sal on 26 Noversber take a northerly course, in oder to avoid the busy Paife trade routes and merchant shipping that oled the ocean; maintain strct Fado silence; ana launch ts alrratt in two waves from a position 370 hlometres north of Oahu. The tentative date fr the attack Was Gesignated as 7 December 1942. A corcon ff fleet submarines was postioned around Oahu to provide eary waring of American ship ‘movements and attack any US Navy vessels that mght be at sea near the harbour. Fe midget submarines were tobe launched from their mother submarines hours before the aera attack, with the hope that they might inttrae Peart Harbor and launch torpedoes at anchored vessels ofthe Pacife Feet. Early in September, senior Japanese officers convened atthe Naval War Callge in Tokyo ‘and finalised the plans forthe attack, One ‘month later, senior pets who would assume JAPAN'S FIRST STRIKE commanc of al groups were informed of the target against which they had been taining so rigorously. They aready had some idea of Is nature, since the torpedo groups had worked to perfect ther runs against capital ships fnchoredin shallow waters Combined Fleet Top Secret Operational Order No 1 was issued on 5 November, flloned 48 hours later by Order No 2, authorising the fleet to weigh anchor at the end ofthe month and to txecute the attack on Peart Harbor When the fleet set sai, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomuca and Special Envoy Saburo Kurusi were in Washington, DC, conducting last-ditch negotiations with Secretary of State Cordell Hull ana President Franklin D Roosevelt. These negotiations were expected to fal, and when the impasse was reached, specie orders to Taunch the attack would be issued to Nagumo A the same time, the envoys, oblivious to the details of the Pear Harbor ettac, ‘were instructed to deliver a message fo the US government, offealy terminating the negotiations, The goverment in Tokyo considered this diplomatic step essentially a declaration of war, times fora half hour before the Japanese aircraft appeared inthe sky above Peat Herb. Te bates USS Azone bees Bak smoke {ostperatartare buchen fora dean “none aun he est ror anc JAPAN ATTACKS Aor: A Japanese Mitsbl Zr he rar he ght ok of tose carer Agen ete Pet Naor i Lueutenant Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, leader ofthe ar groups ofthe Fist Ai Feet, was assigned the tas of allocating aera to Secifi targots, organising the two waves of i planes to coordinate thelr attacks and allatng fighter protection against any defending i ‘American planes that might make ft into the my ‘ky. Fuchida assigned 185 aircraft to the frst C wave. It consisted of 49 Nakajima BSN “Kate Dombers earning armourpereing bombs, 40 Kates with aerial torpedoes, 51 Aichi D3A ‘Val lve bombers with general purpose bombs ‘and 45 superb Mitsubishi ABM Zero fighters to provide escort and stra targets of opportunity Wille the Kates hit the warships anchored in Pearl Harbor, 25 Vals were designated to bast the primary American fighter base at Wheeler Field 17 Vals were assigned to destroy Fra Islan's patrol pane and fighter base and nine were to strike American bombers based at Hickam Field The second wave included 5 Kates armed with 850 and 125-90und oom to demolish installations and erate uraye at the airfields, 80 Vals with 550-pound bombs terronew the attacks on the warships in the harbour and 36 marauding Zeroes, Fuchida received an inteligence message {oma lapanese spy on Oahu the day before 30 the attack was launched, ft was tnged both with optimism thatthe element of surprise Would be achieved and disappointmert that the three American ateraf carters, Enterprise, Lexington an Saratoga were not present atthe ‘anchorage, tread, “No balloons, no torpedo defence nets deployed around battleships in Pear Harbor. All battleships ao in. No Indications trom enemy radio activity that ocean patrol fights being mage in Hawaiian area. Lexington lft harbour yesterday. Enterprise also thought to be operating at sea.” The Saratoga was steaming into the harbour ‘at San Diego Califia when the Japenese sttackers arived above Peel Haraor on 7 December. Although the aircraft caries were absent, there was no turning back, The attack had to proceed as odered and the Japanese rationalise that the remaining target, particulary the US batleships, were high value ‘enough to justiy the rsk being undertaken, As the sky was ail dark over the deck ofthe Akag! itched in rough seas, a green lamp was waved ina Gle and the fst Zero fighter roared down the ight deck inte the ait. Within “ASTHE SKY WAS STILL DARK OVER THE DECK OF THE AKAGI, AGGREEN LAMP WAS WAVED IN A CIRCLE AND THE FIRST ZERO FIGHTER ROARED DOWN THE FLIGHT DECK INTO THE AIR” 425 minutes, the entire frst wave was aibomne. [At 7.40am, the north shore of Oahu came into ‘lew, Fuchide was extant. He raciced “Tora “oral Tora” to the anxious Nagumo,signtying ‘that complete surprise had been achieved. For several hours, the attackers wrought devastation on their targets belon, Elsewhere inthe Pact, Japanese forces ‘moved aggressively in concert wth the Pearl Harber attack, reaching for objectives that would minimise US interference with coming operations to seize the Dutch East Ingles, secure vite resources such as oll anc rubber for thelr war machine and extend their Gefensive parimoter further into the expanse of tho great ocean AS the attack got underway in Hawal, word was fashed to Midway Atal at 6:30am local time on 7 December, The Marne garrison went on high alert and by dusk, the Japanese ‘hc arived. Two Imperial Navy destioyers, the Alebona and Ushio, vere sighted 9s they prepared to shel the installations on Migway. Wor eame to the atoll at 9.38pm, a8 Japanese 13-centimetre shes crashed on ‘Sand and Eastom Islands, the two spits of land that within months, would become the ‘epicentre of World War lin the Paci. As the ‘ostroyers cruised back and forth, the Marine ‘guns responded wth soven and 13.centimetwe founds. Japanese shels set te large seaplane hangar ablaze. One enemy round scored ‘acect niton the concrete structure that housed the Sand Island poworpant. smashing ‘through an air intake and mortally wounding @ young Marne officer, 1st Lieutenant George H Cannon, who refused to leave his post {or medica eatment and later received & posthumous Medal of Honor The Midway bate lasted for about haf an hour and Marine gunners claimed to have svored hits on at least ane enemy destroyer, which was seen belching smoke and fame, ‘When the Japanese finally withdrew, four [Americans were dead and 40 wounded, 36 Japanese bombers hit Wake Island on ‘the morning af 8 December across the International Date Line), destroying 3 dozen Grumman FAF Vildost fighters on the ground. Meanwhile, Japanese troops landed at Kota ‘Bharuon the coast of Malaya while the Pear Harbor attack force was in he ar. Within hours ‘ofthe strike against Pear, Japanese bombers hit Clark Fe and other instalation inthe JAPAN'S FIRST STRIKE Philippines, catching American planes on the round again ‘Shocked and bloodied, the United Statos was suddenly at war Fr time, Japanese ‘domination ofthe Pacific was virtually Uncontested, but just a Yamamoto feared, 3 protracted conflict, one that Japan could not Win, emerged. Even as Aled forces turned the {ide and fought thei way inexorabiy to Tokyo ‘Bay and vetory in 1945, the specte of Peart Haroor naunted the Americans, While conspiracy theories ave surfaced in the three-quarters of a century since the ‘Day of nfamy, those remain the tope of heated Sebate ana coniecture. Some revisionist Distoriana have reviewed al the proof they eed 1o conclude that President Roosevelt and other high ranking Allied civilian leaders ond rniltaryoffeers ~ even Bish Prime Minister Winston Churenill- were aware thatthe attacks on Peel Harnor and other cations ‘were coming, However, the "ease" wil probably ever be closed (nthe tactical evel, the Americans recelved several wamings of the Japanese ar armada approaching Peal Harbor on 7 December 1942 “an encounter with a midget submarine and a radar sighting at Opana above Kahuku Point on ‘he north shore, for instance. An opan question femains as to whether American commanders In Hawali should have taken action to improve Dreparedness ana should have been more Fesponsive tothe signs of imminent attack on that fateful Sunday morning. 34 JAPAN ATTACKS. KEY PLAYER: ISOROKU YAMAMOTO MORE THAN ANY OTHER INDIVIDUAL, YAMAMOTO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR SHAPING THE PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE 32 ON PEARL HARBOR soroky Yamamato was born a8 Takano Isoroky fon 4 Api 1884 in Nagaoka, in the Nigata Prefecture onthe west coast of Honshu. An above average student, Isoroku entered the Japanese Naval Academy in 1900 and, ater ‘raduating, went to sea during the Russo Japanese War. The following decade, his life began a stoop upward ‘trajectory when in 1913 he entered the Japanese Naval Staff Coleg. Aterwards,Isocoku was adopted by the Yamamoto family, and subsequently changed his name to Isoroku Yamamoto. The adoption was a routine accurrence in Japanese culture by familes that lacked @ male hei. Before the close ofthe decade, Yamamoto made the frat of two extended vieits tothe United States. During his fst tour rom 1919 to 1921 he stucled English at Harvard University. He then returned to nis nomevand to ‘teach briely atthe Naval Sta College before retuming to the United States for two yoars begining in 1926. The highlight was a stint as Japan's naval attaché, ‘Yamamoto's time in America had a profound inuence cn him. While rubbing ebows with US naval offers, he ‘was able to see what most interested them and how they spent thei recreational ime. He thought that they were rather fvolous as they seemed to spend an inordinate amount of time playing golf ana ridge But what did impress the young commander was the industrial might ofthe United States, He realised from his visits that a protracted war withthe United States would be citfcut, i not impossible, for Japan to wi, When he retumed to Japan, his career soared to new heights. He had the good fertune aver the next ten years toland a string of assignments, each of which wouls bring greater responsibity and prestige. Throughout ‘this climb up the naval ladder, Yernamoto would have a chance to apaly his sharp and visionary intellect. He began in 1928 by commancing the largest arratt cater in the Imperial Japanese Navy's fleet, Akag. He was promoted to rear admiral the folowing year and assigned to lead the division ofthe Naval ir Corps responsible for parading and telaing new weapons and equiomert. In the 1930s, ne was catapulted ito the stratosphere ct naval command, He le the First Cater Division in 11934. Upon reecivng @ promotion to vice admiral in 11936, he was assigned to serve as the vice ministor of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Two years later, he was. {2ven command ofthe Fst Fleet. These assignments were invaluable onthe jb traning. On 30 August 1930, he was appointed to serve as commander in-chiet ofthe ‘Combined Fleet. The position was the highest commana inthe Imperial Japanese Navy. ‘Yamamoto was a realist. He opposed the invasion of northern China in 1937, the subsequent Tripartite Pact (0f 1940 and ~a least at first -confict with the US, largely because he believed it would be unwinrable. [Atthe same time he was convinced that iit became necessary Japan must tako all ofthe steps necessary to ‘ensure it would prevall. Indeed, once Japan had invaded Indochina, Yamamoto argued for war withthe US, while ‘ealsing that Japan's only chance of vitor ay in a ‘When seat to attend the London Naval Conference in 1935, Yamamoto had extracted Japan from a series of treaties by whicn Great Britain and the US restricted how many large ships the Japanese Navy could buld in elation to thor rival naves. The estetions, frst imposed attr World War had relegated Japan toa second-rate naval power, n the late 19308, the okt school Japanese admirals of ‘the Naval General Stat insted neauiy in buleing and launching two ofthe largest and most heavily gunned battleships ever uit the Yamato and Musashi ‘These 65,000-ton behemoths dwarfed te 45,000:t0n US lowa-class batleships. In their minds, the admirals envisioned ‘2 decisive battle between the big, ships ofthe rival fleets clashing in the westem Pact, perhaps near the Marana Islands or Marshall islands, ‘Yamamoto fought a war of ‘word withthe Imperial Nowy’ top admirals in the year precoding ‘the Pear Harbor attack in which he sought to persuade them to iscard the socates big ships ‘doctrine in favour of new strategy {omen on aieraft carr tates ‘and capabiities. Yamamoto pert argued in favour ofthe cartier doctine. By using his Sharp intellect, extensive experience and formidable connections, Yamamoto ultimately wa able to get the ‘empire's Naval General Statf to approve his pan fr @ pre-emptive strike on Peart Harbor witha formidable ‘armada of naval aircraft that include dive, torpedo and harzontal bombers, al protected bya large umbrella of fignterarrat. ‘Yamamoto remained aboard his flagship in Japan's Inland Sea curing the Peart Harbor attack, From that location, ne would issue a coded attack oder, a8 well a final words of inspiration that wore ead to the fleet. As the mastermind behing the Peat Harbor attack, Yamamoto exhibited tothe wor his tactical and strategie genius. The subsequent campaigns he ‘ected id no go as wel. Inthe attack on Midway Island in 1942, ho sought to destroy US ships not ‘caught at Pear Harbor, inluding the US Navy's alert carirs, However, the Battle of Midway was ost, KEY PLAYER: ISOROKU YAMAMOTO Fleet Admiral 'soreks Yamamoto YEARS OF SERVIC! 1901-1943, POSITION: CCommanderin Chit ‘ofthe Combined Feet ‘SERVICE: Imperial Japanese Naw in large part because Yamamato's plan, which had ultple objectwes that stretched his miltay assets, was 0 complicated, After that, the Imperial Japanese Navy was onthe defensive in 1943 in the Guadalcanal and Solomon Islands campaigns. Yamamoto committed his unts piecemeal, never wining a decisive victory ven so, convinced that they had to eliminate their most sited adversary, US Navy offeals used inteligence to Aiscorn his lecaton in spring 1943. On 18 Api, tho "Mitsubishi GéM bomber in which the admiral was being shuttled on an inspection tour of island bases in the Soloman Islands was shot down by @ pack of US P38 Ughtning area. Yamamoto's body was recovered and cremated. He was given an elaborate state funeral on 5 June 1943. In recognition of his service and achievements, Yamamato posthumously received tho tile of marshal. His ashes were cvided, with haf going to a publle cemetery in Tokyo and the other hal to his hometown of Nagacka, elipree no tiie Bate of Tsine 33 ery A aD Re a area; ST THE SUN BEGAN TO SET ON THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN 1942 WITH A HUMILIATING DEFEAT WHERE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF ALLIED SOLDIERS BECAME PRISONERS OF THE IMPERIAL.JAPANESE ARMY. AMONG THEM WAS 21-YEAR-OLD BOB HUCKLESBY Ra iS or MM ALY VRC eat em TTS 0 haere are : Peete enced! [orice oat ney sete eermmpeol eae cuenta Noha Seer ee Cece cetera Pare rears Cee ee reenter ; See es eee a eee] ees sr em on cent no Seen ee eo eee pore, but for mary others brutality on the part ofthe Japanese that Eee emits Sree et ee et te ee ee en ae eet ett ee eaten ieee Perce rear ene eee err CS ET UNUM) SO TTS Tatra eT ae Stns ee Ts et Ee ee oe being even worse at fhting. This was proved cer ere eer eet ee ee ae cee y perenne te eee eee een) eres iy erento Perc ee aes ee a ee ee aed eae senator Pepe ornare en cet earch’ Se te ee ee ee ee ee ener ey Eero gi venison er iment Dring re am voueeogre beamritrbenr nt Pre ey tne ae rR forte ete ane ee ee erro Cintra eS pebirperir premiere ares mmcat oeanempieiinas erent seems troy sate an nmenET eC aoa Erie Rea tps en erm teehee. botnet noone eterna pet Pent ea ay tr mm sere ceed am ee ee ee nt Pi soiree erat cpr teen om oe EC Er van om oe eee ete ne Ta Fe deen a oeanttot oe eam oon niin inn Kran ac ei Anat ET a eee ety Fyne ieaanienen aaron mperaiepe cenit canoer oni Perera ee eae ee ee ie meee Fr ect oocimeuepechint ss mca cont rat aeieirl amma teeta Ree asta en Ear tceaarunc eee on Meee yore ESCO artes eee pennant ete Parana soeinyneesenston Prrepelimcen cto tr emma ee et A neces mT eter ert) prey ecient 1 creme ee tet ec rey Feat se seer tere necin iam oo Sets Ape Noo re et MEO Poche eeoeee neta eae ae tee Ty ee ete ne ee eT een ee ee Sorted ten ee ee nL Gaecclre tT eM anaes tee Prior apeere en eT Oe int te mE vena ae ay OTT Caer er rr ee am ert erect a rare ee een rer er mnt ering Ce te ee tes before being murdered. Such atrocities were poerneirimrereey tert paren canner mrt i TM ANC Se 1 7 eee Locarno eee ee re heen ty Fa oieeerin buctreteeateh mm cent eth eater Ant ea retin Palreniereeco trees Cee partner ore rneod Japanese were poorsoiders whose success 1 lanuay 1942 ver since the mason er JAPAN ATTACKS. 36 force landed in Malay, the British defence of Singapore had been attacked from benind and ‘the Alle army withdrew across the causeway cover the Johor Strat that separated Singapore ‘om Malaya, The island would now pay host to ‘the Ana stand between the two empires. Sling into this turbulent station was a young Brtish solder calleg Bob Huckieby. Born in 1921, Mucklesby was a sapperin the Royal Engineocs and nad sorved inthe armed forces {om the outset: I was conscripted andjined ‘the army in May 1939. When was called up ut my Uniform on ang went of witha iba. Fed’ know what was going to happen. War broke out on 3 September and we were on a routo march passing trough part of Norwich ‘Alady came rushing out of her nome and sai, "ou'te doing it for eal now As 8 sapper, Hucklesby worked on 8 ‘compressor rick ard was aso trained in ‘explosives. For the trst two years ofthe war, he sored as pat ofthe Home Forces in Britain but towards the end of 1941 he was preparing ‘ogo abroad to sere inthe Mice East when his transport ship was dherted, “Everything was stencled in to go to Base and we were In hak dit and pth helmets ete, which was ot the sort of thing fr the jungle. When Pear Harbor was bombed, we were a few days out of Cape Town. The decision was then made to ‘send the whole dision to Bombay. While he was in ina, Huchlesby had to ‘agust tothe not elmate: "The reason we wont ‘to Bornay was to accimatise because we nad eon at ea for almost three months. We had 8 fortnight of accimatisation in India and my eld ‘company was at Dacia (Deoaly). It was a hot Spot and can understand where the prvase, ‘Gone Dooall’ came tom. Then we took off and arived at Singapore on 23 January 1942." Before he arrived on the island, Hucklesby's knowledge of his Japanese opponents was. minimal “We knew very itl. In my opinion, the British should have taken note of what had ‘already happened in China. We near a lat bout that afterwards because | met up with ope inthe navy who nad been on gunboats ‘onthe Yangtze iver. They used to tell me ‘that every morning they [saw] dead bodies floating down the river, 80 we ought to have known.” Hucklesby consequently came infor 8 direct shock when he docked at Singapore (0n 29 January 1942: "When we arrived onthe ‘quaysie there were cviiane queuing to get of, So we realised that things were serious. Two days ater Hucklesbys aval, Percvals entire force of British an Commanwealth troops had witherawn across the 335 metre ‘causeway over the Svat of JoPore onto, Singapore Island the causeway was. subsequently blown up to prevent the Japanese from crossing. most 100,000 Aled soldiers ‘were now based on Singapore, compared to Yamashita’s aproaching army of 30,000. Between &9 February, 23,000 Japanese troops crossed the straits in iancng cat. Australians were among theft to see ‘combat and thelr perfomance was highly mies, Some simply dropped the riles and ran, but ners fought the Japanese to a standstit at a ‘base near Jonore Bahru. A the Kran depot, the Australians incinerated many attacker by sting Cl tanks alight andthe Japanese imperial Guard beheaded 200 wounded prisoners in vengeful retaation. At 4.20am on 9 February, an order to withcraw was accidental given by te British high command, which proved to be a cosy ‘estak asthe main ine ofthe Alieg defence hag now elapsed, “This rapa deteriorating situation was isorientatig fr Hucklesby, who was forces to adjust quic to his new circumstances, “It was a totaly diferent environment to what we'd ‘een used to, | remember being on guord in our tented camp that was in a rubber plantation, \Witn the tees in in, whichever way you looked tmade it eifiult not to see a Japanese Coming in trom behind because we knew they were on the island. Huchiesby was stationed onthe coast and he put his engineering sil to work, “used ny compressor ad cut two channels a good stance apart ina reinforced concrete jetty. | laid a charge down each channel and biew it up. Itwas far enough apart so that you could jump ‘tom one side tothe other. It was meant to be a deterrent forthe Japanese to use that conerete pier 2s 2 means of landing” ‘Mer reparations were complete, Hucklesby prepares to ght, "Not iong after that, there were no particular duties for sappers inthe Rojal Engineers so we became itary. My section was ranged along 2 monsoon drain ‘opposite a playing field, because it was thought that te Japanese had broken through the st lie ana they would have an advantage i they ‘came across this fe. twas also used by a herd of cove tooo that made fvery dificult” ‘though Hucklesby's section did not see combat, they eame under dee attack by Japanese bombers: “We wer in that situation Tor about tives days and used to soe tho Japanese ait force go over on a regula basis ibecause there was nothing to stop them. There was no Aled air force at Singapore because itwas vacated to Java, so the Japanese could rop bombs and do whatever they wanted. | recall seeing a Tamil or an indian in his white robes walking around in a ccleand then you'd ‘ee a bomb drop. These bombs would blow up people but thankful they missed us.” Despite the bombardment, Huckiesby felt secure in his postion: “We thought we were ressonably Safe inthis rather deep monsoon drain. was comforting ina way” GROWII 3AS Hucklesby’s situation was one that was being repeated thousands of times across | ‘THE FALL OF SINGAPORE JAPAN ATTACKS. the fland, Not ony was there no effective fi defence, the British were paying the price for years of complacency and poor itary planning Short before the Japanese attack, ‘he new Brtish cammander.inever ofall forces inthe Far East, General Archibald ‘ave, nspected Singapore and found that there were no defences on the noth shore ‘ave sent Churehil an urgent report and the rime minister later wrote of his surprise atthe Situation, I must admit to being staggered by Wave's telegram. The possibilty of Sngapore having no landward defences no more entered my mind than that ofa batteship being Taunched without boom.” ‘rumour later culated thatthe naal guns a Singapore could notbe tured nortwards but Hucklesby aspels that mth: "Those big {guns only nad armour piercing shal they did't have any that would spit. Tey could tan them around inland but they were no use because {the shells were not good fr that purpose. You ‘can imagine how | fee when thnk somebody should have realised that ound this out years later and fet annoyed because it seemed to me ‘that those who were thereto acvise hadn't realy Teh intaly been predicted that Singapore oul holdout for atleast three months, ‘This would nave been enough me for reinforcements to reach the island and make it too weil defended for Yamashita to overcome, However, with the continual air bombardments, nerves were beginning to shred. Singapore City in particular was suffering nigherehiian ‘catuatie than solders in the feld an atthe Trent Percival was becoming unnerved by the Japanese attack In cealty, Yamashita’s offensive was on the verge of faltering. The Japanese were cutrumbered thee to one and were chronically Ir cid ws jing ca bel ert’ Japanoes bombing ad Tene of tusana f Sao 38 short of fuel and ammunition, Senor ofiers ‘argued that a major offensive against the British would ultimately fa, but Yamashita ignored ths advice and decided to take a huge gamble, He ordered his artiery to shel the British as though his gunners had an endless ‘supply of ammunition. Percival el for the ruse. As an experienced Ww veteran, he thought thatthe renewed barrage was comparable tothe artery ofensives of the Western Front Like Yamashita, he was also short on ammunition ‘anc limited his own gunners to 20 rounds per ay. To compound the stuatin, Pereval had also depioyed his troops across the ent wicth Ofte island, resulting in hs men being spread {oo thinly to concentrate en masse against the enemy, witn disastrous rests, There was fore fighting along tho Choa Chu Kang ‘na Bukit Timah roads as well as numerous battles, including hand to-hand fighting at Pasle Paniang but in each case, Alled troops were ‘overnheimed and driven Back, Despite this, the Japanese senior commanders were stil urging Yamashita to reconsider hs options, They continuously ‘sdvsed him to withdraw his forces to Malaya in ‘ter for them to resupply, ready to begin afresh attack with mere men and more ammunition However, Yamashita erally stuck to his guns ‘ang gave the orders thatthe artilery barrage ‘ang advance against the Ales would continue. ‘The last thing ne wanted was to ge the Brsh ‘non Gone erat na lease rom cpt he Mes paces tect behind Aes Sepreme Commander, ‘oad USS asa on 2 September 068. the gre on te nt baht Machu 18 chance to recover, particularly when Churchil ‘was unleashing his bulldog spit. AN EMPIRE DISHONOURED The prime minister was aware ofthe Geterorating situation and sent a highiy ‘uncompromising cable to Wavel for ting to “THERE MUST BE NO THOUGHT OF SAVING THE TROOPS OR SPARING THE POPULATION. THE BATTLE MUST BE FOUGHT TO THE BITTER END AT ALL COSTS” ‘THE FALL OF SINGAPORE CONQUERING ‘THE GIBRALTAR OF THE EAST’ The fall of Singapore was completed by incompetent British-led withdrawals and Japanese tactics that were both cunning and brutal “THE JAPANESE CAPTURE THE MAIN BRITISH AMMUNITION DUMP AT ALEXANDRA BARRACKS BEFORE ENTERING THE NEARBY MILITARY HOSPITAL, THEY MURDER HUNDREDS OF WOUNDED PATIENTS AND STAFF” 39 JAPAN ATTACKS. 40 Continue: “There must be no thought of saving ‘the troops or sparing the population, The betle ‘must be fought tothe biter end at all ost. Commanders and senior affeers should de ‘wth ther troops. The nonour ofthe Bish Empire and ofthe British Army is at stake rly an you to show no mercy or weakness in ay form. The whole reputation of eur country an ar race is Involved. I's expected that every Unt wil be brought into close contact with the ‘enemy and fight out” Despite te bloctirsty metorie from Chuehil, Waveland Percival taunt ‘ferent, The ferocious nature ofthe Japanese offensive was overefelming ona practial level, the water supply had almost boon destroyed and there was a high tsk of an epidemic resulting fom the mary unburied ‘ead in Singapore Gy. Wavel sent a message to Percival rom Java on the morning of 15, February, urging him to corte fain but he ended his communication saying "When you are finaly satisfied that this is no longer possible, | gve you discretion to ‘ease resistance, Before doing ¢, all arms, ‘equipment and transport of value must, of ‘course, be rendered useless. Percival agreed and sent three officers tothe Japanese headquarters to atange a ceasefire Yamashita agreed but he intially suspected & Brtish deception, As the Japanese were greatly cutnumbered, he feared thatthe Allos were buying time or trying to organise a Dunk style evacuation. Neither was acceptable to Yamashita as he cou no longer afford another big offensive. In an attompt to force Porcva’s hand, Yamashita inited him to suttende talks at the Ford Motor Company's assembly plat. ‘The location was deliberate as twas the largest building onthe island and could easily ‘accommodate the large number of Japanese reporters, photographers and newsreet ‘cameraman that Yamashita had assembled to record the occasion, When Perlval arrived at 6pm for tals, Yamashita deliberately kept him waiting for faimost an hour before demanding thatthe Brtish unconditionally surender immediatly Percival attempted to delay unt the following ‘ay Dut Yamashita persisted and told his Interpreter: want to hear nothing from rim ‘xcept yes or no.” Faced with no choice Percival accepted an unconditional surrender This was the dering moment of Yamashita’s| ‘career He had been informed that Singapore ‘ould holdout fr 18 months and would require fve divisions to overwhelm the defences. Against the odds he had accomplished the Island's conquest in a campaign lasting 70, ‘days and with only three dvsions. Fr the Ales, and particularly the British, it was total humiliation, especialy when Yamashita ordered the entire garrison to be parade in font of hs army and Japanese news photographers. Away trom the negotiations Huckiesby was stil on alert when news reached him of tho surrender AVter about four days we learned ‘through a courier that the British hac called it 2 ‘ay and capitulate. We got cut ofthe tench, and when | took my boots of | dscovered they ‘were coloured white because I’ been In water {or days. Then we made our way toa large house and I met up with ethers frm the same “WHEN PERCIVAL ARRIVED AT 6PM ¢ FOR TALKS, YAMASHITA DELIBERATELY = * — KEPT HIM WAITING FOR ALMOST AN HOUR BEFORE DEMANDING THAT THE BRITISH UNCONDITIONALLY SURRENDER IMMEDIATELY” )_ ZB ‘lela company that was In, While I was there Ltnought, Tm not letting the Japanese use my compressor so | gt the tools out, took the head off one ofthe cylinders, removed the valves and threw them away so It coutan't be Used. We hung about a day and then later on ‘we were told where we hadto line up on tis ‘oad ready to march of to Changi.” A BLOODY AF |ATH “The fight for Singapore hod been a devastating ‘encounter The castes ofthe battle Rseit were around 5,000 Aled and 4,485 Japanese ead and wounded. Nevertheless, worse was stil to come. Japanese solders were ready notorious ior their brutality while on Campaign and now they nfcied their wath on Singapore's eiviian. ‘The military police rounded up tens of thousands of Chinese men as well as diverse members ofthe professional classes. They ‘were taken out of town, shot and cumped Inmass graves, with estimates of the dead ranging wily between 5,000-100,000. Yamashita later claimed that he was unaware ofthe atrocities but ashe was nominally in charge ofthe sian i i vtually possible that he was ignorant ofthe atrocities ‘Away from this horer, the Japanese, with no sense of irony, renamed Singapore allowed them to consolidate their conquest ff the Duten East Indies and ite ol. This gave ‘Japan a vial eine forts conquests, The conquest eectivelynoutalised tho Brtish as a serious threat nthe Paci fora numberof years, but the loss of prestige was arguabiy more damaging. 80,000 solders ‘Were captured ina surrender that signaled 2 Sgnicant death kel to the Brtsh move. The sheer number of psoners was a surprise both to the Japanese and evento British soldiers lke Hucklesty. Tt wasnt long ater becoming prisoner of war and being without food for three cays that we realised it was not ging to bbe as short stay as we orgally thought. The Japanese decided that they had to do sometning with the vast numbers of prisoners. They dnt expect that number anc we aso didn expect that number ta be there. We had no idea how ‘mary Alied troops there were onthe island” ‘As one ofthe many thousands who were captured, Hucklesty fel thatthe Britsh could have feughton, but roiects that was an Unfortunate situation, “I don't tink surrender was inevitable, but the Bish and the Ales \wete at a disadvantage fom day one” he reflects It seemed fo me that tas ony towards the end when the Japanese got onto the island I Yee had't been a capitulation ‘there would nave been no drinking water for the thousands of nates who lived on "Shonan’ (Light of the South) ane thelr victory the island. To me, ghing up wasnt quite as ‘THE FALL OF SINGAPORE definite because there were other reasons. Nevertheloss, tas hell ofa blow” Hucklesty belioves thatthe blame for surrender ie solely with serio lied commanders, "You've got to realise that Britain ‘wos involved in war on several fronts anc Singapore and Hong Kong were a tong way of. There was nothing that got in the way ofthe Japanese making it al the way down Malaya "They had a geod foothold and in my opirion iewas too sudden and too late forthe Ales ‘whave taken that on board cocecty and, with good advice, nda way to deal with that particular war twas a huge strategie error” In the immediate aftermath ofthe surrender, Hucklesby was angry atthe Aled high command: "At the time |was diusteg, | felt that they had’ taken the Japanese seriously tenaugh for long enough. To gve You some idea, Tolan apaly fr my medals unt around 1965, because didnt really want to wear them. Nevertheless, Hucklesby is remarkably {generous towards the man most responsible ‘or the fal of Singapore. wth whom most historians have lumped the major ofthe blame. “I never realy blamed Percwal because he was mare of an administrate than a soldier and he should have been surrounded bythe "ign advisors, He tied to compensate as much a he could because he got invowved with Far East POWs when we got home He didnt desert Us and he could have done.” ee OTS MNES SN CS Ee Ut aa Sa Tats LOSS OF PRESTIGE WAS ARGUABLY MORE DAMAGING” g & E = 2 = s SUNT tte Maem emer cee mae) Mae tree ee] Sameer ae eu eco Aa cae oon NWR kc Want has become synonymous with death en ener Cees ee eee a nee tas Snr Pere era ena Seon a ent Ty enn ti rene eek Se ae See eee ‘the Japanese military ana government through ee ee ety poet ere) Se eee eee cl ae Se eee tee oe as Peer er Meco OL et an or eta ee ee eet carer e scenes C7 Nea Set Pr en Singepore, Huckesby quickly realised that he Seen ee een ee hits etary looking or working partes and carpenters ee Sear es Cee ear ee ead Co re Pe eran Cee ee eg Pe near ee ae Wile he was en route, Huckiesby witnessed Se ee eee errr eet nt ‘si bamboo poles were the heads of Chinese er rt Se eet et Lees) Priore econ oer re Peres end eee et ee ene rene) eee et ee ee Prone cree ren inetd “COMRADESHIP BETWEEN Lag SET ta aha he Sod ats ina shop and, in his own way, aeons a ee ee er Re er ete eee tr trey eee ee ees eet ee tencg tee aa ee icra rata Eee as at random. “Wile Iwas down, there was pee er ees He pulled me out, gave me a lg and had Pere en al Rr areca ee erent eee Tee Pere erent ey oer Caer start por eee Ome ng Pera er cat a ae) back and have a goat me with his bayonet.” piper teeny ca eerie ree Ceo eer kerr as Sen eee Pe eee es errr rts er eer ested Cr eet) Poe ae nar peaeeanecmteren ttt tana ee ea roars re ees eerie rey conan renee a eens oat eee cy eee ears Se re ed pee Despite the passage of more than 70 errrerre ee rans Ceres ree er tea) Etter teers ‘that long." Dysentery was not the only disease eee eres een Cor eres Pore noeteateennatat) cere es Pee real Tortunate person.” UAVS TEC eee tet ther prisoners were taken from Singapore Se haat peeves eR a en ee ee or eee pre ee teehee Renee tte err ert Cre Ry Ree oreo) injust over a year Dee cere toret ad Rote tenre a etna oon Po etree Cee ee ea See eres) eee oe eee walked through the jungle and stopped at two Penta eatery orn rennet ee etry ee ed ee ate eats See acre oon conn he was stl expected to work, “A working party Per eec ee rater ets een ear ty ere ty Ce te peritectic ener ae emer eters would be my ob to keep te fire going and to err ts During his capi, Hucklesby began to lose eet eer ent Cet eam een ees eM tee een) Ce rons ner et 43 ery ~ ae Wek ry tee ed Cee ee ee err te) one Leen See pene aerete rca reer Net eg acre eee a ey eet ee erie) ree en eee ont tg Prev eee eer [ere terriers Serena re Coen cre solders and came from ths brutal rime and Renee te gas rg Hucklesy is clear that his captors were Se hes Meee) ete eeu eee ee ey eee eer Pr anes re eee ee roy Renan t nti ee ee a St erat eet ee erate ei ee ers Se aC eras Coren tere Tees nee eerie oreo nent Steet ee ete) eee eer ete sete eee eae ts ee eC ree er Pemaeeinnen tee iets ee eer ee as eres ere og Pe eee always enough to help prisoners survive because ‘the Japanese deliberately withheld aid. The en eee ay eae an ne terra ee ars ee Ror See teas See eee eee) Peter ee en Es ett rr econ! on rag al eee Cae ene eet ene rs ee en ane nnat ant Peete meme netey tata Ce ee er er Peete ase eer reese LIBERATION AND ise sig ae es en ara Stearn toed et nt tens changing was when I could hear an airplane the distance in daylight. The noise got closer peer ea ena ere rrr Ad ce nt Cero ee ers once eee eres pete tr atm) ety eee ere et poe ee et Ceres) Poder ees perce ere renee Lt co ee en eens ceaereer irre eaMeeerents een err nine) iemeerernes renner SE cee a Pee eed Porerernner inter nd cs Cite Ura Raney cei i Senenlen eta pen eat eee ee eae rs eater ogy ee eee enn Peo ee ened enn ee mee pe ene rt een ty eto | Pree net ct ari ; i i Cone ared eee rene Soe eae eaten pepe et reer) tell because | was one ofthe Tso leave the camp when arrangements were made to ret ee eee cn ee eect oe er errr s enters et trees ‘e088 on @ plank or wal ntl there was a barge Scare neg ee eee rere ee ari a ee es cane ean wa peer Pemeniia protesters na ec) Re ee ere ea eens ead eat cer es ear eet ener ctor ey) ee erry eer ae tg eet aoe ea onerous ret Perret ries were tld we could send a message home and Sate ferns Peer ers ee aoe een ea) orient) Preeti) neg Peete ror eer res corre yi on Caer Bnet [NFEWRA IS THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION PROVIDING PRACTICAL HELP AND ASSISTANCE ‘TO FORMER FEPOWS (FAR EAST PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES) AND ‘THEIR WIVES AND WIDOWS withrenin rts hls bam Sameer ae Cer) ree ong eter ere) neers rete ena) rere rete Seen ed erent Sena een Th Pore eens ‘While ne was recovering at Poona, Hucklesby ae ee) Cir Es tea Peer eaten pene ee eee coe ee atterwards that twas an international order from the Rea Cross that we should have those Rene eet erent are eee) Se ie pene eee eae ancy Coe oni ce mtn paar le ern ener eee ens Tea ae a Seer rater) eer ta eee ean pone nt ered or Centr end ea ee rons en eee acd Petre trem Perey eaten a eee eas eta Ete eo eet Ty eee cee Paneer eee Pe te ete eo) Ce ere reed ea rec eee ees Pa eee reer) Panera createed eet tea ant oe ae nreerent oor ears ete ret Paper een Perea atest Perr rere rt ee ar es aero te Pereeereernertti re See eee nae tay cere rete nec Paes or re a acre ert neg Ula Ted T 3 THE TIDE TURNS WITH DECISIVE ves) eRe aa as) CEES aaa ek) een CR any Ree ed CT RUS ae eae Game os) [AUS task force sought to cripple or sink the ee na tao SOR) CUD Vg Pee ea Sn eed Midway fails 064 AUSTRALIA'S THIN GREEN LINE recent a invasion. Its last line of defence: citizen See een 072 GAINING GROUND AT ce ree Ree Ey offensive in World War Il, wrested the Pacific Ee enue Cac aU Nes Se Ean ess Sey TO ee er THE PACIFIC THEATRE STATE OF PLAY: 48 1942-43 ora time, appeared that Japan would be victorious on land, se3 and air wherever it chose to fight dung Wort War lin the Paitin erly 1942, the itany of Alea defeats ‘as almost to trite to contemplate. In mig-Febnuary, after Hong Kong's surrender on Christmas Day 1941, the British bastion «Singapore fel, 80,000 Commonwealth Soldiers marched into biter captivity. in Apr, ‘American and Flpino solders surrendered to the Japanese at Bataan inthe Pilppines and began the agonising trek on foot 9 Camp O'Donnel, more than 90 kilometres sway. Many died or were murdered en route during the infamous Bataen Death March, By May, the ast Aled resistance inthe Pilppines ended on the flana of Corregidor. More than 100,000 US and Fipino troops were capture Japanese forces gained conto of te Dutch est Indes, landed on te island of New Guinea, and threstened Austra, while thee naval forces were victorious in tho Indian Ovean and the Java Sea, American carrer based firratt mounted rads against eneny bases 23t Wake and Marcus Islands and targets inthe Marshal islands, By mic-1942, a reversal of fortune occurred Japanese plans were thwarted in the Coral Sea in May, and a resounding American victory at Midway followed a month late. American forces landed at Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands In August. In. 1943, the US assumed the affensive with amphibious landings elsewnere inthe Solomons and New Gunes. Marines aseauited Tarawa inthe Gilbert Islands, andthe ‘og across the Pectic gained momentum, bee foo TiN ALLIED FORCES TURN THE TIDE WITH A NUMBER OF KEY VICTORIES AGAINST THE JAPANESE MON@QLIA | SMANCHUKUO ” oi zs f . ggarorn Sas Bo paren oo— Corleone £ fae oe 4s inato i ai eaonsto™ MARIANAS I (ap Mase OGAsAWARy ‘Geel pauquis MP REAR 4 Poa Ld ee peeeiiarebrertine fig MARSHALL IS. TP No aan) GILBERT IS@ STATE OF PLAY: 1942-43 TRIUMPH, TERROR AT TARAWA reetarrrentcrre ron acne eyed eee od EQuator MARCK ARCH. EW IRELAND. aor SRN\gnee. SANTA CRUZ IS aie) won) JARVIS | sa) * pHoent. TOKELAU I ey) FOOTHOLD Ar OVE 4 3 coeentraey SAMOA Is. See HeoRIDES BES Mand 8 a AME! or NEW CALEDONIA ae) : “NORFOLK 1 Ao Be NGA 1S, ees oe " : peered TROPIC « Perret ee) 49 ‘THE PACIFIC THEATRE 50 DUEL OF THE CARRIER GROUPS A US TASK FORCE SOUGHT TO CRIPPLE OR SINK THE JAPANESE CARRIERS SUPPORTING THE PORT MORESBY INVASION ins UME MESH he decks ofthe two American carers inthe mide ofthe Coral ‘Sea buzzed wth activity on the ‘morning of7 May 1942. The pilot ofa scout plane radioed to the ‘eet that he haa seen what he beleved to be ‘wo Japanese carers and two cruisers 362 Ielometres northwest of Rear Acca Frank Fletcher's Task Force 17. Jumping atthe chance ‘to surpcise the Japanese, Fletener made 8 attack with the majority ofthe aera from both tatops, Dive bombers, torpedo bombers and fighters roared off the decks and set off 9 Fletchers Task Force 47 a carer trike ‘10up that included the Nations Yorktown and Lexington with total of 133 irra was acting on orders from the US Pacife Command tw cripple o: destroy the enemy carriers involved in the Port Moresby amphibious invasion Te Japanese invasion force, which consisted of several ciferent groups, set sal for Port Moresby on 4 May. Hundreds of ilometres to the east, one of those groups led by Japanese Vice Admiral Takeo Taka, was steaming southeast into the Coral Sea after sain through the Solomon islands to get Behind a US carrer sto group bolved tobe inthe area, Takap's strke force comprised tne carers Shokak and Zuwak witha total of 227 it two heavy cruisers and six destroyers iil the siow-maving transports of the Invasion force hugged the coast ot New Guinea, 8 covering group with the light earir Shoo followed them on the seaward side to protect thom from aerial attack by Aled aircraft, ‘though both earier fleets were within striking cstance of each other on 6 May, ‘they fll to locate eachother Infact, they Uurwittingy passed within 112 kilometres of tach other that night. Bath the Japanese and the American carer forces were plagued ‘throughout th battle by the nabity oftheir scout plots to accurately identity any enemy shins they spotted whe on patrol. Eroreous reports bs scout alats on both sides resuted Inthe lunch of fullscale strikes against what ‘were reported tobe eneny carers but were actualy other large surface ships, In esponse toa report made by a scout pilot fom the Shokals at 722am on 7 May of an enemy fattop and cruiser 302 kilometres meus comets DUEL OF THE CARRIER GROUPS YORKTOWN sie Heh eaoen ie Ce ceee Bera Eee ny PIM coats 51 THE PACIFIC THEATRE 52 un as south of his ste group, Takagl scrambled 78 Birra. The scout pet had actually spotted the oll USS Neosho and ts escort the destroyer USS Sims. Fletcher had instructed ‘the vessels, which had recent refueled the ‘carers, to walt in what e beloved was a safe part ofthe Coral Sea 482 kilometres southeast ‘of Task Foree 47, 36 Aichi D3A dive bombers Seared tee Nit an the Sims sinking, and ‘mortally wounded the oller with seven hits thet left it ablaze. tt sank four days later. ‘When the plot of an American SBD scout plane wine had spotted the two carters and {wo cruisers at 8:15am on 7 May turned to USS Yorktown, ne revised his report. He had ‘only seen two crusers and two destioyers Itwas too late for Fletcher to recall his 93 ‘aka, 80 they remained alot. Another scout plane reported wo hours later spotting new fata, turned out tobe a covering group that included the Shoho. Fletcher's carer aera. attacked the Shoho. The Americans scored 13 bomb hits and seven torpedo hits, which at 111,35am sank Shoo, Both fleets put scout planes aloft again at ‘dawn on 8 May. Taka) was confident fom tne provious day's events that he knew whore the US cartier stnke group was located, so he put ‘loft nearly al of his airerat without waiting for 2 sighting from his scout panes. The Japanese Strike group consisted of 33 ave bombers, 18 tomedo sera and 28 fighters “THE REMAINING TORPEDO BOMBER PILOTS MANAGED TO SEND NEARLY A DOZEN STEEL FISH THROUGH THE SHIMMERING WATERS TOWARDS THE LEXINGTON” Takagls confidence was high because the Japanese were clever steaming on ‘a southeastery course concealed by a 460-bilometreong weather front with low hanging clouds and rain squalls that made the carers cifout forthe American scout planes to spot After the planes launched, the ‘Shokaku launched Rites to cicle above i as {2 defensive measure, while the 2ukaly steered Into a squall to hie. ‘Mier neat theee hours inthe ar the ‘american scout planes found the Japanese ‘strike group 281 kilometres tothe east. Fltcher immediately ordered his attack aircraft Into the lr. The Lesingion and Yorktown launched 43 and 39 alert respectively at 8.20am. After two hours aft, the Yorktown air group bogan its attack onthe Shokaku. The ‘Americans had to ant ther way through the Japanese fights wating for them over the ‘vessel. Widats tangled with Zeres as Douglas TeD Devastators began low runs aganst the carir. The SBD Dauntless dive bombers rolled ‘over and dove onthe carrer. However, the Yorktown's aircraft made a poor showing. The torpedoes wore wide of mark and the dive Bombers scored ony two Nts. The bomis set of fires on the Shokaku's fant deck that the crew evertualy extinguishe. When the Lexington a group aves, the expert Japanese fighter pits spashed tee \Wildesis. The air group's only achievement was 8 single Hit bya dve bomber. The attack Killed 4100 ofthe Shokak's erew and hidden inthe ‘squall, the Zukalu remained untovened, “ust before 10am, radar operators on the Lexington detected enemy aicraft headed toward the two carers. The Lexington was saling in front with the smaller Yorktown 29 lometes behind I. The task force ted but was unable to get its remaining fightars aloft In time to Bunt the aerial attack, The Japanese akreraft came zooming out of the morning sun. Even though the Americans wore able to splesh four ofthe slow-moving Nakajima BSN torpedo bomber. the remaining torpedo bomber plots managed to send nearly 8 dozen see! fish through the shimmering waters towards the Lexington, Two torpedoes ‘Struck the port side ofthe Lexington an Aichi aa senor «ive bombers swooped down on Lady Lex in ‘uick succession ‘The Yorktown fared better, Since she was signtcantyigner than the Lexington, Captain Eliott Buckmaster was abe to dodge the torpedoes. However, a dive bomber scored a hitwitn an 800-pound bom near the flatts Conning stand that bore dawn thyough twee seeks before exploding 24 metres below the ‘ight deck. The explosion killed 66 salors instantly and put damage contol parts to work frantically tying to extinguish res that ‘aged on the lower decks. ‘No further attacks were launched because ‘sa many aircraft rom the opposing strike {gr0UnS wor lost, damaged or missing. The Americans lost one lige arrat cari, an oll, a destroyer, 68 aerate and 547 men. ‘Te Japanese lost a small carir, 77 airraft ‘and 1.047 men. The Lexington could not be ‘ved because internal explosions renderes it Lunsalvageabie. iter te ship was abandoned, 22.US destroyer sunk her with four torpedoes. ‘The Yorktown limped back to Pearl Harbor where repair teams patched her up in time to participate inthe Battle of Miwa In eary June. The battle was significant because it ‘marked the frst time that naval clash was {ought solely with cartier arorat, Adtionay, ‘the ships of the opposing fleets never sighted leach ther nor da they re on each other. ‘Although the Japanese imperial Navy lost {ewer ships than the Americans, they suffered ‘greater losses in arcrat and aircrews. The Shokaku was so badly damaged that i took ‘mary months to repair it. Despite the fact that the Zukahu was undamaged, had ost ‘experienced alrcrens. For these reasons, nelther carer participated in the Batto of Midway. While the battle was a tactical deat itwas sila strategse victory fr the Unites States because it compelled the Japanese to permanently scrap telr amphibious invasion (oF Port Moree. DUEL OF THE CARRIER GROUPS Centon aearaons se ‘itor dovctanig ete by dapnese carr eaced ‘Sheraton hay 1082, Inte nay aang tthe fervra ig deck fe care Stok My 1982 53 MIDWAY DESPITE AN OVERWHELMING ADVANTAGE IN NUMBERS, THE JAPANESE OFFENSIVE AGAINST MIDWAY FAILED IN THE FACE OF SUPERIOR AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ‘tos LA EWES CENTRAL PACIFIC OCEAN 4 JUNE 1942 bers trom the US airerafe earner Enterprise spotted tne Japanese feet north of Midway Aol at 10.05em fn 4 September 1942, They ‘lased on it and queued up ina single ine ‘a 19,000 feet for their attack, The air group ‘commander berked instuctions for the 33, ‘ve bombers to attack the heavy carriers aga and Akagi, but in the confusion of battle ‘mast ofthe aircraft went after the 38,200 ton Kaga. 15 minutes later, the metal bids ‘swooped down on their rey “The ight deck ofthe mighty Keg was packed with areraft. Air ews were refueling Zero fenters and making last-minute ‘justments to fully ames bombers that were minutes away from launching against the US carrier strike foree, “Dive bombers!” ‘shouted a lookout on the Kaga as the Dauntless alcraft began releasing thelr 500-pound bombs at 2.500 feet. “I saw this glint in the sun ~ it looked like a beautiful iver waterfall these were the dive bombers coming down,” sad Lt Car Joho Simm’ Thach, a fighter plot from ihe Yorktown who witnessed the attack The frst Domb stuck the Kaga starboard ‘att among the aircraft waiting to launch ‘The second and tid exploded near the forward elevator, one of them penetrating to the hangar deck, where it st off secondary exposions among armed tomers wating ‘to_be sent tothe fight deok. The fourth bomb struck amidships on the port side. The Survivors abandoned ship. At dusk, a pair of intemal explosions rocked the great vessel, fang she rolled over and sank. Before the day was over, the Imperial Japanese Navy's other three large earriers participating m the Bate of Midway suffered the same fate. The ttanie batle for supremacy Inthe Pacific would only cost the US Navy one of ts valuable carirs, Ina single day, the Americans wrested the initiative inthe Pace ‘theatre from the Japanese. TWO OFFENSIVES Following the inital clash between Jopanese and United States aireraft carers in te Coral Sea in May 1942, the Jpanose sought to retum tothe offensive against the US. The Americans hed landed a heavy psychological blow aginst the Japanese by the daring long-range bomber sre against Tokyo known as the Dooittle Raid in Api 1942. The following month, Japanese and American sireratt carers clashed forthe fst ime nthe Coral Sea, These two events spurred Admiral Isoreku Yamamoto to devise a comprehensive Est ey “THE TITANIC BATTLE FOR SUPREMACY IN THE PACIFIC WOULD ONLY COSTTHE US NAVY ONE OF ITS VALUABLE CARRIERS” ‘THE PACIFIC THEATRE 56 ss sung tanks ne by Japanese tom, plan whereby the Japanese would retake the ‘omentum from the Americans, Yamamoto wanted to extend the Japanese ‘empire's eastem perimeter into the Cental Pacific to furish a greater buffer for Japan's home istands. To do this, he drew up a plan for his Combined Feet to capture Midway Atl, an autier ofthe HawalianIsiands located 1,300, miles northwest of Peat Harbor. The objective of Yamamato's offensive was to capture Midway inorder to use its airstip to project Japanese airpower deop into the Central Pacific Ocean. Yamamoto's grand plan Called fora two-pronged offensive that would ‘employ a vast array of surface warships, submarines, transports and support vessals, ‘Operation Aleutian islands (Operation Al was a feint designed to draw one ofthe US Carters tothe northern Paci. To execute the aperation, Rear Admiral Kaku) Kakuta’s Second Carrier Ste Force had 40 attack arrafton the ight carriers the Fyujo and nye. Kakuta was to send his caiier aerate on 3 dune to bomb Duteh Harbour, the principal port in the Aleutians, wile Japanese amphibious forees landea ‘crt Nagume was one {ihe mporalosenese| see eee fon Attu ana Kiska Islands atthe tip ofthe Aleutian Chain ‘The main attack, known as Operation Migway island (Operation M, would go ferward the following day, Yamamoto planned ta devate the bulk of the Combined Fleet's forces tothe operation. Vice Admiral Chuicht [Nagumo, the hero of the attack on Pearl Harbor, would once again have the same four heavy carers Akagi, Kage, Sou and Hiryy ‘that he had used n the Surprise atack sik ‘months earlier ‘On June, Nagumo was to take up a position 300 miles northeast of Midway and launch alrrat rom his Fist Carer Stiking Force to pulverise Midway's defences in preparation forthe amphibious lancing Nagumo's carrer force would have 261 tireratt as ts offensive arm, ‘Other large forces would follow behind Nagumo’s carrier group, Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka's invasion force of 5,000 troops in @ dozen transports would rendezvous aff west lof Midway with Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo's Second Feet, which would escort thom to their objective. Bringing up the rear would be the Fist Fleet's Main Foree under Yamamoto, which would depioy 300 miles west of Nagumo, Yamamoto would direct the various ‘components ofthe operation from his flagship, the gigantic battleship Yamato. THE UNSINKABLE CARRIER Following the action in Coral Sea, US Pacife Feet commander Admiral Chester Nimitz recalled Task Force 16, wich was but round the eaniers Hornet ‘and Enterprise, to retum to Peart Harbor. veteran commancer Vieo Admiral Wiliam Halsey, was serous il and Nimitz replaced him with neophyte Rear Admiral Raymone Spruance ‘vera command ofthe two task forces went to Rear Admit Frank Fletcher, ‘commander of Task Force 17 MIDWAY THE PACIFIC THEATRE 58 who had performed ably inthe Coral Sea. ‘The nucleus of Task Force 17 was the carrer Yorktown, which had sustained major damage inthe same skirmish, and was in need of Urgent repairs if she were to partipate In Midway. Sho arrived in Peart Harbor on 22 May to get patched up so that she could take part in the battle that was brewing. Meanwhile, Task Force 16 arrived in Peal Harbor on 26 May fr refueling and resuppy ‘together, the two US task forces had a total of 233 carer aircraft, which included 1112 dve bombers, 42 torpedo bombers and 79 fighters n aalton, the Americans possessed an assortment of 125 Navy and Marin airrat, many of which were obsolete on Midway Ato, 'US Navy Captain Cyt! Simmara, the senior ‘commander at Midway, had 3,650 troops af the Sith Marine Defense Battalion and ‘multiple ant-averatt batteres with whieh {a defend the Midway against the expected ‘amphibious attack The air group that Simmard commanded at Migway would funetion as an “unsinkable aircraft carr” that would help balance the Japanese advantage in carirs. Bath Yamamoto and Nimitz knew that whoever won the battle inthe sky would control the island when the battle was over Yamamoto did not expect the US Pacitic Fleet to bein position to cantest the Invasion force. The Japanese mistakenly believed that both the Lexington and Yorktown had been destroyed in the Coral Sea. The Americans had indeed lst the Lexington at Coral Sea, but nat the Yorktown. As fr the ather US carers, the Enterprise, Hornet and Saratoga, the Japanese had no idea ‘where they were inthe Paci. The Saratoga ‘was unavaiabe fr Midway because fas Undergoing extensive repairs in Puget Sound following Japanese submarine attack in January 1942, INTELLIGENCE FAILURE ‘Although the Imperial Japanese Navy hac ‘destroyed the American battleships In its Pear arbor attack on 7 December 1944, tnad falied to catch any ofthe American caries in the harbour. Yamamoto believed thatthe American aieraft carriers would sorts fram Peart Harbor once the invasion was in full sing, Atthot point, Nagume and ‘Yamamoto would team up against the weaker US Pace Fleet and destroy itn a decisive bale that would compe! the United States to sve for peace. To monitor the movements ofthe US Pacife Feet, Yamamoto ordered Vice Admiral Terunisa Komatsu to dopioy his fleet often suomarines In an are between Hawall ang Midway no later than 2 June to watch fr the US aireratt carters. The only way the Japanese ‘would know how many they'd be up againet at Midway was from Komatsu's submarines and from scout planes launched by Nagumo's feet nee it hag arcved north of Midway ‘Through back breaking fort, the US ‘combat inteligence unt at Pearl Harbor leaned that the Aleutians strike was nothing tore than a diversion, and thatthe real 0510.5 June Hon sated Men Seuss ) Akagi scuted BATTLE OF MIDWAY 2400 +700 me 790: Sank 1920: 0500, 5 june: 1925: 3 Kaga inks Fy Assauur on un canmens pane nous sped Aneesh {Se bombers at 0.20an oe carer Bp. The Aras cup be Akg Kgs ad So ries peak erably owe her tse ti Tei cos wore cso ‘whe pt deck cos eli AN Zoo ‘anes an pepaig aed Donte tach gat ie hose cre. ‘CARRIERS AFLAME Tre ameeandie amber th fat ‘ewe the Kags Sather ames ethan twotont he de omer aah ts yor mines. The ents toned ot scans epson ‘atancomestie eck fale hie a eos THE UN ATTACKS 8 30am, lepaese de bombers ‘ertamtd do on fasted ptr Sing on als one wee onto doped high expose brenance ont infact on an isan the wast US rf bates sot own i apes aia. X MipwaY MIDWAY ATOLL ISLAND Usha ay a cnt ot ast I ee an tp see od Sn tog srs asap bre car thon re ayo pt sere, a a ‘afterwards reinforced it with aircraft, troops and tea noe ton Pent ar TFT Yorktown EB TF16Hornet & Enterprise PS vorutown Bed artAckeD Somber ez ys stom th Hy tached ‘he rktwn at nT bombs uc he deck of cari. One um tc eared pt oc, ‘thar sack te af ig eck Std prea he fe et Sothern ete onthe a eke ouian Suppor foe vast Nain Fore vaanor0 Second let KONDO Tange —_ suexice ——) see US Suman: French gt Shoals ‘TORPEDO STRIKE down a) EE ett Aceind te ene ahs frome Miu composed a en a Japanese pede bombers. seat sh Zes, approached = =) Terceace tte arktone spain Spm, Othe fe bombers ‘Nat manage aun ait u tapes two nth akeady p lan erie Te terpedoes tamed ite port ie fe ames? Yortom, damage el aks me si sioner eee ; TTD Hy waRvU Is CRIPPLED Acie tke wae caposed ‘om bombast +f iy wt furbombs 2 Sp ‘ve Dombs ste ere eck Thebambspenttegis thenangar cower set sf soomear epson tat ‘puede al tes eon ne tr ond cused ein dsm skagen eseeueeeareie Japanese Air Strikes AGM, BSN2, D3A1 4 oon. ig tar nanatiot Midway Land Based Air Army 8-26, Navy TBE Marine Corps SBD, SB2U-3 Japaeese save 168 snuck w onthe —) Midway Based Army B-17s US Navy Canis ir Strikes $80 TBD, FAF ‘orton nd needa spread of terpedors. To tthe Yritonncasinhrta onthe {along main. Dest ne os efots of Fi aie sted and suk on Tie Sate Farce ‘AGUMO scarier 0400, 34une eal BY begin serch o Hy Hermes S Reef Layan SS (0900hrs, 3June istic Hind Ga Transported Isond Pinas by Pav === i i i 59 ‘THE PACIFIC THEATRE 60 dbjective was Midway. The ineligence data spurred Nimitz to put his two task forces into postion northeast of Miway to ambush Nagumo’s carrier strike force, Bath US task forces included cruisers and destroyers with which te sreen their carriers fram attack by Japanese carr aircraft and submarines. During the last week of May, both sides sailed forthe waters around Midway. Nagumo's carrier group departed from Japan on 27 May, and other elements folowed over ‘the next several days both from Japan and ‘the Marianas Islands, Meanwhile, Task Force 116 salled from Pear! Harbor on 28 May, and itwas followed two days later by Task Force 117. Bath task forces were in position 360, Iles north of Midway before the Japanese Submarines were in place between Oahu and Midway. The result was an intelligence failure forthe Imperial Japanese Navy that would leave Nagumo's carter group wuinerabie to first strike bythe American carers. While Nagumo’s carrer group moved into position narth of Midway, Admiral Kakuta sent Ske aeratt from his to light caners on 3 June to bomb Duten Harbour. Nimitz sent 3a task force to counter the Japanese thrust in that sector, but he ad not sené ary of his. prized carers. The feint fled to draw off 3 US carter, ‘The Japanese carers began launching 4108 airratt to bomb Midway at 4.30am on 4 June. Lieutenant Jichi Tomonaga led a strike {group that comprised 36 each of Mitsubichi [AGM Zeroes, aici DBA ave bombers and Nokajima BSN bombers. The Americans Used easy-to-pronounce names to report Sightings of Japanese aircraft. Thus, Val’ and Kate’ were the names appropriated forthe ‘Nichi 034% dive bomber and the Nakajima ASN bomber, The Kate bombers coud be configured either for torpedo missions o: for fevel bombing from high altitude. The Vals Carried one 550-pound bomb, and the Kates fone 1,760-pound high-explosive bomb. For the frst strike wave against Midway, the carers His and Sarvs launched ther Kates, and the ‘Akagl end Kaga unleashed their Vas. Midway radar picked up the incoming hostile aierat when they were 93 miles out lr aid Sirens wailed asthe plots ofthe Navy and Marine aircraft scrambled to get aloft in order te avoid near certain destruction if the airratt had remained on the ground. 25 minutes later the airfela was empty. The motley group of US fighters and bombers few north arectly toward the incoming Japanese aircraft ‘Sporadic dogfights between the incoming Japanese and outgoing American aerate irom Midway broke out 30 miles from the atoll. Japanese Zoros poole off fom the ste wave to engage the American aircraft while the Japanese bombers continued on to Midway. Likewise, the US dive, torpedo and level Bombers from Midway continued fying north in search of the Japanese carers ‘Mier his strike group had bombed Midway at 6.20am, Tomonaga radioed Nagumo that another strike was needed to fensure marimum damage tothe arstip and other infrastructure NAGUMO’S DILEMMA Earlier that moming, at 5.52am, PBY Catalina pilot Ueutenant Homara Ady eported sighting {wo Japanese carriers and reported thei bearing, course and speed. Upon hearing the report. Fletcher ordered Spruance to close withthe Japanese carer group and launch his bombers, "Nagumo ha only a fraction of the number cof searen planes looking for the Americans 8s they had looking for Fim. At daw, fve Japanese warships launched a total of seven Search aicraft n contrast, the Americans had 33 PBY Catalinas based at Midway, and they hal ben searching since 30 May for the approaching Japanese warships. This gave the Americans a big advantage in aerial feconnaissance, and enabled them to spot the Japanese cacrers early. Eary sightings hhad enabled the Americans to send Boeing ‘-A7 Fying Foresses against the Japanese warships, but they missed their targets, ‘While the frst wave of lapanese aircraft was assaulting Midway Atol, Nagumo's ai crows were arming a second wave of aircraft to strike the American carrers once they were located In anticipation of second strike wave against the American carriers, Nagumo Nad his ait crews arming Vals with armour piereine bombs and ‘Kates wth torpedoes, both highly effective against ships. ‘Upon receiving Temonaga’s message calling fora second strke against Midway, Nagumo issued orders at 715am for the ar crews to farm the Vals and Kates fora second strike ‘agelnst the atl, rather than the unsighted Caries. Nagumo believed it was imperative to Completaly destroy the airstrip so that enemy araft could not iaunch repeated sorties ‘agoinst his carers The Japanese aircrews had to rush to arm the Vals on the hangar decks ofthe Hryu and Soryu with high-explsives rather than armour Pieteing bombs, and to take the torpedoes at ‘the Kates on the Akag! and Kaga and replace ‘them with high-explosive bombs. The crows needed to work at breakneck speed, because 'S0an the earriess would have to recover the aireraft returning from Mloway. 'Nagume received a report at 7:30am that ramatically altered the situation The pot of 8 Japanese loatlane from the cruiser Tone ‘accompanying the Fst Carir Fleet reported Spotting warships of an enemy task foree 240, miles northeast of Micway. 50 minutos later, he confirmed the presence of an enemy carier Inthe task fore. The report fem the Tone rattled Nagumo and his staf, as they had not expected ‘the carirs of the US Paci Fleet to be so close to Midway that eal In the battle. Ater Teaming of the presence ofan American Inn Pot task force, Nagumo issued trders at 7.45am forthe ait ews to leave the torpedoes on any Kates they hag not yet reconfigured with high explosive bombs. At Tam, the fist stke wave of 121 aleratt ‘00k af from the Homet and Enterprise. Air Group Commander Stanhope Ring ed the Hornet's 60 aircraft, and Lieutenant Commander Wade MeClusky ed the Enterprise's 61 aircraft, AS the US bombers and fighters raced toward the Japanese Carriers, the US tand-based dive and torpedo bombers from Midway were approaching Nagumo's earners from the south Nagumo's fleet had assumed a box formation, wih the sreening warships protecting the cariers inside the perimeter Inside the box, the carers igzagged or salled In wide cries to avoid being struck by enemy torpedoes. The stikeaireratt from Midway 61 THE PACIFIC THEATRE —— Ce enn Fai seeccreceteriana eer Frye ee Be emg SR eee ty REGISTERING A SINGLE TORPEDO HIT” was notin vain 0rd ant airerft batt ut toe ‘all but he lea his alive bombers in an attack on the Soryu. All tives caries suffered neavy ‘damage from the US Navy dive bombers, Nagumo was forced to ranster his Nag fom ‘the burning Akagi to the eruser Nagar. ‘The Japanese were thirsting for revenge, andi fll tothe aeraft crows of th Hiry to inflict damage on the Americans, The Hit began launching is areraft at approximately {'19m, Fletcher ordered an additional 15, Grumman FF Wildcats to launch to join the £2 fighters already conducting combat air patrol. Because the Yorkiown's radar picked Up the attackers as they were inbound, the fight deck crew was able to send parked areraftto tho hangar deck. Athough the Yorktown's antiaitcrat guns and fgters owned 13 Vals, the Japanese dive bomber attack was a success. Three bombs exploded ‘on the fight deck of the Yorktown, The heavy ‘damage compelies Fletoner to transfer is flag tothe cruiser Astoria, Damage control crews succeeded in putting out the fies after luhich the fight deck crew was able to recover Leslie's eve bombers 3s they returned from thelr mission. In adaton, they refueled the Wildcats in anticipation ofa second strike oss “AS THE SUN SET OVI MIDWAY ER THE FLAMING FLATTOPS THAT WERE ONCE THE PRIDE OF JAPAN, THE HORROR OF WHAT OCCURRED SPREAD THROUGH THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY” \When Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguch! onthe Hiey learned from search arcrat after 1pm that three American carriers had attacked the carrie group, he ordered another strike, Te Hiryu began launching torpedo bombers fora second strike against the American carers at 4.30pm. Since the damage contrl crews on the Yorkiown had put out the fires started by the frst strike, the Japanese Kates attacking the Yorktown mistakenly believed they were. attacking second carer. FLAMING FLATTOPS ‘An American searon plane finally located the Hiry st mi¢-aftemnoon, and less than an nour attervards, 20 dive bombers took of fram the Hornet and Enterprise against Nagumo's last functioning cae. They destroyed it with four bombs, As the sun set over the flaming fattops that were once the pide of Japan, the horror of what occured spread through the Imperial Japanese Navy. Huge explosions ripped ivough the Kaga and Soy, sinking within minutes of each other. Both sides lost large humbers of arraft. The Amercans lost 179, while the Japanese lost all 261 of their carrion aireraft, as well as 74 fighters. Though the Japanese had ather carers, the four lost at Midway were the pride ofthe navy, and their absence was felt. Four Japanese destroyers fod torpedoes atthe Akagi at dawn on 5 June to sink ner, land the Hin went down a fow hours later Yamamoto canceled Operation MI that same afternoon, Nite had outfought Yamamoto; in 50 doing, he torpedoed Yamamoto's dream of destroying the US Pacific Rest and of forcing the Amerans to sue for peace 2 8 Daan AUSTRALIA'S THIN GREEN LINE IN 1942 AUSTRALIA STOOD ON THE BRINK OF INVASION BY THE CITIZEN SOLDIERS NE IN THE HELLISH JAPANESE. ITS LAST WILLING TO LAY TH LINE OF DEFENCE: EIR LIVES ON THE LI CONDITIONS OF THE KOKODA TRAIL 1 Australian history, Kokoda ranks only behind Galipot in terms of eultural, importanee and its impact onthe Anzac (Australian and New Zealand ‘my Corps) myth The name i invoked Anzac Cove as kind of shorthand fora uniquely Australian version ofthe fabled "Bitz Split 2 signifier of Aussie mateship against rg Kokoa Tallvereus Kokoda Track he former nas gained the upper hand in modern wang, te ator was more common such attempt. Thy eonel “INTHE POPULAR IMAGINATION, THE CAMPAIGN STOPPED A JAPANESE INVASION OF MAINLAND AUSTRALIA, BUT HISTORIANS HAVE SINCE DISCOVERED THAT THE JAPANESE HAD DECIDED AGAINST ANY SUCH ATTEMPT” never realistically occupy a landmass of sueh Immmene siz, n 1942, however, the of imvasion was very real forthe avera ‘Australian. Japanese submarine atta ‘Sydney Harbour and alr aids against Important that we won because if we ait win who knows what would have happened. A MOUNTAINOUS TASK The bates hat omed te Koda Carpsin ran from miaJuy to mid-Novembe through the hot, wet ungle tothe vilages of User and lribaiwa, where the path Begins to URN eS rise dramatically. This frst section ofthe Tal fends in what soon became known to many ers as the "Golden Stars’ ~ 4,000, the mountainside From the ‘Golden Stairs the grusling ascent continues tothe vllage of fog, some 1,500, metres above sea eve, and on to Mya, which would become an Australian foward base, a 2,000 metres in altitude, Wit temperature falls andthe The Tal then peaks at what a3 Templeto’s Crossing, some 2,500 meties Above sea level, before begining o nally descend across Eora Creek and tough the pe Papuan infantry Battalion of the AMF had been eventualy dispatched across the Owen Stanley to counter the possibiity vin ota Tat a meng tran Dan ct aa Japanese landing on the northeast coast Thumber of harassing action eo cA eer Cr “THERE WERE CLUMPS OF JAPS HERE AND THERE AND HEJUST MOWED THEM DOWN. HEJUST WENT STRAIGHT INTO "EM AS IF BULLETS DIDN'T EAN ATHING...” De the Tal twas here thatthe A forced to again wtndraw naving ‘rinepaly ro what happened, “He came forward with ‘Bren (ight machine gun) and he just 2829 JULY The Aston N cence cement ot The wage ot ohoda fought a tines tract! se. PY iags aso he AF reinforcements Japanese defences at ore Crook {and nlgnbouring yo Ridge where whe Australian ‘evanoe for tree ‘oye before sping atage. Ara cosy Date te Japanese conduct a etn retest rom the ‘won Stanoy| ange. TRAIL OF DEATH Kokoda proved as much a resilient enemy as the Japanese. Each day the Australians had to fight another war: against the terrain itself Papua offered some ofthe hardest tecitory lover which to fight a war. The region's tropical climate had an average annua ental of over 250 centimetres. These monsoonal downpours ‘meant that a creek could become a ring tiv within an hou. In Ue mountains, which = 89 By 2itun J center te vilage of Ding fred. Nonetnalass Wisbotha morale Boosting cory and a stataye ono wth a forward aires now in Biictsr Jy ura against stocks. Despite A reinoresment, ‘the Australians ae forced wiharew, and executes by ‘tho Japanese, ‘te campalgn an the ‘loses tho Japanese lot 1942. JANUARY 1943 ‘though ie Kokoaa ‘Tallnad boon recapture, three months of combat operations ensuo unt tho last apaneso frees ae desuojed or eptured tt tinal nding ronthess coast NOVEMBER raion ores form the ‘spine’ ofthe country and the site for the famous battles at Templeton’ Crossing, twas both cold and wet. At ower attudes twas simply hot and wet. The train ofthe Trail eel varod from treacherous ridge lines to valleys filed with Kunal grass and virally Impenetrable primary rainforest. had a ‘Significant affect onthe fighting, Visibility wes very restricted meaning that most contacts withthe enemy were at comparatively short range. Sub-machine guns and grenades were Pantculary favoured for ths reason. Any fadvance was slowed to a snals pace asthe “Tall rapily tuned to sometimes knee-deep ‘mud. The sealers themselves were constanty wet and could never properly wash and dy thelr Clothing or boots, contiiting to dysentery and other linesses. Thay were also constantly Plagued by malaria carrying mosquitos. In shor. Temas, as once famously deserved by a Digger, ‘a bastard ofa place Sewing ose 2 ie OCU Renta n en the battle of og, E, tresnanese been ounce “VISIBILITY WAS VERY RESTRICTED MEANING THAT MOST CONTACTS WITH THE ENEMY WERE AT COMPARATIVELY SHORT RANGE. SUB-MACHINE GUNS AND GRENADES WERE PARTICULARLY FAVOURED FOR THIS REASON” Dan ct FATE PLAYS ITS ROLE “AWEEK-LONG BATTLE ENSUED AT TEMPLETON'S CROSSING AND INTO EORA ITSELF. MORE THAN 50 DIGGERS WERE KILLED IN ACTION AND OVER 130 WERE WOUNDED DURING THIS TENACIOUS CLASH” See eae CU OMe oot mele tr) MA LR ee 19) Cea 10) he rats Japanese advance — the famous ‘Chocos’ rom} OCU Ren tyne “DESPITE NOT CONTACTING A SINGLE ENEMY, THE AMERICAN UNIT TOOK AN ASTOUNDING 42 DAYS TO CROSS THE OWEN STANLEYS” Dan ct “OTHER WEAPONS, UKE THE vloxens MEDIUM MACHINE GUN THAT COULD HAVE BEEN DECISIVE IN THE EARLY BATTLES ON THE TRACK, WERE INEXPLICABLY ae TO BE LEFT BEHIND” 7 “THEY ARE BEAUTS AT GETTING UP THE COCONUT TREES AND SNIPING. THEY SEEM TO BE EVERYWHERE, AND I'LL BE BLOWED IF | CAN SEE THEM” OCU Renta nen Ue) 3 ea UTR) nM r—1 10 (cd wielded in the jungle JAPANESE ARMS pal de Pa MACHINE GUN AUSTRALIAN ARMS DL Pier) oa comparatively be, and super eet et td ‘THE PACIFIC THEATRE GAINING GROUND AT GUADALCANAL GAINING GROUND AT GUADALCANAL OPERATION WATCHTOWER, THE FIRST US LAND OFFENSIVE IN WORLD WAR » WRESTED THE PACIFIC ISLAND OF GUADALCANAL FROM JAPANESE CONTROL y the summer of 1942, American nd Aled forces inthe Pacific ‘Theatre of Word War ll were ‘inally poised to assume the ‘offensive. Operation Watchtower, ihe campaign to secure the southern Soloman Islands, was conceived to deter Japanese southward expansion tht could ‘threaten tenvous supply and communication lines stretching trom the West Coast of tne United States to remate Pacife bases, and finally to Austral. ty in 2942, Japanese troops began constructing a seaplane base on the siand Of Tulagl and an airstrip at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal, 35 klometes to the south across Sealark Channel. When these bases became operational, erfial Aled instalation’ ‘wouldve within range of Japanese ara. The onl altematve forthe Americans was to attack. Operation Watchtower, set for 7 August 1942, was designed te capture Guadalcanal, Tag, and tne neighbouring Istands of Tanambogo and Gavatu, and the task fll intaly tothe US Ast Marine Dnsio, Under General Alexander A Vandogrit. The division, 19,000 stong, was 10 receive logistiesl support from Task Force 6, under ‘eral Frank Jack Fletcher, whe amphibious forces under Admiral Richmond Kely Tumer put the fing men ashore, 12,000 of them fn Guadalcanal. Admiral Robert Ghormiey, ‘commander of US forces in the Sauth Paci ‘Area, was responsibe forthe overall effort When the Marines splashed ashore at Tula, Tanamoogo and Gavut, heavy fighting ensued, but the islands were secured within thres day. [At Guadalcanal, the Marines met vitually no resistance on the beaches. Surprisingly, they ‘estabished a beschnead more than 1,500 metres long and 550 mates deep. On 8 ‘August they secured the area Tt vas the calm before the storm, During the next six months fehting ged on Guadalcanal, as well as the airspace and seas around the istand. No fewer than seven naval battles, ‘ve of them nocturnal, took a heavy tal earning Sealark Channel a new name ~"ion Bottom Sound’. Fighting in fetid jungles and swamps, Marines and US Army troops Captured Guadalcanal the folowing February. ‘The cost was high with 1,600 kiled and 4,200 wounded. Japanese losses were catastrophic with more than 24,000 dead ‘As soon as the Americans had taken the lst, they renamed it Henderson Fle honour of @ Marine pilot kiled in the recent Battle of Mioway. Navy construction battalions (Seabees) competed the airstrip, making itoperational fr US planes. Control of Henderson Fila became the linchpin of victory {3t Guadalcanal. The landings had taken the Tepanese by surprise, Rather than launching ‘an overwnelming counterattack on land, ther response ashore was piecemeal, although alr Sttacks and naval sorties tieatoned to thwart Operation Watchtower ‘On the night of 8 Augusta Japanese naval task force sank the US crusers Astra, Vincennes and Quincy, and the Australian crulser Canberra inthe Bate of Savo Island, Fletcher began withdrawing his Hoot. Many ships stl Nad thee cargoes aboard, and the Marines were eseentialy merooned with ‘only 17 days’ rations. They seounged fo, feonserved water and fought ike ons, ‘Reancerted Japanese effort to elect the Amertcans ftom Guadalcanal was not undertaken until mid-August when the 28th Infaney Regiment, under Colne! Kionaa Ichkl, mage landfall. The impetuous lehik ‘truck at American postions atong the ty River, misidentified an Marne maps as the Tenaru, on the night of 21 August. The 2nd Battlin, 1st Marines absorbed the brurt ofthe assaurt, and American light tanks, ale, machine-gun andre fre shredod Clusters of enemy troops attempting to cross the river. Alter daylight the Marines mopped Up. 800 Japanese soldiers were dead, while 134 Marines were kiled ana 73 wounded, Distraught, ehiki umed his regimental 73 ‘THE PACIFIC THEATRE stondardandcommited suicte, Henderson US st one Fels wos sae but ony temporary cea The Japanese continued o deliver supplies Sees uaa ‘and reinforcements via noctumal runs down saws New Geom Sours rckromed The Sit td these fst conway wore soon dbo the Toso Express bythe Americans, Meare, US fentesone Bombers, dubbed the ‘Cactas JarFoes engage In dgtants wih enemy plone, iterated Jopenese bombing missions and stated trees poor inlung ene troop vanspots cau! ering doyle our, Marne Maer Joseph Foss te the fever lit, becoming an ae an Shooting down 23 Japanese arate mn October ara November. tl he American gi on Henderson Fis emaino tenuous a he Japanese were fa oH Narn Raiders and atom troops moved ‘rom Tag) to Geadslcanaln September Joining the 2nd Battatin, Sh Marines Gefenang ine facing west 0 ote Henderson Fels An alot Japanese afer tobreak trough an take te ails was launched ater dork on £2 Sotember Uutenart Colonel Mert Ree ike Eon leda desperate Marne deeres against, mate eneny charge. In some aes, fing was Randa. Morne ety wos cr time one accurate, astng the Ipanese ‘tose attacking waves aly receded Rensar, the ro of shorpeat ting bore the name of 00d) Rg’ Edsors Ree ster th galt comma More than 800 Japanese voops be, end aroond 600 mere ‘unde. Mare esos amounted o 89 filed 2 200 woundes ‘20 the sage swirled, On 2425 sin th Satie ofthe Easter Slomens was ought toa Bloody daw wn the ara Carte USS Enterrisecamage neat October he Jopaese landed retorcements despite merean erence sg the noctuna Bate of Cape Esperance nthe Bate ofthe Sata Grr sands on 25.26 October he aera cer Horne wos st ‘le Enterprise nas damaged ones again But Japanese earrs were damaged ana her averens sted tore losses InmicNoverbe, Japanese rervorcement mission wos stopped rng the Nova ate oF Guadalcanal ton te 5th the ater carr USS Woda was torpedoed and sunk by 8 Sapanese submarine the endo he month, the Japanese won atari atthe Bate of Tesafronga but gan fale to put troops snd spots ashore on hod Una to estaish comoete col of the se or alr around Guasleana), Japanese Seniorconmandors reise that fhe yt contest te stand was sping ony. They asa certo thatthe ed Token on ach SEC eC a Pea gtry 24 AUGUST 1942 @ 12 SEPTEMBER 1942 @ 24 SEPTEMBER 1942 Pret et) eae C nerd co amet creer poate Leer ore) ee et ° pears GAINING GROUND AT GUADALCANAL “ENEMY RESISTANCE BEGAN TO NOTICEABLY WANE BY THE END OF JANUARY, AND ON 9 FEBRUARY 1943, GUADALCANAL WAS DECLARED SECURE” greater significance than they had originally Assigned It in one last gamble for etry, they ‘committed two ful divisions to battle. ‘General HarukichiHyakutake arrived on the island in early October, and a week later ‘the Marines receved einfercements fom ‘the 23¢a (Americal) Dsion ofthe US Army. ‘Admiral Robert L Grormley was raloved on 18 ‘October, replaced with Admiral Wiliam F "Bul Halsey, a toughminded commander intent fon winning Hyakutake continued nis roo Dulldup and then hurled thousands against the 4st Batlaion, 7th Marines, under Lieutenant Cone! Lewis B ‘Chest’ Puller, reinforced by ‘the 164th infantry Regiment, Americal Division, along the Matanikau River on 24-25 October. ‘The Americans were hare-pressed, One bettaion endured three fanatical Japanese charges on the second day, but the offensive blow self ou, gaining nothing at a cost of +3500 dead. American casualties amounted to 200 kiled and wounded, ‘i November, the Americans began clearing pockets af Japanese resistance long the Matanikau while holding tei ine against repeated enemy attack. I December, the 4st Marine Division was tna witharawn after four months in combat, Amy Leutenan General Alexander M Paton relieves the heroic Vanelegrit, ang his new command of 80,000 ‘Woops included the 2nd Marine Division, lana the Army's Americal and 25th Infantry Dhisions, atthe end of the month, Patch initiated a decisive push. Enemy resistance began to noticeably wane by the end of January, and on 9 February 1943, Guadalcanal was declare secure “The Japanese had sustained mounting losses in ther reinforcement efforts and finaly conclude thatthe necessary pace would be unsustainable, Many solders were Suffering fom dlsoase and manta. In ‘mid December, Imperial General Heacauarters hed decided to abandon the island, finally ‘evacuating about 11,000 ragged and femaciated soldiers, “Te American victory at Guadalcanal was 2 turing point in the Paci War. From that time nti thee surrender in Tokyo Bay three years later, the Japanese were obliged to ight on the efensive against American freos. Pret mene 6 OCTOBER 1942 © 25 DECEMBER 1942 @ 9 FEBRUARY 1943, i Prt tee) Pu 4 Soro ol entre ar ne vtean acres. | ans eps nwa. | by hr 76 ERY MULOAY CLLR H ME CII ALEXANDER BONNYMAN JR STORMING ASHORE AT TARAWA, THIS FIRST LIEUTENANT LED HIS MARINES ACROSS A PIER SWEPT BY ENEMY FIRE TO CLEAR THE WAY ACROSS THE ISLET OF BETIO he Islet of Bei, shaped ke 3 part Is the principal landmass (Tarawa atoll inthe Gibert Islands of the Paci. Is only tivee klomettes long, 730 metres across a is widest point, and ts 291 acres ‘encompass roughly half as much ground as. New York's Central Park. in 1943, however, yard foryard, Beto was quite probably the most heauly defended teritory on Earth When he arrived on the try islet that August, Rear Admiral Keil Shibazakl was impressed ‘th the stout defences constucted during the 18 months since the Japanese had seized ‘Tarawa folowing US entry into World War I “Three days ater the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese oops and Korean labourers had ‘ecupied and begun frtiyng the ist to Stvengthen the Imperial “absolute defence zone.” Eventually, tio was fat bristled ‘wth eonerete blockhouses,pilboxes, bunkers Feiorced with coconut logs and tons of sane, ‘and machine-gun nests. Mare than 40 atilery ‘emplacements also studded the islet. ‘Shibasali stood before the garrison of Beto, which hed grown to more than 4,000 including 2,600 men of te ete 6th Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force, waved his samurai sword Inthe air, and bellowed -A milion men cannot take Tarawa In @ hundred years!” ‘Shibasaki, however, ad not yet encountered the Leathernecks of the 2nd Marine Dvsion, ‘men lke Set Lieutenant Alexander "Sandy Bonnyman, executive ofcer, nd Battalion Shore Party, 8th Marines. For the Americans, Operation Galvanic, the assault on Tarawa, was the fst offensive step ofthe Central Paotic Campaign, the island road to Tokyo that ‘would cover thousands of klometres of ean ‘and culminate with the Japanese surrender ‘wo years later. Tarawa had tobe taken by storm. Men lke Bonnyman made capturing the “impregnable” Beto possible despite ‘Shioasak's boast ~n a femearkable four cays of helsh fighting, ‘Te 2nd Marne Division hit the beaches at Tarawa onthe morning of 20 November 1943. ‘The landing zones ~ codenames Red Beaches ‘One, Two and Three ~ stretched aorss the breast and bally ofthe Beto part. A shortage of amphibious LVTs (Landing Vehicle, Tracked), Dopiary known as amtracs, meant that ‘mast ofthe Marines would ride towards the ‘embattled shoreline in LOVPs (Landing Craft Venice, Personnel) or Higgins Boats. However, the LOVPs could not traverse the coral ret that ‘ringed the 17 mile-long, nine-mile wie lagoon ‘hat fronted the chosen landing beaches, “Tree waves of amas began churning {ward the line of daparture, 6,000 yards trom the beaches, at 8.24am., These were followed by two waves of LOVPs. Pre-vasionneval and firbombardment were ineective against the feinforced Japanese frtiiations, and when the cascade of bombs and shells ited, the ‘fenders of Betioexted thelr underground Safe spaces, manned their guns, and poured devastating fre into the oncoming Maines. Japanese troops manning posivons an the ‘ocean side of Betio began rushing toward the lagoon side as reinforcements. When the amivaes were within 3,000 yards, the fenders" guns barked and stuttered. As the LGVPS started to hang up onthe reef, ating, ‘en ware forced to exit thet landing raft, ‘ana wade hundreds of yards to shore under a torrent of enemy bullets and shel To the night, 8 deadly Japanese crossfire converged on an inlet at Red Beach One, {ulting down Marines while mortars and arly, pre-registered onthe beaches, scored ‘rect hits on amtracs that cleared the ret To the Marines’ eft, 500 yardong pier {utted into the lagoon atthe junction of Red Beachos Two and Trvee. Japanese machine uns and rifles chattred away atthe Marines In ths sector, as wel as trom the hulk ofthe halt sunken freighter Saida Mar, struck by American dve bombers eary in the action, ‘al along the beeches, Marines were being chopped to pieces. Some sought cover along a fvesoot seawall near the water's edge. Others ‘wed to dg in. Numerous units ost thelr senior ‘commanders in short order, West ofthe per at Red Beach Two, Lieutenant Colonel Herbert R ‘Amey ed to ral his beleaguered mee, ralsing his Cot piso! and shouting. “Come ont These bastards can't stop us” Immodiatoy, he was "idole with machine-gun bults. Liewtenant Colon! Walter Jordan, an ofice ofthe 4th Marine Division who had come along as an jserer, took command of the 2nd Baton, 2nd Marines and quickly leaned that one ‘ompary was pinned down wile nother had lost fie of se afcers, By the end ofthe fist day, the Marines ‘managed to maintain a toshald onthe beaches of Beto, The deepest penetrations at Red Two land Thvee were a mere 250 yards. A 600 yar ap separated Marines on Red Beach One from #3 smal enclave that had inadvertent landed {at Green Beach along the parrots beak, which Was relatively undefended and perpendicular 0 the slaughter on the Rea Beaches. ‘The only Marine battalion to land elatvely Intact on the morning of 20 November was aloe Henry P Crowe's 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines, at Red Beach Three. They came ashore east of the pier where the destroyers Ringgold and Dashiel gided into the lagoon EVISU VLU muy LUKABLE GUY, BUT HE LO aI a SUMO You'D Cay ae Ceti ‘THE PACIFIC THEATRE sy HIS DAUNTLESS FIGHTING SPIRIT, UNRELENTING AGGRESSIVENESS ND FORCEFUL LEADERSHIP THROUGHOUT THREE DAVS OF UNREMITTING, VIOLENT BATTLE, 1ST LIEUTENANT en iH a i ne a HER it ENABLING THEM TO BEAT OFF THE COUNTERATTACK AN HOSTILE RESI STNCE INTHAT SEclOR Medal of Honor Citation 78 {and sprayed accurate fe support st enemy Positions. Bonnyman realised that Japanese [Buns had pinned down a large number of Marines at the end of the per and quickly assumed the niiatve 'Bonnyman's posthumous Medal of Honor citation ads that he "repeatedly tied the blasting fury ofthe enemy bombardment ‘tw organize and lead the besleged men over ‘the long, open pler tothe beach and then, voluntary obtaining famethrowers and ‘emoltions, organized his pioneer shore party Into assault demoltioiss and arected the bowing of several hostile instalations before the close of Day.” During the harowing right that fotowed, ‘the Marines on the wlnerabi Red Beaches braced fora Japanese counterattack that never ‘materialised. Approximately 5,000 Marinos had landed on Beti, and 30 percent of these ‘were killed, wounded or missing. However, the Japanese had suffered mig 38 well. Many oftheir officers had been killed, and he ‘communications had been disrupted to such an extent that there was no hope of mounting a ‘co-ordinated counterthrst. ‘Stil, the early hours ofthe second day were ‘as deadly asthe fst. Marine reinforcements \weterdled by enemy small arms. The 4st Battalion, 8th Marines, last of the Immediate reserves, took 350 casualties among its 800- rman complement, due te murderous fre from ‘the hulk of te Saida Maru and the relentless {usage from Japanese emplacements ringing Red Beaches Two and Thre. The Marines ‘on the thn ibbon of shoreline faced an ‘agonising choice: remain where they were and suffer, oF attempt to silence the enemy guns, ‘They got moving. "The Marines on Green Beach were reinforced. Working in tandem with the few ‘ands that made It ashore, they began @ Successful fank attack across the lat Meanutile, here and there, teams of Marines ‘to0K on the enemy bunkers and blocknouses ‘with hand grenades, explosive satchel charges land flamethvoners. Yard by yard, pillbox by pillbox, the Marines advanced from the Rea Beaches across the airstrip in the middle of Betio. At about 4pm, Colonel Robert Shoup, ‘commanding the 2nd Marine Regiment, was Confident enough to radio to senior officers offshore: “Casualties: many. Percentage de unknown. Combat efficiency: we are winning” ‘Orders forthe third day of fighting on Beto \were straightforward. The gains on Green Beach were tobe exploited while a Japanese salient between Red Beaches One ard Two \was tobe eliminated, end the two battalions bf the th Marines on Ree Beach Three were to attack eastward. The tiple treat of 2 ‘coconut log bunker with multiple machine ‘guns, a steel reinforced plbox, and large biocthouse that was supposedly Shibasak's headquarters contonted Crowe's Marines ‘on Rea Beach Three. Around 8.30am, a “Marine mortar round scored aiect hit on ‘the ammunition compartmant fer the coconut og bunker, blowing the entre structure sky high. An Na Sherman medium tank nicknamed Colorado fred a 75mm round that cracked ‘en the pillbox. The enemy grip on Red Beach Three had begun to sip, but the ALEXANDER BONNYMAN JR bockhouse continued to belch dead rite and machine-gun fre, Eatly morning onthe third day @ Japanese message, possibly sent by Shibssaki, naa relayed the desperate situation to Tokyo. “Our ‘weapons have been destroyed From now an, ‘everyone is attempting a tial charge. May Japan exist for 10.000 years.” If he was alive and in the blocenouse, he had minutes tv. ‘The heavily frted blocknouse was the highest point on Beto. ad lank attacks hd been thrown back with severe lasses, ‘Apparent, the only way to silence the structure ‘was to gaits rooftop and drop grenades or explosive charges down tho air vents to force the enemy out. Lieutenant Bonnyman led fve engineers across 40 yards of open ‘gyound under covering re. Boneyman clawed his way up the sandy slope tothe root ofthe blockiouse 2s dozens of Japanese roops ‘emerged to fight. The 33 yearoldleutonant ‘opened up afamethrawer on several of ther, emptied his Md carbine ito others, and then Ile tree more before he was shot down in a hal of enemy gunfre 'AS the Japanese recoiled in disorder, Bonnyman's bed tumbled down the slope. Inspire by his actions, the remaining engneers detonated explosives while enemy soldiers ‘swarmed out ofthe blockhouse, Colorado took out 20 of them with a single canister round, and a bulldozer piled mounds of sand against ‘ring sits that remained active. ‘The Marines on Red Beach Three had finaly stenced their supreme tormenter. The blackened corpses of more than 200 Japanese ‘troops were found insde te blocknouse, but ‘Admiral Shibasakis bocy was never postively Identiied. onnyman’s ctation contre: “Assalled by additional Japanese after he had gained his objective, ne made a neroe stand onthe edge ofthe structure defending his stratege position with incomitable determination in the face ofthe desperate ‘charge... before he fel, mortally wounded” ‘The courage of 1st Lieutenant Alexander Bonnyman broke the stalemate of death and destruction on Red Beach Tree, wile other acts of bravery helped tu the tide at Taraws {or good. After Beto was deciared secure on 2 Novombor, only 17 Japanese troops anc 1129 Korean labourers survived, A total of 4056 Marines and US Navy personne were kiled an nearly 2.300 wounded. The Marines leamed valuable leszone at Tarawa, including ‘the need fr olunging ire to affect results during preliminary shore bomberdment, beter ‘communications, and more tracked landing vehicles. The Japanese learned that Marines, ‘ke Lieutenant Bonryman, were ling to give ‘ther ves in combat —and that there were others ike him The lieutenant was interred ina cemetery on Beto, but the exact location ofthe burial site was obscured. Bonnyman’s 12-year-old daughter, Frances, accepted her fathers posthumous Meds! of Honor during a ceremony In 1947, owas one of fur Medals of Honor ‘warded fr heroism at Tarawa. Inthe spring of 2015, more than 71 years later, the cemetery was rediscovered an Beto. (n 27 September, the Marine hero was buried ‘wth military Honours in Knowle, Tennessee. 79 paca gj ha esr carob yy THE ALLIED aga DESPITE FIERCE JAPANESE RESISTANCE, THE ALLIES Ud Oe 082 STATE OF PLAY: 1944 ee ee! Cee cs Sead C2 easy naa aa acl The US and Imperial Japanese navies squared off CE re eed Cee ey (FSS NaN ea Inside the culture of sacrifice and nationhood Der ee ie eed CT Ow LUN After an arduous slog through the Pacific, US ‘Marines mounted one final assault on Japanese Cee ee BY Ey ye) De eee handedly repelled a Japanese onslaught BAZ Uo See ae Cet a This super battleship embarked on a desperate De eu a ey SEC aay See ae Japanese machine gun fire, taking out enemy ‘gunners one by one and saving his comrades 80 cre THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE STATE OF PLAY: 1944 THE ALLIES GO ON THE ATTACK, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE OVERSTRETCHED AND INCREASINGLY DEFENSIVE JAPANESE eee Treader esa nd ae iad coforahe parzneter Em ising Me . stretching across thousands of J iets kilometies of ocean, was under Pearman ‘omtinang attack. American Industral might, ona comprehensive war footing, had begun to produce weapons in staggering quantves ‘and outstanding quality, which Japan could not hoe to maton, These Incuded the Essexclass ‘aircraft carer and the superb Grumman FEF Holicat and Vought FAU Corsair fighter planes tem eres that eclipsed the preeminence ofthe once Pern tr apparertl invincible Mitsubishi Zero, "The Ales pursued a two-pronged island hopping offensive strategy, bypassing some fortified Japanese islands and leaving them to wither under ar attack ana without resupply. In the South Pacific General Douglas MacArthur's ‘command struck through New Guinea, the northern Solomons, and the Bismarck ‘chipelage toward the Philippines, while ‘Admiral Cnester Nimitz led the Cental Paci thus othe Marianas, From June to August, combined US Marine and Army operations sezed the islands of Saipan, Guam and Tinian in the Maranas ‘against fanatical Japanese resistance, including banzal suicide charges against American ines. Simultaneously, Japanese naval ar power was ‘oblterated during the Battle ofthe Prlippine Sea. Arflelds constructed onthe islands brought Japan within range of American heavy toombers that laid waste to Japanese ees, MacArthur reached the Philppines in October ‘uring landings an the stand of Luzon while the US Navy defeate the Japanese in the great naval Battle of Leyte Gul. 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STATE OF PLAY: 1944 GREAT SEA FIGHT AT LEYTE GULF eet cece eee emer ear rors eee ee rs Peenees oa Seer rN rvs eer Ny picoermee pene ett patentee ea emeey peeseree etter) Equator 83 THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE THE BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF THE US AND IMPERIAL JAPANESE I SQUARED OFF IN A SERIES OF ENGAGEMENTS THAT CAME TO COMPRISE ONE OF HISTORY’S LARGEST NAVAL BATTLES cee eee eee rome geet Peet omeaecoaserri is 00 US troops onthe island of Leyte ey eect re terme eng rene aero Feet covering the amphibious invasion force Oa ae eed Piers ere Se Vice-Admirastsaburo Ozawa and consisting of Senet ten eee ty Preteen perenne etna at] ete ae Pere rarer as Pee ae ee ert paar) een Seer Secs) PCa et ae io pect ee coer res true ako ta ener eee ee ee ss eo eens Ce ee OPPOSING FORCES LEADERS: Cunt Group ‘Ve Adm Takeo Crete eae ie Tn eee ies ee cern eed fanenarer eer nid feet, rea Seen cea seen Beret ea beeping with most Japanese naval operations eoriats eos erties Pete ‘AIRCRAFT: around 300 ecieoeeer ttc cry THE BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF es cement I SSI ae SUTTON TaN TY a man eres 11/07 BCR Ui Fy NowTHERN Fonce Decoy '28 OCTOBER 1944 ers races Halse f Oras ete Fore anche decides ge chase tos ‘he Japanese hoped he we. Halsey tkes allot wercige wii, wag retirg edo uate Son nara Stale. the apanches te aio betes inter Gut [KURITA RETREATS. 25 OCTOBER 1944 ‘Shaken bythe ened stance ‘le Amsean xc ee nd destroyers of Sams, ‘roman sng ho ‘aeingtemain US et, Kurita ‘ene contc and Gate ropes ac pe San ‘emadne Sta. 224024 Oy mesearesertan art's Cane Coup mats forth Son Bomar Svat heading fr eta Gt whe Nina tas at oh Sian Sal, estnon Leyte Gt were the US amis ‘estes ocoe spporing the iain res, Czas Herter Fae trams Sut eet pon lung ova Halsey Te eet BATTLE OF THE SIBUYAN SEA 24 OCTOBER 1944 (0523 Oats US submarines Darra Dace lnc omodees agaist he hp oF rts ‘Conte Group, sing wo pase ruse They soy Hale Kuta' poston. The et ay. cater ples rom Halsey Ta et tack at's, sinking the bates Musas Halsey ow ithe beiesKrt' et is2 ‘sent inptrt fore. Pac pare TO} end 06 2%, ‘CAPE ENGANO 25 OCTOBER 1944 ay carier ps aed rma tontem Force snd hoe oft carers ‘ing te Bate of Cape nga forth aby men eit nbs ‘eating, Hey reco Srevcededmesng stot ‘he plait Soret ets ithe arvetottobe font. victory he sopanese etree torment ths haumeg Despite miscommunication tate the masion fest xpos Let Gut ‘sa ante viton ert US Hay. "tks 26 Japanese wasps othe JATTLE OFF SAMAR. 25 OCTOBER 1944 art's cane Grouping, ‘hesiper dates Yana 6 ‘mucin power an Haley Sots dius own he ‘ow amped Sn Bemarone ‘Seat Thon sip betwen ‘hem and be anphious sips 0 ther practi deste at $n eae ene Sona, ye Rnerearemmirt eset aimee apaese ‘leaner ss ate The ateship a See Feet ae ‘eth at Sugs Sat ans sid et posing Fp, ema. Taty 3a r om, rer Pps earns oF THE red SURIGAO STRAIT 25 ocTOBER 1944, into eatymomigot 25 october, Metin’ Sotho Fore hae gehts, crs ard desta’ Seanth Fletin be Surg Sat. ne latte atone, the aponese ates Faso ans eras are suk Shines os, ‘umngup eed Msi ips, feet ck twa Rha ae received clear notification that Halsey was. taking his whole feet away and continued to belive that some of it was guarding the San Bomardino Stat ‘wit tne strongest elements of the US Navy now steaming north, Kurita tured his own feet ‘around and thrcugh the San Bernardino Strat His Centre Group emerged in the early morning of 25 October to dscover Seventh Fleet's Task Force 77.4 between ard the invasion feet’s transports. Task Force 774, under the ‘command of Rear Admiral Tomas Sprague, \was composed of tee task units - Taffy Tatty 2 and Tatty 3. Each was bul around & Cclueh of escort carers ane some destroyers Iinkai's Seventh Feet had been organises tw prove aie cover to the American oops ashore, not fight major engagement against ‘tho Imperial Japanese Combined Flet but that is what they had todo. The outgunned and thorough surprised US Navy men of Tay 3, under Rear Admiral Cliton Sprague, mounted a desperate defence, attacking the Japanese with thelr ov carier Panes, dropping whatever bombs had been ‘reed loaded on them for close air support tissions ashore and then strafing the enemy ‘warships withthe machine guns of thei obsolescent Wildcat fighters. They were joined by ther companion destroyers, which mounted ear suicidal attacks against the Digger Japanese ships. Tay 1 and 2 were stil far ‘away but immediatly sent lp. For the te being, Tatty 3 a all alone “The ferecity ofthe American response, with destroyers charging in to trade fre wth ‘temendous Japanese battleships coupled withthe fog of war, convinced Kurta that he \was facing the whole of Third Feet, nota mere invasion feet covering force. After losing three ‘cruisers, he ordeed a retreat. American losses \wete heavy but the vulnerable invasion feet had been spared annihilation. Inthe meantime, Ted Fleet was stil chasing Czawa's Northern Force and, unfortunately, the rest ofthe Seventh Fleet was t00 faraway, ‘That same day, inthe early moming daranese ‘of 25 October, Nishimura's Southern Fores had ‘come up the Surigao Strait with Shima’s group THE BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF forming a astant rearguard to be met by the bominardment ships of Seventh Fleet under Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendot. Oldendor's fet was centred on sk od battleships that hag been repaired ana sent ack to war. They'd been providing fre support forthe invasion forces but now they dulled withthe Japanese. Nishimura's vanguard was ult around the battleships Yamashiro and Fuso. A torpedo attack by American destroyers baely damaged Fuso, which ater exploded, ‘Yamashiro was struck by torpedoes, too, anc then had to contend with the eruption of ee ‘tom Oldendor's battleships and crusers. Aided by fire contol radar, an avalanche of hheany shell plunged into Nishimura's ships. ‘Yamashiro was sunk before dawn, and the eau cruser Mogami was last ater that cay ‘Shima, far tothe rar, secing th catastrophe ‘that had befallen Nishimura’s force, turned nis ‘wn rearguard fia around and headed back fut of Sungao Strat. The fat was history's, laet between battleships Having sought out Ozawa and at lat found im, Halsey’ Tir Fleet carer planes conducted strikes against the Northem Force fn 25 October. Lacking arpower, the Japanese ‘were mad ty the US Navy fers In this, the Battle of Cape Engaro, three Japanese caries were sunk anda fourth was heavily damaged In the midst of the battle, Halsey receved ‘an encaded message from his commander {demanding to know wnere he was. The escort caries and destroyers of Taffy 3 at this moment were being pubrised and Third Floet’s battleships, which should have beon protecting the invasion armada, were nowhere tobe found. With a wounded Northem Force ripe for destruction, Halsey was forced to turn his battleships round and head back south to help the embattled Seventh Fleet ~but by the time they atved, the fit was over. twas an Inglorious end for Halsey to the Batle of Leyte Gulf, which was a huge American victory, Al told, 216 US Navy hips and two Australian warships cushed a ‘leet of 64 Japanese vessels. By the end of the skirmish, 26 Japanese ships had been estroyod and only seven American ones. nea eters propre to Taweh hom USS Rina By ue th a Saar 35 2 g Brae heag sy ee Bh Nas BESS) aia tesa oA Ea UD Tae ey U a ed eee PO wee LO) BEHIND JAPAN’S KAMIKAZE PILOTS lie oe eet eae eet Penne eons ee ete ee ce Pacer nae ot Perens eens ees Paneer ety Pre acneeXereyuetentd a seer rae Formosa, and more than 300 Japanese planes. enre eur ecaa a eas aes oe ee cd ce erat toe eared Pree peeares ren Pore arte Pecan eer ee Desperate times called for desperate measures. Grace eee en See eel Peete Tae eer eee ate Teena A week later, onthe more of 25 October, Peer Ace Sees anierr eines eet en Teer re) emer teen) ence eon These wore escort carers — basicaly large Piero er a erty ee ei Inalspensable for ar cover dung landings. era te re ees pore omer Pare her ua Pee eee ees ‘menaced them. The squadron leader, Lieutenant Somer arnt tees Pe [onan nr Pe eter are om) eo eat} eee rnd eretecer nnn srt Ty Peeper “TF ONLY WE MIGHT FALL LIKE CHERRY BLOSSOMS IN THE SPRING ~ SO PURE AND RADIANT!” = HAIKU OF AN UNKNOWN KAMIKAZE PILOT THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE a CU etre Raabe) mcm mae at Maa ay co ror ee Cnt ies oon ee peer Snes oe titae erate eae Pomc el ee eats Secret er rs pepe tet rontird ras at Seen Pern ats ed was us Incieriminat eer) they neared ener er ei broadeast ot eatiest eee Reece re es pee recngret et ei ee KIJIRO ONISHI WAS AN PILOT CRE TO ORGANISE A SUCCESSTUL SPECIAL ATTACK Born in Hyogo Prefecture on 6 June 1891, Takjio Onish's life coincided wth the rise of Imperial Japan, Detalee biographies about him are very scarce and few go beyond Credtng Onishi asthe ‘Father of Special tack This supposedly orgiated from an unconvertianal tactic he ‘explained to suborcinates or crippling a US Navy airratt carrier ~ by erashing a bomb ladon plane ito it He was one ofthe frst UN fighter aces curing the ‘Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45). A staunch patriot, Onishi also believed that it was unsound for Japan to wage war onthe United States of America. Despite this, he is recognised as one ofthe planners ‘behing the surprise atack on Pea Harber. ‘Some kamikaze writers suggest Onishi was introduced to the concept of selfsacriice ‘among Japanese pilts In ethor 1943 or ‘ary 1944, By the time he arrived in the Philippine Islands, Onishi had new orders — from ‘actly who ie unknown —to organise ‘Special Atiack operaton using the ‘squadrons ofthe 1st Air lect. “HEWAS GRIPPED BY A DET oa een Ny Poe enero Ee ree ees eran ear THE FATHER OF KAIMIKAZE ITED AS THE FIRST ON ALLIED FORCES Luke many of his peers, Onish harboured serious doubts about the effectiveness of Special Attack tactics. It was Particular dsturing for an officer with his backround, _Bven his expert grasp of modern ar combat. ‘Onishi Kept is mislvngs to himse. Like the rest of the IIN in 2944, ne was gripped by a determination to do anything fr tho Japaneso cause, mare so with tho Alios rawing near in ever greater numbers. (Onisn’s personal conduct during the campaign to reconauer the Plippine Islands is unknown. But the Toko Taltactis he devised wer stil being cavried out well nto £1945 by UN holdout inthe Philppines, with disappointing results. Back n Tokyo, Onishi knew, at least privately, that Special Attack tactes were squandering ines. “The architect of Kamnkaze met aterbie end. Hearing of the emperor's surrender message over tho rad, the ‘sheartened Onishi commited seppuku, or ritual suicide, But in 9 macabre twist, he was found a day later on 26 ‘August, wething in agoay. Having disembowelled hist with aie, ne was unable to sit his throat and refused ' sft decapitation from a second, He lingered for hours before finally eying ERMINATION TO DO ANYTHING FOR THE OFFICER JAPANESE CAUSE, MORE SO WITH THE ALLIES DRAWING NEAR” THE DIVINE WIND OF DEATH CRACKING THE AIR LIKE THUNDER FOR A AND THE DEFENCE FRO ED nani? ‘The Special attack proved more more twas used, Since the kanvka ‘only used en masse in two campaigns — Leyte Gui and Okinawa ~ a specie doctrine w ‘ever developed by the US Navy and air Corps to counter them, Mast kamikaze missions {alles anyway, thanks to poorty maintained teat, shoddy training, anda far more lethal factor: US gunsery By 1945, US warships were equipped wit increable ati ana ant-submarine weapons, ‘he former included radarassisted guns, AX gun batteries and rapive cannons. Most fetfetive were the tain 4Omm Bofors mounted innests on US Navy destroyers, carers and transports, These ack-ack guns fled thea with lac at macium ranges if one kamikaze got too close, 8 20m ‘oerikon or tandem 50-calbre machine guns ‘vcan mth nied States de 1942 S WAS 6000 OLE ST would blow i to pieces. Just as vital was US Navy air ever for blowing up any incoming sulelde planes, By the time Okinawa was fmiy under American conto, it proved tobe the costiest battle in the Pacite Theatre A total of 2.363, Kamikaze attacks between October 1948 and 2 June 1945 left mora than 5,000 US and Alieg dead ‘Approximately 40 Aled s were suns An edational 368 were damoged Title more than a month after Okinawa, atomic bombs leveled Hiroshima and Nagasal Japan surrendered on 18 August, The last kamikaze squacrors were disbanded and the fnce-doomed pots Ived on to demooiise for peacetime. Over 70 years since, the kamikazes hotoriety remains @ potent symbol of Japanese fighting Spin during World War I “IN BLOSSOM TODAY, THEN SCATTERED; LIFE IS SO LIKE A DELICATE FLOWER. HOW CAN ONE EXPECT THE FRAGRANCE TO LAST FOREVER?” ADMIRAL TAKUIRO ONISHI 1 riage, manent fora kama’ Ingo shows aw Joneses ote piesa airs ttn ingen THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE MACHINE OF DEATH WHILE THE KAMIKAZE’S MISSION WAS OFTEN FRUSTRATED THEIR ATRCRAFT WERE SUPERB EXAMPLES OF ENGINEERING AND AERODYNAMIC INNOVATION BY MECHANICAL FATLURE Ja9an entered Word Wa I with the finest combat arvatin Asia. The problom was that the USA could bull ‘more of ts own fighters. /apanese planes also had weaker engines, less ‘armour protection, and couldnt match the ‘ttude of US heavy bom For the Tokko Ta, however, the type of aireraft wasnt always important. The plan, frawn up at Tachiaral Joint Service Fight ‘School outside Chiran as well as in other ‘nearby ales, was to deploy as many Special THE IMPERIAL, CHAMPION’ | ftack iomation as posse nang petcion | 3046, there wos tl enough AGM Zeros es left or use in araze missions. Hunted sagt ean ofthe older ABM figntrs wore co opted for the missions as wel. Designed by the inventor and engineer Jiro Horikoshi in the late 19308, the Zero was a lightweight marvel with super® rmanoeuvrabiity and an excellent 14-cyindor 41.130 horsepower engine. ‘At the beginning of Japan's Pace War, the Zero proved ts superiorty over American rivals lke the FAF Wildcat. Mere than 10,000 zeros would be bul but the gradual loss of UN 92 carries in Midway, the Philppine Sea and ether bales limited its effectiveness, ‘The advent of Tokko Ta tactics marked the ero's undoing With insufficient armour plating, ‘countless numbers of them were biown to bits ‘a thay approached US warships. The UN Air ‘Corps officers used aircraft Ine ranance and ‘ated lite for keeping thee planes arworty. ‘This, along wih dluted aviation fue supple, ‘xplains the high rate of failure among Speci ‘tack missions Once a Tokko Ta pilot was selected and trained his plane was given enough fuel te reach the area of operations. A single '500.pound bomb was loaded along wit. ‘ammunition forthe twin 7.7mm machine guns ‘and 20mm cannons. Baring a midair erash or ‘an accident, te Tokko Tal plot embraced his, ‘end ashe few to his target. ag ‘TANDEM ARMAMENTS Smears wouommeamonn Seonconeng, ‘teeming os Liana ero crop IND OF DEATH Shean preset ek, 0 Ca MCR eTCnT Daal ersten ota ck ocd a oS TE [eee a a ee ee Tae te ee re eee eer ren D¢cAST OW ATEN AO1GT/ CRM cen ee Lee eee ot eee et eer ry rors eres tare) a hat he changed his name during the Cera priori Ti irene peneroren reat eee ee Cee eee Ran easy eR CE NT a eC eee nar eT Ram aaa rac aOR AT ers Ce Rane CCC Uict) There are stil many false assumptions surrounding the ae eres eee ere eager Creer itr treinries en na) Site peer eee eri) err ee ee a Is why personal appeals bythe emperor together wit rosy Be ee nec eee en eee arenes psn oe eee cat ‘obsessed with ching ether. Death in bate ee re pore eta eens aes tse nes eee ea epee etl Pn anny sao tte Frere ea be we Cee Cn ee er te ee ec Nr Restoraton that replaced te Tokugawa Shogunate, Jagan Pe an Ler eae ee reer Pen ener) ete ae eee eed eee eres res merce tea ener een Ue Conia olcee ace ee ee ee Cerri ei ee tia pore eed een et pea peerenent treet ene prone eer ain Ponerinae eon ee ens ‘ther planes began to warrant notice. eet eee nee Rete eee ees ee ees ee ns Pree eet ee ee Tay ete ea eet tos THE DIVINE WIND OF DEATH THE CHERRY BLOSSOM TAKES FLIGHT ‘As eatly 98 1943, the Aeronautical Research Laboratory was tasked with developing a rocket ponered "Tying bomb. In or before ‘August 1944, Warrant Offer Shoici Ota told ‘2 befuddled Lieutenant Commander Tadaneo Miki that in ou ofa guidance system, his team should just install a cocxpit on the NYT Onka, {he primitive cruise missle they eferesto-as cherry blossom ‘The suggestion launched the Divine Thundor God Corps, the UN's newest elite uit and the orginal Toko Tas. The Thunder Gods were ‘supposed to steer their msi, which was packed with 2.600 pounds of explosive, 2 targo ator being dropped in mid-air by a ‘mather ship’ ~ a bomber ‘There was precious litle time to ocganise, train and equip the Thunder Gods for their ‘deployment. The fest batch of Ohkas were ‘supposed to be deployed inthe Philippine DURCE-POOR UILD A VIABLE ANTI-SHIP IT TURN THE TIDE? Islanes in 1944 burt their transpor, the American submarine. The largest Thunder The concept behind the Ohka might have ‘ireraft cartier Shinano, was sunk by an God mission volved a fight of 18 GaM been futurist, but these chery blossoms medium bombers heacing for Okinawa. The repeatedly failed ther missions. When US formation was intercepted by US warplanes foros seized production models ofthe Ohka fand destroyed. Laterin the Okinawa fn 1 Apt 1945, they re-cvistened it the Campaign a singe Onka reportedly managed Baka — Japanese for ‘stupid. Maybe because to target the destroyer USS Mannert Abele twas April Fool's Day, or pera the doa of & and sink it piloted bomb was too silo comprenend sats gt rctan SIMPLE < ALTIMETER AIR SPEED z i a CHARGE NOSE FUSE, ROCKET IGNITION SWITCH 95 THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE AFTER AN ARDUOUS SOG THROUGH THE PACIFIC, US MARINES MOUNTED®ONE FINAL ASSAULT ON JAPANESE FORCES IN AN ATTEMPT TO UNLOCK THE MAINLAND crt re aes ‘against eed eat ce Ts ene oe peers cater em re oe EC eae Iwo JIMA, THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE ‘er the decisive naval victory at ‘the Batle of Midway in lune 1942 (the fst signifean iumph in the Paci for the Alios since Japan Instigated the war at Pear Harbor in December 104%), the US Navy was atforced some time to reuilé during 1943. Ships were in need of repar and refitting, seamen and ‘round troops required rest and armaments needed repenishing Tewas during this ul that Chiet of Command forthe US's Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester W Nima, refocused the tactios employed against ‘the Japanese inthe Pacific. Rather tan take on the enemy direc, a campaign af iland-hopping ‘was instigated. Imperial forces had become. heauly entrenched on certain kay islands, ‘making them efit ard costly targets forthe ‘los to capture. Instead, Nimitz’'s plan was to skirt around this nucle, taking the less fortion Islands inthe Pacife asthe US advanced towards the Japanese home islancs. The war was taking its tl on the Japanese ‘as the US gained the upper hand in both the sea ane the alr. To make matters worse, Japanese cyphers were easly decoded by US intaligence, who kept Alled forces one step ‘ahead oftheir enemy at all times. It was this ‘20vantage that led tothe death of Marshal ‘mira soroku Yamamoto (Nimitz's opposite number n Apr 1943, ‘After the Japanese defeat at Guadalcanal, ‘Yamamoto decided to go on a moral boosting Inspection of the South Paci. Word of ‘the Japanese Commander in Che's plans reached US Navy inteligence, leading President Frankin D Roosevelt to give the order: “Get ‘Yamamoto™. On the morning of 18 Apri 1943, the commancers plane was shot down by US forces, dealing an embarassing blow tothe Imperial Japanese Navy By Apil 1944, wih momentum frmiy on their side, US forces recaptured the Marshall Islands. Later the same year, it was the turn ‘ofthe Marlana and Caroline islands to fal Into lied hands, 8 plans for the invasion ‘of Okinawa continued apace. The Japanese ‘mainland was, metaphorical in Sign with just, ‘one remaining target: wo Jina Located 1,200 hlametres south of Tokyo In the Voleaniclelancs cluster, lo Jima was home to two Japanese arstrips (witha thi under ‘construction at the north ond ofthe island). The US believed tis small island, just 20 square kilometres in siz, tobe a strategie necessity for mainland atacks, It caud be captured, the island would be used as a base for escort ‘igters, as well asa landing patch for damaged 1829 bombers returning rom the mainland ‘The lonanese had also recognised the Importance of vo Jima and, under the ‘command of General Tadamicn Kurbayashi, began constructing numerous inland bunkers Inthe summer of 1944, a noted departure {fom the usual beach fortifications used by the imperil Japanese forces. US aerial ‘nd submarine reconnaissance showed the supposed scale with 642 plboxes, blocktnouses and other gun positions identiiod port the assault ’ summeriong barrage designed to incapacitate the staunch Japanese defences ensued. For 74 days straight, US bombers ‘pummeled this tiny bot of volcanic rock, while Inthe 72 hours running up tothe invasion, the US Navy peppered two Jima with shells, ‘shattering the peace ofthis once iylie Soutn Paci island. THE INVASION BEGINS ‘codenamed ‘Operation Detachment, the Invasion proper began on 19 February 1945. ‘The assault was tasked tothe V Amphibious Marine Corp, ed by General Holland "Howlin -Mag’ Smith, Gommancing Genera or the ‘expeditionary troops once ashore. Hour was ‘set for Gam, withthe intial wave of armoured ‘amphibian tiactors coming ashore at 9.02am fallowed, three minutes later, bythe frst troop carrying vehicles. ‘Spiting down the ramps, the 4tn and Sth Marine Divisions (led by Major General Cifton ' Cates and Major General KelierE Rockey respectively) waded thug the ankle deep voleanc ash of io ma's southwestern shore Unopposed. The preievasion bombardment appeared to have cleared the island. However Unknown to the US forces, Kuribayash's 109th Infantry Division was holed up in a network of ‘ver 5,000 caves and 17 klometres of tunnels around two Jima, waiting forthe lancing force's sheting to cease before showing their esistance. ‘There were murmurs among the US troops ‘thatthe Japanese forces had been wiped out as the beach remained eeniy quiet a marked ‘departure from previous infantry bates in ‘he Paofc where shoreines were staunchly defended. The landing plans tasked the Sth Division's 28th Regiment wit taking Mount ‘Suribach, the 554 foat dormant volcano atthe Island's souther-most tip, by the end of D-Day. LUkewise, the ath Division was scheduled to take Airle the same day. In the calm of the Ina anaing, bot plans seemed achievable Yet, as the leading battalions crested the terrace a the end ofthe beach, General Kusibayashi gave the order to take up weapons. ‘he unmistakable chatter of mactine gun fre from hiden Japanese emplacements cut down the inital waves of US troops, as fariley ane mertar fre no began to pound the beaches. The soft voleanic sol, churned by the re ivasion barrage, proved aificult to move ‘rough at pace, slowing the US advance. To make matters worse, fortifcations on Mount Suribachi (protected by reinforced steel doors) rained cown shells onthe 098s below. Despite landing some 30,000 man, progress was slow and, by the time the US advance eas called to a halt at 6pm, the Marine line fell well short of thelr D-Day targets. Sil, Mount Sunbach's northeastern side had been surrounded by the 28th Regiment The Sth's 27th Regiment had been abe to push towards “UNKNOWN TO THE US FORCES, KURIBAYASHI'S 109TH INFANTRY DIVISION WAS HOLED UP IN A NETWORK OF OVER 5,000 CAVES AND 17 KILOMETRES OF TUNNELS” the northwestern coastline but had taken heavy casualties in doing 0, wile th dth Division ‘kited around ified 1s southem perimeter, ‘securing a line towards the quarry near East Boat Bas, During previous battles, Japanese banzai charges nad causes considerable chaos {throughout the night and, expecting similar attacks, US forces remained vglant during Garkness. Genoral Kuribayashi did nt boieve in the usefuness of such tactics, though, feeting the banzal charge was a needless loss of Ife. This alloned the 3rd Battalion, 43th Marines the artery support for the 28th Regiment) o launch mortar and 205mm Howitzer shel attacks on Mount ‘Sunbachi during the evening of 19 February in preparation of an ascent the next morning. CAPTURING MOUNT SURIBACHI Formulate bythe 28's leader, Colonel Hany B Liversedge, the 2nd and 3d Battalions plunged forward at 8. 30am on 20 February, withthe 15t Battalion remaining in eserve. With oguar gunfire proving useless against te Jopanese emplacements, US t00Ds tuned to ther trusty fametivowers and grenades to flush defenders out of tei foxhles. However. the Jopanese (hanks to tei comprehensive. tunnel network soon remanned each supposedly clea pillbox. t woul be a tactic ‘that kept US forces fighting on ll ronts across ‘the Island, Keeping the Marines’ progress to “ust 200 yards of Mount Suribachi had been taken by Spm on D+. Te following day Liversedge's Marines attacked again ater 8 40 plane airstrike. With al tree battalions heaving forward on ane front, and with effective ‘suppor from tanks and arly, the 28th Regiment surged othe fot ofthe mountain, ‘withthe naval support covering the western Sie, the Marines Rad Surlbaehi surrounded by 22 February. Finally, 2 dy later, after reconnaissance from 2nd Bataan, 2 40-man combat patrol ass Sent to the summit upon the orders of LUeutenant Colone! Chandler W Johnson. Under the command of Firs Lieutenant Harold G Scher, they stomed the summit, raising a ‘small US fag while under intense fie from the remaining Japanese oops. Later thet day, 2 larger lag would be raised inorder to boost the morale of Marines across the island Wile the 28th Marine Regiment was sti fn Suribaci, the 26th and 27th Regiments Of the Sth Division had pushed to Ivo Jima's Wester coast with suicidal rapicy, begioning {heir journey to th islana’s north sector on 20 February. Mean, the ath Ouision's 2rd, 28th and 25th Rogiments had secured ‘Motoyama £, the southeen-most airfield. With the 8th Division surging the Marne line forward by around 1.000 yas, only the 23rd Regiment (fenting on the 4th Divisions let flank) oul keep advancing ata similar pace Iwo JIMA, a aos Sane Hoisn Smith Gena Tio USiNraNTe aja “Ampibous Cos (SUS 1APAN INFANTRY Mare Dison, 1 Impeal anby Din {15DMMAD Sherman 72am toa Coos {ont (hcodng 8 Barony Ns 268) ‘eta rapa Tank Regent anetora 1npAN GAME CHANGERS Teshesramberelmen bee ard 5.000 aes (ro. 70,000 trom Gated roan ten, Imo tate ret couse lent be parece st 36 yan Int tracous eos 99 THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE Compared withthe souther half of Wo Jima, the northem sector was extremely well forted, thanks tothe efforts of Kurbayash's ‘men during that summer of 1944. The US —» 19 FEBRUARY-26 MARCH 1945 <= bloody resistance. Any gain was seemingly met. _ eeeeeesunet cares aoe erasers eaten euaemal INTO THE MEAT GRINDER ‘Te same day the remaining regiments of Major General Graves Erskine's Sed Division ‘were committed to Iwo Jima. The veteran ‘vision was tasked with advancing through the supposediy flat centro line ofthe island, going head-on into Kurbayashi’s main defensive Ine on 25 Feoruars. With Ramethrowing tanks incinerating the enemy (and 50 per cent ofthe ‘corps’ atilry missions aiding the 3ré Division) ‘twee days of tol tnaly pad oft on the evening (of 27 Februay. The Japanese line cracked, and the 9th Regiment found ise controling two hill north af the second aired, wise the following 02 (022 Fea dings ‘ay, the 2st Regiment stormed theaugh the care ere remnants of Motoyama vilage to seize two hils commanding over the unfinished airfld ar, US sare Seas sekter {vee Elewhere, he Sth Dison had secired ‘tape pes Ait ag i Hil 362A’ after initial resistance from the ‘Marns raise the ig top the mountain, Ay Japanese proved deadly. 224 of the son's (ca be moet ttedon ce Marines were led or wounded on 1 March, ‘soda ren oso 3 but the hls access to Nishi Ridge on the northwest ecg ofthe sland was too important tobypass. ‘While many hil had fallen with relative ease, Hi 382 on the eastern edge othe island was proving a more acu proposition forthe 4tn Division. Honeycombed with Kurbayash's ‘tunnels the hil's approach was guarded by hidden tanks, while the crest hag been forties Inta a huge artiterypr0of bunker. ‘South ofthe hill as series of ridges, topped by Turkey Knob, while further south of 100 Iwo JIMA, Wh tbo ting a but oe, tho 2 OD Berrozrtsrtesins ‘Dione 2h Rgimeet in see much are pane hemsehes aed wih a age loons feito Many Bron stank ae bor bred up ot tw, pein « emplacements that eenato the dn vos progess and aie General Eakin re isin toe bought 4 rice oS eran Sur saga care Sirsthes ae 240 Regents tack nt, despite ang otng on Try “4b Konto UStorcs veto rtmatunder | ‘hecoverofesnake seen jst bee > LS ssicon ae, O] eee sete iba oa mas sober beaches 19 Feta) 1845, th at US ste agit he ang its te ik, "oleae on 15 Jue 1848, wth US mers bosodn Span ng unrest sense sorts, aw iy) k Fg se Soa othr fone eS Onion se oat ‘tuna yoda eer tro = eS Sclatenmb tren penne {Sine hgioet soa pee 104. ‘THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE ——m Ai -_ S— —— “THE US MARINES WERE FINDING THE ROCKY TERRAIN TOUGH TO NEGOTIATE, WITH EVERY CLEARED PILLBOX AND FORTIFICATION SOON REOCCUPIED BY JAPANESE FORCES WHO WERE PUTTING UP A STAUNCH AND BLOODY RESISTANCE” this massive rock was a natural bow known fs the ‘Amphitheatre. The fighting here was bloody, wih 1 March the fourth cay thatthe ision’s Marines hag hurled themeeWves atthe ‘apanese forces. Such was the elentessness ofthis quadrant, it became known as the ‘meat ginder. i wasnt until 10 March thatthe Japanese defenders around Turkey Knab’ were ‘liminated, Naval re, carer ar stkes, heavy Sheling and many Marine ines were needed before Hi 382 finaly felinte US hands. In this ime, the 5th Division's 26th Regiment had succeeded in securing ‘Hil 3628° on 3 March, before the 3d Division readied iteelf forthe assault en ‘Hil 3620 four days later. Under cover of darkness (a departure ‘tom the sual US tates in the Paci, General Ershine's men aavanced beyond the unsuspecting Japanese forces. twas blow for General Kurbayashi, yet his men ‘emained to resist strongy in their lasting areas of occupation. Unfortunately fr imperial Japan their attacks were bacoming increasingly unc ‘ordinate, allowing patos from the 3rd Marine Dhision to reach the northern coast by 9 March. The folowing eveing. there was only fone final pocket of Japanese resistance left, in the division's sector, although the tunnels Luncemeath the ground gave many more fanatical infantry hing place. in the eastern sector, ome ofthe Ath Division, Japanese troops launched & countersitack on 8 March. Under the cover of heavy artlley fre, the men attacked the Marine forces, worming ther way though the 23rd and 2atn Regiment's ines. Some atackea wth the blood eurding banzal ey, though mary chose a steaithier approach, attempting t0 impersonate wounded US solders, Despite the counterattack’ ingenuity, twas an ultimately hopeless effort that saw 650 Japanese hiled bby noon the following day. The end result was that, on 10 March, the Turkey Knob/ Amphitheatre salient was completely destroyed {285 Marine forces pushed Kuribayash's Gefences right back tothe northem coast. CLEARING UP THE NORTH For the remainder of Operation Detachment, leach Marine division would be faced with isolated pockets ofesistance dated around Iwo Jima, The 3 Davsion was tasked with the gim job of destroying a heavily fortified resistance souttwest of Hil 362C (eventually Achieved on 16 March), while the Ath Division {focused on an enemy stronghold between East Boat Basin and Tacha Point. ‘eross the island, Sth Division bore down on Japanese frees around Kitano Pont, the last point of defence Inthe two Jima campaign. Joined by two battalions ofthe 3rd Dnisin's 24st Regiment, the tral Marne cive began ‘on 4 Maren with naval sheling and airstrikes, ‘The US artery again had itve impact, tnough ‘making intial progress painstaking Despite being ravage since the inital landing on 19 February, the th Division carved ‘tough 1,000 yards bexween 1425 March, as ‘many ofthe Japenese oops meta fer end at the hands ofthe Marines’ fame-thrawing tanks. Te eee Ere ones Iwo JIMA, stuck nthe charmed up WERE EVER CAPTURED, WITH ROUGHLY 300 LEFT HIDING IN THE TUNNELS FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE WAR” The following day, the 2st Regiment flanked the Japanese on the right, proving the US. forces with two attack fronts fo decimate the remaining imperial forces. ‘By 25 March, oganised enemy resistance was declared over However, Kunbayash's men had one fal assault up ther sleeve. In the wnty of Motoyama 2, some 300 men ‘assembled that evening, On the moming ofthe 26 March 1945, they stormed the US camp, kailing steeping Marines at wil uti defensive line was formed bythe Americans as dawn broke, sending te remaining Japanese into hiding. After 36 days, the Bat of io Jima became @ manhunt, with at east 223 Japanese Soldiers hunted and kiled, General Kurayash was rumoured to have been among those slain, bringing to an end a bloody confit that saw ‘more than 70,000 Marines deployed Cf the 20,060 Japanese troops on the Island, only 216 were ever captured, with roughiy 300 left hing inthe tunnels forthe remainder of the war On the US sie, 5,931 Marines were kiled, with a further 17,372 injured ~ the only tine inthe Pacific Theatre that American casualties outnumbered those ofthe Japanese, General Holand Smith had “thrown human flesh against reinforced conerete” i taking Ivo ma. Yo. in the ensuing feral war against the Japanese mainland, ‘ver 2,200 heavy bombers made unscheduled landings onthe Island's astips, saving 24,761 US airmen from potontial dsastor. Iwo Jena was a grim yet insprational victory for the Americans that demeralsed ther enemy. Manan Japan had never seemed Closer tothe United States. fal vietory inthe Paci was in sight 103 THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE “HE NEVER BARKED LIKE THE OTHER GUNNERY SERGEANTS BUT RULED LIKE A WISER, OLDER BROTHER LOOKING AFTER HIS YOUNGER SIBLINGS, WITH HUMOUR AND A STYLE ALL HIS OWN” William Dougias Lansford, Heroes of the Medal of Honor JOHN BASILONE THE NEW JERSEY CHAMPION BOXER ALMOST SINGLE-HANDEDLY REPELLED A JAPANESE ONSLAUGHT AND BECAME A LEGEND OF ‘nn Basone is considered a hero of ‘the US Marine Corps, however thore ae few outside ofthe corps that how remember him, While he was fave, John was a national nro who was honoured with parades and had highways, landmarks and even a Destroyer warship, ‘named after him. He was the frst marine to Win a Medal of Honor during Word War lang emains one of the most highly decorated ‘marines of al time, also earing a Purple Heart ‘and Navy Cross. John was bor into a big alia famity ‘and grew up in Raritan a small town in New ‘oreey He was the sixth cid often to Dora ‘and Salvatore Basione, who nad emigratea to the United States from Naples In 2903. Aged 436, despite his mother's wishes, he crooped ‘out of school and, always a keen sporteman, worked asa golf caddy forthe local county lub. However this wasn’t enough for nim and in July 1984, aged 18, he enisted in the US ‘Army. He served for three years with Company D, 16th Infantry, including along stretch based inthe Philippines. However, during his Ume in the army he achieved tle, except proving that hhe was a champion ligh-beavyweightboxar— ‘undefeated in 19 bouts, Stil, Baslone looked on those formative years fondly forthe rest of his fe, e2ming imself the rickname "Marila John’ Because he kod about hi experiences inthe Philippines ‘so much, Discharged rom the army as @ Drvate frst class, he worked for afew months 38a tuck drver in Maryland but soon hankered te return to Manila once mare. Beseving that Joining the Marines woula et him there taster than e-eiisting inthe army, Basilone joined ‘Te Few, The Proud in 1940, ut when the THE US MARINES Japanese attacked Pear Harbor a year into Basiione’s training, his plans to return the Phlippines were scuppered. Determined to stop the spread of the Japanese Empire, which was threatening the ‘suppy routes between the US and Australia, the Americans fe the Ales frst offensive in ‘the region. They landed on Guadalcanal inthe Solomon Islands on 7 August 1942, surprising the Japanese so that they wre able to seize an airstrip. However, the Japanese clung on tenaciousy, withthe so-called Tokyo Express, high-speed warships, celvering reinforcements everynight to try and eotake the istna, twas inthe midst of one of these fierce counterattacks that Basione entered Marine lore. Along with 4,157 others from the 7th Marine Regiment, Basione formed part of ‘an unbroken Ine of dence to een the Japanese from reaching the Henderson Feld arstrp. known as the Lunga Perimeter, the ‘Ales commanded a series of ridges thatthe Japanese would have to climb after traipsing ‘through miles of dense jungle, muddy ravines ‘and vers. But this dant deter them, After ateady being beaten back atthe Battles ofthe Tenaru and Edson’s Ridge, the Japanese tied a new tactic. On 12 October 41042, enginoors broke a 24-klometie tail ‘through the jungle tothe Lunga Perimeter. Between 16-18 October, the notonaus 2rd Infanty Division ofthe Imperial lapanese Army began its march up this path; each solcier carried one artillery shel lus his pack and rite. While the val took several days ionger than anticipated, forcing the troops onto haf rations to compensate, when they finally attacked on ‘the evening of 23 October, they stil caught US twoops unaware Caught on the back foot, Aled forces were hastiy rearranged to compensate, leaving Basione ana the 1st Battaion, 7th Marines, left to hold the entire 2,300 metres of the perimeter east of the Lungs River. On the right 0f 24 October, just after 9.30pm, a regiment of approxamately 3,000 2nd Divison Japanese solders descended on Basilone anc the to {gun crows of 15 mn that he commanse Basione ordered them to allow the enemy to {get within 20 metres and then “let them Nave IR" Ths strategy successfully wiped out the frst wave of attackers, However. fihting inthe dark and in the midst of heavy ain, the US forces were hammered tro 105 THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE OUmeresimye DI vee 00 pe Basan cmmanng va seston of imine ane mae po 5 me Baton rersthen 0 waltferth vemyo sete 30 mes anton Testy sees o2mre ‘cain, aed he res son se ‘asta A mortar els ils eres may fe an row ang st 0 aon ghing wth Bolo. The uanery Sergeant respons y monigen eta go ino poston nd manning tone. ogame REPAIRS. iran epiacon, ofthe four nes ona sug tower eter ti wong dr ‘engithi gr Hethon Darconaly mans, hole te “VIRTUAL ANNIKILATION” hen tot oth ri ‘ust blr cant on be scan dy sion ts of ees of epost ‘Wen enoresmerts aly tiv ty finde vole te wth an bes Basler’ Medal Hoorn de Nisactne the vital naan of RUNNING FOR AMMO Engen 8 orf eh, amo event rns esata on Basle knows the a ammunition dump ust 90 mates nay, tts being ney ns Basan ead cot tough the ange, ogee mange teary "chon carp bok ack hi remaining ren eater epeas thst racing an So ump thats 550 mates. “HE COME FROM NOTHING AND 10 GREATNESS, ITHINK THAT'S ~ JOHN BASILONE WHAT WE ALL HONOUR: THE GUY THAT DIDN'T HAVE ANYTHING, THAT MADE IT. HE JUST RAN OFF AND BECAME A WORLD HERO. THE WHOLE COUNTRY HONOURED HIM” Clinton Watters, 5th Marine Division with grenades, mortars and machine gun Shalls.A mortar explosion killed or inured ‘many of the gun erew, so only Basilone and two ethers were lef fo hold the line, Basione Fespondes by postoning a second machine [Eun and fring both atthe enomy at once. They Kept up the fg or 48 pours. Inevitably, in sueh 9 long shootout, the ‘machine gun ammunition began to run Iw. However, the suppl line had been breached and Japanese troops stood between Basione and the ammunition dump Gertan thatthe Position would fl f the gun teams were not Fesupplied, @asione made his vay down the teal alone, flgting his way 90 metres tothe dump. after retuming wit several belts of ‘ammunition, he set ou forthe unmanned ‘Bun pts to his right, knowing thatthe heavy weapons were essential to defending the rage. However, when he got to the gun positions, ne found the two unoccupied ‘machine guns wore jammed. Working in tho Garkness with ony his tngers to guide him, he managed to thx one ofthe ‘guns. He then used ito rain down heavy freon the Japanese forces that were still coming. At several points, the Marines were forced to ush back the mounting pile of bodies to maintain a clear fold of re As the battle raged on, facing eight separate waves of attack, Basione was forced to make Several more tps forthe desparately needed ammunition Inthe end, its bebeved Basiione’s platoon fred more ‘than 25.000 rounds. However facing such vast number, few ofthe gunners survived. 8 the time reinforcements ave, only Basilane and ane otner ‘gunner held the ridge, with Basiione Fahting wih ust ‘a machete and .45 pst. However, by ths time, the Japanese to0ps were anniilated; the bodies of falen soldiers fing the vale below. The rest ofthe 2na Division's attack was also pushed back, marking 2 turing point fo the Ales, in which the Japanese eventually forfeited Guadalcanal that November. Inthe light ofthe new day, Baslone was @ war hero, Decorated with @ Medal of Honor in Melbourne, Australia, ho was also shipped home to attend teker tape parades and encourage Americans to ‘back the attack’ and buy war bonds. Met by a cheering crowd of £15,000 when he retumed to his home town, appearing in cinema newsreels alongside felebres ard traveling the country making Speeches, many soldiers could have been happy teeny their welLearmed new fame and fortune, But inthe words of ichara Greer, who had also been in the 7th Matines alongside Basle: "He was 8 Marine, not a salesman,” sa, Thovgh the miltary top brass wanted B10 hoop him Statosige, Basiono tuned BY own commission after commission, ‘ujng to convine them to retura him to the Paci. Eventually, they relented, ‘and in December 1943 he was Bas sxaioned st Camp Pendleton, ‘California, to prepare for wat. t ‘was at Pendleton that ne met his future wife, Lena Mae Figg iho was a sergeant inthe Marine Corps ‘Women's Reserve. ‘They maried the following July, but stil Baslione requested to rtuen tothe fig. In February 1945, ne saw action ‘again, a8 a machine un section leader curing the tical Invasion cof wo Jima. Ths time the situation ‘was reversed to Basione's battle fon the Lunga Perimeter Japanese forces were secure in forte block houses fring atthe Marines, who ‘were pinned down on the beaches. Basilone once again showed tremendous courege, creeping up on the biockhouses before attacking them wth grenades, single-handedly estioying a garrison. He aso helped ‘tee 0 stranded tank trapped on an ‘enemy minefield, but was kled ‘by lepanese mortar shrapnel ‘after guiding te vehicle ‘over the hazardous terrain to safety. Fortis cfforts, Basilone was, Posthumous awarded coms the Marine Corps ‘secondhghest decoration fr valour, the Navy Cross. 107 JAPAN’S DOOMED FLAGSHIP IN 1945 THIS SUPER BATTLESHIP EMBARKED ON A DESPERATE MISSION TO HALT THE AMERICAN LANDINGS ON OKINAWA Sr aay = ea eens ee Lect a em ere sats Tecan tac) ce oe a ee eee te ere cr Ce ere Se te flagship ofthe Combined Fleet. Itis far superior Penne ees Se eee ay ewe re ee ad at eee ener ere ea Pore teers) Renee a ad entre Coo! En) ee ee re Soe rar Reet ee eae ee oro mee Cen eae ee Serena ec ee ee eet et eee ae oS petro nt cs Serene rs onest of Okinawa. US Navy warplones have. ea een mre Peeters petite caer ee Coo Seen ee eter eter een rT Pee ee mene recy etree Ty Sea ee reece ian es eat aes ee dicate oT ae ry Proteome tas eee aco eet eer annette oe rene! Pore ee a eee ee eet re een cere th ce from Kure Harbour to dle at Okinawa, covered In glory fox the good of the navy. “The fate of aa YAMATO: JAPAN'S DOOMED FLAGSHIP THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE Maa Ue AC) ees ‘the navy rests on this one action,” her crewmen ‘were portontousl told 2s they departed Despite her anesome power, Yamato has seen itis combat, having engaged the ‘Americans bre during the Batle of Leyte Git in October 1944. The ship has been outmoded since the star of the Paco War. The stvke on Pear Harbor on 7 December 1941 proves that ‘alcraft carers, not battleships, were now the ‘rtiters of war at 208. A mere two days later, ‘the Japanese confirmed the vunerabity of surface warships to alreraft when thee planes struck and sank the Royal Navy's HMS Prince ‘of Walos and HM Repulse. Surfaco ships, however powerful, were extiemely vuineable {air attack unless themselves protected by fighters, and so for much ofthe war Yamato has bean kept sholtored in home wators, wating 2 decisive bate with American battleships that ‘wil never come, ‘The Surface Special Attack Force is under ‘the overall command of Vee Admiral Sei to, ‘whe uses Yamato as his fagship, while the ship herse i under the drection of Captain Kasekt ‘rga. tos aghast at what he considers the purposeless waste of his ships and the lives ‘of his men, but he Keeps such thoughts from ‘them. Yetthe crewmen of Yamato are under ro ilsion that Tenihigo can end in anything besides her destruction Iisa suicie mission. ‘They have been ordered, preposterousy, that Ir they manage to survive long enough to reach ‘the ilang, they are to arm themselves and 0 ashore to continue the fight. Mary sailors, 110 Caray soe ‘aware of what is to come, have written their last letters ame to thei loved ones, ‘Awaiting Yamato and the ships ofthe Second Destroyer Squadron that accompanies it on this death ride isthe US Fifth Fleet, riding high atthe peak of its wartime might. The Yamato ‘crewmen know they have been spotted by an [American supmarine, but they are deeply upset ‘thatthe Americans have radioed ther position ta the rest of tho fleet without even encoding the message, asi they are not taking the great battleship seriously enough ‘On Yamato, rice bals and black tea are served ta the crow, who sing paote songs ‘an shout “Banzal’, the traditional Japanese battle ery. Arga, a popular captain allows some of his younger officers to affectionately pat his, ‘ald pate, Tere isa lit to the levity, however In contemplation of the swarm of American kraft that is sure to assailthem, one salloe ‘kes morily but wth true prescience, “Which County showed the world what aipanes could {0 by sinking Prince of Walos?™ “110 IS AGHAST AT WHAT HE CONSIDERS THE PURPOSELESS WASTE OF HIS SHIPS AND THE LIVES OF HIS MEN, BUT HE KEEPS SUCH THOUGHTS FROM THEM” TYPE 96 25MM ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS ENGINES Chorale austere ars Ensign Yoshida finds that one of his fellows, Ensign Sake Katono, is reading Leo Tolstoy's War and Peace, while Yoshida buries himself in 28 biography of Baruch Spinoza. He also sees that another ensign, Kunio Nakatani, is weeping into his plow. The assistant communications offieer aboard Yamato isa Japanese-American from California whe was studying in Japan and had the misfortune to find himeet strandee there whon the war began. He has recsived, at ong iast—just before Yamato sailed on her final voyage ~ a letter from his mother in Amerie, that reaches him va neutral ‘Switzerland. He wil never see her aga, ’Neconnaissance plane operating off the irra carrier USS Essex spies the fotla st '.15am on 7 Apri. Over the folowing four hours, ‘the Americans doggedly track Yamato and the father ships of the foi, smal Raymond ‘Spruence, commanding offer ofthe Fith Fleet at Okina, at fest decides to kaep his carr fighters close by to provide cover against the swarming kamikazos and instad sonds a powerful squadron of tatieships to contfont the fnrushing Japanese ships. Yamato, it soems, wil fal gett ull her purpose and duel valiantly wth her Amecean poor. ‘en Spruance cancels his oer. Vice Admiral are Mtscher, the commander ofthe cari aircatt of Task Force 58, coruinces him that his planes wil be better dealing with ‘he immense Japanese warship. At 10am 280 planes from no fewer than ten aircraft carers launch themselves into the leaden Pace sk, TN YAMATO: JAPAN'S DOOMED FLAGSHIP nas rs pours SPE Ty SE TaN LES A Ta NO STA ag ATO’S EXECUTIVE OFFICER, REAR MTS CAO FLP BUT ADMIRE THE PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE OF THE ATTACKERS, Fi EAT Nas @ mpre aie, Oty estined fora fateful cendezvous with the ‘approaching Yama, 'AL12om Admial to sits onthe brig of ‘Yamato and smiles. He says cheerful, "We got tough the moming at ight, dint we? ‘he hatleship's good fortune wil not as lor. Just 20 minutes later Yamato's ait searen radar ‘elects the approaching American aera ‘The Japanese ships are bereft of fighter cover Their only defences willbe the anti-aeraft guns aboard. Then the attacks begin — the fst wave ‘of many ina sea offre and smoke. ‘Yamoto an-arrat atteres and those of her escorts open up in defence. The ferocious fre sent skyward ~a prsmate, tracert torrent of soaring motal~ does the Japanese Ships ttle good. The Amercans manoeuvre ‘their machines with great sil. Yoshida grimly ‘observes that their highly tained plots in a ‘straight course ony long enough to drop their bombs o* torpedoes, then hurriedly zigzag ‘away. The sheer number of alcraft also works inthe Americans favour as the Japanese gun crews find themeelves overwhelmed with a ‘multilicy of fast moving targets, inal, 364 American cater ara pounce fon Yamato an the ships in per escort. The light cruiser Yahag, the lead ship of the Second Destroyer Squadron, goes down after bein ‘tuck by seven torpedoes and 412 bombs, ails US aireraft also hammer the destroyers. is Yamate, however, that receives the greatest attention from the American fiers They ‘concentrate thelr torpeco strikes onthe port ‘side ofthe ship to cause herto lst quickly ‘Wave after wave of Avenger torpedo bombers ‘and Helisver dive bomber, protected by Corsair and Kelicatigters, surge over Yamato. YYamato's executive offer, Rear Admital Nobi Morishita, cant help but admire the “THE FEROCIOUS FIRE SENT SKYWARD - A PRISMATIC, TRACER-LIT TORRENT OF SEARING METAL - DOES THE JAPANESE SHIPS LITTLE GOOD” professional competence ofthe attackers. ‘Beautifully done, isn't KP” he says. She is hit by one torpedo after ancther Between 11 and 23 strike her, together with no fewer than eight bombs. There are many mare near misses, {and she Ists worryingly to port. Se takes on ‘thousands of gallons of seawater to counter the listing, ut toile aval. The waves crash over her port sid. At 2.10pm a bomb strikes her rudder, damaging t and knocking out all Dower inthe ship. She ean no longer menoeue, Yoshida spies a thin, humar-sizad length of flesh danging ftom a rangefinder. Her crew has been equally savage. ‘Another wave of enemy planes bears down fon Yamato. “Don lose hear” Captain Arig keeps urging the surviving men on the bridge. But there is no hope for Tenienigo. Adria Ito's ott has been shredded by American ipower tono purpose, just as he had fexpecte. Like Yarag), ost ofthe destroyers have boen smashed, He calls off the operation ‘and commands his remaining ships to return home after picking up survivors of disabled ships Alter giving his order, he goes to his tabin and closes the door behind him. He wil never emerge. Captain rig cals Ns ew to Yamato’ deck as water foods the stricken vessel and orders them to abandon ship. YAMATO: JAPAN'S DOOMED FLAGSHIP ‘5 ean of Yamato Operon Tmlega P1965 He wi nat be leaving with them. Aiga binds himself to a binnacte so tate wil fo down ‘ith Ris ship. “Long Ive the emperor!” he ris. Yamato's severe list now reaching an astonishing 90 degrees to port. As she ontinues to al, the giant Shells she stows for her main guns slp and sido in ther magazines, thelr fuses striking bulkheads andl overheads, They begin to detonate. By 2.23pm Yamato is completely upside down and begins to sink. The ‘featest ofthese blasts consumes her, sending lip musiroom cloud of fiery smoke that can be seen al the way back in Japan. Ensign Yoshida i Indescribaby lucy. The plunging Yamato was about to pul him under in ke whirpoo! when thie final explosion propels him back tothe surface. He wil ve, The remains ofthe battered Yamato finaly snk in 883 meves of ater. Yoshida, who wil become a bank executive after the wa, i plucked ftom the of choked water by the festroyer Fuyutsub. He wites his Requiem for Batieship Yamato years later, cling Ten ichigo "An operation that wil ine in naval annals forts recklessness and stupidity.” The Japanese navy loses seven ships in Tenichigo, including Yamato, along with 4,250 sors. Only thres destroyers excape the amage, The US Navy's losses are much lehter “a mere ten warplanes and 12 airmen, When Emperor Hiroto leams of te flue ofthe operation andthe oss of Yamato, he raises his hand to his head and sways. “Gone?” he says in shhookes olsbelt. "She's gone? The Okinawa invasion wllnot be stopped. Ie continies uni late tune, wen the lt Japanese resistance is erushed. Ofte 3,900 Crewmen of Yamato, jst 269 survive. Her dead are the amorg te ist casualties in the (Okinawa campaign. They are not the last 113 THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE EDWARD ‘TED’ KENNA IN FULL VIEW OF AN ENEMY GUN EMPLACEMENT, PRIVATE KENNA FIRED HIS BREN GUN AMID A HAIL OF JAPANESE MACHINE GUN FIRE, CALMLY TAKING OUT ENEMY GUNNERS ONE BY ONE AND SAVING HIS COMRADES ‘ward “Ted” Kenna learned to shot by hunting rabbits In Hamilton in rural Victoria, Australia, during the Great Depression. His father had worked onthe always and as enna late recalled, “their wages wasnt $0 hot, and So anything eatra (bath in terms of pets and meat onthe table fr the famly of rine) helped. Hs skills would stand him in great Stead when itcame to is experiences in Worl War I. 25 May 1945 saw him advancing on the northwestern slopes ofthe Wii Mission Station overlooking the Wowak airstrip in rortnern New Guinea. Kenna’sdision was involved in the Atape \Wewak Campaign, one ofthe fnal operations of the Pacife Theatre, fought fom November 41944 unt the end ofthe war. Indeed, It as on ‘the Wewak aystrip that the Jopanese General Hatazo Adachi surrendered to Australian forces on 43 September 1945, The Japanese had occupied Altape in northern New Guinea during thet vance South in 1942. n April 1944 the US Ary retook parts ofthe area (centred on the Wewak airstrip) to secure their flank and act as a base for ‘the upcoming Philippines ‘camoaign. Fighting was Tmited despite there being 30:35,000 Japanese troops from the 28th Army inthe, ‘area. Responsibility for the defence ofthe region was passed to the ‘ustralians and from (etober 1944 elements 114 ofthe Sox Battalion began arriving. They Immediately took on the task of reeenturing the entire region. General Adachi withdrew his forces to concentrate them in the area around the Torcell Mountains and Wewak, ‘Multiple Australian columas mage thelr way through the afcut terrain na southeasterly rection inland, taking each village and town, The important and well defended area lof Maprik was al but cleared by 22 Ap by the 17th Brgade, although sporadic fighting continued into May The coastal campaign against Wewak proceeded atthe same time as the Maori ‘campaign. On 4 May the 19th Brigade took fver the advance tom the 16th that, By then, had been ina forward position fr three months ‘and hag seen 25 weeks of continuous action IR was estimated that there were between '500 and 1.000 Japanese at Wewak — by far the greatest concentration of ‘enemy forces inthe area. The town fell on 14 May anc the Japanese withdrew southwards aver the Prince Alexander Mountain, leaving song defensive postions behind them on ‘each successive knoll ‘and ridge. Each poston could fre onthe Previous position ana heeded tobe taken fut inavialy. ‘Soon the only area not secures bythe Australians was the rugged aa one ee RMT UNTILIT OPENED UP rt ia TT Ma) ST ET ‘THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE tein tothe south vetoing the Wewak toda witha machin gun posto that the Pate Kenna endeavoured to pat is Bren ait, end was ognnt hese postions company col etn fin no apostun whore col engage he that gnPetoen, Company 2th fancy Kone‘s support secon and one cine Suto bu ws nate to oso becouse of Eataion tn nfory Sige atvaced, sedton wee pn Jom the ener potion th neue oto oun. Oris om tate feavymectne gun postions on rey cold le tevemaicert re netoonutaniod and witout re Prete Kena mediate Hecomenteteatiewanicuremnang X'Honrtsctaton sated ene starting Seed up ansintu ew ete oneyee han Bec ond nesdedtoDetakon ut, hemost__ secon cane bpwew aie enamy they SO yards mets] one and engaged le somnan ese pstors vaste S.meve- wee nme engaged ot ey Cove enge bane ings Ben gun fom he Nb gr G0O‘oe hina gosccoeea nicl Wiel byneay alomove tee ome poston ot” Renate eraen (ests M2000, ofed 80) MMostn Staton know co Moston lc To pens dlscesea Bott seclons Sarted reds sighyafetetyaltmughKares Eve @ boginwion Company ote astitace of kingcossins, Te ton conraed, Gems ofismartancoseappanch to comet sronk toe Sqn 2) sored “fry th mache gun opened upon Regent blot Kenna ie rcaleg out thats hen| gt eal se enn blow butte oes Stoned tp on il LE Tiptup and opened ft, tee shes ar wos thee and we hee gtr on carom atotaly re anda couple gti te rad ‘ro men had proceed on ot uvough ie ‘fe coe of ult. Bat hen. wen wos tal hana pas. Te trom es nage and Gouge the sco bunt opened upon there nano arly or mortar support ins and ats nen puta ou of aton tenianeyesime mecarectna : reoeitha tt uk Teas gt st tay saw soe oe orcs gang Tope) win me in scale fora New Gens the nr ior anch on of tebe ete Rol The estem slopes and tet of he ; Crew tome fm te aes, valor ten by a on Ney. Sed tavvenedtogatariiore sot wes but he Japanese fugit back om ae Kenn’ toon a ordre fond sald be onl exp haa coomamumataae a Peer ‘on al stip n Nowak Preroere cone “THERE |S NO DOUBT THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE COMPANY ATTACK EDWARD ‘TED’ KENNA WOULD HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY ENDANGERED AND MANY CASUALTIES SUSTAINED BUT FOR PRIVATE KENNA'S MAGNIFICENT COURAGE AND COMPLETE DISREGARD FOR HIS OWN SAFETY” done what he did. “The opportunity came to Shoot and shot, that's al.” When pressed as: to why he iit, he repel could answer that and never tea lie” He called nimselt 9 ‘sticky beak ~ always wanting to know what was going on ~ and he couldn't see what was {ong on Wing down, so he stood upto take a Took. He aso Sad, “t's Just one of those things ‘that you do | suppose. I's hard t 83) | think anyone would have dare the same thing in the same position because, wal i's no good laying down there and doing nating. You Naa {0.60 something, ana! don think te Nips DDapanese! would nave bros tea or cinner forme” ‘he Vietofa Cross citation goes onto speak cof Kenne's "magncert bravery inthe foce fof concentrated fre” thatthe bunker was Captured without furher loss ard the company action was successfully concluded. Large ‘amounts of muntions and equipment were Captured and the successful aking of Wit Mission gave the Australans complete conto! ofthe Wewak coastal pain. Kenna's modesty and no-nonsense aporoach can be seen in his words, He had enrolled In the Citizen Miltary Force in the 1930s and then the Australian army in 1640, He said that he wasn't one of the brave ones wha rushed off to war and only wanted to ge and fgnt when he actually had to. He thought thatthe greatest battle a soliernac to perform was actually waiting to go to war. Kenna was assigned tothe 23/3ist Battalion and served in Vetora and Darwin, Australia, In June 1943 he was sent to Queensland, ‘raining tthe Jungle Warfare School in Canungara. Kenna recalled, “We lac the way to Vea jungle and the way the jungle treats those that i kind to them somehow it right ony be walking from here to there, but You've got to move with certain care or certain Fespect, i put it that way, and that's now it Is Kenna's battalion was then disbanded and its men sent to other units, Kenna Was alloca te the 2/4 Battalion, Socond AI, and In October 1944 ne salle fr New Guinea. Iris od that a crack shot with arte was ven charge of his support section's Bren gun “he felled successive enomies with a single shot at Wir! Staton. But Kenna appreciated his Bren, even if he saw ts limtations “The Bren s more ofa gun that you put on automatic and give them hell ike that... the perfect shot, wih a ren, you couldnt do it Kenna’s interviews make itcler that he was a character (what the Australians would calla Larkin: a mischievous person, uncutvated and rowdy but ood hearted) who often spoke fut of tun to hs superiors. “Alt of times that ve spoken to a higher up, ike saya captain or leutfieutenant or something ike tat and told him in certain torme that what he was. doing wouldnt win the war tal, but when Hock back at it now, everything done and everything | was going todo and filed ike they told me, and I went against ito my own stupid.” On at least one occasion Ne was deprives ofa promotion to lence corporal, which ‘was probably vent him after his ation at Win 147 ‘Staton, but he lost ess than ‘vee weeks later Kenna makes some interesting observations regarding not being in the gwar or the major ‘campaigns that usualy Ai history books. The campaigns around Wiewak were cnaractersed as ‘smal-scale patting with small-scale company attacks ‘The foros against which the Australians advanced wore ‘seldom more than a few hundred fandin some actions only a handful Kenna, however, maintained tat “war could be a ite parol. One men, two men, tree men an pavol and you get shot, well that war isthe biggest war he's ever been in ony a handful of men... and ifyou call them big nm book the smal ite patrol ould be the biggest war ofthe ot. Is one life as far as theyre concemed and that's the big war. That's my idea of war... ere’s no ‘such thing as big war. I's a one-man job and thar For ll thatthe Atape Wewak campaign may seem He a minor one today, two Victoria Crosses were earned by members ofthe Australian forces during the fenting there, ‘hich puts the heroes they performed ito perspective. Lieutenant Albert Chowne was “DESPITE THE INTENSE MACHINE GUN FIRE, HE SEIZED THE RIFLE AND, WITH AMAZING COOLNESS, KILLED THE GUNNER WITH HIS FIRST ROUND” 1 know, a this ie of ay." EDWARD ‘TED’ KENNA tase fant o the 2/12 Bata esting one ‘ak of th Danan how Guinan bts aessung Snares poston nor Metapo ean oncry 1845 ‘awarded a posthumous VC on 25, March at Dagua during the advance on Weak, Australians were awarded 20, Vietora Crosses during World War two coming in the Wewak campaign and two others (Reg Rettey and Frank Peartage) during the 1945 Bouganvile campaign, also In New Guinea, ‘The apparently cisproportionato sumer of awards fr these minor late war campaigns reveals, as Kenna contended, that war was a one-man job ‘and thatthe Australians who fought in those campaigns did so as heroically as any otner serviceman, ‘Some the weeks after his actions at Wir Station, Kenna was wounded inthe mouth ‘and evacuated to a miltary hospital back in ‘usralia Mt was there that he met his future ‘wife, Marjorie, who helped to nurse him. But ‘wil in hospital he also overheard the doctors talking about his serious wounds and ping him only @ 40 per cent chance of survival Kenna’s response was typical: "Pgs. m the other way, don't you wor ‘Mtr spending more than a year in hospital, he eventually puiled through and began the road to recover. Bizarey, he almost missed the phone cal to advise him of his Victoria Cross, because he was inthe shower. His Immediate reply on being told he was to reoekve ‘the honour was, “Oh that's a strange thing, you B © negara be meg a THE DEATH THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC COMES TO A DEVASTATING END PPAR eC} eae ey Ce ee Pee 124 THE FIREBOMBING OF TOKYO US bombing raids on the capital of Imperial Se Oe LTT TSCA ee a Free aS es eo 132 OPERATION DOWNFALL a Cea pe aa ae) Reo een ey See a Cee pCO Re malts ‘The war in the Pacific came to an end amidst apocalyptic bombing raids and saw the dawn eed 120 Frry FIGHT TO THE DEATH STATE OF PLAY: 1945 THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC REACHES ITS BITTER, BLOODY CLIMAX AS THE AMERICANS UNLEASH HELL he island road to Tokyo and lied tory In Worid War I'in the Pacific ‘were insight by 945; however, war Panners were under no iusions. The already Doody campaign across the vast ocean promised even greater ‘Sanustie before its end, An imvasion of Japan Inst was a daunting prospect as well (On 19 February, US Marines stormed ashore on io Jima in the Volcano Isiands, ‘round 1,200 kilometres from Tokyo. The ‘ensuing battle fr the Isand, itll only 20 square kiometes, lasted 36 agonising days. ‘The defenders fought tothe death and were instructed to kl ten Americans each before then sacrificing themsalves forthe emperor. In the Philippines, the capital of Manila was berated by American troops in March after ‘a month of blog fighting. Japanese troops ‘ofencing the city committed numerous ‘atrocities against the civiian population as ‘iscpine disintegrates. Marines and Army troops landed on Okinawa, {ust 545 lometros from the Home istanes, on {Api ana though resistance was ight at frst ‘the Japanese had forties the sauthem portion of the island and conducted a resolute defence ‘that consumed thousands of ives during 82 ‘days of combat At the same time, the US Navy remained on station, braving an onslaught of Kamikaze suicide attacks from enemy aircraft Meanwhile, at Alamogordo, New Mexico, the fest successful test detonation of a nuciear ‘weapon occurred on 16 July. Weeks later, ‘stom bombs devastated the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On 2 Septemoer, Japan formally sutendered ding ceremonies in Tokyo Bay. arses A Pea mene eer yen STATE OF PLAY: 1945 Dey TOJAPAN ed Sd re Peeters eat Lemenerennriaiioty Sere oe y oer arataes) ina . eas ee er tir Pattee ts een eer ee ea ere een ote eters WAKE Fentmyrieiaprenrtir ae JOHNSTON 1. wan 3 | Neg MARSHALL IS. aie Yoo ast Be ihiecneernemeys eee, Fesesiatecinitegrioi Ste SS5 GlLgaT Is perenne) ran : ce gs EARER Ee aaireeaeeepy MARCK ARCH. . Faeroe ewinecane Beerreeerret een euce | Reeesteerenrsrrers oor . MARRUESAS IS. ct "Santa caus. NEW HEBRIDES _/ TUAMOTU wow por ac ee sat a . su Aauiti “2 ARGHIPELAGO 4 [ee : new CaLeDonia to kee TUBUAI AUSTRALIS. * PITCAIRN 1. oe ee *NORFOLK 1. as T KERWADEC TS, ‘store Hoe. on 123 (—} > < } — i rT} rr} = ey--] i ~r—) T=] oie s irs a LY QS if ‘THE FIREBOMBING OF TOKYO WHAT WAS IT? Tha fiebombing of Tokyo was @ US bombing raid on the capital of imperial Japan. The devastation caused bythe bombardment was the deadtest ofthe whole of Wort Wari wth t least 80,000 people pershing. The aitraft tasked withthe mission was the Boeing 29 Superfortess and 279 were unleashed during the night ‘of 8 March and the early hours of 10 March. The attack runs were fown ata ow aude under the cover of darkness to Increase bath accuracy and potency. ‘Many ofthe city’s houses were wooden 80 the explosions caused a raging inferno tat leapt trom house to house. Aer the three-hour barrage had long finished, song winds fanned the flames causing people tobe ether burnt ave or suffecate inthe smoke. The crews ofthe bombers coulé smell the stench of buming flesh trom ther postin more than 1,500 metres above the ground as 44 square klometies ofthe cty was ravaged. Just afew months later, another 8.29, Enola Gay, would take to the skies with an atomie cargo destined for Hiroshima, With 7 re ? y) t WHY DID IT HAPPEN? The US Airforce had only recently developed the ga capacity to strike Japanese ees on the island of | Saad Honshu, This was down tothe introduction ofthe 18.29, a formidable longrange bomber that was capable of reaching Japanese cles fom US altilds inthe Mariana Islands in the North Pacfe Ocean, ‘The frebombing of Toye, codenamed Operation Meetinghouse, was aertealy important tring polnt Inthe war inthe Pact ts undertaking, lke the atomic bombs that would follow wae motivated by the Aled esi to bring imperial panto its knees as sui as possible through huge shock attacks. On a windy, dry hight in Maren, was the perfect epportunty to start the fire, With Tokyo and the Japanese miltary hierarchy, not to mention the civilian population, reeling fom the, attack, the land occupation of the Aus pow could begin with five months of fn let before Vs Day Mar General LeMay panned tho raid and is reported to have si "Kling Japanese dit terme very much that Ue, was geting the war ove tot bothered ma" General of the Army and Air =; Force Henry Harley Arnold = 1886:1950 Concemed tate Pace Campaien was sala, Nos’ Ard encourages the lveducton of noensary bombing on Japanese tages. es Emperor Hirohito The emperor of Japan was more of fuehesd oie hing war tan an ae commander tk Paetiy he sll made sue to walk dough the rubble rere) after te tac. FIGHT TO THE DEATH FIRESTORM AT OKINAWA. A. aie cores ‘rou earns nacre FIRESTORM AT Weta CANPA GN OF OKINAWA, RYUKYU ISLANDS 1 APRIL - 22 JUNE 1945 twas @ curious calncidence - Operation leeberg, the Aled invasion of Oinawa, was scheduled for Apri 1945, both Easter Sunday and Api Foo's Day. Shor of an invasion of Japan se, the island inthe Ryuayu archipelago was the last objective of the Alled campaign across the Pacific Ocean during World War I Only 547 llometes fom the Japanese Home islands, (Okinawa would provide the stemest test of the war forthe Marine Ill Amphbous Corps and the US Army's XXNV Corps, comprising the Tenth Army under Lieutenant Geneval Simon Bollvar Buckner, veteran army officer and the son ofa Confederate general from the American Cw Wa. The invasion date was designated Love Day (ay to avoid confusion witn the 1944 0-Day landings in France. actualy, the Alled bull ‘up was larger than that of B-Day. Tho US and Bris Royal Navies brought 1.300 warships land suppor vessels along with 750,000 tons Of supples to the waters off Okinawa Buckner’ Tenth Army inuded more than 180,000 troops. Marine Major General Roy S Geiger le the ll Amphibious Corps, Including three divisions ~ the veteran 1st Marine Division, nicknamed the Old Breed, the 6th, ‘ana the 2nd in serve. Major General John F Hodge commanded the XXIV Amy Corp, including four infanty divisions ~ the 7th, 77th, ‘96th and reserve 27%. ‘The recent camage at Iwo Jima remained {tosh in American minds and 2 bloodbath was also expected at Okinawa. During the week before Lay, navy guns fired 13,000 shells ‘and carer based ara ew 3,095 missions. ‘The Lay lancings ware to tthe Hagushi ‘beaches on Okinava's southwestern shore ‘Mter the anticipated fight to gain a foothold, the Americans intended to advance eastward ‘cross the liana Peninsula, seiing Yontan ‘and Kadena aed. Spitting the flan in two, they would swing north and south, fighting their way to oppasite shores, completing the conquest of Okinawa. Another worrisome aspect of Operation Iceberg was the kamikaze {reat othe hast of Fifth Fleet ships obliged to remain offshore. Japanese suicide planes were fexpected to assault these ric targets with ‘unprecedented vigour. ‘82 days of figting on Okinawa and the ‘nearby cluster of small slands also seed Yielded an immense harvest of destruction, “THE RECENT CARNAGE AT 1WO JIMA REMAINED FRESH IN AMERICAN MINDS AND A BLOODBATH WAS ALSO EXRECTED” FIGHT TO THE DEATH By the time the Island was declared secure on 22 June 1945, American deaths totallod 7.274, ‘wtle 31.807 were wounded and 239 were missing, The navy sufered 4,907 casualties, £120 ships were damaged and 29 had been sunk, Marines and soiers eamed 23 Medals ‘of Honor, many of them posthumous. The Japanese garison, under Leutenant General Mitsuru Ushiima, commander ofthe ‘3nd Army, fled over 100,000 troops — ‘only 11,000 prisoners surrendered. & total of 2,373 Kamikaze plots died and thousands, ‘of sallors perished inte Imperial Japanese Navy's last substantia offensive action of the war. Many died when tho super battleship ‘Yamato sank under a fuse of bombs and ‘rial torpedoes. An estimated 150,000 ‘Okinawan evilans lost thei ves. Undor a canopy of arraft and naval bombardment, the invasion rolled forward ‘nthe moming of 1. Ari, landing craft. engines stirring white wakes extending 12 Ihlometros across. Vrtualy no rosistanco was ‘encountered. By the end of Lay, 60,000 ‘American troops occupied 8 beachinesd 4,600 metres deep and 14,000 metres wide. 28 men ‘were kiled, 104 wounded, and 27 missing Ushijma watched the awe-inspiring sigit {om his command post at Shuri Castle, the ‘ancient abode ofthe kings who once ruled the Ryulyus, asthe Americans put 1,000 ‘Woops ashore in an hour. fim advocate of ‘defence in depth, he conceded the beachhead ‘ad airfilds to draw the American inland, ‘where ne would defend the Istand tothe last man, his frees included the 9th, 24th and ‘62nd Divisions Independent brigades and ~anillery, engineer and naval troops were also ‘attached. For the death struggle, the fapanese ‘onstucted tree defensive Ines acoss southern Okinawa, ety progress was swift. In four days, ‘American troops took tertery they thought 128 CHARGED FORWARD AGAIN, KILLING EIGHT ENEMY SOLDIERS AND SMASHING A MORTAR POSITION” would require three weoks of combat. Both fields were captured on the fst day. By 3 April the 1st Marine Dvsion crossed the Ismkawa Isthmus, captured the Katchin Peninsula and cut OKnawa in hat. The airfields were quichy operational. Marne Air Groups ‘31 and 23 flew in from aircraft carriers and an ‘any Air Force fighter wing also arrived ‘Soon enough, the Manes found stuobom resistance, Fe battalions ofthe &th ane 29th Marines attacked 265-metre Mount Yae- Take and 2,000 enemy troops under Colone! Takesiko Uso. The Maines were stonewalled by enemy machine guns and mortars. The {Usinch guns of the battleship USS Tennessee barked, and Gorsairs of Marin Fighter ‘Squadron 322 (VMF-322) bombed and strafed. Te Udo Force was slaughtered while the Marines took 964 casualties clearing the area ‘he 7th and 96th Divisions hit the frst. ‘efensive line on 19 Api. The 27th Division ‘was soon committed. Minimal gans could not be held an the attack faltered, meaning that ‘Sherman tanks got separated from supporting Infantry while advancing near Kakazu ad enemy guns knocked out 22 ofthe 30 that wore sent forward. On 23 Api, Admiral Chester W Nimitz, commander in chet ofthe Pacite, ‘arrived on Okinawa and voiced his concerns for the Fifth leet as kamikaze attacks intensified. Hammering Buckner ta energise the offensive, [Nimitz snaried mat if Buckner was nat upto the task, “Well get someone here to move it "rm losing a ship and a half each day out here” ‘Nimitz was blunt fr a reason — Japanese Operation Ten-Go was unleashing 4,500 amikazes against the Fith Fleet, fling the shies with ten mass sorties nicknamed Kinusul, or Floating Chrysanthemums, each Inelvang 350 or more aireratt Te sailors of ‘the Fith Fleet endured, eaming the nickname ‘ofthe leet that came to stay’ Two kamikazes Fipped into the aircraft carer USS Bunker Mil ‘98 11 May, is BBth day on station, [American fighter plots shat down scores ‘of kamikazes. On 22 Apr three Marine Corse of VMF-223 famed 16 in 20, minutes, Nevertheless, some sucide planes ot through. The stand ofthe Fifth Fest (redesignated Third let when Admiral Wiliam F "Bull Halsey relieved Admiral Raymond A Spruance on 27 May) wrote 2 stiring chapter In US naval history. ‘Mtr threo weoks of fighting, Ushijima pulled surviving defenders outof the rst ine, cloaked Under steady rain and thick fog, In ently May, ‘the Tenth Army was poised to assault the second, or Shui Line, four disions abreast ‘across a &,200-metre front. On 2 May, the ast Marine Division assaulted the Awacha Pocket, ‘The Sth Marines advanced through a downpour but ran into enemy fre fram concealed positions. It took a week to clear Awacha. 2a.yearold Private Dale M Hansen of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, lost his rifle a8 itwas shattered by an enemy bullet during his sinlehanded destruction of Japanese pillbox on 7 May. He picked up another weapon ‘and ran up an adjacent rage but ix Japanese Soldiers blocked his path. Hansen shot four but then his rifle jammed. The two survivors pounced. Hansen swung the rite's butt and ‘tipped away. Grabbing a third rife and a Clutch of gronades, Hansen charged forward ‘again, ling eight enemy solders ana ‘smashing/@ mortar postion. More Maines followed, claiming the ridgeline. Hansen was killed by a sniper four days later. On 30 May 2346, his parents accepted his posthumous Mecai of Honor. ‘The 1st Battakon, 7th Marines, reached the top of Dakesh Ridge twice 09 12 May but was forced to rete, A day later, tee Sherman tanks, two mounting lamethyoners, charge ahead ofthe riflemen siting flame {and machine gun bullets and claimed the high graune, The Marines atop Dakest Ridge looked southward towards the rocky jumble cof Wana Draw and nearby Wana Rie. The 4st Marine Division flung itself against tho ‘uteropoings, clits and eves. Progress was ‘measured i yards. Though 19 days of hor, Marine casuaties averaged 200 for every 100 yard advance, ‘Marine and army tanks fed §:000 75mm ‘hells and 175,000 rounds of .30-calibre ‘ammunttion on 16 May slone. The 3a Battalion, 7h Marines lost a dozen officers in four days. The th Marines took 700 ceasuates at Dakeshi Ridge and 500 more in five days at Wana rev '300 replacements reached the 1st Marines, which relieved the 7th Marines, and renewed the attacks an Wana Drav, 365 metres wice atts mouth but narowing southward towards ‘Shur Ridge, tunneling Marines into interocking fields offre. By 20 May, the 5th Marines nad taken Hill 55 west of Wan Oraw but at the fend ofthe month, the 1st Marine Division was bogged down ane ridgeline short of Shur ‘rpc somos ana ngtrs te Royal any Pet A em Meanwhile, to tho west, the 6th Marino Division crossed the Asa River on 10 My, ‘advancing 900 metres In 36 hours. By 12 May. it had drawn up around a nondescript hil rising reciitousy 70 metres. The ritemen ricknamed it Sugar Loat. ‘Sugar Loaf was fanked by two more small hils dubbed Half Moon and Horseshoe. ‘The Marines di not intaly realise thatthe ‘complex was the western command nexus ‘ofthe Shut Line, 2,000 Japanese solders \ofended Sugar Loaf and another 3,000 held Half Moon and Horseshoe, The battle for the Sugar Loaf Half Moon Horseshoe wiag extended for ten harrowing

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