Lecture 15

Safety Practices in Chemical and

Nuclear Industries

Review of Nuclear Accidents

Dr. Raghuram Chetty

Department of Chemical Engineering
Indian Institute of Technology Madras
Chennai- 600 036.
Chernobyl Accident
RBMK PLANT
 A Large pressure tube reactor with graphite moderator
and water coolant in the pressure tubes cooling fuel
bundles containing slightly enriched fuel. Power Rating :
1000 MWe. Four plants at Chernobyl site.
 Plants operated by an elite group of operators. Reactor
staff lived in the town Pripyat. Plant located about 110
miles from Kiev.
Chernobyl Accident
ACCIDENT
 Accident happened on April 26, ’86 night. This was a
power increase accident and not a heat removal
degradation accident as was TMI-2.
 Chernobyl happened because of many operator errors
and deliberate disabling of safety systems and the
operation of reactor in an unstable regime, where the
reactor had a positive void coefficient (Design Flaw).
Chernobyl Accident

Courtesy:
Google
4 Images
Chernobyl Reactor

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5 Google Images
Chernobyl Accident

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6 Google Images
 Chernobyl Accident
 It is a historical irony that the worst nuclear accident, ever,
began as a test to improve safety. The NPP wanted to
ensure water supply to the reactor in the case of a station
black out event. It took the diesel, 30 seconds to start-up.
The Soviet staff wanted to use the spinning energy of the
turbines, on their way to shut-down, to generate electricity for
a few seconds before the diesels would start. The experiment
was to see how long the electricity generated from the
turbine would run the main pumps to keep the water flowing
in the fuel bundles.
 Chernobyl Accident
 The test procedure was to bring the reactor to 50% normal
power, shut one turbine, then disconnect the remaining
turbine and use its spinning energy electricity to run the main
pumps. There were however some inauspicious
circumstances,
 A shut-down was planned following the test; so test had to be
done,
 The test was thought to be an electrical test only, perhaps
not supervised by the reactor operators,
 Insufficient preparation, and
 Overconfident operators, since no: 4 reactor ran the best
among the 4 NPP’s.
Chernobyl Accident
 The accident was initiated 24 hours earlier, since the
errors made set the scene for the event sequence
shown.
 The test proceeded as planned: Permission was
given to reduce power to 50%. After 12 hours, 50%
power was reached in the afternoon and one turbine
was disconnected. Next step was to reduce power
to 30%, but the power dispatcher would not allow
that since power was needed. The reactor stayed at
50% power for another 9 hours.
Chernobyl Accident
 The operators got permission to perform the test at
11.10 P.M and received permission to reduce power
to 30%. But the operator made an error and forgot to
set a controller leading to the power dropping to 1%.
 This sudden reduction of power to 1% started
producing Xenon, which is a neutron absorber and
would shut the reactor down completely with no test
accomplished. Also, with low power the water in the
core stopped boiling and added more absorption.
Chernobyl Accident
 The operator pulled out almost all the control rods and
crawled back to ~ 7 % power (~ 200 MWe). The reactor is
highly unstable at that power level. Also it was not
allowed to pull all the rods out, since they took long time
to come in. The rods also had a flaw, since there is a
graphite region between the fuel region and the follower
of boron region.
 The operator wanted to perform the test at 7% power, in
spite of the previous errors. They did one final but a
grievous error. They disabled the automatic shut down
signal as the turbine is tripped.
Chernobyl Accident
 At 1:23:04 on April 26, the turbine was disconnected and
its energy fed into 4 out of the 8 pumps. As the turbine
slowed down, the water flow slowed down on the hot fuel.
The water started boiling and the void started adding
positive reactivity to the core. Power first rose slowly and
then faster. At 1:23:40, an operator pushed the manual
scram button to drive in the emergency rods and shut
down the reactor. This person did not survive, but it was
too late.
Chernobyl Accident
 The shut down rods were so far above the core, that it would
take 6 seconds to insert and start shutting down the reactor.
Also the graphite region in-between the fuel and follower
region added more reactivity, since it displaced water. The
reactor was above prompt criticality. And in 4 seconds, the
power had risen to perhaps 100 times full power (400,000 MW)
and all that power destroyed the reactor.

 The pressure generated lifted and hurled the 1000 ton

concrete lid which travelled some distance, but before that it
broke all the 2000 steam pipes at the top of the core. It was like
2000 guns shooting into the upper part of the building whose
roof was blown away. With so much energy discharged a
plume formed which was about 1 km high and travelled long
distances. The radioactivity was first discovered at Forsmark,
Sweden, about 2000 air kilometers away.
 Public Consequence

 The public consequences of Chernobyl accident are due to

the radioactivity released and the extent of its spread in the
world. Unlike theoretical estimates and predictions made in
accident analysis performed all over the world, the
Chernobyl radioactivity release reached very long distances
and its effects was not only local (upto 30 to 50 km radius)
but almost global or at least continental.
 The release practically stopped after 10 days when the
graphite fire burned-out.
 Public Consequence

 Estimates of the releases of radio nuclides have been made

and those for volatiles and refractory materials are shown.
The releases are very large indeed. A very large fraction of
the core inventory of FPs was released which were in the
form of gases, vapors and fuel particles. About 2% of the
fuel was released as particles. This however did not travel
beyond 30 to 50 km, since its heavy and falls to the ground.
Public Consequence

Courtesy: Google Images

The “Liquidators”
 After the initial burst of activity with the evacuation of
135000 persons, the question arose “How to clean up the
site?”, so that there would be no further spread of the
radioactive material leading to more evacuation.
 The Soviet government “asked for volunteers” from armed
forces, from the many nuclear laboratories and other
institutions to assemble a force of 600,000 persons called
the “liquidators”. The liquidators did the clean-up but in the
process they did absorb considerably larger amount of
radioactivity. They, in fact, were the real heroes of the
Chernobyl tragedy, some of them have already passed
away, but some of them will die prematurely.
The Chernobyl Accident: Sarcaphogus
 After the Chernobyl accident occured, the question
arose “How to contain the highly radioactive fuel which
was still in the interior of the building of reactor 4, with
an opening to the atmosphere at the top?” A picture of
the interior showed that the melted fuel had combined
with the structural products (concrete, sand etc.) and
formed a lava type material, which apparently had
spread around in the basement levels of the buildings.
The Soviet government decided to construct a building
on top called shelter or Sarcaphogus. This huge
building was built in approximately 6 months under
excruciating conditions of radiation exposure.
The Chernobyl Accident: Sarcaphogus
 Since the building was built in a hurry, it was not leak
tight, in fact there were holes between the concrete
blocks which formed the roof on top through which the
rain water would enter into the Sarcaphogus.
 The walls of the Sarcaphogus building also rested partly
on the original walls of the unit 4 building, which were of
uncertain strength.
 There are about 180 tonnes of fuel material inside the
Sarcaphogus, which has turned into a powder mixed with
concrete, sand and other materials. A picture of the
insides of the current Sarcaphogus is shown.
The Chernobyl Accident: Sarcaphogus

Courtesy: Google Images

The Chernobyl Accident: Sarcaphogus
 The G-7 countries have agreed to fund construction of a
very large confinement building, which would cover the
current sarcaphogus building completely. To eliminate
completely or reduce considerably radiation exposure of
the workers, the new sarcaphogus would be moved on
rails on top of the present sarcaphogus (shelter) building,
to enclose it completely and will be sealed on all sides.
 It is an expensive project, wherein the new generations,
born after Chernobyl can also feel somewhat more
secure about the radioactivity not impacting their lives
again.
The Current State of Sarcaphogus

Courtesy: Google Images

The Sarcophogus: current and future

Courtesy: Google Images

The Fukushima Accident
The Fukushima Accidents

 The accidents were caused by the tsunami generated by

the magnitude 9.0 earthquake off the coast where
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant containing 6 BWRs is
situated.
 The plant survived the earthquake which was beyond their
design basis, and shut down, but the tsunami that
followed was 14 meters high and Fukushima defenses
were designed on the basis of a 7 meters tsunami.
 The essential components for Plant Safety e.g.,
emergency diesel engines, their fuel supplies, batteries
etc. did not survive the water flooding from the tsunami.
The Fukushima Accidents

 The plant suffered a common cause station blackout (SBO),

which could not be repaired. Most station blackouts can
generally be repaired in about 30 minutes, but this SBO lasted
for more than two weeks.

 In addition, the pumps and motors employed for emergency core

cooling circuits were flooded and did not function, even after the
power was restored.

 Thus, the Fukushima reactors 1-4 suffered the feared long-term

station black out. The Fukushima-6 had an air-cooled emergency
diesel generator, which survived and helped to bring about the
cold shut-down of reactors 5 and 6.
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants

Courtesy: Google Images

Summary of Nuclear Power Plants
Overview of Mark-1 Type BWR (Unit 1,2,3 and 4)
Major root cause of the damage
 Classical Progression of a Severe Accident
 The worst progression of a severe accident in a BWR in which
all active and passive water systems are lost for a long time
has been calculated and is shown for the Fukushima reactors.
 It is seen that with the decay heat the core dry-out and heat-
up occurs in about 2 hours. The zircaloy oxidation, and clad
melting starts after about 2 hours and 20 minutes. The fuel
melts in about 5 hours, the core relocates after 7 hours and
the vessel fails after 13 hours. The core melt discharged from
the vessel may go through the 6 meter thick concrete
basemat in about one week.
 Thus the time available to operators to add water is very short
in order to avoid a severe accident.
Assessment of events timing for worst scenario
Public consequences
 Radioactive releases to atmosphere
 The Japanese government had provided data on the
release of isotopes to the atmosphere. The releases are
large and that is why the accident has been classed as
level-7 accident, they however are in the range of 5-
10% of those from Chernobyl.
 This may sound comforting. However, it should be realized
that Chernobyl releases were dispersed over an
enormously larger area than those of Fukushima
accidents, due to the energetic plume release of
Chernobyl.
Public consequences
 Thus, the burden of clean up, decontamination etc. for the
30-50 km radius may be similar as in Chernobyl. A
fortunate occurrence was that most of the time the
radioactive releases went towards the ocean. Perhaps
entry to some land and forests may be restricted.
 One must be grateful to the Japanese government for
evacuating the population in the vicinity of the Fukushima
station; since no member of the public died or was injured
due to radiation exposure.
40 Year Plan Dismantling Fukushima Daiichi

Courtesy: Google Images

Lessons Learned From Fukushima
 Emergency generators should be installed at high
elevations or in watertight chambers.
 If a cooling system is intended to operate without power,
make sure all of its parts can be manipulated without
power.
 Keep power trucks on or very close to the power plant
site.
 Install independent and secure battery systems to power
crucial instruments during emergencies.
Lessons Learned From Fukushima
 Ensure that catalytic hydrogen recombiners (power-free
devices that turn dangerous hydrogen gas back into
steam) are positioned at the tops of reactor buildings
where gas would most likely collect.
 Install power-free filters on vent lines to remove radio-
active materials and allow for venting that won’t harm
nearby residents.