P3D – SEARCH AND SEIZURE - PEOPLE v. NIGEL RICHARD GATWARD our fishery laws.
our fishery laws. They are usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing
G.R. NOS. 119772-73, February 07, 1997
FACTS:
U Aung Win was caught in NAIA after arriving from Bangkok, Thailand. He had his
luggage inspected then proceeded to the conveyor to retrieve another baggage, but never came back.
The Customs examiner became alarmed by this and subjected the luggage under x-ray and found the
powdery substance heroin. Thereafter, the Customs Police were alerted and U Aung Win was caught
in the next day at the check in counter.
Gatward was caught with the helpof U Aung Win’s information during his investigation. He
was found bound for Amsterdam and already on the plane but was off-loaded in time. His baggage,
however, was not unloaded as it would delay the flight. The baggage was returned on the returning
flight, subjected to x-ray examination where to envelopes of heroin were found.
U Aung Win pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the RTC to 25 years of reclusion perpetua
and a fine of PhP 1M, taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty.
Gatward was sentenced to 35 years of reclusion perpetua and PhP 5M.
Gatward filed an appeal. During its pendency and while awaiting the filing of appeallant’s
brief, the Court received a mimeographed Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. It was signed by the
appellant, but not by counsel. The Court denied the motion for lack of merit. The pleading of appellant
was unauthorized, and the Court does not discuss or transmit notices of judicial action except to
counsel of the parties.
ISSUES:
Whether the Trial Court was correct in rejecting the challenge to admissibility in evidence
of the heroin retrieved from the bag of the appellant.
RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that the trial court was also correct in rejecting the challenge to the
admissibility in evidence of the heroin retrieved from the bag of appellant. While no search warrant
had been obtained for that purpose, when appellant checked in his bag as his personal luggage as a
passenger of KLM Flight No. 806 he thereby agreed to the inspection thereof in accordance with
customs rules and regulations, an international practice of strict observance, and waived any objection
to a warrantless search. His subsequent arrest, although likewise without a warrant, was justified since
it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of the heroin in his bag, or in flagrante delicto.
Roldan v. Arca
65 SCRA 336
Constitutional law; Bill of rights; Searches and seizures; Search of vessels suspected of illegal fishing
is an exception to the requirement of search warrant.—Search and seizure without search warrant of
vessels and air crafts for violations of the customs laws have been the traditional exception to the
constitutional requirement of a search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant could be
secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be
constitutionally effected. The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching
ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard.
Same; Same; Same; Search as an incident of a lawful arrest does not require a search warrant.—
Another exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant for a valid search and seizure,
is a search or seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest (Alvero vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637; Justice Fernando,
The Bill of Rights, 1972 ed., p. 224). Under our Rules of Court, a police officer or a private individual
may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) who has committed, is actually committing or is about to
commit an offense in his presence; (b) who is reasonably believed to have committed an offense which
has been actually committed; or (c) who is a prisoner who has escaped from confinement while serving
a final judgment or from temporary detention during the pendency of his case or while being
transferred from one confinement to another (Sec. 6, Rule 113, Revised Rules of Court). In the case
at bar, the members of the crew of the two vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with
dynamite and without the requisite license. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while
committing a crime is lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites
therein was equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest. Roldan, Jr. vs. Arca, 65 SCRA 336, No. L-
25434 July 25, 1975
FACTS:
Respondent company filed a case against Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Roldan, Jr. for the
recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI which had been seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries
Commissioner through the Philippine Nay. The CFI Manila granted it, thus respondent company took
to possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI.
Petitioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehended vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also
respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some provisions of the
Fisheries Act. On August 5, or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing
with dynamite.
ISSUE:
WON the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was valid.
HELD:
The seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites was valid.
Search and seizure of vessels and aircraft without search warrant for violations of the customs laws
have been traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant because, the
vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality and jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be
sough before such search or seizure can be constitutionality effected. The same exception should apply
to the seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are usually equipped with powerful
motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard.
Another exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant for a valid search and seizure,
is a search or seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. Under our Rules of Court, a police officer or a
private individual may, without warrant, arrest a person a) who has committed, is actually committing
or is about the commit an offense which has been actually committed; b) who is reasonably believed
to have committed the offense which has been actually committed; or c) who is detention prisoner
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who has escaped from confinement while serving final judgement or from temporary detention during
pendency of his case or while being transferred from one confinement to another. In the case at bar,
the members of the two vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without
the requisite license. Thus, their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while committing a crime is
lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was equally valid
as an incident to a lawful arrest.
Salvador v. People
GR No. 146706, July 15, 2005
FACTS:
On June 4, 1994, Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos and petitioner Tomas Salvador all aircraft
mechanics employed by the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) and assigned at NAIA and Manila Domestic
Airport, were apprehended by intelligence operatives of the Philippine Air Force (PAF) for possessing
13 packets of smuggled watches and jewelries valued at more than half a million pesos. The officers
were conducting routine surveillance operations at the Airport to act on reports of drug trafficking and
smuggling by PAL personnel. They were keeping a close watch on an airplane parked inside Airport
Terminal. Late that night, the officers noticed 3 persons boarding the plane, and eventually they
disembarked with their abdominal areas bulging, thereafter boarding an airplane tow truck. The
officers immediately followed the truck, when they were able to block it, they asked the persons to
alight, the 3 accused having packages covered by girdles, inside their shirts. This prompted the officers
to arrest the accused. Upon examination of the packages, an inventory was made of assorted watches
and gold jewelries. An information was charged against the accused, but they denied committing the
offense, alleging that they were framed by the officers. Despite the defense, the RTC rendered a
decision finding them guilty, which the CA affirmed. Only accused Salvador filed this petition
assailing the decision.
ISSUES:
Whether the seized items are admissible in evidence.
HELD:
Yes the seized items are admissible as evidence. The petitioner contends that the warrantless
search and seizure conducted was illegal, since they were unaware that a crime was committed and
the officers just engaged in a fishing expedition in violation of the petitioner’s right against unlawful
search and seizure. The Court ruled that one of the exceptions in requiring a warrant before an arrest
is when it amounts to a customs search. The special mission of the officers was to conduct a
surveillance, to act on reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by PAL personnel. This is in a nature
of a customs search so a warrant may be dispensed with. In addition to that, the petitioner and his co-
accused were on board a moving aircraft tow truck, which is also one of the recognized exceptions for
a warrant to be dispensed with. It is impracticable to wait for a warrant to be issued first before a
search is conducted for moving vehicles, since they can easily be moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction were the warrant is sought. Establishing that the search and seizure conducted was legal,
the pieces of evidence obtained are admissible in court to sustain the conviction of the petitioner.
People vs. CFI Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City [GR L-41686, 17 November 1980]
Facts: One week before 9 February 1974, the Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center (RASAC) was
informed by an undisclosed Informer that a shipment of highly dutiable goods would be transported
to Manila from Angeles City on a blue Dodge car. Spurred by such lead, RASAC Agents Arthur
Manuel and Macario Sabado, on said date and upon order of the Chief of Intelligence and Operations
Branch, RASAC-MBA, Col. Antonio Abad, Jr., stationed themselves in the vicinity of the toll gate of
the North Diversion Road at Balintawak, Quezon City. At about 6:45 a.m. of the same day, a light
blue Dodge car with Plate 21-87-73, driven by Sgt. Jessie Hope who was accompanied by Monina
Medina approached the exit gate and after giving the toll receipt sped away towards Manila. The
RASAC agents gave a chase and overtook Sgt. Hope's car. Agent Sabado blew his whistle and signaled
Sgt. Hope to stop but the latter instead of heeding, made a Uturn back to the North Diversion Road,
but he could not go through because of the buses in front of his car. At this point, the agents succeeded
in blocking Sgt. Hope's car and the latter stopped. Manuel and Sabado who were in civilian clothes
showed their identification cards to Hope and Medina and introduced themselves as RASAC agents.
The Agents saw 4 boxes on the back seat of the Dodge and upon inquiry as to what those boxes were,
Sgt. Hope answered "I do not know." Further, Hope and Medina were asked where they were bringing
the boxes, to which Medina replied that they were bringing them (boxes) to the Tropical Hut at
Epifanio de los Santos. Agent Sabado boarded the Dodge car with Hope and Medina while Agent
Manuel took their own car and both cars drove towards Tropical Hut making a brief stop at the
Bonanza where Agent Manuel called up Col. Abad by telephone. Arriving at the Tropical Hut, the
party, together with Col. Abad who had joined them waited for the man who according to Monina
Medina was supposed to receive the boxes. As the man did not appear, Col. Abad "called off the
mission" and brought respondents and their car to Camp Aguinaldo arriving there at about 9:00 a.m.
An inspection of Sgt. Hope's car at Camp Aguinaldo yielded 11 sealed boxes, 4 on the rear seat and 7
more in the baggage compartment which was opened on orders of Col. Abad. On the same order of
the intelligence officer, the boxes were opened before the presence of Hope and Medina,
representatives of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs, P.C., COSAC and
photographers of the Department of National Defense. The contents of the bozes revealed some "4,441
more or less wrist watches of assorted brands; 1,075 more or less watch bracelets of assorted brands,"
supposedly untaxed. As consequence, thereof, ASAC Chairman General Pelagio Cruz requested the
Bureau of Customs to issue a Warrant of Seizure and Detention against the articles including the
Dodge car. The Collector of Customs did issue the same on 12 February 1974. It was admitted,
however, that when the apprehending agents arrested respondents and brought them together with the
seized articles to the ASAC Office in Camp Aguinaldo, the former were not armed with a warrant of
arrest and seizure. In conjunction with the Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued by the Collector
of Customs, seizure proceedings were instituted and docketed as Seizure Identification 14281 against
the wrist watches and watch bracelets pursuant to Section 2530 (m) — 1 of the Tariff and Customs
Code, and Seizure Identification No. 14281-A against the Dodge car pursuant to Section 2530(k) of
the same Code. On the other hand, Hope and Medina disclaimed ownership of the seized articles.
Ownership was instead claimed by one Antonio del Rosario who intervened in the proceedings. Hope
claimed that at the time of apprehension, he had no knowledge of the contents of the boxes, and
granting that he had such knowledge, he never knew that these are untaxed commodities; that he
consented to transport said boxes from Angeles City to Manila in his car upon request of his girl friend
Monina as a personal favor; that he was not present when the boxes were loaded in his car nor was he
ever told of their contents on the way. On the part of Monina Medina, she testified that what she did
was only in compliance with the agreement with Mr. Del Rosario to transport the boxes and deliver
them to a certain Mr. Peter at the Tropical Hut who will in turn give her the contracted price; that Mr.
Del Rosario did not reveal the contents of the boxes which she came to know of only when the boxes
were opened at Camp Aguinaldo. As there was not enough evidence to controvert the testimonies of
respondents and the narration of claimant Antonio del Rosario, the Collector of Customs issued his
decision in the seizure cases on 1 April 1975 declaring that the seized articles including the car are not
subject of forfeiture. Meanwhile, on 14 March 1974, after the requisite preliminary investigation, the
City Fiscal of Quezon City, finding the existence of a prima facie case against Hope and Medina, filed
Criminal Case Q-3781 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City). Upon arraignment on 23
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April 1974, respondents pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced on 28 January 1975 and while the
prosecution through its first witness, Agent Macario Sabado, was adducing as evidence the pictures
of the 11 boxes containing the assorted watches and watch bracelets, the defense counsel objected to
the presentation of the pictures and the subject articles on the ground that they were seized without the
benefit of warrant, and therefore inadmissible in evidence under Section 4(2), Article IV of the New
Constitution. After the parties have argued their grounds in their respective memoranda, the trial court
issued the order of 20 August 1975 declaring that the alleged smuggled articles and the pictures taken
of said items as inadmissible in evidence. The prosecution's motion for reconsideration was denied on
30 September 1975. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari which was treated as a special civil
action in the Supreme Court's Resolution of 5 May 1976.
Issue: Whether the search and seizure made on the boxes in the blue Dodge car was valid, even after
the Collector of Customs declared the seized articles not subject to forfeiture.
Held: It is not accurate to say that the Collector of Customs made no findings that the articles were
smuggled. In fact, what the Collector stated was that the prosecution failed to present the quantum of
evidence sufficient to warrant the forfeiture of the subject articles. In a general sense, this does not
necessarily exclude the possibility of smuggling. The decision of the Collector of Customs, as in other
seizure proceedings, concerns the res rather than the persona. The proceeding is a probe on contraband
or illegally imported goods. The importer or possessor is treated differently. The fact that the
administrative penalty befalls on him is an inconsequential incidence to criminal liability. By the same
token, the probable guilt cannot be negated simply because he was not held administratively liable.
The Collector's final declaration that the articles are not subject to forfeiture does not detract his
findings that untaxed goods were transported in Hope and Medina's car and seized from their
possession by agents of the law. Whether criminal liability lurks on the strength of the provision of
the Tariff and Customs Code adduced in the information can only be determined in a separate criminal
action. Hope and Medina's exoneration in the administrative cases cannot deprive the State of its right
to prosecute. But under our penal laws, criminal responsibility, if any, must be proven not by
preponderance of evidence but by proof beyond reasonable doubt. As enunciated in the leading case
of Papa vs. Mago, in the exercise of the specific functions, the Code does not mention the need of a
search warrant unlike Section 2209 which explicitly provides that a "dwelling house may be entered
and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge (or justice of the peace), upon sworn application
showing probable cause and particularly describing the place to be searched and person or thing to be
seized." Aware of this delineation, the Court in that case expressed the considered view that "except
in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs
law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws." The
rationale of the Mago ruling was nurtured by the traditional doctrine in Carroll v. United States 6
wherein an imprimatur against, constitutional infirmity was stamped in favor of a warrantless search
and seizure of such nature as herein. On this stable foundation, the warrantless seizure did not violate
Article IV, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution, which finds origin in the Fourth Amendment of the
American Constitution.
P4A – Asuncion v. CA GR No. 125959, 1 February 1999
Martinez, J.:
Doctrine: Search and Seizure
Legal bases cited:
Facts
Petitioners seek reconsideration of resolution of Honorable court dated Feb. 10, 1997 which denied
his Petition for Review on Certiorari for his failure to sufficiently show respondent Court of appeals
had committed a reversible error in rendering questioned judgment.
Said petition seeks a review of decision of Court of Appeals in CA CR No. 16308 entitled People of
the Philippines v. Jose Maria M. Asuncion, which affirmed judgment of Regional Trial Court of
Malabon, Branch 170, finding petitioner Jose Maria M. Asuncion guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
possession of regulated drugs punishable under Section 16, Article 3 of Republic Act No. 6245,
otherwise known as Dangerous Drugs Act.
On June 29, 1994, a Notice of Appeal was filed and records of case were transmitted by trial court to
Court of Appeals. On April 30, 1996, a decision was rendered by appellate court, which states:
Wherefore, premises considered, appealed decision of Regional Trial court in Malabon MODIFIES
as to penalty imposed but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Thus, accused appellant is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of SIX (6) months of arresto mayor in its maximum
period as minimum to FOUR (4) years and TWO (2) months of prision correctional in its medium
period as maximum and fine of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000) imposed on accused is hereby
deleted.
On August 6, 1996, a petition for review on certiorari was filed before this Court with petitioner
arguing that Court of Appeals erred.
On March 17, 1997, a motion for reconsideration was filed. Petitioner sought reconsideration of
dismissal on grave constitutional considerations, arguing that warrantless search was illegal. The
shabu recovered, being illegally obtained, was inadmissible as evidence. The petitioner also raised
constitutional issues for re-examination.
Issue
1. Whether trial court’s ruling of time of commission is not material in proving offense
charged.
2. Whether probable cause was required to effect warrantless arrest and search exist
under the circumstances.
3. Whether defense evidence are mere denials which cannot override positive assertions
of prosecution witnesses.
Held
Search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not absolute. As search of moving vehicle
is one of doctrinally accepted exceptions to Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be
made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining existence of
probable cause. The prevalent circumstances of the case was made as regards a moving vehicle of
petitioners which was flagged down by apprehending officers upon identification. Thus, police
authorities were justified in searching petitioners automobile without a warrant since situation
demanded immediate action.
Court, in case of People v. Lo Ho Wing, elucidated the rationale for exemption of searches of moving
vehicles from coverage of requirement of search warrants, to wit:
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". . . the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a
moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before
a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the
satisfaction of the issuing judge — a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of
smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to
another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the
ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."cralaw virtua1aw library
The apprehending officers even sought the permission of petitioner to search the car, to which the
latter agreed. As such, since the shabu was discovered by virtue of a valid warrantless search and the
petitioner himself freely gave his consent to said search, the prohibited drugs found as a result were
admissible in evidence. 11
First of all, even though the police authorities already identified the petitioner as an alleged shabu
dealer and confirmed the area where he allegedly was plying his illegal trade, they were uncertain as
to the time he would show up in the vicinity. Secondly, they were uncertain as to the type of vehicle
petitioner would be in, taking into account reports that petitioner used different cars in going to and
from the area. Finally, there was probable cause as the same police officers had a previous encounter
with the petitioner, who was then able to evade arrest.
Unfortunately for petitioner, his defense was anchored only on a single document — a medical
certificate signed by a Dr. Aster Sagun, Jr. of the Pagamutang Bayan ng Malabon. 19 Said document,
according to the defense, proved that petitioner was indeed forcibly abducted by the police, brought
to the said hospital at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening and afterwards was brought to the police
station, where he slept until the alleged time of his "arrest." To the mind of this Court, petitioner placed
too much reliance on said document, which did not even give an inch towards proving their allegations.
The medical certificate could not possibly prove anything more than the fact that petitioner had his
blood pressure checked at said hospital at said time. To claim that it proved something more would be
to venture into speculation and guesswork.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration, is hereby DENIED.
P3F
People vs. Suzuki (2003)
Keywords: Bongbong’s Piaya, Dangerous Drugs, Consented Search, VALID WARRANTLESS
SEARCH, Airport Security procedure
Facts:
Sometime in November 1993, the PNP Narcotics Command issued a directive to all Chiefs of
Narcotics Regional Field Units to cover all domestic airport terminals within their respective areas of
responsibility, following reports that drug trafficking is prevalent in domestic airports; and to
coordinate with local airport authorities and the PASCOM. In the morning of 12 April 1994, Hedishi
Suzuki and Takeshi Koketsu, both Japanese nationals, entered the pre-departure area of the Bacolod
Airport Terminal. Suzuki was bound for Manila via Philippine Airlines and was carrying a small
traveling bag and a box marked “Bongbong’s piaya.”
At the pre-departure area, upon the advice of Corazon Sinosa, a civilian personnel of the PASCOM,
Suzuki proceeded to the “walk-through metal detector,” a machine which produces a red light and an
alarm once it detects the presence of metallic substance or object. Thereupon, the red light switched
on and the alarm sounded, signifying the presence of metallic substance either in his person or in the
box he was carrying. This prompted PO3 Rhodelin Poyugao of the Police Aviation Security Command
(PASCOM) to frisk him bodily. Finding no metallic object in his body, PO3 Poyugao picked up the
box of piaya and passed it through the machine. Again, the machine was activated. PO3 Poyugao then
ordered Suzuki to go to the hand-carried luggage inspection counter where several PASCOM and
NARCOM personnel were present. SPO1 Arturo Casugod, Sr. requested Suzuki to open the box.
He appeared tense and reluctant and started to leave, but SPO1 Casugod called him. Eventually he
consented, saying in faltering English, “open, open.” SPO1 Casugod opened the box and found therein
18 small packs, 17 of which were wrapped in aluminum foil. SPO1 Casugod opened one pack. Inside
were dried fruiting tops which looked like marijuana. Upon seeing this, Suzuki ran outside the pre-
departure area but he was chased by PO3 Poyugao, SPO1 Gilbert Linda of the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) and Donato Barnezo of the PASCOM. They apprehended Suzuki near the entrance of
the terminal and brought him to the PASCOM office. They also brought Takeshi and his wife, Lourdes
Linsangan, to the office, being suspects as conspirators with Suzuki in drug trafficking.
Lourdes asked permission to call Atty. Silvestre Tayson. When he arrived, the police apprised Suzuki
of his constitutional rights. Meanwhile, SPO1 Casugod weighed the contents of the box and
inventoried the same. The total weight of the suspected marijuana fruiting tops was 1.9 kilograms or
1,900 grams. He then drafted a “confiscation receipt” which Suzuki, upon the advice of Atty. Tayson,
refused to acknowledge. SPO1 Casugod turned over Suzuki to SPO1 Linda for investigation.
Subsequently, Suzuki and his companions were brought to the prosecutor’s office for inquest and
placed under the custody of C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara at the NARCOM office. The box with its
contents was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory. P/Inspector Rea Abastillas Villavicencio, the
forensic chemist of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, conducted three tests on
the specimen samples which proved positive for marijuana. Suzuki was charged with unlawful
possession of marijuana, a prohibited drug, in violation of the Dangerous Drug Act. Suzuki entered a
plea of not guilty, and trial followed thereafter. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Bacolod City in
Criminal Case 94-16100 convicted Hedishi Suzuki of illegal possession of marijuana, defined and
penalized under Section 8, Article II of RA 6425, as amended, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of death and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue:
Whether the PASCOM has the authority to inspect luggage or hand-carried bags
Held:
YES. PASCOM has authority and the warrantless search is valid
The Police Aviation Security Command (PASCOM) is the implementing arm of the National Action
Committee on Anti-Hijacking (NACAH), which is a creation of Presidential Letter of Instruction (LOI)
399, dated 28 April 1976. On 18 February 1978, a Memorandum of Understanding among the
Secretary of National Defense, the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communication,
the Secretary of Justice, the Director General, National Intelligence and Security Authority and the
Secretary of Finance was signed. Under the said Memorandum of Understanding the then AVSECOM
(now PASCOM) shall have the following functions and responsibilities: (1) Secure all airports against
offensive and terroristic acts that threaten civil aviation; (2) Undertake aircraft anti-hijacking
operations; (3) Exercise operational control and supervision over all agencies involved in airport
security operations; (4) Take all necessary preventive measures to maintain peace and order, and
provide other pertinent public safety services within the airports; xxx. Based upon the Memorandum
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of Understanding, pursuant to President LOI 399, in relation to RA 6235, the PASCOM had the legal
authority to be at the Bacolod Airport, Bacolod City and to inspect luggages hand-carried bags. This
is not the first time that the Court recognizes a search conducted pursuant to routine airport
security procedure as an exception to the proscription against warrantless searches. In People
vs. Canton, and People vs. Johnson, the Court validated the search conducted on the departing
passengers and the consequent seizure of the shabu found in their persons. Clearly, the PASCOM
agents have the right under the law to conduct search of prohibited materials or substances. To simply
refuse passengers carrying suspected illegal items to enter the pre-departure area is to deprive the
authorities of their duty to conduct search, thus sanctioning impotence and ineffectivity of the law
enforcers, to the detriment of society. It should be stressed, however, that whenever the right against
unreasonable search and seizure is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search or seizure. Here, Suzuki
voluntarily gave his consent to the search conducted by the PASCOM agents.
PEOPLE VS. LEILA JOHNSON
Facts:
Leila Reyes Johnson, 58, a widow, and a resident of California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen
who was naturalized as an American in 1968 and had since been working as a registered nurse, in the
United States. On 16 June 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her son's family in Calamba,
Laguna. When she was about to flew back to the US, at around 7:30 p.m. of that day Ramirez was on
duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers,
employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and
explosives. When she frisked Johnson, she felt something hard on the latter's abdominal area. Upon
inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an
operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the
matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying "Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po
iyon." She was directed to take Johnson to the nearest women's room for inspection. Ramirez took
Johnson to the rest room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed outside. Inside the
women's room, Johnson was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and
Johnson gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked her "to bring out the
thing under her girdle." Johnson brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to
Embile, outside the women's room. The confiscated packs contained a total of 580.2 grams of a
substance which was found by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be shabu. Embile took Johnson and
the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area of
the NAIA, where Johnson's passport and ticket were taken and her luggage opened. The RTC found
Johnson guilty
Issue:
Whether the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport violates her right against unreasonable
search and seizure.
Ruling:
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial
investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5,
Rule 113 of tie 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that "A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in
fact just been committed and person to be arrested has committed it; and xxx." The circumstances
surrounding the arrest of the accused falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence
the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from being accurate. The
shabu seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to
airport security procedures. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane
hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to
board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage, as well as checked
luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of
suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little
question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed,
travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline
tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such
would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. The packs of methamphetamine
hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in
evidence against Johnson. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was
justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of "shabu" in her person in flagrante
delicto.
P4D People vs. De Gracia 233 SCRA 716 (1994)
Facts:
The records show that in the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence
Division, National Capital Region Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota car conducting
a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at EDSA, together with his team and was conducted
pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division that said establishment was being occupied
by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post. After a while, a group of five men
disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of the surveillance team drew their
guns and fired at the team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh.
Nobody in the surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought cover inside the car and
they were afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire. As a consequence, at
around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were
able to find and confiscate contrabands inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano
which is located at the right portion of the building. On February 22, 1991, the trial court rendered
judgment found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. That judgment
of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal.
Issue:
Whether in a state of emergency circumstances exist, the arrest of the accused involved in rebellious
act is valid without securing a arrest and search warrant.
Held:
Yes, Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under
one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military
operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that
a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant
their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to
apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on
December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and
5
exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with. While it is true that the
officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of
accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said
officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime. Probable cause has been
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless
search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of
each case.
Valmonte v. De Villa
G.R 83988
Constitutional Law; Search and Seizure; Checkpoints; The constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed or
threatened to be infringed.—No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course
of their routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners’ right against
unlawful search and seizure or other rights. In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union
of Lawyers and Advocates for People’s Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National Police, it was held that
individual petitioners who do not allege that any of their rights were violated are not qualified to bring
the action, as real parties in interest. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to
be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonale search and seizure in any particular case is
purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. Petitioner
Valmonte’s general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search
warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the
incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient
to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte’s right against unlawful
search and seizure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Reasonableness of a search to be determined according to the facts of each
case, not by any fixed formula. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited.—Not all searches and
seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to
be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. Where,
for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the
public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search. Valmonte vs. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
Same; Same; Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence, and promote public
welfare, and an individual’s right against warrantless search which was reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail.—The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in
other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the
interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in
cities of police and military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are
reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions—which all sum up
to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of
the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual’s right against a
warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutionality of Checkpoints; Checkpoints during abnormal times, if
conducted within reasonable limits, are constitutional.—True, the manning of checkpoints by the
military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power
is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to
the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits,
are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. Valmonte vs. De Villa,
178 SCRA 211, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
FACTS:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant
to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of
conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose
of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital
Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints,
the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the
arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering
that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night
or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety
increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of
Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC
manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing
to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in
the air.
ISSUE:
WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people against unreasonable searches and
seizures
HELD:
Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the
checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se, illegal. No proof has been
presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military, indeed,
committed specific violations of petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only
by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and seizures
are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. The setting up of the questioned
checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt, in the interest
of public security. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public
welfare and an individual’s right against a warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably conducted,
the former should prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by
the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost
of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these
6
abnormal times, when conducted withinn reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly
society and a peaceful community.
P4F – SEARCH AND CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 104961, October 07, 2018
FACTS:
Congressman Francisco B. Aniag assails in this petition Resolution No. 2327 for being
unconstitutional and Resolution No. 92-0839 for want of legal and factual bases.
In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections on May 11, 1992, The
Commisson on Elections issued Resolution No. 2323 otherwise refered to as the “Gun Ban”
subsequently it issued resolution No. 2327 providing for summary disqualification of candidates
engaged in gun running, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces and
establishing spot checkpoints.
Pursuant to the “Gun Ban” Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant at Arms, House of
Representatives, wrote to Cong. Aniag requesting the return of two firearms issued to him by the
House of Representatives. Upon being advised of this request the petitioner instructed his driver
Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms in his house and to return them to Taccad. The car driven by
Arellano was flagged down by the policemen manning a checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex.
They searched the car and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in
the trunk. Arellano was apprehended and detained.
The police referred Arellano’s case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for inquest, however,
the inquest did not include the petitioner as among those charged with the election offense. The City
Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano finding the latter’s sworn statement meritorious. The City
Prosecutor also recommended the dismissal of Arellano’s case and “unofficial” charge.
Nevertheless, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 92-0829 directing filing of information
against petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Elecetion Code and petitioner to show
cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 2327.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration and to hold abeyance the administrative
proceedings as well as the filing of information in court but it was denied by the COMELEC. Hence
this recourse.
ISSUES:
Whether the warrantless search conducted by the PNP without informing the driver of his
fundamental rights is lawful.
RULING:
No. The Court ruled that the checkpoint was set up twenty (20) meters from the entrance to
the Batasan Complex to enforce Resolution No. 2327. There was no evidence to show that the
policemen were impelled to do so because of a confidential report leading them to reasonably believe
that certain motorists matching the description furnished by their informant were engaged in
gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier,
was there any indication from the package or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the
suspicion of the policemen. Absent such justifying circumstances specifically pointing to the
culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not be valid. The action then of the policemen
unreasonably intruded into petitioner's privacy and the security of his property, in violation of Sec. 2,
Art. III, of the Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of petitioner's right
against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding.
An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the
search had reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law
offender or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a
crime in the vehicle to be searched. The existence of probable cause justifying the warrantless search
is determined by the facts of each case. Thus, we upheld the validity of the warrantless search in
situations where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where
the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
People v. Martinez et al.
G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010
FACTS: On September 2, 2006 at around 1245 PM, PO1 Bernard Azarden was on duty at the Police
Community Precinct along Arellano St., Dagupan City when a concerned citizen reported that a pot
session was underway in the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan
City. PO1 Azardan, PO1 Alejandro dela Cruz and members of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)
proceeded to aforesaid house. Upon inquiry from people in the area, the house of Gonzales was located.
As the team entered the house, accused Orlando Doria was arrested while coming out. Inside the house
were Gonzales, Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, and Rezin Martinez. Seized from the accused were
open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of used
aluminum foil. The accused were arrested and brought to police station, seized items were sent to the
Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory. All accused, except for Doria, were found positive
for methylamphetamine HCL.
On February 13, 2008, RTC found Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, Rezin Martinez and Rafael
Gonzales guilty beyond reasonable doubt under Sec. 13 in relation to Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 and
sentenced each to life imprisonment and fined PHP 500,000 plus cost of suit.
The CA supported the findings of the lower court.
ISSUE: Were the guilt of the accused proven beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING: No, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt because (1) evidence against the accused are inadmissible and (2) even if the
evidence were admissible, the chain of custody was not duly established .
The evidence is inadmissible because of the illegal arrest, search and seizure. Searches and seizures
without a warrant are valid in (1) incidence of lawful arrest, (2) “plain view” search of evidence, (3)
moving vehicle search, (4) consented search, (5) customs search, (6) stop and frisk, (7)exigent and
emergency cases. Under Rule 113, Sec. 5 of RRCP warrantless arrest can only be done in in flagrante
cases, hot pursuit cases, and fugitive cases. The arrest of the accused-appellants were based solely on
the report of a concerned citizen, no surveillance of the place was conducted. Under Rule 113, fugitive
case does not apply. In flagrante and hot pursuit case may apply only upon probable cause, which
means actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion. It is reasonable ground of suspicion when
suspicion of a person to be arrested is probably guilty of the offense based on actual facts, that is,
7
supported by circumstances. In case at bar, this is not the case since the entire arrest was based on Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a
uncorroborated statement of a concerned citizen. white envelope slipped and yielded a small sachet containing drug.

The chain of custody as outlined in Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165 was not observed as no proper inventory,
photographing, was done in the presence of the accused nor were there representatives from the media,
the DOJ and any popularly elected official present, although in warrantless seizures, marking and
photographing of evidence may be done at the nearest police station.
Court sets aside and reverses the decision of the CA dated August 7, 2009, acquits the accused and
orders their immediate release.
P5C - People v Rancho GR No. 186529, August 3, 2010
Appellant was charged with 2 separate information. One for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for
transporting or delivering; and second, of Section 11, of same law for possessing, dangerous drugs.
During arraignment, appellant pleaded “Not Guilty” to both charges.
Appellant also averred that he went to Baler, Auror to visit his brother to inform him about their ailing
father. He maintained that charges against him were false and that no shabu was taken from him. He
insisted that he was blocked while on his way to ride a tricycle, was forced to alight, stripped of his
clothes and underwear, then brought to police station for investigation.

Nachura, J: In his brief, appellant attacks credibility of witnesses for prosecution. He avers that prosecution failed
to establish identity of confiscated drug because of team’s failure to mark specimen immediately after
Doctrine: Arrests seizure. He also questions admissibility of confiscated sachet on ground that it was the fruit of the
poisonous tree.
Legal Basis Cited:
Records show that appellant never objected to irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Thus,
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with judicial the Court abides by that the appellant has waived his right to question validity of is arrest as the legality
warrant, otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be of the arrest affects only jurisdiction of court over his person. Appellant’s warrantless arrest cannot be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, basis of acquittal.
namely:
As to the admissibility of seized drug in evidence, RTC concluded that appellant was caught in
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; flagrante delicto, declaring that he was caught in act of actually committing a crime or attempting to
2. Search of evidence in “plan view,” commit a crime in presence of apprehending officers as he arrived in Bale, Aurora bringing him a
3. Search of a moving vehicle; sachet of shabu. Also, a search is substantially contemporaneous with an arrest which can precede
4. Consented warrantless search; arrest of police to have probable cause to make arrest at outset of search.
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk, and Issue
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
1. Whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial 2. Whether that information of a tip is sufficient, by itself, as a probable cause, to effect
question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of a valid warrantless arrest.
the search and seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search
and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.
Held

Facts
On appeal is the Court of Appeals Decision dated 22 May 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425,
affirming Regional Trial Court (RTC) Joint Decision dated 8 July 2004 finding appellant Jack Rancho
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police posing as a buyer transacted with the appellant
for the purchase of shabu. Said confidential agent gave police the appellant’s name, together with his
physical description, together with the location where the appellant would provide the shabu--in Baler
Aurora.
On May 20, 2003, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler, Aurora, carrying the appellant. Thereafter, the police
approached the appellant and invited him to the police station on suspicion of carrying shabu.
1. YES. As what prompted police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip
given by informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora, carrying shabu.
2. NO. Jurisdiction states that “reliable information” alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest. The rule requires, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that
he has committed, or is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Jurisprudence dictates that appellant should have done some overt act to be rendered guilty.
Also, exceptions do not apply to him as the arresting officers were not impelled by urgency
that would allow them to do away with requisite warrant s they had learned the description
of appellant as well as his name. They had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.

8
 This is an instance of a seizure of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” hence confiscated item is
inadmissible as evidence. As such without confiscated shabu, appellant’s conviction cannot
be sustained based on remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted.
After a thorough review of the records of the case, the Court finds that appellant can no longer question
the validity of his arrest, but sachet of shabu seized from him during warrantless search is inadmissible
in evidence against him.
While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to
preserve peace and security of society, the Court admonishes them to act with deliberate care and
within parameters set by Constitution and law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated 22 May 2008, in CA
-GR CR-HC No. 00425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jack Rancho is
ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.
The Director of Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause immediate release of appellant, unless
the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of date of his release,
or the reasons for his confinement, within ten (10) days from notice.
P5D - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ENRIQUE REYES
G.R. No. 224498, January 11, 2018
Facts: Accused-appellant was charged with murder in an Information which alleges that the said
accused, with treachery, attack DANILO ESTRELLA Y SANCHEZ by firing his armalite rifle at said
Danilo who was then walking home and hitting him on different parts of the body, depriving the latter
of a chance to defend himself from the attack thereby inflicting upon him mortal gunshot wounds
which caused his immediate death.
Invoking self-defense, accused-appellant argued that he was informed by Aelardo that Danilo and four
other men are planning to kill him. Fearing for his family's safety, accused-appellant prepared his
Armalite rifle. When Celia was on her way to accused-appellant's house, she saw a man holding a gun
approaching accused-appellant from behind. When Celia shouted "Ricky," accused-appellant turned
towards Celia and saw Danilo holding a gun in the act of shooting him. Accused-appellant drew and
fired his Armalite rifle, hitting Danilo who fell on the ground.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant can validly claim self-defense.
Ruling: Self-defense cannot be validly claimed. By invoking self-defense, the burden of proof shifted
to accused-appellant to show that the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
invoking self-defense.
In this case, accused-appellant claimed that when Celia shouted his name, he saw Danilo who was
about to shoot him. However, based on Celia's testimony, Danilo was only approaching accused-
appellant while holding a gun. Celia did not witness any positive act showing the actual and material
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The accused-appellant is held guilty of murder.
Ratio Decidenci: Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful
aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing for there is nothing to repel.
Gist: This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, modifying accused-appellant PFC Enrique Reyes' conviction
from Murder to Homicide, and the CA's Resolution which denied his Motion for Reconsideration.
LUZ V. PEOPLE
G. R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012
FACTS:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned as a traffic enforcer saw the accused,
driving a motorcycle without a helmet; this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a
municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving said motor
vehicle, he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place is almost in front of the
said sub-station.
He was alerted of the accused’s uneasy movement and thus asked to take out the contents of the pocket
of his jacket, as the latter may have a weapon inside it, the accused obliged and slowly put out the
contents of the pocket of his jacket which later the accused spilled out the contents of the container on
the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the
other two (2) contained suspected shabu.
The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs as the substances are positive
of methampethamine hydrochloride. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
Upon a petition for review on certiorari, petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure,
because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was
erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance.
Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted
upon him.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a valid arrest.
RULING:
There was no valid arrest. When the petitioner was flagged down for committing a traffic
violation, he was not, by the fact itself for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person into
custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected
by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the
custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the
body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an
intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of
the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. There being no valid
arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The following are the instances
when a warrantless search is allowed (1) A warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) search
of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5)customs
search; (6) a stop and frisk search; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable
to this case.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very concrete
evidence of the crime illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes
conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused
9

P5F MARTIN VILLAMOR Y TAYSON v. PEOPLE, GR No. 200396, 2017-03-22
Facts:
A mere tip from an unnamed informant does not vest police officers with the authority to barge into
private homes without first securing a valid warrant of arrest or search warrant. While there are
instances where arrests and searches may be made without a warrant, the Court finds that the
constitutionally-protected right against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated in the case at
bar.
Villamor was charged with violation of Section 3(c) of RA 9287 for collecting and soliciting bets for
an illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng" and possessing a list of various numbers, a
calculator, a cellphone, and cash. Another Information[5] was filed in the same court charging
Bonaobra with violation of the same law
On June 17, 2005, at around 8:30a.m., Villamor went to Bonaobra's house to pay a debt he owed to
the latter's wife, Jonah. At that time, Bonaobra was having coffee with his father Floren... t... cio inside
their house. Villamor gave Bonaobra P2,000.00 which the latter placed on top of the table. Bonaobra
then went outside the house to answer his cellphone. When Bonaobra was at the door, a man later
identified as PD Peñaflor kicked the fence of Bonaobra's house, grabbed Bonaobra's right arm, and
said, "Caught in the act ka!" Florencio went outside and asked PD Peñaflor if he had a search warrant.
Two more men entered the house and took the money from the table. Petitioners were then made to
board the service vehicle and brought in for investigation at the police headquarters.
the RTC of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43 rendered its Judgment finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of committing illegal numbers game locally known as ''lotteng... respectively as a
collector or agent... and as a coordinator, controller, or supervisor... he RTC gave credence to the
testimonies of the arresting officers and held that petitioners were caught in flagrante delicto
committing an illegal numbers game locally known as "lotteng,"
Issue:
whether the petitioners' conviction for violation of RA 9287 as collector or agent under Section 3(c)
for Villamor, and as coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d) for Bonaobra, should be
upheld.
Held:
The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures was
violated by the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra's compound without a valid warrant
of arrest or a search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant for a valid
search and seizure, none applies in the case at bar. Consequently, the evidence obtained by the police
officers is inadmissible against the petitioners, the same having been obtained in violation of the said
right.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires a judicial warrant based on the existence of
probable cause before a search and an arrest may be effected by law enforcement agents. Without the
said warrant, a search or seizure becomes unreasonable within the context of the Constitution and any
evidence obtained on the occasion of such unreasonable search and seizure shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
In... warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur, namely
"(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer."
After a judicious review of the records of the case, the Court finds that there was no valid warrantless
arrest on petitioners. It was not properly established petitioners had just committed, or were actually
committing, or attempting to commit a crime and that said act or acts were done in the presence of the
arresting officers. Based on the testimonies of PO1 Saraspi and PD Peñaflor, they were positioned
some 15 to 20 meters away from petitioners.
Considering that 15 to 20 meters is a significant distance between the police officers and the petitioners,
the Court finds it doubtful that the police officers were able to determine that a criminal activity was
ongoing to allow them to validly effect an in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest and a search incidental
to a warrantless arrest thereafter. The police officers even admitted that the compound was surrounded
by a bamboo fence 5'7" to 5'9" in height, which made it harder to see what was happening inside the
compound. It appears that the police officers acted based solely on the information received from PD
Peñaflor's informant and not on personal knowledge that a crime had just been committed, was actually
being committed, or was about to be committed in their presence. The Court finds it doubtful that the
police officers witnessed any overt act before entering the private home of Bonaobra immediately
preceding the arrest.
P6A – People vs Plana
Facts:
Helen Perote was found dead by her brother and the police in Brgy. Cobe, Dumarao, Capiz. The body
was in prone position and was already in an advance state of decomposition.
Per the post mortem examination conducted by Dr. Ricardo Betita, Rural Health Officer of Cuartero,
Capiz: the most probable cause of death was massive hemorrhage or blood loss secondary to multiple
stab wound. According to Dr. Betita, the victim died more than seventy-two (72) hours already before
the police authorities found her body.
Felix Lagud identified accused-appellants Plana, Perayra and Saldevea as the three men who were
holding the girl while their fourth companion Banday was raping her.
Lagud did not immediately disclose what he witnessed to the authorities. As Lagud explained on cross-
examination, he was afraid that accused-appellants would harm him had they known that he saw them
commit the crime.
Delay in bringing up the matter to the authorities do not destroy the veracity and credibility of the
testimony offered.
Assessment of the witness/es credibility, The defense failed to impute any ill motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses to testify falsely against accused-appellants. In this case, the trial court correctly
gave credence to the positive identification of accused-appellants as the assailants of Helen by Felix
Lagud. His testimony was straightforward, direct and consistent.
The prosecutors questioned them if they saw a girl named Helen Perote. They answered no. Accused-
Appellants were then instructed by the police to go to the police detachments, but they didn't comply.
So the policemen looked for them and when they were already at the detachment, the authorities began
10
interrogating them. Later in the afternoon, the four accused-appellants were brought to the municipal
hall in Dumarao, Capiz. They were placed under detention there.
Accused-apellants denounce as violative of their constitutional rights their detention without, at the
time, a judicial order or an information filed in court.
Issue:
WON the detention without a judicial order or an information filed in court violated their constitutional
rights.
Ruling:
Prior to the filing of the information, suffice it to say, that they already waived their right to question
the irregularity, if any, in their arrest: this is because Accused-appellants respectively entered a plea
of not guilty at their arraignment. By so pleading, they submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court,
thereby curing any defect in their arrest, for the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the
court over their persons.
Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused must be made BEFORE HE ENTERS HIS PLEA, otherwise the
objection is deemed waived. The accused must move for the quashing of the information against him
before arraignment. Otherwise, he is estopped from questioning the validity of the arrest.
Accused-appellants interposed the defense of denial and alibi.
Alibi: is concededly one of the weakest defenses in criminal cases. It cannot prevail over, and is
worthless in the face of, positive identification by credible witnesses that the accused perpetrated the
crime.
For alibi to prosper, the following must be established: (a) the presence of accused-appellant in another
place at the time of the commission of the offense and; (b) physical impossibility for him to be at the
scene of the crime.
Accused-appellants miserably failed to satisfy these requisites. Considering that they admit that they
were all in Barangay Cobe where the rape and killing of Helen was committed, it cannot be said that
it was physically impossible for them to have committed the crime.In fine, accused-appellants guilt
for the crime of rape with homicide had been proved beyond reasonable doubt in this case. Further,
the trial court rightly appreciated the existence of conspiracy among the accused-appellants. Their
individual acts, taken as a whole, revealed that they shared a common design to rape and kill Helen.
They acted in unison and cooperation to achieve the same unlawful objective. The principle that the
act of one is the act of all is applicable to accused-appellants in this case.
After due trial: a judgment was rendered by the trial court finding accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. The trial court imposed upon them the supreme
penalty of death.
People v. Conde G.R. No. 113269, April 10, 2001
Fact: Apollo Romero, was home sitting by the window and drinking coffee when he saw four men
block the path of two decease Indian nationals (bombay) on a motorcycle. One of the men, later
identified as Oscar Conde, poked a gun at the two Indians while his three companions approached and
stabbed the Indians. After the stabbing, the four men fled. Romero was about 25 to 35 meters away
from the place where the crime was committed. PO3 Rodencio Sevillano, testified that he was assigned
with the Intelligence and Investigation Division (IID) of the PNP, he was told to investigate the
abovecited incident. The police arrested the three accused. Police recovered the weapons used in the
robbery, when Felicidad Macabare, Conde’s wife, went to the police station to talk to the accused.
These weapons were discovered inside her bag after a routine inspection. Sevillano admitted, however,
that they did not have a warrant of arrest when they apprehended the accused. Nor did they have a
search warrant when they inspected Felicidad’s bag and when they searched the house of a certain
Jimmy where they found the stolen items.
Issue: Whether the conviction of the accused is valid even if their arrest was conducted in violation
for their right against warrantless arrest.
Held: Yes, the arrest was a clear violation of their constitutional right; unfortunately, appellants did
not assert their constitutional rights prior to their arraignment. This is fatal to their case. An accused
is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the
Information against him before his arraignment. When the appellants entered their pleas on
arraignment without invoking their rights to question any irregularity, which might have accompanied
their arrests, they voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the judicial
process. Any objection, defect, or irregularity attending their arrests should had been made before they
entered their pleas. It is much too late for appellants to raise the question of their warrantless arrests.
Their pleas to the information upon arraignment constitute clear waivers of their rights against
unlawful restraint of liberty. Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for
setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The
warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings including those leading
to the conviction of the appellants and his co-accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to
convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their culpability.
P6E - SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD, GR No. 157870, 2008-11-
03
Facts:
Petitioners question the constitutionality of Section 36 of RA 9165, a.k.a. the Comprehensive Drugs
Act of 2002. Section 36 requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of
secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, particularly those who are charged with
offenses punishable by a penalty of not less than 6 years and 1 day of imprisonment.
On December 23, 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution 6486, which provides the rules on the
mandatory drugs testing of candidates for public office. It requires the COMELEC offices and
employees concerned to submit two separate lists of candidates: one for those who complied with the
mandatory drug testing and the other of those who failed to comply.
It was Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. who opposed such resolution, contending that it was unconstitutional as
it imposes an additional qualification for senators.
Issues:
1. Do Section 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution 6468 impose an additional qualification
for candidates for senator?
2. Is RA 9165 unconstitutional?
11
Ruling:
1. Yes. The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Section 36, validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution provides. The COMELEC resolution
effectively enlarges that qualification requirements for senator, enumerated under Section 3, Article
VI of the Constitution.
2. The provision of RA 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing for students (Section 36[b]) are
constitutional as long as they are random and suspicionless. This is because schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students, and schools have the right to impose
conditions on applicants for admission that are fair and non-discriminatory.
The provision requiring mandatory drug testing for officers and employees of public and private
offices (Section 36[d]) are also justifiable. The privacy expectation in a regulated office environment
is reduced. A degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld. To the Court, the need for
drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual’s
privacy interest under the premises.
On the other hand, the Court finds no justification in the mandatory drug testing of those prosecuted
for crimes punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 years and 1 day (Section 36[f]). The operative
concepts in the mandatory drug testing are randomness and suspicionless. In this case, it cannot be
said that the drug testing is random. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of
RA 9165.
In sum, Section 36(c) and (d) are constitutional, but 36(f) is not.
JESSE U. LUCAS v. JESUS S. LUCAS
G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011,
On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate
Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 72, Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy
(Elsie), migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain "Ate Belen (Belen)" who worked in
a prominent nightspot in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany Belen to work. On one occasion,
Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belen's workplace, and an intimate
relationship developed between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant and, on March 11, 1969, she
gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioner's father was not stated in petitioner's
certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his father is respondent. On August
1, 1969, petitioner was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue, Pasay City. Respondent allegedly
extended financial support to Elsie and petitioner for a period of about two years. When the
relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie refused to accept respondent's offer of support and
decided to raise petitioner on her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several attempts
to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all attempts were in vain.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing
order.
HELD:
Yes. Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed
to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states: The appropriate court
may, at any time, on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order
a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of
the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case; (b) The biological sample:
(i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously
subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA
testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce
new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other
factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the
DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the
behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if,
during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause
hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or
a reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the test. In these states, a court
order for blood testing is considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie
case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable
cause.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative
father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the
petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
G.R. No. 215305: Marcelo G. Saluday vs. People of the Philippines (April 3, 2018)
CASE:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari on the Decision and Resolution, CA-G.R. CR No. 01099,
of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the Philippine Army
at a checkpoint to check the presence of contraband, illegal firearms or explosives and suspicious
individuals. A bag, small but too heavy for its size, belonging to the Petitioner, Marcelo G. Saluday,
was found by SCAA Junbert M. Buco (Buco). Petitioner was arrested for failure to produce authority
to carry firearms and explosives.
In an inquest conducted, the Prosecutor of Davao City found probable cause for violation of PD 1866
for carrying firearms, explosives and ammunition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the trial court misappreciated the evidence against the Petitioner by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals.
2. Whether the search was illegal.
RULING:
Rule 45 under the Rules of Court applies only to question of facts. The finding of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is accorded with great respect.
The elements of the crime committed, particularly the possession or ownership of the firearm,
explosive or ammunition, and lack of license to own or possess said firearm, explosive or ammunition,
raises questions of fact. The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the trial court; hence, there was
no need to disturb the latter’s findings.
On the issue on the illegality of the search, the Supreme Court disagrees with the Petitioner. Section
2, Article III of the Constitution applies only to unreasonable searches or seizures.
The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure emanates from one’s right to privacy. When a
person displays an expectation of privacy, which the society is ready to recognize as reasonable, the
12
State cannot violate a person’s right against unreasonable search or seizure (Katz vs. United States). In
addition, one’s expectation of privacy to be reasonable, it must counter the safety and welfare of the
people.
The Supreme Court did not agree to the Petitioner’s position that his failure to object to the search
cannot be construed as an implied waiver. Constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right that can be waived. However, the waiver should be voluntary, clear,
specific and intelligently given, absent any duress or coercion.
HELD:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Terry v Ohio
329 US 1
10 June 1968
Warren, CJ.
Martin McFadden, an experienced police/detective, confronted three men after he had noticed the two
of them (Terry and Chilton) passed by the same store front a number of times, subtly observing what
was inside. After McFadden had identified himself as a police officer, the men mumbled something,
so the former instinctively spun Terry around, patted down his outside clothing, and felt a pistol in his
overcoat pocket. He did the same for the other two and found another weapon inside Chilton’s overcoat
pocket. Terry and Chilton were then charged with carrying concealed weapons.
The two accused moved to have the weapons seized declared inadmissible in evidence, claiming that
the same were obtained in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights (to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures) since the search was made without warrant and without probable cause for an
arrest.
Issue: Whether the search and seizure done by McFadden (stop-and-frisk) violated the Fourth
Amendment rights of the accused
Held: No. What is protected by the Fourth Amendment is the right of the people to be protected from
unreasonable searches and seizures aimed at gathering evidence, not for other purposes like prevention
of crime or personal protection of police officers.
Stop-and-frisk (or Terry frisk, as later called) is a permitted police action. For their own protection,
police officers may perform a quick surface search of a person’s outer clothing for weapons if they
have a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed. Such suspicion must not be based solely on a
police officer’s hunch but on specific and articulable facts.
In this case, McFadden’s suspicion, arising not from a mere hunch but from the men’s behavior in
front of the store, was reasonable.
Dispositive: The petition was dismissed.
P43 ALAIN MANALILI v. CA, GR NO 113447, OCTOBER 9, 1997 [Per J. Panganiban]
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid warrantless search
FACTS: Policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City were conducting a surveillance
in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen
alighted from their vehicle. They then chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who
appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a
swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and
introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he was
holding in his hands. The male person tried to resist. They asked the man to show him his wallet to
which he accepted, and found crushed marijuana residue. When he was turned over to the precinct, he
was identified as Alain Manalili. Manalili now protests the admissibility of evidence was a product of
an illegal search
HELD: Yes. There was a valid warrantless search. The Solicitor General, in his Comment dated
July 5, 1994, which was adopted as memorandum for respondent, counters that the inadmissibility of
the marijuana leaves was waived because petitioner never raised this issue in the proceedings below
nor did he object to their admissibility in evidence. He adds that, even assuming arguendo that there
was no waiver, the search was legal because it was incidental to a warrantless arrest under
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the
landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio,18 a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of
the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapon(s).
Here, the policemen observed during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was
wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information
was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics
Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts
who were "high."
Therefore, The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he
was actually high on drugs.
P44. Posadas vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 89139 August 2, 1990
Facts:
On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat.
Umbra Umpar, both members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom
assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street,
Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted
petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.
They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner
attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.
They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38
Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber
gun a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the
petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was
asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his
possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the
prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He
was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City
Issue:
13
 Whether there was a probable cause to justify the warrantless arrest and search of Posadas
Ruling:
From the foregoing provision of law it is clear that an arrest without a warrant may be
effected by a peace officer or private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person arrested has committed it.
At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the
petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing
the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding
something in the buri bag. They did now know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not
justify an arrest without a warrant.
P46 - People vs. Cogaed
Facts:
6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San
Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel, La Union, “received a text message from an unidentified civilian
informer ”that one Marvin Buya“be transporting marijuana” from Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La
Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order to intercept the suspect. They set up a checkpoint
in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City.
A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived and the jeepney driver disembarked and signalled
to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were carrying marijuana.
SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later identified as Victor Romana
Cogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack whileDayao was
holding a yellow bag.
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. Cogaed and Dayaotold
SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a favorfor their
barriomate named Marvin.
Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana. Both of them were
then arrested. Case against Dayao was dismissed because he was a minor.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid search and seizure; and, whether the marijuana confiscated isadmissible as
evidence.
HELD:
NO. There is no valid search and seizure; thus, the marijuana confiscated shall not be admissible as
evidence. There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation
for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest.
The person searched was not even the person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the
name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed
responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one
circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without
a valid search warrant.
Likewise, the facts of the case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The apprehension
of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances enumerated in Rule 113,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest was made.
At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to
commit a crime. There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested hat
Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time. Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisone rthat time;
hence, he could not have qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.
The Constitution provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Otherwise known as
the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this rule prohibits the issuance of
general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions.
(P47) PEOPLE v. COMPRADO GR No. 213225, April 4, 2018
Facts:
This is an appeal from the Decision dated 19 May 2014, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 01156 which affirmed the Decision[2] dated 18 April 2013, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 25, Misamis Oriental (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2011-671 finding Renante Comprado y
Bronola (accused-appellant) guilty of illegal possession of marijuana.
On 19 July 2011, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article 2 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
Version of the Prosecution. On 15 July 2011, at 6:30 in the evening, a confidential informant (CI) sent
a text message to Police Inspector Dominador Orate, Jr. (P/Insp. Orate), then Deputy Station
Commander of Police Station 6, Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, that an alleged courier of marijuana
together with a female companion, was sighted at Cabanglasan, Bukidnon. The alleged courier had in
his possession a backpack containing marijuana and would be traveling from Bukidnon to Cagayan
de Oro City. At 9:30 in the evening, the CI called P/Insp. Orate to inform him that the alleged drug
courier had boarded a bus with body number .2646 and plate number KVP 988 bound for Cagayan de
Oro City. The CI added that the man would be carrying a backpack in black and violet colors with the
marking "Lowe Alpine." Thus, at about 9:45 in the evening, the police officers stationed at Police
Station 6 put up a checkpoint in front of the station
Version of the Defense
Accused-appellant denied ownership of the bag and the marijuana. He maintains that on 15 July 2011,
at around 6:30 in the evening, he and his girlfriend went to the house of a certain Freddie Nacorda in
Aglayan, Bukidnon, to collect the latter's debt. When they were about to leave, Nacorda requested him
to carry a bag to Cagayan de Oro City
The RTC Ruling... the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of illegal possession of marijuana. It held
that accused-appellant's uncorroborated claim that he was merely requested to bring the bag to
Cagayan de Oro City, did not prove his innocence; mere possession of the illegal substance already
consummated the crime and good faith was not even a defense premises considered, this Court finds
the accused RENANTE COMPRADO y BRONOLA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
of the crime defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as charged in the
14
Information, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT, and to pay
the Fine of P500,000.00, without subsidiary penalty in case of nonpayment of fine.
The CA Ruling... the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant. It opined that accused-
appellant submitted to the jurisdiction of the court because he raised no objection as to the irregularity
of his arrest before his arraignment
It added that while it was admitted by the arresting police officers that no representatives from the
media and other personalities required by law were present during the operation and during the taking
of the inventory, noncompliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not fatal and would
not render inadmissible accused-appellant's arrest or the items seized from him because the
prosecution was able to show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items had been
preserved. The CA disposed the case in this wise
Issues:
1. Whether accused-appellant's arrest was valid;
2. Whether the seized items are admissible in evidence; and
3. Whether accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged.
Ruling:
The Bill of Rights requires that a search and seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, any evidence obtained from such warrantless search is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.This proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely: 1) Warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest; 2) Search of evidence in plain view; 3) Search of a moving vehicle; 4)
Consented warrantless search; 5) Customs search; 6) Stop and Frisk; and 7) Exigent and emergency
circumstances.
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others' safety, he is entitled to the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be
used to assault him.
On the other hand, the Court found no sufficient justification in the stop and frisk committed by the
police in People v. Cogaed (Cogaed) In that case, the police officers received a message from an
informant that one Marvin Buya would be transporting marijuana from Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel,
La Union, to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.
The circumstances of this case are analogous to People v. Aruta. In that case, an informant told the
police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus. At the bus
terminal, the police officers prepared themselves. The informant pointed at a woman crossing the
street and identified her as "Aling Rosa." The police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they alleged that
she allowed them to look inside her bag. The bag contained marijuana leaves.
The Court finds that the totality of the circumstances in this case is not sufficient to incite a genuine
reason that would justify a stop-and-frisk search on accused-appellant. An examination of the records
reveals that no overt physical act could be properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse
suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that he had just committed, was committing, or was
about to commit a crime.
As regards search incidental to a lawful arrest, it is worth emphasizing that a lawful arrest must precede
the search of a person and his belongings; the process cannot be reversed. Thus, it becomes imperative
to determine whether accused-appellant's warrantless arrest was valid.
Without the confiscated marijuana, no evidence is left to convict accused-appellant. Thus, an acquittal
is warranted, despite accused-appellant's failure to object to the regularity of his arrest before
arraignment. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility
of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 19 May 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 01156 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Renante Comprado y
Bronola is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from detention unless he is detained for any other
lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision
and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.
PAPA vs. MAGO
Facts: Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting
upon a reliable information received on 3 November 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of
personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from
the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of Ricardo Papa,
Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance
at gate 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate 1 at about 4:30 p.m. of 4 November 1966,
elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina
Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks, consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two
trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed
ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected
on Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain
Bienvenido Naguit. Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks
and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Manila a petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction (Civil Case
67496), praying for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the police and customs
authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus
for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary
damages in their favor. On 10 November 1966, Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte
restraining Ricardo Papa (as Chief of Police of Manila) and Juan Ponce Enrile (as Commissioner of
Customs) in Civil Case 67496. However, when the restraining order was received by Papa. et. al.,
some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of
officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of Remedios
Mago.
Under date of 15 November 1966, Mago filed an amended petition, including as party defendants
Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police
Department. At the hearing on 9 December 1966, the lower court, with the conformity of the parties,
ordered that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the
representatives of the claimant of the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti- Smuggling Center
of the Manila Police Department. On 23 December 1966, Mago filed an ex parte motion to release the
goods, alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited
importation, the same should be released as per agreement of the parties upon her posting of the
appropriate bond that may be determined by the court. On 7 March 1967, the Judge issued an order
releasing the goods to Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00.
15
On 13 March 1967, Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the
court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had been
directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of
the seizure proceedings. Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and
alleging that they had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Papa, et.
al. filed the action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.
Held: The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing
by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff
laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any
cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any
fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk,
envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence
therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search
and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article
as aforesaid. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect
the search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to
demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal
duty to render said assistance.
This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search
and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle.
He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo. Martin Alagao
and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by
a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant herein. The Code
authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter,
pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house;
and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope
or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of
holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law,
without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house,
the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued
by a judge or justice of the peace." Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons
exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search
warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
Herein, Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to make any search before they
seized the two trucks and their cargo. But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect
that no search warrant would be needed under the circumstances obtaining herein. The guaranty of
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a necessary difference
between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may
readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods,
where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Having declared that the seizure by the
members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question was in accordance with law and
by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the
enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
PEOPLE VS. USANA
Facts:
During a COMELEC gun ban, some law enforcers of the Makati Police, namely, PO3 Suba, PO3
Nonato, SPO4 de los Santos, and Inspector Guico, were manning a checkpoint at the corner of Senator
Gil Puyat Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX). They were checking the cars going to Pasay
City, stopping those they found suspicious, and imposing merely a running stop on the others. At about
past midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride car with Plate TBH 493. P03 Suba saw a long firearm on the
lap of the person seated at the passenger seat, who was later identified as Usana. They asked the driver,
identified as Escaño, to open the door. P03 Suba seized the long firearm, an M-1 US Carbine, from
Usana. When Escaño, upon order of the police, parked along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., the other passengers
were searched for more weapons. The three passengers were thereafter brought to the police station.
Upon reaching the precinct, Nonato turned over the key to the desk officer. Since SPO4 de los Santos
was suspicious of the vehicle, he requested Escaño to open the trunk. Escaño readily agreed and
opened the trunk himself using his key. They noticed a blue bag inside it, which they asked Escaño to
open. The bag contained a parcel wrapped in tape, which, upon examination was found positive for
hashish weighing 3.31 kgs. Dependants were charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act 6425, as amended and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in violation of
Presidential Decree 1866.
Issue:
Whether the search conducted on Escano’s car is illegal, and whether the evidence acquired therein
would be sufficient to convict Lopez and Usana for possession of illegal drugs.
Ruling:
The Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies
of
public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly,
routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists' right to "free passage without
interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers
during which the vehicle's occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the
vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an
individual's right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed
area, are even less intrusive. The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban
enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its
deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for
which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know that
they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs. The facts adduced do not
constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search and
seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those
whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they
would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without opening the car's doors
or subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the
situation demands.
Despite the validity of the search, the Court cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez for
violation of RA 6425, as amended. The following facts militate against a finding of conviction: (1)
the car belonged to Escaño; (2) the trunk of the car was not opened soon after it was stopped and after
the accused were searched for firearms; (3) the car was driven by a policeman from the place where it
was stopped until the police station; (4) the car's trunk was opened, with the permission of Escaño,
without the presence of Usana and Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the police station and until the
opening of the car's trunk, the car was in the possession and control of the police authorities. No fact
was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car. Their having been
with Escaño in the latter's car before the "finding" of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an
appreciable time and without their presence left much to be desired to implicate them to the offense
of selling, distributing, or transporting the prohibited drug. In fact, there was no showing that Usana
16
and Lopez knew of the presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before it
was seized.
P51
People vs. Vinecario
Keywords: Marijuana, Checkpoint, Probable cause
Facts:
On the night of April 10, 1995, as about fifteen police officers were manning a checkpoint at Ulas,
Davao City pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735, otherwise known as the COMELEC gun
ban, a motorcycle with three men on board namely appellant Victor Vinecario (Vinecario), Arnold
Roble (Roble) Gerlyn Wates (Wates) sped past of the police officers. When they were ordered to
return to the checkpoint, a police officer asked what the backpack contains which the appellants
answered that it was only a mat. The police officers suspected that it was a bomb and when appellant
opened the bag it turns out that its contents were marijuana. The three were then brought to the police
station and later to Camp Catitipan and there they were investigated by police officials without the
assistance of counsel, following which they were made to sign some documents which they were not
allowed to read. The Regional Trial Court rendered them guilty for transporting, possessing and
delivering prohibited drugs under Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659), and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
Whether or not the search upon the appellants and the seizure of the alleged 1,700 grams of marijuana
violated there constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Held:
NO. There was no violation of the constitutional right to searches and seizures
Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians passing through
checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may be stopped and extensively
searched when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints
that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of
some offense. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by the Court
as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic
bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. In
light then of Vinecario et al.‘s speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and even after having been
flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures when interrogated on the
contents of the backpack which they passed to one another, and the reply of Vinecario, when asked
why he and his co-appellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was a member of the Philippine
Army, apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with their inspection, there
existed probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that appellants
were offenders of the law or that the contents of the backpack were instruments of some offense.
Camara v Municipal Court
FACTS: In 1963, a housing inspector from San Francisco's health department entered an apartment
building to conduct a routine inspection to locate possible code violations. The building manager
informed the inspector that a tenant might be using his space contrary to permitted policy. The
inspector approached the tenant to enter the area, but the tenant denied entrance for lack of a search
warrant. The inspector returned twice more, again without a search warrant, and was again denied
entry. A complaint was subsequently filed against the tenant, and he was arrested for violating a city
code. He filed suit under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The California district court of appeal, relying on the previous case of Frank v.
Maryland (1959),[1] upholding a conviction in similar circumstances, ruled against the tenant. The
tenant then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the decision in Frank v. Maryland should be
overruled.
ISSUE: Valid search and seizure?
HELD: Writing for the Court, Justice White wrote that, “having concluded that Frank v. State of
Maryland,[1] to the extent that it sanctioned such warrantless inspections, must be overruled, we
reverse.”[2] He first reviewed principles of the Fourth Amendment, noting that “the basic purpose of
this Amendment…is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions
by governmental officials.”[2] He then reviewed Frank's reasoning, “re-examin[ing] of the factors
which persuaded the Frank majority to adopt”[3] its approach. He disagreed with Frank that routine
inspections are peripheral and that “it is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private
property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of
criminal behavior.”[4] He reviewed other aspects of Frank, and found that “administrative searches of
the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interest protected by the Fourth
Amendment.”[5]
White then discussed “whether some other accommodation between public need and individual rights
is essential”[5] when dealing with public health and safety. He noted that routine inspections are
necessary to ensure health and safety compliance with public codes, and that such inspections are well
within common law history. Therefore, “area inspection is a ‘reasonable’ search of private property
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”[6]
Because the inspection is reasonable, when government officials are inspecting premises for health
and safety compliance, “it seems likely that warrants should normally be sought only after entry is
refused unless there has been a citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing
immediate entry. Similarly, the requirement of a warrant procedure does not suggest any change in
what seems to be the prevailing local policy, in most situations, of authorizing entry, but not entry by
force, to inspect.” [7]
However, because the tenant had refused entry, a warrant was necessary, so charging the tenant for
refusing entry without a warrant was unconstitutional. The ruling of the lower court was vacated and
remanded.
Dela Cruz v People
GR No. 200748
23 July 2014
Sereno, CJ.
The NBI had an entrapment operation to nab Jaime Dela Cruz, a police officer who was allegedly
extorting a sum of money from the family members of one Ariel Escobido in exchange for the latter’s
freedom. After Dela Cruz was apprehended, he was subjected to a urine test and tested positive for
methamphetamine use. He was then charged with violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act and penalized by the RTC (and affirmed by the CA) with a compulsory rehabilitation.
For his part, Dela Cruz claimed that the evidence (the urine sample) should be declared inadmissible
as the same was obtained in violation of his right to privacy and right against self-incrimination since
he was forced to undergo the drug testing without the presence of his counsel.
17
Issue: Whether the urine sample is admissible If there was a valid search and seizure and whether the marijuana confiscated is admissible
as evidence.
Held: No. The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act only allows mandatory drug testing for those
who are accused of committing the prohibited acts listed in the said law. Dela Cruz, on the other hand, Ruling:
was apprehended for extortion/robbery. The mandatory drug test, therefore, should not have been done NO. There is no valid search and seizure; thus, the marijuana confiscatedshall not be
with Dela Cruz, and the evidence gathered from the same is inadmissible for being violative of Dela admissible as evidence.As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the
Cruz’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination requirements of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution are reasonable. This warrant requires the
existence of probable cause that can only be determined by a judge.
Dispositive: Dela Cruz was acquitted.
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. The
known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:
P55 ERWIN DE LA CRUZ v. PEOPLE, GR NO 209387, JANUARY 11, 2016 [Per J. Leonen] (1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
(2) Seizure of evidence in “plain view,”
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and seizure in this case. (3) Search of a moving vehicle;
(4) Consented warrantless search;
FACTS: On May 2007, While buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter. (5) Customs search;
It took him around 15 minutes to purchase a ticket. Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance(6) of Stop and frisk; and
the terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray scanning machine for inspection. The operator of the x- Exigent and emergency circumstances.
(7)
ray machine saw firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag. Dela Cruz admitted that he was owner of the “Stop and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law
bag. The bag was then inspected and the following items were found inside: three (3) revolvers; NBI enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of
clearance; seaman’s book; other personal items; and four (4) live ammunitions placed inside the offenses.
cylinder. When asked whether he had the proper documents for the firearms, Dela Cruz answered in However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in
the negative. He was later judged by the RTC of violating the Omnibus Election Code for carrying accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of
firearms during the election period. “suspiciousness” present in the situation where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may
HELD: Yes. This was a valid CONSENTED search. The port personnel’s actions proceed from be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. It does not have to be probable cause,
the authority and policy to ensure the safety of travelers and vehicles within the port. At this but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a “genuine reason to serve the purposes of the “stop and
point, petitioner already submitted himself and his belongings to inspection by placing his bag in the frisk” exception.
x-ray scanning machine. The “stop and frisk” search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of
The presentation of petitioner’s bag for x-ray scanning was voluntary. Petitioner had the choice of detecting dangerous weapons. There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there
whether to present the bag or not. He had the option not to travel if he did not want his bag scanned was no approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched
or inspected. X-ray machine scanning and actual inspection upon showing of probable cause that a was not even the person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya,
crime is being or has been committed are part of reasonable security regulations to safeguard the and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying
passengers passing through ports or terminals. that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This
should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search
P56. People vs Cogaed warrant. Likewise, the facts of the case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The
apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of theinstances enumerated
G.R. No. 200334; July 30, 2014 in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest was made. At the time of
his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime.
There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in
Facts: possession of drugs at that time. Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could
not have qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.
Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in
San Gabriel,La Union, " received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer" that one
Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) "[would]be transporting marijuana" from Barangay
LunOy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union. Thus, PSI Bayan P58 – Umil vs Ramos
organized checkpoints in order to intercept the suspect.
Victor Cogaed was riding a jeepney with a bag from Barangay Lun-Oy and during a FACTS:
checkpoint, the driver of the jeepney he rode made a signal to the police telling that Cogaed was
carrying marijuana inside Cogaed’s bag; the police officer then approached Cogaed and asked the Military agents received confidential information that a certain man, Ronnie Javellon, believed to be
accused about the contents of his bags. Cogaed replied that he did not know what was inside and that one of the five NPA sparrows who recently murdered two Capcom mobile patrols was being treated
he was just transporting the bag in favor of Marvin, a barriomate. Cogaed subsequently opened the in St. Agnes Hospital, for having gunshot wounds.
bag revealing the bricks of marijuana inside. He was then arrested by the police officers.
Later on, it was found out that Ronnie Javellon is a fictitious name and that his real name is Rolando
Issue: Dural (verified as one of the sparrows of the NPA).

18

Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons.
Meanwhile, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM
mobile patrols.
In this 8 consolidated cases, it assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by the military on
the petitioners; that a mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army member is
a valid ground for his arrest without warrant.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest is valid
HELD:
YES. The arrest without warrant is justified because it is within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule
113, Dural was committing an offense, when arrested because he was arrested for being a member of
the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized and for subversion
which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing offense.
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the
overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes
Hospital.
Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without a warrant, at the
St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the
two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end
there and then.
Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents
or representatives of the organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or
insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e.
adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion
are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and
violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing an organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his
membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts
mentioned in this case.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named
persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple, and Ocaya), no prudent man can say that it
would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That would
have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace
officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of
executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the
alleged violation of the law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21 An arrest is
therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without
limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an
overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set
forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty
of committing the crime for which they were arrested. Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is
the reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in the
interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant.
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested
persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. But if they
do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime
of arbitrary detention, for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other
administrative sanctions.
(P59) People vs. Sucro GR 93239, March 18, 1991
Facts:
On 21 March 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt.
Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities of Edison
Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. As planned, at
about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio positioned himself under the house of a certain Arlie
Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel.
Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw Sucro enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be
marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where
he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while Sucro went back to the chapel and again
came out with marijuana which he gave to a group of persons. It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio
radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the activity going on P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to
continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to
report that a third buyer later identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with Sucro. At that
point, the team of P/Lt Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were at the Youth
Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and Sucro. P/ Lt.
Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of
the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which
turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought
the same from Sucro in front of the chapel. The police team was able to overtake and arrest Sucro at
the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana
from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante. The teabags of marijuana were
sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The
specimens were all found positive of marijuana. Sucro was charged with violation of Section 4, Article
II of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Upon arraignment, Sucro, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not
guilty" to the offense charged. Trial ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered, finding Sucro
guilty of the sale of prohibited drug and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and
pay a fine of P20,000, and costs. Sucro appealed.
Issue:
Whether the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently, whether the evidence
resulting from such arrest is admissible.
Held:
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest without
warrant is considered lawful. The rule states that "A peace officer or private person may, without
19
warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it;" An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the
meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although
at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. The
failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge acquired
from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant.
What is paramount is that probable cause existed. Still, that searches and seizures must be supported
by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental
to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. Herein, police officers have personal
knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities
of the accused. Under the circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for
the arresting officers, to arrest Sucro who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the contraband.
Thus, as there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with the requirements
of a warrantless arrest; ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence.
People vs. Gerente
G.R 95847-48
Constitutional Law; Illegal Search and Seizure; Search and Seizure incident to a lawful arrest,
considered valid.—The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves
as evidence in violation of his constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and seizure, for
the dried marijuana leaves were seized from him in the course of a warrantless arrest by the police
officers. We do not agree. The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in
his possession were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. People vs. Gerente,
219 SCRA 756, G.R. Nos. 95847-48 March 10, 1993
Same; Same; Search conducted as an incident to valid arrest lawful; Rationale.—The search conducted
on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is
in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. xxx The frisk and search of
appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to
protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them
unless he is first disarmed. People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756, G.R. Nos. 95847-48 March 10, 1993
FACTS:
At about 7:00 a.m. of 30 April 1990, Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy
Echigoren, allegedly started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in Gerente’s house which is about
6 meters away from the house of Edna Edwina Reyes who was in her house on that day. She overheard
the three men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that she heard Fredo
Echigoren saying, “Gabriel, papatayin natin si Clarito Blace.” Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente
carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of the same day. Reyes allegedly
witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy
Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell,
Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim’s head. Thereafter, the three men dragged
Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente. At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime
Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a
mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was
informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was massive
fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with
Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the
mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and
two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by Reyes that she saw the killing and she pointed to
Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito. The policemen proceeded to the house of
Gerente, who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house and they introduced
themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked Gerente and found a coin purse in his pocket
which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National
Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana. Only
Gerente was apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are still at
large. On 2 May 1990, two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Benjamin Caraig against him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of RA 6425, and for Murder. When
arraigned on 16 May 1990, Gerente pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the two cases
was held. On 24 September 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172,
found Gerente guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425 and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for a term of 12 years and 1 day, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum; and
also found him guilty of Murder for which crime he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. . Gerente appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether the police officers have the personal knowledge of the killing of Blace to allow them to arrest,
and the subsequent searchly Gerente’s person, without the necessary warrant.
HELD:
The search of Gerente’s person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were valid
because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Court provide that “A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it;” The policemen arrested Gerente only some 3 hours after Gerente and his companions
had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime,
they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers
had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to
the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances,
since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that
Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they
had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two
companions did. The search conducted on Gerente’s person was likewise lawful because it was made
as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules
of Court which provides that “A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.” The
frisk and search of Gerente’s person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of
arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and
might attack them unless he is first disarmed.
P61 - ARREST - PEOPLE v. VS. DANILO SINOC
G.R. NO. 113511-12, July 11, 1997
FACTS:
20

Danilo Sinoc was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in two cases tried; one, of the
special complex crime of kidnapping with murder; and the other of the complex crime of kidnapping
with frustrated murder. In each case, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed on him.
Isidoro Viacrusis, manager of Taganito Mining Corporation, was riding a company vehicle,
a Mitsubishi Pajero driven by Tarciso Guijapon, were stopped by several armed men, who identified
themselves as member of the New People’s Army, as they were approaching the public cemetery of
Claver. Guijapon and Viacrusis were shot several times. Viacrusis miraculously survived, Guijapon
dies on the spot. The only malefactor that Viacrusis was able to identify by name was Danilo Sinoc.
The police team was able to stop Danilo Sinoc. Riding on the recovered “Pajero”, the police
officers brought Sinoc to Star Lodge only to discover that his companions were no longer there.
The Trial Court was satisfied with that the evidence actually presented by the Government
sufficed to establish Sinoc’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the two felonies with which he stood
charge. Hence the appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether the Trial Court erred in not rejecting the evidence obtained after he had been
“arrested without any warrant of arrest.”
RULING:
No. The Court ruled that the foregoing circumstances left the police officers no alternative
save to arrest Sinoc and take possession of the "Pajero." His arrest without warrant was justified;
indeed, it was in the premises the officers' clear duty to apprehend him; their omission to do so would
have been inexcusable. The law provides that an arrest without warrant may be licitly effected by a
peace officer, inter alia "When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it."
PEOPLE VS. BAULA
Facts:
Jupiter Caburao, allegedly decided to follow his mother, Patrocinia Caburao, who had earlier left their
house to settle her due obligations at a store, about 1 1/2 kilometers away. While traversing the road
towards the store, Jupiter allegedly noticed a commotion near the creek about 10 meters away from
him. He allegedly focused his flashlight towards the direction where he heard the commotion and saw
Crisanto Baula and Danilo Dacucos in the act of hacking a person who was lying on the ground, while
Robert Baula and Ruben Baula stood as lookouts. The assault allegedly lasted for about 4minutes. The
Baulas and Dacucos allegedly fled but not before they had threatened Jupiter with death if he were to
divulge the incident to anyone. Jupiter went near the lifeless body of the victim who turned out to be
his own mother. For fear of reprisal from the Baulas, et. al. and believing that the police would be able
to solve the gory killing on their own, Jupiter did not reveal the damage to either his relatives or the
police. The investigation revealed that before the victim was killed, she had been to the store; that the
Baulas, et. al. were also at the store having a drinking spree; that the victim left the store between 7:00
p.m. and 8:00 p.m., and that, 15 minutes later, the Baulas, et. al. also left. SPO4 Mirande, with several
policemen, repaired to the respective houses of accused-appellants. The policemen asked Ruben Baula
and Crisanto Baula for the clothing they wore on the night of the murder. Ruben Baula gave his
bloodstained pair of short pants, and Crisanto Baula turned over his bloodstained polo shirt. The
policemen next went to the hut of Danilo Dacucos. Inside the hut, the group found hanging on the wall
a bloodstained bolo. The results of the examination disclosed that the bloodstains found in the bolo,
the bloodstains on the polo shirt and the bloodstains on the pair of short pants had the same type "O"
blood as that of the victim. Crisanto Baula, Ruben Baula, Robert Baula and Danilo Dacucos were
convicted with murder.
Issue:
Whether the Baulas can be arrested without warrant for the killing of Petrocinia Caburao, and whether
seizures can be effected pursuant to such arrests.
Ruling:
The proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures is not absolute, and the Court has had
occasions to rule that a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid under certain circumstances.
There can, for instance, be a lawful warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12, Rules 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; or seizure of evidence in
"plain view," its elements being extant; or search of a moving vehicle; or consented search; or customs
search. The situation here in question, however, can hardly come within the purview of any of
the established exceptions. In a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, the arrest itself must
have to be effected under the circumstances enumerated by law. One such case is when an offense has
in fact just been committed, and the peace officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it. Danilo Dacucos, Crisanto Baula and Ruben Baula were not
being arrested at the time that the bloodstained bolo, polo shirt and short pants were allegedly taken
from them but were just being questioned by the police officers conducting the investigation about the
death of Patrocinia Caburao. The investigating officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the accused had committed the crime. Being in no position to effect a warrantless arrest, the police
officers were thus likewise barred from effecting a warrantless search and seizure. The police officers
acted on a mere suspicion that Baula, et. al. could be responsible for the commission of the crime and
only because of their being at the store where the victim was last seen. Mere suspicion cannot satisfy
the requirement of probable cause which signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he can be charged. An illegal search cannot be undertaken
and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by that search. The Court finds it
less than credible the stance of the prosecution that the polo shirt and short pants have been voluntarily
given. An alleged consent to a warrantless search and seizure cannot be based merely on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty. This presumption by itself, cannot prevail
against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual, and zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot
ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors.
P63
People vs. Cubcubin (2001)
Keywords: Hanes White Shirt, Tricycle Shooting, Probable Cause
Facts:
Early morning of August 1997, Sgt. Rogel, desk officer of the Cavite City police station, received a
telephone call that a person had been shot near the cemetery along Julian Felipe Boulevard in San
Antonio, Cavite City. For this reason, a police team, composed of SPO1 Malinao, Jr., PO3 Rosal, etc,
responded to the call and found Henry P. Piamonte slumped dead on his tricycle which was then
parked on the road. PO3 Rosal testified that a tricycle driver, told him that Fidel Cubcubin Jr. and the
victim were last seen together coming out of the Sting Cafe, located in Cavite City, about a kilometer
and a half away from the crime scene.
21
Forthwith, the two officers, went to the cafe and talked to a waitress in Sting Cafe. Waitress described
Cubcubin as a lean, dark-complexioned, and mustachioed man who had on a white t-shirt and brown
short pants. Another tricycle driver, told PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. that Garcellano's
description fitted a person known as alias "Jun Dulce." Armando Plata, who knew where Cubcubin
lived, led PO3 Rosal, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., and Prosecutor Lu to Cubucubin's house in Garcia Extension,
Cavite City.
The policemen knocked and were opened by a man who answered the description given by the waitress
and who turned out to be Cubcubin. The police operatives identified themselves and informed him
that he was being sought in connection with the shooting near the cemetery. Cubcubin denied
involvement in the incident. PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked permission to enter and
look around the house. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said that upon entering the house, he noticed a white t-shirt,
bearing the brand name "Hanes" and the name "Dhenvher" written in the inner portion of the shirt's
hemline, placed over a divider near the kitchen. Upon close examination, he said that he found it to be
"bloodied." When he picked up the t-shirt, two spent .38 caliber shells fell from it. PO3 Rosal stayed
with Cubcubin while he conducted a search. They then took the t-shirt and the two bullet shells. SPO1
Malinao, Jr. then asked Cubcubin to go with them to Sting Cafe for purposes of identification.
There, Cubcubin was positively identified by the waitress as the victim's companion. The police
investigators asked Cubcubin where the fatal gun was. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said Cubcubin refused to
tell him where he hid the gun so he sought the latter's permission to go back to his house to conduct a
further search. Thereupon, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., accompanied by Prosecutor Lu, PO3 Estoy, Jr., PO3
Manicio, SPO3 Manalo, and PO3 Rosal, proceeded thereto. Inside the house, they saw Cubcubin's 11-
year old son Jhumar. PO3 Estoy, Jr. found on top of a plastic water container (drum) outside the
bathroom a homemade Smith and Wesson caliber .38 revolver (six shooter), without a serial number.
He found the gun loaded with five live bullets. PO3 Estoy, Jr. said that he inscribed his initials "RDE"
(for Raymundo D. Estoy) on the cylinder of the gun with the use of a sharp object. While PO3 Estoy,
Jr. was conducting the search, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. and PO3 Rosal stayed with Cubcubin in the sala.
The .38 caliber gun, the white "Hanes" t-shirt, and the two spent .38 caliber shells were all
photographed. Cubcubin was then taken to the police station, where he was photographed along with
the things seized from him. Cubcubin was charged for the crime of murder and was found guilty
thereof.
Issue:
Whether there was "probable cause" existed at time of warrantless arrest
Held:
NO. There was no probable cause
Under Rule 113, two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the
offender has just committed an offense and, second, the arresting peace officer or private person
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. It has
been held that "personal knowledge of facts' in arrests without a warrant must be based upon probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." Herein, the arrest of
Cubcubin was effected shortly after the victim was killed. There was no "probable cause, however,
for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the arresting officers, to believe that Cubcubin committed the
crime. The two did not have "personal knowledge of facts" indicating that Cubcubin had
committed the crime. Their knowledge of the circumstances from which they allegedly inferred
that Cubcubin was probably guilty was based entirely on what they had been told by others, to
wit: by someone who called the PNP station in San Antonio, Cavite City at about 3:30 a.m. of 26
August 1997 and reported that a man had been killed along Julian Felipe Boulevard of the said city;
by an alleged witness who saw Cubcubin and the victim coming out of the Sting Cafe; by Danet
Garcellano, waitress at the Sting Cafe, who said that the man last seen with the victim was lean,
mustachioed, dark-complexioned and was wearing a white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants; by
a tricycle driver named Armando Plata who told them that the physical description given by
Garcellano fitted Cubcubin, alias "Jun Dulce" and who said he knew where Cubcubin lived and
accompanied them to Cubcubin's house. Thus, PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. merely relied on
information given to them by others. Be that as it may, Cubcubin cannot now question the validity
of his arrest without a warrant. The records show that he pleaded not guilty to the charge when
arraigned on 11 November 1997. Cubcubin did not object to the arraignment, and thus has waived the
right to object to the legality of his arrest. On the other hand, the search of Cubcubin's house was
illegal and, consequently, the things obtained as a result of the illegal search, i.e., the white "Hanes"
t-shirt, two spent shells, and the .38 caliber gun, are inadmissible in evidence against him. It cannot
be said that the .38 caliber gun was discovered through inadvertence. After bringing Cubcubin to the
Sting Cafe where he was positively identified by a waitress named Danet Garcellano as the victim's
companion, the arresting officers allegedly asked Cubcubin where he hid the gun used in killing the
victim. According to SPO1 Malinao, Jr., when Cubcubin refused to answer, he sought Cubcubin's
permission to go back to his house and there found the .38 caliber revolver on top of a plastic water
container outside the bathroom. Thus, the gun was purposely sought by the police officers and they
did not merely stumble upon it. This could not be considered plain view.
People v Rodrigueza
FACTS:
 The police officers of Ibalon, Legaspi City, received a confidential information regarding
an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay.
 The police officer (Taduran) acted as a poseur-buyer. He was told by the Informant to look
for a certain Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs.
 Taduran went to Tagas alone and, while along the road, he met Samuel Segovia. He asked
Segovia where be could find Don and where he could buy marijuana. Segovia left for a
while and when be returned, he was accompanied by a man who was later on introduced to
him as Don, herein appellant.
 After agreeing on the price (P200.00) for 100 grams of marijuana, Don left Taduran and
Segovia and when he came back, he’s already bringing with him a plastic containing
Marijuana. Thereafter, Taduran returned to the headquarters and made a report regarding
his said purchase of marijuana.
 Based on that information, they apprehended the accused without a warrant of arrest.
 Thereafter, NARCOM agents raided without a search warrant the house of the
father(Jovencio Rodrigueza) of herein accused-appellant. During the raid, they were able to
confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe, among others
 The next 2 days, the father was released and Don and co-accused remained.
 The three accused (Don, Segovia, Lonceras) presented different versions of their alleged
participation.
 RTC found Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article
II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425, as amended) while the two
co-accused were acquitted.
 Hence, this appeal raising the issue of the legality of his arrest.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest was in consonance to his constitutional right
22
HELD:
NO. The arrest and seizure were illegally conducted.
As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be authorized by a search
warrant duly issued by the proper government authority. True, in some instances, this Court has
allowed government authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without a search warrant.
 when the owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion;
 when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest;
 when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws;
 when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or
immigration laws;
 when it involves prohibited articles in plain view;
 in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary
and building regulations,
In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio
Rodrigueza was not authorized by any search warrant.
It does not appear, either, that the situation falls under any of the aforementioned cases above.
Hence, appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM
agents could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under
surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should,
because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time.
The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the confiscated marijuana
leaves and other prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as evidence against appellant.
From the records of the case, Taduran (poseur-buyer) bought 100 grams of marijuana from Don but
the evidence presented were the prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called
follow-up raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza.
The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana leaves that became the basis
of appellant's conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic bag
and the dried marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime. As such,
the existence thereof must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal
to the cause of the prosecution.
Finally, the Court has repeatedly ruled that to sustain the conviction of the accused, the prosecution
must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. 31 As clearly
shown by the evidence, the prosecution has failed to establish its cause. It has not overcome the
presumption of innocence accorded to appellant. This being the case, appellant should not be allowed
to suffer for unwarranted and imaginary imputations against him.
Go v CA
GR No. 101837
11 February 1992
Feliciano, J.
Rolito Go shot Eldon Maguan following a road altercation when their vehicles nearly collided in a
one-way street in San Juan, Manila. Maguan would later die from the gunshot wound. Several
witnesses identified Go and the car that he was using at the time of the commission of the crime. The
police then promptly effected a manhunt, but six days later, Go presented himself before the police
station, together with his lawyers, and he was thereafter arrested without a warrant. Go questioned
the validity of the warrantless arrest and asked for his immediate release.
Issue: Whether the warrantless arrest was valid
Held: No. Go’s arrest did not fall under any of the warrantless arrests allowed by law.
There are three instances when a warrantless arrest can be effected by a police officer or a private
person: (1) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense, (2) when an offense has just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it, and (3) when
the person to be arrested is a fugitive.
The crime was not committed in the presence of the police officers who arrested Go. Go’s arrest also
took place only six days after the crime was committed, which undeniably does not fall under a
crime that “has just been committed.” The police officers also had no personal knowledge that Go
was the one who committed the crime as they had to rely on the testimonies of the witnesses to
ascertain Go’s involvement. Lastly, Go was not a fugitive. The warrantless arrest, therefore, was
invalid.
Dispositive: The petition was granted; the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was ordered to
conduct a preliminary investigation; in the meantime, Go was ordered released upon posting of a
cash bail bond
P67 PEOPLE v. ANTONIO ENRILE
222 SCRA 586 (1993)
FACTS: At about half past six in the, a buy-bust team composed of the Quezon City Police Anti-
Narcotics Unit was dispatched to entrap Rogelio Abugatal at Roosevelt Avenue in San Francisco
Del Monte, Quezon City.
In their separate testimonies, both policemen said that on the occasion they saw someone hand over
to Abugatal the marked money representing payment for the mock transaction. The two
policemen then approached Abugatal and placed him under arrest, at the same time confiscating the
wrapped object.
The prosecution also showed that, upon providing Abugatal led the policemen to a house at 20
De Vera Street, also in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City, where he called out for Antonio
Enrile. Enrile came out and met them at the gate. Abugatal pointed to Enrile as the source of
the marijuana, whereupon the policemen immediately arrested and frisked him. They found in the
right front pocket of his trousers the marked money earlier delivered to Abugatal, with Serial No.
PJ966425.6
In his defense, Enrile testified that the marked money was "planted" on him by the police
officers, who he said simply barged into his house without a warrant and arrested him.
Sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P30,000.00 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
Antonio Enrile faults the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for convicting him.
ISSUE: Whether Antonio Enrile's arrest constitutes a valid arrest.
23
HELD: No. This is not a valid arrest. Rule 113 Sec. 5, gives a private officer or a peace officer to
make warrantless arrest in under specific circumstances. Here, Enrile was not even at the scene of
the entrapment at that time. Abugatal said he did lead the policemen to Enrile's house where he
pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana. Even assuming this to be true, that circumstance P70 PEOPLE VS DUMAGOY GR 216753
alone did not justify Enrile's warrantless arrest and search.

What the policemen should have done was secure a search warrant on the basis of Facts:
the information supplied by Abugatal, and then, with such authority, proceeded to search and, "[B]etter to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one
if the search was fruitful, arrest Enrile. They had no right to simply force themselves into his innocent man for a crime he did not commit.
house on the bare (and subsequently disallowed) allegations of Abugatal and bundle Enrile off to the
police station as if he had been caught in flagrante delicto. Appellant was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, otherwise known as the
The discovery of the marked money on him did not mean he was caught in the act of Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in an Information which reads:
selling marijuana. The marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that fact alone That on or about October 14, 2006 in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
would not retroactively validate the warrantless search and seizure. of this Honorable Court. the above named accused, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, give
away to another. transport or distribute, any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
(P68) People vs. Pasudag GR 128822, May 4, 2001 and feloniously sell and deliver to PO2 JOSEPH RICHMOND C. JIMENEA, PNP, RIID-PRO 9,
PDEA, who acted as poseur-buyer, twenty (20) vials of 1 ml. Morphine, one (1) vial of 200 ml.
Facts: Nandrolone Decanoate, two (2) syringes, which accused knowing the same to be dangerous drugs.
On 26 September 1995, at around 1:30 p.m., SPO2 Pepito Calip of the PNP Sison, Pangasinan, went
to Brgy. Artacho to conduct anti-jueteng operations. He urinated at a bushy bamboo fence behind the That further, the accused was at the time of his apprehension in possession of an unlicensed .45
public school. About 5 meters away, he saw a garden of about 70 square meters. There were Caliber pistol (Homemade) with Serial Number 112074 with two (2) magazines and thirteen (13)
marijuana plants in between corn plants and camote tops. He inquired from a storekeeper nearby as live ammunition for caliber .45 and a Lifan Mitsukoshi Motorcycle with Plate No. JH 7640 and
to who owned the house with the garden. The storeowner told him that Alberto Pasudag y Bokang Chassis No. LF3XCH7AXlAOOA363, which he used, in furtherance of the crime charged as special
owned it. SPO2 Calip went to the Police Station and reported to Chief of Police Romeo C. Astrero. aggravating circumstances.
The latter dispatched a team (composed of SPO2 Calip, SPO3 Fajarito, SPO3 Alcantara and PO3
Rasca) to conduct an investigation. At around 2:30 p.m., the team arrived at Brgy. Artacho and went Appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
straight to the house of Pasudag. SPO3 Fajarito looked for Pasudag and asked him to bring the team
to his backyard garden which was about 5 meters away. Upon seeing the marijuana plants, the
policemen called for a photographer, who took pictures of Pasudag standing beside one of the
Appellant denied the accusations against him and testified that he was at the area to meet a certain
marijuana plants. They uprooted 7 marijuana plants. The team brought Pasudag and the marijuana
"Bill," a member of the American Navy, to run errands for him; that while waiting for Bill, he went
plants to the police station. On 17 December 1996, 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
inside the canteen located at the back of the gas dump; that when he came out, he saw four
Pangasinan Emiliano M. Matro filed with the Regional Trial Court, Pangasinan, Urdaneta an
policemen positioned outside the canteen; that he was approached, manhandled and hit continuously
Information charging Pasudag with violation of RA 6425, Sec. 9. On 10 February 1997, the trial
by the policemen; that there were several witnesses, among them was Sgt. Rogelio Necesario (Sgt.
court arraigned the accused. He pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The Regional Trial Court,
Necesario); and that he was brought to the police station, where the policemen demanded money
Pangasinan, Branch 46, Urdaneta found Pasudag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
from him.
cultivation of marijuana and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00,
without subsidiary penalty and other accessories of the law. Pasudag appealed.
Sgt. Necesario testified that he has been a member of the Philippine Army since October 27,
1997;[52] that appellant used to run errands for the American soldiers who joined the Balikatan
Issue:
Exercises; that on the said date, he was at the gas dump located at WESMINCOM; that he saw
Whether time was of the essence to uproot and confiscate the marijuana plants.
appellant enter the canteen; and that after a few minutes, he saw him board the PDEA van blind-
folded, handcuffed, with plaster on his mouth, and lying face down on the floor. On cross-
Held:
examination, he clarified that, from where he was positioned at that time, he could not see what was
As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is required before a law enforcer may validly
inside the canteen; and that about five minutes elapsed from the time he saw appellant enter the
search or seize the person, house, papers or effects of any individual. The Constitution provides that
canteen and the time he saw him again inside the van.
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable." Any evidence
On August 26, 2011, the RTC rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty of the crime charged.
obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible. Herein, the police authorities had ample
opportunity to secure from the court a search warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip inquired as to who owned
Appellant appealed the RTC Decision arguing that there was no valid buy-bust operation and that
the house. He was acquainted with marijuana plants and immediately recognized that some plants in
the police officers failed to comply with Section 21 of RA 9165, or the Chain of Custody Rule.
the backyard of the house were marijuana plants. Time was not of the essence to uproot and
confiscate the plants. They were three months old and there was no sufficient reason to believe that
On October 23, 2014, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the RTC Decision. The CA ruled that
they would be uprooted on that same day. With the illegal seizure of the marijuana plants, the seized
based on the evidence presented there was a valid buy-bust operation. As to the chain of custody, the
plants are inadmissible in evidence against Pasudag.
CA noted that the non-compliance with the Chain of Custody Rule was never raised during the trial
24
of the case. In any case, the CA found that the Chain of Custody Rule was followed notwithstanding
the non-presentation of SPO1 Gallego and PCI Diestro. It also ruled that although the RTC
committed an error in describing the dangerous drug as "methamphetamine hydrochloride" instead
of morphine during the August 4 and 7, 2008 hearings and in its August 4, 2008 Order, such
erroneous description does not affect the actual evidence presented and offered by the prosecution,
which are the vials of morphine recovered from appellant.
Hence, appellant filed the instant appeal, raising the same arguments he had in the CA.
On August 3, 2015, the Court required both parties to file their respective supplementary briefs;
however they opted not to file the same.
The Court's Ruling
Issue: Was the chain of custody in accordance in with the procedure be admissisble as evidence in
the proceedings.
Held:
While there was a valid buy-bust operation, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish an
unbroken chain of custody of the seized items, i.e., there were missing links.
The Prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized items.
Chain of custody is "the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping, to
presentation in court for destruction.
Section 21 Article II of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640,[73] reads:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs. Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, x x x so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
(i) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, x x x shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, That the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and
custody over said items.
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hour upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, x xx the same shall
be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results x x x shall be issued immediately
upon the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of dangerous drugs, x x x
does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination
report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be
examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued
immediately upon completion of the said examination and certification;
The Court has consistently ruled that each link in the chain of custody rule must be sufficiently
proved by the prosecution and examined with careful scrutiny by the court. The prosecution has the
burden to show "every link in the chain, from the moment the dangerous drug was seized from the
accused until the time it is offered in court as evidence." Failure to strictly comply with rules of
procedure, however, does not ipso facto invalidate or render void the seizure and custody over the
items as long as the prosecution is able to show that "(a) there is justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved."
Thus, in case the police officers fail to strictly comply with the rules of procedure, they must be able
to "explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized
evidence had nonetheless been preserved x x x because the Court cannot presume what these
grounds are or that they even exist." In other words, taking into consideration the difficulty of
complete compliance with the chain of custody requirement, the Court has considered substantial
compliance sufficient "as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending police officers."
In this case, it was established by the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses and the stipulation of
facts agreed by the parties that PO3 Jimenea and SPO4 Rosales marked the seized items with their
initials at the police station; that PO3 Jimenea turned over the seized items to SPO1 Gallego; that
after the seized items were turned over to him, SPO1 Gallego marked and photographed them; that
an Inventory[80] of the seized items was then made in the presence of appellant and the
representatives of the media and the DOJ; that SPO1 Gallego then prepared a Request for the
Laboratory Examination of the seized vials, which were then brought to the crime laboratory on the
same day; that PCI Diestro examined the specimen she received; and that her findings were reduced
into writing in the Chemistry Report.
No testimonies or stipulations, however, were made on the details of the turnover of the seized vials
from the police station to the crime laboratory, and the turnover and submission of the same from the
crime laboratory to the court, as only the following facts were stipulated:
In today's trial, the proposed testimony of [SPO1 Gallego] was dispensed with and [the] parties
agreed to stipulate the following: that he was the investigator in this case; that he took cognizance of
this case by virtue of the Investigation Report - Exhibit "L[;]" that he received the person of the
[appellant], twenty pieces/vials of Morphine Sulfate - Exhibit "B[;]" one big vial [Decaject] 200; two
syringe[s] - Exhibit "C;" five pieces of P100.00 bills Exhibit "H[;]" picture Exhibit "J[;]" linger
prints Exhibit "N[;]" Inventory Exhibit "I[;]" that he prepared the forwarding report - Exhibit "M[;]"
and that he has no personal knowledge as to the actual exchange of the buy-bust money and the
dangerous drugs and the articles. x x x
From the foregoing, it is very evident that the prosecution in dispensing with the testimonies of
SPO1 Gallego, the investigating officer, and PCI Diestro, the forensic chemist, failed to show every
link of the chain of custody. Without the testimonies or stipulations stating the details on when and
how the seized vials were brought to the crime laboratory, and thereafter, to the court, as well as the
details on who actually delivered and received the same from the police station to the crime
laboratory, and later, to the court for the prosecution's presentation of evidence, the Court cannot
ascertain whether the seized vials presented in evidence were the same vials seized from appellant
when he was arrested. These gaps in the chain of custody create doubt as to whether the corpus
delicti of the crime had been properly preserved. And more importantly, although appellant was
charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 for selling vials of morphine and
25
Nandrolone Decanoate, the parties however stipulated, per August 4, 2008 Order of the RTC, that
the items seized from appellant yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Clearly, the identity of the corpus delicti of the crime had not been properly
established.
The prosecution likewise failed to give an explanation or a justifiable reason why the apprehending
police officers had failed to mark the seized items and conduct the physical inventory of the same at
the place where the appellant was arrested. It bears stressing that the marking of the apprehending
police officers' initials or signatures on the seized items must be made in the presence of the accused
immediately upon arrest.[85] And although the Chain of Custody Rule allows the physical inventory
of the seized items to be done at the nearest police station, this is more of an exception than a rule.
Police officers, therefore, must provide an explanation to justify their failure to conduct the marking
and the physical inventory at the place of arrest.
The Court also noticed that, although the prosecution stipulated that SPO1 Gallego conducted the
inventory, the Certificate of Inventory was signed by a certain PI Domingo.
Considering all the foregoing, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to (1) prove the corpus
delicti of the crime; (2) establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs; and (3) offer any
explanation why the Chain of Custody Rule was not complied with. Accordingly, the Court is
constrained to acquit appellant based on reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR HC No.
00985-MIN, which affirmed the August 26, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, appellant Jesus Dumagay is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE VS. DELA CRUZ
G.R 205821
CRIMINAL LAW; DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT; ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS;
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS; ELEMENTS OF.—THE ELEMENTS THAT
MUST BE ESTABLISHED TO SUSTAIN CONVICTIONS FOR ILLEGAL SALE AND ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS ARE SETTLED: IN ACTIONS INVOLVING THE
ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS, THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS MUST FIRST BE
ESTABLISHED: (1) PROOF THAT THE TRANSACTION OR SALE TOOK PLACE AND (2) THE
PRESENTATION IN COURT OF THE CORPUS DELICTI OR THE ILLICIT DRUG AS
EVIDENCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IN PROSECUTIONS FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF A
DANGEROUS DRUG, IT MUST BE SHOWN THAT (1) THE ACCUSED WAS IN POSSESSION
OF AN ITEM OR AN OBJECT IDENTIFIED TO BE A PROHIBITED OR REGULATED DRUG, (2)
SUCH POSSESSION IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY LAW, AND (3) THE ACCUSED WAS FREELY
AND CONSCIOUSLY AWARE OF BEING IN POSSESSION OF THE DRUG. SIMILARLY, IN
THIS CASE, THE EVIDENCE OF THE CORPUS DELICTI MUST BE ESTABLISHED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. PEOPLE VS. DELA CRUZ, 737 SCRA 486, G.R. NO. 205821 OCTOBER
1, 2014
SAME; SAME; CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE; THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COMPLYING WITH
SECTION 21’S REQUIREMENTS CANNOT BE OVEREMPHASIZED; BY FAILING TO
ESTABLISH AN ELEMENT OF THESE OFFENSES, NONCOMPLIANCE WILL, THUS,
ENGENDER THE ACQUITTAL OF AN ACCUSED.—THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COMPLYING
WITH SECTION 21’S REQUIREMENTS CANNOT BE OVEREMPHASIZED.
NONCOMPLIANCE IS TANTAMOUNT TO FAILURE IN ESTABLISHING IDENTITY OF
CORPUS DELICTI, AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSES OF ILLEGAL SALE AND
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS. BY FAILING TO ESTABLISH AN
ELEMENT OF THESE OFFENSES, NONCOMPLIANCE WILL, THUS, ENGENDER THE
ACQUITTAL OF AN ACCUSED.
SAME; SAME; SAME; IN PEOPLE V. GARCIA, 580 SCRA 259 (2009), THE SUPREME COURT
(SC) NOTED THAT THE MERE MARKING OF SEIZED PARAPHERNALIA, UNSUPPORTED
BY A PHYSICAL INVENTORY AND TAKING OF PHOTOGRAPHS, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF
THE PERSONS REQUIRED BY SECTION 21 TO BE PRESENT, DOES NOT SUFFICE.—AS
PEOPLE V. HOLGADO, 732 SCRA 554 (2014), EMPHASIZED, “[E]VEN THE DOING OF ACTS
WHICH OSTENSIBLY APPROXIMATE COMPLIANCE BUT DO NOT ACTUALLY COMPLY
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 21 DOES NOT SUFFICE.” IN PEOPLE V. GARCIA,
580 SCRA 259 (2009), THIS COURT NOTED THAT THE MERE MARKING OF SEIZED
PARAPHERNALIA, UNSUPPORTED BY A PHYSICAL INVENTORY AND TAKING OF
PHOTOGRAPHS, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF THE PERSONS REQUIRED BY SECTION 21 TO
BE PRESENT, DOES NOT SUFFICE: THUS, OTHER THAN THE MARKINGS MADE BY PO1
GARCIA AND THE POLICE INVESTIGATOR (WHOSE IDENTITY WAS NOT DISCLOSED),
NO PHYSICAL INVENTORY WAS EVER MADE, AND NO PHOTOGRAPH OF THE SEIZED
ITEMS WAS TAKEN UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED BY R.A. NO. 9165 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES. WE OBSERVE THAT WHILE THERE WAS TESTIMONY WITH
RESPECT TO THE MARKING OF THE SEIZED ITEMS AT THE POLICE STATION, NO
MENTION WHATSOEVER WAS MADE ON WHETHER THE MARKING HAD BEEN DONE IN
THE PRESENCE OF RUIZ OR HIS REPRESENTATIVES. THERE WAS LIKEWISE NO
MENTION THAT ANY REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE MEDIA AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, OR ANY ELECTED OFFICIAL HAD BEEN PRESENT DURING THIS INVENTORY,
OR THAT ANY OF THESE PEOPLE HAD BEEN REQUIRED TO SIGN THE COPIES OF THE
INVENTORY. PEOPLE VS. DELA CRUZ, 737 SCRA 486, G.R. NO. 205821 OCTOBER 1, 2014
SAME; SAME; SAME; NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER
JUSTIFIABLE GROUNDS, AS LONG AS THE INTEGRITY AND THE EVIDENTIARY VALUE
OF THE SEIZED ITEMS ARE PROPERLY PRESERVED BY THE APPREHENDING
OFFICER/TEAM, SHALL NOT RENDER VOID AND INVALID SUCH SEIZURES AND
CUSTODY OVER SAID ITEMS.—SECTION 21, PARAGRAPH 1, OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, INCLUDES A PROVISO TO THE EFFECT THAT
“NONCOMPLIANCE OF (SIC) THESE REQUIREMENTS UNDER JUSTIFIABLE GROUNDS,
AS LONG AS THE INTEGRITY AND THE EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED ITEMS ARE
PROPERLY PRESERVED BY THE APPREHENDING OFFICER/TEAM, SHALL NOT RENDER
VOID AND INVALID SUCH SEIZURES AND CUSTODY OVER SAID ITEMS.” PLAINLY, THE
PROSECUTION HAS NOT SHOWN THAT — ON SEPTEMBER 14, 2004, WHEN DELA CRUZ
WAS ARRESTED AND THE SACHETS SUPPOSEDLY SEIZED AND MARKED — THERE
WERE “JUSTIFIABLE GROUNDS” FOR DISPENSING WITH COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION
21. ALL THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS DONE IS INSIST ON ITS SELF-SERVING
ASSERTION THAT THE INTEGRITY OF THE SEIZED SACHETS HAS, DESPITE ALL ITS
LAPSES, NEVERTHELESS BEEN PRESERVED. PEOPLE VS. DELA CRUZ, 737 SCRA 486, G.R.
NO. 205821 OCTOBER 1, 2014
FACTS:
Information for violation of R.A. 9165 was filed against herein accused.
The prosecution narrated that the accused was apprehended during a buy bust operation they
conducted after conducting surveillance for a week. The said accused was allegedly part of their
barangay watchlist. The buy bust operation conducted was successful. The police operatives were able
to confiscate a plastic sachet of shabu which when brought to the crime laboratory for examination
yielded positive result.
26
 The defense denied the allegations filed against him. He was just allegedly sipping coffee in his
house while two neighbors were talking in front of his house, a Tamaraw FX arrived. Five armed men
alighted from it, whereupon his neighbors ran away and were chased by them. The armed men then
returned, saying, “Nakatakas, nakatakbo.” (They had escaped and ran.) One of the armed men saw
the accused and entered his house. It was PO2 Ibasco, who frisked him and got PhP 60 from his pocket.
PO1 Valencia also entered his house and came out with a shoe box, then said, “Sige, isakay n’yo na.”
(Take him in the car.) He asked the armed men what his violation was but was told to merely explain
at the precinct. Thereafter, he learned that he was being charged of violation of dangerous. A plastic
sachet was shown to him and was told it was allegedly recovered from him
There defense presented two more other witnesses which corroborated the earlier testimony of the
accused of what transpired on said date of his apprehension.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated June 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02727, which affirmed in toto the February 8, 2007 Decision2 in Criminal Case No. Q-
03-117814 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82 in Quezon City. The RTC found accused
Garry de la Cruz y dela Cruz (Garry) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the defense was able to present strong and convincing evidence so that
its defense of denial frame up will prosper?
2. Whether or not that chain of custody has been properly established as to warrant conviction
of herein accused?
HELD:
1. With respect to the first issue, the defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and
convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular
performance of their official duties. Nonetheless, such a defense may be given credence when there is
sufficient evidence or proof making it to be very plausible or true. We are of the view that accused-
appellant’s defenses of denial and frame-up are credible given the circumstances of the case. Indeed,
jurisprudence has established that the defense of denial assumes significance only when the
prosecution’s evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, as in the instant
case. At the very least, there is reasonable doubt that there was a buy-bust operation conducted and
that accused-appellant sold the seized shabu. After all, a criminal conviction rests on the strength of
the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.
There are other pieces of evidence putting in doubt the conduct of the buy-bust operation, these
irregularities take on more significance which are, well nigh, fatal to the prosecution. Putting in doubt
the conduct of the buy-bust operation are the uncontroverted testimonies of Buencamino and Lepiten,
which gave credence to accused-appellant’s denial and frame-up theory. The Court is not unaware
that, in some instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract information
from or even to harass civilians. This Court has been issuing cautionary warnings to trial courts to
exercise extra vigilance in trying drug cases, lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually
severe penalties for drug offenses.
2. With respect to the second issue, the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the requisite
chain of custody of the seized specimen. “Chain of custody” means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation
to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. The CA
found an unbroken chain of custody of the purportedly confiscated shabu specimen. However, the
records belie such conclusion.
It is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same
substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug be established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. This, the prosecution failed to do.
The prosecution must offer the testimony of key witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain
of custody.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accused-appellant Garry De La Cruz y
Dela Cruz is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged on basis of reasonable doubt. Accordingly,
the CA Decision dated June 30, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727 is SET ASIDE. The Director
of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause the immediate release of accused-appellant, unless he
is being lawfully held for another cause. No cost.
P72 – EXCLUSIONARY RULE/VALIDITY OF CONVICTION - PEOPLE v. MYRNA GAYOSO
Y ARGUELLES
G.R. NO. 206590, March 27, 2017
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, finding Myrna Gayoso y Arguelles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of illegal sales of a dangerous drug and illegal possession of a dangerous drug and imposi upon
her the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of PhP 500,000 for selling shabu, and the indeterminate
prison term of eight years and one day, as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day, as
maximum for possessing 0.53 gram of shabu.
The information in the criminal cases states that the accused have in her possession, control
and custody eleven sachets of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as “shabu”
weighing 0.53 g; and that the accused unlawfully and criminally sell, deliver and dispense one pc.
small heat-sealed sachet of “shabu” weighing 0.06 gram.
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale and illegal
possession of shabu declaring that the prosecution ably established the elements of illegal sale and
possession of shabu through the testimony of its witnesses who arrested appellant after selling a sachet
of illegal; drug in a “test-buy operation” and for possessing 11 sachets of the same drug in her house
after enforcing a search warrant immediately thereafter. The CA affirmed the ruling finding appellant
guilty of unauthorized sale and possession of shabu, ruling that all elements for the sale of shabu were
established during the “test-buy operation.”
ISSUES:
Whether there was probable cause in the issuance of the search warrant since Barber had no
personal knowledge of her alleged drug dealings.
27

RULING:
Here, the records reveal that the trial court issued the search warrant after deposing two
witnesses, namely PI Barber and SPO3 Salamida. In particular, the deposition of SPO3 Salamida
shows that he had personal knowledge of appellant's drug pushing activities which served as basis for
the finding of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. Thus, whether or not PI Barber
had personal knowledge of the illegal drug activities committed by appellant will not adversely affect
the findings of probable cause for the purpose of issuance of search warrant.
Probable cause for a valid search warrant is defined "as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." The probable
cause must be "determined personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized." Probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause, nor
does it import absolute certainty. The determination of the existence of probable cause is concerned
only with the question of whether the affiant has reasonable grounds to believe that the accused
committed or is committing the crime charged.
PEOPLE VS. VILLANUEVA
Facts:
At around past 5:00 a.m. of January 1, 2012, Amie Bafiaga (Bañaga) was selling tapsilog to a group
of persons playing cara y cruz at the comer of an alley in Summitville, Barangay Putatan, Muntinlupa
City. Thereupon, Bafiaga saw the accused-appellants and Valencia arrive and ask the group if they
know Enrico Enriquez (Enrico), to which they answered in the negative. Thereupon, the accused-
appellants and Valencia went to the tricycle terminal, which was about 10 to 15 meters away, where
they saw Enrico. They then simultaneously attacked Enrico. Villanueva punched Enrico on the face
twice while Sayson hit the latter at the back of the head with a stone wrapped in a t-shirt. Valencia
then stabbed Enrico on the left side of his armpit twice. Enrico tried to fight back to no avail. The
assailants thereafter fled. However, Villanueva was caught by men aboard a pursuing tricycle. Enrico
was brought to the Muntinlupa Medical Center, but he was declared dead on arrival.8 Dr. Roberto Rey
C. San Diego, medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, conducted an autopsy on
Enrico's body. He noted two stab wounds on the left side of Enrico's chest, one of which penetrated
the left atrium of the heart. The accused-appellants denied the allegations against them. RTC found
the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. The RTC appreciated the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength considering that Enrico was all alone when he
was attacked by the accused-appellants and Valencia. Unperturbed, the accused-appellants appealed
the RTC decision to the CA, claiming that the RTC erred in ruling that the prosecution was able to
prove all the elements of the crime of murder.
Issue:
whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision which found the accused-appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
Ruling: To warrant a conviction for the crime of murder, the following essential elements must be
present: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the
killing is not parricide or infanticide. One of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248, which
qualifies the killing of the victim to murder, is abuse of superior strength. The prosecution failed to
establish the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The fact that the accused-
appellants and Valencia, armed with a knife and a stone, ganged up on Enrico does not
automatically merit the conclusion that the latter's killing was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there
is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage
of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that there were two persons who attacked the
victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength,
there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must
establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to
use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out
of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The appreciation of this
aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties. However, mere
superiority in numbers does not ipso facto indicate an abuse of superior strength. The accused-
appellants' guilt is, thus, limited to the crime of homicide. Supreme Court held that accused-appellants
Cyrus Villanueva y Isorena and Alvin Sayson y Esponcilla were found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide.
P74
Dabon vs. People (2018)
Keywords: Two witness rule, Shabu, Search of house, Section 8 RULE 126
Facts:
Law enforcement agents applied for a search warrant after the surveillance and test-buy operations
conducted by the operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP)-Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) in Bohol, which confirmed that Dabon was engaged in illegal drug
activity. Search Warrant No. 15, which armed law enforcement agents to search Dabon's residence
for violation of the RA 9165.
On July 2003, 5:30 a.m., P/Insp. Mallari, SPO2 Maglinte, and SPO1 Triste of the Bohol Criminal
Investigation and Detection Team proceeded to an apartment unit at Boal District, Tagbilaran City
where the residence of Dabon is situated. Upon reaching the two-storey apartment at about 7:30am,
the CIDG operatives requested Barangay Kagawad Angalot, SK Chairman Angalot, media
representative Charles Responte (Responte) and Department of Justice (DOJ) representative Castro
to witness the search. The group entered the house and the CIDG, together with Brgy. Kagawad
Angalot and SK Chairman Angalot went to the second floor where Dabon and his family resided.
The second floor had two bedrooms, a kitchen and a living room. They found Eusubio Dumaluan
(Dumaluan) in the living room while Dabon was inside one of the bedrooms.
After P/Insp. Mallari handed the copy of the search warrant to Dabon, the CIDG operatives searched
the kitchen where PO2 Datoy and PO2 Enterina found, in the presence of Brgy. Kagawad Angalot,
drug paraphernalia. The police officers then frisked Dumaluan and recovered from his pocket, a coin
purse, a lighter, a metal clip, three empty decks of suspected shabu, two pieces of blade and
crumpled tin foil.
The police officers proceeded to search one of the bedrooms where they found three plastic sachets
containing suspected shabu, which were hidden in the folded of clothes inside a drawer. They also
recovered numerous drug paraphernalia
On July 28, 2003, PO2 Diola of the Bohol Provincial Office of the PNP Crime Laboratory received
from PO2 Imperina a letter signed by P/Insp. Mallari[16] requesting the conduct of chemical
28
examination on the seized items. The letter and the seized items were turned over to P/Insp. David
Tan (P/Insp. Tan), a Forensic Chemical Officer.
The chemical examination and confirmatory test conducted by P/Insp. Tan on the seized items
yielded positive results for the presence ofshabu. For his defense, Dabon argued that he was
surprised when he was awakened by alleged members of the CIDG, who entered his room, pointing
guns at him and telling them that they will conduct a raid. Dabon and Dumaluan claimed that they
were not allowed to witness the search conducted by the CIDG. Instead, they were ordered to stay
and sit in the living room while other members of the household were locked inside the room of their
house helper.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence was admissible
Held:
NO. The evidence obtained in the search is not admissible.
Here, the hierarchy among the witnesses as explicitly provided under the law was not complied with.
For one, the lawful occupants of the premises were not absent when the police authorities
implemented the search warrant. Even so, the two-witness rule was not complied with as only one
witness, Brgy. Kagawad Angalot, was present when the search was conducted.
As told, based on the testimonies of PO2 Datoy and Brgy. Kagawad Angalot, it is clear that the
mandatory rule under Section 8 was violated. Clearly, the contention of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) that SK Chairman Angalot was there was belied by the statement of PO2 Datoy and
Brgy. Kagawad Angalot.
Failure to comply with the safeguards provided by law in implementing the search warrant makes
the search unreasonable. Thus, the exclusionary rule applies, i.e., any evidence obtained in violation
of this constitutional mandate is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. [40] We emphasize
that the exclusionary rule ensures that the fundamental rights to one's person, houses, papers, and
effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.
In People v. Go,[37] We rendered inadmissible the evidence obtained in violation of this rule and
stressed that the Rules of Court clearly and explicitly establishes a hierarchy among the witnesses in
whose presence the search of the premises must be conducted. Section 8, Rule 126 provides that the
search should be witnessed by two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality only in the absence of either the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his
family. In People v. Del Castillo,[38] We ruled that although the lawful occupants were present
during the search, the fact that they were not allowed to witness the search of the premises violates
the mandatory requirement. In Bulauitan v. People,[39] We decided for the acquittal of the accused
because of failure to comply with the aforequoted rule, which rendered the evidence against him
inadmissible.
People v Crispo
FACTS:
This case stemmed from two (2) Informations5 filed before the RTC charging accused-appellants of
the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, and Crispo of the crime of Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs
ISSUE:
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld accused-appellants'
conviction for the crimes charged.
HELD:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends
the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our
people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be
more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of liberty of every individual in
the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection
the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities,
however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules as follows:
(a) Crim. Case No. 12-293828 is hereby DISMISSED and
declared CLOSED and TERMINATED insofar as accused-appellant Enrico Herrera y Montes is
concerned due to his supervening death pending appeal; and
(b) The appeal of accused-appellant Marcelino Crispo y Descalso is GRANTED. The Decision
dated March 1 7, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 07117
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, he is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being
lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
People v Que
FACTS:
This case stemmed from two (2) Informations5 filed before the RTC charging accused-appellants of
the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, and Crispo of the crime of Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs
ISSUE:
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld accused-appellants'
conviction for the crimes charged.
HELD:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends
the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our
people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more
so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of liberty of every individual in the
realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the
innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however
praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual
in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules as follows:
(a) Crim. Case No. 12-293828 is hereby DISMISSED and
declared CLOSED and TERMINATED insofar as accused-appellant Enrico Herrera y Montes is
concerned due to his supervening death pending appeal; and
(b) The appeal of accused-appellant Marcelino Crispo y Descalso is GRANTED. The Decision dated
March 1 7, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 07117 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, he is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau of
29
Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for
any other reason.

No. This case merely involves 0.0157 grams and 0.0783 grams of alleged shabu. These are quantities
so miniscule they amount to 4.7% of the weight of a one-centavo coin or 2.0 grams.67 These miniscule
amounts were contained in sachets, the handling of which from the target area to the police station
was totally bereft of safeguards. As with Lescano, De Leon, and Holgado, the miniscule amount of
narcotics seized, coupled with the dubious circumstances of seizure, militates against the prosecution's
case.

The buy-bust team's failures bring into question the integrity of the corpus delicti of the charge of sale
of illegal drugs against accused-appellant. This leaves reasonable doubt on the guilt of accused-
appellant Joshua Que. Necessarily, he must be acquitted.

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