Emerson 2010

Radical Neglect?
The “War on Terror” and Latin America

R. Guy Emerson
ABSTRACT
The rise of leftist governments in the Americas and the adoption

of policy initiatives contrary to U.S. interests highlight a disconnect
in interamerican relations, which cannot be understood simply as
U.S. “neglect” of Latin America. In contrast to arguments that
attribute the deteriorating relations to U.S. preoccupation with the
Middle East, the article examines whether the “War on Terror”
acted as a guiding paradigm for the George W. Bush administra-
tion in Latin America. Opposition to this “War on Terror” paradigm
was evident following Colombia’s 2008 air strike in Ecuador. Jus-
tified as a preemptive strike against a terrorist threat, Colombia’s
action met regional condemnation. The article argues that this
Colombia-Latin America division reflects a larger geostrategic dis-
connect, whereby the “War on Terror” is challenged, causing the
increasing marginalization of Washington and resistance to U.S.
policy.
T he Latin American turn to the left is well documented. The supposed

“pink tide” saw the Brazilian Workers’ Party leader, Luiz Inácio Lula
da Silva, succeed Fernando Henrique Cardoso and his market-oriented
reforms. Similarly, the policies of Argentina’s neoliberal architect, Carlos
Menem, have given way to the unilateral repudiation of Argentine exter-
nal debt, in defiance of international financial institutions. Mass protests
in Bolivia toppled President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s government
in 2003 and eventually led to a landslide victory for the antineoliberal
Evo Morales in 2006 (Potter 2007). In his 2006 address to the UN Gen-
eral Assembly, moreover, the president of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, delivered one of the most overtly hostile
attacks against a U.S. president, likening George W. Bush to the Devil.
Add to this the electoral success of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Michelle
Bachelet in Chile, Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay, Rafael Correa in Ecuador,
Fernando Lugo in Paraguay, and Mauricio Funes in El Salvador, and the
perceived tilt to the left during the Bush presidency was manifest. Such
movement led Sheila Collins to note that America’s “backyard” could no
longer be considered safe to play in (2005).
While Latin America’s political shift to the left reflects broader
movement within interamerican relations, this article centers on the
geostrategic nature and diplomatic consequences of the shift. An
© 2010 University of Miami

34 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 52: 1
understanding of these movements, however, is not possible through

analysis that focuses on events in Washington. In making this argu-
ment, the article has two aims. The first is to dispel assumptions that
change in the Americas is explained by U.S. preoccupation with the
Middle East and the consequent neglect of Latin America. On the con-
trary, the following analysis will suggest that the “War on Terror” acted
as a guiding paradigm for a U.S. policy that extended beyond the con-
fines of Iraq and Afghanistan to include the Western Hemisphere.
Second, the article argues that in spite of an approach to the hemi-
sphere shaped by the “War on Terror,” events originating in Latin Amer-
ica are as important as those in Washington in explaining the discon-
nect in the Western Hemisphere.
The article begins by illustrating the theoretical shortcomings of
neorealism and dependency theory and the limitations they place on
interamerican analysis. In so doing, it attempts to go beyond the deter-
minism of regional power asymmetries by moving the analysis toward
an understanding of interamerican relations that acknowledges the
agency of Latin American state actors. It examines the practical conse-
quences of U.S. policy toward Latin America under the Bush adminis-
tration, and more specifically the regional effects of the “War on Terror,”
challenging arguments about the significance of U.S. withdrawal from
the region after September 11, 2001. The question it then explores is, if
the U.S. policy concentration on the Middle East cannot explain the
regional disconnect, what can? Focusing on the geostrategic quality of
this disconnect, the study finds that the regional disconnect stems from
Latin American opposition to the expansion of the “War on Terror” to
the Western Hemisphere. It uses Colombia’s military intervention into
Ecuadorian territory in 2008, which killed a guerrilla leader and pro-
voked opposition from other Latin American countries, as a reference to
argue that a combination of factors in both Latin America and the United
States offers a more nuanced understanding of the changing nature of
interamerican relations.
THEORETICAL LIMITATIONS AND THE IMPORTANCE

OF RECOGNIZING LATIN AMERICAN ACTORS
The assumption that the United States is the principal agent of change
in Latin America is reflected in the wider theoretical scholarship on
interamerican relations. The two predominant theoretical schools on the
Americas, neorealism and dependency theory, underplay the capacity of
Latin American states to act independently of Washington. As will be
shown, this is largely a result of the emphasis placed by both theories
on structural factors as the primary determinants of state interaction. The
practical consequence of this determinism is to entrench Latin American
EMERSON: WAR ON TERROR 35
subordination, whereby U.S. economic and strategic military supremacy

alone shape the policy options and preferences of Latin American states.
Determinism is evident in the two central tenets of neorealism,
anarchy and the distribution of capabilities. Anarchy underpins the inter-
national system for neorealists. Central to the anarchic system is the
assumption of no functional differentiation between states, which, for
Kenneth Waltz, means that all states perform the same functions in order
to constitute themselves as political units (Waltz 1979). In making this
argument, Waltz is not concerned with the capacity of states to perform
these functions, but with the condition that, at a systems level, all states
face the same tasks to perform (Waltz 1979; Buzan 1998).
When forced to move beyond this politicolegal idea of the state and
examine the distribution of capabilities, however, Waltz differentiates
between dominant and secondary states. In addition to giving the inter-
national system an appearance of order, this differentiation offers an
insight into interamerican relations. Waltz argues that the international
system is ordered by secondary states’ automatically acting or “balanc-
ing” against the hegemony of dominant states (Waltz 1993, 1979). Apply-
ing Waltz’s balancing proposition to interamerican relations, Latin Amer-
ican opposition to Washington is consequently involuntary.
Dependency theory directly challenges this assumption. While
Waltz’s no functional differentiation between states is implicitly con-
tested through dependistas’ hierarchical core-periphery dichotomy,
dependency theory views the balancing proposition as contrary to Latin
American history. The premise of balancing ignores that peripheral
elites often perceive dependency on the core as consistent with their
interests (Cardoso and Faletto 1979). “Bandwagoning” behavior sees
peripheral state actors maintain rather than balance against the status
quo, as economically it may be in their interest to preserve dependent
relations (Schweller 1994).1
Acknowledging bandwagoning behavior by peripheral states and
the difficulty of balancing against the United States is important for two
reasons. First, it highlights that any resistance to U.S. policy prescriptions
is not automatic, but involves Latin American state agency. Second, at a
theoretical level, bandwagoning behavior and the push to act in accor-
dance with U.S. interests contrast with Waltz’s balancing proposition.
Rather than automatically balancing against a hegemon, an uneven dis-
tribution of capabilities highlights the difficulty Latin American states
face in acting independently of Washington.
This point is emphasized by Arthur Stein, who argues that the dis-
tribution of capabilities between states not only determines the context
of interaction, but also influences the preferences of interacting states
(Stein 1982). Far from automatic balancing, asymmetrical capabilities
probably result in interaction that is more favorable to the hegemon.
Applying Stein’s arguments to the Americas, U.S. preferences not only

structure the choices available to Latin American actors, but also condi-
tion their policy preferences. Therefore, while opposition to U.S. policy
prescriptions is possible, the likelihood of opposition is minimized by
the preponderance of U.S. capabilities in interamerican relations.
The premise of power determining outcomes is not confined to
neorealism. Regardless of how neorealism and dependency theory con-
sider power, be it strategic-military for neorealists or economic for
dependistas, each establishes a global hierarchy that determines subal-
tern subordination.2 While neorealism views outcomes as highly
dependent on the distribution of capabilities among states, dependency
theory argues that peripheral integration into the global system perpet-
uates their underdevelopment. Not only is peripheral state development
conditioned by the structure of the world capitalist system, but periph-
eral actors must also follow the system’s imperatives in order to sustain
themselves. This adherence to the system ensures state conformity to
the hierarchy of core and periphery, consequently leaving the core des-
tined to rule while the periphery is destined to be ruled (Wendt 1987).
The international structures for both neorealism and dependency
theory determine the role of the state. Whether it is established through
a distribution of capabilities or the capitalist world economy, the structure
constrains the foreign policy options available to subaltern states (Wendt
1987).3 The practical limitation of the emphasis on structural factors is that
both dependency theory and neorealism have difficulty acknowledging
change originating from Latin American actors. This stems from the fail-
ure to consider how the state as an agent can shape the international
system (Hobson 2000). With the emphasis of both theories placed so
heavily on structural factors, the state can no longer modify the interna-
tional structure or its position in it (Hobson 2000, 2001).
To recognize change that originates in Latin America, it is necessary
to place greater focus on the agent rather than the structure. For John
Hobson, this is possible through a study of autonomy that recognizes
state agency in spite of structural constraints (Hobson 2000). This view
contrasts with realist interpretations of autonomy, which argue that no
external actor can enjoy authority within state borders, or dependency
interpretations that stress autarchy (Krasner 1996; Amin 1990). Reorien-
tating the focus of autonomy toward a recognition of state agency offers
a new lens through which to view interamerican relations. First and
foremost, it moves analysis beyond a determinism that underplays Latin
American capacity to pursue its own interests independently of U.S.
strategic objectives. The deficiencies of narrowly viewing change in the
Americas as a product of events in Washington can be highlighted
through the false assumption that the current disconnect in the Ameri-
cas is a product of U.S. neglect.
A Priori Shortcomings
At first glance, the argument that the “War on Terror” explains the diplo-
matic disconnect appears persuasive. Viewed through a geostrategic
lens, U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, in addition to claims of
hegemonic overreach, enables Latin America to challenge its subordina-
tion in interamerican relations. U.S. preoccupation beyond the hemi-
sphere not only appears to offer Latin America the flexibility to generate
policy options according to its own interests, but also reduces the fear of
possible retribution should those interests contradict U.S. objectives.
These interpretations of change are based on an understanding of
autonomy as “noninterference”; that is, an understanding of interameri-
can relations that emphasizes the importance of favorable geopolitical
factors largely beyond Latin America’s control. The hemispheric discon-
nect has occurred due to U.S. withdrawal from the region and not
through action in Latin America itself. The logical extension of this view
is that the ability of Latin American states to act independently expands
and contracts irrespective of their action. A change in hemispheric rela-
tions, it is argued, depends on the United States and its strategic inter-
est at any given time.
The principal weakness of defining change according to a conjunc-
ture of external factors is that it fails to recognize Latin American states
and their capacity to influence external factors. To overcome this weak-
ness, it is necessary to move beyond a restrictive view of autonomy as
noninterference to the aforementioned view that is mindful of Latin
American agency. While analysis needs to recognize U.S. interests, these
interests are not absolute and should not overshadow events in Latin
America. A multidimensional approach acknowledging both U.S. and
Latin American interests better explains the present state of interameri-
can relations.
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION: FROM ENGAGEMENT

TO RADICAL NEGLECT
In contrast to assumptions of neglect, the Bush administration initially
sought to foster closer relations with Latin America. Breaking the tradi-
tion of making Canada the destination of the first presidential visit,
George W. Bush’s first official travel in 2001 was to the ranch of Mexi-
can president Vicente Fox. More than a symbolic gesture, this illustrated
President Bush’s intent to engage the region by broaching the con-
tentious issue of legalizing Mexican immigrants (Angrisani 2005). Fol-
lowing these events, the third Summit of the Americas in April 2001 rein-
forced perceptions of a new era in interamerican relations. Heralded as
unprecedented, the surprising level of amity with which delegates set
2005 as the deadline for hemispheric trade talks concerning the Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was surpassed only by the fact that
agreement was reached at all. This consensus, however, was not to last.
The September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon shifted Latin America from an issue of presidential concern to
the domain of lower-level officials. Although the “War on Terror”
reduced high-level political engagement with the region, it is a mistake
to suggest that Washington “withdrew.” Indeed, it is important to dis-
tinguish between “priority” and “importance.” Just because other regions
occupied the center of Washington’s attention, this did not render Latin
America insignificant (Russell 2006). A closer examination of post-2001
U.S. policy reveals a clarity of purpose that belies the withdrawal thesis.
The “War on Terror” as Guiding Paradigm for the Americas

With the impending fall of the Soviet Union, Thomas Carothers wrote
that the collapse of the Iron Curtain would render obsolete the para-
digm Washington had used to define Latin America. The result,
Carothers argued, would be a policy approach that improvised and
would become “increasingly incoherent” (1990, 14). Writing 11 years
later, Joseph Tulchin and Ralph Espach argued that the collapse of this
paradigm gave Latin America greater policy flexibility than it experi-
enced during the Cold War (Tulchin and Espach 2001). In practical
terms, Heraldo Muñoz has argued that this flexibility was a product of
benign neglect under the Clinton administration, and Peter Hakim has
stated that “after 9/11 Washington effectively lost interest in Latin Amer-
ica” (Muñoz 2001; Hakim 2006, 39). Although a post–Cold War analysis
of U.S. policy toward Latin America does not concern this article, the
relevant question is whether the “War on Terror” replaced the Cold War
as the guiding paradigm for U.S. policy toward Latin America during the
George W. Bush administration.
While senior officials in the administration focused on the Middle
East, lower-level appointees sought to recast regional policy as comple-
mentary to the “War on Terror” (LeoGrande 2007). In the U.S. State
Department, policy initiatives increasingly were constructed by Otto
Reich, assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs; his suc-
cessor, Roger Noriega; and Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte.4
The first signs of a radicalization of the State Department’s Latin Ameri-
can stance became apparent in 2002 with the ultimately unsuccessful
coup d’état against the Chávez government. Declassified CIA documents
showed that State Department and White House officials were aware of
the Venezuelan opposition’s plans; since then, it has also come to light
that the United States provided both logistical and financial support in
developing a post-coup “transitional government” (Foster 2007).5
The Guardian newspaper reported that before the 2002 coup

attempt, Reich met with the coup plotters at the White House to discuss
logistics. One of those present, Pedro Carmona, was later installed as
Venezuela’s president for the two days before Chávez’s eventual rein-
statement (Vulliamy 2002). Equally embarrassing for Washington was
the initial welcome it gave the coup plotters on the day of the golpe,
offering diplomatic recognition amid regional calls to respect democracy
(Foster 2007). This support was given even though the Venezuelan
opposition acted in violation of the Democratic Charter of the Organi-
zation of American States (OAS), to which Washington is a signatory.6
The radicalization of Latin American policy in the State Department,
however, was not confined to Venezuela. Since 2001, and particularly
during President Bush’s first term, Washington increasingly sought to
influence the domestic politics of Latin America by providing diplomatic
and material support to actors sympathetic to U.S. interests. U.S. involve-
ment extended most commonly, though not exclusively, to the threat of
economic sanctions (LeoGrande 2007). Coercion involved threats to halt
remittances to El Salvador during its 2004 elections and Nicaragua in
2002, in addition to claims that bilateral assistance to Nicaragua and
Bolivia would end if the respective electorates did not vote according to
U.S. interests in their respective 2002 elections (Domínguez 2007).7
It should be noted, however, that during the Bush administration’s
second term, there appeared to be a softening in the State Department
that coincided with the replacement of Roger Noriega by Thomas Shan-
non as assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs. After
taking charge in 2005, Shannon called 2007 a “year of engagement,”
saying that both he and the United States were willing to “work with
anybody who wants to work with us” (cited by Birns and Kellberg
2007). Although these comments contrast with the comparison made by
former U.S. secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld between President
Chávez and Hitler, Shannon’s approach to the region appeared incon-
sistent (Associated Press 2006). During Nicaragua’s 2007 election cam-
paign, Shannon met with the two conservative candidates but not with
the eventually victorious Sandinista, Daniel Ortega. Shortly thereafter,
the U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua, Paul Trivelli, threatened economic
sanctions if Ortega were elected president (LeoGrande 2007). In con-
trast, a nonconfrontational approach to Bolivia saw Shannon and La Paz
speak of “common interests” and “open doors” (cited by Birns and Kell-
berg 2007).
Although improvement may have been evident, trends toward
warmer interaction ran concurrently with actions that undermined closer
relations. In September 2008, Bolivian president Evo Morales expelled
U.S. ambassador Philip Goldberg amid assertions that Washington was
promoting separatist elements in that country. President Morales
claimed that the U.S. ambassador was “conspiring against democracy”

by supporting opposition groups that sought greater autonomy and
increased control over natural gas revenues (BBC News 2008). In
response, the United States asked Bolivia’s ambassador to Washington
to leave, while David Johnson, assistant secretary of the Bureau of Inter-
national Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs at the State Department,
stepped up hostilities by stating that Bolivia, along with Venezuela, had
“failed demonstrably” in the war on drugs. The result was the lifting of
the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, thereby rescind-
ing Bolivia’s access to U.S. markets at preferential tariffs in return for
cooperation on drug matters (Phillips 2008).
The Rise of the Pentagon in Policymaking

While an improvement may have been evident in the State Department,
an additional concern was the increased role of the Pentagon in con-
structing U.S. policy. Part of a decadelong shift, proposals for hemi-
spheric security have increasingly come from the Pentagon and not the
State Department (Diamint 2004; Ciponline 2004). This has increased the
importance of the U.S. Southern Command (Southcom) in constructing
hemispheric policy, as the body responsible for Latin America and the
Caribbean (except Mexico) at the Pentagon.
The increased profile of the Defense Department has coincided
with a wider transfer of resources away from the State Department with
respect to the Western Hemisphere. It is estimated that Southcom has
more people working on Latin America, about 1,100, than most key
civilian federal agencies combined, including the Departments of State,
Agriculture, Commerce, and Treasury, and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (Ciponline 2004). In its recent strategy statement, “Command
Strategy 2018,” Southcom announced its intention to expand its scope
by acting as the regional coordinating body for both military and non-
military operations (Southcom 2008).
The Pentagon’s greater role is another element of the qualitative
change in U.S. policy toward the Western Hemisphere. The immediate
result of an enhanced military standpoint has been that policymakers
elsewhere in the U.S. government have begun to approach Latin Amer-
ica from a disproportionately security threat–based position (Ciponline
2004). This shift has occurred in the Pentagon itself: the Bureau for
Western Hemisphere Affairs initially was transferred from the Bureau for
International Security Affairs into a bureau with the disquieting name of
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, and then later moved
into Homeland Defense and America’s Security (Isacson 2001).8
Although the Defense Department’s higher profile was evident
during the Clinton administration, viewing Latin America through the
Figure 1. Total U.S. Military and Police Aid to Latin America

(millions of US$)
Source: Just the Facts 2009
lens of the “War on Terror” accelerated this trend. Traditionally, U.S.

training of foreign military troops has been funded and administered by
the State Department, due to its foreign policy implications. The State
Department’s training programs were governed by the Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1961, which is scrutinized by the U.S. Congress and pro-
hibits assistance to military units known to violate human rights (Just the
Facts 2007).9 In contrast, Defense Department–funded programs provide
less scrutiny from a human rights perspective (Ciponline 2004). Since
the shift to the Pentagon, two-thirds of U.S. military training for Latin
America is now paid for directly through the Department of Defense, a
change partly explained in that congressional support is more easily
gained for defense spending than for foreign aid (Ciponline 2004; Just
the Facts 2007). The movement of Latin American policymaking toward
the Pentagon coincided with a broader increase in total U.S. military
spending in Latin America.
After a brief drop in 2001, U.S. military spending in Latin America
has increased significantly (figure 1). Beginning in the period
2005–2007, 5 countries in the region were among the top 20 global
recipients of U.S. military assistance (Just the Facts 2007).10 In addition,
between 2001 and 2005, 85,820 Latin American soldiers were trained in
the United States. This compares with the 61,000 soldiers and police
trained by the infamous School of the Americas between 1946 and 2000
(Tokatlian 2008). The justification for the increase in spending was made
through reference to the “War on Terror.” Southcom Commander Gen-
eral James Hill declared, “as with every other combatant commander,
the war on terrorism is my number one priority” (cited by Ciponline
2004, 3). Additionally, in his 2004 Posture Statement, General Hill
asserted that “terrorists throughout the Southern Command area of
responsibility bomb, murder, kidnap, traffic drugs, transfer arms, laun-
der money, and smuggle humans” (cited by Ciponline 2004, 3). These
statements have had direct policy implications.
Dubbed “effective sovereignty,” the policy promoted by the Penta-
gon contends that U.S. national security is threatened by Latin American
governments’ failure to exercise control over the vast “ungoverned
spaces” within their borders. As General Hill explained in March 2003,
“today’s foe is the terrorist, the narcotrafficker, the arms trafficker, the
document forger. . . . This threat is a weed that is planted, grown and
nurtured in the fertile ground of ungoverned spaces such as coastlines,
rivers and unpopulated border areas” (Hill 2003). This policy position
was reinforced by then–secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld. “Terror-
ists and transnational criminals,” he remarked, “often find shelter in
border regions or areas beyond the effective reach of government. They
watch, they probe, looking for areas of vulnerability, for weaknesses,
and for seams in our collective security arrangements that they can try
to exploit” (cited by Isacson 2005). These statements paint Latin Amer-
ica as a “soft underbelly” for the terrorist group Al-Qaeda to mount
attacks on the continental United States (Steinitz 2003).
Viewed from a historical perspective, the policy of “effective sover-
eignty” is the latest version of the “internal enemy” threat circulated
during the Cold War. Part of the U.S. national security doctrine to
combat local communism in Latin America, defense against the internal
enemy had two intertwined components: military training and the teach-
ing of the national security doctrine (Wright 2007). In addition to a
quantitative increase in operational training, the teaching of the national
security doctrine qualitatively reoriented military training by situating
the internal enemy as the chief threat to national security.
This new method of training had dangerous repercussions. Military
dictatorships in the region appropriated the language of the “internal
enemy” and expanded it to include unions, opposition party leaders,
human rights defenders, journalists, authors, and leftist intellectuals, and
to justify the censure of democratic institutions (Tokatlian 2008; Isacson
2005).
While this threat is less apparent today, the policy of “effective sov-
ereignty” sets a dangerous precedent in Latin America. At its most fun-
damental, “effective sovereignty” establishes the ideological and physi-
cal tools necessary for regional militaries to undermine civilian
authorities (Lobe 2004; Isacson 2005). Central to this danger is the risk
of politicizing the armed forces by widening their responsibility to fight-
ing crime or other roles that civilians can perform. The monopoly the
military develops on the use of force (or the threat of force) means that
when it disagrees with the civilian consensus there is a heightened pos-
sibility of violence (Ciponline 2004). This line has further blurred as
Southcom, traditionally a trainer of defense personnel, has envisaged a
greater role for itself in the training of regional police forces (Ciponline
2008).11 The application of the “War on Terror” paradigm through “effec-
tive sovereignty” strengthens the military, security, and intelligence
forces that have historically posed a danger to democracy while also
weakening civilian and democratic institutions (Diamint 2004).
Far from acting as a new paradigm, however, the invocation of
“effective sovereignty” and the repoliticization of the “internal enemy”
reflect a continuity of logic between the “War on Terror” and previous
Cold War approaches. Just as the “internal enemy” historically provided
a justification for continued U.S. involvement in military and political
bodies throughout Latin America, so does “effective sovereignty” today.
This continuity is illustrated in reference to the War on Drugs and Plan
Colombia, in which the purported new security discourse associated
with the “War on Terror” appears to be based firmly in an old threat
analysis.
Dangers in Practice: Plan Patriota

The application of the “War on Terror” to the Western Hemisphere has
caused the Southern Command to have to defend its resources and rel-
evance in the Pentagon. It did this first by changing “narcotraffickers” to
“narcoterrorists” in sections 1004 and 1035 of the 2002 Defense Autho-
rization Law, originally used to fight drugs in Colombia (Just the Facts
2007). The Southcom Command Strategy 2018 notes that “narcoterror-
ists derive their funding and power from the sale of illicit drugs and
have evolved into groups in Colombia including [the guerrilla organiza-
tion] FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia]” (Southcom 2008,
9). While this shift may appear merely semantic, the change enabled a
doubling of military training in Colombia, with funds originally designed
for counternarcotics programs diverted to support counterinsurgency
missions (Ciponline 2004).
Although Plan Colombia was established under the Clinton admin-
istration, the policy has increasingly become defined as a key element
of the “War on Terror.” Colombia is currently the largest recipient of U.S.
military assistance in Latin America, and from 1997 to 2007 received $2
out of every $3 of U.S. military aid spent in the region (Just the Facts
2007). In 2006 alone, U.S. assistance to Colombia amounted to $741.68
million, approximately 80 percent of which was military and police aid
(figure 2). The justification for this spending has centered on the
Figure 2. U.S. Aid to Latin America, 2006 (millions of US$)
Source: Just the Facts 2007, 26–27
antidrug campaign Plan Colombia and more recently on the launch of

Plan Patriota.
Changes in the 2002 U.S. Defense Authorization Law laid the foun-
dations for the 2003 launch of the military offensive Plan Patriota in
Colombia’s “ungoverned spaces.” A primary example of the dangers of
both the policy of “effective sovereignty” and the increased militariza-
tion of the U.S. approach, Plan Patriota required significant logistical
support and intelligence from Washington to enable Bogotá to retake
territory from the FARC guerrillas (Isacson 2005). Similar to the expan-
sion of the “War on Terror” to the Americas, Plan Patriota simplified a
complex conflict into an armed confrontation, whereby farmers and the
population at large were met with military force rather than engaged
through other politicosocial means (Diamint 2004). With policy
informed primarily by a military focus, concerns about human rights and
broader policy considerations were sidelined.
While the “War on Terror” underscored the militarization of U.S.
policy, it also framed Washington’s approach to other parts of the region.
The most explicit example of “War on Terror” thinking involved the tri-
border region encompassing Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina. U.S. offi-
cials have claimed that several Middle Eastern terrorist groups have oper-
ated in this region for more than a decade. Francis X. Taylor, then coor-
dinator for counterterrorism at the State Department, declared on
December 19, 2001 that “it is no secret that you have, living in this area,
more than 15,000 persons from the Middle East. Islamic extremist organ-
izations such as Hizballah, Hamas, al Gamaat al Islamiyya, and others are
using this vibrant area as a base from which to support terrorism” (Taylor
2001).12 His successor, Cofer Black, later echoed these sentiments, claim-
ing that the region was a hotbed of terrorist activity (Goldberg 2002).
Added to this interpretation was a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
report stating that Hizballah was using the “ungoverned space” to laun-
der money (Levitt 2002). Facing this threat, in 2005 Washington estab-
lished closer military ties with the Paraguayan government that saw a
series of U.S. Special Forces exercises and a contingent of four hundred
U.S. troops stationed at the international airstrip of Mariscal Estigarribia
near the politically sensitive triborder region (Prevost 2007).13
Despite increases in military expenditures, however, limits to the
expansion of Washington’s regional presence were also becoming
apparent.14 Although the extra U.S. funding was welcomed, a perma-
nent or even temporary military presence often met opposition. This sit-
uation increasingly concerned Washington, as the loss of its “coopera-
tive security location” in Ecuador in 2009, for example, would have left
the United States without a permanent military base on the South Amer-
ican mainland. While rumors circulated that Peru could host the relo-
cated base, on May 6, 2009 the Pentagon budget submitted to Congress
requested the funding to develop a new $46 million military base in
Palanquero, Colombia. In a proposed ten-year agreement, furthermore,
the United States is set to use seven Colombian military bases to con-
duct counternarcotic and counterterrorist activities in the region. In spite
of developments in Colombia, however, U.S. attempts to step up mili-
tary relations in other parts of the region appear to be floundering.
Facing this opposition, Washington’s strategic approach has become
increasingly unilateral. The reactivation of the Fourth Fleet underlined
this shift.
Created during World War II to combat German submarines, the
U.S. Fourth Fleet was originally disbanded in 1950. In July 2008, how-
ever, it was relaunched and assigned to U.S. naval forces under the
Southern Command. Admiral Gary Roughead, the U.S. chief of naval
operations, stated that “reestablishing the Fourth Fleet recognizes the
immense importance of maritime security in the southern part of the
Western Hemisphere, and signals our support and interest in the civil
and military maritime services in Central and South America” (U.S.
Department of Defense 2008). In this capacity, the Fourth Fleet is tasked
with combating terrorism, keeping sea lanes free and open, countering
illicit trafficking, and providing humanitarian assistance (Kozloff 2008).

Because Washington can point to no imminent military threat in the
region, however, the reactivation of the Fourth Fleet has a symbolic sig-
nificance, indicating a potential return in Washington to “gunboat diplo-
macy” (Ross 2008).15 Comments made by Admiral Roughead that the
Fourth Fleet sends a strong signal to navies in the region do not augur
well for cooperative interamerican relations (Ross 2008). The Fourth
Fleet also raises the specter, however unlikely, of deteriorating relations
and possible conflict.
All of these developments made the “War on Terror” a significant
part of the Bush administration’s policy approach to Latin America. To
suggest that the “War on Terror” was an all-encompassing guiding par-
adigm for the Bush administration, however, is an exaggeration. The
persistence of previous threats associated with the policy of “effective
sovereignty” reflects continuity with the past rather than a complete
break. It should be noted also that trends toward greater militarization
preceded the Bush presidency. Moreover, while a radicalization in U.S.
policy was apparent, so too were steps to improve relations, as was evi-
dent with the appointment of Thomas Shannon.
From this perspective, the sending of mixed signals illustrates a
level of policy incoherence that undermines arguments of a new guid-
ing paradigm in U.S. policy. This is not to argue that uncertainty is not
dangerous. Interamerican relations under the Bush administration saw
the specter of greater, and potentially violent, conflict. Irrespective of
whether the “War on Terror” acted as a guiding paradigm, these trends
undermine the assumption that the present disconnect in the Americas
is a product of U.S. withdrawal. The notion of U.S. neglect contradicts
evidence of a radicalization of its policy toward Latin America. This shift
points more to a qualitative change than to a quantitative change in rela-
tions, a distinction that the “withdrawal” thesis potentially overlooks.
COLOMBIA AND THE APPROPRIATION OF THE

“WAR ON TERROR”
In view of the difficulty of explaining the geostrategic nature of the dis-
connect through U.S. action alone, this study emphasizes Latin Ameri-
can action and the rejection of the “War on Terror” rationale. The analy-
sis so far has highlighted this trend. The Ecuadorian government’s
decision to close the U.S. base at Manta in 2009 and the regionwide calls
for the reinstatement of democracy in Venezuela in 2002 despite U.S.
opposition were clear examples of Latin American states disagreeing
with U.S. policy framed in the logic of the “War on Terror.” This trend
can be further traced by investigating the regional responses to Colom-
bia’s air strikes on Ecuadorian territory.
At 12:25 A.M. on March 1, 2008, eight aircraft of the Colombian air

force launched attacks on Ecuadorian territory, which killed 25 people,
including the second-in-command of the FARC, Luis Edgar Devia Silva,
known by his nom de guerre, Raúl Reyes. Although the attacks were
defended by appropriating the language of the “War on Terror,” Colom-
bian claims of the right to undertake preemptive strikes against a ter-
rorist threat met condemnation throughout Latin America. As a result of
this reaction, Washington became increasingly marginalized in the
region, which made it unable to act as a legitimate powerbroker in the
diplomatic crisis that followed Colombia’s attack.
Ecuador’s president, Rafael Correa, immediately denounced the
raids as a massacre and “an act of aggression” that constituted a breach
of Ecuadorian air space and sovereignty (Walser 2008). After expelling
the Colombian ambassador, Carlos Holguín, from Quito, President
Correa announced on national television that he would mobilize 3,200
Ecuadorian troops along the Colombian border (Fernandes 2008).
For his part, Colombian president Alvaro Uribe initially claimed that
Ecuador could not be informed of the attacks because the Colombian
military was in “hot pursuit” of the terrorists (Kraul 2008). However, with
casualties found dead in their underwear, the justification of hot pursuit
turned to assertions that Ecuador had not given Colombia sufficient sup-
port in its war against terrorism and therefore could not be notified, as
Uribe explained, “for the fear that the operation would fail” (cited by
Fernandes 2008, 2; Forero 2008). Again citing the terrorist threat, Uribe
added that “the operation was against one of the most sinister terrorists
in the history of humanity” (cited by Perfil 2008). Colombia’s foreign
minister, Fernando Araujo Perdomo, went further, justifying the pre-
emptive raids as the right of self-defense. “The terrorists, among them
Raúl Reyes, have had the habit of murdering in Colombia and invading
the territory of neighboring countries to find refuge.” Therefore,
“Colombia did not violate the sovereignty, but instead acted under the
principle of legitimate defense” (cited by Nagle 2008, 1).
Using the language of the “War on Terror” and self-defense distin-
guished the March 2008 attacks from previous alleged violations of
Ecuadorian sovereignty. Although the policy of preemption originated
before the George W. Bush administration, preemptive self-defense
became apparent U.S. policy when, in a speech at West Point in 2002,
President Bush stated, “we must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his
plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge” (Bush 2002).16
This stance was later expanded in the 2002 National Security Strategy.
The greater the threat, the greater the threat of inaction, and the more
compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend our-
selves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the
enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adver-
saries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively. . . . In an

age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the
world’s most destructive technologies, the United States cannot
remain idle while dangers gather. (U.S. Government 2002, 15)
Following the March 1 attacks, Washington offered immediate sup-

port to its closest ally in the region and the justification of self-defense.
John Negroponte, then U.S. deputy secretary of state, declared, “we
believe they [Colombia] were acting in a justifiable way,” while Secre-
tary of State Condoleezza Rice called Colombia a good friend and stated,
“everybody needs to be vigilant about the use of border areas by ter-
rorist organizations like the FARC” (cited by Infobae 2008; Walter and
Murphy 2008b). Reaffirming this stance on March 4, President Bush
called President Uribe and reaffirmed his full support for democracy in
Colombia, while on March 18, President Bush said that “the United
States strongly supports, strongly stands with Colombia in its fight
against the terrorists and drug lords” (cited by Walser 2008).
This support was not surprising, given that Colombia was essentially
exercising its control over “ungoverned spaces.” In addition to rhetori-
cal support, Washington also offered military assistance in the Colom-
bian attacks. As Colombian officials told reporters, Washington provided
spying equipment and intelligence assistance that helped track Reyes’s
location (Lobe 2008).17
U.S. support, however, contrasted starkly to the condemnation
voiced by Latin American states. The reaction among Latin American
states to the events of March 1 can be broken into three categories:
vehement opposition, qualified support, and a more pragmatic opposi-
tion that sought a diplomatic solution. It is significant that states in this
third category came to be seen by both Colombia and Ecuador as the
legitimate brokers of peace, rather than Washington. Although this tri-
partite categorization had a level of fluidity, the division helps to illus-
trate the increased U.S. isolation that underlines the geostrategic ele-
ment of the regional disconnect.
The most fervent opposition to Colombia’s action came from Cara-
cas. In addition to calling President Uribe a coward and a U.S. pawn,
President Chávez immediately closed his country’s embassy in Bogotá
and moved ten battalions of troops to the Colombian border (Trend
News Agency 2008; Acosta 2008). In a similar vein, Nicaraguan presi-
dent Daniel Ortega broke diplomatic relations with Bogotá, citing the
dangers caused by Colombia’s attacks and its violation of international
law (Walter and Murphy 2008a). This opposition was reinforced by
Cuba, which blamed the United States for the incident, and by President
Evo Morales of Bolivia, who condemned “external agents” for trying to
convert Latin America into an imperial backwater (Xinhua News Agency
2008a; Agencia EFE 2008a). This vehement opposition contrasted with

more qualified support for Colombia’s action.
As opposed to the U.S. endorsement, the more qualified support of
Mexico and Peru emphasized the dangers of preemption while
acknowledging the terrorist threat. This stance had Jorge del Castillo,
Peru’s prime minister, essentially repeating the U.S. line, claiming that
the Colombian attacks “prove that the FARC are taking advantage of the
hidden jungle zones” (cited by Associated Press 2008a). Similarly, Pres-
ident Felipe Calderón of Mexico was initially hesitant to condemn
Colombia’s attacks before the OAS because Mexico perceived the ter-
rorist threat to be real; he stated that Mexico would “comply fully with
[its] international obligations in terms of combating terrorism, narcotraf-
ficking and organized crime in its diverse forms” (cited by La Nación
2008; López 2008).18 However, such comments were always qualified by
what Calderón believed was the need to “reject any action that consti-
tutes a violation of territorial sovereignty” (cited by Reuters 2008). Sim-
ilarly, President Alan García of Peru affirmed that the region “desire[s] a
just and honorable end to this situation, [and] for our dear friend, Pres-
ident Uribe, to give due redress and apologies to the Ecuadorian gov-
ernment” (cited by Xinhua News Agency 2008b). This qualified support
left Washington as the only state in the hemisphere to fully support
Colombia’s action, in spite of the sovereignty issue.
U.S. marginalization, already apparent, was accentuated by a third,
more pragmatic approach to the diplomatic crisis. While they criticized
Colombia and its actions, the third category of states emphasized a diplo-
matic solution. Chilean president Michelle Bachelet maintained that
Ecuador and the region “deserved an explanation from the Colombian gov-
ernment,” but also stated that her country would work to find a diplomatic
solution (cited by Associated Press 2008a). Similarly, Brazil condemned the
attacks and called for an explicit apology, while presidential adviser Marco
Aurelio García stated that “we are going to mobilize all the force of Brazil-
ian diplomacy and of other South American capitals . . . to find a solution”
(cited by Agence France-Presse 2008a). Uruguay’s foreign minister, Gonzalo
Fernández, echoed this position, pushing Colombia, Venezuela, and
Ecuador “to urgently establish a dialogue so as to resolve and overcome
existing differences” (cited by Agence France-Presse 2008b). In addition to
its outright criticism of President Uribe, Bolivia also strengthened calls for
diplomacy; its foreign minister, David Choquehuanca, made a “fervent call
for dialogue” (cited by Agence France-Presse 2008c).
By offering a more pragmatic though nonetheless forceful condem-
nation of Colombia, these countries became the only actors that Colom-
bia, Ecuador, and by extension, Venezuela could trust (Lobe 2008). This
arrangement relegated the United States to the periphery of Western
Hemispheric diplomacy.
U.S. marginalization was also apparent in the OAS, the chief

regional body in the Americas for issues of security and diplomacy. With
its headquarters in Washington, the organization has become increas-
ingly important to the United States, considering that it is one of the few
remaining regional bodies of which the United States remains a
member. This point was reinforced by the State Department when it
commented, “we believe that the OAS is an appropriate place for these
two countries [Colombia and Ecuador] to find a solution” (cited by
Agence France-Presse 2008d). On March 4, U.S. hopes materialized as
the OAS convened its Permanent Council, and the following day pro-
duced the resolution that reaffirmed “the principle that the territory of a
state is inviolable and may not be the object, even temporarily, of mili-
tary occupation or other measures of force taken by another state,
directly or indirectly, on any ground whatsoever” (cited by Walser 2008).
After 14 hours of negotiations, Secretary-General José Miguel
Insulza said the resolution was aimed not to condemn but to indicate
“the legal principles of the OAS charter” (cited by García 2008). Despite
this noncondemnation, the United States was the only state among the
organization’s 34 members (besides Colombia itself) to defend Colom-
bia’s actions. The U.S. representative to the OAS, Robert Manzanares,
argued that his country “completely backs the forces of the Colombian
government and President Uribe” and again highlighted the need to
“combat the threat of terrorism” (cited by Clarín 2008). While Washing-
ton already held an isolated position, this separation became more pro-
nounced with calls by President Correa to create an “OAS without the
United States,” arguing that a resolution to the crisis would be best
achieved among Latin American leaders themselves rather than through
the OAS (Agence France-Presse 2008e).
OAS negotiations reached a consensus resolution on March 17,
2008. The new resolution “rejected” the Colombian incursion, stating
that “no state or group of states has the right to intervene, either directly
or indirectly, for whatever motive, in the internal or external affairs of
another,” and warned Colombia not to repeat such action “under any
circumstance” (cited by Marcella 2008, 8; Tokatlian 2008). U.S. opposi-
tion, however, was again evident. Washington argued that Ecuador had
violated UN Resolution 1373, which obliges states to define as a crime
the aiding of terrorists, whether through refuge or financial support, and
to share information about groups that plan terrorist attacks. Addition-
ally, the United States argued that the OAS had not considered OAS Arti-
cle 22, and Article 51 of the UN charter, which both concern the right
of legitimate self-defense (Agencia EFE 2008b).
The OAS took a different view of events. The organization avoided
classifying the FARC as a terrorist group and thereby avoided any pos-
sible justification for the Colombian attacks (Vieira 2008). U.S. disap-
pointment at these proceedings became apparent when Secretary-Gen-

eral Insulza was invited before the Subcommittee for the Western Hemi-
sphere of the U.S. House of Representatives and obliged to defend his
organization’s handling of the crisis (Agencia EFE 2008b).
Washington’s support for President Uribe largely removed the United
States from a significant role in defusing the diplomatic crisis. Its applica-
tion of the language of the “War on Terror” to the Americas not only placed
it in opposition to the majority of Latin American states but also reinforced
perceptions of U.S. partiality toward Colombia. As a consequence, the
United States as a diplomatic actor became increasingly irrelevant. Presi-
dent Lula da Silva of Brazil summed up the situation best, labeling the OAS
declaration “deeply historic” as “for the first time the United States stood
alone. All the other countries (except Colombia) defended a position and
the United States accepted the result. It was an unprecedented event”
(cited by EFE News Service 2008). Not only did they highlight a limit to
U.S. influence, the events in the OAS showed Latin American states pur-
suing policy objectives irrespective of the U.S. position. It is this divergence
of interests as much as U.S. incapacity to influence regional preferences
that underpins the disconnect in interamerican relations.
The isolation of the United States in regional diplomacy was further
illustrated with the success of the Rio Group in minimizing hostilities in
the Andes. Beginning on March 6, the 10th summit of the Rio Group
took place in the Dominican Republic and included all of its 24 Latin
American and Caribbean members. The Rio Group denounced the “vio-
lation of the territorial integrity of Ecuador” and reaffirmed that “the ter-
ritory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object, even temporar-
ily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by
another state, directly or indirectly, on any grounds” (cited by Marcella
2008, 39; Walser 2008).
While this statement was similar to the OAS findings, what distin-
guished these proceedings was that after seven hours of negotiations,
President Uribe apologized for the violation of Ecuadorian sovereignty,
and President Correa called for the military escalation to end. As one
observer remarked, in seven hours “they went from insults to hugs”
(cited by El Tiempo 2008). For the Venezuelan communications minister,
Andrés Izarra, the significance of these steps was that peace had come
about outside of U.S. influence (Agencia EFE 2008a). Just as President
Correa had argued during the March 4 round of OAS negotiations, con-
flict appeared to be more easily resolved without Washington’s presence.
The isolation of Washington in regional security and diplomatic mat-
ters is also apparent in other contexts. The founding in 2008 of the
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) was heralded as another
step toward regional integration that again emphasized a movement
away from active U.S. involvement. While UNASUR is more than a secu-
rity organization, the South American Defense Council (CSD) estab-

lished within its framework sets the basis for the creation of a regional
armed forces and the further coordination of defense policies.
The U.S. position in this new organization was made clear by
Brazil’s defense minister, Nelson Jobim: “there is no possibility of par-
ticipation by the United States because the council is South American
and the U.S. is not in South America” (cited by Miiller 2008). U.S. isola-
tion was confirmed when, in September 2008, rather than convene an
OAS meeting, Chilean president Bachelet called an emergency UNASUR
summit to discuss the internal crisis in Bolivia. As UNASUR released the
La Moneda Declaration, which fully backed the Morales government,
Bolivia expelled the U.S. ambassador to La Paz, while Secretary-General
Insulza declared that the exclusion of the OAS from the regional dia-
logue was “completely wrong” (cited by Sánchez 2008). To this extent,
the trend toward greater U.S. isolation was not confined to Colombia’s
attacks on Ecuador.
The appropriation of the language of the “War on Terror,” even
though widely rejected in this case, set a dangerous precedent. While
the repercussions of the Bush administration’s approach remained
uncertain, the Colombian attacks on Ecuador made it clear that the par-
adigm of the “War on Terror” had gained some traction in Latin Amer-
ica. Although the regional condemnation of these attacks may have
downplayed the extent of this traction, criticism was far from immedi-
ate, as evidenced by Mexico and Peru. While not as pro-Colombia as
Washington, the qualified support offered by Presidents Calderón and
García highlights the potential for future schism in Latin America.
It is this difference in response to the Colombian attacks that points
to future uncertainty over the impact of the “War on Terror” in Latin
America. While Colombia’s eventual apology at the Rio Group summit
illustrated a temporary healing of wounds, a long-term perspective
would suggest that underlying tensions might remain and potentially
become more apparent should Latin American and interamerican rela-
tions continue to become militarized.
An alternative way to view the events of March 1, 2008 is to empha-
size the regional condemnation and resistance to the “War on Terror.”
The condemnation in the OAS, in the Rio Group, and by individual
states highlights the extent of opposition to U.S. policy prescriptions, as
well as the change in the interamerican dynamic. Taking a short-term
view of Colombia’s action and the regional criticism, Latin American
resistance underpins the disconnect in the Americas. Not only does it
emphasize Washington’s growing isolation as a regional powerbroker, it
also highlights a limit to U.S. influence. Expanding on this view, it is
Washington, rather than its southern neighbors, that needs to adapt to
the new geostrategic setting. Instead of arguments that Washington can
retain control simply by paying greater attention to the region, the diplo-
matic crisis following the March 1 attack forces the United States to rec-
ognize limits to its regional influence. U.S. reluctance to acknowledge
the new setting helps to explain the incoherence of a policy that called
for a year of engagement and only 12 months later relaunched the
Fourth Fleet.
CONCLUSIONS
This analysis has centered on the disconnect in the Western Hemisphere
with respect to geostrategic and diplomatic relations. Consequently, it is
important to note that hostility toward the logic of the “War on Terror”
itself does not explain the regional divide, but rather is emblematic of a
broader shift in interamerican relations. In speculating on what has
enabled the division, opposition to the “War on Terror” should be seen
as part of a generalized shift away from U.S. policy, which developed
partly from the perceived failures of neoliberal economic policies in the
1980s and 1990s. Resistance to neoliberal reforms saw a change in soci-
ocultural attitudes toward political leaders and policies that opposed this
economic trend and its perceived architects in Washington.
The rejection of this economic policy, pejoratively referred to as the
Washington Consensus, reveals a relationship between political actors
and social forces that underpins the capacity of Latin American leaders
to make independent policy decisions on economic and security issues.
Just as the failure of the FTAA negotiations in 2005 reflected a distrust
of U.S. economic prescriptions, Washington’s failure to impose the “War
on Terror” paradigm reflects distrust in a geostrategic sense.
Interpreting the disconnect in the hemisphere solely through struc-
tural factors related to the distribution of capabilities or (potential) eco-
nomic power does not adequately acknowledge the dynamics of oppo-
sition to the radicalization of U.S. policy. Regional resistance to the “War
on Terror” was neither automatic, as the balancing proposition argues,
nor futile, as the structuralist approaches of neorealism and dependency
theory assume.
Without discounting the possibility of a relative decline in Wash-
ington’s distribution of capabilities and its capacity to change the
regional balance of power, shifting the focus beyond structural factors
to include the agents concerned offers a more nuanced understanding
of Latin American opposition to U.S. security overtures. This is possible
if a more normative approach is taken. At the domestic level, opposi-
tion to U.S. policy prescriptions among the Latin American citizenry, and
the electoral success of governments promoting a similar position, high-
light a normative basis whereby opposition to the United States is no
longer seen as radical. Although variation in opposition is evident both
in and between regional states, citizen sentiment plays a key role in

legitimating an independent policy approach.
This position is reinforced at a regional level by past acts of oppo-
sition, such as the failure of the FTAA, which lay a foundation for oppo-
sition to U.S. geostrategic interests and the imposition of “War on Terror”
logic. These domestic and regional factors affect the normative envi-
ronment in which Latin American states make their policy decisions.
This change is reflected in a wider transformation in the hemisphere’s
institutional environment. The creation of UNASUR, the rejuvenation of
the Rio Group, and the developments in the OAS are evidence of an
evolving setting that reveals these wider movements in interamerican
relations.
These institutional developments point to a longer-term shift in rela-
tions that is likely to extend beyond the political cycle of leftist leaders.
However, this is not to say that structural variables are inconsequential.
The economic growth of Latin America, fueled partly by a boom in com-
modity prices that began in 2002, is an example of a structural force
beyond events in Washington that undoubtedly opened up new oppor-
tunities for Latin American leaders to make independent policy decisions.
These observations, however, do not suggest that U.S. influence
was inconsequential in the creation of regional division. In contrast to
assumptions that the disconnect was a product of U.S. neglect, a grow-
ing militarization of U.S. policy became evident, a policy that viewed the
Western Hemisphere as complementary to the “War on Terror.” When
attempts to militarize relations encountered regional opposition, one of
Washington’s responses was to act unilaterally and relaunch the Fourth
Fleet. Examined in relation to the Colombian airstrikes in Ecuador, the
geostrategic and diplomatic disconnect was a product of Latin America’s
opposition to the logic of the “War on Terror” and its expansion to the
Western Hemisphere. To this extent, not only did the “War on Terror”
fail to mask a decline in Washington’s relative influence in the region, it
also revealed that the decline extended beyond the economic sphere to
include diplomatic and security issues.
Viewing actors throughout the Western Hemisphere as agents of
change in interamerican relations offers a better understanding of the
regional disconnect. The growing militarization of U.S. policy, combined
with opposition to the expansion of the “War on Terror” to the Ameri-
cas, underpin an understanding of this divide. While the full conse-
quences of the Bush administration’s approach to the Western Hemi-
sphere are yet to be seen, the current state of interamerican relations
says as much about Latin America as it does about Washington.
Although resistance to U.S. policy prescriptions is far from unanimous,
the existence of Latin American opposition reflects policy positions
taken in reference to the region’s own concerns.
This situation has been facilitated by a convergence of regional

beliefs associated with the perceived exhaustion of the Washington Con-
sensus, and the rise of Latin American leaders in an environment that
enables greater independence from the United States. These factors cre-
ated a context in which Latin American opposition to the “War on
Terror” was possible. To this extent, Washington needs to recognize
both the growing policy autonomy in Latin America and the militariza-
tion of its own regional approach. Until this awareness becomes appar-
ent, the geostrategic disconnect in the Americas is likely to persist.
NOTES
The author would like to thank John Minns, Daniel Martín, and Barry Carr
for their input and criticism. Thanks also extend to Lisa Villani, Toni Hall, Bruce
Kent, and four anonymous reviewers of LAPS for their direction.
1. In addition to bandwagoning for economic reward, Stephen Walt attrib-
utes bandwagoning behavior to weak domestic states, as they are more vulner-
able to hegemonic pressure. He also highlights isolation as creating bandwago-
ning behavior, whereby the cost of balancing against the hegemon alone is too
great (Walt 1987). For analysis that seeks to move beyond the bandwagon-bal-
ance dichotomy see later work by Randall Schweller, specifically Schweller
1997.
2. Although power for both neorealism and dependency theory results in
similar outcomes, the definitions themselves are different. Waltz contends that
power predominantly concerns military capacity, with other measures of state
power important only if they can be converted into coercive forms (Waltz 1979).
More recently, Christopher Fettweis labels this distinction “potential” and
“kinetic” power (Fettweis 2006). Dependistas, however, maintain that this view
of power is futile for the periphery, arguing that the pursuit of power includes
the pursuit of wealth. Subaltern state survival, dependistas argue, depends pri-
marily on economic development rather than security concerns (Escudé 1997).
This consequently highlights the inadequacy of “potential” power if its ultimate
aim is economic survival and not military “kinetic” power.
3. Although the structures of both neorealism and dependency theory are
generally considered similar, Alexander Wendt distinguishes between them.
While both structures constrain the choices of states, the dependency structure
also generates the state itself. That is, the international capitalist system both cre-
ates and constrains the periphery (Wendt 1987).
4. In addition to involvement in the failed 2002 Venezuelan coup d’état
attempt, Reich also equated Castro’s Cuba with Nazi Germany (Doyle and Isac-
son 2001). For his part, Noriega played an active and successful role in inhibit-
ing the extradition of Luis Posada Carriles, despite his conviction in absentia for
the 1976 bombing of a Cuban airliner that killed 73 people. Posada Carriles is
believed to have had links with the Central Intelligence Agency. Noriega also
helped to expand the U.S. embargo on Cuba (Lettieri 2007). Finally, during the
nomination process of John Negroponte for the position of UN ambassador, U.S.
Democratic senator Christopher Dodd accused Negroponte of perjury for his

failure to disclose his tacit support for human rights abuses in Honduras. Specif-
ically, these included the Big Pine II joint military exercises, which deployed
thousands of U.S. troops in Honduras from 1983 to 1984, and the training of
Contra forces on Honduran bases by CIA and Argentine advisers. These abuses
were perpetrated by Contras during Negroponte’s tenure as U.S. ambassador to
Honduras. More recently, as director of national intelligence, Negroponte estab-
lished a CIA unit to oversee intelligence operations in Venezuela and Cuba
(Democracy Now 2004; Birns and Kellberg 2007; Doyle and Isacson 2001).
5. Wayne Madsen, a former U.S. intelligence officer interviewed by the
Guardian, explained that U.S. military attachés in Venezuela and counternar-
cotics agents were in contact with the coup plotters. During the coup attempt,
U.S. Navy vessels were stationed off Venezuela’s coast and, according to the
Guardian, knew of the coup (Niman 2002). For more on U.S. funding of oppo-
sition forces in Venezuela see Jones 2004; for military involvement and an
account of U.S. economic support, see Golinger 2006.
6. The welcome extended to the International Monetary Fund, which was
ready to offer funds to the new administration.
7. For more on the role of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for
International Development in conjunction with the National Endowment for
Democracy, see specifically Domínguez 2007 and the rest of that issue of NACLA
Report on the Americas for more general background on the U.S. role in pro-
moting low-intensity promarket democracy in Latin America.
8. The author thanks Adam Isacson for the clarification on this, and many
other points.
9. State Department–funded military aid and training programs are over-
seen by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, and the foreign operations subcommittees of the appropriations
committees (Ciponline 2008).
10. Colombia is the 5th-largest recipient of U.S. military aid, while Bolivia
is 8th, Peru 10th, Mexico 12th, and Ecuador 20th.
11. Increased police training comes in spite of a U.S. ban on the training
of foreign police forces, instituted in the 1970s due to human rights violations
committed by graduates of its training programs.
12. Although the triborder region was named a terrorist hotspot, the four
terrorist groups that Washington recognizes are located in the Andes. Three are
in Colombia (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC; the National
Liberation Army, ELN; and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, AUC)
and the fourth is in Peru (Shining Path).
13. The U.S. and Paraguayan governments deny that the U.S. military
sought to establish a base at Mariscal Estigarribia. The U.S. government asserted
that only limited and short-term deployments of U.S. military personnel were
scheduled, and only between July 2005 and December 2006. In the region, the
U.S. has military bases in Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), Roosevelt Roads and Forth
Buchanan (Puerto Rico), air bases in Reina Beatriz (Aruba), Hato Rey (Curaçao),
Palmerola and Soto Cano (Honduras), and radar stations in Colombia and Peru.
It is also building military camps in Barahona (Dominican Republic) and at
Palanquero (Colombia) (Russell 2006).
14. Increased military spending extends beyond Washington. Defense

spending by governments throughout Latin America rose from US$24.7 billion
in 2003 to US$38.4 billion in 2007 (Military Balance 2008).
15. Developments since July 2008 have included a growing regionwide
militarization. In an apparent response to U.S. warships’ delivering aid to Geor-
gia, Russia held joint military operations with Venezuela in the Caribbean in
December 2008. This was the first time since World War II that a Russian war-
ship passed through the Panama Canal.
16. The policy of preemptive attack originated in 1992 during the first
George Bush administration. Aimed at maintaining U.S. preeminence, the 1992
draft Defense Planning Guidance, crafted by I. Lewis Libby, Paul Wolfowitz, and
Zalmay Khalilzad, all Defense Department staff members at the time, set out a
framework and a justification for preemptive attacks. It proposed “the use of
preventive or preemptive force, and the idea of forsaking multilateralism if it
didn’t suit U.S. interests” (U.S. Department of Defense 1992). Sidelined during
the Clinton administration, the idea of preemptive self-defense again arose in a
series of reports produced by the Project for the New American Century, notably
in 1997 and September 2000, which again outlined the case for U.S. preemi-
nence through the use of preemptive strikes.
17. Ecuador later argued in an OAS report that U.S. support was necessary
to supply the advanced guiding technology needed to launch the six GBU-12
bombs that hit the FARC encampment (Vieira 2008). A spokesperson for South-
com would neither confirm nor deny U.S. military participation, stating, “we do
provide intelligence support to partner nations but I can’t get into details on
operations” (Associated Press 2008b).
18. Calderón’s response was no doubt affected by the presence of five
Mexican students in the FARC encampment.
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Radical Neglect?

The “War on Terror” and Latin America

The rise of leftist governments in the Americas and the adoption

T he Latin American turn to the left is well documented. The supposed

© 2010 University of Miami

understanding of these movements, however, is not possible through

THEORETICAL LIMITATIONS AND THE IMPORTANCE

subordination, whereby U.S. economic and strategic military supremacy

Applying Stein’s arguments to the Americas, U.S. preferences not only

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION: FROM ENGAGEMENT

The “War on Terror” as Guiding Paradigm for the Americas

The Guardian newspaper reported that before the 2002 coup

claimed that the U.S. ambassador was “conspiring against democracy”

The Rise of the Pentagon in Policymaking

Figure 1. Total U.S. Military and Police Aid to Latin America

Source: Just the Facts 2009

lens of the “War on Terror” accelerated this trend. Traditionally, U.S.

Dangers in Practice: Plan Patriota

Figure 2. U.S. Aid to Latin America, 2006 (millions of US$)

Source: Just the Facts 2007, 26–27

antidrug campaign Plan Colombia and more recently on the launch of

illicit trafficking, and providing humanitarian assistance (Kozloff 2008).

COLOMBIA AND THE APPROPRIATION OF THE

At 12:25 A.M. on March 1, 2008, eight aircraft of the Colombian air

saries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively. . . . In an

Following the March 1 attacks, Washington offered immediate sup-

2008a; Agencia EFE 2008a). This vehement opposition contrasted with

U.S. marginalization was also apparent in the OAS, the chief

pointment at these proceedings became apparent when Secretary-Gen-

rity organization, the South American Defense Council (CSD) estab-

in and between regional states, citizen sentiment plays a key role in

This situation has been facilitated by a convergence of regional

Democratic senator Christopher Dodd accused Negroponte of perjury for his

14. Increased military spending extends beyond Washington. Defense

Amin, Samir. 1990. Maldevelopment: Anatomy of a Global Failure. London: Zed

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