Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
December 1986
-“.
;: ‘f‘“
t
f
./
1’
. . Twhnology..see pases 4
7
,
THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE USARMY ‘
11
Published by
HONORABLEJOHN
O.MARSHJR. Secretary of the Army
MILITARYREVIEW STAFF
Colonel Frederick W. Timmerman Jr., Edi/orin Chef
L!eutenanl Colonel Lynn Havach, Assoc!ate Ed!tor
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Conrad, Managing Eddor
Mrs Patrlcla L Wtlson, Secretary
,,
I
From the Editor
Christmas is normally a time when we think of toys, gifts, and the like. I remember
as a youngster in the 1950s I thought I had arrived when I received my first metal erec
tor set. In its day, it was state of the art in technology applied to toys. My erector set
served to stimulate imaginations large and small, acting as a springboard to new
ideas and new ways of dealing with my developing world. As a gift, the opportunity to
unlock the vault of creativity is a great one, and that erector set got a lot of use. Tech
nology was truly one of my teachers.
In our Army today, there is sort of a rift when if comes to technology. On one side,
there are those who say techtiologists have forgotten the human factors in war. On the
other side, some well-meaning professionals point fingers and say the humanists are
nothing but old conservatives masquerading as medieval warriors and romantics.
Our question in this season of “glad tidings” is: Where is the middle ground? Have
some professionals forgotten that techn&logy does have a place in the human condi
tion?
Technology has always had a place in the art of war, and it always will. Those who
believe otherwise deserve a great big Brons cheer. Therefore, maybe some have been :
too quick to condemn technology. Maybe we tend to look for simplistic, comfortable
solutions where there are none. And maybe, unlike the children we were in our youth,
we have been afraid to reach out and grasp technology and make it work for us. This
i
failure has served as a big roadblock and, in turn, has limited our own creativity as ,~
wartighters.
So, heresy of heresies, we at Military Review think it is time to look at the techxtolc)
gy problem a little differently. We do not cast it as the villain in this issue. From Gem , ~
eral C&man’s article on educational technology to Major Maginnis’ piece on selecting I
emerging technologies, we offer you a look at technology as somsthing that can be ~ .
used, something that can be molded, but something that ie not a panacea.
At the same time, we at the journal wish you, our valued readers, a most happy and
joyous holiday season. As you sit down with your children and the gifts they receive,
think how far we have come since our own childhoods. Also, think how far we might
go, given the smiles and sense of excitement in the faces of our children as they play I
with their new toys.
1
FWTJR
. * Subscription Rates Go Up 1 February
Itis not too late to grab a subscription to the English edition of
Military Review at the $14 yearly rate that has been i.I effect since
JamrarY 1982. A@ announced last month, our subscription rates will
each rise a dollar on 1 February 1987. Our single-issue price US
and APO/FPO will ga to $2, and our foreign single-issue price will
be $2.50. Call now and save a buck!
)J
3
.
Military Review
CONTENTS
4 EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY: YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW
by General Paul F. German, US Army, Retired
12 WHAT IF IT WORKS?: AIR ARMAMENT TECHNOLOGY FOR DEEP AITACK
by Lieutenant Co/one/David R. Mats, US Air Force, Retired
26 LHX
64 CITIZEN SOLDIERS:
86 NEWS
1’
88 BOOK REVIEWS contamporaiy reading for the professional
,
92 INDEX—VOLUME LXVI, January-December 1986
(
MILITARY REVIEW is published monthly in English, monthly m Spamsh and quarterly m Portuguese. Use ‘
of funds for the prmlmg of thts pubhcat!on has been approved by the secretary of the Army on 19 February
1985 m accordance wdh the provisions of Army Regulation 310-1. Second-class postage pa!d at {
Leavenworth, KS 66048-9998 and additional entry offices. Engfish-language subscriptions: $14 per year
1
US and APO/FPO; $16 fore!gn; and $9 for US Military Academy and Reserve Off!cers’ Training Corps J
cadets and Officer Candidate School candidates. Single copies $1.75 US and. APOIF PO; $2 fore!gn.
Address aII mail to Military Review, uSACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027.6910. Telephone (913) 664
5642 or AUTOVON 552-5642. Unless otherwise stated, views herein belong 10 the authors and not to the
Department of Defense or its elements. Use of news Items constitutes neither affirmation of their accuracy
nor product endorsement. Military Review reserves the right to edh material to meet space constraints.
Basis of official disirtbution is one per general ofhcer and one per fwe field grade officers of the Active Army,
and one per headquaiiers (battalion and higher) of the Army National Guard and the US Army Reserve. fvfill
tary Review is available on m!crofilm from Unwersify Mmrofilms, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106, and is indexed by the
PA IS (Public Affairs information Service) Bulletin. Postmaster: Send change of address mformabon to Mili
tary Review, USACGSC, Fort Leavanworfh, KS 66027-6910. ,,
u
Th!s is a renewal.
B
i_ � MasterCard � VISA Card Number
1
<— Yes! Send me — MR binder(s) (holds Expiration Date
, 12 msues) S8 CKJeach. (year/month)
I
1 Street
[
B
mm
1
i C,t~ State/Country Zip Code
!
T Mfitary Retiew
commentcard ,$
0 We need reader feedback. Please use this card 10
A .
Y
~
Military s I
I
1
Review
US Army Command and General Staff College
=
~’
t
B
—--;
i
1
1’
------------ ------------ -7
i
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
111111
FI UNITED STATES
I BUSINESS REPLY
FIRST
MAIL I ~
CLASS PERMIT NO 12062 WASHINGTON D C
Military ~
Review =
US Army Command and General Staff College i~
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-S990
,
EDUCATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY
—.
\ -. .1, _—.— -.--— -
‘. ,
—
> ;--—
In a time of resource constraints, better, more efticient and more
cost-effective methods of training and education must be found.
This article was originally a paper presented to the Army Exten
sion Training Conference sponsored by the US Army Training Sup
port Center in May 1986. The author presents his views on how to
get better returns for the money.
N 1973, Isaac Asimov, the famous futur tem. Obviously, he predicted, the relentless
ii ist and science fiction writer, attended a drive of technology, aided and abetted by in
conference on educational technology. Tele ternational economic competition, would
vision (TV) cassettes were then considered assure that this auxiliary equipment be
the wave of the future. A number of papers came progressively smaller, lighter, more
were presented by educators enthralled mobile and more responsive to its users’ ,1
with the possibilities of storing an extensive habits and needs. Eventually, he opined, the
trove of information, readily retrievable by auxiliary equipment would be eliminated
a student. The TV cassette, it was held, con and combined with the recording rnediuml
stituted the beginning of a new era in enter the cassette itself.
tainment and could open new vistas in Asimov then turned to the considerab e
teaching. When some mishap befell one of energy requirements for a 1973 TV casse$1e:
the scheduled speakers, Asimov was unex system, That 1973 audience was keenly at
pectedly asked to speak. In an impromptu tuned to the implications of the Uni~~d
talk, he invoked his experience in imagin States’ dependence upon foreign-supphed
ing the future and invited his audience to ac fossil fuels. Accordingly, he predicted that
company him on an intellectual foray into our engineers would systematically rec@ce
what was to come. the energy requirements for the system to
He began by describing the size, bulk and the point that its energy requirements ~
expense of the apparatus that decodes the would be negligible. )
analogue signals recorded magnetically on Hence, he prophesied, “we can look for-J
the cassette tape, controls the flickering ward to a small, light, self-sufficient, immi
beam which stimulated the face of the bulky nently portable information source. While it’
picture tube and evokes synchronous sound would consume energy and materials in its
from the audio amplifier and speaker sys manufacture, its cunning design would all
tury. Asimov went on to extol the advan Force f. serious etiom lwzgade ..?1 W@.mrdand squadron] frmmg for
tages of the printed page as a medium for now mc!udw an advamjd on.thwab !rahmng system, predcnkd on me {act
teaching. He felt it was superior, for most th.t 70 P3ma”l c.ftecimcn tmn!ng m-wrenm”ls th.! SUPWII ““II m,ssums
are rIIOt thr0U9h on.th6.job tra,”!”g and affect more than 90 Per.,”! of ,4,,
rekent years. For an Army with a fixed end directed at training and evaluating senior
strength which must plan for a fixed budget leaders or their staffs.
(or even a reduced budget) in the years Were I one of the Army’s leaders, I would
ahead, either the,Army must tind more cost- be looking with urgency for a way to pull all
effective ways to train or forgo some of its that disparate, largely research-oriented ef
planned materiel modernization or part of fort together and to focus it on the larger
its structural upgrades, or both. question. I could conceive of an integrated
At the same time, in US Army, Europe, program of individual and collective train
traditional training methods relying on ma ing in units resting on EIDS, ITMS, SIM
neuvers in the countryside and live fire at NET and NTC-like fisld exercises for bat
major training areae are under severe at talions. These could be coupled at higher
tack from politically potent environmental echelons with battle simulations and corps
ists. Again, I suspect that educational tech levsl instrumented tactical exercises with
nologists could supply remedies, but I am out troops (TEWTS) which permit evalu
not sure they have been brought to bear. ated, opposed maneuvers over actual ter
I have long doubted that firing live am rain in real time. whether my vision is true
munition at two-dimensional, pop-up or or not, somehow the Army—and the Air
moving targets continues to make much Force-must find a better way to train for
sense in an era in which most direct-fire the AirLand Battle without sacrificing
weapons are equipped with infrared sight needed improvements.in its equipment and
ing devices and many have laser range find structure.
ers and on-board fire control computers. I Concerning standards of performance, I
know that robotic, freely maneuverable, am aware that the vice chief of staff of the
three-dimensional targets are available Army has asked perceptive questions as to
and that such targets can be realistically en whether the Army has adequately defined
gaged with lasers with almost no loss of real training missions horizontally across the
ism unless one insists on the environmen combat, combat support and combat service
tally objectionable concussion. support units of the force, ‘and vertically
With the Defense Advanced Rssearch from the theater echelon downward to the
Projects Agency’s (DARPA’s) SIMNET lowest functioning units and detachments.
project now under way at Fort Knox, Ken As far as I know, his questions have never
tucky, it is possible to contemplate force-on been answered.
force engagements without even having to From my own experience, I know we have
position elements of a task force on the same fecnsed our atten~ion, appropriately enough,
continent. However, I detect disconnects be upon the combat arms and those arms and
tween such obviously related projects as services directly involved in aiding the
EIDS, the Integrated Training Manage forrnerto control land and people. Moreover,
ment System (ITMS) being fielded at Fort the Army has a propensity to drill repeated
Lewis, Washington, the upcoming effort to ly in the performances of units at battalion
automate the Army Training and Evalua or lower level and labors under strong budg
tion Program (ARTEP) and SIMNET, the etary disincentives for exercises involving
up~ades contemplated for the National brigades, divisions or larger formations. I
Training Center (NTC), the new Joint Read These budget limitations are not all bad, for
iness Training Center, DARPA’s AirLand I share the, h6resy of General Arth~r S.
Battle Management project and the Army ‘tAce” Cbllins Jr. who wrote in his book
Research Institute’s several undertakings Common ,Sense Tmining: A Working Philos-
ophy for Leaders concerning conventional giving priority to field exercises at lower ‘
field training exercises (FTXe} echelons makes eminent common sense.
The benefits from afield-training exercise But the usual FTX will hardly do the job to-
extend to unite two levels below the highest day at any echelon. The Army has a doctri
keadqwarters participating. In a company. nal imperative for the pmficik.nt exercise of
level exercise, the platoons, squads, tank command at higher echelone, derivative of
crews, andgun sections derive the most bene- the speed and reach of modern weaponry
fit; a battalion exercise benefits the company and of the ever-increasing interdependence
and platoon level; a brigade exercise benefits of the Army and the Air Force. A maladroit
the battalwn and company; and so on. If this corps staff can obviate very high proficiency
i-sa sound rule of thumb, ars~ if the training among tbe corps’ battalions.
of individuals and small units is the real key AirLand Battle will be only rhetoric nn
of successful training, then field exercises less there is genuine integration of air and
above battalien do not add much to the quali- ground operations at the corps level. Train-,
ty of training. The larger-unit exercises con- ing for such integration now relies on simu
sume time and resources that could better be lations driven by computers, using models
used to improve individzml and small-unit which are simply not credible to many gen
training, the foundations of unit readiness. erals as a measure of how the joint forces
Battalion-level exercises should not be held might perform under the time-distance
too often; once a year is enough. Some stresses of actual operations. I em convinced
will disagree thoroughly u@h this outlook on that the Army must now find a new format
large.unit tmining, but there are good his- for training for AirLand Battl~ne which
torical precedents to argue persuasively tkat would permit, as I have indicated, an op
full-scale division and brigade-level FTXS posed TEWT for a corps and its air support
are not essential to achieving a fully trained against a Soviet-type field army and its air.
status. For World War II, the Japanese If the Army can do so, it will be able to vali
trained a formidable fighting force with no date, or to make more credible, its computer ‘ t
exercises above battalion level. The training models. More important] y, it will he able to
of the Wehrrnacht emphasized small-unit find ways to train and evaluate its corps
training and was dlwtefor the most part near commanders and their staffs to realistically!
home kasernes. . . . high standards, better assuring the pre#
While I am sure that we should not dent and the Congress thai-our forces are ii&,
wholly accept the Japanese or Germans as deed ready to discharge their wartime r$
models-after all, they lost the war—I do sponsibilities.
agree that, if resources and time are scarce, But to find, the Army must search. %
.
Gene?alPafdF. Gormnn, US Army, Retired, op- >
crates a consulting seruice in Aflon, Virginia.He ,
> recemed aB.S. from the US MilifaWAcdemy and
,, an M.PA, fmm Haruard Uniuwsityand is a grad
4 uate of the USACGSC and the National War Col-
y kge. He has serued as commander in chisfi US
. ~z.
-j Soutkcrn Command, Panama, and, smcc retiring,
;i’ as a commissioner on ttw Prssi&nt’s Blue Ribbon
j commission on Defense Management and a con
“* * sultnnt to tti Pre8i&nt’s Commission on Orga
m-zed Cn”me.
1
1915
On 22 April 1915, the Germans, in a rela soldiers ask what will happen if the
tively minor offensive at Ypres, first used technology for ‘deep operations’ does
chlorine gas as a supplement to the tradi not work. . . . There is plenty of criti
tional means of attack. The gas drifted over cism . . . to warn as against being over.
the French lines and incapacitated many reliant on technology. Is there enough
while terrorizing the rest. A 4-mile gap ap to steer as away horn being under-
peared in the lines. In the absence of an ar reliant or to assure that we will be
tillery barrage, the terrain was still solid ready ifit is actually the best case
enough for the advance of troops and their that comes to pass?
,1
1980s as an interim weapon until the boost will require excavation before it can be re
ed kinetic energy penetrator (BKEP) is paired. But the Warsaw Pact people will not
ready for deployment. Durandals are good be able to get to that work quickly becaue,~
weapons, but too few warheads can be deliv~ HB876 area denial mines will be scattered
ered on a single pass. Thus, the development over the area ready to blow up any b@
of this kind of weapon continues. dozers or other equipment. Those adve:s~ry
e The DAACM. The direct airfield at airplanep that do survive the AMRAAM
tack combined munition (DAACM) takes and other defenses will have to recover at”al
the Durarzdal another step. The idea is that, ternate locations (if they can) where their
while the Warsaw Pact air forces are aloft on subsequent sortie rates will be much lower.
their initial strikes, the runways of their e The improved 2,000-pound bonlb. A
main operating bases will be put out of central concern in the NATO area and Ko:
action by runway penetrators. The BKEP is rea has been a continuing adversary pro;
under development at the US Air Force Sys gram for hardening important structure?
tems Command’s Armament Division to im such as command, control and commtinica
prove upon the Durandal. It has a rocket tion bunkers, munitions storage facilities
motor that will drive it all the way through and aircraft shelters. The standard 2,00@
the runway surface before the warhead is pound bomb has been in the inventory’since
detonated, causing heaving damage that the 1950s, and the Air Force has found it to
p&iority missions and other ground attack MiGs more dangerous when at close ranges. ‘
roles, the GB Ul 5 will reduce attrition and Both of the subsequent fighters, theF15 and
the number of rounds required for a given F16, were designed with the same internal
target. When added to the improved 2,000 gun.
pound bomb, it will give NATO a new stand During the waning days of World War II,
off capability. It will also provide precision air-to-surface rockets seemed to limit the fu
guidance against tough targets on Warsaw ture of the gun in that role. True, they could
Pact air bases, on the battlefield and along not achieve the muzzle velocities of guns,
the route of the second-echelon units headed but the warhead could be made so much
for the fight. bigger that the impact speed did not mat
e The AGM130. The GB U15 achieved its ter that much. Once the rockets were ex
additional standoff range by adding airfoils pended, the weight of the plane was greatly
to the standard bomb. Adding some power reduced, but the gun had to be carried back
was only a natural next step. The powered to base. The M61 did some yeoman work
guided bomb, the AGM130, is the followon against ground targets in Vietnam. That
to the GB U15 TV bomb. The rocket power and the growing Warsaw Pact armor ad
unit gives NATO aircraft even greater vantage led to designing the A1O T/umder
safety from local defenses when attacking bolt around an advanced 30mm gun simi-
Warsaw Pact airfields or lines of communi
cations. Now in full-scale development, it
provides kits for the standard and improved
2,000-pound bombs.
During the waning days of
@ Aircraft guns. The air-to-air gun re
World War 11, air-to-surAace rockets
seemed to limit the future of the gun in :
ceived a premature requiem several times
that role. . . . [but the] M61 did some
since World War II. Both the F89 Scorpion
yeoman work agaiast ground targets
and the F86D Sabre were put aloft without ,!
in Vietnam. That and the growing
guns of their own. Shortly, though, the
Warsaw Pact armor advantages led
splendid 20mm M61 Vulcan appeared and
to designing the AlO Thunderbolt
was designed into the 3’105 and others in the
around an advanced 30mm gun ~
late 1950s. However, the AIM7 Sparrow
similar to the M61. ~
and the AIM9 Sidecoirzder were coming
along so well that the early versions of both
the Navy and Air Force F4 Phantoms were
designed without guns. Iar to the M61. The result was the 30mtu
But the combined effects in Vietnam of GAU8, with a new series of rounds havi,~g
rules of engagement requiring visual iden alum:num cases and giving an impresswe
tification before opening fire and the mini performance.
mum release ranges of both missiles se e A new gun pod. The F15 andF16 ~ere
verely constrained US fighters. The North designed primarily as a high-low mix to ~
Vietnamese MzGs, with their internal guns, achieve air superiority. Once such superior- ~
got a better break than they deserved. A ity is achieved, the task would be to exploit:
quick fix was putting the M61 Gatling gun it through CAS and interdiction against
into pods to hang on the pylons of the F4s al both the first and second echelons. Both air-,
ready in service. That hurt their perform planes have the internal 20mm’ Vulcan, a
ance and range. The F4E was designed with good weapon but not quite stout enough
ita own internal gun, making life for the against the adversary’s improving armor.
(a) GF’u5,4 gun pod and an F76A; (b) F4 with SIX GATOR 1‘
mme dispensers; (c) Combined effects bomblets (CEBS);
and (d) Detonation of one CEB dispenser load over test
vehicles I
,,
..%
‘.0 &
., ..., ... w
AIRARMAMENT
penser contains 72 m i nes (BLU91B) with IR sensors describe a track over the ground, ‘
~haped charges that are aimed straight up leaving little chance for a hot engine to
ward as the mine lies on the ground. As the escape. Once it is detected, the warhead
tank rolls over it, the fuze is actuated by the charge is instantly detonated, forging a slug
magnetic tield, and the charge bores a hole out of a concave copperplate mounted on its
in the thin underside armor. There are 22 bottom. That slug is propelled downward
other GA TORS (BLU92BS) in the dispenser through the top of the tank. NATO aircraft
that are fragmentation weapons. The prob can deliver four or more of these dispensers,
lem for Warsaw Pact soldiers is that it is dif amounting to 160 warheads per sortie. It
ficult to visually tell the difference. Trip has been said that it would take eight con
wires set the BL U92BS off. It is enough to secutive miracles for one of the warheads to
complicate sweeping and at least put a delay work. Two recent tests resulted in direct
on the follow-on forces. hits on target tanks for all four of the war
e CEBS. If the second-echelon troops be heads in each submunition,
come so concerned with the GATOR threat Ijveryone knows that it is a long way from
that they do not lift their eyes off the ground, the test range to the battlefield and, unlike
their tanks are liable to get hit from the oth the GAZ’OR and the CEB, the SFW is still
er direction. An alternate load for an F’4 (or some way from entering the invqntory. The
other aircraft in varying numbers) would be technology entailed is fairly well-matured,
six dispensers, each one loaded with 202 of and it is likely to multiply the Supreme
the combined effects bomblets (CEBs)— Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, com
.1,212 delivered by each F4. The CEB has a ‘mander’s options against follow-on forces.
contact fnze. When it hits the ground or the
top of a tank or truck, its shaped charge tires
downward. At the same time, the casing SPECULATIONS
bursts, sending a huge shower of fragments ,i
to punch holes in gas tanks, or whatever else
they hit, and incendiary material to set the Mostof the weapons technology so far dis
fuel on tire. cussed is mature. Theee weapons are either
e SFWS. The CEB is a free-fall item, de already in the Air Force inventory or clase td
pendent wholly on the pilot’s aim. Many of it. There e many other munitions p$
the CEBS will miss tanks—though they grams that e more esoteric, and those th&
might still damage other vehicles and work out wiY 1have their own multiplying if
troops in the column moving toward the bat fects. The Army and Navy also have plaris
tlefield. Something more is needed. The afoot that will add to the weight of the
new BLU108 sensor-fnzed weapon (SFW), NATO air forces’ assault. Recall, toq, that
known as the Skeet, comes in tactical muni the proven effectiveness of many of the @m
tions dispensers having 10 submunitions, unitions can also enhance the power ofar
each of which contains four warheads (40 for tillery or ground-launched missiles. That:
the dispenser). redundancy could, in the end, prove a hedge j
The submunitions are ejected some dis for the FOFA in the face of the continuing)
tance above the ground. They descend on improvement in Warsaw Pact air defenses.
parachutes until a radar altimeter triggers It is also worth remembering that we
a rocket motor that propels them back up have consideredjust one pap of the military
ward and spins them. The spin throws out power equation—nonnuclear armament
the warheads, themselves spinning. Their technolo~. The impact of the airherne warn
?
\
MILITARY REVIEW � Dscember 1986 23
ly have gone for naught except f~r the per
ceptiveness of one mfiitary m-averick and a
few bold civilians. Had Air Chief Marshal
High C. Dowding and his civilian sup
porters shrunk from making a substantial
investment in immature radar technology,
then all of the sacrifices of the “few” in 1940
would not have made any difference. If
Dowdinghad not foreseen the synergy of the
combination of technologies and built his
elaborate command and control system to
integrate them, the ‘<narrow margin” might
not haye been there at all.”
Still, Karl von Clausewitz taught us that
war is uncertainty. He wrete that pure chsnce
can decide momentous events. Everything
in war, he said, is simple, but even the sim
ple is very difficult. As inspiring as the Bat
tle of Britain still is, we cannot forget what
happened to our marvelous Flying Fortress,
its Norden bombsight and its picklebarrel
bombing when it found itself over Schwein
furt with a flight of four Messersdwiitts fly
ing straight at its windscreen. That and the
memory of the seeming impotency of tech
(a) A Royal Air Force operations room from wh!ch fighters nology in Korea and Vietnam are too pain
were controlled from the ground by radar and radio during
the Batile of &itaIIY (inset) Air Chief Marshal Hugh C. ful to permit us to easily put ail of our egge in
Dowding; and (b) !% airborne early warmng and control the technological basket.
system (AWACS). Many would argue that it was a failure of
will (or judgment) and not technology that
ing and control system (AWACS), the Joint led to the sad outcome in Vietnam. With
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar Sys FOFA, it would certainly be a different case. I
tems (JSTARS), improvements in aircraft There can be no question that NATO would
and engine performance, the Low-Altitude be on the defensive, fighting for its own turf
Navigation and Targeting Infrared Night and not for some abstract voting right for an
System (LANTIRN) and the Global-Posi alien people. In that context, technology
tioning System will add to that capability. might be more determinate.
The outcome could well amount to more Most critics are not advocating surren
than the sum of the parts. der—farfrom it. Some say that the technolo
A combination of fairly mature aerody gy will not work or is too expensive but that
namics technology in the Spi@e and Hur deterrence or victoi-y can be had through
ricane, with eight well-matured Browning some strategic or tactical changes. Others
machineguns, thoroughly matured com hold that, if only the military can improve
munications technology and immature ra the teeth-to-tail ratio through some reor
dar technology, had dramatic results in the ganization, the problem will be solved.”
summer of 1940. But all that would certain Maybe there is something in that, but some
would fear that what they really imply is and guided by a valid strategy, really does ‘
the substitution of bodies ~or bucks. “ - produce an outcome greater than the sum of
What if technology does work? Honey was the parts, will there be enough of the arraa,
all too correct when he said that superior ments to carry it through? Will there be
weapons “favor” victory. They cmmot guaran- enough fully trained operators and main-
tee it, for there are many other factors in- tainers? Do we have ihe policies necessary
volved. Lieutenant General Leo Marquez has to till the ranks with people who can absorb
recently written that our tendency to see a that training? Have our leaders pondered
coutlict as a ‘“short war” is liable to inhibit the their choices should our technology and
proper filling of our supply bins to sustain a strategy work out better than expected?
longer one.” Rogers has complained that Have our decisionmakers pondered in ad-
shortages in ammunition stocks and other vance what they would do if it suddenly be-
conventional deficiencies are liable to drive came possible and seemingly easy to thrust
bimearly on to recommend tbe nuclear option across into Czechoslovakia or East Germa
to avoid surrender.” ny to grasp the values that might move their
If the new armament technology, com- opposite numbers to an early and uncle.
bined with all of the other improvements manding peace conference? ~
NOTES
1 I S Honey J, Ideas and WeWo”s, Arch.” SC&s, Hmldm Cm” 10 CQlonel De[berl Co,”m, L,EulwIanl Colonel Gten” G,,{WI. L,e”!enanl
1971, P14. CQlo”el James Jones, L,e”le”mt CO1O.I,I Ke,lh Kra”sq L,e”!e”mt CO!.”.(
2 General Bernard W Rww$, Tati,u and Technotoqy,, NATO’, S,x- Ronald Lord, L,wte”ml C4to”el Robe” Msfl,”, L,euleha”t CO],,,] Malcalm
teen NaOom, F@ 1985. PP 1622, end General Don. A Start)’, ExlenO,ng W<”!,, and L,eute”anl Colonel Da”,d Young, The Tat, of Two Br,dge,
the SSli@l,eld. Mrlrtam fiewew. March 7987. LID37.50 USAF SOICIW8S1 ASI. Monograph S,..s, Volume 1,Mmqr.sPh 1, US 0.9”.
3 !.@@ Jo. s Powell, A,rLand Ban!. ‘the Wrong Doctrine Ior the emnen! Pnntmg OffIce, Weshlngmn, D C, ?976, m ?.96
Wrong Reman AJ,U”WWSIVRW,,W, May+”. !985, w 15-22, Steven L. T 1 Derek Wood and Derek DernPsle,, The Na,mw Mwqr”, McG’aw.H,ll
Cmby, II, Convent,o”a! D,!,”,. 01 Eu,oPe The OPeref,ona! L,mit, of S.mk Co, NY, t961, pP409.i6
EmemJ”g Tmhnoimy: Wor!sng PaPe, N“mt.e, 55, W,!,.” Center, Wesh. 12 Elmer D,.,,, and Paddy Gr,ti,fh No! 0“,, by Chn.wnm NA TO, C,..
!nubn, D C., remnted m Cumenl Maws, Soec,d Ed,l,o”. 17 Sm!embe, ! 965. w Fmnlm Wmfd Wwnl, Hwxmne Seas, N Y, 1983 though not hlngmg
a% D, JetfrL?; Record, Oefend,”g Eu,oPe Cxmve”t,onally An Anmman Ihe,r ,rg”ment o“ any a“\,l@motwy Ihes,s, da POP.,. that a conventm”al
Persmctr”e 0“ Needed Reforms. A!r Unwers,?.’ Rw,ew Seotembe,-Oc!o defense E Poss,ble ,1 only tha s{,alegy w,!! be nwd,l,ed {o Prav>de {m the
....’0.,.
... .. .....
“. . . . . .
9rasP,.9.1 some Wamaw Pact values fhat wit ,.ducefhe other sde to wsh !.
4 Ernest R. May, Le.s.sO”Sof H(skmy The Use and M!wm 0$ {ha Pass ,“ lerm,nale a war w)thml gwmg m 10 m ,mdef)n$!eslalemate Cmby, q al ,s
A7ne”cm Fore,gn Pol,cy, Oxford Ltn<vers,iy Press, N Y !973 W<c.late ,s h,, argument that {he Wnerg,”g technology ca”nd be !unded
5 me Wesr mm! Ams of A?mncm INars, ed!ted by Colonel Vmce”f J ,“0 !s !0. unreliable ,“ any w,”:. [n M,, P?ecs, hwwl,es {hat the answer he,
Ewostlo, Pram.’ Publ>$hem, N.YY, 1959, volume t, Pmt. ?39 ,“ sImPl,l,cat,on d the orga”?mt,on and a ,. -an@?.,,, cm Ihe ,altack c.” {he
!. Brw’m, .?m Crassbow M H.Somb, Ind,. IUS{ eche!o” wh,ch t, eas.!er ,.6 mom rel<able lnan the follow+” 1o,c,$ ,1+
leek Elsewhere, Slew” L Cmby, M,l,la,y Reform end the A“ 01 War, ~ur
“)”,1, M,”-dune t 983, w 120-27, IS ,x!JI,c!l m wqng that moqan,zat,on ~d
wno!xl$cat!on, along wth less mm... on techwlosw w?t$result In a SUHIC .t
,“crease ,“ the ,leelh 10,.”0., the Nofih A!18”I,c Tree!, Om.mm!,cm s“t e-,
.. ....... ..... . “or tothe WarsawPact
:;
00 crt . 0.197-99’ and T,?, West Pam! Ada. of ?3 L,e,!enmt General Leo Mm”.,, The Shwl War Strategy I& ~
1,s,, A,, Force Jmlmal 01 Lows*.,, Winter 1986, PP 24
i 4 James Moray Sew.., Conventmnd Defmce Irnwovemenls whim J
!s tne All,ance Got”g?, NATO .%vmw, AP”l 1985, L)2
state-of-the-art technology. it is technology AHI, with Its two-man crew and an hour’s ~
that 1sfeasible today and, in many cases, al worth of fuel, can carry only two Tow mis7
ready demonstrated and available. siles. The UHI can only c&rry a single Pasa
senger besides its three crewmen, Th(
0H58cannot carry any payload beyond a pi:,
Current Deficiencies lot and fuel.
TO survive in a hostile environment, heli~
Currently, the Army’s light helicopters “popping up” only momentarily to perf0rp3
include the UH1 H({c:Y, the AH1 Hue.Y Co their miss]ons, These helicopters are se
bra, the 0H6 Cayuse and the 0H58 Kloua. verely limited in this type of flying, thus ex
These hehcopters come up short in perform posing them to ground fire from small arms.
ance when compared to projected require These light helicopters were designed with
ments and threats. For example, in the Mid out much radar, infrared, acoustic or “isual
dle East, with its high altitude and hot tem signature-reduction technology. What sig
peratures, current systems are severely natlme-reduction techniques they possess
limited in their load-carrying ability. The have been added as afterthoughts. The pro
.,
jetted battle environment of the 1990s and my has set down the basic characteristics it
beyond is what is called a “dirty” battlefield. wants in the LHX systems. The Army is
Current light helicopters are limited when looking at two versions—a scout/attack
it comes to surviving in nuclear, biological (SCAT) version and a light utility model.
and chemical (NBC) warfare. The goal is to have 70-percent commonality
There is also the matter ofbeing able to fly between the two. Common design would be
and tight at night and under adverse weath in the areas of mission equipment, propul
er conditions. Cm-rent systems are limited sion and rotor systems. Major differences
in navigation and target acquisition when would be found in the basic fuselage. The
light utility version would be used for trans
porting less than full-squad-size combat
groups as well as the myriad ofjobs the term
. . . the Army has set down the utility implies. The SCAT version would be
basic characteristics it wants in the designed fox
LHX systems. The Army is looking qt
o Surveillance and reconnaissance. ~~
two versions+ scoutlattack (SCAT) o Local area security.
version and alight utility model. The o Air defense suppression against air and
goal is to have 70-pereent commonality ground threats.
between the two. Common design * Area suppression escort duty.
,
Mx versus 8!ackHawk/ApaGhe
* 43.perCentL8SSEnginePowerRequired * 62.psrcentimprovement in pa~ioa~~rossweightRatios
* &-PerZentLighterEmp~weight e 43-perceMLighterDesignGrossWeight
* %?-percenf
!-essMissionFuelRequired e Siinn! e-SeaiSChT(scouVaffack)
This mea~ the LHX could be flown on systems used in the AH64 Apache.
mabd navigation and targeting, digital To further reduce pilot work load, an au
rnapa, interactive voice controls, sensor fu- tomated %irt.ual cockpit’> with a helmet
sion, wide-fieId-of-view optics and digitaI mounted dispIay (RMD) will be used. With
flight controls. This high Ievel of automa- the HMD, the pilot is presenkd key infor
30
December 1988 � MILITARY REVIW
LHX
?:-.
,..
LHX only half as expensive to operate and ment of new tactics as will the abundance of
maintain as the light helicopters it will re new technology with which the pilot will ~
place. have to work. % ?,
$
Cl “~
3A
*,”, -i
, --
I
‘Y.— (
Colonel Wdliam D Smru Jr., US AwForce, Re Lw&vmnl Colonel John 1). Busick, US Air
t,red, is a senior research assoc,ate, Unzuersit.v of Force, Retired, is a free-lance writer spt-cuzlizmg L?I
i
Colorado, and a free-lance writer. He recelued a auwtion topw.s. He recemeda B.G.S. from the UII
B. S,MJ7. from Wayne State Unwerszly, an um.ity of Omuha, an MA.O.M, from the Unmer
M. S.A-S. from iheAtrForceInstdute of Technolo sity of Southern Califonua and an M.Diu. from ,
gy and a Ph.D. from Aruona State University. On Denum Seminary. Whale on actme duty, he served
actwe duty, he commanded the Frank J. Seder Re as a /ighter pLlot and was involued m flying safety
beginnhgs, siege technology has come a long The tank was first used in the swampy ‘
way. The modern assortment of projectiles shell-pocked terrain of the Somme on 15
and cannons (and howitzers) has signifi September 1916. It was initially a failure
cantly altered the tactics and organisation because of the unfavorable terrain. Unfor
of armies. tunately, many armies did not recognice the
The first portable firearms were the har tank’s future role. These nations wrongly
quebuses. These weapons were first carried interpreted the lessons of World War I. The .
by the victorious army of Charles V (Charles tank played a significant role in World War
I of SPain) against the mighty French army II. Itsroleonthemodernbattletieldwas con
in the Battle of Pavia. His weapons fired firmed when German tank units blitzed to
stone balls at the intended targets. Stone the English Channel and east into the
was eventually replaced with cast iron and USSR.
even bronze balls during the 15th century. At the beginning of the Korean War, the
The portable firearm (or musket) was later aggressor North Korean army further dem.
improved with the introduction of a spirally onstrated the superiority of tank-equipped
gmeved or ‘W%&’ barrel which imparted to units over lightly armed forces. The North
a bullet a spinning motion which improved Koreans used 150 tanks to push the ‘lahk
the accuracy of fire. The introduction of less” South Koreanforces into the Pusan F%
breechloaders, smokeless gunpowder and rimeter. The lesson was clem—inautticient
cartridge magasines improved the individ matching technology can be disastrous.
ual weapon. To counter the likes of the modem tank,
The technology of repeating weapons antitank weapon systems were ‘developed.
(like the Gatling gun) and barbed wire sig In World War II, the best tank killer was an
nifkantly influenced World War I. It took other tank. Yet, interestingly, the Wehr
the countertechnological invention of the nu-cchtawarded 10,000 antitank close-com
tanktoknockdownthe wire endtoprovide a bat badges to gallant infantry soldiers for .
moving wall of steel ts protect the attacking killing or disabling tanks} Today, the tech ,1
ini%ntrymen. nologies to kill tanks have improved to the
point that a tank is no longer an invincible
m
,/, -, monster. J
5* Crossbow, circs The airplane (horn the triumphs of th~
lZthcentury Wright brothers’ first flight, to Brigadier?
L
-%
General Charles (Chuck) Yeager’s Mach 1 ‘
upset, to today’s Stealth techn~logy) has in-:
“%)
i
A
fluenced the nature of war. Initially, the
simple biplane of World War I was used for
reconnaissance and artillery spotting mhch
{
Emerging Technologies
deemed necessary for nuclear war. Reorgan ern heavy forces were no match for light ‘
ization around nuclear weapons left the Ar forces in certain terrain or during certain
my vulnerable to conventional coutlict. weather conditions.
The tank is a technological innovation During the Korean War, the US Army
that influenced organization. German tank was dead set on a type of mobility which was
corps commander General Heinz Guderian not adapted to Korean terrain. As a result,
recognized the error of allowing tanks to dic many lives were needlessly lost, and the war
tateorganization and-mission. Heeventu was prolonged before a different philosophy
ally abandoned tank-pure organizations in of warfare was eelected.
favor of more flexible combined arms. eIs the new technology the best use of
More recently, the US Army decided to as scarce resources? The American people have
sign four tanks per platoon (in lieu of five). a low tolerance for what they perceive as
This decision was accompanied by the tran overindulgence or waste. Report: of over
sition to the Ml A brains tank. The implica priced coffee makers, toilet seats and spare
tion is that superiority in firepower and ma parts especially alarm them.
neuverability more than offsets the loss of
one tank. The choice suggests that the Army
prefers technology as opposed to numbers.
Unfortunately, this iscontraryto the US
World War II philosophy for countering
Germany’s advanced tanks. During that
war, the United States built tanks en masse
to defeat a technologically superior German
tank. Today, the Soviets have adopted a
similar philosophy to counter US technolo
gy. ~
Technology frequently dictates the mis
sion. For example, the succeesfid 1945 test of
the atomic bomb influenced the US philos
ophy of war in the Pacific. Without the bomb’s
technological edge, the United Statesman
have settled for something less than total
eurrender, or it would have paid a much
higher price.
The United States’ air superiority and
considerable helicopter lift capability in
Vietnam were partially responsible for the
search-and-destroy missions which domi
nated its Vietnam tactical philosophy. Con
siderable US artillery and close air support
further supported the mission selection
process.
Finally, new technology may dictate or
limit the Army to specific types of terrain.
The,Soviets discovered this during the Finn
ish Winter War, They recognized that mod
.
~!
I J F C Fuller, Mach,ne Walara ma !“t8”?rv Jc?”maf, 7943 w 61 P%W. Damsk+dl GE, 1956, P 157.
..
., 6 H S&e,bm, Zwmchm Don ..6 Dow (Wwwem Don and 0.3., i, Q).
2 S..., M,l,tafy Pow,, SuPemlendent .1 Dccuments, US Government Neckargemund, GE, 1967,0 13S anti the Iollowng IE.WS
Pn.mg Ofl,ce, Was.h(ngtoo, D C., 1981, p 76 7 Franz Uhte.wailer, Baflksfida, Ce.rrd Eumoe, P 22 Th19 was taken
3 Franc6 R Allen, Technology and Sow Chenge, A$.cdeton<ent.ry fromone of e very lewautho”zad translat,om d the Gwnmn-$ anwage Ong,
Cwa17%,N Y ,1957, P357 “.1.
4 Hwz G.6m.., Panzer Marsh (Tanks, Forw@Jd March>, Murwh, GE, 8 W,lh.sm 0 Dafby end Wmam H Bwner, w. Led fha WSK Pre@o
1957 011% Press, Nov,1o, CM 1980, P 90
5 i M,ddledorl, Taknk h??Russlandfeldz.g flawcwfhe R.ssIm Cam
+
Major Robert L. Maginrus ISchief oftheLeader
shtp Branch, US Army Infanhy School, Fort Ben- “i
, ning, Georgti. He received aB.S. from tb UShfili
/
tary Academyand an M.S. from the Naual Post- J
.,, ., graduate School and is a graduate of the
USACGSC. He has served with three infantry diui
sions in a variety ofcomm.an-d and staffpmiticm.s m 3.
Korea, Europe and the Continental United States.
, \& t His article “Harnessing Creativity” appeared in.
the March 1986MilitaryReview.
SPIWF NEW
cles. Enthusiasm is a commendable trait-
perhaps necessary to a combat command
er-but it is misplaced in planning. So, it is
HIGH GW.ll!iD not mean-spirited to attempt to cool some of
the hot air of the Army’s aspiring spacemen.
B. Bruce-Briggs
A ment. It is not to denigrate the vision to call
attention to its roots in science fiction. This
is especially true in popular Buck Rogers-
type ‘<space operas” featuring vigorous men
in elaborate uniforms enjoying exciting
adventures in company with exotic females.
Alas, today the prospects are mundane and
must be analyzed in commonplace terms.
Space is merely an inconceivably large
place, a forbidding and unpleasant milieu
where men can do some things they consider
useful but at high costs and considerable
risks.
Hardly was the first artificial satellite
placed in orbit when space was labeled “the
new high ground.”] What a p~werful metp
phor that is! The importance of the high
ground to military operations is not only
part of the rudiments of the art of soldie~
but is also one of the few military principles
known to the public-at-large. In many cases,
metaphors confuse thought, but this one is
singularly appropriate and instructive.
Space is very much like the high ground,
-., only more so:
. The high ground is inherently worth
less. It has no rich farmland, no water, no
. convenient or efficient transportation
routes, no factories and little or no popula
tion. Its mineral resources, if any, are more
expensive to extract than those of the low
land. The low giotmd is what people want,
why people fight wars.
Space is more worthless than the most
barren crag. There is nothing and nobody
F
there. Space enthusiasts have tried to con limited by the next parallek
jure eftlcient economic uses for it. The heat . The high ground is necessarily visible
that can be identified is the possibility of and vulnerable. That which gives line-of
more efficient production of specialized sight communication downward works in
goods in the apparent weightlessness of reverse. The bill is visible. Fire can easily be
orbiting bodies. Trans-spac*that is, other directed and concentrated against it.
celestial bodieehee somewhat more po Space is worse. Nothing is more visible
tential. Perhaps something wondertid will and potentially vulnerable than an orbiting
be discovered, or something rare and expen spacecraft. On the high ground, at least you
sive on Earth will be so plentiful elsewhere can dig in or h@ser down on the other side.
as to justify the transportation costs. But, so You cannot passively defend a spacecraft,
far, manned and unmanned probes have nor is there a military crest in space.
only seen and sniffed rocks. Consider the balloon, a device once con
o The high ground is strategically worth sidered of enormous military potential. It
less. Even a state wishing to hoId a moun offered height higher than the highest
tain range as a frontier would concentrate ground, it was marvelous for observation
on securing the low passes. Not even the and it had terrific gravity effects. But who
most imaginative “geopolitics” theorist has would care to man a balloon under fire? Yes,
claimed that possession of the Alps would balloons were deployed once upon a time,
dominate Enrope or that the Tibetans will and a consequence of their operations was
rule Eurasia from their Himalayan heights. the invention of the parachute.
Similarly, space has no strategic value. e The high ground is logistically diflicult. ,
US security might be improved if all Cubans Water, food and munitions must be trans
could be put in orbit or the Soviets emi ported upbill. For space, add air to the provi
grated to the moon. sions, and multiply the problems. Although
e The high ground is tactically valuable. the cost is dropping, lifting and supporting , \
This is the real case for military space. The men and material in space is and will be
high ground is desirable for military opera extraordinarily expensive.
tions for two reasomx’ But everything is expensive thes~ days, ~
Obseruatien. Eyesight, like any line-of and the military benefits would seem toj~
sight transmission of information on or near tify the costs. The possible military usesi @
a sphere, is given more range end coverage space are weather forecasting, navigational’:
by height. Space-based systems offer enor aids, reconnaissance, communications”
mously more range and coverage than the transport, bombardment and counters to all
highest peak. of these and to civil uses.
Grauity. It is easier to fight downward All of these functions can be and have
than to tight upward. Men, animals, vehi been performed by other means and, despite
cles and munitions can be propelled down a the commendable progress in space sys- .
slope more easily and rapidly than uphill. terns, all of them continue to be done with {
This effect is even more pronounced with endoatmospheric systems. Whether space is ]
space. The energy required to drop some used end how much it is used will be deter
thing from orbit is a small fraction of that mined mostly by narrow technical questions
required to carry it up. of feasibility, effectiveness and efficiency :”
The tactical advantages of the heights of which can only be addressed credibly’ by
space do and will continue tojnetifi military technicians who are conversant with alter
use, but these advantages are necessarily native technologies.
NOTES ,j
#
1 Thephrase has been .nnbu!ed 1. former Cc.ngressrm. F Edward fad, ti,squitetheoppsne b=usetie3pawvehlde& Lw.anacwddspwti:
Hebw! .1 Louis!+ ”.. mlv, whrle a wound lame! can only be ane.eked w wroxnm!ely hmwokan.
2 IO@mn ClmmewIQ, On War, tiledmd trans!a!ti by Michael tioward CAM,
am Paler Pam Pmnceto. uowwsm Press, Princeton, N.J,, 1976, p !352. He 3 Thequ.l!fica!mn !9 Pfudenl,al kca.sa ti !s c=mcewabls that same fbrm
lkstsa ttmd advan@w-gr8aler actwaqof fire bwa.sn of the geometrical of stinliti mew m.ld b generated mom eas,ly I. spaca than on the
relationship of the he,ght to the low gm””d WI!h W3w”SOf R@ .9-u,.w, ground-for exanwle. solar or nudeer energy tm dangerous to mk m the
shca!mg down a a Ilaner target resulu m a smaller cmcu!ar error probable atmosphere.
than shc.s!tng up al e twget on a slope Thts concept u Ikra!ev.mt 10 SWC=3. In
I
(’
VIEWPOINTS
being can. Robotics has been defined as “the grams which possess extensive knowledge ‘
intelligent connection of perception to in a specific, typically very narrow, domain.
action.”s The word intelligent in the defini A great deal of effort is being focused on ap
tion implies the “hand and glove” relation plications which can provide the military
ship that exiata between AI and robotics. commander with an expert planning aid.
The queetion then becomes, “HOW are AI
end robotics related, and how can they be
used for military applications?”
‘(Al) is the part of computer
science concerned with designing . . .
systems that exhibit the characteristics
Artificial intelligence we associate with intelligence in human
behavior. . ..’ Applications in this area
deal with how a computer can solve
AI is an interdisciplinary field, integrat
problems like a human being can.
ing such things as cognitive psychology,
Robotics has been defined as ‘the intel
philosophy and computer programing. Cur
ligent connection ofperception to
rent research tends to aim at making com
action.’ The word intelligent in the
puters exhibit intelligent behavior in do
definition implies the ‘hand and
mains which are sufficiently narrow to
glove’ relationship that exists
be manageable. The problem with this ap
between AI and robotics.
proach is that these programs will not work
when moved into a “real-world” environ
ment. Reality is much too complex for these
simple systems to cope with. The AI “pur This system will know and understand the
ists” focus on research into those attributes unit’s mission, the terrain and the unit’s or
representing intelligent thought. A prime ganizational etructure.
complicating factor is that human intelli The expert system will also have access to ‘
gence is poorly defined and even less-well whatever combat intelligence exists. When
understood. AI researchers are slowly mak the commander plans a mission, thtxsystem
ing progress in determining how people will help by providkg software tools to do’
think, see, remember, communicate, and so screen-displayed tactical overlays, fi~
on. support plans, obstacle plans, movemedt,,
Since AI technology is not very mature, routes, and soon. It may also aid by offeririg’
applications developers tend to focus their suggestions on alternative courses of actioh
efforts upon easier problems. Unfortu and by analyzing those alternatives f@
nately, military problems are not typically weaknesses and strengths.
among thie group. The military operational The next step is to use this know~e?ge
environment is too cluttered, or “dirty,” for base to develop a real-time decision aid’ for
most developers to tackle at this stage. Nu use in the context oftactical situations. Con
merous potential military applications of ceptually, it is as though General George
the technology, however, do exist. S. Patton Jr. were sitting by your side, whis
The erirliest applications of AI to military pering in your ear, “Don’t forget to look
operational deficiencies will probably for . . . “or “Remember what happened the
emerge, as have those for commercial busi last time we tried that maneuver.” This,eys
nesses, from an area called “expert sys tem is much more difficult to develop be
tems.” Expert systems are computer pro- cause it requires not only the vast knowl-
FMC Corporation versions of a tactical robotic vehicle. (Left) The prominent sensors on the vehicle gave it some obstacle
avoidance capability, and it could be controlled by a human operator uaing voice commands. (Right)A Iaterconfiguration
on the same test veh]cle performed a roote reconnaissance mission mder the ,jkeclion Ofa commander a“d driver from a
command post. The robotic vehicle was able to detect unforeseen obstacles, determine trafficability of routes, detect ene
my activities andJocatrons, plus call for arlillety support,
,,
tank or a howitzer. The motion of the base tion of man-made barriers and alterations :
causes stability problems as the manipula from weather and seasonal changes. Thue,
tor attempts to move through its range of if the robotic vehicle merely follows the
motion. route planned by the computsr, it will fall in
Speed of response and cycle time are also the first hole created by an artillery shell. !.~
areas of concern. If a manipulator is to be Obviously, the robotic vehicle must have ,
used to load main gun rounds in a tank or a sensors which will allow it to pexceive
howitzer, the manipulator must operate as changes in the environment. These sensors ~
fast as a human loader, Today’s manipula could be visual, acoustic, laaer scanner, tack
tor control algorithms do not provide for tile, and soon. ;
those speeds. Once the sensors are in place, the problem
The development of a robotic vehicle ca is how to process the information generated
pable of performing milita~ missions cre by them so the computer can make a deci.
ates equally difficult technological prob sion on the route to follow. Processing capa~
lems, Regardless of the mission the vehicle bility, computer size and processing time
is intended to perform, the mission module then become important. For user utility, t~e
must be mounted on some type of chassis c; processing must take place at near real
pable of autonomous cross-country naviga time. Several current computers have proc
tion. An intelligent machine must be able to essors which possess adequate speeds (as
plan routes for the vehicle to follow. suming a limited application—for example,
The basic problem is that these planned solely navigation). Size constraints of the
routes are generated using a digital data computers also become a problem. Today’s
baee. This digital data baas ia only aa good state-of-the-art computer technology does
as its last entries and probably does not re not provide for a computer that has ade
flect the actual environment due to the addi quate processing capability while, at the
I
MILITARY REVIEW . December 1986 ,$5
ated with the military applications of ro
botics. Programs are in place that are ad
dressing the research issues necessary to ex
pedite the fielding of a robotic manipulator
to perform military missions. In addition, a
great deal ofactivity is focused on the devel
opment of a robotic vehicle capable of cross-
country, autonomous navigation.
MartmMarietta’s
fieldmateriel-handling
robot
Numerous military applications ofAl and
Many tasks petiormed by soldiers robotics do exist. The technology to support
today are, by nature, repetitive. Guard these applications is not available today but
duty is apefiect example. . . . Ammuni- may be available in the near future provid
tion handling is time~consuming and ed that research and development efforts
definitely labor-intensive. Robotic are properly focused, The US Army can cap-
devices could speed up the entire italize on this technological lead in the area
ammunition-handiing process. of computers and signal processing. As this
technology mat,ures, it will not only in
crease our force effectiveness but also re-
same time, being small enough to fit inside. duce manning requirements or at least al-
currently fielded weapons systems. low for the redistribution of personnel. Ag-
There is a lot of activity ongoing within gressive pursuit of the technology is the key
the Army to address the problems associ- to success. ~
NOTES I
1 Applocamm of Robot,.. mdAfafic!aI lnfef)wnce to Reduce Rmk..d Wlrge”ce, W,ll,an Kaufman 1“. bls 480s, Cal,f 1984, Volume I
lmpmve Effeco.eness A Study for the Umted States Amy, Nat$onal Acac- 3 M,chael &ady, &Dfic,al [nte!l,ge”ce and Ro&70cs, AD.A1424W, D
emy P<,,,, Washl”gtOm D C 1983, D 1 tense Tech”,cal lnfonmal,o” Center, ,41em”dm, V.,, 19S4, PI
2 wm. Bam and Edward A F%mnb.wm me Handbook of Am flc!ti !..
r
Captain Ricky Lynch is the robotics project ofi
cer, Directorate of Combat Developments, US A:
my Armor School, Fort Knoz, Kentucky. He m- ,x
cewed a B.S. from the US Mihtary Aca&my and >.~ ,
an MS, fm,p tti Massachusetts Institute of Tech
..,
nology. Hepreuiously seruedas the commandaofa
mobde a.ssmdt bridge company and a combat mgi
neer company, 17th Engineer Battalion, 2d Ar
mored Dmi.sion, Fort Hind, Texas. 2
iis
Cnptam MicbaelR. McGee is wtih the Artifxiai
Intelligence Cdl, AwLand Battle Test-Bed, Direc
torate of Combat Developments, US Army Armor
School, Fort Knox, Kentucky. He receiued a B.S. ,?””
from East Tennessee State University and an M.S. \
from the Umuersity of Southern California. He
previously served us the S4, a.ssi.sta?it S3 and corn.
man&r, Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Cauahy,
Fort Hood, Trxas.
[
1’
NTELUGHICE
,
Major Kenneth H. Rose,,
,,
MILITARY REVIEW � Desembw 1986
another object or acted upon by another ob dure. One such procedure may control walk
ject or force.” People probably abstract sev ing, a rather complex motor activity that is
eral rules into higher order rules as they accomplished without thinking through the
mature, but the rules are still there, gener individual elements of knowledge required.
ally hidden from conscious behavior. Another theory suggests that thinking is
Imaging is a very powerful form of repre an associative process-people search and
sentation and may well rule our conscious sort through their space of compiled knowl
and unconscious moments. It is the stuff edge by a series of associative leaps con
that dreams are made of—literally. It is trolled by matching patterns between mem
the process that allows children to place a ory and the real world. Medical diagnosis
square peg in a square hole. Demonstrating provides an example. When a young woman
this process of imaging is not ~ifficult. suffering an outbreak of hives entered her
Thhk of a square. Think of a circle. Think of physician’s office, he was standing in the
an elephant with a trunk at both ends. It is waiting room. He took one look at her and
really quite easy. Describing how imaging asked, What did you eat that’s different?”
is used in thinking is not so easy. Her reply was, “Diet soda.” His prescription
Mental modeling is an imaging-like proc was, “Don’t drink diet soda.” This was the
ess on a very general level. When people are end of the examination. The physician did
trying to put heavy objects into a truck, they not search through a series of primitive
may choose to push or pull them up a ramp rules regarding dermatology. Instead, he I
instead of t~ing to lift them. This choice made an associative leap from a single ob.
may result from a’ mental model dealing servation to a probable conclusion using
with the use of inclined planes. The model is
applied to the situation at hand and trans
formed into a real-world solution, a solution
that may generate a rule or image for future AI researchers consider knowl
use. edge representation to b~ the current
How do these processes cooperate? What state of their art. The AI subfield of
when opening a can of paint? Is it a rule that medium for examining this. In expert
says, ‘<Ifyou want to pry the lid off a can, use systems, three of the most common
patterns common to current and previous then apply the rules for legal moves, apply ‘
events. the rules for wise moves, compute some ex
AI researchers consider knowledge repre pected value for each move and then select
sentation to be the current fundamental the best choice. Instead, they look at the
hurdle in advancing the stats of their art. board position and associate the whole with
The AI subfield of so-called expert systems alike or similar position in memory. This is
is a good medium for examining this. In ex the base for determining the next move. On
pert systems, three of the most common the other hand, not everyone plays this way.
forms of knowledge representation are
rules, fkames and logic. Rule-baaed systems
parallel propositional representation. Su
Logic provides a form of
printing press.
When estimating the potential for inven
tion, two types of people should be consid
myriad of exceptions that characterize the ered: those who develop the technology—
environment, not because they apply an in the reseaichere-and those who apply the
flexible dogma of facts and procedures. It is technology-the users. The research comnm- ,,
tempting to establish a frame for birds that nity is replete with people who are bright,
indicates all birds have feathers, lay eggs energetic, innovative, enthusiastic, skepti
and can fly. This is fine except for the pen cal, optimistic and pessimistic—but not all
guin. This may be solved by preventing the at once. Visit any researchtcenter or attend
few exceptions from inheriting the charac any conference, and you will not find a char
teristic of flight. But what”about birds with latan among them. Regarding the connec
broken wings? What about very young b~? tors between researchers and users-the
Neither of these can fly, but that does not commercial community—suftlce it to say
mean the species cannot fly. that the classic zule ‘<Letthe buyer beware”
Logic provides a form of representation applies.
that allows the system to create new facts Technology limitations are not the only
through deduction. Typically, the syntax is hurdle for AI. There is another to be found in
based on first-order predicate calculus, a the way we in the Army deal with new high
kind offormal logic representation that uses technology. AI is of no use if it remains in
operators and arguments, with variables the laborato~, it must be applied to real-
being allowed among the arguments. As a world problems. The people who do thie
much-simplified example, “Irving has soldiers who are not researchere-consti
feathers” might be represented as (has tute a hurdle that would probably exist even
feathers Irving). Has ::eathers is the opera if technology limitations did not.
tor, and Irving is the argument. Also, “If X Soldiers are little different from their ci
has feathers, then X is a bird might be vilian peers when it comes to new ideae-
GermanKrummlauf30-degree
curved-barrelunit
withperl.
ssops and clamp for attaching
to rifle barrele, 1945
both resist change. Senior executives wbo the Wright brothers showed thaf peopl~
have spent their entire working lives devel could use machines to fly. They did not show
oping qualification in their craft do not want that airplanes could deliver mail to Milwa~
to be told that the rules have changed. Sen kee, dust crops in Kansas or consign large:
ior personnel know very well how to do their naval vessels to deep, watery graves. That~s
jobs and do not need to be told how by some not what researchers do; that is what usqi-s
time-proven ways-ways that have brought The. matter of risk and the professional
the next problem is the “one-page executive to fail, it is likely not to be tried. Those who,
summary syndrome”: “Don’t waste my time have been around for a while understand 1
with the technical details, just give me the well that it is easier and safer to be critical’
bottom line. Tell me what AI can do for me.” than correct, especially when you are un
This abrogates the obligation of technology sure of your subject or unsure of the outcome]
users-to determine how technology may be of a course of action. When dealing with
usefully applied in their domain. In 1903, high technology, there is grest wisdom in
a row of hooks in a restaurant that, when we AI is not something that was cast in stone
see them, we know they are for ha~ging at creation. Neither success nor failure is in- ~
coats? Why do we know that we can hang trinsicorpreordained. “Machines will think
more than one coat on each hook but that when people teach them to think.” Why k? ,.
there is a limit? After three or four coats, the AI not work? Because people might no!
hook is no longer a hoolq additional coats make it work—the same people who abhor
will slide to the floor. failure. Why will AI not work? We should
SOLDIERS
nate units to carry out his and his superior’s The now-standard interpretation of Auf
intent. The subordinate commander decid tragstaktik rests upon signitliant misunder
ed upon a specific course of action which be standing of the language and how the con
came his resolution (Entschluss). cepts fit together. This does not mean that
The German army, therefore, did not the current US concept of mission-oriented
build the cornmander’sintent into a particu orders is invalid or that it fails to meet the
lar miesion or vice versa.’ The primary Ger Army’s needs. It simply is not an accurate
man field manual of World War II, Truppen reflection of the old German system. Noth
ftihrung, explicitly stated’that a subordi ing is to be gained by filling briefings and
nate commander could change or abandon journal articles with statements that the US
his task within the framework of the higher Army is using German concepts that proved
commander’s overall intent. This was a seri successful in World War II. Such is not the
ous matter, and a commander who did this case.
assumed full responsibility for the decision Likewise, a number of recent authors
and its consequences. Immediate notifica have taken great satisfaction in describing
tion of the higher commander was a strin the similarities between the German dot-,
gent necessity.’ This ability to separate in trine of “blitzkrieg” and the tenets or imper
tent at higher levels from task and resolu atives of the AirLand Battle doctrine} The
tion was critical both to the Gm-znan army’s problem with this is that the German army
legendary battlefield flexibility and to the ini had no doctrine of blitzkrieg: That term de
tiative of its cormnanders at all levels. scribes a result rather than a particular the-
starting point, but it lacks depth in institu from its experiences.” Because of their im:
tional atTairs, theoretical foundations and pressive cohesion under great stress and the
operational matters.’” A few of the most im capabilities of their lower ranking leaders,
portant issues meriting consideration di German units remained effective fighting
rectly relate to the ability of the German ar forces despite enormous 10SSI+?S
my to carry out its doctrine of mobile war The second fundamental pillar of the
fare cohesion, offlcerpersonnel policies, the Prussian-German system was the elitist
General Staff system and improvisation. system of officer selection, education, as
Perhaps most important, the Prussian signment and promotion.” Inseparably
and German armies demanded and pro coupled with this was the General Staff sys
duced cohesive, effective fighting units. tem. No comprehensive treatment of either
German units of both world wars retained currently exists, especially in English, de
their cohesion and combat effectiveness in spite the popularity of Trevor N. Dupuy’s A
both offense and defense despite heavy loss Genius for War and the work of apology byy
es and substantial inferiority in firepower Walter Goerlitz.” Numerous studies in Ger:’
+
and mobility. Disputes exist, of course, over man, which, taken together, would allow a’
quantitative measurements of the relative more thorough understanding of these corn-:
efficiency of (@-man units and those of their plicated subjects, have had little if any im,
enemies.” Nevertheless, the overall superi pact on the US Army’s view of Hitler’s army
ority of German units in the West is hardly or its Prussian predecessor.” This is e.k,pe
open to doubt.~>This does not mean that all cially unfortunate because careful consider
German units were of equal caliber or that ation of the Prussian-German oftlcer per
they maintained the same quality through sonnel system is absolutely essential to any
out the warm effort to understand how tbe Germans de
The German army built effective combat veloped and executed their doctrine.
units through tough (even brutal) and real As a matter of principle, the Prussian-
istic training, iron discipline and harsh pun German army accorded quality precedence
ishments, an effective replacement system over quantity in virtually all ofticer mit
and, as is well-known, effective leadership. ters. There exists among historians no una
It was extraordinarily effective at learning nimity on the precise details of the Prus-
1.
NOTES
1 Edwarti N L“llwak, The Pentagon .“0 the An of War The O!I.StIO” of EI”e ae.tscne M!lra.sche Tradmon,,, E.ropasche Wehrk.”de, Jun. 1982,
M,l!lary Reform, Stmon & Scnuster. N Y 1954 P 112 PP 264.65, traces the word Aunmg to 1873 and the concept to the early $ih
2 See, lor exaI@e, Lieutenant Colonel Paul ~ber,, German VW,”% So- century Ha does not me”lm” A“firacJstahUk
.,,! Sl,lztmeg, M,l,tafy Rev(’aw, SePtember 1985, PP 63-77, and M.qor (P) 6 R,charc E Snnpkln, Race 10 the swff Thoughts 0“ Twen!y+rst Cem
Stephen T R!ppe, Leader3hlp, F#rePower mm Mane.ver The Snt,sh and 1.v Wwfare, Srasseys Delenca, London, Eng, 1985, pp 227-32
Germans. Mrlrtafy R.wew, October 1985, w 30-36 Some PUWC.IIO”S Pre- 7 HeerwSd(e”SvOrSChnH (HO”) 300!1 TmPPe”fdhrung. E. S M, filer 8
Ced& the 1982 VMSIO”. ! F,eld Manual 1GQ.5, operations see Gapte,n An- SO., 0.0,., Gee, 1941, Pa!t 1,and HDv 34011, Truppenfuhm”g, cm. EIsner
thony M. Corodles, Maneuver to WI.. A Real,st,c Altemame MJItav R.. R G Sed,n, G,, 1941, Pal II
vmw, SePtembec 1981, w 35-46 8 me”, OP Ot., m 63.64 Lleutenmt Colonel Paul T. DeVms, Mane..
3 Nearly the entire March 1986 rssue of M!l!lmv Revtew n an example vw and the OPeraUonal Level 01 War,. M,l,tary Rewew Februa? 1983, pP
4 LIEutenanl colonel John W. Mountcastle, 0. lhk Move Command 33-34, and Major Ge.eraldohn W Woodmansee Jr, Sl,tzk.eg and the Acr.
a“o Gmtrol of Armor Unltsm CmnDat, M,lttery Rev,ew, November 1985, PP land Sanle; M,lmy Rwmw, August 1984,0021.39, make the argument
24-25 9 See Samuel J. Laws Forgone. Leg!ons German .4fmY fnlano Pol
5 O“eofthe fewexamplests$” Wtihelm sack, TakIk. E S M#Oler &S... my, ?978.1941, Praeger Publ,shecs, N. Y., 1985, m 45-55, and R,Chard T.
Berm Ger, 1908.10, volume I,P 347 Balckme.t,onsth’a tenr mas.$ngle In- Surke, The German Panzenvalle, 1920.1939 A study In 1.sl,!.! ,0.81
sw.ce%nd does ..! devote even af.11 semence to,1 m h(s follovmg dfscus- Change, “nPubltshed Ph D’ dlswlat,om NorIhwestem UnlW1$ltY, Eva..
sm. of leaders, t“matwe and <“dependence Or D,eter 0s., ,Der A.lm.g S1O”, Ill, 1969, w 223-28.
10 S,, Helmut Otto, E“steh””g ““d We,,” de, Bl,Qk”e@7.one de, 25 Edward A Sh,!s and Moms JanmvItz Cohes,o” and D,s!nle@o. m
de.tschen !mwmhm.s vor dem Emten We! fkneq,,, Zem.hnt /Or M;IJ the German Wehrmachl m world war 11, Pub!!. OfJmm. O.armrfy, summer
Mrgesch)chfe, 1967, w 40%-41 4 194S, w 280.305 Rqer A. Beaumont e“d Wll,am P Snyder, Tombs!
11 MaIorGemcge A Htg.JIu, Gem.. andUSOperat,onalA fi,AQntmst Ei+tiveness. Parad,gm and P.radoxes; Combat Eifeco.eness. Cohesrdn,
,. Maneuwr,,, M!l!tary Renew, October 1985, m 23-24 Colonel Walace P. stress, and me volunteer Mmary, .30?w by Sam C smkewn Sage P.blP
Franz, OP,,.I,O”,! ConcePls: Mll,lwy Re.mv, July 1984, w 1 ?-1 2, .1s4 ca!(ans, Beverly Hil($, Ca[$l., 1980, w 20.56
d,sc.sses pmalyas as the @ of mmm.ver. 26 B“rk.d M,Uer-H,lleb’and, Das Hew. E, S, M,tUer & Son, FrankfuII, GE,
12 H,WTS,CP .)1, PP24.25 19s9, volume Ill, p 264
13 Heinz G.dens. $.1 forlh h,s concept s,. some waltered pe..d,c.l 27 wall.! GoerlIQ, H!story of the German GnnEraI 57ati, 1657-1945.
afi(des a.d a book Burke, OP. .!1., has a Pan,al I,st of Ihes Gudenm was tmwated by B.,. BaNeIshaw, Pr.mger P.bl$shers N.Y., 1953, has earned
emphaw that lhe main .b)ect(ves of tanks were .Chlevd by fire and mat the the scmr.1 most h,slmmm The belier books,.! ‘fJvch them .,. seveml, am
destruchm fvwm.htung) 01 the enemy through the effects of tank weapons all m German
was the essence See He,nz G.dmm., f% Pa..mwaff. .nd fhr Z.sam 2S Showalter, OP. CL has a wad Ihst
menwrken rmr.nderwn wane., E S, M,n(er 8 S0., Berlin, Ger., 1937, w 22 29 U. fml.natdy, there we few adequata sem”da~ so.rcas and “o”. m
% and He,”, G“dma”, D!. Pmzer,wffe, Un,O” Deutsche Verlagqesell. En@sh o“ m>, ImIPorl.”1 quesmn. LMMd N SPIr.n, imw!eand ReafW m.
%hat, S!.kwti, Ger., 1937, PP 167-227 Ths volume vms a second edtil(on Mzkmg of the Gem.” Oi?cer, 1921.1933, Greenwcad Press, WestWrl,
of Acht”ng-Psnzw wimch We. f,rst Pubtished t“ +936 Con” ~984,,, the best PI,.. 10 start
?4 See Waldemar Ertwlh, Dre G@sch#chte de, de”tsche” Genardstabm 30 There are “o C.mnprehenw.e treatments 01 th+s prc.sess m E“@h. My
,.” 7978bts 1945, M.,temchm,dt, Gon,”ge”, GE, 1957.1’h,e US Amy Corn Iorlhcomng book on the Prussan army,, w“erels (The ffing,s F!”mt,
rnana and General stall school press, ForI Lewe”wmh, Kansas, p.bl,stwd PraEwr P“bl,shers N Y ] w,II offer a m,’, CzmlP!et.9 exP1.”at,O” There were
e translmo. .t volume 1, mace.m!ely Iabemd ,Troop Leading m 1936 e.cept ,.”s,, of m.rse, mcl.d,m royal!y and graduate. .f th. .ad.t ..Vs.
C.r,o.$ly, “ot even lh,sverwm has fo.nd ,!s way ml. most Merat.re 31 John A Engl,sh, 0“ l“fantw, PraeW’ P“bl,sheLs, N Y 1984, PP 113
15 Colonel Hub. Wass de CzeW, Wow 10 Change a“ Army, M!ht.cy 14
Rev(ew, November 1984, P 3S 32 The aetatts are beyond the sc.ape 01 th,s mud. but would prov,de a
1S TmPDenl"hmng wasaSemPhatlc O"thlSPO!nt a$,lw.$ thattheQOal Ol cla?.slc example 01 s.p.d( aal mwmon of a greatly INs.ndemtcod Ioretgn
?Jlthecombmed.rms m an allacxwast.bung the mfa”trylo ,Il”aldec(s(on example. See Paul Br.nsafl . . . S.hellendorlt The owes of the Genwd
w.,”.! the enemy See HDv 300! 1, TruPpenf.hnmg, w c,f Pert 1, P 127 StaH, HIS Malesly’s Sla(,oneIY Oti!ce, London, Eng 1907
Ib,d, Pm II... 5.6, .Iearlv de f,ned the 00.1s of tanks mlhe attack 8. be,rm 33 General E“Ch Brande”be’W(, Tca,n,”g end Develwment rlf German
,den!,cal 10 time 01 !he”,nfanlv Th&e Included enemy Iofllf!callons: General st’dH Ofmers; us Ewopea” Commano Fore,gn M#l#law stud,.,.
reserves, tanks and unspec,l,ed rear sem,ces Larry H Add,n@n, The Sh@ Repor! Number 6, The German Gemm’ Stan, US European Command
kneg Era and the Gem.” General Sfaff, 1865.7941, RUtgWS U“,”WWY OP.r.1,0..l H,S1OV Branch, Ms P-031a, volume XXX pp 40.45.
Press, New Brumvwk, N J ,1971, w 3S-37 34 Was, de Crag,, w Of, PP 36.37.
17 P.nzer-GmPPe 2, N, 307,41 g Kdos G,”me”bef,hl Nr 110, den 35 The key Phrase IS a Paraphrase of Para3raPh < d TnJPoenl”h,””!I
Ang.n fGm.p Orders Number 1 for the Ar,wkl, 8 June 1941, sgned by 3s Fmdmh von R.benau Seeckl A.s s.,”w71 Lebe., 1918.7936, Hase
Gud.rmn, 0. Roll T314 775 of the !mcrofwned German annv moral% & Kmhler, Le,P?<Q Ger .1940, P 596
18 General G.nlhec Blumenlnn, DerAnsaQ der H GI Mike be, de, ErbW 37 John 1 A!wr, me Ouest for tictow The H>Story of the PvncIPJes of
“u”g de, R“ssla”d.Feldz”gs mi J“”, 1941, US Eurqmm Command For. W.% Gree”wcmd Press, Westpoti, Con”, 79S2, w 132.33
q“ M, I,I?IIY Stud,,., M. P-209, Gras,. E(”kessel””gs-Sch)achte” m 7 38 Richard F. mmwns, Lesson. From the Past for NATO,,, Parameters.
Welfhneg, US E.mpe.n Comm.nd Opwat,onal HISIOW Smnch, p 52 Autumn >984, PI) 3:17
19 me mm! recentwwm !heava(lablesowces IS 0...1s E Showallw 39 Rowr A Beaumom On the Wehmacht Mymque, Mmwy Re.!ew,
Gem.. Mhtay H6tov, 7648.7982 A Cnocaf B!blowrwhy, Garland Pub- July 1986, w 4’-56
l,sh(nq N Y., 19S3 40 There are Ihnmtsas 10 which parts of the German W@ expe..nce
20 Marun Van Creveld, F,ghl!”$I Power G.ma” and U S Amy Petiom may be of 6trm relevance 10 m.em problems, but ob%.nng the valuable
ace, !939- 1945, Greenwood Press, Wes!pod, CO.. , 1982 van Crweld, !! .o,.ts w,th ..”,,,1 am”men!s ah.”! overall Naz !mef+le”w,erves “0 “se
must be “olea, .Ccellts the A“Hrmmlamk Phr.%e N lace “.1”, and C,fl#C#Z~S iul putp.se”
US thmv and Wrimmance,. wood War 1!0. ava.etyof related and unre 41 C.pmn Xmothy T L.Pier, Jh@(?manvm otmxtnne The Chmges m
lated gwnds Ge,ma” Tacbcel CU.!””. D“””g the F,rst Worlti W,,, Leave”woflh Paws,
2? Trevor N DWUY, A Ge”s”s for War The Gem,” Ann y and Gem,.) Number 4, Combat St”des 1“s!,1”!,, US Amw Comrna”d and Gener.1 StaH
s!.w, 7s07- 7945, MacDmaldand Janes, London, E.9 19?7 aPPllesa,.V CJllqe, Fo!l Lea”e”worth, Km July 1981
wewonable Wltlst$cal formula to me,wre German ,Upeno.ty s,. John 42 Den”,. E Showaller, A Dub>,., Her,tqe The M,!(1.IY Legacy 01 the
Sloan Smwn, Colonel Trevor N DUII.Y and the Mymm 01 the Wehmn.chl RIJss.-Gemnan war, Au Unrverwy Re.ew, March.Apm 1985, PP 4-23
S“PMO”CI A Reconsldwat, o”, M, fhfaIY Affwrs Jm.my 79S6, w 16-20 4! TWO recent {he,es w’,lle” al !he School d Adva”md MTtaIY SludleS
Michael Howard, I.st$tut(onal!zed Excellence.” The TIm.s LJ!erav s.PP@. are example. Mqor Davrd M Tankdey, What IS the S..(.1 Owmo.na!
me”t, London, E“g ,21 Am 1978, PP433-34 Maneuver Gm”o a“d What Am 1!s fmP!Jcaoo”s for the U S Ann”. Arland
22 John Keegan, SW Anmes !“ Normandy From D-Day !. the hberaoon Bam Docfn..7, M M AS. Thes,s, US Army Command and General S!.11
of Pans Pen!q.1. soaks, N Y, $982, and Max Hawngs, Overioro D.D.Y College, FOII Lewe.worih, Km, 1985, and M.par Steven J Atwrsmwr, An
.“. the Ba~e 10, No,w.”cIv Sm.” & Sch,$ter, N Y 1984 See al,. V.. OPeralro.ti ConcePt for the Banleheld Defeat of the sow.!. Based m an
Cweld q 01, Dass>m Analys,s OIOW Sov,etDe.rstomC”de, M M.A S Thess, US AM7y Command
.,,
23 T?w German annyclassrf,ed ,i?,var, o.%k,.dsd dlvmon. bylhe,r capa end General Stai+ College, For! Leave”worlh, Kan, 1984. mare IS.0 am-
.......
b,l,t,es Some, forex.mple, were mns,dered .nsulteDle fordep!oyment!n the parable amount of translated nmterm ava,lable for the Gem.. mmy, espe.
east anti !h”s could be used watinst the Ont,$h ,,6 Ame”cans c,.(!Y P“O, IO 1945
24 Wd!,amm” Murray, llIe Gerrman ResPo”se t. Vntory m Poland A 44 The I.ndame”!al ,s3.. ,s that of qualliy regardless.1 whatever valrd
Case study m Pro fess!onalmm, Armed Fomes and Socrew, W,nter 19S1. reason. expls!n lhe l.ab!lty of so many oHIcers or wm.!. to re8d the lllera
w 285.9S l.re of the amws they have chosen to study or 10 compare wdh the US An’w.
. .,—=.-._
*I
I)on,ci.1 H,mhes is the command historian. US =
I Kansas. He recewedaPh.D.
.N.r?
. h I%ml?na
. . . . at
. Cham4
.
from the Uruuerscty of
Hill. He um.s formerlv a
al .
,1
Chemical W’;!l’~en;: A Policy States and other Western nations must con
sider most seriously in their plans—particu - ,
larly in the context of intensifying campaigns
By Brad Roberts
Issues in Science& Technology, against terrorist forces and the states sup
porting them.
Spring 1986
Roberts, in his article, says the United
Chemical Weapons in the Gulf War States has historically followed a two-track
By W. Andrew Terrill Jr, approach to the chemical warfare problem.
Strategic Review, Spring 1986 The goals are to eliminate chemical weap
ons through arms control and to deter use of
The US policy for dealing with chemical them againsl the United States by main
weapons in which it has combined efforts to taining an arsenal of offensive chemical
eliminate them through arms control with weapons and defenses against chemical at
efforts to deter the use of such weapons “is tack.
under growing stress,” according to Brad Roberts urges a “more creatihe mix of pol
Roberts writing in the Spring 19861ssues in icies and new forms of leverage” to keep the
Science & Technology. US two-track policy effective. He suggests
He advocates a policy “better attuned” to @ Prompt attention to the proliferation
the changing military, technological and agenda by US policymakers.
political environments around chemical e Ad hoc efforts with other nations to im
warfare and suggests “Without some sig prove chemical export controls.
nificant progress in arms control in the near e Bilateral efforts with the Soviet Union
to medium term, the chemical warfare prob to contain proliferation.
lem will likely grow dramatically worse.” . An effort to achieve a comprehensive
It already has according to W. Andrew chemical arms-control agreement.
Terrill Jr, who writes in the Spring 1986 o A strengthening of US deterrence.
Strategic Review that the use of chemical 6 Are-examination of the current US po
weapons in the Persian Gulf war between sition regarding its offensive chemical de
Iran and Iraq should sound an ominous terrent.
warning for US policymakers. He says the Terrill examines “the kind of chemical
employment of chemical warfare “would warfare problem that Roberts suggests will
beckon strongly to a Third World country be most troubles.orne for Up policymakers.
engaged in direct’ confrontation” with the The Persian Gulf war marks the first time
United States, or other Western states. Ter since World War 1, according to Terrill, that
rill concludes: two large conventional forces have used
This is the contingency that the Uvited chemical weapons in combat.
Besides the mere use of chemical warfare, er undertaken. Their principal conclusions
the problem should cause concern because of were that:
the “truly revolutionary advances in chemi . Congress should “maintain a healthy
cal and related arms, along with the ease skepticism” of claims of tremendous ad
and low cost of their manufacture relative to vances in SDI research.
other weapons 6f mass destruction,” writes o A closer look should be taken at wheth
Terrill. He notes that Iraq has demonstrat er intercepting missiles in their boost phase
ed some restraint in its use of chemical “can ever be made to work and whether
weaponry, but he cautions against thinking space-based assets can ever be made surviv
it will maintain this policy in the future. able.”
On the contrary, Terrill says incidents .e. Discriminating warheads from decoys
suggest Iraq would resort to the large-scale in midcourse is a much larger problem than ,
use of chemical warfare if significant Irani Congress has been led to believe.,
an territorial victories carmot be turned back e Congress should be concerned about
with conventional attacks. “Should the mil shifts in SDI priorities. They indicate the
itary situation deteriorate significantly, SDI Office “still does not have a firm idea of
Iraq will tight with every available weapon how a strategic defense system might be im
to avert defeat,” he writes. plemented,” and Congress is being asked for
These actions cast “clear and ominous im billions of dollars on the promise that pro
plications beyond the Gulf.” The author gram direction is clear.
says there are “foreseeable circumstances” e ConWess should question the rush for
under which chemical warfare might be an SDI deployment decision by the early
waged to a much greater extent than it al 1990s. ,,
ready has been in the Persian Gulf.—ELH. e Much more scrutiny must be given to
whether it is feasible to produce, deploy and :‘
maintain an SDI system.
Program uncertainty is everywhere, the
Star Wars: Breakthrough or
authors suggest. Since the United States,
Breakdown? even with strategic defenses in place, would , i
By Douglas Wailer, James Bruce and
never be able to test the system under realis
Douglas Cook
tic conditions, they believe “much of that
Arms Corrtro/ Today, May-June 1988
uncertainty will likely remain.’’—ELfl. ~ ,!
Commissioned by several senators on the ;
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee to
study the progress, changes, challenges and
The Strategic Defense Initiative: ~,:
problems involved with the Strategic De Meeting the Soviet Military ,
fense Initiative (SDD, the authors of this Challenge in the 21st Century
With all of the emphasis being placed upon tration of this point is the use of the term ‘
US relations with Latin America, a civil af “terrorism” in the present definition. In all
fairs group on the isthmus of Panama might probability, we do not want ta use terrorism,
be just the thing to rebuild a Y-midge” be at least not offlci~lly, as a measure or a
tween North and South America that may countermeasure.
be lost when the Panama Canal and its US While it is true that practicably all of our
bases revert to Panama in the year 2000. experience in this type of war has been de
fensive in nature, it may be time to rethink
L! Col ThomasD. Morgan, USA, Ret/red, our role in light of our implicit policies in
f-acey,W’ashingfon Nicaragua and Angola, for example. Fur
thermore, to describe the activities in terms
of enemy capabilities may leave us ‘with a
psychological void in our thinking, which
LIC-Another Definition way be one of the reasons for the difflcukies
m the development of a proper doctrine.
The August 1986 issue of Mi2itaryReuiew In the search for an alternative definition,
contained excellent articles on the recur the premise was that we are dealing with a
ring need for definitions and doctrine on war, however different from conventional
what has been called low-intensity conflict wars, and not a mere competition. What the
(LIC). The “Dialogue” between Lieutenant enemies can do to us or our allies, we can do
Colonel Peter A. Bond (“In Search of LIC”) to them, or better. After much thought, I “
and Major Mitchell M. Zais (“LIC: Matching propose the following definition
Missions and Forces”) was especially illumi A coordinated and systematic struggle,
nating. As stated in these articles, the offi shod of an all-ad war between states or rival
cial definition of LIC reads: governments, for the ccmtrol of population,
Low-intensity conf7ict is u limitedpolitico territo~, resources and government by mili
military struggle to achieue political, social, tary, political, economic, psychological, reli
economic or psychological objectives. It is gious and civic means.
often protracted and ranges from diplomat In this definition, there are certain key ,i
ic, economic, and psycho -social pressures terms such as “a coordinated and systematic
through terrorism and insurgency. It isgen struggle” which excludes isolated acts or
erally confined to a geographic area and is events by individuals or groups-not part of a
often characterized by constraints on the long-range straggle withdetinitive political)
weaponry, tactics, and level of violence. objectives. The term “short of an all-od$
Zais points out that this definition fails to war” addresses the question df wheth@,
distinguish between political and economic actions by main force elements, such as o+ :
competition between friendly countries and raid on Tripoli by the 6th Fleet and the Air
a conflict meaningful from the military per Force Fill squadron, the Israeli raid on
spective. He also says that the line between Tunis or even the 1982 Israeli incursion into
low- and mid-intensity war is ambiguous at Lebanon, should be included in this defini
best. He concludes that the definition suf tion. In my opinion, they should.
fers from the absence of something. Another exclusionary term “war betw~en
While I agree with these observations, a states or rival govermnente” would exclude ;
close examination of the definition left me wars between belligerent states such as the j
with the impression that it was written 1973 Middle East War, the current war )
around what the enemies have been doing between Iraq and Iran, and even the Falk-
or can do to us or to our friends and allies. It, Iande War. The war in Vietnam, under thk .
therefore, projects a defensive posture on definition, could be regarded as a LIC, in
our part. It appears to be lacking in what we the initial phases which eventually “gradu
or ciur allies can do to tbe enemies. An illus ated into a war between the states, thus
World War IL The Germans, it seems to me, Silent Victory: The US Submarine War
were ahead in many technical areas and Against Japan, German submarine tech
had the Allies worried almost to the end nology was far superior to ours. Among the
of the war. more interesting experimental projects that
Beaumont states that the “Germans did were under way in Germany during the war
not put the first jets into the air or lead in ra was the development of smoothbore, tin-sta
dar development.” In the case of radar, he bilized artillery with incredible range (95
has made a good point. By the end of the war, miles for a 28-centimeter gun) and high
the Allies were ahead of Germany m radar muzzle velocity. The smoothbore cannon
development by ahout three years. But what still enjoys wide use as the main armament
about jet aircraft? Beaumont does not name on today’s tanks.
the source for his statement that the first jet It may not be far off the mark to say that
aircraft did not fly in Germany. Edward V?. the initiatives under way in the German
Constant II’s highly acclaimed The Origins R&D programs more or less foreshadowed
of the Turbojet Revolution states that the the course that post-1945 military R&D
first jet flight did occur in Germany. In fact, would follow. This would certainly seem to
according to Constant, the Heinkel Corpo be true where intercontinental ballistic
ration flew two different jet models before missile and aviation developments are cOn
the maiden flight of the British GlosterE28/ cerned.
39. Furthermore, the Germans developed All of this is to say that, if Beaumont’s
their own jet engine independently of the purpose was to debunk the myth of German
British and, by 1939, were two years ahead military prowess, he may be a little wide of
of the work of Frank Whittle, British turbo his mark. Furthermore, I suggest that,
jet pioneer. where enterprises such as this are conc
The Germans were also the first to have erned, we should proceed cautiously. In our
operational jet aircraft—the Me-262 and efforts to distinguish myth from mythistory,
the Ar-234. To the end of the war, men such we should neither introduce our own myths
as General James H. Doolittle and General into historical accounts nor discard truth
along with hyperbole. ,~
Carl Spaatz were afraid that the Germans
would be able to produce enough Me-262s to
regain control of the skies over Germany. LI Col DonaldR. Saucom,USAF, AirForceOfficeofHistoy,
BollingAirForceEase,Washington,
O.C.
understand that the final charge at Cold Military Review is a terrific publication,
Harbor was really a relatively minor event hut articles pertaining to the Reserve com
when viewing the campaign as a whole. ponents would be most appreciated. Even
While the North was losing 55,000 replace with the “one Army” talk, the division is
able men during the series of battles from still very much alive and well. Include us
the Wilderness to Petersburg, the South suf more often, please.
fered 20,000 to 40,000 casualties-losses it
could not make good. Ma]JmdanM.Hughes, ARNG, SaIILakefSty,Utah
Grant’s character and generalship were
(We, too, would like topublish mom about Reserve tom.
never more clearly evident than after the ponent issues, but the articles simply kaue not been
bloody repulse at Cold Harbor when he be forthcoming. We knotu th,wbje.t ??@tererpm+sareo.t
gan his brilliant turning movement across there somewhere. Put thepm to paper, folks, and let us
the Chickahominy and the James R]vers, kaar from you on Reserve component matters.-Editor.)
the latter involving a pontoon bridge 2,100
feet long. Lee was completely fooled (no
mean accomplishment in itself) and, bad
Grant been better served by his subordi Give Us More History
nates, he would have seized Petersburg and
been astride Lee’s line of communications, The July 1986 issue of Militmy Reuiew
thereby possibly concluding the war then that focused on history was long overdue,
and there. I thank you also for the comments by the
In short, Grant’s bad reputation as a gen editor in chief included in “From the Editor”
eral is based upon his offensive tactics. Ad at the beginning of the journal. That page
mittedly, they were rather pedestrian and should be given to every student entering
costly, but so were those of most other com the US Army Command and General Staff
manders on both sides. No one had really College.
solved the problem of attacking troops
armed with rifles behind field fortifications, Cd Charles J. Kunzelman, USAF,Iletksd,
a problem that was to haunt armies until LnsArrgeles,
California
the invention of the tank. Grant, however, (Weapprecinteyoursuggestwnandarepbzraedtortport
more than compensated for his tactical that Wekauealready respon&d, EveWstudentatteti-
shortcomings by his solid and often brilliant mg theCommandand GeneralSta#O@ms Courseret
operations, as well as his grand strategic de ceiws MilitaryReviewfree for the 10 months he or she
spends hare. It is part of mm ded-ntiort to Army eduZw
sign to end the war. tLon and a way ofgettmg the Army to mad.-Ed&-r.
~..
Cal Dwigll L. Adama, WA, Retired, J,
UShrmyWarCntlege,CarlialeEarriwka,Pennsylvania
Heat Overwhelms A4R > . ~
The Kansas heat obviously overwhehped
Give Us More on Reserve us as we nut topether ourJulv 1986 issue be
Component issues cause w; allo-wed an erro; to creep into
print. According to the ,National Archives, ~
I enjoyed tbe “Viewpoints on War” section the soldier with *he cigar in his hand on~
most of all in your September 1986 issue. page 11 of the July issue is not Niajor George
But, as a National Guard member, I would S. Patton Jr. as we identified him. Patton, as
like to see more attention given to Reserve a lieutenant, is the fellow wearing the tie tQ“’
component readiness issues. the left and behind General John J. Peish
ing. Our Patton is Pershing’s censor, Major
MajDanielL.Keys,Ar?NG,
Elomnkrgtm,
Indiana J. L. Hines.—Editor.
OGUMTRIALS
Initial trials are under way on the The vehicle’s suspension system The Ogum can accept a w!de
firstprototype of a new, light, trscked canstsf.sof four tubbsrrosd Week on range of weapons, incfuding a mor
srmored vehida-#e EET4 Ogun+ each side, addve sprccket at lhefront, tar, antitank missiles and a 20mm
produced by the Srazilian mmpany an Idlerat the rear and one track return cannon. The Brazilians say the EET4
ENGESA. The Ogurn, which takas roller. It develops a msximum road “can be used in either aground or air
its title from the name of an African spead of 70 kilometers per hour and defensa role as well as for battlefield
war god, carries dual-hardness ar has a mssimum ranae of 500 kilome reconnaissance and command and
mor to give protection from small ters, While combat w~ght depands on control.-Jane’s De fence Weekly,
arrns fire and shell splinters. wesponsinstailsd. 01986.
X-WING HELlCOPTER
UNVEILED
Sikorsky Aircraft Company re
cently unveiled its X-lWng aircraft
which combines helicopter and
fixed-wing technologies to achieve
vertical takeoff, a hover capability
and aw speeds approaching Mach
..-.
nfl
Designed under a $100 mtlllon re
search and development effort fund
ed by the Department of Defense,
the X-Wfng isenvisioned forusein
long-range antisubmarine wsrfare
and combat search-and-rescue mis
sions. The sircraft is designed to
take off vertically and fly Iiks a heli
copter up to 200 knots per hour. At
that point, the pilot can employs
clutch to tran$itionto fixed-wing flight
within 30 seconds.
Tests continue with the aircraft at
this time. Developers will fwst fly X-
Wfng without a rotor and then test it
wth the rotor in a fixed-wing position.
A rotor-cspabilittes test and a final not being built to replace convent!on neuvera~lity with a fixsd-wing air
check of the conversion system will al fixed-wing or rotary aircraft. ln craft’s highcruising speed -TheAs
follow. stead, It should be able to periorm sociated Press, a 1986 and De
Sikorsky offtceds say the X-Wng IS mws!ons requmng a helicopter’s ma- fense News, 01986.
~..
ROLL OUT
THOSE ARMY
SHIPS
In a precedent-setting move, the Army decided its latest operational and it carries enough On-bQard sup.
US Army has awarded a contract to requirements could best be met by pfies to sustain its crewof13 or vOy
Lockheed Shipbuilding Company of modlfymg a commercial vessel de agea lasting up to 18 days.
Seattle, Washington, to produce a sign. The LCU2000 will be 174 feet
new-generation, utifity landing craft. The vessel being built isa new long and42 feet wide with a bow
ThiSmarks the first time m h!story 2000-class utitity Iandmg craft (LCU) ramp 16 feet wids-large enough t@
tha~the US Army has written specift that will replace older 1400-class handle the Army’s largest rollin~
cattons fora major watercraftsys LCUS and complement the 1600 stock. A bow ramp this size efimi.
... .
fmll .------
r-la<c ICI I which WII remain i“ the nates the need for cranes to Ioadand
Previously, the Army satisf!ed!ta Army mveotor:y. The new LCU ia unload rolfing stock. Seven LCUswill
need to move material from ship to self-deployable and has a 4,500 be delivered in the first two years of
shore and along coastal waterways nautical. mile range w!th a 25-per the five-year contract, wtth another
with no port facilities by using ves cent fuel reserve. Itcaniravel fully la built ovsr the final three years,
selsdesigned for and used by the US loaded w!lh 350 short tons of cargo The Army holda anopti#itopur
Navy. In thfs instance, however, the at a speed of II*I2 knots per hour, chase another 15 vessels as well.
*$
London-based institute. The theme subject was years, CW has pushed its way mto both dsfen
“New Technoloev” which. with the controversial sive and offensive thinking by militsry planners
‘Star Wars” p;;ject beginning to materialize, throughout the world. Recent certain and
makes added topical interest. The 16 papers, alleged uses of CW by Thk’d World riations and
read by well-known international experts from tbe Soviets and the deadlock in both biliteral
several Western countries, are packed with and multilateral negotiations on a CW treaty
technological facts, concepts and techniques and demonstrate the importance of A thorough
are forward-looking. Editor Robert O’Neill, an understanding of the practical, political and
Australian and director of the 11SS, comments philosophical aspects of these much-maligned
that “The rate of change of applied technology weapons.
ap ears to be unprecedented.” Edward M. Spiers, a defense lecturer at the-
+% e purpose of this conference was to examine Umversity of Leeds, makes a useful contribu
challenges that technological change poses for tion to this need. Chemical Wqfare provides a~
all concerned with the management of security update to the two previous standards, Chermcal
in the West. Optimism was tempered hy caution and Biological War,fareby Seymour M. Hersh
as it was pointed out that the opportunities that and A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story
technology provides for improving Western of Gas and Germ Warfare by Jeremy Paxman
defense may be great but so, too, are the uncer and Robert Harris. From a heavdy British point
tainties. Technology affords opporttuuties for of view, Spiers covers much of the same history
arms control but “arms control n challenged by as the previous authors but with an emphasis on
technology” which creates the problem of exact the political and strategic thinking behind the
ly what investments to make in thk field. scenes. His discussion of the thinking of the men
New Technology and Western Security Policy around Franklin D, Roosevelt, Winston Church-
is designed to clarify the subject as far as possi ill, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini gives a
ble, set the bounds and point the way to making solid foundation to the role of CW in World War
rational choices. But it was admitted that most II.
of the committee discussions “foundered on Topics of more immediate concern, of course, :
uncertainty, and there was difficulty in reach are the proliferation of CW capability and use,
ing conclusions.” However, the necessity for con current Soviet vis-k-vis North Atlantic Treaty
tinuing research programs is emphasized. West Organization posture, deterrence and prospects .
ern governments should not be deterred by the for an acceptable chem]cal disarmament treaty. , ~
high cost, as the cost of a nuclear conflict would The author’s personal views are very evident in
be so much greater. Although, at present, the discussions of these topics. Still, the chapters
Soviets are behind the United States in some contain the most thorough and inclusiwe discus.
technological aspects, they are not only seeking sion I have seen on the many disparate lines of
to reach parity but are also striving to obtain reasoning used by the advocates and critics~f
complete technological superiority. These binary production, US-Soviet c6mprehensive}r
papers, which contain useful source footnotes limited treaties, the strategic and tactic+
and explanatory charts and diagrams, are excel employment of CW weapons and defensive mea
lent reference material for technological re sures, and the influence of CW on the nuclear
searchers and planners in the military field. threshold. There has been no large-scale use of
CW weapons in almost 70 years. Therefofe,
Edgar O’BaNance there is no way to know for sure what policies
will be most effective at deterring Soviet C W{use
and aggression in general.
The value of this book lies in its presentation,
of the issues as complex as they are. In 1917, <
CHEMICAL WARFAREby Edward M. Spiers. 277 A. E. Hodgkin, a chemical adviser to the US/
Pages. University of Illinois Press, Champaign, Ill. Army, bitterly wrote, “Never, never will the
mysteries of gas warfare penetrate the brain of
1986.$24.95. the regular soldier.” Spiers’ extensively refer- I
enced (762 footnotes) work, especially the c,hap
Chemical warfare (CW) bas received in
ter on current issues, should be required for mil
creased attention during the laet decade. From
itary thinkers, both theoretical and in the tield.
near oblivion in the early 1970s to the likely pro
duction of binary nerve agents over the next few MajOavidN.Clark,
US.4R
emerging technologies. Payne argues convinc itary objectives should conyince them oFthemer- ‘
ingly that the answer is yes its of a policy of their own. This policy should be
[SDII is not sornaoptional experiment to be con flexible, popular, nonviolent but not pacifistic,
tintied or curtailed depending on short-term relatively inexpensive and comforting because it
budgetary or arms control considerations. It is a offers surcease of spiraling technologies.
uital long-tsrm effort to strengthen our ability to If the ‘first of this book is undercut by wishful
prevent nuclear war. thinking, subsequent chapters on transa$ma
His unmistakable conclusion is if we slow ment, deterrence antitactks of defense add mus
down the research now and fail to fund the pro. cle to the argument. Sharp considers not only na
gram at levels that will allow it to develop in a tions like Switzerland with a unilateral and
timely manner, we will not have the answers we highly developed civilian.based strategy but also
need to chart a long-term strategy and sustain a potential regional cooperatives such as Den
credible arms-reduction policy. This is compel mark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland.
ling reading and an invaluable resource for ev Sharp’s last chapter assesses socioeconomic-mil
eryone interested in SDI. itary-political complexities. Sizs and location of
their countries, strength of their gross national
Jerome P. Gideon, products and their alignments mandate consid
LegislativeAssistanttOrNatima/
Security
10 erable tailoring for policymakers to achieve ac
Congfessnfan
RobsftK.Mman, Washington,D.C. ceptable conventional and nonconventional ca
pabilities. And every situation will dictati varia
ble applications of military, civilian, guemilia,
MAKINGEUROPEUNCONIIUERAGLE: The Poten economic, political, diplomatic, psychological
tial of Civilian.Based Deterrence and Oefencq by and ideological responses.
Gene Sharp. .252 Pages. i3allinger Publishing Co., The publisher’s choice of green for th$cover of
this book may be revealing politic~lly, but it is ,
Cambridge, Mass. 1985.
somewhat unfair to the author’s avowed pragma
Making Europe Unconquerable acquires credi tism. Civilian-based defense demands :rgsniza- .
bility as one reads, From the initial “mouse that tion, preparation and training. In dehberating
roared tone of the introduction, Gsne Sharp out the power and use of society’s population and in
lines a national defense strategy that rings fa stitutions to resist attackers, Sharp offers a bold
miliar to students of history. He argues for new and provocative approach to Westam European +
policy to deter or dissuade attacks through civil security. ,,
ian-based defense in Western Europe. “Present Sharp, a professor of political science and soci-
policies,” he asserts, “are inadequate to ensure OIOgY associated with the Center for Internation
their objectives against thelmilitary might of the al Affairs at Harvard, has written a,sensible
Soviet Union.” study that gains steam as it moves. The seve~
Throughout his opening chapter, Sharp ex chapters warrant open-minded considerate@
plains Europe’s long experience in dealing, But I wonder if an eighth chapter might not sl&iw
through civilian resistance, with both invasion extensive analogies between Sharp’s deterrerice
and internal takeovers. Examples from history and defense and modem terrorism which is airni
culminate in strategy Shar$ suggests is particu larin many ways and dependent on similar intel
larly appropriate today. If ~uropeans believe the ligence and organizational infrastructures. ~
United Statss and the Sovist Union are capable
of sacrificing Europe, escah$ting a~s cOstsand MajGlen E. Lici+,ARNG,
recent failures of the military to achieve nonmil- Headguaftefs,
491hArnrohdDivision,Austin,texas
NAPOLEONICMILITARY HISTORY A aibliogfaphy. Editsd by FIGHnNG aACfi Winning the War Againal TsfmriSm. Edftsd,.
Donald D. Howard. 6L19Pages. GadI nd Publislrmg. N.Y. 1986.
by Neil C. Livingston and Tsrrell E. Arnold. 26a Pages. Lex
$74.00.
mgton Books, Lsxington, Mass. 1986. $2&O0.
THEPLOAFTERTHE LEaANONWA by EmAeF. Sahhyeh.26a
SOVIEf RAOIOELECTRONIC COMaATby OavidG. Chtzum. 125
“4
Pages. Westwew Press, Boulder, Mo. 19L36.$30.00. Pagea.Westvisw Press,Boulder,Colo. 19a5. 517.00.
!,
January-December1986
CONTENTS
93 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Title Index .,
96 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Author index
Index compiled by
Patricia H. Nomrarr, Editoria/Assistar7f
Educational Technology Yesterday, Today and Tomorrw Gen pauI F. ~~an. fJSA. Ret . 4 Dee;
Eliminate the Fdtersand Wiw LtCol Allan J. Futernick, USA ..................... 20 yov
Encirclement Operations; Maj (P) Michael H. Vernon, USA .. . . .. . 11 Sep
“Eureka” Conference, The: A Busy Time m Tehera% Col John L. Bates, USA, Ret . . .. . .. 74 oat
FoRow-On US Echelon for NATO Defense, A, Kevin N. Lewis and Peter A. Wilson 12 Jun
Force Integration’s Next Big Challeng% Lt Col William T. Marriott III, USA 4 Apr
Forced March: Armoq Robert E. Rogge . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Jul
Foreign Policy and Military Strategy The Civil-Military Equatiow
Maj(P)Charles D. McFetridge, USA...... . . . . . . . . . . . . ..~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Apr
Ge”ghis Khan and 13th-Century AirLand Battlq Capt Dana J. H. Pittard, USA.. . . .. .. 18 Jul
Geopolitics of the Caribbean Basin, Thq Marvin F. Gordon . . . . . . .. . . . . . 16 Aug
Karl von Clausewitz Analysls of FM 100-5, Maj (P) Steven J. Argersmger, USA 68 Feb ‘
Kinds of War, Capt Ralph Peters, USA.. . . . . 14 Ott
!1
Leadership Imperatwe$ Lt Co] Cecil B. CaRoway, USA 55 Nov
LeavemvmtbLmnp, The .. :...... . 113 Aug
Legacy of Liddell Hart, The, Maj (P) Jerry D MoreIock, USA .,. 65 May
LHX; Cd William D. Riur” Jr, USAF, Ret, and Lt Col John D Bwick, USAF, Ret 26 Dec
Liberation Theology;
Capt Michael T. McEwen, ARNG, and Ch ICapt) Ronald K. ReddeR, USAR 62 AUF
LIC: Matching Missions and Forces MaJ Mitchell M. Zais, USA *. 89 Aug
Light Divisions and Low-Intensity Conflict, The: Are They Losing Sight of Each Otherl
Maj Peter N. Kafkalas, USA. . . . . . . . . . . . ,,. 18 Jan ,
Light Infantry Integration m Central Europe Brig Gen Wayne A. Downing, USA 18 Sep
Low-Intensity Conflict m the 1980s The French Experience;
Lt COIMichel L. Castdlon, French Army . . . 68 Jan
Operation Urgent Fury and Its Critms; Capt Daniel P. Bolger, USA . . . . . . . . . . .
57 Jul
Operational Loglst~cs in SUppor+ of the Deep Attack Maj Gen Albin G. Wheeler, USA. .
12 ‘ Feb
Private’s Viewpoint on”AirLand Battle, A, Pfc Mark T. Schmidt, ARNG .,,,,...,, ... . . . .
67 Sep
Purpose of US Army Schools, The; Gen Bruce C, Clarke, USA, Ret . . . . . . . . 30 May
Values and the Amer,can Soldier; Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr. . . . .
4 N$v
VlewofCivil Affams m the LIC Arena, A; Lt Col John J. Zygiel Jr, USAR . . . . . . .
58 . Aug
Viewpoints on Educatlonand Trammg . . . . . . . .
26 May
Vwwpomtson Europe . ... . . . . . . . ,.
48 Jun !
Viewpoi”tson Low-Intemity Cordlict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
42 Jan ]
Viewpoints on Regional issues ..,...... . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
56 Aug
Viewpoints on Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .." . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
42 Dec
Viewpoints OnValues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
30 Nov >
ViewpOints On War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .,, ..1.. .
62 Sep
Violence ‘Tim Alternate Political Institution;
.,
Adams,JohnA.; HeavyversusLightForces A MiddleGr.!md. . 64 Ott
Argeminger,M@ (P)StevenJ.; KarlvonCIausewitzAnalysis of FM 100-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Feb
Daskal, Capt Skven E.; Insurgency Tbreatand Ways to Defeat R, The . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Jan
Depalo, Col W]lliamA. Jfi Militmy Situation in Nicaragua, The . . . . . .. . . .. . 26 Aug
Downing, Brig Gen Wayne A,;
Light Infantry Integration in CentraIEurope . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Sep ‘
Training to Fight . . . . ..~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. ........................ 18 May
Hall, Maj Wayne M.; Theoretical Perspective of A,rLand Battle Doctrine, A 32 Mar
Halloran, Jo% Comma:dand Control Interoperabillty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Ott
Hammett, Capt ThomasR.; Sov]et Psychological Threat, The 64 Nov
Harried, Ma] Glenn M.; Offenmve Rear Battle 30. Feb
Harvey, Maj (P) Thomas N. and Congressman Richard B. Cheney;
Strate@c Underpinnings of a Future Force. .. .. . . 4 Ott
Hmper, N. John; D.Day Remembered Legends and Legacies .,. 50 Jun
Hughes, Daniel J.; Ahuses of German MiIita~ History . ,,, 66 Dec
Lewis, Kevin N. and Peter A. Wdson: FolIow-On US Echelon for NATO Defense, A 12 Jun
Livingston, Capt Noyes B. 111;Bhtzkr,eg m Europe Is R Still Poss]ble7 26 Jun
Luva.?s, Jay; Some Vaqant Thoughts on Doctrine 56 Ma+ ,j
Lynch, Capt Rlcky and Capt Michael R. McGeq
Mdltary Applications of Artificial Intelhgence and Robotics 50 Dec
r
McGee, Capt Michael R. and Capt Ricky Lynch
Mditary Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Robotjcs 50 Dec
McMahon, Lt Col Timothy L.; Decisionmakmg m Modem War.. 33 Ott ~
Meis, Maj Emil F. IIL Md,tarism in Russia From Imperial Roots to the Soviet Union . .. 28 Jul
,/
Mets, Lt Col David R.; What ]f It Works? Am Armament Technology for Deep Attack . . . 12 Dec ,
Meyer, Col Rom+L; Of ALOs, FACsand TACS .. . . ... .. . . . . .. 57 Ott
Forelock, Maj(P)Jerry D.; Legacy of Liddell Hart, The .. . . 65 May ,
),
Red&ell, Ch (Capt) Ronald K. and Capt Michael T, McEwen, Liberation Theology 62 Aug ,
Richardson, Gen William R.;
FM IOO-5Tbe AirLand Battle in1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4 Mar
Training Preparation for Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Jun
Rdey, Maj Don T.; Serve Your Soldiers to Win . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Nov
Roe, Maj Linas A. and Maj Douglas H. Wisq
Space Power Is Land Power Tbe Army’s Rolein Space .. . . .. . .. .. . . . . . 4 Jan
Rogalla,2d LtMichael A.; '`Art'' inthe ArtofWar, The.... . 64 Sep
Rog.ers, Col John B.; Synchronizing the AirLand Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Apr
Rogge, Robert E.; ForcedMarch Armor . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . 38 Ju1
Romjue, John L.; AirLand BattIe~e Historical Back~"nd..., . . .. . . . .. . . . .. 52 Mar
Rose, Maj Kenneth H.; Why Artificial Intelligence Won,t Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Dec
Russell, Cd Eugene N. and Col William P. Jobnscm Jq Army Strategy and Structure, An ,....,. 69 Aug
Takeshma, MaJ Lloyd S.: Strategic Defense Initiative and NATO, The . . . . . .. 31 Apr
Taylor, Capt Percher L. IIL Professional versus Personal Values . . . . . . . . 32 Nov
Tkus, Ma] Keith R.; Tbrough Ivan’s Eyes ... ... . .. . . .. .. . . .. .. 46 Apr
Tomes, Lt C.1 Jonathan P.; Indirect Responsihdity for War Crnnes 37 Nov
Air Power
CloseAirPlanting ........................... ........................................... 54 Sep
Of ALOs, FACsand TACS ....................................................... 57 Ott
Aircraft
LAX . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . . . 26 Dec
AirLand Battle
AirLand Battle The Histrmcal Background . . . . . . 52 Mar
Close AirPlanning ...................................................................... 54 Sep
Encirclement Operations 11 Sep
FM100-5The AirLand Battle in 1988 4 Mar
Genghis Khanand13th-Century AirLand Battle .. . .. . .. 18 Jun
Leadership Imperatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 tiov
Maneuver, Synchronization and Obstacle Operations . . ..$ . . . . 36 Feb
Operational Logistics in Support of the Deep Attack .. . .. . . . . . . .. ... 12 Feb
Private’s Viewpoint on AirLand Battle, A.... . . . .. . . .... . 67 Sep
Space Power Is Land Power: The Army’s Kole m Space ... .,,, . . . 4 Jan
Synchronizing the AirLand Battle . . . . 65 Apr
Theoretical Perspective of AmLand Battle Doctrine, A . . . . .. .. . 32 Mar
Training to Figbt.. . . .. . . . 18 May
Area Studies
Pakistan: Onthe Front Porch of Conflict. . . .. . . 68 Mar :
Armor
Forced March: Armor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Jul
Battalion i
Heavy versus L1gbt Forces A Middle Ground 64 Ott ~
Brigade
Fire Brigade, The . . . 77 Sep
>
Caribbean Basin
Geopolitics of the Caribbean Basin, Tbe . . . . . . . 16 Aug\
Central Europe
+
Cost Across tbe FLOT, The . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 30 Sep ,.
Light Infantry Integration in Central Europe . . . 18 Sep ,
Civil AfTairs
ViewofCivil Affaimmtbe LICArena, A 58 Aug;
Command and Control
Battle StatTTkammg Pro.gram, A...... .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 49 May
Command and Control Interoperability . . . .. .. . . . .. . . . . 3s Oqt
Open Letterto General George S. Paiton, An..... . 64 Jun
Synchronizingthe AmLand BattIe.. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Apr “
Communications
!
Tactician, This Is Logistician. Talkto Me. Over. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Feb ,)
Communism
M]li@Situation lnNlcara@a. ~e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Aug
Conventional Warfare 1
Five Functions of Land Combat. The . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Apr
Defense
Challengeofa Coalition in Peace and War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Jun
Education-Training
Battle Staff Trai”ing Program, A.... . . . 49 May
Decisionmakmg in Modern War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Ott
Educational Technology Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow . . . ,%. 4 Dec
HaIlandia Attaining V,ctory. .. .. . .. .. 40 May
Insurgency Threat and Waysto Defe?t It, The . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Jan
Our Common Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 May
Purpose of US Army Schools, The.... :.. . . . . 30 May
ROTC Today and Tomorrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 May
Ps=v ..................................................... . . . 21 Mar
Training Preparation for Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. 4 Jun
Training tonight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 18 May
Engineers
Maneuver, Synchronization and Obstacle Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Feb
Equipment
Selecting Emergmg Technologies ,., . ...-,,, . 32 Dec
TW=V ............................. . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . .. 21 Mar
Force Modernization
Operati”g inthe21st Centw-y, . . . . . . . . . . 4 Sep
Strategic Undevihningsofa Future Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Ott
France
Low.lntensity Conflict in the 1980s The French Experience . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . 68 Jan
Geography
Geopoliticso ftheCarihbeanB asin,The ................................. . . .. .. . 16 Aug
Germany
Abuses of German Military Histmy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Dec
Hollandia
HollandmATrainmg,V]ctory. . . . . . . . . . .. 40 May
Infantry
Heavyversu6LightForcexAMiddIeGround . 64 Ott
L,ghtDivislonsandbw-Intensity Conflict,The&e TheyLosingSightof EtichOther? 18 Jan
L,ghtInfantryIntegrationin CentralEurope : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Sep
Infonnat,on
ClausewitzmUSand GermanDoctrine 39 J..
WesternMediaandKecentWars . . .. . . . . 4 May
Intelligence
Countering GIobal Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Jun
Militav Applications of Afiificlal In&lligence and Robotics 50 De.
Why Artificial Intelligence Won’t Work .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . 57 De.
Iran
“Eureka’’C on~erence,T heABusyTimei nTeheran . 74 Ott
Latin America ,,
Army StrateWand Structure. An..... . . . . . . . 69 Aug
Challenge and Wsponseonthe Southern Flank: Three Decades La*r . . . . . 4 Aug
Geopolitics oftbe Caribbean Basin, The 16 Aug
Liberatmn Theology . . . . 62 A“g
MdItary S,twatmn m Nmaragua, The . . 28 Aug
VlewofCwd Affamsm the fJCArena, A 58 Aug
,1
Violence’ The Alternate Pobt,cal Instltut>on 42 Aug
Law
Specml OperatLonsand the Law . . 49 , Jan
Leadership ,!
Americans Strategic Character . .. .. . . . 14 Apr ,
“Art’’intheA rtofWar,The . ........ . . .. .. . . 64 Sep ~
A@ragstakt&InI tsProperPer spective . .. . .. ... . 50 Ott ?,
Battle Staff fiainlng Pro~am. A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 May ;
Command and Control lnteroperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Ott ‘
Decm]onmakmg mModern War 33 Ott ,
ElimnmtetheFiltersandWin 20 NW
Five Functions of Land Combat, The . 72 Apr
Forei@Policy and Militaw StratemTheC lvll-M,l]=wE quation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 AP<
Harnessing Creativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Mar
Indirect ffesponsibility f.r War Crimes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Nov
Initiative inthe US Soldier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Nov
fsWar Too Important for Generals? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Sep
Karlvon Clausewitz. Analysis of FM IOO-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 68 Feb ,;
Leadership Imperatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Nov
Mentor, The More Thana Teacher, More Tbana Coach ... ... . . . .. . . . . . 4 Jul
Open Letter to General George S. Patton, An . . . . . . . . . . ... . . ..... . . . 64 JwI >
OurCommon Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 33 ?&y
Professional versus PersOnal Values... .. .. .. ... .. .. . . . . . .
32 No.
PuwoseofUS Army Schools. The . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
30 May
ROTC Today andTomomow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . 36 May
TITLES
$
Sewe YowSoldlerstoWin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PAGE MONTH
10 No,
SpecialOperationsandthe Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
49 Jan
Syncbronizi&theAirLandBattle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
65 Apr ,
T%=v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
21 Mar
‘TrainingPreparationforCombat. . . . . . . . .
4 Jun
,1
lYainingto Fight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
16 May
WorldWarflDirision Commanders,. . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . .
61 ?&r
Logistics
CostAcrosstheFLOT,The . . . . . . ...’. . . . .. . .. . .... . .... .. 30 Sep
OperationalLogisticsin Supportof theDeepAttack 12 Feh
Tactician,ThisIs Logistician.Talkto Me.Over. ................................... 20 Feb
USRailroadsAForgottenMiIitaryAsset . 49 Feb
Low-IntensityConflict
ArmyStrategyandStructure,An, . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. .. . .. . . . .. .. . 69 A“g
DebateAboutLow-IntensityCcmRict, The . .. . ,., ,., 60 Feb
In Search ofa Countetimorism Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Jan
In Search of LIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Aug t
lnsurgemy Threat and Waysto Defeat It, The 26 Jan
Ki”ds of War . . ... . ... .. .. . . . . .. . . . . . 14 Ott
Liberation Tbeology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 A“g
LIC: Matching Missions and Forces 79 A“g
Light Divisions and Low-Intensity Contlct, The: Are They Losing Sight of Each Other? 16 Jan
Low-Intensity Cdlict in the 1980s The French Experience 68 Jan
Special Operatmnsandthe Law 49 Jan
ViewofCivd Affairs inthe LICArena, A 58 Aug
Maneuver
Genghis Khanand 13th-Century AirLand BattIe . . . . .. 18 Jul
Maneuver, Synchronization and Obstacle Operations . 36 Feb
Manpower
%
Militarism m Russia From Imperial Roots to the Soviet Union
28 Jul
Onthe Wehrmacht Mystique . . . . . . .
44 Jul
Operatmgin the7.1st Century .. Y.. :
4 Sep
Medical
Army Nurse Corps,85Years Young . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 58 Feb
Military History
Abuses of Cerman Military History.. . . . . . . 66 Dec
AirLand Battle The Historical Background. . . .. . . . . . . 52 Mar
Auftmgstahtzh:l nItsProperP erspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Ott
D-Day Remembered Legends and Legacies . . .. . .. . . . . 50 Jun
“Eureka’’Conference,T heABusyTimem Teheran . 74 Ott
FM IOO-5Who Influenced Whom? . . . . . . . . . .. .. 46 Mar
Forced March Armor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Jul
Foreign Policy and Military Strategy The Civil-Mditary Equation. 22 Apr
Genghis Khanand 13th-Century AirLand Battle . . ... .. . .. . . . . 16 JuI
Hollandia A’Training Victory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . .. .. .. . 40 May
indirect Responsibility for War Crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..., 37 NW
bitiativein the US Soldier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 No.
Is War Too Important for Generals? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,,., 71 Sep
Kinds of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Ott
Legacy of LLddell Hart, The . . . .. ... . . .. .. . . . ... .. 65 May
Militarism in Russix FromlmperiaIRoot. tothe Soviet Union ... . ... .. . .. ... . 26 Jul
O“the Wehrmacht Mystique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Jul
NATO
Blitzkrwg ii Europe Is It Stall Possible? . .. 26 Jun
Challenge ofa Coalition in Peace and War . . . . . . . . . . 57 Jun
Countermgthe DaringTbrust ........... 42 Sep
FM IOO-5:The AirLand Battle m1986 . . . . . . . . . 4 Mar :
Follow-On Forces Attack Joint Interdiction by Another Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Feb
Follow.On US Echelon forNATODefense. A ................................... 12 Jun
Strategic Defense Initiatweand NATO, Tbe . 31 Apr ~
Nicaragua ,1
Mlli@~Situation lnNicaraWa, The . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Aug
North Afr,ca
Forced MarchArmor 38 Jul
Offense
Encirclement Operations . .
Follow-On Forces Attack. Joint InterdictIon by Another Name
. . . . . . . 11
4
30
II
Se’
Fe, ,
Feb ‘
Offensive Rear Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Operational Logistics mSupportofthe Deep Attack . . 12 Feb
Operational Level of War
Close Air Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Sep
Cost Across the FLOT, The . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 30 , Sep
Countering the Daring Thrust... : fj.p
Light Infantry Integration in Central Europe . Sep
Organization
Amy Strate~and Structure. An . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Aug ~
Challenge ofa Coalition in Peace and War . .. .. .. . . . . . . 57 Jun I
Command and Control Interoperability. .. .. .. .. . . . 36 Ott, ~
Force Integration’s Next Big Challenge.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 APr
Heavy versus Light Forces: A Middle Ground . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Ott
Space Power Is Land Powe~The Army’s Rolein Space .. . 4 Jan
Pakistan
Pakistam Onthe Front Porch qfConflict ................................................... 66 Mar
Panama
Challenge and Response on the Southern Flank Three Decades Later . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Aug
Personalities
Clausewitz for the 20th Century The Interpretation of Raymond Aron 38 Apr
Clausewitzin USand Getman Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 JUII
“Eureka’’C onference,T hcABusyTimei nTeheran .. .. .. .. .. . .. . . . .. .. 74 Ott
Genghis Khanand 13th-Century AirLand Battle 18 Jul
KarIvon Clausewitz AnaIysisofFMIOO-5 ... . .. .. . .. . . .. .. . . . 66 Feb
Legacy of Liddell Hart, The 65 May
Mentor, The: More Thana Teacher, MoreThana Coach 4 Jul
Open Letter to General George S. Patton, An . . . . . . . . 64 Jun
Personnel
Army Nurse Corps,85Years Young . ..’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Feb
Cohesion andthe Vietnam Experience 56 May
Eliminate the Filters and Win . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 20 Nov
Indirect Responsibility for War Crimes . . . . 37 Nov
Initiative inthe US Sold]er . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Nov
Leadership Imperatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Nov
Of ALOs, FACsand TACS ., 57 Ott
Operatingin the21st Century . . . . . . 4 Sep
Our Common Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 May
Pro sessional versus Personal Values 32 Nov
Serve Your Soldiers to Win...... 10 No.
Soldler’s Keturn, A . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Nov
Soviet PsycholoRcal Threat, The 64 Nov
Values andthe American Sold.er . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Nov
Psychologmal Operations
Psychological Operations Against Terrorism The Unused Weapon 59 Jan
Soviet Psychological Threat, The . 64 NOV
Religion %
Liberation Theology . . 62 Aug
Research
Mihtav Applications of Artificial Intethgence and Robotics 50 Dec
ROTC
ROTC Today and Tomomow . . . . . . . . . . . 36 May
Space i
Army in Space, The: New High Ground or Hot-Air Balloon? 44 Dec
Space Power Is Land Power The Army’s Role in Space . . . . .. 4 Jan
Specml Operations
Countering Global Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . .. 72 Jun
Special Operations andthe Law . 49 Jan
Strategy
AmerLca's Strategic Character . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14 Apr
Army Strategy and Structure, An . . . . . . . . 69 Aug
Challenge and Response on the Southern Flank: Three Decades Later . . . . . . 4 Aug
Challenge ofa Coalition in Peace and War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Jun
Clausewitz for the 20th Century The Interpretation of Raymond Aron 3S Apr
Follow-On US Echelon for NATO Defense, A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Jun
Foreign Policy and Militmy Strategy The Civil-Mihtary Equation. . . . . . ... ... . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Apr
Geopolitics of the Caribbean Basin, The 16 Aug
HolIandia A Training Victory . . . . . . . . . . 40 May
In Search of LIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Aug I:
Tactics
f31itzkrieg
in Europe:Is ItStallPossible? ... ,.. . ... ,., . . 26 Jun
CloseAirPlanning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Sep
CounteringtheDaringThrust. . . 42 Sep
EncirclementOperations 11 Sep
FireBrigade,The.. ... .. . . 77 Sep
HeavyversusLightForces A MiddleGround 64 Ott
InsurgencyThreatandWaysto DefeatIt,The 26 Jan
Manemw, SynchmmzationandObstacleOperations 36 Feb
Of ALOs,FACsandTACS . .. . 57 Ott
StrategicUnderpinningsof a FutureForce 4 Ott
SymhmnizmgtheAmLandBattle ,, .,.. 65 Apr
Tactlc>an.ThisIsLozistic,an TrdktoMe.Over. . 20 Feb
Technology
Army in Space, The: New H]gb Ground or Hot-Air Balloon? ,,, . . ,,. 44 Dec
Educational Technology Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow ..,. 4 Dec -
LAX,,,..., ................ ...... . 26 Dec
Mditay Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Robotxs . . . . .,. 50 Dec
Selecting Emergmg Technologies 32 Dec
i
What if It Works?. Am Armament Technology for Deep Attack . . 12 Dec ‘
Why Art,ticial Intelbgence Won’t Work 57 Dec
Terrormm
Countering Global Terrormn j2 Jun ~
In Search ofa Counterterrorism Doctrine 44 Jap
Psychological Operations Against Terrorism: The Unused Weapon . 59 .Ja~
Terrorlsnx The Search for Working Detimtlon.s... ,,. 70 J&
VkienceTheAl ternatePol%ticalIn stitution . . 42 A{g ‘“
,. Transportatmn
US Railroads: A Forgotten Military Asset 49 Fqb
Unconventional Wartare
Debate About Low-Intensity Conflict, The 60 I Feb
In Search of a Con”tertermrw,m Doctrine ,. .’.,,, 44 Jan
Inmrgency Threat and Ways to Defeat It, The ,. 26 Jan
USSR
Countering the Daring Thrust 42 Sep i
Encirclement Operations . .. 11 Sep ~
Militarism in Russia From Imperml Roots to tbe Soviet Union . . 28 JuY
Soviet Psychological Threat, The . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 ~OV
20 NW
37 Nov
45 Nov
55 Nov
32 Nov
10 NW
‘4 NW
II
56 May
I
64 Sep
50 Ott
26 Jun
38 Ott
33 Ott
64 Ott
71 Sep
14 Ott
57 Ott
64 Jun
67 Sep
4 Ott
77 Sep
32 Dec
12 Dec
71 Sep
66 Dec
50 Ott
50 Jun
74 Ott
36 Jul
40 May
44 Jul
72 Nov
49 Feb
61 Mar
,1
83 May
83 May
89 NW
88 Jul
8? APr
89 Jun
86 Jul
91 Ott
65 May
89 Sep
88 Jul
86 Mar
87 NrJv
90 Jun
105 A“g
90 Jun
90 Jun
88 Mar
67 May
87 Dec
i
,4
88 Sep
90
90
86
104
86
104 Aug
84 MST
66 Jul
90 Od
87 I Feb
$J3V
Jun
API’ .
Jan /
Jan /
Jul
Sep
Apr ;
par
Jan
Ott
Jun
X-Wing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Dec
Parachutes
Parafoils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Mar
Bridgqs
ChieftainMk-6AVLB(ArmoredVehicIeLaunchedBridge). . . . . ..’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Nov
MobileAssaultBridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 Jul
CBR Warfare
Robot Maruin Usedin Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Ott
Clothing
AN/PVS4Small Starlight Scopes .,..... . . .. . . . . .. . . . 87 Feb
AN/PVS5ANight Vision Boggles . . . . . . . 87 Feb
AN/PVS7Night Vision Goggles . .. . . . . . . . . .. 87 Feb
Hplster, Beltand Ammunition Pouch . . . . . .. . . . . . .. .. . 90 Ott
Holsters forthe Beretta92SB-F. 88 Jan
M12Hip Holster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Jul
NLght Combat System. .. . . . .. . 90 Jun
Commumcations
AN/MLQ34TACJAM (Tactical Jamming) System 86 Mar
Carrier Pigeon Force 85 Jul
ELF (Extremely Low Frequency) Communication System 89 Jan
Hermes Defense Communications System ., .,, 86 Maf
JSTARS (Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System) 86 Feb
MARC (MAC Airlift Control Element Reactmn Commumcationl .-. . 85 Jul
MCS2[Maneuver Control Systeml 88 Nov
MF15Radio ................... 89 Nov
Momtor for JSTARS (Joint Survedlance and Target Attack Radar System] .. 87 Nov
MSE (Mobile Subscriber Equ]pment) Communications System 85 Mar
RV2/400Portable ffadio . . . ...}.... 90 Feb
Education-~aming
AQM37C Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. 88 Jun
CkW(Cockp,t Procedures’framer) forBIB ..: . . . . . 85 May
GI 10,000 Computerized System for Pilots 87 Apr
Periscope Image Generator Simulator .. 88 Jul
RadConz Portable Firearm ~aining System . 104 Aug
SIMNETTank Simulators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ;..... 90 Ott
Equipment
AIMES (Avionics Integrated Maintenance Expert System) 88 Sep
AN/PVS4~mall Starlight Scopes . 87 Feb
ANlPVS5ANlght VisLon Goggles . . . . . . 87 Feb
ANIPVS6 MELIOS (Mini Eyesafe Infrared Observation Set) .. .. 89 Sep
AN/PVS7Night Vision Goggles . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . 87 Feb
BCS(Battery Computer System) . . . . . . . . 87 Jul
Camouflage Pattern Generation Facility . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 May
Computer <'Expeti Sys@m'' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 Jan
.Eagle Eye Search-and-Rescue Camera... .. ... . 90 Jun
GIIO,OOOComputerized Image-Generating System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Apr
HVME(Hull V1brationand Monitoring Equipment) 105 Aug
lCC(Individual ConcealmentCoverl .................... ..................... 88 Jan
Light ina Tube . .... . .. ... .. . . ... .. . . . .. .. . 89 Feb
Robot for F]eld Materiel Handling “. ... ... .,, .,,, 91 Ott
Infrared Dewces
LmescaII 4000 Airborne Infrared Surveillance Device for Tornado Aircrafi . . . . . 87 May
Laser Appkcations
LVIPVS6 MELIOS (Mm, Eyesafe Infrared Obsewatmn Set) 89 Sep
MULE (Modular Umversal Laser Equ]pmentl S9 Jun
Night Combat System 90 J.n
Logistics
Parafods Deliwr Cargo ., . . . . 85 Mar
Robot for F]eld Materiel Handlmg . 91 Ott
~
Naval Vessels
Submarines !(
ELF {Extremely Low Frequency) Communication System ....... 89 J+
Periscope Image Generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,, ,,. 88 Jul, ‘:
TridentIIFleet BaHist]c Missile . . . . . 85 Apr’,
Surface
Antwtanz Aegis 88 Ju$
HVME (Hull Vlbrat,on and Monitoring Equipment) 105 AUS!
STANDFLEX 300 Project . . . . . . . . . . 86 ‘May
2000. CIass LCU (Utility Landing Craft) 87 Dbc
Wisconsin Battleship . . . . . . ... . . . 89 Nov
Zummf Hydrofod Missde Boat 88 Mar ~
Radars ,)
JSTARS (Joint Survedlame and Target Attack Radar System) . .. . . . 86 Feb
Mcmitor for JSTARS (Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System) . . . .. . .. 87 NLIV ,
!.
Shelte~
MARC (MAC Airlitl Control Element Reaction Communication). .. .. . . . . . . .. . 85 Jul
Polyester Shelters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Aug
Vehicle %pairand Main&nance Sheltir . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Sep
Transportation
Chi@amMk-6A VLB(ArmoredV ehicleLaunchedB ridge) .................................. SS Nov
Mobile Assault Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,,. 86 Jul
88 Nov
86 Apr
86 Sep
105 A“g
90 Ott
87 Jul
90 Ott
85 Jul
87 Jul
89 Jun
89 Nov
87 May
91 June
84 May
81 Nov
86 Dec
89 NOV
89 Mar
89 Mar
89 Mar
89 Mar
Aug ‘
Ott
Sep
Sep
Sep
Jul
May
Jun
Jun
Jan
Sep
Aug
Jun
May
Aug
Feb
Jun
Ott
May
Sep
Aug
Jun
Jun
Apr
Mar
Mar
Jul
May
May
MaY
Mar ,?
Apr
Jul
Apr
These theses were written by students of tbe 1988 class of the US AnnY Command and General Staff Offk’ers
Course and the Advanced Military Studies Course as part of their requirement for the Master of Military Art and
Science degree. All theses are entered mtm the Defense Technical Informatmn Center, Cameron Station, Alexan.
dr,a, Vm@ia 22314 wh~ch wdl prov~de copies to qualified users. Copies wiJ1 not be avaiIable until spring ~987.
Gunnery Training Strategy for a Bradley (M2)-Equipped Infantry Squad Maj Patrick W. Casey, USA
History of the Marine Corps Institute, Tha Maj Hugh M. Mcllroy Jr., USMC
Is the Tactical Air Force Prepared for Night Close Am Support?; Ma] William E. Rial, USAF
Kenya-Somali Boundary Dispute, Thq Maj Jeremaih M. Kianga, Kenyan Army
Know Your Enemy: A Comparison of a Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiment and tbe Opposing Forces (OPFOR) Motor
ized Rifle Regiment Maj Robert L. Jordan Jr., USA
Low-Intensity Conflict & Practiced by John Singleton MosbY in the American Civil WaK MaJ Rick Gutwald, USA
Management versus Leadership as Reflected in Selected Militav Journ+ls (1970 -1985k M+ John R. Combs, USA
Managing the Near-Term Functions of Change m Medical Units Maj Ray G. Bruekmd, USA
Middle Eastern Strateoc Deploymen+Oasls or Mirage? Maj Stephen B. Howard, USA
Military Rule in Nigerlzx The Economy and Foreign Policy MaJ EIias J. B. Nyan, Nigerian Army
Military’s Peacetime Role (Implications of the Civilian Conservation Corps Experience); Maj Gerald M. Brennan,
USAF %
Model to Establish the Effectweness of a Mixed Force of H]gh and Low-Cost Fighters for the De fensme Counterair
Mission, A, Maj Terry V. Jackson, USAF
NCO Authority: Roles, Rules and Begulatlons; Maj John D. Altenburg, USA
100,000 Presidential Call-Up, The: Should R Solve Tbls NatIon’s Imtial Mobdlzation Needs? [UK Maj J. C. Dibert, ,,
USA
Rinciples of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, and Support in Counternmurgency to a Developing Natiow Col G
:,
Tejindar Singh Shergill, Indian Army
$
Responsible Soldiering in tbe Nuclear Age: Inferences From tbe Catholic Bishop’s Pastoral on Nuclear War Li c’ol I&l
q
Mason E. Smith, USA .
Selection process of US. AnnY Recruiters, Th& Maj Petter Wendelborg, NorwaY Soviet Military ‘nt er - t,om T ~
Afghanistan and Policy Options for Pakistan; Maj Manzoor Iqbal Awan, Pakistan Army
Strategic and Operational Implications of Iranian Military Operations in tbe Iran-Iraq Wa~ Ma; Donald H. #
Zacherl, USA ,g
Study of Soviet Use of Field Artillery Weapons in a Direct-Fire Role, A: Maj Larry. W. CokerJr., USA e
~
Tank Gunnery A Comparison of Evaluations Maj Kurt D. Norman, USA :
E
Unconventional Threat to the Central Army GroupwithinAlliedCommand,Europe,‘I%<MajGeorgeM.Svitak, S
USA g
Vaiiables in the Guatemala Operational Environment That AtTect Guatemala Declsionmakers Concerning ~
Relations With the United Statea Maj Donald C. Waring, USA *