Bruce Bueno de Mesquita: A Critique of ''A Critique of The War Trap''

A Critique of "A Critique of the War Trap"
Author(s): Bruce Bueno De Mesquita

Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Jun., 1984), pp. 341-360
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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A Critique of "A Critique of
The War Trap"
BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA

Department of Political Science
University of Rochester
By applying the criteria suggested by Lakatos for comparing rival theories, I show that
the expected utility research program developed in The War Traphas yielded an integra-
tive, fairly comprehensive theory that has provided a better empirical understanding of
international conflict than any widely tested alternative. I go on to demonstrate that
Majeski and Sylvan are mistaken with regard to their criticisms of the accuracy, impor-
tance, relevance, and fairness of the theory set out in The War Trap.Also, I show that they
have misunderstood fundamental aspects of the theory and have, therefore, attributed
premises and characteristics to it that it does not possess.
The construction of a theory of war is a critical, although difficult,

task facing students of international relations. I have confronted that
task by developing a research program focused on a rational choice,
expected utility approach to conflict decision making. Majeski and
Sylvan seem convinced that my efforts are so seriously flawed as to be an
impediment to scientific progress and movement in this area. Thus, they
conclude their critique of my research agenda by saying "the research
design of The War Trap rules out any such movement, and pursuing it
further would be counterproductive." In the end, this is by far their most
serious accusation. It states that further pursuit of an expected utility
approach to conflict is harmful to the field.
In the following pages I address their major criticisms both in terms
of the arguments made in The War Trap and in the body of additional
research that I and others have published or presented at conferences
since the completion of The War Trap (hereafter TWT) more than four
years ago. In doing so I make no claim that TWT is without flaws-
AUTHOR'S NOTE: I would like to thank John Ferejohn, Seifeldin M. Hussein, and
Grace Jusi, who read and commented on earlier versions of the article.
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 28 No. 2, June 1984 341-360

? 1984 Sage Publications, Inc.
341

342 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
indeed I note many of them in the body of the book-but I do claim that
the theoretical approach taken there, rather than being counterproduc-
tive, yields an integrative, fairly comprehensive theory that provides a
better empirical understanding of international conflict than any widely
tested alternative. This is a bold claim, but one which I will support with
clear and explicit evidence.
At the heart of the current critique is the conviction that "Bueno de
Mesquita makes assumptions that are unjustified and inconsistent."
Consistency, as I note repeatedly in TWT, is a central theoretical con-
cern. Propositions derived from an inconsistent argument have, in my
view, no theoretical standing. Whether assumptions are justified or not,
on the other hand, is an empirical question. To quote from TWT, "The
theorist's task is to make assumptions so 'realistic' that subsequent
deductions are not, in Sir Isaac Newton's words, 'dreams and vain
fictions of our own devising. ' " (p. 10) It must be noted at the outset that
Majeski and Sylvan concede the internal consistency of my argument,
and that doing so is critical to their basic challenge of the rational choice
approach. They contend,
Bueno de Mesquita [ hereafter BdM] conflates premises and assumptions, so that

his unrealistic background conditions are also his premises. Under such treatment,
highly reductionistic premises do not yield erroneous deductions-a great advan-
tage in "proving" an argument. In effect, BdM engages in sleight of hand: assuming
the existence of a world in which people behave in a reduced fashion. If such a
world were to exist, BdM's theory would be true by definition. Alas for the theory,
such a world does not exist.
Note they concede the internal consistency of my argument: "If such a

world were to exist, BdM's theory would be true by definition." The
issue, then, really is an empirical one. Is my theory so reductionistic as to
be Newton's "dreams and vain fictions"? Are my "background condi-
tions" unrealistic, reductionistic premises? Or does my theory ade-
quately approximate the world as it really is?
HOW CAN WE EVALUATE THE THEORY?
Majeski and Sylvan (hereafter M/ S) do not offer systematic evidence

in support of their contention that my theory or my assumptions are
unrealistic. Instead, they resort to such arguments as
we believe that empirical evidence must be adduced indicating that nations' actions
are consistent with those rules and indices [delineated in TWT] and inconsistent

Bueno de Mesquita / A CRITIQUE OF THE CRITIQUE 343
with plausible others. Under common standards of disputation, the burden of

proof here, as throughout The War Trap, is on BdM to provide argumentation and
evidence (not merely "empirical fit" for final equations) supporting each claim he
makes. Without such support, a plausible counterargument and counterexample
are prima facie grounds for suspecting-perhaps rejecting-his claims.
Elsewhere they resort to similar "beliefs," asserting that certain of my

measures-despite goodness of fit-are "inherently uncredible" (p. 28).
It is tempting to respond simply by noting that they provide no system-
atic evidence for their beliefs, and by noting that the tests of "empirical
fit" (in a significance testing sense) found throughout Chapter 5 of TWT
exceed the most widely used standards for evaluating evidence in the
field. Instead of responding to their assertions in this way, however, I
accept their implicit challenge. In the pages that follow I will show that
on evidenciary grounds the published plausible alternative counterar-
guments are inferior to the rational actor, expected utililty approach to
conflict.
What are the criteria by which alternative explanations of behavior
are to be compared to one another? I propose using the widely accepted
criteria suggested by Lakatos:
A scientific theory T is falsified if and only if another theory T' has been proposed
with the following characteristics: (1) T' has excess empirical content over T: that is,
it predicts novel facts, that is, facts improbable in the light of, or even forbidden, by
T; (2) T'explains the previous success of T, that is, all the unrefuted content of T is
included (within the limits of observational error) in the content of T'; and (3) some
of the excess content of T' is corroborated [Lakatos, 1978: 32].
I have claimed TWT contains an integrative theory capable of

explaining important parts of many of the phenomena of central con-
cern to students of international conflict. In particular, the theory
addresses the following: (1) the identification of likely initiators of
conflict; (2) threatening situations that are likely to escalate to include
violence, and discriminates between those cares and threatening sit-
uations that remain nonviolent; (3) situations in which third parties are
likely to enter ongoing conflicts as war participants and situations where
third parties are likely to remain neutral; (4) the specification of situa-
tions in which alliance commitments are likely to be honored; (5) when
deterrence is likely to be successful; (6) the explanation and prediction of
war-related deaths; (7) the formation of (and defections from) alliances;
and (8) accounts for the outcome of violent disputes. I know of no other
empirically tested theory that has tackled all of these problems, so that

my "Lakatos" comparisons will, perforce, be limited to analyses of

specific studies that address only a subset of problems confronted by my
research agenda. It should be noted that this places my approach at a
disadvantage since I account for these diverse phenomena with a single
theoretical framework, while others have formulated what they believe
is the best "isolated" explanation of the phenomenon of interest to them.
COMPARISONS WITH RIVAL HYPOTHESES
Let me begin by noting that TWTcontains a number of comparisons

of the expected utility approach to other arguments prevalent in the
literature. For instance, I report that while a central balance of power
hypothesis (stated by Kissinger) linking power to war initiation is found
to contribute a proportionate reduction in error of 51%, the central
expected utility hypothesis on the same question reduces proportionate
error by 71%. The contention that cultural differences militate against
the "materialistic" orientation inherent in an expected utility approach
is also examined in TWT, with the evidence indicating that my theory
works equally well regardless of the geopolitical setting of the conflicts.
Similarly, the long-standing debate between those who maintain alli-
ances are entangling and those who suggest that alliances are security
enhancing is reviewed. Again the expected utililty approach proves
more successful at ferreting out likely conflict initiators than is a focus
on who is or is not aligned. Finally, Russett's 1963 study of deterrence is
directly compared to my approach, with the outcome again strongly
favoring the expected utility explanation I suggest. Beyond these "Laka-
tos" comparisons from the TWT, let me turn to analytic comparisons
not reported in TWT.
THE ROLE OF ALLIANCES IN WAR
In footnote 11, M/ S, while criticizing my use of alliance data as an

indicator of utilities, observe, "Although there are numerous studies on
alliance commitments and war involvement, none to our knowledge
links commitments and expectations about third party involvement."
Yet there are such studies, and at least two are widely cited. One, by
Siverson and King (1980) "is aimed at identifying those attributes of
national alliance membership that tend to be associated with war partic-

ipation" (p. 1). Using a very similar data set, Altfeld and BdM (1979)
apply a "rational-choice theory of how decision makers choose sides, or
neutrality, in ongoing wars" (p. 87). The expected utility model deve-
loped in that study is virtually identical to the multilateral component of
the model developed in TWT. Thus, we have a direct test of the relative
explanatory power of two studies, using essentially the same data, but
with different theoretical foci.
Siverson and King's discriminant classification results explained 29%
of the variance in third-party choices to participate in ongoing wars. In
an analogous test (i.e., did a third party participate or not participate in
the war, as predicted by the theory), the expected utility model explains
56% of the variance. Siverson and King's results yield a 34% reduction in
error while the expected utility approach yields a 64% reduction in error.
What is more, Siverson and King's approach only allowed predictions
of whether a third party would participate in an ongoing war. Altfeld
and BdM's study not only predicted participation, but on which side.
The expected utility approach proved very successful at discriminating
between those who would choose one side or the other-using the
alliance patterns as indicators of utilities-so that on the more difficult
question of predicting on which side nations would fight, Altfeld and
BdM achieved a 42% reduction in error.
"Choosing Sides in Wars" satisfies the Lakatos criteria, at least in
comparison with Siverson and King's study of the same problem.
"Choosing Sides" has the added virtue that it allows us to predict when a
nation will honor its alliance commitments and when it will not. That is
a question of central importance to almost all of the Realpolitik litera-
ture. For instance, in The War Ledger, Organski and Kugler argue,
"Most of the time alliances are simply not a realistic method of pre-
venting threatening changes in the distribution of world power, given the
skewness of relations between the great and the lesser nations, and also
among the half-dozen great powers themselves" (1980: 25). A competing
balance of power hypothesis (Morgenthau, 1973; Claude, 1962; Kaplan,
1957) suggests that it is exactly when two rivals are about equal in power
that allies are critical in tipping the balance in favor of one side or the
other, providing the margin of victory. The trouble is that these two rival
explanations have no way of reconciling their differences so that we can
tell when alliances will not matter. However, the expected utility
approach is capable of doing exactly that.
Organski and Kugler derive their hypothesis from reasoning that says
when two dominant nations fight each other, allies are unimportant

because the dominant states are so much stronger than their allies that
the allies are unable to make a meaningful contribution of power in the
war. Without any empirical evidence beyond their own, it is possible on
purely mathematical grounds to demonstrate that the Organski-Kugler
hypothesis is a subset of the expected utility approach to war. To see
this, I restate the basic form of the expected utility argument as it
appears in my recent paper "The War Trap Revisited" (with the note
that everything deduced in TWTis shown in that paper to be deducible
from the revised model):
E'(U i) =
[(Sj(P.psi)tl + (1 - pi)(Ufi)rl) + (1- Sj)(Usi
+ 1E (Sk [Pik + Pjk - 1 (Uk - Uki)Cri)]

k~i,j
~[Q.
11
(Ur)+Q()+
sql i2 sq2 i3 (Ur)i
sq3
Focusing on the component that calculates the expected utility contri-
bution of third parties,
(% [Pik + - - U ri)Cni)
Pjk 1] (Ui
we see that if k is assumed to have virtually no power (with the "P" terms
referring to the probability of success of the subscripted actors and the
"U" terms referring to the utility contribution of k to the relevant
subscripted actor) then,
*
(Pik + Pj k) (Pi + P-)
(Pi + P.) = 1, by definition
then
(Pik + Pjk -1) 0
thus
(Sk(Pik + P.k - 1)(U~~ - U . i)eri)

- -
(k (Pik A j l)(Uki Uki~

Therefore, third party k has no impact on the expected utility of i orj

when i and j are dominant powers engaged in conflict, with k's power
approaching zero relative to i's and j's. The evidence that Organski and
Kugler adduce in support of their hypothesis that allies make no
difference a regression analysis in which the role of alliances in power
transition wars is shown to be insignificant is equally well suited as a
test of the expected utility formulation under the power conditions they
specify. But, if (Pik + Pjk) meaningfully exceeds (Pi + Pj) in value, then,
as suggested by balance of power theorists (Morgenthau, 1973; Gulick,
1955) alliances do make a difference, as demonstrated by the evidence
presented in Altfeld and BdM (1979), in TWT, and even in Organski and
Kugler when they evaluate non-power-transition wars. Thus, the
expected utility approach satisfies the Lakatos criteria in these alliance
comparisons because it provides added, corroborated empirical content
over both the power transition and balance of power theories. It tells us
when alliances "matter" in conflict and when they do not, and it does so
in an empirically accurate way. Thus, the expected utility theory allows
us to say when alliances are likely to form in response to temporary,
power-seeking motives (as in the balance of power theory), and when
they form in response to long-standing, ideological or policy motives (as
in the power transition theory).
ALLIANCE FORMATION HYPOTHESES
Comparisons with alternative investigations of alliances need not end

with questions of war participation. In studies by Berkowitz (1983) and
Newman (1982), over 90% of decisions to form or terminate alliances are
accounted for through the marginal effect of alliances or of internal
economic growth rates on national expected utilities (computed using
the formulation devised in TWT). These results stand in sharp contrast
to the only other efforts I know of to account empirically for alliance
formation. Over the past decade there have been numerous applications
of stochastic process models in a balance of power framework as an
attempt to account for alliance activity (McGowan and Rood, 1975;
Job, 1976; Siverson and Duncan, 1976). Those studies have proven
inconclusive, with different models yielding the best fit in different time
periods. Yet Newman's expected utility results prove equally robust
across the period 1816-1965. Furthermore, the plausible alternative

studies have been able to predict the rate of alliance formation, but not
the specific members of such partnerships. The studies by Newman and
Berkowitz use an expected utility framework based on the design set out
in TWTto identify the specific nations joining alliances with each other
and, in Berkowitz's case, even decisions to modify or terminate existing
alliance relationships.
Newman, furthermore, is able to construct a critical test that con-
trasts expectations from the balance of power theory with those from
expected utility theory. The balance of power theory leads to the expec-
tation that as power becomes more concentrated in a few hands, counter-
coalitions are likely to form, thereby increasing the proportion of
aligned nations in the international system. The expected utility frame-
work, on the other hand, suggests that as power becomes more concen-
trated, the opportunities for expected utility maximizing alliances di-
minishes, therefore leading to the hypothesis that the proportion of
nations in alliances is inversely related to the concentration of power in
the international system. Here, then, we have two diametrically opposite
hypotheses. The balance of power notion supports a direct association
between power concentration and systemic alignment; expected utililty
supports an inverse association. Newman finds a strong inverse rela-
tionship, with his results being highly significant substantively and
statistically. The expected utility-based hypothesis explains over 50% of
the variance in systemic alignment. Again in a direct test of expected
utility against a plausible alternative (the balance of power in this case),
the Lakatos criteria favor expected utility.
LAKATOS COMPARISONS: DETERRENCE

AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
In several tests applying the Lakatos criteria I have shown that

expected utility seems superior to plausible rival hypotheses. However,
we need not stop here. In a recent study by Huth and Russett (forthcom-
ing) they directly compare their best-fitting models of deterrence to my
expected utility formulation. They test hypotheses linking the success of
deterrence to a variety of power relations, past behavior, and contextual
44communitarian" ties between states. Although their own argument is
derived from an expected utility perspective, their tests are probit anal-
yses of variables that they see as important in such a perspective, but not
variables formulated as an expected utility argument. Although their
empirical inquiry leads to the examination of a large number of probit

models, their best-fitting results do not meaningfully outperform the

expected utility results they extract from my research. Thus, they report
that 76% of the outcomes are correctly predicted by their best-fitting
model. Using the model from TWT they note that 71% are correctly
predicted. This difference is not significant, with the attendant z-score
equal to .67 (N = 49). They then go on to point out that with the smaller
set of cases for which they had complete data from my revised model
presented in "The War Trap Revisited," 72% of the outcomes are
correctly predicted. With the comparable data set, their best-fitting
model accounts for 83% of the cases (N = 18). Again the difference is
insignificant, with z = 1.25. In other words, pitting my solitary model
against the large number of alternative models they tested, they found
that I did about as well as their best fitting cases.
On the other hand, when Huth and Russett turn their attention to
cases of failed deterrence in an effort to explain whether fighting is
expected to break out, their best-fitting model explains 80%of the cases;
mine only 47%. Here, then, their expected utility formulation outper-
forms mine. However, I should note that in a recent dissertation by
Walter Petersen (1983), over 90% of initiator decisions to stand firm or
stand down in the face of a deterrent threat are accounted for by
measures of expected costs derived directly from the theory set out in
TWT. Of course, it is important also to note that the Huth and Russett
formulation is designed exclusively as an explanation of deterrence. My
model is an appropriate explanation of deterrence, but it is also a
powerful explanation of conflict initiation (BdM, 1981, forthcoming),
escalation (BdM, 1984a, forthcoming), crisis resolution (Petersen,
1983), alliance formation and dissolution (Newman, 1982; Berkowitz,
1983), and so forth. Finally, my theory has proven a powerful predictor
of conflict outcomes, with 83.7% of such outcomes correctly catego-
rized. Maoz (1983a, 1983b), whose resolve model possesses, to the best
of my knowledge, the strongest predictive capability concerning conflict
outcomes, properly categorizes 85.2% of the same cases. His resolve
model is a plausible explanation that deals only with conflict outcomes.
Yet it does not significantly outperform the expected utility approach-
an approach that is axiomatic, internally consistent, and broad in its
empirical applications. In short, contrary to the claim by M/ S that my
expected utility research agenda is counterproductive and untested
against plausible rival hypotheses, it has been so tested, and it has
proven successful and productive.

CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION AND

THE CRITIQUE OF CONCEPTS
M/ S's main accusation-that the research program laid out in TWT

is counterproductive has been found to be groundless. Yet, we must
delve still deeper into their contentions to comprehend better the foun-
dations of their misunderstanding, for they have clearly misunderstood
many of the arguments I intended to convey. For instance, they say,
"BdM simultaneously implies that in any given year, new events are
irrelevant, policies are unchanging, and decision makers are immovable.
None of these positions is tenable" (p. 4). In fact, TWTcontains explicit
passages on these very points. On page 48 I define the terms that
comprise the elements in the bilateral expected utility lottery. Included
among those terms are U(ASi) and U(AFE), defined respectively as "i's
perception of anticipated change in the difference between i's world view
and j's policies over the time period tO (the present) to some future time
(tn)" and "i's perception of anticipated change in how muchj would alter
i's policy outlook in the future compared with j's current perceived
policy differences with i." Comparable terms for the multilateral lotter-
ies also are discussed. Here, then, I deal directly with how decision
makers view new events and changing policies. Far from being ignored,
these terms are an important part of the logic of my approach. What is
more, these concerns are even more strongly taken into account in "The
War Trap Revisited."
Indeed, M/S's failure to notice these terms seems at the root of
another criticism they level against TWT. They say,
In essence BdM posits that the decision makers are indifferent to or assign the same
expected utility to both the gamble (the lottery: going to war and either winning or
losing) and the certainty equivalent (not going to war) for all possible results from a
standard lottery. Thus, scaling of policy positions is unaltered by risk.... the
certainty equivalent (no change in policy) is set equal to zero. As we have pointed
out above, this implies that all nations obtain zero utility from no change.
Yet, focusing on the bilateral lottery (only for simplicity of presentation)

we see that I express this relationship (1981: 47) as
E(Ui) [PiU(Si) + (1 - I'U(Fi) + PiU(ASi) + (1 - PI)U(AFi)]

which must be greater than or equal to zero. Rearranging terms we find
that my bilateral conflict formulation can be rewritten as
P U(Si) + (1 - Pi)U(f1) > P.U(-ASi) + (1 - Pi)U(-AUf1)

or the value of initiation versus the value of noninitiation, given antici-

pated changes in policy. My original formulation, and more current
revisions, take changes in policy into account and treat them as the
foundation for the gamble point. What is more, while TWT took
risk-taking into account in inadequate ways (here M/ S are correct), that
deficiency is corrected in "The War Trap Revisited." Risk-taking is
integrated into the utility functions as a continuous variable, introduc-
ing concavity or convexity and eliminating the operationally based
zero-sum tendencies in the earlier formulation.
Indeed, in "The War Trap Revisited" I replicate the analysis from
TWTusing the revised formulation and annual, rather than quinquen-
nial data. The model with these improvements works as well as TWTat
discriminating between initiators and noninitiators (and between initia-
tors and opponents), and does much better at accounting for conflict
escalation. Furthermore, the revised formulation permits the specifica-
tion and testing of hypotheses concerning differences in perceptions.
The revised theory identifies circumstances in which a conflict initiator
mistakenly expects its adversary to capitulate, and circumstances in
which an initiator, expecting a violent response, finds, to its surprise,
that its foe capitulates to its demands. The revised theory specifies a
circumstance in which threats have escalated to war over 90% of the
time. It also identifies circumstances in which threats virtually never
escalate to warfare. These cumulative, deductively derived results
hardly seem to warrant the accusation that the expected utility focus is
counterproductive.
Of course, it is likely that M/ S would object to the deductive logic
surrounding the propositions concerned with perceptions. This infer-
ence seems warranted by their argument:
In effect, many of his basic premises arefalse. Now, consider what would happen,
given these incorrect premises, if Bueno de Mesquita's assumptions (qua back-
ground conditions) were realistic. What we would expect, quite simply, would be
that any deductions from these premises would also be false. For example, one of
Bueno de Mesquita's premises is that the gain of winning a war is -1 times the loss
of losing it. This view we have already criticized as seriously reductionistic and
incorrect; but what if it were combined with the realistic assumption that decision
makers are unable to make fine distinctions among alternative courses of action-
say between expected utilities of 0 and -.001 ... ? Under that assumption, the
deduction that calculation of the expected utility of war would give definitive
guidance for fighting or not fighting it would be incorrect, since decision makers
would have to move within ranges of utilities. This would probably eradicate as
meaningful expected utilities hovering just above or below zero. Thus, under
realistic assumptions, Bueno de Mesquita's premises would yield deductions that
are empirically false.

Here we have a particularly revealing set of criticisms. Before delving

into the "range of utilities" argument, let us first pause to note the two
serious misconceptions expressed by M/S. First, it is clear that they
have not understood the distinction between necessary conditions and
necessary and sufficient conditions. As they acknowledge, I state in
TWT that I am attempting to construct a theory of necessary, but not
sufficient, conditions for various aspects of international conflict. Yet,
their statement, "the deduction that calculation of the expected utility of
a war would give definitive guidance for fighting or not fighting it,"
presumes the existence of necessary and sufficient conditions. I only
claim my theory provides definitive guidance for not fighting. Thus,
their example of a false deduction is not derived from my theory at all. In
fact, they violate one of my fundamental conditions-that I am specify-
ing only necessary conditions for conflict.
Second, the allegation that one of my premises is that the gains and
losses from war are zero-sum is demonstrably false. On pages 48-49 of
TWT I note "the theory treats bilateral wars as if they are viewed as
situations involving pure competition. I believe it can gain as much
from a bilateral conflict as i believes j must lose.... Once i must consider
the possibility of third parties entering the conflict, however, its view-
point ceases to be one of pure competition." Thus, M/ S's statement is
accurate only under extremely constrained circumstances-circum-
stances which do not frequently arise. The existence of even one
nonzero-sum case in my analysis is conclusive proof against their allega-
tion. That about one third of the cases examined in TWTare character-
ized by the fact that E(Uij) + E(Uji) does not equal zero is conclusive
proof of the falsehood of M/ S's claim that the theory holds zero-
sumness as a premise. Furthermore, in "The War Trap Revisited," only
about 10% of the cases remain apparently zero-sum in the face of
improved measurement procedures. Thus, the allegedly false premise
turns out not to be a premise of my theory at all.
Majeski and Sylvan's allegation that it is more realistic to assume that
a range of expected utilities guides behavior is a serious theoretical
concern. Their assumption violates the axioms of rationality by positing
that decision makers cannot establish connected, transitive preferences.
That is, according to M/ S, when decision makers estimate expected
utilities from alternative courses of action and derive small differences,
national leaders cannot tell that one number is larger than another. As a
practical matter this claim may have some merit; that is an empirical
question, which I address momentarily. As a theoretical matter, how-
ever, there is no basis for their argument. Even the restricted view of
rationality contained in the literature on satisficing behavior recognizes

a theoretical need to define expected utility boundaries between, for

instance, adequate and inadequate alternatives. And, as a matter of
empirical record, the deductions I have constructed regarding conflict
escalation (and differences in perceptions) depend on small, logically
derived differences in expected utility values. That the theory is realistic
seems borne out by the evidence. Movements across relevant bound-
aries yield significant changes in the likelihood of threats escalating to
violence. Every change is in the predicted direction, and of the order of
magnitude anticipated by the theory (BdM, 1981, 1984a, forthcoming).
In light of the evidence, and the theoretical implications of M/ S's
suggestion, it does not seem sensible to abandon an axiomatic, rational
choice perspective for an unsubstantiated, ad hoc, perspective the "real-
isticness" of which currently has no status beyond its having been
asserted by M/S or some others.
CRITIQUE OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
M/ S seem convinced that the empirical tests contained in TWT are

irrelevant. I have already responded to this objection by applying the
Lakatos criteria to a comparison of my results to those of plausible rival
hypotheses. However, a few further comments are in order regarding
some of their lesser empirical objections.
They repeatedly contend that my data set and my analysis is biased by
my decision to focus only on serious disputes and by the fact that the
threats data and interventions data are drawn only from disputes that
involved at least one major power. It is incorrect that I examine only
serious disputes. Indeed, at another point in their discussion they object
to the fact that I permit the inclusion of all dyads as potential conflicting
pairs. The analysis, in actuality, begins with an examination of the
tendency of initiators to satisfy the conditions I specified as necessary
for conflict relative to that tendency in the population of dyads in
general. These results prove to be very significant. The occurrence of
positive expected utility among conflict initiators, for instance, is more
than 28 standard deviations above the mean for all dyads (BdM, 1981:
129). The comparable figure for targets of initiation, incidentally, is not
significantly different from the distribution of such scores in the popula-
tion of dyads. The likelihood of conflict initiation was found to be 36
times larger if the conditions I specify in TWT are satisfied than if they
are not. Later in TWT I make such comparisons to the initiators'

opponents, under the reasonable assumption that both parties to a

dispute had some motive, but only the party satisfying the theory's
necessary conditions was in a position to initiate-a proposition borne
out by my evidence and the arguments of others (for instance, George et
al., 1971, note that it is asymmetries in motivation that are highly related
to who gives in to whom during a crisis).
M/ S seem to recognize that the relevant empirical comparisons are
made, leading to this contention: "Even if it could be demonstrated that
nonnegative expected utility is a necessary condition for war initiation,
BdM's modeling of that relation provides little explanatory power";
again, on the same page, they ask, "what have we gained if the initiator
also has greater nonnegative expected utility scores from lotteries with
many other potential antagonists?" Thus, they suggest that the neces-
sary conditions I identify are trivial.
ARE MY NECESSARY CONDITIONS TRIVIAL?:

THE CASE FOR LUNG CANCER
What have we gained? Given the distribution of expected utility

scores among the approximately 560,000 annual dyads from 1816-1974,
we find that the likelihood of initiating a war when the necessary
conditions are satisfied is 36 times greaterthan the same likelihood when
they are not. But, you may object, the likelihood may still be inconse-
quential. To be sure, the likelihood is small. The rate of war initiation
among those with positive expected utility is 82.8/100,000 dyads, while
the rate among those with negative expected utility is 2.3/100,000.
Contrast these with the rate of lung cancer among smokers and non-
smokers: 156/100,000 and 7.8/100,000, respectively. The ratio of lung
cancer among smokers compared to nonsmokers is about 20 to 1, or
about one-half the ratio among those satisfying my conditions to those
who do not. The actual rates are on the same order of magnitude. One
might object, however, that while these results suggest my theory dis-
criminates at least as well on its dependent variable as does smoking
with regard to lung cancer, still I am dealing with a very rare event and
medical researchersare dealing with an all too common event. While it is
true that cancer happens far more often than war (but not at a much
different rate), it is also true that about 200,000 Americans die each year
from all types of cancer. Just to achieve the losses of the Soviet Union
during World War II, we must accumulate 100 years of cancer deaths (at
200,000 per year). The costs of war over history are staggering-and, it
might be noted, can be accounted for using the expected utility theory I
have devised (1983)-as are the costs of cancer. While it may be ghoulish

to worry about which is more staggering, I think at least we can agree

that each war carries with it an enormous cost, one equal to many
thousands of cancer deaths. In short, I have isolated a result with respect
to war of the same general magnitude as the result identified between
lung cancer and smoking. Who is prepared to claim that such a level of
discrimination is trivial?
Of course, the expected utility approach's ability to discriminate does
not end with the initiation of war. As noted earlier, the theory also has
proven a powerful tool for accounting for battle deaths-perhaps the
most important single cost of war. It also has proven exceptionally
powerful at discriminating between conflicts that escalate to warfare
and those that do not. Indeed, on this score, the theory appears (to the
best of my knowledge) to perform as well or better than all the alterna-
tive explanations of escalation that have been tested empirically (Wal-
lace, 1979, 1982;Leng, 1980;Gochman and Leng, 1983). The theoretical
results regarding escalation given the outbreak of conflict are, in my
opinion, the most important implications from the models I con-
structed. These results permit us to predict with a very high degree of
accuracy not only the likelihood of verbal threats becoming violent
conflicts, but the variations in those likelihoods that result from differ-
ences in the perception of expected utilities by the relevant initiators and
opponents (BdM, forthcoming).
IS PREDICTIVE POWER IRRELEVANT?
Majeski and Sylvan seem of many minds regarding the evidence I

offer as part of the analysis in TWT. In addition to objecting that the
evidence is inaccurate or trivial, they seem also to argue that its
predictive power is irrelevant. They wish to dismiss predictive ability as
a means of assessing the evidence. Thus, they argue,
If an assumption is known to be dubious, or downright wrong, then a theoretical

prediction stemming from that assumption is of no explanatory value-even if the
prediction is empirically accurate.... Consider, for example, the role of Ptolemy's
epicycles in astronomic predictions. For almanac purposes, such predictions may
be quite accurate, but no one today would say that Ptolemaic theory is therefore
correct.
Here, I believe, we gain some insight into fundamental epistemological

disagreements that are the source of the difference in perspective exhib-
ited by M/ S, on the one hand, and myself on the other.

First, at no time have they done more than assert that my assump-
tions are dubious or wrong. They provide no systematic evidence for
these claims. Second, and far more importantly, they seem completely
to deny a consequentialist approach to evidence and the acquisition of
knowledge. They have, we must remember, conceded that my theory is
internally consistent. They concede in the section from which I just
quoted (in which they argue against the widely utilized "as if" principle)
that my theory possesses predictive power. Yet, internal consistency and
predictive power are not, according to them, warrants for viewing the
theory as a useful vehicle for explaining international conflict. Why not?
Because we know of past instances where such consistency and predic-
tive power proved incorrect-Ptolemy's theory of astronomical motion
being the prime example. But here we must look at exactly what they
say.
The key phrase in the quotation cited above is "no one today would
say Ptolemaic theory is therefore correct." Quite right-no one today.
Why not? Because today we have a theory that is more parsimonious
and that renders more accurate predictions. That is, in exactly the
Lakatos sense, the Ptolemaic theory has been supplanted by a better
theory. The Newtonian revolution in science yields better predictions
and explanations than did the Ptolemaic theory. Of course, in the same
sense, Einstein's theory of relativity has supplanted Newtonian theory.
This reminds us that scientific knowledge is a growing, vibrant entity, in
which new perspectives from time to time replace older ones. But, at any
moment, we must rely on the best knowledge available. It does us no
good to say that the future will hold a better explanation than we now
possess. Surely this is always true. One builds on earlier knowledge. One
does not begin any endeavor de novo, as if there were a blank slate. I
have no doubt that future research will modify the efforts set out in
TWT, probably making the original formulation unrecognizable or
even irrelevant. I doubt my theory can survive the challenges of rival
approachs for more than a millenium, as did Ptolemy's. For the sake of
world peace, I pray it does not.
IS THE EVIDENCE BIASED?
Having argued my evidence is inaccurate, trivial, and irrelevant, M/ S

then go on to argue that my evidence also is biased. Let me now briefly
address this final central empirical critique. They claim that my use of
Gochman's data on serious disputes (which excludes disputes in which

no major powers were involved) "biases BdM in favor of finding his

hypothesized relation between nonnegative utility and threat- or
intervention-initiation." It is true that the theory fits those categories of
conflict rather well and that, although I am now in possession of a
nonmajor-power disputes data set that will allow me to test the theory
without that "bias," there might be reason to regard the threats and
interventions data with caution. However, the theory fits best with the
more important war-initiation data set. That data set is not restricted to
conflicts involving at least one major power. Therefore, the putative bias
is absent. Not only does this data set yield even stronger results, but
those results are quite robust. Indeed, if we focus only on warring dyads
in which both initial participants were minor powers-thereby eliminat-
ing the allegation that major powers have some a priori expected utility
advantage-the goodness of fit continues to be very strong, with gamma
= .85. In short, the empirical record does not bear out the claim that the
evidence is biased in favor of my theory. At every juncture in my
analysis, the war data-which are clearly unbiased as they represent the
population of wars-yield the best empirical fits with my theory. M/ S
have now been shown to be wrong with regard to their criticisms of the
accuracy, importance, relevance, fairness, and comparative advantage
over other theories manifested by the research program set out in TWT.
LESSER CRITICISMS
There are numerous lesser accusations levelled against TWTby M/ S.

They object that the use of quinquennial capabilities data distorts my
results. Yet, replication of the analysis using annual data yields equally
strong or stronger results (BdM, 1984a). They object that alternative
indicators were not tested. In subsequent studies, a large number of
other types of data, ranging from events data to area expert inputs to
economic flows data, have been used with success equal to or greater
than that achieved with the very crude indicators of utilities and proba-
bilities used in TWT. Unfortunately, I have not yet published the results
from those studies, so that M/S could not know about them (BdM,
1984b; Beck and BdM, 1984). I should also note here, as indicated
earlier, Huth and Russett (forthcoming) have tested an expected utility
approach using alternative indicators with considerable success. Des-
pite M/S's concern that my approach is counterproductive, it has
proven cumulative and expansive in its capabilities. The models have
grown in their scope of explananda as a result of revisions and exten-

sions. They have proven equally powerful at explaining conflict escala-

tion and international policy choices. The salience of issues has been
introduced into the model, risk-taking measures have been greatly
improved, allowing me to do away with the discrete decision rules set
out in TWT for dealing with risk and uncertainty (see "The War Trap
Revisited"). Zero-sum tendencies have been eliminated from my anal-
yses through the introduction of concavity and convexity in the utility
functions-allowing also estimates of the effects of differences in per-
ceptions on behavior. In short, the theory has grown both in its theoreti-
cal potential and in the empirical corroboration of its content.
Many of the lesser objections found in the M/ S critique are so clearly
incorrect or inaccurate that I will not detain the reader at length with
responses to them. However, this should not be construed as tacit
agreement with any of their objections. Quite the contrary. Each such
objection can be readily answered. Usually the objection stems from a
misunderstanding of the model, from confusion over the distinction
between necessary conditions and sufficient conditions, or from a dif-
ference in tastes regarding theory construction and epistemological
orientation. However, one remaining criticism seems to warrant a
response.
BdM commits the error of reification: measuring phenomena that quite possibly do
not exist. We make no claim that expected utility for war cannot or does not exist ...
but merely that its existence in this case is unproven and, in light of our criticisms in
the previous section, problematic. Here, as elsewhere in The War Trap, BdM fails
to meet the burden of proof.
In the above quotation, M/ S call into doubt the ontological existence

of expected utility, at least as that concept applies to war. It is a curious
objection. They admit that they make no claim for the nonexistence of
expected utility. And, as is the custom throughout the critique, no
compelling evidence is offered to suggest that expected utility does not
exist. They rely, rather, on the series of questions they have raised about
the conceptual foundations of TWT. I have, I believe, laid to rest the
credibility of those objections, but still it seems important to respond to
their doubts about the existence of expected utility calculations.
I admit that in writing TWT it did not occur to me that the very
existence of expected utility would be called into question. Rather, I
anticipated that objections would be raised regarding the particular
specification of the expected utility model that I chose to use. After all,
microeconomics is built upon the foundation of expected utility theory.
Microeconomics has, it must be admitted, enjoyed greater theoretical

and empirical support than any other subject in the social sciences.
Furthermore, expected utility theory as an explanation of war-related
phenomena is not original with me. The research on deterrence that
grew out of work by Brodie, Schelling, and others is very much
grounded in an expected utility framework. Even as early a student of
war as Thucydides seemed to have a solid grasp of expected utility as an
explanation for war. Thus, Thucydides, quoting Hermocrates of Syra-
cuse, wrote,
That war is an evil is a proposition so familiar to every one that it would be tedious
to develop it. No one is forced to engage in it by ignorance, or kept out of it by fear,
if he fancies there is anything to be gained by it. To the former the gain appears
greater than the danger, while the latter would rather stand the risk than put up
with any immediate sacrifice. But if both should happen to have chosen the wrong
moment for acting in this way, advice to make peace would not be unserviceable ...
I suppose that no one will dispute that we went to war at first, in order to serve our
own several interests, that we are now, in view of the same interests, debating how
we can make peace; and that if we separate without having as we think our rights,
we shall go to war again [1951: Book IV; 59-60].
Apparently I mistakenly shared Hermocrates view that no one would

dispute that war is waged to serve self-interest. But why M/ S wish to
dispute this point of view is not at all evident, except that their tastes
take them to a different theory of war than a rational, expected utility
perspective. I have no difficulty with the notion that personal prefer-
ences guide the specification of one's research agenda. But we should be
clear that it is such personal preferences, and not logic or evidence, that
is at the root of the current critique. I have accepted the challenge of
establishing the superiority of my approach to the plausible, empirically
tested rivals. I have demonstrated that mine is a productive research
agenda. I look forward to appropriate tests of the Majeski and Sylvan
approach so that we may once again make the relevant comparisons.
And I am sure that they, like me, will judge the results of such a
comparison on the basis of the evidence and not on the basis of personal
preferences, so that neither they nor I "hold rashly an opinion in a
Scientific matter, so that we may not come to hate later whatever truth
may reveal to us, out of love for our own error" (St. Augustine).
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Bruce Bueno de Mesquita: A Critique of ''A Critique of The War Trap''

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Bruce Bueno de Mesquita: A Critique of ''A Critique of The War Trap''

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A Critique of "A Critique of the War Trap"

Author(s): Bruce Bueno De Mesquita

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