KNOWLEDGE AND VOLITION IN EARLY "ASHʿ ARI" DOCTRINE OF FAITH

Author(s): FERIT USLU

Source: Journal of Islamic Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2 (May 2007), pp. 163-182
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26199805
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Published online 7 February 2007
Tournal of Islamic Studies 18:2 (2007) pp. 163-182 doi:10.1093/iis/etl071

KNOWLEDGE AND VOLITION IN EARLY

AStfARI DOCTRINE OF FAITH

FERIT USLU
Hitit university

The doctrine of faith (.iman) occupies a central role in the teac

Ash'arism, still one of the most important theological schools
Despite the importance of the doctrine, very few studie
epistemological structure have been attempted in contem
literature.
Among the most notable works that specifically address Ash'ari t
of faith are Cantwell Smith's article 'Faith as Tasdiq',1 Toshihik
book The Concept of Belief in Islamic Theology2 and R. M.
article 'Knowledge and Taqlld: The Foundations of Religious B
Classical Ash'arism'.3 Izutsu asserts, on the basis of only some
statements by Sa'd al-DIn al-Taftazanl (d. 1389), a later Ash'ar
that Ash'aris hold to a voluntaristic theory of faith. Cantwell
view concerning the epistemic structure of Ash'ari doctrine
(whether it is voluntaristic or rationalistic) is unclear. Frank
position opposite to Izutsu's, arguing that early Ash'aris held
assent of faith is constituted by a cognitive judgement requiring c
Although Frank describes the main features of the structure of
early Ash'ari doctrine clearly and persuasively, his paper does n
adequately on the role and meaning in it of volition.

1 Wilfred Cantwell Smith 'Faith as Tasdiq,' in Parviz Morewed

Islamic Philosophical Theology (Albany: State University of New Yo
1979).
2 Toshihiko Izutsu, The Concept of Belief in Islamic Theology (Tokyo: The
Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, Yokohama: Yurindo Publishing,
1965).
3 R. M. Frank, 'Knowledge and Taqlld: The Foundations of Religious Belief in
Classical Ash'arism,' Journal of the American Oriental Society, 109.1 (1989),
37-62.

© The Author (2007).

Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Oxford Centre for Islamic
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164 FERIT USLU

This article discusses the meaning and relationshi

knowledge in early Ash'aris' theory of faith up to
The distinction between 'voluntaristic' and 'rationalistic' turns on the use
and role of reason and knowledge in faith. Of course, the Ash'aris
themselves did not use such terms as 'voluntaristic' or 'rationalistic',
which arise from the application of contemporary concepts to help
explain their thinking.
Sometimes faith is defined as 'very firm belief, either unsupported or
insufficiently supported by evidence'.4 This definition raises a serious
question: If faith is a 'very firm belief', and the believers do not have
strong evidence to support it, how do they make up or fill the
evidential gap? Voluntaristic theories of faith^ developed to answer
that question, argue that believers make up or fill that evidential gap
by an act of will.6
Voluntaristic faith is very common among Western theologians and
thinkers. John Hick, a contemporary philosopher of religion, counts
Thomas Aquinas, Blaise Pascal, and William James among such
thinkers.7 Also the voluntaristic character of faith is continually stressed
in the decrees of both the First and the Second Vatican Councils.8
According to the usually accepted view of knowledge in this approach,
knowing the truth of a proposition does not entail a volitional choice,
since knowing is only possible if there is sufficient and conclusive
evidence. So the attitude of knowing has an involuntary character.
If there is not sufficient and conclusive evidence for the truth of a
proposition, a volitional leap will be required to believe in it. And in that
case, faith is considered as volitional.
For example, Aquinas (1225-74) defines faith as 'an act of intellect
assenting to divine truth at the command of the will moved by grace

4 John Hick states that this definition of faith is common among believers
and unbelievers in Western thought (See John Hick, 'Faith' in Paul Edwards (ed.),
The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (London: Collier Macmillan Limited, 1967),
iii. 166; idem, Philosophy of Religion (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice
Hall, 1973), 54-5.
5 Theological voluntarism is defined as the theory that 'gives prominence
to the human will over human reason'. (See, Richard Taylor, 'Voluntarism',
The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, viii. 270-71.
6 Hick, 'Faith', 166.
7 Ibid.
8 For the former, see De Fide, canon 5: for the latter see Declaration on
Religious Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae), 10.

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 ASH'ARI DOCTRINE OF FAITH 165

of God'.9 He distinguishes two kinds of assents accor

motivations. In the assent of scientific knowledge (scientia
is moved by the object itself, motivated by either direc
knowledge. But in religious assent (i.e. faith), the intelle
moved by the evidence itself, because the insufficiency of ev
intellect in doubt. Evidence may make an object equally a
deniable to the intellect. But, according to Aquinas, faith is n
nor opinion, it is a certain and firm assent. The firmness of
faith cannot lie in the epistemic disposition of the intellect; i
the will that commands to it. In order to have faith, Aq
intellect, 'through an act of choice [.. .J turns voluntari
rather than to the other'.10
As seen in the case of Aquinas, voluntaristic theories of f
act of will as a 'voluntary leap' that does not rest on suf
conclusive rational grounds, i.e. scientific knowledge.11
There is another approach to the role of reason and kn
faith. In this paper I call it a rationalistic theory of faith.12
proponents of this approach, the objects of faith are either i
scientific knowledge or they rest upon scientific knowled
the objects of faith can be demonstrated by reason, eithe
(from widely shared theological premises) or inductively (
experiences).
In this understanding of faith, the role of volition is not to make up or
fill the gap arising from lack of evidence, rather it is to strive and will to
know and understand. Thus volition has a role in this theory but one that
differs from the voluntaristic theory of faith.

9 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans, by Fathers of the English

Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Bros., 1947), II-II, q.2 a.q.
10 Ibid. See also, Terence Penelhum, 'The Analysis of Faith in Thomas Aquinas'
in Terence Penelhum (ed.), Faith (London: Collier Macmillan, 1989), 120.
11 Cf. Hick, 'Faith', 166-7.
12 Nicholas Wolterstorff called the rationalistic theory of faith 'evidentialism'
and gives John Locke's approach as an example in Western thought.
(See Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, 'Faith' in E. Craig (ed.) Routledge Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998), iii. 538-44.) According to Locke,
'one is entitled to believe things about God only if one believes them on
propositional evidence'. In this respect, there is a great similarity between the
Ash'aris and Locke. On the other hand, there is an important difference between
Locke's approach and Ash'ari doctrine. As Wolterstorff points out, Locke regards
faith as a species of opinion that must be rested on sufficient evidence, but
according to the Ash'aris—as will be shown in the following pages—faith is a
kind of knowledge.

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i66 FERIT USLU

The relation between faith and knowledge consti

question in determining the epistemological characte
Therefore, in order to discover the epistemologica
Ash'aris' theory of faith, it seems more approp
discussing their thought on the relationship betwee
edge. Before doing so, a particular clarification may
The main question being addressed here is whe
understanding of the epistemological structure of fa
not consist of something that goes beyond knowled
In this context, 'going beyond knowledge' has two
to be carefully distinguished.
In one sense, the question is asking the role in fa
obedience, awe (ta'zim), reverence, sincerity, truthf
I will call them in this paper 'moral and existentia
sense, if one says 'faith goes beyond knowledge' on
consists not only of knowledge, it consists also of m
attitudes.
In the other sense, the question is asking the
the relationship between knowledge and will in fa
'faith goes beyond knowledge' means, knowledgelj
have faith; rather, as in the Thomistic definition,
needed, namely a 'volitional leap'. So in this meani
asking whether faith is volitional (i.e. weak eviden
leap) or rational14 (i.e. assent on the basis of conclus
any volitional leap)?
Cantwell Smith, describing understanding of faith in
'faith [...] is not merely knowledge; it includes knowled
else as well'13 If we examine his argument carefully, w
questioning the issue in the first sense above. He goes
he means by the expression 'but something else as w

The difference, then, between knowledge and tasdiq [fait

and in the operationalist addenda denoted by the later ter

13 In this context 'knowledge' is used in the meaning

acquaintance', not 'knowledge that'. The main difference
while the former meaning of knowledge does not necess
the latter does. I give a more detailed explanation of
its consequences for faith in the first section.
14 In this context 'rational' is used not as the opp
but of volitional. For this use, see: Richard Taylor, 'Voluntarism'
The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, viii. 270-1.
15 Cantwell Smith, 'Faith as Tasdiq', 109.
16 Ibid, 110.

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 ASH'ARI DOCTRINE OF FAITH 167

According to Smith, sincerity and operationalism are the two elements

that 'go beyond knowledge' in Islamic faith. He himself qualifies these as
moral and personal characteristics of faith.17 He also determines four
levels to the meaning of faith. One of them is propositional and concerns
knowledge, hut the others have to do with morality and sincerity.18
So, for him, the things that, in faith, 'go beyond knowledge' are moral
and existential attitudes.
Of course there is nothing to say on these explanations. I agree with
Smith's evaluations of the conceptualization of faith in kaldm, reading
his explanations as the answer to the question above in the first sense.
In that sense, faith is something more than knowledge. But can it said in
the other sense of the question above?
The answer is no. However, I think that those two senses can easily be
confused. So someone can mistakenly infer that faith needs a voluntary
leap from the material that exists in the classical texts of the
mutakallimun. An important reason for that confusion may be the
Western history of thought on faith and knowledge. Under the influence
of that history, people think that in the epistemological sense faith is
more or less conjectural, and has a lower degree than knowledge.
Accordingly, in order to have faith, a volitional 'leap of faith' is
necessary.
As will be shown in the following pages, most Muslim theologians,
especially the early Ash'ari scholars, did not see faith in that
epistemological category. In consequence, they did not have a voluntar
istic theory of faith. However, that does not mean that they did not admit
that faith goes beyond knowledge in the first sense above.

FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE

From Abu l~Hasan al-Ash'arl (d. 935), the founder of Ash'arism,

two distinct definitions of faith (imdn)19 have arisen. First, he
defined faith as 'assent' (tasdiq),10 and later as 'knowledge'21

17 See ibid, 110, 111.

18 Ibid, 106.
19 In this paper, I have translated Iman as 'faith' and used 'belief' to render
itiqdd. Belief and faith are not used as synonyms; as will become clear, they have
different technical meanings in Ash'ari thought.
"° Abu 1-Hasan al-Ash'arl, Kitdb al-Luma , ed. Richard J. McCarthy (Beirut:
Imprimerie Catholique, 1953), 75.
21 Abu Bakr Ibn Furaq, Mujarrad Maqdldt al-Ash'ari, ed. Daniel Gimaret
(Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq, 1987), 16, 152.

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i68 FERIT USLU

(ilm, marifa). Further, with the term 'heart' to hi

occasionally another definition occurs in his writin
bi-l-qalb, 'assent by heart'.23
The three terms that come into view from these definitions of
al-Ash'ari—assent (tasdiq), knowledge (ilm, marifa), and heart (qalb)—
will be considered in more detail below. I should perhaps first observe
that, on the face of it, finding in al-Ash'ari's writings two quite different
definitions of faith—as 'assent' (or 'assent from the heart') and as
'knowledge'—might indicate that he was inconsistent or did not use
terms adequately and accurately. However, if we look closely at his
writings, we realize that this is not so. According to the reports of Ibn
Furaq (d. 1015), a leading follower of al-Ash'arl, he (al-Ash'arl)
constantly stressed that faith was a kind of knowledge.24 According to
al-Ash'arl, knowing God is strongly recommended and denying (nakr)
and ignoring (jahl) Him, the opposite of knowing, are prohibited.25
Similar expressions can be seen in the writings of the leading followers of

22 In Arabic there are two words that mean knowledge: ilm: from the root
'-l-m, and ma'rifa from the root of '-r-f. When the Ash'aris defined faith as
knowledge, they did not exclusively use one or the other word. Rather, they
sometimes attributed faith to a group of words derived from '-l-m and
sometimes to a group of words derived from '-r-f. This practice is appropriate in
that al-Ash'arl himself and his early followers considered and used 'ilm and
ma'rifa as synonyms. Ibn Furaq said of al-Ash'ari's usage of these terms: "ilm and
ma'rifa have the same meaning' (Mujarrad, 284.). In addition, the terms as used
by the Ash'aris in their definition of knowledge clearly indicate that the two
words had the same meaning for them: 'knowledge is cognizing something
as what it really is' (al-'ilmu ma'rifa al-ma'lum 'aid ma hniva bi-b) (Abu Bakr
al-Baqillanl, al-Tamhid al-awa'il wa-talkbis al-dalail, ed. Imad al-DIn Ahmad
Haydar (3rd edn., Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Kutub al-Thaqafiyya, 1414/1993), 25;
Abu 1-Ma'ali al-Juwaynl, al-Irshad ed. Es'ad Temlm (1st edn., Beirut: Mu'assasat
al-Kutub al-Thaqafiyya, 1405/1987), 33.
23 Ibn Furaq, Mujarrad, 284.
24 Ibid, 249.
Ibid. Al-Ash'arl (ibid, 248) cites the following Qur'anic verses in support of
this view: 'Shall he then who knows (ya'lamu) that what has been revealed unto
you from your Lord is the truth be like him who is blind? But it is only the men of
understanding that pay heed' (al-Ra'd, 13. 19); 'Know then (fa-'lam), that there
is no god but God, and seek forgiveness for your sin, and for the men and women
who believe[...]' (Muhammad, 47. 19); '... and fear God and know (wa-'lamu)
that God is strict in punishment' (al-Baqara, 2. 196); . .And know (wa-'lamu)
that God knows (ya'lamu) what is in your hearts, and take heed of Fiim; and
know (wa-'lamu) that Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Forbearing' (al-Baqara,
2. 235).

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 ASH'ARI DOCTRINE OF FAITH 169

al-Ash'arl, Abu Bakr al-Baqillanl (d. 1013) and Abu 1-Ma'alI al-Juwaynl
(d. 1085).26
The language used and terms adopted by Ash'ari scholars are so
unfamiliar when compared to usage in contemporary studies of theology
or philosophy of religion, that it can inhibit understanding of the Ash'ari
concept of faith. That is why it is both necessary and worthwhile to dwell
on the meaning of the terms used. First of all, when the Ash'aris defined
faith as knowledge, what kind of knowledge were they referring to,
what are its structural features? Secondly, how did they relate this
knowledge to faith? Did they consider faith as an attitude that included
knowledge but at the same time went beyond it, or did they argue that
faith was directly a kind of knowledge? To answer these questions
we must take account of the meaning of assent (tasdiq) in their usage.
According to them, assent is the acceptance of a proposition or a given
report.27 Al-BaghdadI (d. 1037) gave the Ash'aris' definition of faith as,
'to assent to God's and His prophets' messages'.28 In Ash'ari terminology,
when assent is used in connection with God, it means, 'to accept the truth
that is reported by God',29 'to know the existence, divinity and
sempiternity (qidam) of God"0 and 'to confirm the truth of the message
that was sent by God'.31 And when used in connection with the Prophet,
assent means, 'to know the truth of the Prophet's message'32 and 'to
approve the truth of the Prophet's message'.33
As can be seen in the above quotations, the assent in faith is about the
'truths', in other words, it has the character of an affirmation of
propositional statements. This tells us that the early Ash'ari model
of faith was propositional. All of the main features that are expected

26 al-Baqillanl, Tamhid, 389; al-Juwaynl, Irshad, 333-4. In fact considering

faith as a kind of knowledge was not peculiar only to early Ash'aris; it can be
seen in all Ash'aris and can be generalized to other streams of thought in Islam.
Thus Franz Rosenthal stated: '...there is so much evidence for the equation
of faith and knowledge in Muslim religious writings, and so little for the
opposite point of view that the two have nothing to do with each other'
(Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval
Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970), 108.
2 Al-Baqillanl, Tamhid, 389; al-Juwaynl, Irshad, 334.
2S 'Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdadl, Kitab Usui al-din (3rd edn., Beirut: Dar
al-Kutub al-Tlmiyya, 1401/1981), 247-8.
29 al-Juwaynl, Irshad, 333-4.
30 Abu 1-Qasim al-Ansari, al-Ghunya ft usul al-din (Istanbul: MS III Ahmad,
no: 1916) fol. 228r f.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.

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 FERIT USLU

in the concept of a prepositional faith as 'assent'

and 'the cognitive character of faith' are present
In the quotations above, two common features

i. the propositions,
ii. to accept (or to approve) their truth.

There is another feature that should be added t

an important clue about why faith was seen as
Ash'aris. It is:

iii. The certainty of the assent.34

It appears that early Ash'ari scholars regarded certainty as one of the

most important elements of assent in faith.
The historical roots of connecting faith with certainty pre-date
al-Ash'ari. The link between faith and certainty as seen by early
Muslim scholars was so strong that faith was defined as 'certainty'
(yaqin) by some of the traditionists (ashab al-hadltb). Al-Bukharl stated
that faith means 'certainty', on the basis of the phrase 'certainty is the
whole of faith' attributed to the Companion, 'Abdullah b. Mas'ud.35
From that, it will be understood that assent (tasdlq) in the Ash'ari
definition of faith carries the meaning, 'certain true belief'.
According to early Ash'aris, the most appropriate term that fits the
concept of 'certain true belief', which is seen as the basic feature of faith,
is knowledge. The following expression of Abu 1-Qasim al-Isfara Ini,
a leading Ash'ari scholar, gives us accurate evidence about it. Having
defined faith as 'knowing the truth of the message of God and His
Prophet', Abu 1-Qasim al-Isfara'inl goes on to clarify the term assent in
faith as, 'the religion {dirt) sees assent (tasdlq) as knowledge (ilm).
So taking assent only as a belief (itiqad) but not considering it as

34 In the kaldm books, the discussion of certainty of assent is found mostly in

the sections where the question 'Can there be an exception in faith?' is raised.
For example, while examining the subject of 'exception in the faith' al-Juwaynl
states, 'it is firmly known that there is no place for doubt in faith' (Irsbad, 336).
Certainty of faith is also stressed in discussions of the question 'Can faith increase
and decrease?' The recognized degrees of assent are opinion, assumption,
supposition, thought, belief, conviction; it was thought that if someone's faith
had degrees—in other words, if it increased or decreased—this would mean
that it lacked certainty, which was out of the question for the notion of faith.
(For an example, see ibid, 335).
35 Al-Bukharl, Iman, in Sahih, 8 vols. (Istanbul: al-Maktaba al-Islamiyya,
1315 ah), i. 8.

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 ASH'ARI DOCTRINE OF FAITH

knowledge, is not enough.'36 Additionally, Abu 1-Mu

maintains that Ash'aris use the term assent in a par
to mean an inferential (bi-l-istidlal) assent, and he adds th
to Ash'aris, assent means knowledge {'ilm).37
These examples perhaps explain why al-Ash'arl and his ea
defined faith sometimes as assent and sometimes as know
be seen, there is no contradiction between the two defini
there is complementarity—the same meaning is affirmed
terms and views. Broadly speaking, for the early Ash'ar
special kind of knowledge that includes essentially ass
'knowledge that'.
Here, I use the term 'knowledge that' in its sense as
by Gilbert Ryle in contradistinction to 'knowledge by acq
The opposite of 'knowing that' used in this sense (because
tied to the truthfulness of propositions) is 'denying that'
that'. Also, the terms implying uncertainty, like doubt,
suspicion stand in contrast to 'knowledge that' by a
In 'knowledge by acquaintance', acceptance or denial of t
proposition is not always necessary, so the opposite of th
knowledge is not, necessarily, rejection or denial of a pro
usually, simple ignorance of a fact or a thing.
Thus, in Ash'ari writings we find that the usage of 'kn
tasdlq\ a 'knowledge that', is not the opposite of ignorance
of a proposition, of doubt and degrees of opinion.39

36 Al-Ansarl, al-Gbunya fol 228r.

3 Abu 1-Mu'In al-Nasafl, Tabsirat al-adilld' fl usiil al-din (ed. C
2 vols., 1st edn., Damascus: Institut Fran^ais de Damas, 1990), 3
38 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes &c
133-4. For a further explanation of these two types of kn
H. H. Price, Belief (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), 42-6
39 These usages are clearly seen where al-Juwaynl lists concep
knowledge by tasdiq. One of these is jabl. While the word lite
ignorance, al-Juwaynl does not use it in that way. Rather, he
'to believe that something is different from what it really is',
'misbelief' or 'false belief'. And this definition corresponds to th
usage of jabl. The other concepts opposite to knowledge by tasdiq
to al-Juwaynl (Irshad, 35-6), opinion (%ann) and doubt (shakk).
In Ash'ari terminology, as in the definition of faith in propos
unbelief (kufr)—the opposite concept in Islamic terminology to f
defined in a propositional way as takdbib, which means denying
(ibid, 35-6).
While Ash'ari scholars used jabl to qualify unbelief as just st
not mean by it ignorance or not-knowing but believing somethi

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172. FERIT USLU

'Knowledge by tasdlq' is also opposed in Ash'a

(itiqad).40 However, the relation between knowledge
usage needs some further explanation. The difficulty o
by early Ash'ari scholars of i'tiqad in two different
In one sense, belief (t tiqad) is used for all the degrees
degrees of assent—listed from stronger to weaker—
tion, belief, opinion, doubt (because it was consider
some Ash'ari writings)41 and false belief—were acc
belief. So in this usage, knowledge is a kind of belie
In the second sense of belief (i tiqad), seen more f
writings, the term includes only the degrees of assent
certainty. Thus, while doubt, opinion, subjective
recognized as kinds of belief, knowledge cannot.43
In order to distinguish the two senses,44 we see t
when referring to the second sense of belief, g
expression 'mere belief'.45 Accordingly, the sen
opposite to 'knowledge by tasdlq' is 'mere belief'. W
the standard of subjective certainty, it lacks the s
necessary for objective certainty (i.e. conclusive evid
recognized as knowledge. Furthermore, while mere
true and false, knowledge ought to be always true.
To clarify the contrast between 'knowledge by tasdlq'
we may say that, if someone believes that p, then
knowledge about it. Nonetheless, if someone know
do not (merely) believe that p. This contrast betwe
and knowledge is clear in the following formulatio
"However their beliefs (i tiqad) are not knowledge [

In this way, it also means incorrect belief. Another mea

terminology is denying and rejecting. Thus, by qualify
they meant the rejection of religious propositions, the opp
40 Al-Ansarl, al-Ghunya fol. 228r; al-Juwaynl, al- Aqi
Ahmad HijazI al-Saqa (1st edn., Cairo: Maktaba al-Ku
1398/1978), 91; al-Nasafl, Tabsira, i. 30.
41 Al-Juwaynl considered doubt as a degree of assent sin
in doubt assents to there being an ambiguity or balance to
proposition in question is true or false (Irshad, 27).
42 Al-Ansarl, al-Ghunya fol. 228r; al-Juwaynl, Irshad, 3
43 Al-Ansarl, al-Ghunya fol. 228r; al-Juwaynl, al-'Aqid
44 Richard M. Frank also takes note of the two meanin
(i'tiqad), in Ash'ari terminology. See Frank, 'Knowledge a
45 Al-Nasafi, Tabsira, i. 30.

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 ASH'ARI DOCTRINE OF FAITH 173

a [kind of] belief"46 In this second sense, the relationsh

knowledge and belief can be formulated as the two are mutually
To turn back to the first sense of 'belief', the relation betw
knowledge was understood differently. In this sense, 'kno
tasdiq1 is a kind of 'belief that' (i'tiqad). According to Ash'a
'knowledge by tasdiq' was seen as true belief that had suff
conclusive evidence.
To sum up, two important features arise from the relation between
'knowledge by tasdiq' and 'belief that':

i. 'Knowledge by tasdiq' and 'mere belief' are mutually exclusive.

ii. 'Knowledge by tasdiq' is a kind of belief, in the general meaning of belief.

These features have important consequences for the relation between

faith and knowledge in early Ash'ari thought and therefore merit some
further consideration.

The consequences of the first feature

The mutual exclusiveness of 'knowledge by tasdiq' and 'mere belief'

points to why early Ash'ari scholars consider faith as 'knowledge that'
but not as 'belief that'. As we emphasized above, al-Ash'ari and his early
followers thought that assent in faith always had to contain truth and
certainty. These two properties come together only in 'knowledge that'.
Therefore 'knowledge that' was deemed more worthy than any other
term properly to express 'assent' (tasdiq) in faith.
However, if a 'mere belief' happens to be true and the person who holds
it believes in it firmly, it seems on first appearance that it fits the conditions
of 'assent' put forward by early Ash'ari scholars. Then why was 'assent'
not used in a way that it could also include the true, firm belief?
The answer to this question will provide us the first evidence for the
general argument of this paper that early Ash'aris had a rationalistic
theory of faith.
It seems appropriate to seek the answer from the point of the
relationship between faith and certainty.
As we just reiterated, Ash'aris considered certainty to be one of the most
important properties of faith. Similarly, we understand from their writings
that they also regarded certainty as one of the major features of 'knowing
that'. For instance, Ibn Furaq reported that al-Ash'ari had seen no
differences between knowledge and certainty.47 The point here is that they
did not regard certainty as a degree or even as the strongest degree of
knowledge, they regarded it as knowledge itself. As certainty, to them,

46 al-Juwaynl, al-Aqtda al-Nizamiyya, 91.

4 Ibn Furaq, Mujarrad, 11.

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174 FERIT USLU

was a necessary feature for describing an assent as kno

either possesses certainty, then it is called knowledge,
certainty, when it is 'mere belief'. Therefore, in early
the term certainty did not refer only to subjective con
but also to the objective features of it, to its h
evidential grounds.48
Ash'aris consider that 'mere belief', even if true
cannot be free from doubts and suspicions due t
grounds that constitute objective certainty to assent
seems to be the essential reason for not holding true, f
knowledge in Ash'ari thought. Thus, even if believ
hearted subjective conviction about something
conclusive evidence for it, their belief cannot be tak
For, even if a 'mere belief' happens to be true, the
it cannot know its truth without possessing str
evidence, i.e. scientific knowledge. It can be said th
early Ash'ari scholars considered 'assent' in faith (i
true belief', which fulfils both subjective and obje
certainty. And also for this reason, al-Ash'arl did no
of a blind follower of the creed (muqallld) as a
faith.50 According to the report of Ibn Furaq, al-A

48 al-Juwaynl, asserted this point clearly when criticizi

knowledge formulated by some Mu'tazlll scholars as 'know
something is, as it really is [that is, 'truly'] with the whole he
According to al-Juwaynl, that definition was incorrect b
clear the difference between a true belief and knowledge. I
Mu'tazllis were taken as true, the belief of a 'blind foll
(muqallld) in the Creator of the world should be consid
Even if the muqallld truly and strongly believed that some
al-Juwayni, that belief could not be taken as knowledge, an
definition of Mu'tazllis was misleading (Irshad, 28).
49 The following statements of al-Juwayni indicates clearly w
could not be considered knowledge: 'Most of the fol
and community (ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama a) have true belief,
(mu'taqid) belief that something is as it really is. But t
knowledge, since the believer does not necessarily know the
And most of the community do not have evidence [for their
not knowledge it is hard to protect it" (al-'Aqida al-Nizdm
50 Ibn Furaq reported al-Ash'ari's view on this subject a
the insightful (ahl al-nazar) among those who seek t
mutakallimun is of the same kind as when one speaks a
theological speculation with great detail (al-tafsll). The kn
believers depends upon a general knowledge of the subjects

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 ASH'ARI DOCTRINE OF FAITH 175

the belief of a person who did not know even generally the evidence
for the truth of his religious assent, could not be considered as faith.
Al-Ash'ari's rationalistic approach led him to regard the muqallid's
faith as invalid. If the reasons for this stance are examined carefully,
it is quite possible to argue that they were epistemological
rather than religious, that is, directly logical results of his theory of
knowledge.

The consequences of the second feature

According to the Ash'ari theory of faith, the most considerable

consequence of seeing 'knowledge by tasdiq' as a kind of belief is that
such knowledge always entails acceptance. So when one says, 'I know
that p\ it entails at least the meaning, 'I believe that p'. Thus one cannot
say, 'I do not believe that p' after affirming, 'I know that p\ Usage of the
word 'believe' does not permit this kind of a meaning without lapse into
contradiction.
It follows from this feature of 'knowledge by tasdiq'' that to say,
for example, 'I know that God exists', is to say, 'I believe firmly
that God exists and I have sufficient and conclusive evidence
for believing so.'
In this respect 'knowledge by tasdiq' is clearly distinguished from
'knowledge by acquaintance', since the judgement just expressed cann
be applied to the latter. To say, for example, 'I know Descarte
ontological argument' in the sense of 'knowledge by acquaintance' is t
say, 'I am acquainted with Descartes' ontological argument', meaning
I know the premises, the conclusion and the reasoning that it consists in.
This kind of knowledge does not necessitate assent. Therefore, in thi
sense of knowledge, if one says that 'I know Descartes' ontologic
argument but I do not believe it at all', it does not entail a lapse int
contradiction.
One needs to be careful with the word 'at least' in the expression
'knowledge by tasdiq' entails at least the meaning "belief"'. While
'knowing that' always entails 'believing that' when someone says 'I know
that p', the expression is not reversible, i.e. 'believing that' is not a
sufficient condition for 'knowledge by tasdiq'. Thus from the point of
view of early Ash'aris, the expression 'I know that p' comprises three
distinct elements: (i) I believe firmly that p, (ii) p is true, (iii) I have

explained by the mutakallimun in detail. The beliefs (t tiqdd) of those people,

who fall outside these two groups, are in "doubt" and "conjecture". If their
beliefs are correct, in this case they believe truly by imitation (taqlld), but if their
beliefs are false, they will be the people who fall into error and go astray'
(Ibn Furaq, Mujarrad, 251).

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i76 FERIT USLU

sufficient and conclusive evidence for believing fir

In sum, they saw a contrast between 'knowledge b
belief', and they considered that 'mere belief' was n
proper faith, therefore they defined faith not within
but 'knowledge that'.
This analysis provides the first ground for the ar
Ash'aris had an intellectualistic theory of faith rather
one. For if they had been defining faith as 'mere belief
been a need for a volitional leap. However, as they defi
that', there was no need for this leap. Reasoning, wh
claim of sufficient evidence, took the place of such a le
There is a second ground for our argument about the
which can be derived from the analysis of the relation
evidence.

Faith and Evidence

Ash'ari scholars, following Abu 1-Hasan al-Ash'ari, classified 'knowledge

that' as necessary (al-ilm al-darurT) and inferential (al-'ilm al-istidlali or
al-ilm al-nazari or al-'ilm al-kasbi).51
Ibn Furaq reported that al-Ash'ari considered necessary knowledge
as knowledge that did not depend on reasoning or on inference or on
some already existing notion (fikra).52 Included among the kinds of
necessary knowledge enumerated by al-Ash'ari were: knowledge
acquired from immediate sense experience; self-evident knowledge
(like knowing the impossibility of contradictory propositions being
simultaneously true); immediate knowledge from introspection;
and reports on the veracity of which there has been mass accord
(tawatur).53
Necessary knowledge is something that compels one to accept it
as soon as one understands it.'4 According to Ash'aris, inferential
knowledge is distinct from necessary knowledge in that it depends on
reasoning from evidence.5;> The 'reasoning' meant here can be done

51 Regarding this classification, al-Juwaynl (Irshad, 35) appears at first sight to

think differently, since he classifies knowledge into necessary (.al-'ilm al-darurt),
self-evident (al-'ilm al-badihi) and inferential (al-'ilm al-istidldli). But according
to him self-evident knowledge is a kind of necessary knowledge. Then, in his
classification, inferential knowledge is distintiguished from necessary and
self-evident knowledge.
52 Ibn Furaq, Mujarrad, 248.
53 Ibid, al-Baqillanl, Tambid, 27, 28.
54 Ibid, 26.
55 Ibid, 27-8.

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 ASH' ARI DOCTRINE OF FAITH 177

either from the premises of necessary truths or from the premises that are
derived from other premises that contain necessary truths.56 The term
'evidence', in the definition formulated by early Ash'ari scholars,
means that which is constituted by 'indications' or 'signs' or 'marks'
that lead us to knowledge that cannot be acquired from perception or
self-evident truths.57
The method they used in inference was defined so as to be consistent
with the definition of evidence, and named 'inferring the unseen from
the seen' (istidlal bi-l-sbahid 'ala l-ghayb). Al-Ash'arl stated that,
as we know from seeing a book that there is an author of that book,
or as we know that there is an agent from witnessing some of his/her
acts, we know that God exists by His acts.58
It is important to recognize that they used 'seen' (shahid) and 'unseen'
(gbayb) as epistemological rather than ontological terms in their
understanding of 'inferring the unseen from the seen'. Thus Ibn Furaq
reported that al-Ash'arl referred by 'seen' to a kind of knowledge
that is known directly by perception or necessarily by reason, and
by 'unseen' to a kind of knowledge that cannot be known by either
of those ways.59
Accordingly, evidence, in their thought, consists of either necessary
truths or propositions that are derived from necessary truths. Then,
in light of the precise terminological meanings of ghayb and shahid,
the fact that objects of faith belong to the former rather than the
latter indicates that faith consists of inferential knowledge rather than
necessary knowledge.
It can be asked at this point whether or not they regarded the evidence
acquired by 'inferring unseen from seen' as sufficient and conclusive.
A cogent answer to this question can be found in al-Ash'ari's
formulations as quoted by Ibn Furaq. There, al-Ash'ari stresses that in
order for a reasoning that depends on 'inferring the unseen from the seen'
to lead someone to believe in God it must meet a number of conditions.
After enumerating these conditions—they include 'to be free of

56 Ibid.
57 Ibid, 33.
^ Ibn Furaq, Mujarrad, 287.
5' According to Ibn Furaq (Mujarrad, 14), the relevant formulation used by
al-Ash'arl was this: 'The seen (al-sbahid) means known in necessarily where it
does not come to the meaning of that which cannot be perceived or known by the
senses [...] And the unseen (al-ghayb) means that which cannot be perceived by
the senses and that cannot be known in a way that is acquired by either necessary
knowledge or sense perception.'

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i78 FERIT USLU

prejudices', 'to analyse all of the alternative views

detail'—he goes on to describe how this reasoning w

the person [...] can know the truth or falsehood of a judgem

his necessary knowledge as a foundation or as a criterion
[enable] the judgement that he is going to evaluate. He acc
[judgements] that have evidence for and the falsehood of
have evidence against. When he cleanses his thoughts and
the things that prevent him from reasoning and from
objectively, then indisputably [...] the knowledge that he
knowledge that God exists] will appear in his mind.'60

Al-Ash'ari saw a necessary correlation between fa

which could be paraphrased as 'believe that to w
leads you'—and he saw the evidential ground a
element of faith. In other words, evidence is an ess
element in the epistemological structure of his con
The text just cited also indicates a strong rationali
affirms that if we cleanse our minds of prejudices
lead us easily and directly to the truth that ca
accepted.
In conclusion, in early Ash'ari teaching, the assent in faith does not
depend upon a voluntary leap that fills in the gap caused by
insufficiency of evidence. Rather, the evidence leads to assent in faith
in so certain a way that there is no need for a volitional leap. Hence,
we never see in the Ash'ari theory of faith the 'leap of faith' concept,
common to medieval Christian (especially Catholic) theological
argument.61

60 Ibid, 250.
61 The voluntaristic character of faith is continually emphasized in the decrees
of both the First and the Second Vatican Councils. (See, respectively: De Fide,
canon 5; Declaration on Religious Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae), 10.) We see
this emphasis prominently in the writings of Thomas Aquinas, which have been
hugely influential for the doctrine of Catholic faith from the Middle Ages on.
For Aquinas, faith is a virtue whose primary act is the assent to propositions at
the command of the will. Faith differs from knowledge in respect of the epistemic
status of the proposition assented to: while in knowledge the proposition that
is assented to rests on conclusive evidence, in faith this is not the case.
The inconclusiveness of the evidence for faith frees the intellect to choose
whether or not to assent. So, according to Aquinas, the firmness of the assent in
faith cannot lie in the epistemic disposition of the intellect, it must lie in the will
that commands to it. (Summa Theologica, II-II, q.3 a.4.)

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 ASH'ARI DOCTRINE OF FAITH T79

The Role of Volition

The way early Ash'ari scholars correlate faith and evid
question about the role of free will in faith. Is there any
theory of faith for the concept of free choice?
While looking for the place of free will in their theory of f
that the key concept that should be considered first
knowledge' (al-ilm al-iktisabi). In Ash'ari terminolog
knowledge' was used as the synonym of inferential
(al-ilm al-istidldli) and in contradistinction to necessary
By calling inferential knowledge 'acquired knowledge
pointing to the obligatory character of inferential kn
'acquired', in this context, refers to an intentional effor
process that consists in thinking, picking up evidence, argu
and coming to a decision.63
In order to determine the role of volition in early Ash'a
faith, it is important to consider the reason for calling the k
faith 'acquired knowledge'.
According to al-Ash'arl, the knowledge in faith was no
necessary knowledge that came either innately or self-evi
direct evidence to the senses. For, if knowing that God exists
the kind of necessary knowledge, all humankind would be
compelled to know Him and it would be impossible to
opposite of this truth or even to doubt it.64 However, b
inferential knowledge as 'acquired knowledge' (kasbi), a p
for free will, to seek or not seek it, and then to accept or
It is not the insufficiency of evidence made up by a v
that provides a place for free will and voluntary assen
theory of faith. Rather, conclusive inferential knowledg
reasonable volitional choice possible. Therefore, according
it is not the volitional leap that makes faith virtuous and wor
it is the intentional effort that took place in the inferent
that does so.65

The Role of the Heart

The third concept with an important place in Ash'ari the
was the 'heart'. As I mentioned at the beginning, so

62 By way of example of this contradistinction, consider th

al-Ash'ari: 'For this reason, the knowledge about God in this wor
a necessary knowledge but an acquired knowledge' (Ibn Furaq, M
63 al-Baqillanl, Tamhid, 27-8.
64 Ibn Furaq, Mujarrad, 248.
65 Al-BaghdadI, Kitdb Usui al-din, 8; al-Nasafl, Tabslra, i. 31.

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i8o FERIT USLU

Ash'ari scholars describe faith as 'assent from the heart' instead

of only 'assent'. This occasional presence of the 'heart', as a third
element in the definition of faith, would initially indicate a
voluntaristic emphasis. As we know that is not the case, what did
the Ash'aris mean by adding 'from the heart' to their definition of
faith as an assent?
It seems that the first consideration the early Ash'ari scholars had
in mind was not the meaning that 'from the heart' put into the
definition but, instead, the meaning that was thus excluded from it.
There appears to have been a discussion on the theme taking place
at the time among opposing Muslim theological schools. According
to the Qarramiyya, an early Muslim theological sect, who interpreted
assent in an extremely literal, formal way, faith was seen only as
a formal profession (al-iqrar) of the creeds.66 The Qarrami scholars
claimed that if one publicly made the statement 'I believe..it would
be enough to then be regarded as a believer. Ash'ari scholars
were strongly and unanimously opposed to this claim. For this
reason, in order to emphasize that faith is not only a formal
profession of the creed, they were not satisfied with the definition
of 'faith is an assent', and included 'from the hear' in their definition
as well.
Al-Ash'arl considered faith essentially as an inner speech, and thought
the act of oral profession a manifestation (i.e., an external expression)
of it. The following passages of Abu 1-Qasim al-Ansarl indicate clearly
the 'inner speech' character of faith in al-Ash'arl's teaching:
The answer of AbuTHasan [al-Ash'arl] given to the question of what he meant
by assent (tasdiq) was variable: Sometimes he explained tasdiq as knowing God's
existence, his divinity (uluhiyya) and sempiternity (qidam); sometimes he said
that assent (tasdiq) was an inner speech (qawlu l-nafs), which included knowing
and could not be present without knowledge. The latter was also the view of
al-Qadi (al-Baqillamj for assent and rejection are usually to do with oral
assertions. 7

Al-Juwayni stated the same idea in a similar way: 'Faith is an

assent to God. And as far as assent is concerned, in fact it is an inner
speech.'68
Accordingly, in the definition of faith in early Ash'ari terminology,
we must understand that 'from the heart' denoted essentially the mental

66 Abu-l-Hasan al-Ash'ari, Kitdb Maqdldt al-Isldmiyytn wa-ikbtildf

al-musdllin, ed. Helmut Ritter (Weisenbaden, 1980), 279 ff.
67 Al-AnsarT, Ghunya, fol. 228r.
68 Al-Juwaynl, Irshdd, 334.

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 ASH'ARI DOCTRINE OF FAITH 181

aspect of assent in contrast to oral profession.69 It would not be correct

to conclude that they meant to allude to a voluntaristic characteristic
or any non-intellectualistic or feeling-related aspects of faith.
That said, we can still ask why they did not use the term 'reason'
instead of 'heart' in their definition. The question presupposes that in
Ash'ari terminology 'the heart' has some elements or attributes that go
beyond 'reason' in that terminology. If that is indeed the case, then it will
take us to the conclusion that, by including 'the heart' in their definition,
early Ash'ari scholars were alluding to some voluntaristic characteristic
of faith that goes beyond 'reason'.
But the presupposition seems not to be true. In the Ash'ari
terminology, 'heart' referred to the centre of cognitive activities and
attitudes of mind (such as cognizing, knowing, understanding, thinking,
reasoning, etc.) rather than to conative or feeling-related attitudes.
For example, al-Ash'ari asserted that 'God created the knowledge of
colours in the hearts of people who are blind.'70 That is why he
considered the knowledge of colours to be an la priori knowledge'.
Another piece of evidence for the usage of 'heart' completely in the
meaning of reason is regarding one form of inference (nazar) as an act of
'heart'. For example, al-Baqillani defined al-nazar as 'an act of heart by
which the things, which can not be acquired necessarily or by sense
experience, can be known'.71 Similarly, al-Juwaynl described inference as
'considering, thinking' (fikra) and 'reflecting' (ta'ammul) by the 'heart'.
He mentioned scholars of some other theological sects that gave to
'inference' (nazar) emotional meanings like 'hoping for something'
or 'being in forgiveness' and pronounced this false.72
In sum, there are two arguments against any claim that including
'from the heart' in the early Ash'aris' definition of faith alluded to
the existence of a voluntaristic element of faith in their doctrine of it.
One is that 'the heart' was used to indicate, in contrast to public

69 We can see this explicitly from an occasion when al-Ash'arl was giving the
reason for including 'from the heart' in the definition of faith: Ibn Furaq reports
that al-Ash'arl, after defining faith as 'an assent from the heart', concluded,
'since a formal profession without an assent from the heart cannot be seen a real
faith' (Mujarrad, 150.) And again in this sentence attributed to al-Ash'arl:
'Formally oral profession is called 'assent' (tasdiq). This is the meaning of faith
among the non-scholars. But in fact, faith is an assent from the heart' (ibid, 152).
70 Ibid, 5-17, 88-9, 83-4.
1 Al-Baqillani, Tambld, 33; idem, al-Insaf fima yajibu i'tiqadubu wa-la
yajitzu l-jabl bihi, ed. Muhammad Zahid al-Kawthari (Cairo: al-Maktaba
al-Azhariyya li-l-Turath, 1414/1993), 15.
2 al-Juwaynl, al-Kdfiya ft l-jadal, ed. Fawqiyya H. Mahmud (Cairo: Matba'a
Isa al-Babi al-Halabl, 1979), 17.

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182 FERIT USLU

profession, inner speech, or the inner effort of as

not only in their definition of faith but generally,
'heart' as a faculty contrasted with reason or going
two arguments are taken together, along with the
'from the heart' was not always used in their form
we may conclude that use of the phrase did not
dimension or different emphasis to the meaning of the
of faith as 'assent'. We may also conclude that 'hea
a volitional or non-intellectual connotation in thei
it would appear to be incorrect to argue, from the
the heart' in their definition of faith as assent, for a v
in the doctrine of faith in early Ash'arism.

CONCLUSION

Overall, we can say that early Ash'ari theory of faith wa

upon a strong rationalistic view. The rationalism in their theor
was based on two grounds: that faith is inferential knowled
and that knowledge gets its certainty from conclusive evid
say that almost all their teachings about faith either aim
this doctrine and strengthen its logical structure or are
quences of it.
Proofs and evidences were thought, in their faith theory, to have a
constructive role in the logical structure of faith, as foundations of an
arising faith, rather than as supportive or defensive of an existing faith.
Further, by virtue of their argument that the evidence was sufficient
and conclusive for faith, they believed that there was no need for
a volitional 'leap of faith' to make up deficiencies in the evidence.
Finally, for the reasons given above, the inclusion by early Ash'aris
of 'from the heart' in their definition of faith as assent does not alter
this general conclusion.

E-mail: uslu@gazi.edu.tr

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