(Transformations of The State) Dominika Biegoń (Auth.) - Hegemonies of Legitimation - Discourse Dynamics in The European Commission-Palgrave Macmillan UK (2016) PDF

Transformations of the State
Series Editors: Achim Hurrelmann, Carleton University, Canada; Stephan Leibfried, Uni-
versity of Bremen, Germany; Kerstin Martens, University of Bremen, Germany; Peter Mayer,
University of Bremen, Germany
Titles include:
Dominika Biegoń
HEGEMONIES OF LEGITIMATION
Discourse Dynamics in the European Commission
Joan DeBardeleben and Achim Hurrelmann (editors)
DEMOCRATIC DILEMMAS OF MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE
Legitimacy, Representation and Accountability in the European Union
Karin Gottschall, Bernhard Kittel, Kendra Briken, Jan-Ocko Heuer and Sylvia Hils
PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT REGIMES
Transformations of the State as an Employer
Andreas Hepp, Monika Elsler, Swantje Lingenberg, Anne Mollen and Johanna Möller
THE COMMUNICATIVE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE
Cultures of Political Discourse, Public Sphere, and the Euro Crisis
Achim Hurrelmann and Steffen Schneider (editors)
THE LEGITIMACY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE AND AMERICA
Achim Hurrelmann, Steffen Schneider and Jens Steffek (editors)
LEGITIMACY IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL POLITICS
Achim Hurrelmann, Stephan Leibfried, Kerstin Martens and Peter Mayer (editors)
TRANSFORMING THE GOLDEN-AGE NATION STATE
Lutz Leisering (editor)
THE NEW REGULATORY STATE
Regulating Pensions in Germany and the UK
Kerstin Martens, Alessandra Rusconi and Kathrin Leuze (editors)
NEW ARENAS OF EDUCATION GOVERNANCE
The Impact of International Organizations and Markets on Educational Policy Making
Kerstin Martens, Philipp Knodel and Michael Windzio (editors)
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF EDUCATION POLICY
A New Constellation of Statehood in Education?
Kerstin Martens, Alexander-Kenneth Nagel, Michael Windzio and Ansgar Weymann (editors)
TRANSFORMATION OF EDUCATION POLICY
Steffen Mau, Heike Brabandt, Lena Laube and Christof Roos
LIBERAL STATES AND THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
Selective Borders, Unequal Mobility
Aletta Mondré
FORUM SHOPPING IN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
Christof Roos
THE EU AND IMMIGRATION POLICIES
Cracks in the Walls of Fortress Europe?
Heinz Rothgang and Steffen Schneider
STATE TRANSFORMATIONS IN OECD COUNTRIES
Dimensions, Driving Forces, and Trajectories
Heinz Rothgang, Mirella Cacace, Simone Grimmeisen, Uwe Helmert and Claus Wendt
THE STATE AND HEALTHCARE
Comparing OECD Countries
Steffen Schneider, Achim Hurrelmann, Zuzana Krell-Laluhová, Frank Nullmeier and Achim
Wiesner
DEMOCRACY’S DEEP ROOTS
Why the Nation State Remains Legitimate
Peter Starke
RADICAL WELFARE STATE RETRENCHMENT
A Comparative Analysis
Peter Starke, Alexandra Kaasch and Franca Van Hooren (editors)
THE WELFARE STATE AS CRISIS MANAGER
Explaining the Diversity of Policy Responses to Economic Crisis
Silke Weinlich
THE UN SECRETARIAT’S INFLUENCE ON THE EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING
Hartmut Wessler (editor)
PUBLIC DELIBERATION AND PUBLIC CULTURE
The Writings of Bernhard Peters, 1993–2005
Hartmut Wessler, Bernhard Peters, Michael Brűggemann, Katharina Kleinen-von Kőnigslőw
and Stefanie Sifft
TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF PUBLIC SPHERES
Jochen Zimmermann and Jörg R. Werner
REGULATING CAPITALISM?
The Evolution of Transnational Accounting Governance
Jochen Zimmerman, Jörg R. Werner and Philipp B. Volmer
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN ACCOUNTING
Public Power and Private Commitment
Transformations of the State Series Standing Order

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Hegemonies of
Legitimation
Discourse Dynamics in the European
Commission
Dominika Biegoń
Parliamentary Assistant, European Parliament, Belgium
HEGEMONIES OF LEGITIMATION. DISCOURSE DYNAMICS IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Copyright © Dominika Biegoń 2016
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this
publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written
permission. In accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs
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may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
First published 2016 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
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in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited,
registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills,
Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.
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DOI: 10.1057/9781137570505
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England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke,
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A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
A catalogue record for the book is available from the British Library.
Contents
List of Figures and Tables vi
Series Preface vii
Acknowledgements ix
1 Introduction: Legitimacy as a Discursive Battleground in

the European Commission 1
2 Discourse Dynamics 29
3 Reconstructing Meanings of a Legitimate EC/EU: Discursive

Metaphor Analysis 59
4 Change and Continuity of Legitimacy Discourses in the

European Commission between 1973 and 2013 94
5 The Failed Hegemonic Project: The Identity Discourse in

the 1980s 141
6 Democracy as a Successful Hegemonic Project in the 1990s 169
7 Conclusion: Towards an Alternative Horizon – Democracy

and Dispute 195
Bibliography 203
Index 228
v
Figures and Tables
Figures
2.1 Temporally fixed hegemonic discourse 49

2.2 Antagonistic counter-hegemonic operation 55
2.3 Heterogeneous counter-hegemonic operation 1 56
2.4 Heterogeneous counter-hegemonic operation 2 58
4.1 Number of analysed legitimacy-relevant documents per
year 96
4.2 Development of legitimacy discourses (1973–2013) (%) 102
5.1 Chain of equivalence of the identity discourse 149
5.2 Structure of the people’s Europe discourse 159
6.1 Break-up of the people’s Europe discourse 177
6.2 Chain of equivalence of the democracy discourse, early
1990s 179
6.3 Structure of the political union discourse 186
Tables
1.1 Models of legitimacy 16

3.1 Theories of metaphors 75
4.1 Change of expression in the democracy discourse:
Overview 133
4.2 Legitimacy discourses, source domains and stylized
metaphorical expressions 138
vi
Series Preface
Over the past four centuries, the nation state has emerged as the world’s
most effective means of organizing society, but its current status and
future are decidedly uncertain. Some scholars predict the total demise
of the nation state as we know it, its powers eroded by a dynamic global
economy on the one hand and, on the other, by the transfer of polit-
ical decision-making to supranational bodies. Other analysts point out
the remarkable resilience of the state’s core institutions and assert that
even in the age of global markets and politics, the state remains the
ultimate guarantor of security, democracy, welfare and the rule of law.
Does either of these interpretations describe the future of the OECD
world’s modern, liberal nation state? Will the state soon be as obso-
lete and irrelevant as an outdated computer? Should it be scrapped for
some new invention, or can it be overhauled and rejuvenated? Or is the
state actually thriving and still fit to serve, just in need of a few minor
reforms?
In an attempt to address these questions, the analyses in the Trans-
formations of the State series separate the complex tangle of tasks and
functions that comprise the state into four manageable dimensions:
• the monopolization of the means of force;

• the rule of law, as prescribed and safeguarded by the constitution;
• the guarantee of democratic self-governance; and
• the provision of welfare and the assurance of social cohesion.
In the OECD world of the 1960s and 1970s, these four dimensions
formed a synergetic constellation that emerged as the central, defin-
ing characteristic of the modern state. Books in the series report the
results of both empirical and theoretical studies of the transformations
experienced in each of these dimensions over the past few decades.
Transformations of the State? (Stephan Leibfried and Michael Zürn
(eds), Cambridge 2005), Transforming the Golden-Age National State
(Achim Hurrelmann, Stephan Leibfried, Kerstin Martens and Peter
Mayer (eds), Basingstoke 2007), State Transformations in OECD Countries:
Dimensions, Driving Forces and Trajectories (Heinz Rothgang and Steffen
Schneider (eds), Basingstoke 2015) and The Oxford Handbook of
vii
viii Series Preface
Transformations of the State (Stephan Leibfried, Evelyne Huber, Matthew

Lange, Jonah Levy and Frank Nullmeier (eds), Oxford 2015) define the
basic concepts of state transformation employed in all of these studies
and provide an overview of the issues addressed. Written by political
scientists, lawyers, economists and sociologists, the series tracks the
development of the post-World War II OECD state. Here, at last, is an
up-to-date series of reports on the state of the state and a crystal-ball
glimpse into its future.
Acknowledgements
Writing a book is both an extremely strenuous and satisfying activity.

I have been very fortunate to find myself in a remarkably supportive
professional environment and social network that have accompanied
the ups and downs of the research process over the last six years.
This book was written in the context of a research project taking place
at the Collaborative Research Centre 597 ‘Transformations of the State’
at the University of Bremen. The study benefited greatly from my affilia-
tion to the Bremen Graduate School of Social Sciences. Both institutions
provided a suitable setting and conducive conditions for the intellectual
encounters necessary to do research. I want to thank my two men-
tors Frank Nullmeier and Thomas Diez for their scholarly input. Frank
Nullmeier, who has always carefully read my drafts, taught me the need
for rigour as well as textual and conceptual care. Similarly, Thomas Diez,
who, despite being located in Tübingen, managed to provide me with
long-distance inspiration and encouragement to set high targets.
Moreover, many colleagues from the University of Bremen devoted
valuable time to discussing my thoughts. I am particularly grateful to
Thorsten Hüller, who, rather sceptical of discourse analytical work, con-
stantly pushed me to hone my arguments, and to Martin Nonhoff, who
helped me out of theoretical and methodological impasses.
Furthermore, the regular meetings of my discourse theoretical discus-
sion group consisting of Linda Monsees and Frank A. Stengel were of
immense value for me. Their friendly criticism and constructive com-
ments prepared me well for the presentation of my work in broader
academic circles. What is more, our shared interest in the power of dis-
courses generated a close-knit community feeling in a rather sceptical
academic environment.
Bits and pieces of various versions of this manuscript have been dis-
cussed before many audiences at different conferences and workshops.
I would at least like to mention the name of those whose contributions
were particularly helpful for me in different phases of the research pro-
cess. Thanks go to Richard Bellamy, Anna Geis, Jennifer Gronau, Lene
Hansen, Eva Herschinger, Cathleen Kantner, Brigitte Kerchner, Beate
Kohler-Koch, Sandra Kröger, Ulrike Liebert, Heiko Pleines, Henning
Schmidtke and Arndt Wonka.
ix
x Acknowledgements
In addition, I am grateful to the ‘plan m’ group of women who pro-

vided me with emotional and ideological support. Seeing all of you
handing in your works over the years proved to me that there is a life
after a PhD and it was an incentive for me to write up my own study.
I am also indebted to Deborah Fölsche-Forrow, who has helped me to
polish the edges of some English expressions here and there.
I acknowledge the funding of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
and the University of Bremen, which has made this research possible.
On a more personal level, I am thankful to my parents Mirosław and
Stanisława Biegoń and to my brother Patrick Biegoń for their constant
and loving support.
Special thanks go to Aline le Claire, my oldest friend, who has always
encouraged me to pursue my path. I discussed my project ideas with her
and we had long debates about the relevance of science in general.
Last but certainly not least, I am grateful to my son, Jarek Krowinn
and my husband, Quint Krowinn, both of whom made me recurrently
aware of the joys of everyday life. With their support, I was able to get
through the more strenuous phases of writing this book. Quint believed
in me and in my project long before I ever began to. Over the years, he
has been my most critical and most supportive reader: I dedicate this
book to him.
1
Introduction: Legitimacy as a
Discursive Battleground in the
European Commission
The European Union (EU) has witnessed a sharp decline in political sup-
port in recent years. Approval ratings for the integration process have
constantly fallen and Euro-scepticism is on the rise throughout the EU
(Fuchs, Roger and Magni-Berton 2009; de Wilde, Michailidou and Trenz
2013). This has not left EU institutions unaffected: political elites in gen-
eral, and within the Commission in particular, are worried about the
legitimacy basis of the European integration process and actively engage
in designing measures and programmes in order to react to pending
crises of political support.
Far from being a new phenomenon, ‘legitimation policies’ (Nullmeier,
Geis and Daase 2012) have been designed by the Commission for
decades – long before academics started to worry about the legitimacy
deficit of the EU when the end of the permissive consensus was declared
in the early 1990s. This book proposes to study constructions of legit-
imacy in the European Commission to understand the rise and fall of
legitimation policies over time. It contributes to a deepened understand-
ing of how legitimation policies came about by undertaking a study of
the wider meaning systems in which they were embedded. By analysing
legitimacy discourses, I will reconstruct the conditions that made certain
legitimation policies possible and restrained others. Thus, this book pro-
vides the first systematic analysis of the discursive battle over legitimacy
in the European Commission between 1973 and 2013.
Broadly speaking, this book has three focal points of interest. Its pri-
mary focus of interest is empirical: it maps and reconstructs the histor-
ically variable discursive landscape of competing articulations of what
1
2 Hegemonies of Legitimation
legitimacy signifies in the case of the EC/EU.1 As such, it touches on the

overwhelming amount of literature on the legitimacy of the EU which
has emerged in the last decades. The legitimacy deficit of the EU has
prompted a virtual explosion of academic and public interest since the
early 1990s. This study sets out to make a contribution to empirical legit-
imacy research in European Integration Studies by focusing on legitimacy
discourses. Whether the EU is considered a legitimate entity or not is the
result of discursive struggles and a focus on prevalent and marginalized
meanings of EC/EU legitimacy can add a different perspective to existing
empirical legitimacy research in European Integration Studies.
Interest in the meanings of EC/EU legitimacy already characterizes a
range of empirical studies. There are a scattered number of works deal-
ing with constructions of legitimate EC/EU governance – even if the
terminology employed starkly varies and not all authors would concede
that they study legitimacy discourses. A range of studies has investi-
gated meanings of legitimate EC/EU governance in particular member
states (Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung 1998; Diez 1999; Rittberger 2003).
Those studies that explicitly deal with legitimacy discourses in EC/EU
institutions tend to focus on particular documents such as the White
Paper on European Governance published in 2001 (Joerges, Mény and
Weiler 2001; Tsakatika 2005), the ‘Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and
Debate’, the Commission’s communication strategy (Trenz and Vetters
2006; Michailidou 2007; Brüggemann 2010a), or documents related to
the Commission’s transparency initiative (Hüller 2007; Cini 2008). Only
a few studies trace the development of legitimacy discourses depicting
more general trends over a longer period of time. Writers who do so,
tend to focus on the period after 1990 (de Búrca 1996; Kohler-Koch
2000; Walters and Haahr 2005; Saurugger 2010, but see Biegoń 2013;
Schrag Sternberg 2013). The methodologies chosen in these studies vary
starkly and render diverse empirical results. Often, the focus is not on
the concept of legitimacy per se but on notions that are tightly linked to
the issue of legitimacy such as participation, transparency, governance
1
With the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty, what had commonly been
referred to as the ‘European Community’ or the ‘Common Market’ became part
of the newly established ‘European Union’. In the following, I will generally use
the term ‘(European) Community’ or ‘EC’ when referring to the political order
before the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and ‘(European) Union’ or ‘EU’
when writing about developments thereafter. When discussing the European
Community/Union in a non-time-specific context, I use the term ‘EC/EU’ or
‘Europe’.
Introduction: Legitimacy as a Discursive Battleground 3
and communication. This present study aims to integrate these different

strands of research and to provide a systematic enquiry of the history of
meanings attributed to the concept of legitimacy within the European
Commission.
Second, theoretical interest lies in the conceptualization of discourse
dynamics. Beyond merely describing the rise and fall of legitimacy dis-
courses, this study aims at reconstructing the discursive conditions that
enabled certain discourses to dominate during particular time spans.
The chosen title of the book, Hegemonies of Legitimation, indicates my
interest in the dynamics of commonsensical meanings of legitimacy and
hints at the theoretical basis of the study: I rely on the discourse theory
in the tradition of the Essex School (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Torfing
1999; Howarth and Torfing 2005; Glynos and Howarth 2007). Central to
this strand of discourse theory is the concept of hegemony. The theory
spells out the mechanisms that facilitate or hamper the consolidation
of hegemonic discourses and as such, it gives a comprehensive account
of the production and decay of social meaning that can be utilized
in conceptualizing discourse dynamics. As I will show in the follow-
ing chapters, poststructuralist discourse theory, in particular the variant
developed by Laclau and Mouffe, sheds light on processes consolidating
and circumventing systems of meaning. Thus, the study ties in well with
a number of other works that have likewise proposed a conceptual appa-
ratus drawing on the discourse theory by Laclau and Mouffe in order to
enquire into the logics that make the rise and fall of discourses possible
(Nonhoff 2006, 2008; Herschinger 2011, 2012; Freistein 2012; Renner
2013; Nonhoff and Stengel 2014).
Third, the study also makes a methodological contribution. During
the research process, my initial theoretical interest in the political and
social power of discourses was soon dampened by disappointment with
existing empirical studies regarding the methodological application of
poststructuralist discourse theory. Lene Hansen (2006: xviii) once point-
edly formulated that it is ‘one of the few axioms shared within the
discipline of International Relations that poststructuralism and method-
ology don’t mix’. Although this axiom is certainly outdated, since
many poststructuralist studies have meanwhile been written with elab-
orate methodological sections, in particular in the field of International
Relations (Hansen 2006; Herschinger 2011), reflections on concrete
text-analytical methods are still rare.2
2
For excellent methodological reflections on discourse analysis in the broader
field of political science see Angermüller et al. (2014) and Nonhoff et al. (2014).
I employ metaphor analysis in my study of constructions of legit-

imacy in the European Commission. For this purpose, I develop
a methodology of discursive metaphor analysis that takes the
poststructuralist claim of the ubiquity of metaphors seriously and is a
methodology that is sensitive to highly entrenched meaning structures.
My work on metaphors extends the path taken by authors who have
proposed a poststructuralist reading of metaphor theory and have con-
ducted metaphor analyses that take into account the constitutive role
of language (Maasen and Weingart 2000; Hülsse 2003a, 2003b, 2006;
Drulák 2006, 2008; Onuf 2010; Spencer 2010).
In the remainder of the introduction, I set my enquiry in the broader
field of empirical legitimacy research and justify the study’s focus on
legitimacy discourses in the European Commission. It is beyond the
limits of this introduction to give a detailed overview of the diversity
of approaches developed to study legitimacy empirically. The objective
is more modest: to clarify the central concepts of legitimacy and legit-
imation and to explain in what way focusing on legitimacy discourses
can add to existing empirical legitimacy research. The introduction ends
with a description of the plan of the book.
The social construction of legitimacy
In its most basic sense, legitimacy refers to the rightfulness and accept-
ability of political authority (Hurrelmann, Schneider and Steffek 2007).
A political order such as the EU is legitimate if it rightfully holds and
exercises political authority (Gilley 2009: 3). This definition, however,
raises a range of further questions: what exactly does rightful or accept-
able mean? And who is to judge the rightfulness and acceptability of a
political order?
Both questions pertain to the distinction made between normative
and empirical conceptions of legitimacy. In the normative tradition
of political legitimacy research, a political order is evaluated against
external normative standards:
[P]ower is legitimate where the rules governing it are justifiable

according to rationally defensible normative principles. And as with
any moral principles, these embody a universalizing claim: it is not
the principles that happen to pertain in a given society that are
sufficient, but those that any rational person, upon considered and
unbiased reflection, would have to agree to.
(Beetham 1991: 5)
If research on the normative legitimacy of a political order is under-

taken, political theorists typically engage in an evaluation of the right-
fulness of a political order according to the proximity or distance from
the normative standards they themselves promote (ibid.). The norma-
tive strand of legitimacy research promotes a ‘prescriptive version of
legitimacy’ (Steffek 2003: 253), according to which the task of social
science is to ‘tell us under what conditions governance deserves the
predicate legitimate’ (Barker 2007: 20). To put it simply, in the nor-
mative tradition, rightfulness and acceptability of political authority is
judged by external normative criteria, which are determined by political
philosophers and have a universalizing claim.3
In contrast, in the empirical tradition of legitimacy research, the peo-
ple who are affected by the exercise of political authority rather than
political philosophers are considered to be the relevant subjects who
assess the rightfulness and acceptability of political authority (Gilley
2009: 9). In this context, it is Max Weber’s work on legitimacy and
legitimate authority that has set the standard for the empirical strand
of legitimacy research. His account of legitimacy is unique since the
perspective of those affected by political authority takes centre stage.
Weber highlights the concept of legitimacy beliefs. He defines legitimacy
beliefs by delineating the concept from other related ones: following
Weber, one might distinguish different motives for compliance on the
part of subjects. Subjects may obey out of fear of punishment and sanc-
tion, in expectation of (political or economic) reward, or due to sheer
habit (Weber 1978: 213). These motives, Weber argues, do not form a
sufficiently reliable basis for authority. They have to be supplemented
by a further element: a political order must be regarded by the sub-
ject who obeys as in some way ‘obligatory and exemplary’ (ibid.: 31).
In other words, a legitimate order must be believed to be normatively
right in the eyes of those affected by authority. The meaning of right-
fulness and acceptability will vary significantly in different political
communities.
In the aftermath of Weber’s work on legitimacy, empirical research
was characterized by a focus on people’s legitimacy beliefs. However, the
Weberian definition of legitimacy has been rather ambiguously repro-
duced, stating that a political order is legitimate if those affected by it
believe it to be so. Beetham criticizes the sole focus on people’s attitudes
3
A succinct overview of normative legitimacy research in European Integration
Studies is given by Lord and Magnette (2004) and Føllesdal and Hix (2006).
in empirical legitimacy research and argues that such an approach

towards legitimacy is based on too simplistic a reading of Weber’s the-
ory. He therefore suggests a definition of legitimacy that does not merely
concentrate on people’s beliefs towards a political order, but takes into
account collectively shared legitimacy norms existing within a political
community:
A given power relationship is not legitimate because people believe

in its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of their beliefs.
This may seem a fine distinction but it is a fundamental one. When
we seek to assess the legitimacy of a regime, (. . .) one thing we are
doing is assessing how far it can be justified in terms of people’s
beliefs, how far it conforms to their values or standards, how far it
satisfies the normative expectations they have of it. We are making
an assessment of the degree of congruence, or lack of it, between a
given system of power and the beliefs, values and expectations that
provide its justification.
(Beetham 1991: 11, emphasis in the original)
This conceptualization of empirical legitimacy shifts the focus from an

analysis of mere attitudes of a given group of people towards an anal-
ysis of the dominant system of norms and values within a historically
specific political community. Such a definition understands legitimacy
as a social construction (Beetham 1991: 100) and focuses on the gen-
eration and development of socially valid legitimation criteria. In such
a definition, the societal dimension of legitimacy, which is somewhat
independent of individual beliefs, is brought to the fore. ‘The impor-
tant consequence is that – beyond individual beliefs – valid normative
orders appear as an independent object of analysis’ (Gaus 2011: 9). This
societal dimension of legitimacy is most clearly carved out in the def-
inition of legitimacy provided by Suchman. His definition constitutes
a further development of Beetham’s ideas on the social construction of
legitimacy, since it subordinates the focus on individuals’ beliefs and
attitudes in favour of emphasizing the socially constructed systems of
norms prevalent in political communities:
Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions

of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.
(Suchman 1995: 574, emphasis added)
In line with Beetham and Suchman, other authors have criticized the
undue ‘subjectivation’ (Stallberg 1975: 26) of the legitimacy concept,
that is, of exclusively focusing on individuals’ beliefs in empirical legit-
imacy research, and have demanded that empirical legitimacy research
focus more on the social constructedness of legitimacy and the socially
constructed system of norms (Nullmeier et al. 2010; Schneider et al.
2010; Gaus 2011; Zürn 2013a).4
Methodologically, this has resulted in an increased interest in the
‘communicative dimension of legitimacy’ and in a trend towards text-
analytical approaches in the study of legitimation processes (Schneider,
Nullmeier and Hurrelmann 2007). If legitimacy is socially constructed
and the construction of reality is essentially a communicative pheno-
menon, so the argument goes, the analysis of legitimacy communi-
cation takes centre stage (ibid.; see also Nullmeier et al. 2010; Schneider
et al. 2010). Schneider, Nullmeier and Hurrelmann (2007) introd-
uce the communicative dimension of legitimacy (focusing on the
communicative exchange between those in authority and those affected
by authority) alongside the behavioural aspect (focusing on practices of
(de-)legitimation such as protests) and the attitudinal facet (focusing on
political attitudes, value orientations and legitimacy beliefs). Following
this argument, a comprehensive picture of the empirical legitimacy of a
political order can only emerge if all three dimensions of legitimacy are
taken into account.
While this present study shares the basic proposition that a focus
on language is necessary to understand the social construction of
legitimacy, it takes a more radical stance on the role of language in legit-
imation processes. Based on the poststructuralist approach adopted in
4
An advantage of Beetham’s and Suchman’s emphasis on the social dimension of
legitimacy is that it counters the argument that empirical legitimacy research has
to assume an uncritical standpoint. It has often been argued that if one follows
a strict empirical understanding of legitimacy, one has to accept that a politi-
cal system that systematically violates human rights can still be legitimate if it
conforms to widely shared normative principles such as promoting prosperity.
Indeed, empirical legitimacy research has to remain empirical by being exclu-
sively concerned with the evaluations that prevail in historically specific political
communities. However, such research does not need to be uncritical. The analy-
sis of dominant legitimation criteria in a historically specific society can still be
critical in character, as the knowledge may help to transcend given power rela-
tionships. Allegedly valid systems of rule are unveiled to be socially constructed
and historically contingent, and may thus become the object of change (Beetham
1991: 110–112; Zürn 2013a: 176).
this study (see Chapter 2), I propose a discursive approach towards legit-
imacy. Such an approach focuses on the meanings that are attributed to
legitimacy and the struggles accompanying the process of establishing
commonsensical notions of legitimacy.
A discursive approach towards legitimacy is not a supplementary
dimension to understand processes of legitimation and delegitimation
more thoroughly; it is situated on a more fundamental level: legiti-
macy discourses are constitutive for attitudes towards a political system,
for practices of (de-)legitimation and for communicative exchanges
on the issue of legitimacy. Legitimacy discourses provide the webs of
meaning that make legitimacy beliefs, communication about as well as
legitimating and delegitimating acts towards a political order possible.
My enquiry into legitimacy and legitimation is based on an exhaust-
ive understanding of discourse that goes beyond the notion of com-
municative exchange. Discourses are broadly defined as systems of
meaning that constitute subjects, objects and practices (Torfing 2005a:
14). The distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive is
rejected because reality only becomes meaningful through discourses
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 107).
Accordingly, the main focus of interest in this study is legitimacy
discourses. They are defined as webs of meaning on the rightfulness and
acceptability of a political order. Legitimacy discourses draw on historically
specific legitimation criteria, that is, on historically specific benchmarks
used by political actors to assess political orders as legitimate or not.
Two aspects of this definition are worth highlighting: first, legitimacy
discourses are constituted by articulations that refer to a political order.
Here, I side with Easton (1979) and with those researchers who draw
on his differentiation of objects of legitimacy (Norris 1999; Nullmeier
et al. 2010; Schneider et al. 2010). According to Easton (1979: 190–211),
legitimacy, or what he calls ‘diffuse support’, is mainly directed towards
the regime level of a political system as a whole, whereas specific support
refers to authorities and policies.5 Thus, this analysis only includes those
articulations in which the Commission in one way or another dealt with
the rightfulness and acceptability of the political system of the EC/EU
5
In fact, based on Easton’s work, one could distinguish further objects of legit-
imation such as different institutions of a political system (the parliament, the
executive), regime principles (democracy, rule of law) and the political commu-
nity (Schneider 2010: 50). Yet, for practical reasons, I have concentrated on the
most basic level and only included those articulations in the analysis that dealt
with the acceptability and rightfulness of the EC/EU as a whole.
as a whole, and articulations evaluating the acceptance of single poli-

cies and authorities have been excluded. Second, legitimacy discourses
are constituted by articulations that deal with the acceptability and right-
fulness of a political order and as such make recourse to historically
specific legitimation criteria. Thus, articulations dealing with legiti-
macy at least implicitly refer to widely shared benchmarks of legitimate
governance.
Legitimation as a discursive struggle between rulers

and ruled
The purpose of switching the focus away from individual legitimacy

beliefs to legitimacy discourses is linked to a further change of per-
spective. Legitimacy discourses shaping the meanings of legitimacy
prevalent in particular political communities are not only constituted
by articulations voiced by those who are ruled. Rulers themselves are
also powerful subjects, whose articulations contribute to the construc-
tion of commonsensical meanings of legitimacy. Thus, understanding
legitimacy as a social construction also shifts the focus to the role of
rulers in the construction process.
The more general proposition that rulers play a crucially important
role in legitimation processes and constantly engage in justificatory
practices of the political authority exercised by them is not new.
A variety of authors has drawn attention to different facets of ‘self-
legitimations’ (Barker 2001) exerted by those in authority (Weber 1978:
31; Easton 1979: 278; Beetham 1991: 108).
These authors emphasize the notion that legitimation not only
denotes the process of granting legitimacy by subjects to rulers; it also
has a top-down dimension: legitimacy is claimed and political authority
is justified by rulers. It is again Weber’s work that pioneered a concep-
tualization of legitimation that takes into account the self-justifications
and self-legitimations of rulers. Although Weber’s work on legitimacy
beliefs held by those affected by authority has been widely researched,
his ideas on legitimacy claims and self-justifications proposed by those
in authority are equally crucial and have not been researched in such
depth. Centring attention on the self-legitimation of rulers is pivotal to
gain a fuller understanding of legitimation processes.6
6
On the concepts of ‘legitimacy claim’ and ‘self-justifications’ in Weber’s work
see Bensman (1979), Merquior (1980) and Barker (2001).
Rodney Barker is one author who has invested a great deal of effort
in conceptualizing this particular aspect of Weber’s work and has pro-
posed the concept of self-legitimation to encapsulate all those claims
and practices that rulers engage in order to gain legitimacy. Barker
conceives government in radically different terms and depicts it as a
characteristically self-legitimating occupation:
In the world of everyday government, the language etiquette, and

rituals of self-legitimation are ubiquitous. They are a feature of
all government, and there is much to be gained from reminding
ourselves of this and giving a preliminary account and theory of
legitimation at the centre, from the centre, and for the centre. When
legitimation is seen from the centre outwards, rather than from the
outside inwards, dimensions of government which have languished
in the shadows are thrown into new, or renewed relief.
(Barker 2001: 6)
Other authors have engaged in empirical investigations of the self-

legitimations of rulers. In the field of International Relations, Gronau’s
(2015) case study on the G8 and G20 constitutes the most far-reaching
attempt to empirically study the self-legitimations of international
institutions (see also Biegoń and Gronau 2012). Additionally, there
are some new approaches in International Relations which take the
self-legitimation of international organizations seriously (Clark 2005;
Reus-Smit 2007; Guastaferro and Moschella 2012; Zaum 2013). Further
valuable contributions have been made by Nullmeier, Geis and Daase
(2012), who have proposed the legitimation policies of political and
economic orders be taken into account.
If one examines the role of self-legitimation, legitimation essentially
emerges as a two-sided process (Schneider, Nullmeier and Hurrelmann
2007: 131; Zaum 2013: 10; Zürn 2013a: 177–178): legitimation is
practised both by rulers from above and by those who are ruled
from below. Rulers communicate and justify their claims to author-
ity and these claims are validated and recognized by those who are
ruled.
But how exactly do we determine the role of rulers in legitimation pro-
cesses? Can rulers themselves influence their own legitimacy and condi-
tion the processes of legitimation? In other words, can self-legitimations
influence the attitudes and beliefs of those who are ruled? By drawing
on Beetham (1991: 104–109), I propose two different answers to these
questions.
First, self-legitimation can be conceptualized as direct and strategic

attempts made by the powerful to influence the beliefs and practices of
those who are ruled. Beetham states that such an account comes close
to the Marxist theory of ideology: ‘dominant groups are able to secure
their own legitimacy through their influence or control over the pro-
cesses whereby the beliefs of the subordinate are shaped and reproduced’
(Beetham 1991: 105). According to Beetham, representatives of ideol-
ogy theory argue that rulers strategically apply cultural and information
policies and thus control the means of disseminating and reproducing
ideas in society. The beliefs of those who are ruled emerge as the product
of direct influence by the rulers. Beetham sharply criticizes such a claim
as too simplistic; he argues that first, rulers cannot fully control all the
means of information and ideological dissemination (ibid.: 105). There
are always alternative channels of information that send out contradic-
tory messages. Second, ‘people are never merely the passive recipients of
ideas or messages to which they are exposed to’ (ibid.: 105–106). Even
if rulers fully controlled all means of information, those who are ruled
need not necessarily accept them. The addressees of authority, Beetham
maintains, are selective and carefully assess the information sent out by
those exercising authority (ibid.).
Beetham’s own account of the role of rulers in legitimation processes
is more complex. He asserts that the influence of the rulers themselves
on legitimation processes is indirect and more subtle. Legitimacy can-
not be ‘managed’ in the sense that it can wilfully and directly be shaped
by those in authority. Beetham suggests that rulers tend to contribute
indirectly to the social construction of legitimacy in a given political
community. He highlights the impersonal consequences of the rules and
structures institutionalized by rulers, and argues that it is exactly these
rules and structures that shape what appears as legitimate and what
does not. To put it simply, he is interested in the ‘indirect effects that
a system of power produces’ and lists subtle mechanisms that are the
indirect consequences of the exercise of authority that ‘serve to main-
tain and reproduce the legitimacy of an established system of power’
(ibid.: 108).
I share Beetham’s hesitation in conceiving of rulers as powerful players
in legitimation processes that can strategically influence the attitudes
and beliefs of those who are ruled, and I would agree that the influence
of rulers could best be described as indirect and subtle. Having said that,
I would add a further perspective to Beetham’s elaborations on the role
of rulers in legitimation processes, namely one that takes into account
the role of discourse in legitimation processes.
A poststructuralist account of legitimation processes shifts the focus

away from actors to discourses. Competing discourses struggle to define
commonsensical meanings of legitimacy and these discourses are articu-
lated both by the rulers and the ruled. The discursive arena of those who
are ruled comprises those affected by authority, while the rulers are those
exercising authority.7 In each discursive arena, articulations are made
that ascribe meaning to legitimacy. Both discursive arenas contribute
to the construction of legitimacy discourses and thus shape widely
shared commonsensical meanings of legitimacy in a given political
community.
In other words, from a poststructuralist perspective, legitimation can
be conceived of as a struggle between different discourses originat-
ing in different discursive arenas, encompassing both the rulers and
the ruled. Rulers indirectly contribute to the legitimacy of a particular
political order by articulating meanings of legitimacy that are consti-
tutive for legitimacy discourses in a given political community. Thus,
the discursive arena of rulers constitutes one powerful site that shapes
commonsensical meanings of legitimacy. This site is complemented by
the discursive arena of those who are ruled and together, both are con-
stitutive for constructions of legitimacy prevalent in a given political
community.
The focus of this study is on the articulations made by the rulers as
an influential site in which commonsensical notions of legitimacy in a
given political community are constructed. It goes without saying that
in the multilevel political system of the EU there are many different
rulers contributing to widely shared meanings of legitimacy, including
the member states and the different EU institutions. The articulations
made by the European Commission are chosen as a central focal point
of the empirical analysis because of its central position in the legislative
process, making this institution a particularly powerful ‘player’ in the
discursive battle over legitimacy.8 However, to fully understand the fab-
ric out of which the Commission’s articulations dealing with legitimacy
7
Further discursive arenas could be differentiated which do not easily fit the two
categories proposed here. For instance, the media constitutes an important inter-
mediary discursive arena that is situated between rulers and the ruled. I only limit
myself here to two discursive arenas for purposes of clarity.
8
This does not mean that the discursive power of an institution can be
determined by its position in the structure of a political system. Why some
articulations become more powerful than others cannot be determined before-
hand and is the result of contingent discursive processes (see Chapter 2 for further
details).
are woven, I will occasionally also take into account articulations made
by other EU institutions and member states.
Models of legitimacy
In order to make the Commission’s articulations on legitimacy

amenable to empirical research, I have developed a typology of legiti-
macy models. This typology served a heuristic function and was useful
to meaningfully interpret and categorize the empirical material. Each
model of legitimacy draws on a distinct set of legitimation criteria
and relies on a different understanding of the legitimacy constituency
(citizens vs member states).
The following five models of legitimacy were retrieved on the basis
of an interactive procedure, constantly comparing and re-comparing
the normative literature on the legitimacy deficit of the EC/EU and
the empirical material. I started out with Beetham and Lord’s (1998)
seminal work Legitimacy and the European Union, in which the authors
propose a typology of five legitimacy models. On the basis of these
models, the authors categorize the existing normative literature on the
legitimacy of the EC/EU. Their typology of models of legitimacy was
chosen because it constitutes one of the most elaborate attempts to sys-
tematically map the normative literature on the legitimacy deficit of the
EU and has meanwhile also become an important reference point for
studies in the empirical strand of legitimacy research.9 What is more,
their typology also constitutes a useful heuristic device for analysing
the legitimacy discourses in the European Commission because it dis-
tinguishes a performance, a technocratic and an intergovernmental
model of legitimacy. I consider this distinction crucial in systemati-
cally categorizing the Commission’s articulations on legitimacy. In other
typologies of legitimacy models, these three notions of legitimacy
are typically amalgamated and merely constitute different facets of a
broader performance-centred legitimacy model.10 However, given the
9
A range of further typologies has been proposed for the European context.
An alternative typology is for instance proposed by Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung
(1998) and Diez (1999). Their models of legitimacy were constructed with the
specific research interest of delineating images of legitimate governance that fall
within the realm of traditional statehood from those that do not resemble the
model of the modern territorial state (Diez 1999: 66). Further typologies have
been proposed by Eriksen and Fossum (2004; see also Sjursen 2007; Eriksen 2009)
and by Hooghe (2001, 2012).
10
Eriksen and Fossum’s (2004) ideal type of problem-solving entity conflates the
intergovernmental and the performance model of legitimacy. Jachtenfuchs et al.’s
original role ascribed to the Commission in the integration process,

which had a strong technocratic and elitist element (Featherstone
1994), I was particularly interested in whether the original institutional
identity of the Commission is still played out in its articulations on
legitimacy. This is why I decided to distinguish between technocratic
articulations and performance-centred articulations and not to subsume
both under a broader performance-centred model of legitimacy.
After the first reading of the empirical material, Beetham and Lord’s
typology of legitimacy models was significantly modified and refined.
The modification of the original typology was necessary because during
the empirical analysis, I was confronted with a variety of articulations
that clearly bore reference to legitimacy which, however, would have
been systematically excluded if I had relied too strictly on Beetham and
Lord’s typology. The original typology is based on a ‘distinctively liberal-
democratic’ (Beetham and Lord 1998: 5) understanding of legitimacy.
As such, their typology is squarely rooted in the realm of traditional
statehood. Their three main models of legitimacy (democracy, perfor-
mance, identity) are transferred from the nation state context to the EU
(Lord and Beetham 2001) and they implicitly rely on the existence of a
unitary territory and a more or less unitary group of people. The liberal-
democratic baseline of their typology of legitimacy becomes obvious in
their discussion of the democratic model of legitimacy. The two authors’
discussion of democracy is restricted to reform proposals linked to the
strengthening of the European Parliament (Beetham and Lord 1998:
79–93) and they particularly highlight political equality and political
control (Lord and Beetham 2001: 443) as the two most fundamental
democratic legitimation criteria. Limiting the notion of democracy to
such a liberal-democratic understanding would unnecessarily narrow
the scope of an empirical analysis and would systematically exclude
alternative notions of democracy emphasizing for instance the value
of direct participation. It is against this background that I have modi-
fied Beetham and Lord’s original typology, placing particular emphasis
on the democratic model of legitimacy to draw on a broader notion of
democracy.
The critical reader might wonder whether such a procedure that basi-
cally deduces a typology of possible articulations on legitimacy from
the normative legitimacy debate is adequate for a highly interpretative
(1998) and Diez’s (1999) economic community presents an ideal type of gover-
nance that transcends the nation state in which technocratic and performance
notions of legitimacy are amalgamated.
approach, such as the one taken in this study. Different points of crit-
icism might be put forward. Above all, one might argue that such a
procedure bears the risk of essentializing the concept of legitimacy by
starting out implicitly or explicitly with a firm definition of what legit-
imacy is, instead of reconstructing empirically what legitimacy means
for the Commission. Given that the objective of this study is to trace
discursive struggles over what EC/EU legitimacy might signify, it may
seem paradoxical to take as a starting point a clear-cut definition of what
legitimacy is and which dimensions it entails.
I admit that this is a valid argument; the chosen procedure indeed
bears the risk of systematizing the empirical material too quickly at
the expense of acknowledging the plurality of meanings of legiti-
macy evoked by the Commission. As such, the chosen procedure may
contribute to reifying established notions of legitimacy and disregard
alternative and competing understandings. At the same time however,
I have taken steps to avoid this danger by leaving the research process
as open as possible and by recurrently modifying the original typol-
ogy of legitimacy in the course of the research process based on the
articulations reconstructed from the empirical material. In other words,
the research process remained as context-sensitive as possible and was
mindful not to exclude constructions of legitimacy that did not fit into
one of the categories. Moreover, the reconstruction of ideal typical mod-
els of legitimacy was undertaken with the purpose of taking as sensitive
a research approach as possible to the different interpretations of legiti-
macy found in normative debates and to collecting the widest possible
range of legitimation criteria that might structure the Commission’s
articulations on legitimacy.
I have purposely chosen an interactive procedure of delineating ideal
typical models of legitimacy for two reasons. First, such a procedure has
the practical advantage of providing the researcher with a heuristic field
within which she can place the Commission’s articulations. Second,
I side with Diez (1999: 66) in that such a procedure brings a moment
of reflexivity to the research process. The interpretation of empirical
data by the researcher is always shaped by certain scientific discourses
which to some extent structure her interpretation of empirical phenom-
ena. The ideal of depicting the empirical world ‘as it is’ is misleading,
because every analysis is the result of an active reconstruction made by
the researcher (Nonhoff 2011: 95). Researchers selectively draw on the
discourses available to them in their surrounding environment. The pro-
duction of meaning is, thus, an essentially social process; by disclosing
and reflecting on the theoretical background of my research, I do justice
to the epistemological perspective taken in this study and emphasize

the fact that scientific discourses about the legitimacy of the EC/EU have
significantly influenced my interpretation of the empirical data. In what
follows, I will depict the central characteristics of each legitimacy model
and will briefly discuss the work of those authors who have influenced
the normative debate on the legitimacy deficit in the EC/EU and whose
works draw heavily on one of the five legitimacy models (see Table 1.1
for an overview).
The essential characteristic that distinguishes the technocratic model of
legitimacy from others is succinctly summarized by Beetham and Lord:
the technocratic conception of legitimacy ‘has a clear justification in
terms of a valid source of authority, which is deemed to lie in special
knowledge or expertise to which office holders have access, and which
is validated by the wider legitimacy of technical, professional and sci-
entific knowledge within modern society’ (Beetham and Lord 1998: 17).
In a technocracy, knowledge, or more specifically, technical expertise
grounded in scientific forms of knowledge (Fischer 1990: 18), becomes
the primary basis of authority and political power (see also Radaelli
1999: 1).
Furthermore, as Fischer points out, proponents of a technocratic
model of legitimacy typically agree on ‘the method to be used to resolve
policy differences’ (Fischer 1990: 21). Technocrats call for ‘rational’
Table 1.1 Models of legitimacy
Model of Legitimacy Legitimation Authors

legitimacy constituency criteria
Technocratic European Expertise Majone (1996)

citizens
Intergovernmental Member states Performance Moravcsik (2002)
Identity European Collective identity Kielmansegg (2003)
citizens Howe (1995)
Performance European Performance Scharpf (1999)
citizens
Democracy European Popular sovereignty Beetham/Lord (1998)
citizens Equality Føllesdal/Hix (2006)
Participation Nanz/Steffek (2003)
Deliberation Eder/Kantner (2000)
Accountability Eriksen/Fossum (2004)
Transparency Trenz (2004)
Bellamy (2006)
empirical/analytical methodologies of scientific decision-making, or

what has been aptly called ‘methodological decision-making’ (ibid.: 22).
The technocratic model of legitimacy is rooted in a positivistic concep-
tion of knowledge that relies on empirical measurement and empirical
precision and ‘gives shape to an abstract and technical formulation of
society and its problems. Social problems, conceptualized in technical
terms, are freed from the cultural, psychological and linguistic contexts
that constitute the lens of social tradition’ (ibid.: 42).
A technocracy further revolves around economic imperatives in that
it is geared towards technological progress and material productiv-
ity, and is less concerned with ‘the distribution questions of social
justice’ (ibid.: 22). In this respect, the technocratic model clearly
resembles the performance model of legitimacy, which also assigns
a fundamentally important role to the output of a political sys-
tem. However, authors advancing a technocratic model of legitimacy
define the public interest in instrumental and functional terms (ibid.:
24–25). In contrast, authors proposing a performance model of legiti-
macy typically have a more sophisticated conception of the ‘common
good’.
Finally, the technocratic model of legitimacy is anchored in a long-
standing and deep-rooted animosity towards pluralist democracy, where
pressure groups and mass movements allegedly aim to divert the politi-
cal system away from the common good (Radaelli 1999: 6). Contempo-
rary forms of technocracy are formally respectful of democratic values
and institutions (ibid.: 24). Nevertheless, technocratic conceptions of
legitimacy are highly elitist as they emphasize the essentially important
role of experts’ knowledge and rationality. According to the technocratic
logic, the decision-making process has to be shielded from civil society
influence.
In the context of the academic debate on the legitimacy of the EU,
Majone is one of the most well-known proponents of a technocratic
understanding of legitimacy. According to Majone, the EU is a ‘regu-
latory state’ (Majone 1994) and its main function is economic, social
and legal regulation (Majone 1996: 64–68, 2006: 612–613), which is
best undertaken by independent bodies staffed by relevant experts. He
stresses that non-majoritarian institutions such as the European Cen-
tral Bank and the European Court of Justice can be legitimated by
their ‘distinctive institutional competence’ (Majone 2010: 619) and
need not necessarily be accountable to the general public. With its
reliance on expertise as a source of legitimacy together with its pledge for
depoliticization, Majone’s work represents one of the most sophisticated
attempts to normatively justify a technocratic model of legitimacy for

the EC/EU.
The intergovernmental or ‘indirect model of legitimacy’, as Beetham
and Lord term it (Beetham and Lord 1998: 11), corresponds to the
traditional view of legitimacy in the field of International Relations,
particularly in its US-American variant (Steffek 2007: 182). According
to this state-centric view of legitimacy, international organizations such
as the EU are not regarded as having to depend on the cooperation of a
wider public to achieve their objectives. The addressees of international
organizations’ legitimacy claims ‘are member states and their officials,
not citizens more generally, for the simple reason that it is only the
obedience and cooperation of such officials that is required for the rel-
evant international body to achieve its purposes’ (Beetham and Lord
1998: 11). Similarly, in the context of the EC/EU, the intergovernmen-
tal model of legitimacy draws on the idea that ‘the legitimacy of the
EU derives from that of its member states, as it is also dependent on
them and their legitimacy for the implementation of its policies and
the enforcement of its legislation’ (ibid.: 13). Thus, in this legitimacy
model, national democracies assume the task of legitimating the Union.
Regarding the input dimension of legitimacy, the intergovernmental
model of legitimacy stipulates that the EC/EU be legitimated by national
democratic procedures.
Since the provision of input legitimacy is assumed by member
states in the intergovernmental model, ‘the normative justifiability of
international organisations such as the EC/EU is rather weak and largely
depends on performance criteria’ (ibid.: 12). International organizations
have to fulfil the purpose for which they have been constructed in
order to be legitimate. From this perspective, the EC/EU is merely ‘a
means of providing international public goods and removing negative
externalities’ (Lord 2013: 185). The crucial aspect that distinguishes
the intergovernmental from the performance model of legitimacy
is the perceived legitimacy constituency. In the intergovernmental
model, the addressees of legitimation claims made by the institution
are the member states rather than citizens more generally (Beetham
and Lord 1998: 11). In contrast, articulations referring to the perfor-
mance model of legitimacy construct European citizens as the relevant
legitimacy constituency.
Most authors consider the intergovernmental model to be inade-
quate in the context of the present EU largely because it is widely
acknowledged that the Union’s authoritative rules have begun to
impinge directly on citizens, which is why the EU requires the citizens’
acknowledgement (Beetham and Lord 1998: 13). Moravcsik remains one

of the most prominent defenders of the intergovernmental model and
believes this concept to be normatively justified.11 In his view, the EU’s
current activities are restricted to ‘the regulation of policy externalities
resulting from cross-border economic activity’ (Moravcsik 2002: 607),
while issues of higher salience, that is, ‘those functions that inspire
and induce popular participation remain largely national’ (ibid.: 606).
Even in core policy areas of the Union, member states have the right to
exempt themselves or to act unilaterally if they no longer support the
EC/EU’s agenda. From this perspective, member states still play a crucial
role in most of the legislative and regulative activity – and even more so
in the field of policy implementation – and, therefore, remain the locus
of legitimacy.
Following the identity model, the legitimacy of the EC/EU essentially
depends on the social and political structures of a European Commu-
nity (Grimm 1995; Scharpf 1999; Kielmansegg 2003). Thus, it is the
horizontal level of relationships between the European citizens that is of
crucial importance rather than the vertical level, that is, the relationship
between the member states/citizens and the EC/EU institutions, and the
introduction of just procedures (Beetham and Lord 1998: 33). In this
conception, it is the existence of a European identity or connected con-
cepts such as a feeling of belonging, we-feeling, trust and loyalty among
Europeans that play a lead role for the legitimacy of the political system
of the EC/EU because the ‘procedures of democratic decision making
especially that of majority decision, require sufficient trust between citi-
zens for them to accept that being outvoted does not constitute a threat
to their identity or essential interests’ (ibid.: 33).
The identity model of legitimacy as well as the concept of a ‘European
identity’ more generally has attracted the attention of numerous
authors. Beetham and Lord discuss a variety of authors who implic-
itly or explicitly rely on the identity model in their assessment of the
EC/EU’s legitimacy. These authors differ with respect to the role they
assign to the perception of a shared cultural heritage and a common,
shared history (for a similar differentiation see Kantner 2006). Most
authors concede that collective identities are not naturally given or in
some way primordial, but are socially constructed phenomena. Often,
authors argue that a European demos has not yet emerged, but they
11
For a more detailed discussion of Moravcsik’s position and his claim that an
intergovernmental form of legitimacy is sufficient for the EU see Lord (2013:
181–184).
do not a priori exclude the possibility that a collective European iden-

tity might someday develop (Scharpf 1999). Nevertheless, many authors
stress the fact that some form of (socially constructed) shared history
and memory as well as the sense of having a common cultural heritage
is of vital importance since such reference to the past constitutes the
ground from which collectively shared European values can emanate
(e.g. Kielmansegg 2003). While some writers would agree that a collec-
tive self-understanding based on commonly shared values is necessary
for the emergence of a European identity, they also stipulate that com-
monly shared perceptions of the future might serve as a basis for a
collective self-understanding (Howe 1995). In these variants, a com-
monly shared perception of a European past and a European culture
is not considered necessary for the emergence of a European identity.
Howe argues that the perception of a shared destiny and a collectively
shared idea of the future can trigger identity-building processes.
Moreover, in the academic debate on European citizenship, it has
been underlined that the concept of European identity comprises two
components: a civic-political and an ethno-cultural component (Bruter
2004; see also Thomassen 2007). A European identity, so the argument
goes, does not necessarily need to be founded on a collectively shared
culture. Identification with the norms and values underlying a demo-
cratic system such as the EC/EU – or what Habermas (1992: 10) calls
constitutional patriotism – can constitute a sufficient basis for legitimate
governance (for a sceptical position see Shore 2004). ‘Liberal-democratic
values, it is suggested, now have a force and embeddedness that allows
them to be decoupled from the particularities of the nation state and
universalized to transnational institutions constructed from society that
share those value commitments’ (Beetham and Lord 1998: 41).
A radically different conceptualization of the identity model of legit-
imacy is proposed by Diez (1997) and his ideal image of the EC/EU as
a network. He fundamentally breaks with the assumption that a legit-
imate EC/EU needs to be socially founded in a more or less united
peoplehood and instead proposes that a European political community
should be conceived of as a network of interwoven and overlapping
structures of membership blurring distinctions between a clear inside
and a clear outside. Similar propositions have been made by authors
who imagine the EU as a ‘postmodern’ entity (Delanty and Rumford
2005). These works contribute to the development of an identity model
of legitimacy in that they focus on the social prerequisites of legiti-
mate governance and delineate the contours of a normatively justified
conception of a political community. Delanty and Rumford’s as well
as Diez’s notions of a European political community are very different

from other authors since they highlight plurality and heterogeneity at
the expense of an overarching and united European peoplehood.
In their conceptualization of the democratic model of legitimacy,
Beetham and Lord (1998) stick to a strictly liberal understanding of rep-
resentative democracy. In their model, the legitimacy of the EC/EU is
crucially dependent on a functioning system of parliamentary represen-
tation because it is the central mechanism to safeguard ‘core attributes
of democratic governance which we [Lord and Beetham, D.B.] take to be
public control with political equality’ (Lord and Beetham 2001: 444).12
In line with this view of democracy, Beetham and Lord put forward
parliamentary solutions to the legitimacy problems of the EU, that is,
strengthening the autonomy and power of the European Parliament
and developing a properly integrated party system. Their understanding
of democracy closely resembles those variants of democracy existent in
the nation state. According to Beetham and Lord, the character of the
EU as a non-state political system ‘makes little difference to how the EU
ought to be legitimated’ (ibid.: 443). Mechanisms and requirements that
legitimate the nation state also hold for the context of the EU.
Such a narrow perspective of democracy has been criticized from vari-
ous sides. Authors working in the field of normative legitimacy research
have argued that yardsticks derived from a liberal-representative notion
of democracy are inadequate to assess the democratic legitimacy of the
EC/EU. Alternative models of democracy, in particular those rooted in
deliberative democratic theory, are proposed as yardsticks for the eval-
uation of the democratic quality of the political system of the EU.
Research studies following this perspective emphasize the democratic
value of civil society participation (Nanz and Steffek 2003; see also
the contributions in the volume edited by Kohler-Koch and Rittberger
2007), the deliberative quality of negotiations in the EU’s comitology
system (Joerges and Neyer 1997) and recognize the emergence of a
European public sphere, which constitutes a central premise for legit-
imate governance (Eder and Kantner 2000; Eriksen and Fossum 2004;
Trenz 2004). In addition to works rooted in deliberative democratic the-
ory, republican notions of European democracy emphasize the issue of
non-domination (Bellamy and Warleigh 1998; Bellamy 2006; Bohman
2007). Here, a legitimate EU is constructed as a ‘multi-level Republic’
12
For a similar position that arguably also implies a liberal understanding of
representative democracy see Føllesdal and Hix (2006).
(Bellamy and Warleigh 1998: 466) which relies on a ‘robust connection

of diverse dêmoi and institutional locations’ (Bohman 2007: 56) and
which is characterized by a wide dispersion of power.13
All these works emphasize that democracy can be understood dif-
ferently than envisioned in Beetham and Lord’s liberal understanding
of representative democracy. Acknowledging the multiplicity of mean-
ings of democracy, this study sets out to adapt Beetham and Lord’s
original typology on this point and puts forward a broad concept
of democracy, encompassing both the most dominant definitions of
democracy discussed in the context of the legitimacy of the EC/EU
corresponding to liberal and deliberative models of democracy and
marginalized definitions corresponding, for instance, to a republican
model of democracy.
A defining feature of the typology of legitimacy concepts proposed
by Beetham and Lord is the fact that performance constitutes one
dimension of a liberal-democratic form of legitimacy. As Beetham and
Lord emphasize, the question as to whether a political order is capa-
ble of meeting ‘certain fundamental needs and values’, in other words,
whether it is able to enhance the ‘public interest’, is inherently related
to democracy (Beetham and Lord 1998: 94).14 The performance model as
conceptualized by Beetham and Lord bears a strong resemblance to the
notion of ‘output-legitimacy’ as perceived by Scharpf (1999, 2005). Both
concepts are closely related to democracy and are geared towards safe-
guarding the public interest of the European constituency. From this
perspective, the EU may be legitimated by its output if it successfully
contributes to a European common good.
In contrast to Beetham and Lord’s conceptualization of perfor-
mance and Scharpf’s conceptualization of output-legitimacy, the vast
majority of empirical legitimacy research in International Relations
and European Integration Studies tends to stick to a concept of
output-legitimacy which equates the latter with efficient and effec-
tive problem-solving (Steffek 2013) or with the provision of benefits
13
For an excellent overview of Republican views on a European democracy see
Thiel (2012).
14
They reject defining the public interest as the sum of individual prefer-
ences (ibid.: 97) and emphasize that the public interest is socially constructed,
and is motivated by shared values and is shaped by debates and discourses
(Beetham and Lord 1998: 97–98). Historically, performance-related justifications
included arguments that emphasized the EC/EU’s function of delivering security,
economic and welfare rights, as well as civic/legal rights (ibid.: 98).
for members of international organizations. Both understandings of

output-legitimacy (those focusing on effective/efficient problem-solving
and those centring on the provision of benefits) are basically non-
democratic because they do not bear any reference to a collectively
shared common interest. The capacity of a political system to solve prob-
lems is different from the capacity of a political system to solve them in
a particular manner that safeguards the public interest (ibid.: 8, see also
2012). Similarly, the emphasis on the provision of benefits is based on
a ‘support-for-benefit’ logic (Steffek 2013: 7) that lacks a reference to a
common interest.15
The performance model of legitimacy as presented in this study is
based on a very broad understanding of performance which encom-
passes both democratic and non-democratic interpretations.16 Such a
broad understanding of performance legitimacy was chosen in order
not to exclude from the analysis important articulations made by the
Commission. There are a number of examples in the empirical mate-
rial in which the Commission proposes that effectiveness, efficiency
and problem-solving capacity constitute a crucially important basis of
legitimacy. A narrower conceptualization of performance would con-
stitute an inadequate restriction and would exclude a whole range of
articulations. Rather than deciding beforehand on the essential mean-
ing of performance, I will concentrate on the interpretation put forward
by the Commission itself. The distinction between democratic and non-
democratic conceptualizations of performance can serve as a useful
heuristic device to categorize such articulations.
Legitimacy discourses and legitimation policies
So far, I have discussed the notion of legitimation as a discursive bat-

tle over competing meanings of legitimacy held in different discursive
15
In fact, according to David Easton, it is doubtful whether the support that a
political system generates on the basis of an efficient provision of benefits has
anything to do with legitimacy at all. The empirical legitimacy of a political sys-
tem is highly dependent on a sound basis of diffuse support. However, diffuse
support is, according to Easton, distinct from specific support. Specific support is
short-lived and dependent on concrete outputs and the beneficial performance
of a political system. Diffuse support, by contrast, is more durable and normally
‘independent of outputs and performance’ (Easton 1975: 444).
16
For the general differentiation between democratic and non-democratic
notions of performance see Schneider (2010: 53); for the context of the EU see
Biegoń (2010: 189–193).
arenas. The key role of legitimacy discourses and the need to get to
grips with socially constructed legitimation criteria prevalent in polit-
ical communities have been highlighted. What is more, in line with
poststructuralist theory, I have proposed a very broad definition of dis-
course as structures of meaning that constitute subjects, objects and
practices. From this perspective, legitimacy discourses are not merely
instances of ‘cheap talk’ with no consequences whatsoever on what hap-
pens in the ‘real world’. Legitimacy discourses are significant in that
they make certain courses of action possible while restraining others
(Neumann 2009). Although the concrete impact of legitimacy discourses
is certainly not quantifiable, the dominance of particular meanings of
legitimacy and the marginalization of others is certainly consequen-
tial. In this section, I will develop the argument that the dynamics
and resilience of legitimacy discourses can help to understand so-called
legitimation policies (Nullmeier, Geis and Daase 2012).
Legitimation policies are defined as measures launched by politi-
cal elites to make a given political order compatible with established
norms of legitimate governance. Legitimation policies are different
from public relation campaigns and marketing measures, which merely
aim at increasing the public acceptance of certain policies or political
authorities. In contrast to this, legitimation policies aim at generating
diffuse support for the political system as a whole and typically make
recourse to established notions of legitimate rule. Legitimation policies
may comprise cultural, education and communication policies as well
as organizational and institutional reforms. However, not all cultural
policies, institutional reforms, etc. can be interpreted as legitimation
policies. The measures given become legitimation policies if they are
explicitly linked to the objective of making a political system compatible
with a (set of) legitimation criteria.
In the empirical section of the book, I will illustrate that discourses
on legitimacy reconstructed from Commission documents have found
expression in a number of far-reaching legitimation policies. In the
1980s, the rise of the identity discourse paved the way for identity poli-
cies consisting of measures with the explicit aim to inculcate a sense
of Europeanness in European people. As a result, a European flag, a
European anthem and Europe Day were invented (Chapter 5). In the
early 1990s, solutions to the legitimacy crisis were sought in measures
that reduced the distance between the citizens and political institu-
tions by post-parliamentary forms of citizens’ involvement. A new type
of legitimation policy was invented, which I denote as ‘policies of
closeness’, mainly constituted by the introduction of a sophisticated
transparency regime and the subsidiarity principle (Chapter 6). Finally,

the early 2000s represented a further turning point in the history of
the Commission’s legitimation policies connected to the rise of citizen
participation as a crucially important legitimation criterion leading to
a proliferation of policies of ‘participatory engineering’ (Zittel 2008; see
also Biegoń 2014).
But how exactly can we understand the relationship between legitima-
tion policies and legitimacy discourses? How do legitimacy discourses
make the rise of certain legitimation policies possible? In general,
poststructuralist discourse theory is weak in specifying the mechanisms
by which discourses impact concrete practices or policies. The theory
flatly rejects a causal relationship between discourses and policies.17
The reason for poststructuralists’ rejection of causal theorizing is their
broad conception of discourse, which conceives of discourses in terms
of meaning systems and rejects the distinction between the discursive
and the non-discursive (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Scholars building
on a poststructuralist framework argue that ‘seemingly non-discursive
phenomena like technology, institutions and economic processes are
ultimately constructed in and through discursive systems of difference
and from this they draw the conclusion that discourse is co-extensive
with the social’ (Torfing 2005b: 9). Everything that is meaningful is ulti-
mately produced through discursive systems of signification. From this
perspective, the strict separation between cause and effect, characteris-
tic of causal accounts, is problematic, since both cause and effect are
discursively mediated.
As a result, poststructuralists often argue that their analyses rely on
a constitutive rather than causal logic where no such independence
between cause and effect is implied (Kratochwil 2000: 78).18 Constitutive
analyses concentrate on the enabling function of discourses. In con-
trast to causal analyses, poststructuralists do not ask ‘why-questions’
but ‘how-possible questions’ (Doty 1993: 289; Weldes and Saco 1996).
They are interested in discursive processes that make particular courses
17
But see Banta (2013): his conceptualization of discourse is rooted in a critical
realist theory. In his understanding, discourses are causal mechanisms.
18
Kurki (2006) argues that contemporary understandings of causal theorizing rely
on a narrow Humean conception of causal analysis and maintains that the divide
between causal and constitutive analyses can be closed by drawing on a broader
Aristotelian understanding of causes. Freistein (2012: 114–117) critically discusses
whether a poststructuralist mode of analysis and Kurki’s broad conceptualization
of causalities are compatible.
of action possible while restraining others. The constraining function of

discourses is, thus, the flipside of the enabling function. Discourse analy-
ses can either concentrate on the question of whether a discourse made
a certain policy possible or they can illustrate how a particular struc-
ture of the discourse, and the boundaries on which it relies, constrained
certain polices.
Going beyond these rather general remarks, Hansen (2006: 28–31)
has further specified the conditions under which discourses are conse-
quential with respect to certain polices in her ‘model of combinability’.
In line with a poststructuralist approach, she emphasizes that dis-
courses and policies are ‘mutually constitutive’ (ibid.: 28): articulations
make certain policies possible while excluding others and, at the same
time, these articulations are continuously restated and negotiated in
policies. However, despite the fact that the two are mutually constitu-
tive, Hansen argues, it is useful to differentiate between articulations
and policies for analytical purposes. One cannot assume that a par-
ticular articulation will always lead to a particular policy, nor that
a particular policy will always be underpinned by a specific articu-
lation (ibid.: 30–31). Therefore, Hansen maintains that for discourses
to materialize in policies, two conditions must be satisfied: first, it is
necessary that a relatively stable link is established between a policy
and a discourse that makes the two appear consistent with each
other. This link between discourses and policies is always contin-
gent and is neither a ‘functionalist nor an essentialist one’ (ibid.: 30).
A poststructuralist analysis can account for the rise and fall of poli-
cies if the researcher is able to show how a link was forged between a
certain policy and a particular articulation and how these links were
stabilized.
Moreover, Hansen emphasizes that in order to understand why some
discourses are more consequential than others, it is not enough to
relate to the ‘internal stability’ of the discourse, that is, to the coher-
ent construction of discourses; the broader context within which the
discourse is set also has to be considered carefully. Therefore, the second
condition that needs to be met concerns strong and long intertextual
links. A discourse will only succeed in being far-reaching if it man-
ages to become ‘ “common sense” in a particular site or sphere of the
social’ (Griggs and Howarth 2008: 130; for a similar argument see also
Nonhoff 2006: 173; Nullmeier 2012). The link between a policy and
a particular discourse must be forged in a variety of discursive arenas
in order to be consequential. Hansen specifies the second condition
thus:
Whether a discourse articulates a stable relationship between identity

and policy is to be posed not only as a question of internal stability
but also as a matter of whether the discourse is supported or criticized
by other discourses. Put in more pragmatic terms, politically contex-
tualized discourse analysis combines the analysis of how texts seek to
create stability with analysis of whether these constructions are being
accepted or contested within the political and public domain.
(Hansen 2006: 30)
In chapters 5 and 6, I will deal with two influential legitimation poli-

cies – identity policies and policies of closeness – by relying on Hansen’s
model of combinability. I will illustrate how particular representations
of the EC/EU (the EC as a ‘people’s Europe’ and the EU as a ‘political
union’) became ‘common sense’ in a wide range of discursive arenas and
how these representations became linked with particular legitimation
policies.
Plan of the book
The work is structured as follows: the next chapter (Chapter 2) deals

with the question of discursive change in greater detail. I discuss com-
peting accounts of why legitimacy discourses change, put forward in the
fields of International Relations and European Integration Studies. Crit-
ically engaging with alternative approaches sharpens the contours of
a poststructuralist approach towards discourse dynamics that I develop
thereafter.
Chapter 3 sets the methodological stage of the study; I first propose
a poststructuralist reading of metaphor theory before spelling out in
full detail how the empirical analysis was conducted, making method-
ological choices as explicit and transparent as possible and reflecting on
text selection, the identification of metaphors and the construction of
conceptual metaphors.
Chapter 4 gives a broad overview of the developments of legitimacy
discourses in the European Commission. Between 1973 and 2013, four
discourses – the democracy discourse, the performance discourse, the
identity discourse and the technocracy discourse – struggled to acquire
a dominant position and this chapter maps how this discursive struggle
has been played out in the European Commission.
Chapters 5 and 6 apply the conceptual apparatus for discourse dynam-
ics developed in the theoretical part of the study to concrete cases.
They illuminate the conditions that made major discursive shifts of
legitimacy discourses possible. More specifically, Chapter 5 deals with

the rise and fall of the identity discourse in the 1980s. As indicated
above, the 1980s witnessed the emergence of new types of legitimacy-
related articulations that foregrounded the social prerequisites of legit-
imate governance. A cultural-ethnic reading of the European Commu-
nity found an immense resonance in the European Commission. Yet,
despite its initial success, the identity discourse was fraught with ten-
sion, which quickly led to its demise in the late 1980s. In its place, the
democracy discourse gained precedence in the early 1990s. Chapter 6
investigates how the democracy discourse managed to establish itself
as the dominant reading of legitimacy in the European Commission
for almost a decade. The democracy discourse was also immensely pro-
ductive with respect to legitimation polices. The chapter shows how
the discursive shifts of the 1990s paved the way for a new type of
legitimation policy, the so-called policy of closeness, which set out to
democratize the EU by means other than strengthening the European
Parliament.
In the conclusion, I get back to one of the primary tasks of discourse
analytical studies and will engage critically with commonsensical mean-
ings of legitimacy prevalent in the Commission. I concentrate on the
most recent developments of the democracy discourse in the European
Commission and problematize the ‘dialogue and debate fad’ that has
structured the Commission’s articulations on democracy since the failed
constitutional referenda in 2005.
2
Discourse Dynamics
One of the central objectives of this book is to contribute to an

understanding of why established normative benchmarks of legitimate
governance change. Until now, some fragmentary and rather cursory
accounts have been given in the fields of European Integration Stud-
ies and International Relations – often merely dealing with the rise of
a particular legitimation criterion such as transparency (Lodge 1994;
Curtin 1995), subsidiarity (Kersbergen and Verbeek 1994) or European
identity (Bruter 2005; Theiler 2005). A more sophisticated and encom-
passing account of the recent shift of legitimacy discourses and the
launch of participatory democracy in EU institutions has been given
by Kohler-Koch (2011) and Saurugger (2010). Finally, valuable contribu-
tions to the debate have also been made in recent studies in the field
of International Relations, in particular by those authors dealing with
politicization processes (Zürn, Binder and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012). Not all
authors explicitly use the terminology of a discursive change when deal-
ing with their object of study. Instead, the terminology employed rather
refers to a change of legitimacy rhetoric, ideas or norms. Notwithstand-
ing these terminological differences, which certainly point to divergent
theoretical traditions, they all in some way or another tackle the ques-
tion of why legitimation criteria change over time. In what follows,
I will critically discuss the existing accounts on the dynamics of legit-
imacy discourses, be it with respect to the EU or other international
organizations, before engaging in a more detailed description of what a
poststructuralist perspective can add to the debate.
Dynamics of legitimacy discourses: Overview of

explanations
The first explanation given for the dynamics of legitimacy discourses,

which I denote as an institutional account,1 has been prominently put
1
Zürn (2013b), who is a central representative of this strand of research, sets his
perspective within a historical-institutional theoretical framework.
29
forward by authors from the field of International Relations tackling the

politicization of international organizations. Although the institutional
explanation was primarily developed to explain diverging levels of
politicization2 across different international organizations, Zürn and his
co-authors also touch on the causes of changing patterns of normative
benchmarks used to assess the acceptability of international organi-
zations (Zürn 2006; Zürn, Binder, Ecker-Ehrhardt and Radtke 2007).
In general, this perspective puts the interaction between institutional
development and societal change centre stage: according to the institu-
tional account, a change of legitimacy discourses is invariably connected
to the change of the authority structure of an international organization
(Zürn et al. 2007; de Wilde and Zürn 2012; Zürn et al. 2012). Authors
following this approach argue that the legitimation criteria used to
assess the rightfulness of an international organization are significantly
dependent on the level (denoting the degree of decision-making power)
and scope (denoting the breadth of the policy fields within which an
international organization has a say) of authority that an international
organization exercises. ‘Different types of authorities require different
forms of legitimation’ (Zürn et al. 2012: 88). Epistemic authority is dif-
ferent from political authority that has the right to enforce binding
decisions. A political authority such as the EU, with a high level and a
wide scope of authority to which all citizens are subject to some degree
or another, automatically ‘raises the issue of how to ensure political
equality and organize public control’ (de Wilde and Zürn 2012: 143).
People are prone to employing more sophisticated normative yardsticks
when assessing the acceptability of international organizations exercis-
ing a high degree of political authority. International organizations tend
to be evaluated on the basis of democratic benchmarks, rather than
mere performance criteria, if their level of authority is high and their
scope of authority is wide.3 With respect to the EU, an institutional
account would generally expect that democratic legitimation criteria
have become more salient during the integration process, since the
2
Broadly speaking, politicization is defined as raising societal awareness and
contestation of international organizations (Zürn, Binder and Ecker-Ehrhardt
2012: 74).
3
Dingwerth et al. (2014) have proposed a constructivist twist to this argument.
According to them, it is not necessarily factual authority that an international
organization exerts, but perceived authority. If people perceive an international
organization as influential, they will approach it with democratic legitimation
criteria; the international organization does not actually have to dispose of a
high degree of authority.
Discourse Dynamics 31
level and scope of authority has constantly been expanded with each
treaty revision (Börzel 2005; de Wilde and Zürn 2012). What is more, an
institutional account would underline the importance of constitutional
reforms in the history of the EU as a trigger for changes of legitimacy
discourses.4
From a poststructuralist perspective, such an account is problem-
atic mainly because of the implicit automatism between constitutional
reforms (and change of the authority structure) and discursive change
that the explanation suggests. In the institutional account, changes
of legitimacy discourses occur quasi-automatically as a by-product of
deepened integration and increased authority. Every increase in the
Community’s authority, as is implicitly argued, is unavoidably accom-
panied by a change of people’s assessment of the legitimacy of the
institution.
Admittedly, representatives of the institutional account weaken their
claim of an automatism between institutional development and change
of legitimacy discourses by introducing a variety of intermediary fac-
tors that might play a role in discourse dynamics (de Wilde and Zürn
2012: 143–145). A political opportunity structure, consisting of national
narratives about the integration process, media receptiveness to EU
issues, party politics and referendums can, it is argued, significantly
condition politicization processes and even facilitate the rise of demo-
cratic legitimation criteria in a given political community. Despite these
qualifications, however, a tight link between institutional development
and change of legitimacy discourses remains a necessary tenet of the
institutional account. Societal politicization – and linked to this, the
increased reference to normatively sophisticated benchmarks of legiti-
mate governance – is conceptualized as a non-intended consequence of
institutional development (Zürn et al. 2007: 149).
According to poststructuralist theory, there is no necessity between a
given institutional structure and an increase in, for instance, democratic
legitimation criteria in a given political community, because whether
an institutional structure disposes of a high or low degree of authority
4
It remains unclear how an institutional explanation would account for changes
of legitimacy discourses within EC/EU institutions – the object of study of this
book. The institutional account sets out to account for politicization processes
and changes in normative benchmarks employed by citizens that are affected by
international organizations’ authority. How and why political rulers change the
way they talk about legitimacy and the way they try to generate legitimacy has
so far not been theorized by representatives of the institutional account.
always depends on divergent interpretations. There is no such thing as

an ‘ultimate ground of explanation’ (Walters and Haahr 2005: 5) such
as the degree of authority of the EC/EU.
Rather than presenting discourse dynamics as a necessity by referring
to broader societal and institutional changes, a poststructuralist account
denies the existence of any necessity and emphasizes the radical con-
tingency of discursive shifts. This point has aptly been underlined by
Walters and Haahr:
Since the phenomenon in question is not seen to emerge by any

necessity, we are denied the possibility of any global cause or ulti-
mate ground of explanation. Rather than viewing the democratic
problematizations of European integration as for instance reflections
of ‘challenges’ or ‘developments’ in surrounding societies, they must
thus be viewed as elements in a heterogeneity of discourses and tra-
jectories, overlapping and/or competing in their constitution of a
world, and situated in the context of a wider political struggle over
the hierarchization of different discourses.
(Walters and Haahr 2005: 5)
A poststructuralist perspective speculates that the rising influence of

democratic legitimation criteria can be better understood if we acknowl-
edge the radical contingency of discourses rather than referring to
a necessary connection between institutional development and social
dynamics in assessing the legitimacy of international organizations.
The second explanation given for the dynamics of legitimacy dis-
courses is constituted by actor-centred approaches that emphasize the
central role of a deliberatively and strategically acting subject. Such
contributions can be divided into rational accounts (highlighting the
role of the interests of certain actors) and social constructivist accounts
(that understand discursive change primarily in terms of normative or
ideational change).
Interest-based explanations highlight the utility-based calculations of
actors as the driving force for changes of legitimacy discourses. In this
strand of research, the terminology employed refers more to legitimacy
rhetoric than to legitimacy discourse and the explanation has two vari-
ants: (1) a change in legitimacy rhetoric (the launch of new legitimacy-
related concepts such as European identity, transparency, participation,
etc.) is seen as an attempt made by influential supranational actors
(such as the Commission or the European Parliament) to increase their
power in the institutional system of the EC/EU. In contrast, (2) the

intergovernmental variant focuses on a constellation of favourable inter-
ests in the Council that helps certain actors to pursue their goals by
employing a certain type of legitimacy rhetoric.
Interest-based explanations have been proposed for the Commission’s
turn towards European identity in the 1980s as well as for the launch of
the transparency concept in the early 1990s. Bruter (2005: 73) interprets
the Commission’s turn towards European identity as a strategic step to
prevent the Community from becoming a mere free trade area and to
expand its influence to new policy fields such as education and cul-
ture. From this perspective, the identity turn is explained by referring to
Delors’ interests (and the interests of other leading figures in the Com-
mission), namely to move the integration process forward and thereby
to consolidate the Commission’s political clout. Another albeit similar
argument suggests that the Commission began to promote the iden-
tity concept and became increasingly engaged in education and cultural
policies in order to divert attention away from the fact that it had failed
to respond sufficiently to economic challenges (de Witte 1987).
Similarly, the decision to introduce extensive transparency measures
in the early 1990s is often depicted as an interest-driven act. Lodge
argues that the turn towards more transparency suited member state
governments as it served to divert attention away from demands to
increase the power of the European Parliament further. Transparency as
a legitimation policy also helped silence demands for further democ-
ratization of the EU without increasing the clout of the European
Parliament. The reform of the European Parliament had become an
ever more pressing issue for the wider public but was not supported by
member states’ agendas. According to Lodge, many member state gov-
ernments ‘wished to maintain the concentration of power in their hands
and frustrate power-sharing with the directly elected Parliament’ (Lodge
1994: 346). In such a climate, providing the rhetoric of transparency
diverted the focus of interest away from more far-reaching democratic
reforms of the Community and at the same time consolidated the
decision-making powers of the member states.
A further actor-centred approach is constituted by social construc-
tivist approaches drawing on the literature of norm diffusion. Here,
democratic legitimation criteria are conceptualized as social norms,
that is, as ‘standard[s] of appropriate behavior for actors with a given
identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). Social constructivists high-
light the importance of norms alongside material variables as a crucial
factor influencing actors in defining their identities and interests.5

As far as normative change is concerned, the role of norm entrepreneurs
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 893) becomes central. At this point,
the theory becomes actor-centred because normative change is ulti-
mately traced back to certain (groups of) actors who seek to promote
a given norm.
Dingwerth and Witt (2014) have proposed a theoretical account for
the change of legitimacy discourses that draws heavily on the norm dif-
fusion literature. They perceive the process of legitimation as a strategic
rhetorical interaction between different types of actors:
International organizations are legitimated in public contests, in

which strategic political actors seek to define what differentiates a
‘good’ international organization from a ‘bad’ international organiza-
tion. In doing so, the actors draw on – and also shape – the normative
environments, in which international organizations are embedded.
(Dingwerth and Witt 2014: 2)
Changes of legitimacy discourses are explained by referring to actors

‘who seek to promote specific frames and understandings’ of legitimacy
(ibid.: 10). ‘Legitimation contests are compared to a game of chess,
in which different actors make a number of moves in an attempt to
win the game’ (ibid.: 8). Dingwerth and Witt (ibid.: 11–12) identify
three categories of actors: (1) the international organization as a whole,
(2) member states and (3) external actors (such as interest groups, phil-
anthropic foundations, parties and the media as well as countries that
are not members of the international organization) that each attempts
to strategically influence the interactive process of public debate over a
given international organization’s legitimacy. Similar to social construc-
tivist research from the field of norm diffusion, the authors suggest that
the rise of new legitimation criteria is crucially dependent on strategic
framing processes initiated by such groups of actors.
In the context of European Integration Studies, a social constructivist
perspective that borrows heavily from the norm diffusion literature has
been applied by Saurugger (2010) to account for the emergence and rise
of the ‘norm of participatory democracy’ (Saurugger 2010: 488) in EU
institutions. She sees the emergence of the participatory norm as hav-
ing been decisively linked to deliberations held in bureaucratic forums
5
For an excellent overview of social constructivist literature on norm diffusion
and a poststructuralist critique see Renner (2013: 9–42).
that brought together European civil servants and academia in the early
1990s. In the aftermath, a new frame was propagated by the European
Commission and the European Parliament as well as other actors such
as the Economic and Social Committee. The reference to the norm of
participatory democracy is represented as a strategic intervention made
by the Commission (and slightly later by the European Parliament and
other actors) in a broader ‘power struggle among diverse actors compet-
ing for influence and legitimacy in the eyes of other institutions as well
as the European public’ (ibid.: 488).
Finally, a further actor-based approach that combines a strong notion
of agency with an emphasis on structural explanatory components,
and explicitly rejects an interest-based account, has been proposed
by Kohler-Koch (2011) for the same puzzle, namely the turn towards
participatory democracy in the EU after 2000. Kohler-Koch understands
this shift primarily in terms of a more deeply seated ideational change,
since launching new legitimation criteria is a process that is not driven
by strategic utility maximizing actors but by actors with diverging ideas6
about legitimate governance. More specifically, Kohler-Koch explains
the participatory turn in the EU by drawing on Kingdon’s multiple
streams approach (Kohler-Koch 2011). She maintains that the success
of the idea of participatory democracy after 2000 was the result of three
interrelated processes: (1) a problem definition emphasizing the legiti-
macy crisis of the EU, which was becoming ever more pressing at that
time; (2) the fact that civil society participation bore highly positive
connotations and has been prominently propagated in many member
states and in academia since the early 1990s; and (3) a specific political
constellation in which a newly formed Commission served as an impor-
tant political entrepreneur, one who successfully propagated the new
concept of civil society participation. Here again, the role of the polit-
ical entrepreneur is highlighted. He plays a decisive role in ideational
change.
In sum, both interest-based and social constructivist approaches are
premised on the notion of an autonomous actor as a driving force for
discourse dynamics. Discursive change is ultimately traced back to the
interest of certain actors or to political entrepreneurs who successfully
6
Kohler-Koch defines ideas as ‘belief systems that are hardly ever founded on
systematic reasoning but are influenced by historical legacies and myths and
open to new interpretations in response to how an issue is framed’ (Kohler-Koch
2000: 514).
manage to launch a new frame in line with their underlying ideas or

internalized norms.
From a poststructuralist theory perspective, recourse to individual
motives such as interests, ideas or internalized norms as the driving force
in discursive change is highly problematic. Poststructuralists argue that
recourse to individual motives does not suffice as an explanation and
stress that subjective motives are methodologically intractable (Wæver
1990; Diez 1999: 50). We can never be entirely sure of what is going
on inside the head of any actor and whether certain interests, norms or
ideas actually caused a particular action. Even if we were to ask individu-
als about their reasons for acting in a particular way, it would not be clear
whether the reasons mentioned – even if they were voiced in private
settings – were actually the driving force behind their action, since state-
ments made in private settings might be as strategic as those made in
public ones (Krebs and Jackson 2007: 40). Rationalist accounts, in partic-
ular, ignore this methodological problem and often remain fragmentary.
Methodological clarifications dealing with how a particular interest was
researched and evidence that a particular interest actually triggered a
particular action are rarely provided. Frequently, the underlying interest
of member states or the Commission/the European Parliament is merely
presented as being evident.
In contrast to rationalist and social constructivist theories,
poststructuralists argue that social scientists should not base their expla-
nations on an analysis of actors’ motives. Krebs and Jackson’s plea
‘to avoid centering causal accounts on unanswerable questions about
actors true motives and to focus instead on what actors say in what
context, and to what audiences’ (Krebs and Jackson 2007: 36) is in
line with a poststructuralist perspective. The latter shares Krebs and
Jackson’s methodological qualms regarding actor-centred explanations
and flatly rejects explanations perceiving individual motives as causal
factors. In line with Krebs and Jackson’s approach, a poststructuralist
account propagates remaining on the surface and studying the things
that people say as an end in itself.
Moreover, social constructivist approaches emphasizing ideas or
norms as well as rationalist approaches foregrounding the concept
of interest are based on a problematic perception of language. These
approaches see language as a transparent medium that conveys under-
lying motives in a direct manner. A sovereign actor first forms
ideas/interests or internalizes norms and then expresses them in a lin-
guistic utterance or written statement. ‘The locus of meaning is assumed
to be the individual’ (Wæver 1990: 339). She ascribes meaning to a
certain situation and expresses this meaning through language. As a

result, social constructivist and rationalist approaches often only analyse
language in order to reconstruct underlying individual motives.
By contrast, a poststructuralist conception of language problema-
tizes the idea that language conveys individual motives in a trans-
parent fashion (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 74–75). The contours of
a poststructuralist theory of subjectivity and language will be out-
lined in greater detail in the next section. Suffice it to say that the
poststructuralist conception of language is more encompassing; it is
language – understood in the Saussurean tradition as a differential net-
work of meaning units – that becomes the locus of meaning and not
the individual (Wæver 1990: 339–340). Individuals ‘always find them-
selves “thrown into” a system of meaningful practices’ (Glynos and
Howarth 2007: 79). These meaning structures – which are never closed
but always incomplete – shape the identity and practices of individu-
als. Language does not reflect the motives of particular individuals; it
actively constitutes them (Griggs and Howarth 2002).
Discursive change and poststructuralist theory
I will now turn to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s discourse the-
ory and their understanding of discursive change. Here, I draw mainly
on their principal work Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (Laclau and
Mouffe 1985), supplementing this with a number of texts that Laclau
has written alone (in particular Laclau 1990, 1996, 2007). In general,
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory offers a sophisticated understand-
ing of discursive change. The theory outlines how hegemonies – broadly
understood in terms of a dominance of particular systems of meaning –
are established and naturalized but also how they are disrupted. It offers
conceptual tools to investigate the process by which hegemonic dis-
courses emerge and dissolve. Discourse dynamics are part and parcel
of Laclau and Mouffe’s theoretical considerations. Due to the centrality
of the concept of hegemony, I consider their theory to be particularly
well equipped to tackle the problem of accounting for discursive change.
Their definition of discourse provides a suitable starting point in under-
standing their poststructuralist theory and their theoretical account of
discourse dynamics:
Our analysis rejects the distinction between discourse and non-

discursive practices. It affirms a) that every object is constituted
as an object of discourse, insofar as no object is given outside
every discursive condition of emergence, and b) that any distinc-

tion between what are usually called the linguistic and behavioural
aspects of social practice, is either an incorrect distinction or ought
to find its place as differentiation within the social production of
meaning, which is structured under the form of discursive totalities.
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 107)
Laclau and Mouffe’s conceptualization of discourse includes both

discursive and non-discursive practices. They clearly reject setting dis-
courses only within a linguistic horizon – as Foucault’s later work tended
to do (Lemke 1997: 46; Bogdal 2006: 15–17). Discourse is understood as a
relational system of signification, that is, a system through which mean-
ing is generated (Torfing 2005a: 14). Discourses consist of articulations.
The latter are defined as those practices establishing a relation among
elements resulting in these elements being differentiated in a particu-
lar manner, thus rendering them meaningful (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:
105). Articulations are, moreover, conceptualized in a radically formal
way: any practices establishing relationships between elements and not
only linguistic practices are understood to be articulations. Thus, mean-
ing is not only generated when linguistic signs are put in relation to each
other, it is also generated when a relationship is established between
subjects, objects or practices (Nonhoff 2004: 76). Discourse is then ‘the
structured totality resulting from these articulatory practices’ (Howarth
and Stavrakakis 2000: 7).
What is more, to understand Laclau and Mouffe’s notion of dis-
course, it is essential to clarify their idea of the subject. There are
basically two conceptualizations of the subject that can be distinguished
within poststructuralist theory: the subject as the subject position within
a discursive structure and the subject as the subject of lack (Torfing 1999:
14; see also Moebius 2003: 201; Stäheli 2006a: 296). While the former
conceptualization is rooted in Foucault’s archaeological work, the latter
conception of subjectivity draws on a Lacanian notion of subjectivity
which Laclau adopted in his later work. Conceptualizing the subject as
the subject of lack departs from the idea of reducing the subject to the
role of reproducing pre-existing discursive structures and pays tribute to
the constitutive undecidability of every structure. It is predicated on the
core poststructuralist ontological assumption that each system of mean-
ing is essentially incomplete. Thus, Laclau agrees with Foucault that
human beings are constituted as subjects within discursive structures,
yet Laclau stresses that ‘these structures are inherently contingent and
malleable’ (Howarth 2006: 264). Thus, Laclau assigns a potentially more
significant role to the subject in discursive changes, because the moment

of failure of every structure to close itself fully likewise ‘marks the emer-
gence of the subject of lack through the fissures of the discursive chain’
(Laclau and Zac 1994: 32). Particularly in times of a radical restructuring
of social relations, the role of the subject increases:
We maintained earlier that the subject is merely the distance between

the undecidable structure and the decision. This means that the more
dislocated a structure is, the more the field of decisions not deter-
mined by it will expand. The recompositions and rearticulations will
thus operate at increasingly deeper structural levels, thereby leading
to an increase in the role of the ‘subject’ and to history becoming less
and less repetitive.
(Laclau 1990: 40)
Once the ‘undecidability’ of structures becomes visible in dislocatory

situations, the subject can identify with new discursive objects since
the existing structures no longer function to confer identity (Howarth
2006: 264). In this context, Laclau introduces the concept of identifica-
tion. It denotes the moment of decision on the side of the subject with a
discursive object. This moment of decision is partially determined by the
structure, since the subject identifies with something that is available in
the field of discursivity (Moebius 2003: 174–175). Thus, identification
is defined as ‘a movement involving a function of determination trig-
gered by the failure in the constitution of an objective unity’ (Laclau
and Zac 1994: 31). It is through the act of identification that the subject
emerges.
Given these theoretical baselines of the discourse theory by Laclau
and Mouffe, how exactly can their theory contribute to a better under-
standing of discursive change? How can we understand the rise and fall
of discourses with the help of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory?
In my view, the key to understanding discourse dynamics lies in their
concept of hegemony. The two authors meticulously spell out the pro-
cesses by which hegemonies are constructed and those that lead to a
demise of hegemonies. Reconstructing these discursive processes in the
empirical material can contribute to a better understanding of the rise
and fall of discourses.
Based on Laclau and Mouffe’s work on hegemonies, it is helpful to dif-
ferentiate between two forms of discourse dynamics: discursive change
may either occur because of (1) the construction and stabilization of
a ‘new’ hegemonic discourse, or (2) due to a disruption and eventual
collapse of hegemonic systems of meaning (Nonhoff 2006: 207–240;

Herschinger 2011: 33–54).
Before engaging in a more detailed description of how hegemonic
discourses are constructed and circumvented, some terminology needs
to be clarified: Laclau and Mouffe’s poststructuralist discourse theory
has hitherto been primarily applied in studies dealing with successful
hegemonic discourses. Prime examples are Nonhoff’s study (2006) on
the social market economy discourse after the Second World War in
Germany and Howarth’s (2000) account of the success of the Charterist
movement in South Africa in the post-Soweto period. These hegemonic
discourses were particularly successful as they largely hegemonized
the field of discursivity, almost completely sidelining alternative dis-
courses on economic (in the case of Nonhoff’s study) or political
(in the case of Howarth’s study) orders. As I will show in the empir-
ical chapters, Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory cannot only be
applied to reconstruct the process by which fully fledged hegemonies
are established, but is also useful to account for discourse dynamics
on a lower scale. For this purpose, it is useful to distinguish differ-
ent forms of hegemonic discourses capturing different forms of success
(for a similar suggestion see Nonhoff 2006: 138–141). In the fol-
lowing, I will only speak of hegemonies or hegemonic discourses when
a discourse successfully manages to dominate the field of meanings
attributed to legitimacy. Discourses below that threshold, that is, dis-
courses that influentially shape a given space of meaning (in this
study, legitimate EC/EU), but which are articulated alongside other com-
peting discourses, are called hegemonic projects. In the latter case, the
discursive operations are not fully working. They are in some way defect
and deficient and it is the task of the researcher to point out these
ruptures in the discursive structure. The construction of hegemonic
discourses is the result of a discursive process that can, for analytical
purposes, be divided into different hegemonic operations. By contrast,
the circumvention of hegemonies is the result of counter-hegemonic
operations.
Hegemonic operations
For a precise understanding of the workings of hegemonic operations,

a short and succinct definition of Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of hege-
mony is required before engaging in a more detailed discussion of how
Laclau and Mouffe conceive the process by which hegemonic orders are
constructed and circumvented.
The starting point of Laclau and Mouffe’s elaborations on hegemony

is Antonio Gramsci’s work on the subject, which the two authors signifi-
cantly radicalize, incorporating it into a discourse theoretical framework
(Mouffe 1979; Nonhoff 2006: 137–148; Herschinger 2011: 12–32). Their
notion of hegemony builds on important aspects underlined by Antonio
Gramsci, who rejects the traditional Leninist understanding of hege-
mony, which basically denotes attempts made by the working class to
forge a temporary political alliance between distinct forces and interests
to overthrow class rule. According to Lenin, hegemonies are established
by the proletariat by virtue of its economic position or control over
government and the state (Mouffe 1979: 183; Howarth 2006: 257).
In contrast, Gramsci conceptualizes hegemonies as ‘intellectual and
moral leadership’ (Mouffe 1979: 183); a hegemony is constituted by a
fusion of different demands into a ‘collective will’ that represents uni-
versal values and interests (Mouffe 1979: 183–185). The establishment
of hegemonies denotes a process by which a particular group success-
fully universalizes its demands, transcending narrow economic interests
to create a new ideology or ‘common sense’ (Howarth 2006: 257). Fol-
lowing this reading of Gramsci’s work, hegemony becomes the result of
‘ideological struggles for meaning in which one group is able to make
another group share its specific goals, beliefs or world views to create
a collective will’ (Herschinger 2011: 21). Laclau and Mouffe build on
Gramsci’s conception of hegemony and essentially conceptualize it as a
discursive phenomenon. In the understanding of the two authors, hege-
mony does not denote dominance of one class or group of actors over
others, it is more the dominance of particular patterns of articulations or
discourses (including subject positions) which the concept of hegemony
captures (Laclau 2007: 70).
In Gramsci’s work, the fate of a hegemonic project is significantly
determined by the structural economic location of a social group. Laclau
and Mouffe, however, remove any remaining economic factor in their
reconceptualization of Gramsci’s work on hegemony and argue instead
that the success and failure of hegemonies is not determined in the last
instance by the economy but is dependent on contingent discursive pro-
cesses (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 109; see also Herschinger 2011: 21). By
abandoning the last elements of economic determinism in Gramscian
thought, Laclau and Mouffe pave the way for a broader application of
the concept of hegemony.
More specifically, Laclau (1996: 41–43) distinguishes between three
operations that are part of any construction of hegemonic discourses.
These three operations can, however, only be separated analytically.
Empirically, these three operations are closely intertwined and together

they form different parts of a broader discursive process (Nonhoff 2006:
213–221; Herschinger 2011: 34–37). In a first step, hegemonic opera-
tions depend on chains of equivalence between distinct elements of a
discourse. In a second step, an antagonistic division of the discursive
space takes place, which is fundamentally linked to the constitution of
an antagonistic other. In the final stage of every hegemonic operation,
one particular moment7 of the equivalential chain is largely emptied of
its original meaning and becomes representative of the chain of equiv-
alence itself. Consequently, an empty signifier emerges, functioning as
the nodal point of the discourse, thereby consolidating the hegemonic
order.8 In what follows, I will give a more detailed overview of each
of the three stages that accompany every constitution of hegemonic
discourses.
The first operation central for the emergence of hegemonic discourses
is the construction of a chain of equivalence. Here, it is necessary to note
that Laclau and Mouffe basically identify two logics that operate within
every discourse: the logic of difference and the logic of equivalence.
Difference is the most basic relational system within articulations and
denotes a way of relating discursive elements through their mutual dif-
ferences (x is different from y). The differential relationship between
discursive elements is fundamental since it is constitutive of their very
identity. Without this relationship, the discursive entities would be iden-
tical (Nonhoff 2006: 300). If the logic of difference prevails within
7
Laclau and Mouffe differentiate between two types of articulations which make
up discourses, namely elements and moments. Elements are units of meaning
that are not bound to one particular discourse, which is why they are also termed
‘floating signifiers’, while moments are units of meaning already integrated into a
broader discourse (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 113). I will use the term ‘moments’ to
denote those meaning units that are part of an equivalential chain and ‘elements’
for those meaning units that are not bound to an equivalential chain. ‘Meaning
units’ and ‘discursive entities’ are generic terms, comprising of both moments
and elements.
8
Nodal points are defined as ‘privileged discursive points’ that partially fix dis-
courses (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 112). Confusion remains with respect to the
delineation of the two concepts ‘empty signifier’ and ‘nodal point’. It is unclear
‘whether the empty signifier is simply synonymous with the nodal point, a
refinement of the original concept, or picks out and captures different aspects
of social reality’ (Howarth 2006: 268). At any rate, Laclau’s more recent publica-
tion (Laclau 2007) seems to raise the centrality of the concept of empty signifiers
at the expense of the concept of nodal points.
discourse, the particularity of its elements is strengthened and the com-

plexity of a discourse increases; the discourse is mainly constituted by a
multitude of disordered differential positions.
The logic of equivalence is a complementary logic. Relations of equiv-
alence construct a chain of equivalential relations among different
moments of a discourse that are seen as expressing a certain sameness
with respect to a third meaning unit (x is different from y but is equiva-
lent to y with respect to a) (Nonhoff 2006: 87). If the logic of equivalence
prevails in a discourse, a chain of equivalence emerges. A range of differ-
ent meaning units is rendered equivalent and is opposed to a different
meaning unit. This third meaning unit (‘a’), in reference to which all
the other moments of an equivalential chain are rendered equivalent,
can never be something positive. If this were the case, the logic of dif-
ference could never be transcended: we would be dealing with just one
more difference. In line with this argument, Laclau emphasizes that in
an equivalential relation, moments ‘share nothing positive, just the fact
that they all remain unfulfilled. So there is a specific negativity which is
inherent to the equivalential link’ (Laclau 2007: 96, emphasis added).
By entering into an equivalential bond, the original particularity of
the moment of a chain of equivalence is weakened at the expense
of a second meaning that underlies all moments in the equivalential
chain, that is, a meaning that is opposed to the lack or negative identity
outlined above. The more extended the chain, the less these signifiers
will be attached to their original particularistic meaning (Laclau 2007:
96). It follows that every identity of an element entering into an
equivalential chain is constitutively split:
On the one hand, each difference expresses itself as difference; on

the other hand each of them cancels itself as such by entering into a
relation of equivalence with all the other differences in the system.
(. . .) [T]his split or ambivalence is constitutive of all systemic identity.
(Laclau 1996: 38)
Laclau and Mouffe succinctly conclude that a conception which denies

any essentialist approach to social relations is obliged to recognize the
‘precarious character of every identity and the impossibility of fixing
the sense of the “elements” in any particular way’ (Laclau and Mouffe
1985: 96).
The second operation crucial for the emergence of hegemonic dis-
courses is the antagonistic division of the discursive space. Here, it is
essential to note that Laclau and Mouffe reject objectivist accounts
of antagonism. In their understanding, antagonism does not denote a

clash between social agents with fully constituted identities and inter-
ests (Howarth 2006: 259–260; Nonhoff 2006: 221–230). They delineate
their concept of antagonism from that of contradiction or opposition.
While contradiction and opposition presuppose fully constituted iden-
tities, antagonism suggests something altogether different: ‘the presence
of the “Other” prevents me from totally being myself. The relation arises
not from full totalities but from the impossibility of their constitu-
tion’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 125). Thus, antagonism is constituted
by discursive processes in which one discursive entity (e.g. a group of
people) is constructed as an obstacle that prevents another discursive
entity from fully constituting itself. The structural impossibility of any
closure of meaning is the baseline on which antagonisms are founded
and which preclude an objectivist account.
Since there has been a lively debate on different forms of other-
ness, particularly within the discipline of International Relations, it
has to be pointed out that antagonistic relations of otherness are cate-
gorically different from relations of difference. As outlined in the previ-
ous section, the relation of differences is the most basic relationship
between articulations because these relations constitute the very mean-
ing of discursive elements. Thus, relations of difference are all-pervasive,
because without a relation of difference, no particular meaning could be
ascribed to a discursive entity.
Relations of difference have been well researched in empirical studies
inquiring into self-construction processes. Scholars engaging in empiri-
cal analyses of self-constructions have convincingly demonstrated that
the other constituting the identity of the self can have many forms
of ‘non-selves comprising complementary identities, contending iden-
tities, negative identities, and non-identities’ (Hansen 2006: 39; see also
Norval 2000; Diez 2004; Rumelili 2004). The analysis of foreign policy
discourses has revealed that constructions of the other vary significantly,
and that a threatening enemy-like other only constitutes the end of a
spectrum of different other-constructions. Far more inclusive and less
hostile representations of the other are thinkable and, indeed, empir-
ically observable. As a result, different typologies have been proposed
mapping various types of otherness varying in radicalness (Diez 2004;
Rumelili 2004).
In my view, these works dealing with processes of self-construction
in the field of International Relations describe different forms of rela-
tions of difference. As against this background, I want to emphasize
the categorical difference between relations constituting the identity of
discursive entities and antagonistic relations of otherness. The antag-

onistic other only emerges in the process of the construction of
hegemonies. Thus, it is not merely a radical form of non-self in a rela-
tion of difference, but is a discursive entity that consolidates a whole
chain of equivalences and not only the meanings of single discursive
entities.
According to Laclau and Mouffe, the antagonistic other emerges as
an effect of equivalential relations, in other words, antagonism is the
‘flipside of equivalence’ (Thomassen 2005: 297). It is characterized by a
division of the discursive space. In an antagonistic relation, two chains
of equivalences confront each other, one antagonizing force and one
antagonized force, both of which are separated through an antagonistic
frontier which is always unstable and threatened by free-floating ele-
ments that tend to subvert the frontier (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 136).
Thus, central to any antagonistic relation is the dichotomic division
of the discursive space (Nonhoff 2006: 222; Laclau 2007: 86). With
the emergence of the antagonistic other, a variety of negative entities
are consolidated and express themselves through a central lack which,
in turn, is constitutive for the consolidation of an equivalential chain
on the other side of the antagonistic frontier. The antagonistic other
is not simply another difference but something which negates all the
moments within a chain of equivalence (Laclau 1996: 52). Hence, Laclau
and Mouffe assert that relations of difference are fundamentally differ-
ent from antagonistic relations, with the latter denoting the limit of a
discursive order. The antagonistic other is an external discursive entity,
an outside that stabilizes the discursive system as a whole (Laclau and
Mouffe 1985: 125–126).
This distinction between relations of difference and relations of antag-
onistic otherness is significant if we are to apply Laclau and Mouffe’s
theory to analyse discourse dynamics in contexts beyond those of for-
eign and security policy. In the latter case, the antagonistic other is often
constituted by starkly negative representations such as ‘evil’, ‘enemy’,
‘dictator’ or ‘terrorist’ (Hansen 2006: 41; Herschinger 2011: 34). In the
legitimacy discourse being analysed, such radical negative representa-
tions denoting an ‘evil’ discursive entity or an enemy to be combated
were practically non-existent. However, this does not mean that an
antagonistic other has not been constructed. When discussing legiti-
macy, the other against which the self is constituted is constructed more
as an illegitimate or unacceptable discursive entity, but not as some-
thing enemy-like or evil. What is important to trace the emergence of
an antagonistic other in the empirical material is not the radicalness
of the other but the degree of polarization in the discourse. When

I was at the stage of reconstructing a potential antagonistic other in
the empirical material, a question that guided the analysis was: is there a
discursive entity that manages to subsume a variety of different negative
constructions under its heading and, if so, which one?
The final step in the construction of a hegemonic discourse is reached
with the emergence of an empty signifier: as I have outlined above, every
identity of an equivalential chain is essentially split. On the one hand,
it has a particular meaning, on the other it acquires a more universal
meaning by referring to a lack that needs to be overcome. The more
extended the chain of equivalence becomes, the greater the need for an
empty signifier, which adds coherence and stability to the hegemonic
project. As Laclau emphasizes, this final step in the construction of a
hegemonic discourse is decisive: ‘[T]his is strictly the hegemonic move:
the body of one particularity assumes a function of universal represen-
tation’ (Laclau 2000: 303).9 Yet, how exactly does the transition from a
plurality of moments linked by an equivalential chain into a so-called
empty signifier embodying the totality of the series take place?
First, it is essential to note that the empty signifier emerges out of a
chain of particular moments. Due to the given circumstantial reasons
(which will be outlined below), it acquires a certain centrality, embody-
ing the totality of the series (Laclau 2007: 95). So, the empty signifier
representing the chain as a whole is part of the equivalential chain but
at the same time is also above it. This aspect is important as it prevents
us from confusing abstraction and emptiness: the empty signifier is not
an abstract feature shared by all the links in an equivalential chain. In an
equivalential relation, the different links share nothing positive, other
than the fact that they all remain unfulfilled. While each link in an
equivalential chain may have a different level of abstraction, an abstract
moment is just one further meaning unit raised to overcome the lack; it
does not transcend the logic of difference (ibid.: 96). Instead, the central
characteristic of an empty signifier is that it is invested with a range of
empty terms and thereby manages to acquire a more universal meaning.
A very good example to illustrate this point is the empty signifier
‘bread, peace and land’ that emerged during the Russian Revolution,
which is often referred to in Laclau’s work (Laclau 2007: 96–97, 1996).
9
In underscoring the centrality of this discursive operation, Laclau tends to
define ‘universal representation’ in his later publication (Laclau 2000: 304) as
the central logic of every hegemonic operation next to the logic of difference
and equivalence (see also Nonhoff 2006: 216–221; Herschinger 2011: 36).
This slogan does not constitute a conceptual common denominator on

which all opposing forces during the Russian Revolution agreed. There
were many more grievances and, accordingly, further demands that
Russian social forces voiced in 1917. Yet, all of these particular meaning
units expressed themselves through the slogan ‘bread, peace and land’,
because through equivalential links, the slogan also embraced contents
such as ‘justice’ and ‘freedom’ (Laclau 2007: 97). So rather than abstract-
ness, it is more the vagueness and imprecision or the fact that it can
subsume a whole variety of different particular meaning units that is
constitutive for every empty signifier (ibid.: 98).10
This conceptual distinction between emptiness and abstraction also
has methodological implications. In order to reconstruct the empty
signifier, it is necessary to stick as closely as possible to the empiri-
cal material. The researcher should abstain from defining an abstract
discursive entity (in the context of this study, for instance ‘legitimate
EC/EU’) as the empty signifier of the discourse. The empty signifier
is rather a more concrete and historically specific discursive entity
that expresses the abstract notion of ‘legitimate EU’ (for instance, the
term ‘political union’ in the 1990s, see Chapter 6). The task of the
researcher is to reconstruct these historically specific discursive entities
that manage to represent an equivalential chain.
Second, the emptiness of the signifier is never complete. The empty
signifier is only tendentially empty. It does, indeed, experience a cer-
tain ‘emptying’ process of its particular content to be able to represent
a whole variety of different meaning units, on the other hand, how-
ever, the particularity of the link can never be completely extinguished
because then we would have a signifier without a signified. ‘Emptiness,
as a result, presupposes the concrete’ (Laclau 2000: 304). This is because
the empty signifier emerges out of a chain of particular meaning units,
never completely loses its particular meaning and always refers to other
signifiers or chains of signifiers.
Finally, the crucial question arises regarding which of the signifiers
linked into an equivalential chain will fulfil the function of repre-
senting the totality of the series. Laclau himself is quite clear on this
point: ‘Which particular demand, or set of demands, are going to play
10
Laclau also refers to psychoanalysis and the concept of condensation to
describe the nature of the empty signifier: ‘It is like the process of condensa-
tion in dreams: an image does not express its own particularity, but a plurality of
quite dissimilar currents of unconscious thought which find their expression in
that single image’ (Laclau 2007: 97).
this function of universal representation is something which cannot be

determined by a priori reasons’ (Laclau 2004a: 58). With this assertion,
he rejects deterministic solutions in which economic logics are consid-
ered to determine the success of certain signifiers. At the same time, he
admits that the conditions for an empty signifier to assume a represen-
tative position are not completely arbitrary. He specifies two conditions
that are essential for success, namely availability and credibility (Laclau
1990: 65–66; see also Howarth 2006: 262; Nonhoff 2006: 133–134). The
condition of availability is quite straightforward: a signifier needs to be
available in the discourse in order to be transformed into an empty sig-
nifier.11 Credibility refers to the necessity that an empty signifier has to
resonate with already existing structures of meaning and should not
clash with prevailing principles within a society.12 These principles are
never fixed or given but influenced by ‘uneven structural locations’
(Laclau 1994: 43) which are the result of discursive struggles. A third
condition of success, not explicitly mentioned by Laclau but by other
authors who have further developed his theory, is the identification with
the empty signifier by a wide range of subjects. The possibility of a particu-
lar signifier turning into an empty signifier representing the chain as a
whole increases if a range of different subjects starts to identify with it.
Their act of identification confirms, supports and stabilizes the empty
signifier (Nonhoff 2006: 133–135; Herschinger 2011: 39).
With the emergence of the empty signifier, the hegemonic discourse
has reached its maximum degree of consolidation. Through the empty
signifier a range of diffuse elements are articulated into a meaning-
ful totality. The empty signifier impacts on each and every signifier in
11
Laclau elaborates on the rise of the Nazi discourse to underline the importance
of the condition of availability: ‘That National Socialist discourse emerged as a
possible response to the crisis and offered a principle of intelligibility for the new
situation is not something that stemmed necessarily from the crisis itself. (. . .)
What occurred was something different: it was that Nazi discourse was the only
one in the circumstances that addressed the problems experienced by the mid-
dle classes as a whole and offered a principle for their interpretation. Its victory
was the result of its availability on a terrain and in a situation where no other
discourse presented itself as a real hegemonic alternative’ (Laclau 1990: 66).
12
A similar line of argumentation is proposed by social constructivist works
that seek to explain the success of certain ideas by the degree to which they
‘resonate with given and pre-existing consensual identity constructions and con-
cepts of political order embedded in a country’s institutions and political culture’
(Marcussen et al. 2001: 631). The argument being put forward by Laclau in this
context is very similar, only that Laclau negates the notion of given and stable
identities.
A1 A2 A3 A4 chain A
...
A1
B1
B1 B2 B3 B4 ... chain B
Figure 2.1 Temporally fixed hegemonic discourse
the equivalential chain by temporarily fixing their meanings. Based on

Laclau’s own figures (e.g. Laclau 2007: 130), a hegemonic discourse can
be depicted as in Figure 2.1.13
A hegemony is constituted by two equivalential chains (chain A and
chain B) that confront each other and are separated by an antagonistic
frontier which is never entirely fixed (which is why it is depicted by a
dotted line). A chain of equivalence consists of a variety of articulations
which are rendered equivalent (B1, B2, B3, etc.). Each articulation is
13
The well-ordered and cohesive structure of Figure 2.1 certainly does not do
justice to the articulatory struggles taking place empirically in the constitution
of hegemonic discourses. The figure can be criticized on methodological grounds
because taking the discursive structure as depicted in Figure 2.1 as a starting point
‘invites’ the researcher to order discursive entities into two coherent equivalential
bonds that oppose each other. The discursive field is certainly more complex
and contradictory than suggested by Figure 2.1. In the present study, the figure
merely served a heuristic function and provided the researcher with a category
scheme for the analysis. Notwithstanding the analytical merits of Figure 2.1, the
empirical analysis needs to be as open as possible to contradictory and deviating
articulations that cannot easily be fitted into the category scheme.
split between a bottom semi-circle representing the particularity of an

articulation and a top semi-circle representing the universal meaning
that makes the equivalential relation to other articulations of the chain
possible. B1 represents the empty signifier; it has managed to tenden-
tially empty itself of its particular meaning and represents the chain as
a whole. The whole chain of equivalence, including the empty signifier,
constitutes itself against a lack or an obstacle, that is, the antagonis-
tic force represented by chain A in Figure 2.1. The variety of different
obstacles that are constructed in opposition to the moments of chain
B eventually consolidate themselves by the emergence of an antagonis-
tic other (A1) that represents the chain of negative discursive entities.
As a result, the hegemonic discourse consolidates itself and becomes
relatively fixed.
Notwithstanding, this fixation of the hegemonic discourse is always
precarious. Antagonistic frontiers are always unstable and threatened
by free-floating elements that tend to subvert the frontier. In order
to understand the exact processes by which Laclau and Mouffe the-
oretically strive to account for the disruption of hegemonies, their
elaborations on the limits of discourses need to be considered.
Counter-hegemonic operations
The discourse theory by Laclau and Mouffe provides a heuristic device

by which the construction of hegemonic discourses can be traced. Yet,
the process by which a temporarily fixed discourse is disrupted is the-
oretically less clearly formulated. To understand the process by which
a hegemonic discourse is overridden, it is necessary to deal in greater
detail with the limits of discourses.
An essential difference between structuralist and poststructuralist
accounts of discourses is that the former conceives of discursive systems
as relatively stable and fixed structures. In contrast, poststructuralist
theory refutes these assumptions of stability and underlines the precari-
ousness and instability of every discursive structure (Stäheli 2006a: 259).
Discourses never manage to be fully fixed and, thus, never achieve abso-
lute stability. The reason for this inherent instability is the outside or
the exterior of a discourse that constantly threatens to subvert tempo-
rary discursive fixations assuming the form of hegemonies. Similarly,
Laclau and Mouffe underline that ‘there is no social identity fully pro-
tected from a discursive exterior that deforms it and prevents it from
becoming fully sutured’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 111). It is this depen-
dence of every discourse on the discursive exterior, both constituting
the identity of the discourse through delineation from other discourses

and at the same time threatening to undermine the discourse, which
makes complete suture of the discursive structure impossible. Therefore,
it is vital to inquire into the ways in which the limit of a discourse or the
‘discursive exterior’ – as Laclau and Mouffe call it – is theoretically con-
ceptualized in order to understand dynamics (Moebius 2003: 185, 2005).
Traces of the discursive outside are the ‘gateway’ for transformations
affecting discursive structures (Moebius 2005: 127, own translation).
In general, Laclau perceives the limits of discourses in two different
ways. In his earlier work, in particular in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy,
the notion of a limit is more or less synonymous with an antagonistic
frontier (Laclau 2004: 319). The coherence of a discourse is constituted
through a radical exclusion of the antagonistic other which at the same
time constitutes the limits of every discourse: ‘Antagonism as the nega-
tion of a given order is, quite simply, the limit of that order, and not
the moment of a broader totality in relation to which the two poles of
the antagonism would constitute differential – that is objective – partial
instances’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 126). Laclau and Mouffe underline
the notion that the outside of the discursive system must not be mixed
up with differences within the discursive system. The outside must be an
entity sharing no common measure with the discourse in question. It is
exactly this function that is fulfilled by an antagonism: it ‘involve[s] the
construction of otherness that is incommensurable with the discursive
system and therefore constructs its unity and its limits’ (Torfing 2005a:
16). Thus, in Laclau’s early work, the exterior of a discourse is predom-
inantly thought of in terms of an antagonistic other (see also Stäheli
2006b: 232–234), which at the same time constitutes the condition of
the possibility and impossibility of a discursive system.
In his later works, however, Laclau revised his conceptualization of
the limits of discourses. His more recent theoretical work (Laclau 2004,
2007) has refined the notion of limits of discourses:
In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy the notion of limit is more or less

synonymous with antagonistic frontier. Objectivity is only consti-
tuted through a radical exclusion. Later on I came to realize that
this assimilation presented two flaws. The first, that antagonism is
already a form of discursive inscription – that is of mastery of some-
thing more primary which, from New Reflections on the Revolution of
our Time onwards, I started calling ‘dislocation’. Not all dislocations
need to be constructed in an antagonistic way. The second flaw is that
antagonism is not equivalent to radical exclusion. What it does is to
dichotomize the social space but both sides are necessary in order to
create a single space of representations.
(Laclau 2004: 319, emphasis in the original)
Building on these insights and revising his initial proposition that the
limit of a discourse is constituted by the antagonistic frontier, Laclau has
elaborated on his revised notion of the discursive outside in On Populist
Reason (Laclau 2007), where he introduces the concept of heterogeneity.14
Here, he distinguishes between an antagonistic other, which is still part
of the space of representation, and a different kind of discursive exte-
riority, which cannot be incorporated within an existing discourse on
either side of the frontier. Laclau calls the latter entity heterogeneous.
In general, the concept of heterogeneity is significant as it does away
with the ‘static assertion of binary oppositions’ (Laclau 2007: 149) and
therefore constitutes an important source of discourse dynamics. Laclau
succinctly summarizes the core of the concept by delineating it from
antagonism:
So an equivalential chain is not opposed only to an antagonistic force

or power, but also to something which does not have access to a gen-
eral space of representation. But ‘opposed’ means something different
in each case: an antagonistic camp is fully represented as the negative
reverse of a popular identity which would not exist without that neg-
ative reference; but in the case of an outside which is opposed to the
inside just because it does not have access to the space of represen-
tation ‘opposition’ simply means ‘leaving aside’ and as such, it does
not in any sense shape the identity of what is inside.
(Laclau 2007: 139–140, emphasis in the original)
A heterogeneous entity is neither an antagonistic other nor a further dif-

ference that can easily be accommodated in a given discursive structure.
14
The concept of heterogeneity is already indicated in Hegemony and Socialist
Strategy in the concept of a ‘field of discursivity’ (this point is also made by
Thomassen 2005: 303–304). The field of discursivity constitutes the ‘surplus of
meaning’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985a: 111) which incessantly subverts the tempo-
ral fixity of discursive formations and is at the same time ‘the necessary terrain
for the constitution of every social practice’ (ibid.). So, the constitutive precar-
iousness of every discourse has its roots in the potentially unlimited field of
discursivity – an aspect that in Laclau’s later publications is captured by the
concept of heterogeneity (see in particular Laclau 2007).
On the contrary, the essential characteristic of the heterogeneous is that

it cannot be integrated into either side of the antagonistic frontier.15
A fitting example that Laclau often refers to in distinguishing between
a heterogeneous entity and an antagonistic other is the category of
the lumpenproletariat. In Marx’s theory, the lumpenproletariat signified
a deprived group of people including criminals and vagabonds, in
other words people at the edge of society, whom Marx strictly dis-
tinguished from the proletariat. Laclau sees this lumpenproletariat as a
heterogeneous entity because it cannot be structurally located within
the two antagonistic camps of worker and capitalist. In Marx’s the-
ory, the latter entities share a common ground since they belong to
the economic space comprising the two opposing camps of the class
struggle. The lumpenproletariat on the other hand, represents the ‘irre-
ducible remainder’ (Thomassen 2005: 300) and, in contrast to the other
self-constructions, is not an economic category as it does not share
any common ground in the antagonistic relation existing between the
proletariat and the capitalist. Nevertheless, the exclusion of the lumpen-
proletariat from the discursive space made a stable antagonistic frontier
between the capitalist and the proletariat possible (Laclau 2007: 144).
The main difference between the antagonistic other and a heteroge-
neous entity is that the latter encompasses those meaning units that
do not share a common ground with other moments of a hegemonic
discourse stabilized through the antagonistic division of the discursive
space:
While antagonism still presupposes some sort of discursive inscrip-

tion, the kind of outside that I am now discussing presupposes
exteriority not just to something within the space of representation,
but to the space of representation as such. I will call this type of exte-
riority social heterogeneity. Heterogeneity, conceived in this way, does
not mean difference; two entities in order to be different, need a space
15
A similar point is made by Nonhoff (2006), who introduces superdifference
in addition to the well-known relations of equivalence and difference employed
by Laclau and Mouffe (1985). According to Nonhoff (2006: 87, 230–232), the
role of superdifference is to consolidate frontiers between different discursive for-
mations. Relations of superdifference denote the fundamental difference of two
discursive entities that do not have a common measure (x is different from y and
has nothing to do with y). Therefore, relations of superdifference are also clearly
different from an antagonistic relation between two elements. Antagonistic ele-
ments resemble two enemy siblings, whereas superdifferential elements belong
to two different families (ibid.: 231).
within which that difference is representable, while what I am now

calling heterogeneity presupposes the absence of that common space.
(Laclau 2007: 140, emphasis in the original)
In conclusion, Laclau’s refinement of his conceptualization of the lim-

its of discourses allows us to distinguish two types of discursive exterior
(see also Stäheli 2006b): (1) it might either be a lack or obstacle con-
structed in opposition to the self, setting up an antagonistic relationship
between the interior and the exterior; or (2) the discursive exterior might
also materialize in inconsistencies and particularities which cannot be
incorporated into a discourse on either side of an equivalential chain
(neither as an obstacle nor as a part of the equivalential chain facing
the obstacle). In the latter case, those particularities are not constructed
as an antagonistic other (Stäheli 2006b: 237). Quite the opposite, since
they do not share a common measure or foundation with the inside
of a hegemonic discourse, they are simply ‘ignored’ (ibid.) or, in other
words, completely excluded from the representative space. In the latter
case, the outside takes the form of a heterogeneous entity.
The aforementioned discussion dealing with the limits of dis-
courses and the differentiation between two categorically different
discursive exteriors is consequential for the conceptualization of
counter-hegemonic operations. Most generally speaking, every counter-
hegemonic operation is concerned with circumventing an antagonistic
frontier. It is only through the disarticulation of two opposing chains of
equivalences that an existing, partially fixed hegemonic discourse can
be countered.
As outlined above, every hegemonic discourse is incessantly subverted
by the discursive exterior. This is why full suture of the discursive struc-
ture is never possible. If we consider the differentiation made above
between two conceptually discursive exteriors, two fundamentally dif-
ferent ways emerge in which an existing hegemonic discourse can be
ruptured or contestated. First, the disruption of an antagonistic frontier
might be initiated by a discursive entity integrated in an antagonistic
camp, for instance, if an oppressive regime engages in a hegemonic
operation and tries to absorb some of the oppositional demands (Laclau
2000: 303). In this case, an antagonistic force begins to destabilize the
antagonistic frontier. Second, counter-hegemonic operations can also
be initiated by a heterogeneous entity which has not been incorporated
on either side of the antagonistic frontier. For reasons of simplification,
I will call the first type of counter-hegemonic operations antagonistic and
the second type heterogeneous.
A1 A2 A3 A4 chain A
...
A1
B1
Figure 2.2 Antagonistic counter-hegemonic operation
Antagonistic counter-hegemonic operations basically operate by drawing

an alliance between two discursive entities that antagonistically oppose
each other in different equivalential chains (Laclau 2007: 129–138).
An antagonistic counter-hegemonic operation could be illustrated as in
Figure 2.2 (for a similar figure see Laclau 2007: 131).
The disruption of a hegemonic discourse is initiated by an entity
that is part of one of the antagonistic frontiers. More specifically, one
moment in an equivalential chain receives structural pressure from a
rival hegemonic project. Until it is absorbed by the rival equivalential
chain, its meaning vacillates between alternative equivalential fron-
tiers; it becomes a ‘floating signifier’ (Laclau 2007: 131). If successful,
an alliance is drawn between a discursive element from chain A and a
discursive element from chain B. Two moments of formerly opposing
camps are linked. Thus, the antagonistic frontier becomes blurred, as it
no longer consistently separates the collective self from the antagonistic
other. As a result, the hegemonic discourse collapses (see Figure 2.2).
With respect to heterogeneous counter-hegemonic operations, two
types of discursive processes are possible. Heterogeneous counter-hegemonic
operation 1 largely relies on the logic of particularization (Herschinger
A1 A2 A3 A4 chain A
...
A1
B1
Figure 2.3 Heterogeneous counter-hegemonic operation 1
2011: 37–41). Here, the disruption of the hegemony is initiated by the

particularistic remainder of a moment of an equivalential chain. In this
discursive operation, the suppressed particularity of a moment of an
equivalential chain comes to the fore (like the lumpenproletariat dis-
cussed in the section above). As a consequence, the element can no
longer be integrated into the chain (see Figure 2.3).
The nature of polysemy and the ambiguous character of every
discursive entity lie at the heart of this process. In heterogeneous
counter-hegemonic operation 1, it is the particularity of an element
that constitutes the heterogeneous entity. As outlined above, every
meaning of a discursive entity entering into an equivalential chain is
essentially split. The meaning of an element always encompasses more
than the opposition to the antagonistic other. This surplus of mean-
ing is temporarily weakened when an element becomes a moment of
a chain of equivalence. At the same time, it constitutes a potential
source of disruption. ‘Heterogeneity is (. . .) present in the particular-
ism of the equivalential demands – a particularism which, as we know,
cannot be eliminated because it is the very ground of the equivalen-
tial relation’ (Laclau 2007: 152; see also Herschinger 2011: 57). By
accepting the non-fixation of meaning, the discourse theory by Laclau

and Mouffe provides a crucial source of disruption that is initiated by the
particularistic remainder of each discursive element. This process of par-
ticularization leads again to the weakening of the chain of equivalence
and to an eventual rupture of the antagonistic frontier.
Every discursive entity can be affected by particularization. While
the above figure only illustrates the process of particularization for one
entity of a chain of equivalence, it can also affect the empty signifier as
well as one of the entities on the other side of the antagonistic frontier.
Processes of particularization can, for instance, be observed when the
unified picture of the other is questioned or when a differentiation of
the empty signifier takes place, potentially questioning its representative
function.
In heterogeneous counter-hegemonic operation 2, the disruption of the
hegemonic discourse is initiated by an entity that is outside the ‘space of
representation’ (Laclau 2007: 140). A heterogeneous entity is not always
necessarily a suppressed particularity of a moment of an equivalential
chain. It can also be an element in the field of discursivity that has
not been incorporated on either side of the antagonistic frontier (see
Figure 2.4).
In heterogeneous counter-hegemonic operation 2, an alliance
between the heterogeneous entity (C1), which is not a suppressed par-
ticularity of a moment of an equivalential chain, but a free-floating
discursive element from the broader field of discursivity, and a moment
of an equivalential chain is established. This leads to the reparticular-
ization of the discursive entity (B4) that was formerly integrated in the
equivalential chain, and culminates in the rupture of the equivalential
chain and the collapse of the antagonistic frontier. The heterogeneous
entity can stem from a different discursive context or arena. Before
transforming its meaning and establishing a link to a moment of an
equivalential chain, it did not have any common measure either with
the antagonistic force or with the antagonized force; it was merely
ignored.
To conclude, Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory provides an impor-
tant anchor point to theorize the emergence and disruption of dom-
inant meaning systems. Based on the work of these two authors,
I have provided a conceptualization of discourse and have described the
discursive operations leading to the establishment of hegemonic dis-
courses. The main part of the chapter offered a detailed description of
such discursive operations. I delineated the discursive operations that
are crucial for both establishing and disrupting hegemonic discourses.
A1 A2 A3 A4 chain A
...
A1
B1
C1
Figure 2.4 Heterogeneous counter-hegemonic operation 2
The outlined set of discursive operations will serve as a heuristic device

to account for major discursive changes in the legitimacy discourse in
the Commission in the 1980s (Chapter 5) and 1990s (Chapter 6).
3
Reconstructing Meanings of a
Legitimate EC/EU: Discursive
Metaphor Analysis
Europe does not have an essence beyond one which is shaped

by language.
(Stråth 2000: 14)
This quotation taken from Stråth’s groundbreaking book Europe and the
Other and Europe as the Other (2000) indicates a fundamental episte-
mological premise of poststructuralist works: it underpins the primary
importance of language for the social sciences. With its focus on the
production of meaning and because of the constitutive role it attributes
to language, poststructuralist discourse theory is clearly part of the
linguistic turn in social sciences (Torfing 2005a: 153).
Sharing this basic epistemological standpoint, this chapter will out-
line in detail how the analysis of language was accomplished and, more
specifically, how meanings of a legitimate EC/EU were reconstructed in
the text corpus. I will argue that a specific type of metaphor analysis,
one that takes into account the ubiquity of metaphors in everyday lan-
guage, provides a useful methodological toolbox with which to analyse
legitimacy discourses prevalent in the European Commission.
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part is a methodolog-
ical endeavour. The objective is to develop a poststructuralist reading
of metaphor theories and to set the theoretical grounds for a discursive
approach to metaphor analysis that builds on a very broad definition
of metaphors. This definition departs from common conceptions of
metaphors, arguably rooted in classical rhetoric, which merely conceive
of metaphors in terms of ornamental linguistic devices employed by the
gifted speaker to achieve certain (often persuasive) ends. For this pur-
pose, classical rhetoric and cognitive linguistic approaches are compared
with more recent poststructuralist readings of metaphor theory.
59
The second part of the chapter is concerned with concrete methods:

I will first comment on the text-selection procedure and highlight the
importance of paying attention to intertextual references. Then, I will
document how the text analysis was conducted. In a first step of text
analysis, I categorized representations of a legitimate EC/EU accord-
ing to five models of legitimacy (see Introduction). Constructions of a
legitimate EC/EU were broadly categorized as pertaining to the democ-
racy, performance, identity, technocracy or intergovernmental model of
legitimacy. In a second step, a metaphor analysis was conducted with
all reconstructed representations of a legitimate EC/EU. This second
step was necessary in order to inductively generate patterns of repre-
sentations of a legitimate EC/EU within the pool of representations
articulating one model of legitimacy. This inductive and text-sensitive
procedure allowed me to focus on variations within representations
belonging to one legitimacy model.
Given the range of interpretive steps taken in the course of the empir-
ical analysis, and given that many interpretations were made with an
in-depth contextual knowledge of the empirical material that other
researchers may well not dispose of, it is hardly possible for the study to
live up to standards such as reliability and replicability that are typically
listed as quality criteria of positivist research. To ensure the trustworthi-
ness of the empirical analysis, I followed the recommendations made
by Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012: 91–114) on interpretive research
designs: the overall objective of the methodological chapter is to reflect
on the background knowledge that influenced my interpretations and
to make the research process as transparent as possible.
Metaphor theories
The classical approach to metaphors in the Aristotelian tradition puts

forward a narrow definition of metaphors (Hülsse 2003a: 23),1 in which
metaphors are distinguished from other similar figures of speech that
are also based on a transposition of meaning, in particular from
1
In fact, Aristotle himself suggested a broad concept of metaphors; it is only in
later rhetorical tradition that the definition of metaphor was narrowed down.
‘[F]ar from designing just one figure of speech among others such as synecdoche
and metonymy (this is how we find metaphor taxonomized in the later rhetoric),
for Aristotle the word metaphor applies to every transposition of terms’ (Ricœur
2006: 17, emphasis in the original).
Discursive Metaphor Analysis 61
metonymies, similes, analogies, synecdoches and allegories (Kurz 1993;

Glucksberg 2001).
Metaphors are defined by Aristotle in the following terms:
Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to some-

thing else; the transference being either from genus to species, or
from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of
analogy. (Aristotle cited in Jordan 1974: 237–238)
This very general definition of metaphors already highlights an impor-

tant aspect that is typical of classical rhetoric approaches: metaphors are
defined in terms of deviation. A metaphor is the transposition of a term
that ‘belongs to something else’, that is, a term that is alien or opposed
to the ‘ordinary’ or the ‘current’ (Ricœur 2006: 19). A metaphor is a
deviation from ordinary language.
Thinking of metaphors in terms of deviant terms or phrases also
implies that a metaphor can be substituted by another more proper or
literal term. What is commonly referred to as the ‘substitution thesis’ is
a central building block of the classical rhetoric approach to metaphors
(Zashin and Chapman 1974: 296; Jäkel 2003: 86; Ricœur 2006: 21). This
thesis makes a sharp distinction between literal or proper, and figurative
or deviant speech.
In classical rhetoric approaches, metaphors are typically attributed a
range of specific functions, the primary one being ornamental or dec-
orative (Ricœur 2006: 21). Metaphors do not add any new meaning
since the statement could also be expressed with other words; as such,
their information value is negligible and they merely function as making
speech more ornate and flowery. In addition, the classical rhetoric tradi-
tion conceives of metaphors in terms of a persuasive device. As Ricœur
points out, Aristotle’s definition of metaphors has a dual nature, as con-
ceptualizations of metaphors can be found both in the Rhetoric- and
Poetics-part of his work. Metaphors are at home in both domains. In the
Rhetoric-part of Aristotle’s work, the metaphor assumes an oratorical
function; ‘its aim and that of oratory are identical, to know how to
persuade’ (Ricœur 2006: 12). In this reading, persuading the addressee
becomes a major function of metaphor. Finally, works rooted in the
classical rhetoric tradition of metaphors also underline the emotive
function a metaphor may have (Jordan 1974: 19; Miller 1979). A suc-
cessful rhetorician should also be able to arouse feelings (Charteris-Black
2009: 99) since metaphors that are used well help the gifted speaker to
touch the emotions of her addressees.
A further building block of the classical rhetoric metaphor theory is

the ‘comparison thesis’ (Ricœur 2006: 26–30), which is premised on a
particular ontological baseline and a specific theory of language and sub-
jectivity. A famous proposition in the classical rhetorical tradition is the
notion of a parallel between metaphor and comparison. Representatives
of the classical rhetoric theory have claimed that metaphors constitute
an ‘abbreviated simile’ (Ricœur 2006: 28). Aristotle himself points out
that ‘a good metaphor [literally to metaphorize well, eu metaphérein]
implies an intuitive perception of the similarity [to to homoin theôrein]
in dissimilars’ (Aristotle, cited in Ricœur 2006: 25).
Representatives of the classical rhetoric metaphor theory assume that
metaphors express similarities between two things which are ante-
cedently given. The similarity of two objects is simply discovered by
the gifted speaker. Underpinning the comparison view of metaphors is,
thus, a realist ontology (Hülsse 2003a: 26): there is an objective world
‘outside’ that is independent of metaphors. Moreover, a highly instru-
mental understanding of language and a strong notion of agency are
part and parcel of the classical rhetoric theory of metaphor. If used
skilfully, speakers can strategically employ metaphors to achieve cer-
tain ends.
There are not many works in contemporary political science that
explicitly draw on the classical rhetoric theory of metaphor. The contri-
butions by Jonathan Charteris-Black constitute a noteworthy exception.
He analyses a variety of metaphors in political speech and, theoretically,
seeks to integrate the classical rhetoric theory of metaphor and criti-
cal discourse analysis (Charteris-Black 2004, 2005, 2009). Furthermore,
there is a variety of studies implicitly underpinned by the Aristotelian
tradition of metaphors. Classical rhetoric often provides the backdrop
for studies that deal with metaphors as a persuasive device (for an
overview see Mio 1997).
A number of metaphor theories run counter to the widely held view,
shared by the Aristotelian school, that a metaphor is something that is
purely decorative. More particularly, they heavily attack the idea that
metaphors constitute non-literal, distorted or deviant pieces of speech
that can easily be substituted by proper and literal speech (substitution
thesis) as well as the idea that metaphors simply articulate similari-
ties that are objectively and antecedently existing (comparison thesis).
Among those metaphor theories to emerge out of the rejection of cen-
tral premises of the classical approach, the cognitive linguistic theory of
metaphors – or the conceptual metaphor theory – is certainly the most
influential one in the social sciences. The main representatives of the
cognitive linguistic approach are George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, who
compiled their main arguments and findings in the groundbreaking
book Metaphors We Live By (2003). However, there are writers who antic-
ipated many of the theoretical and conceptual baselines later refined by
Lakoff and Johnson (Edelman 1971; Weinrich 1976).
The central idea of the cognitive approach is that metaphors are lin-
guistic manifestations of the way we think about the world. Metaphors
reflect processes of cognition and give deeper insights into the workings
of our conceptual system. In other words, Lakoff and Johnson suggest
that we not only speak but also think in metaphorical terms (Evans and
Green 2009: 295):
The most important claim we made so far is that metaphor is not just
a matter of language, that is, of mere words. We shall argue that, on
the contrary, human thought processes are largely metaphorical. This
is what we mean when we say that the human conceptual system is
metaphorically structured and defined.
(Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 6, emphasis in the original)
The main subject of interest of the cognitive school is human thought

processes. Metaphors are regarded as expressions of cognitive models,
that is, systematic structures of thought that provide general orien-
tations and that usually reside in the speakers’ subconscious (Jäkel
1999: 15).
A crucial difference to the classical approach to metaphors is that
the cognitive linguistic approach is particularly interested in forms of
metaphors used on an everyday basis and that are often employed
unconsciously by the speaker. According to representatives of the cog-
nitive approach, metaphors are particularly useful in analysing people’s
cognitive schemas.
In recent years, Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive approach to
metaphors has gained prominence well beyond closed linguistic circles.
Studies within the social sciences have increasingly utilized Lakoff and
Johnson’s cognitive approach to study social and political phenomena
(for an overview see the contributions in Beer and De Landtsheer 2004;
Carver and Pikalo 2008; Cienki and Yanow 2013).2
2
Social scientists do not always lay open the theoretical foundations of their
work. This is why it is sometimes difficult to classify authors according to certain
schools of thought. A clear-cut differentiation between studies relying on a cogni-
tive linguistic or poststructuralist theory of metaphor constitutes a challenge. The
The theoretical and methodological foundations laid by Lakoff and

Johnson provided a springboard for the applied analysis of metaphors
in the 1980s and 1990s. Building on their proposition of a close rela-
tionship existing between metaphorical language and cognition, social
scientists employ metaphor analysis as a means to study cognitive maps
and belief systems of key political actors (Chilton 1996; Oppermann
and Spencer 2011). Metaphor analysis is considered a research method
‘capable of describing systems of beliefs about politics’ (Chilton 1996:
28). Additionally, a whole research strand has evolved out of the
school of critical discourse analysis that extensively builds on Lakoff
and Johnson’s conceptual metaphor theory, synthesizing cognitive the-
ory and a particular version of discourse theory (Chilton and Ilyin
1993; Chilton 1996; Straehle, Weiss, Wodak, Muntigl and Sedlak 1999;
Charteris-Black 2004; Hart 2008).
Lakoff and Johnson put forward a concise and meanwhile widely cited
definition of metaphors: ‘The essence of metaphor is understanding and expe-
riencing one kind of thing in terms of another’ (Lakoff and Johnson 2003:
5, emphasis in the original). In other words, a metaphor is characterized
by the fact that one conceptual domain is transferred onto another – a
process also referred to as ‘mapping’ (Lakoff 1993: 206). Central for their
understanding of metaphors is the differentiation between source domain
and target domain. A metaphor projects a conceptual source domain
onto another concept that is the target domain. ‘More technically, the
metaphor can be understood as a mapping (. . .) from a source domain
(. . .) to a target domain’ (Lakoff 1993: 206–207). Consider the example,
‘He attacked every weak point in my argument’ (Lakoff and Johnson
2003: 4). The conceptual metaphor underlying this sentence is ARGU-
MENT IS WAR .3 Here, a well-known concept – namely war as physical
conflict – is mapped onto the more abstract concept of having a rational
argument. By and large, this conceptual mapping lies at the core of every
metaphorical expression. By defining metaphors in these terms, Lakoff
classification of works proposed here is carried out on the basis of the main sub-
ject of interest of a given study. The crucial question is whether metaphor analysis
is employed to reconstruct underlying cognitive schemas of particular actors (the
cognitive linguistic approach to metaphors) or whether metaphor analysis is used
as a means to study broader systems of meaning (the poststructuralist approach
to metaphors).
3
Based on the seminal work by Lakoff and Johnson (2003), it has become com-
mon to mark conceptual metaphors as well as target and source domains by using
small capital letters. I will stick to this convention in this book.
and Johnson and the school of cognitive linguistics in general adopt

a broad definition of metaphors, one that embraces different forms of
conceptual transfer, including metonymy, synecdoche and personifica-
tion (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 33–40; Schmitt 2004; Evans and Green
2009: 286–287).
In line with Lakoff and Johnson’s approach, it is important to dis-
tinguish between metaphors and conceptual metaphors. According to
Lakoff and Johnson, the classical understanding of metaphors that goes
back to Aristotle suffers from the fallacy of understanding metaphors in
terms of linguistic expressions – as a mere matter of words. In contrast,
the two authors highlight that ‘metaphor is not only about the ways we
talk’ but ‘about conceptualization and reasoning’ (Lakoff and Johnson
2003: 245, emphasis in the original). Cognitive linguists argue that by
studying conceptual metaphors we can gain insights into human beings’
cognitive structures (Schmitt 2004). Similarly, Charteris-Black under-
lines the notion that conceptual metaphors are the ‘abstract thoughts
underlying metaphors’ (Charteris-Black 2004: XV). Thus, there are many
metaphorical expressions (‘Your claims are indefensible’, ‘his criticisms
were right on target’) integrated by one conceptual metaphor (ARGUMENT
IS WAR ). Lakoff and Johnson are particularly interested in systems of
metaphors and the connections between them rather than in a single
metaphorical expression: it is only through the linking of metaphorical
expressions that the wealth of conceptual metaphors and the modes of
thought prevalent in a given community can be reconstructed.
For Lakoff and Johnson, the main function of metaphors is to ease
understanding. ‘Metaphors are basically devices for understanding’
(Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 184). More specifically, they conceptualize
metaphors as an instrument that helps people to think about situa-
tions that are new, complex or remote, since metaphors draw an analogy
between the unfamiliar and the familiar. ‘Metaphor is one of, if not the
major, cognitive means that communicating minds have for simplifying
and “making sense” of highly complex phenomena’ (Chilton 1996: 28).
Occasionally, this function is also referred to as the ‘heuristic function’
of metaphors (Maasen, Mendelsohn and Weingart 1995: 2).
While understanding is undoubtedly the main function that Lakoff
and Johnson set out to attribute to conceptual metaphors, their work
suggests a further essential function, one that is also of vital impor-
tance to a poststructuralist reading of metaphor theory. What I want to
denote here as the ‘highlighting and hiding function’ of metaphors is an
attempt to give a name to the fact that conceptual metaphors only par-
tially structure concepts – a proposition that is repeatedly underlined by
Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 10–13). By emphasizing partial structuring,

the two authors draw attention to the fact that metaphors map some but
not all attributes from the source to the target domain. Not all charac-
teristics of a particular concept are transferred, meaning that metaphors
highlight only certain aspects of our experience while simultaneously
hiding others.
Lakoff and Johnson illustrate this point by referring to the ‘conduit
metaphor’ that is part and parcel of our way of thinking about lan-
guage. Sentences such as ‘It’s hard to get the idea across to him’ or ‘Your
reasons came through to us’ (both Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 11, empha-
sis in the original) are linguistic manifestations of the complex conduit
metaphor that implies a certain understanding of communicative pro-
cesses, which can be summed up as follows: ‘The speaker puts ideas
(objects) into words (containers) and sends them (along a conduit) to a
hearer that takes the idea/objects out of the words/container’ (ibid.: 10).
The understanding of language that underpins this complex metaphor
entails certain presuppositions. Above all, it draws a transparent picture
of communicative processes and implies that meanings can be unprob-
lematically conveyed and can exist independently of people and place
(ibid.: 11).
In their seminal work, Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson also
deal with ontological issues and the relationship between language and real-
ity. Their cognitive theory of metaphor is based on an ontology, which
they describe as experientialist, starkly rejecting both objectivist and
radical subjectivist theories of truth. The two authors claim that concep-
tual metaphors arise out of basic human bodily experiences. Interaction
with the environment gives rise to an individual structuring of abstract
concepts which ultimately become manifest in language use in the form
of metaphors.
What is more, Lakoff and Johnson maintain that an individual’s con-
ceptual system is crucial for determining what is real to us. They reject
the ‘standard objectivist view’ (Lakoff and Johnson 2003, 122), accord-
ing to which there is a real world ‘outside’ populated by a set of objects
that have inherent properties (ibid.). They go on to assert that the
property an object has is essentially dependent on our experience and
interactions with this object. In line with this assertion, they under-
line the notion that objects (abstract objects such as love, war, madness
but also more straightforward objects such as a gun) not only have
inherent properties, but also interactional properties (ibid.: 120), that
is, properties that emerge through our interaction and experience with
the object.
By and large, the two authors argue that the ‘real world’ does not exist
completely autonomously of the human mind. As a result, their position
can be termed as being ‘modestly idealist’. Idealism is here defined as a
philosophical strand of thought, which in its most radical form ques-
tions the existence of a world beyond or outside of thought (Laclau
1990: 106). The ontological foundation of their theory is succinctly
summed up as follows:
The idea that metaphor is just a matter of language and can at best
only describe reality stems from the view that what is real is wholly
external to and independent of, how human beings conceptualize
the world – as if the study of reality were just the study of the physical
world. Such a view of reality – so-called objective reality – leaves out
human aspects of reality, in particular the real perceptions, conceptu-
alizations, motivations, and actions that constitute most of what we
experience. But the human aspects of reality are most of what matters
to us, and these vary from culture to culture, since different cultures
have different conceptual systems.
(Lakoff and Johnson 2003, 146)
This quotation also implies a theory of language underpinning their cog-

nitive approach to metaphor; they propagate a constitutive understand-
ing of language, that is, language and in particular metaphors ‘have
the power to create new reality’ (ibid.: 145). This proposition has also
been forcefully underlined by poststructuralist theories of metaphors,
although the exact mechanisms by which these two approaches con-
ceive of the power of metaphors to constitute realities significantly
differ. For cognitive linguists, metaphors constitute realities because
they impact on our conceptual system which, in turn, essentially influ-
ences our actions. Accordingly, Lakoff and Johnson admit that ‘it is
reasonable to assume that words alone don’t change reality’ (ibid.).
Instead, they argue, the power of metaphors to create realities follows on
from their ability to structure our conceptual system and these processes
‘do change what is real for us and affect how we perceive the world and
act upon those perceptions’ (ibid.: 145–146). The ability of metaphors
to constitute realities is therefore crucially dependent on their impact
on our conceptual systems.4
4
It should be noted that the critical discourse analysis school, which draws partly
on the tradition of cognitive linguistics in its approach to metaphors, is often
The theory of subjectivity underpinning the cognitive linguistic school

starkly differs from classical rhetoric since it conceives of the subject
as only partially sovereign. Lakoff and Johnson emphasize that sub-
jects cannot wilfully choose new metaphors and thereby initiate social
change. An essential premise of the cognitive linguistic approach is that
conceptual metaphors cannot be rationally and consciously deployed
by calculating agents (ibid.: 145).
Generally speaking, conceptual metaphors are understood as social
entities. The social and cultural embeddedness of conceptual metaphors
is emphasized by Lakoff and Johnson in their discussion on the rela-
tionship between experience and metaphor. As outlined above, the two
authors, indeed, stress that all conceptual metaphors are rooted in per-
sonal experience, yet how we experience things is, again, dependent on
cultural factors:
Every experience takes place within a vast background of cultural pre-

suppositions. (. . .) Cultural assumptions, values, and attitudes are not
a conceptual overlay which we may or may not place upon experi-
ence as we choose. It would be more correct to say that all experience
is cultural through and through, that we experience our ‘world’ in
such a way that our culture is already present in the very experience
itself. (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 57, emphasis in the original)
Raymond W. Gibbs stresses this point even more emphatically by

proposing we ‘move metaphors out of our heads and into the embodied
and public world’ (Gibbs 1999: 162). He thereby accentuates the social
and cultural embeddedness of conceptual metaphors and suggests the
standard view of metaphors as some structure in the minds of individu-
als be complemented by a view that takes the social and cultural context
of metaphors seriously. He argues that ‘cognition arises, and is contin-
ually re-experienced, when the body interacts with the cultural world’
(ibid.: 162).
Despite this plea to acknowledge the context dependence of cog-
nition, the theory of subjectivity underpinning cognitive linguistic
approaches is profoundly impacted by methodological individualism:
more reluctant to agree to the idealism that is implicit in Lakoff and Johnson’s
cognitive theory. In terms of ontology, their work can be sited in the philosophy
of critical realism (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: chap. 2; Fairclough 2005).
social change is ultimately premised and mediated through the indi-

vidual.5 Indeed, new conceptual metaphors are not introduced by
conscious choice on the side of the individual, but ‘enter’ the conceptual
system. At the same time, subjects decide on whether new ‘unconven-
tional’ metaphors fit their personal experience and if they do, chances
are high that these metaphors will become conventionalized and start
to structure our thoughts and action. This view on new meanings and
social change, with individual experiences taking centre stage, is put for-
ward by Lakoff and Johnson when discussing the conceptual metaphor
LOVE IS A COLLABORATIVE WORK OF ART :
If those things entailed by the metaphor are for us the most impor-
tant aspects of our love experiences, then the metaphor can acquire
the status of a truth: for many people, love is a collaborative work
of art. And because it is, the metaphor can have a feedback effect,
guiding our future actions in accordance with the metaphor.
(Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 142, emphasis in the original)
Thus, the individual’s inner self (both her experience and her con-
ceptual system) becomes the driving force behind social change and
the ultimate unit of social analysis. Privileging the subject’s position
as the ultimate source of meaning is typical of the cognitive linguistic
approach. Chilton characteristically sums up the theory of subjectivity
underpinning the cognitive school by depicting its ‘ground rules’ in the
following way:
It [the cognitive school, D.B.] is concerned with the ‘operational

environment’, the ‘belief systems’, the ‘psychology’ and so forth, of
individual decision makers; it is not concerned in any clearly stated
way with the collective meanings of the culture within which such
individuals operate.
(Chilton 1996: 29)
In sum, the theory of subjectivity on which the cognitive linguistic

approach to metaphors is based is highly ambiguous. On the one hand,
5
I follow John Elster in his definition of methodological individualism: ‘The
elementary unit of social life is the individual human action. To explain social
institutions and social change is to show how they arise as the result of the action
and interaction of individuals. This view, often referred to as methodological
individualism, is in my view trivially true’ (Elster 1989: 13).
Lakoff and Johnson reject any high level of intentionality on the side of
the individual as far as the usage of conceptual metaphors is concerned.
On the other hand, the methodological individualism that underlies
their theory and the emphasis on human cognitive processes privilege
the subject in their account of social change.
In the cognitive linguistic approach, metaphors are primarily indi-
cators for cognitive processes that take place behind or beyond dis-
course, and metaphor analysis can reveal the hidden agenda, ideol-
ogy and thoughts of the person using metaphors. Conversely, the
poststructuralist approach does not attempt to reveal the hidden meanings
or thinking behind metaphors (Spencer 2010: 88); it tends to focus on
metaphors as such. Poststructuralist approaches are, so to say, interested
in analysing the surface of discourses and the realities they produce.
As such, metaphors are seen as operating on a level above individ-
ual actors (Maasen and Weingart 2000: 27) and are conceptualized as
supra-individual entities.
While the classical and the cognitive linguistic approaches to
metaphor discussed above are clearly associated with particular authors,
the field of poststructuralist metaphor theories is less clearly definable.
Pertinent studies dealing with metaphors from a poststructuralist per-
spective can, for instance, be found in the history and philosophy of
science literature (de Man 1978; Shapiro 1985; Maasen and Weingart
2000). What is more, in the German context, the work by Jürgen Link
and his concept of collective symbols (Kollektivsymbolik) provides an
important point of departure for a poststructuralist reconceptualization
of metaphor analysis (Link 1984, 1986). Moreover, in recent years, a
number of empirical studies have set out to propose a poststructuralist
reading of metaphor analysis (Hülsse 2003a, 2006; Drulák 2006; Walter
and Helmig 2008; Onuf 2010; Spencer 2010).
The present study draws on all three strands of literature in its endeav-
our to propose a poststructuralist reading of metaphor theories. As with
the Aristotelian theory of metaphor and the cognitive metaphor the-
ory, I will illuminate the contours of a poststructuralist approach by
dealing with the definitions and functions of metaphors, ontological
premises and the conception of language as well as the theory of subjec-
tivity that typically underlies this approach. Not all authors discussed in
this section would necessarily categorize their work as ‘poststructuralist’.
However, what they all have in common is a very encompassing con-
ceptualization of metaphors as social structures of meaning. It goes
without saying that although the above-mentioned literature makes sig-
nificant attempts at developing a poststructuralist variant of metaphor
analysis, the texts set different priorities and vary in part when it comes
to more detailed questions regarding the conception of language and
subjectivity underlying the approach. Therefore, in what follows, I will
not provide a detailed discussion of the different strands of literature
but rather outline the broad contours of a poststructuralist reading of
metaphor theories.
Poststructuralist metaphor theories typically propose a very broad def-
inition of metaphors. No fine-grained terminological distinctions between
metaphors, images, analogies, metonymies, synecdoches, etc. are made.
Poststructuralists regard all of these figures of speech, by and large, as the
same phenomenon: as a transfer of pieces of meaning from one delin-
eable discourse to another. The term ‘metaphor’ is used to denote the
different ways by which meaning is transferred. Maasen and Weingart
put forward the following definition:
Since antiquity, the term metaphor has denoted the transfer of a

concept endowed with a meaning derived from one specific con-
text to another context, where it unfolds its ‘transferred’ meaning.
This transfer from one context to another is what essentially defines
metaphors.
(Maasen and Weingart 2000: 19)
In its broad definition, poststructuralist works are largely in keeping

with Lakoff and Johnson’s conceptualization of metaphors. The decisive
difference is that the poststructuralist definition does not share the cog-
nitivist emphasis on understanding and personal experience. The claim
made by the cognitive school that metaphors are rooted in the experi-
ence of individuals and their struggle to understand new phenomena
is denounced as speculative. A poststructuralist approach to metaphors
is interested in the meaning that is typically attributed to a certain
term and, consequently, in the transfer of meaning that takes place in
metaphorical expressions. The fact that certain metaphors are used and
others not is not attributed to the cognition of particular actors but to
the broader societal context in which some but not other connections
between discursive domains make sense.
Poststructuralist works in the domain of metaphor theory high-
light one specific function of metaphors: their ability to link different
discourses. As they transfer pieces of meaning from one delineable dis-
course to another, they function as interfaces of two different discourses
(Maasen 1995: 28). Thus, metaphors always implicitly refer to other
meanings and incorporate traces of meanings from other texts. To put it
in a nutshell, metaphors constitute links of an intertextual chain (Hülsse

2003b: 222–223). As such, metaphors have a highly integrative function
(ibid.). They build a bridge between specialized discourses and everyday
language; they generalize selective knowledge and in doing so, stabilize
particular discourses (Link 1999: 154–155).6
Finally, for a poststructuralist conceptualization of metaphor theory,
it is decisive to underline that metaphors always impose a certain per-
spective on a subject matter. As already pointed out when discussing
the highlighting and hiding function proposed by cognitive linguistic
approaches, metaphors create new meanings by selectively highlight-
ing certain aspects of the source and target domain and by hiding
others. The highlighting and hiding function that is underlined by
Lakoff and Johnson is also emphasized by poststructuralist approaches
to metaphors (Koro-Ljungberg 2004: 343).
As far as the conception of language and ontology is concerned, there are
three central aspects that have to be pointed out in a poststructuralist
reading of metaphor theory. First, a poststructuralist interpretation of
metaphor theory suggests that metaphors are indispensable compo-
nents of language and, thus, all-pervasive. This is a proposition that
poststructuralists share with cognitive approaches to metaphor. Closely
linked to the hypothesis of the ubiquity of metaphors is the rejection
of the classical Aristotelian distinction between literal and figurative
or metaphorical language. This distinction relies on the assumption
that there are ‘utterances about “real” things (the literal) and those
that are designed to enhance the imagery that attends talking about
things but adds no cognitive meaning to the utterance (the figurative)’
(Shapiro 1985: 193). What is more, the distinction between the literal
and the figurative disguises philosophical commitments and theories
of value that are immanent in figures of speech (ibid.: 195). That is
why poststructuralists are generally highly sceptical of any attempts to
6
To some extent, the integrative function of metaphors mirrors the heuristic
function emphasized by representatives of conceptual metaphor theory. What
both functions indicate is the ability of metaphors to ‘[illustrate] unfamil-
iar connections through familiar ones’ (Maasen 1995: 22). However, authors
emphasizing the heuristic function take the added value for individuals as a
point of departure. This perspective underlines that metaphors help individuals
understand complex matters by drawing an analogy to more familiar contexts.
In comparison, authors stressing the integrative function of metaphors refer to
metaphors as a supra-individual entity. Metaphors are understood to integrate
discourses, stabilizing them via analogies to other already established webs of
meaning.
distinguish between literal and figurative language, emphasizing instead

that ‘figures of speech in general and metaphors in particular, then, are
not mere adornments added to the cognitive meaning of expressions.
They impose and order our reality insofar as they create meaning and
value’ (ibid.).
In this respect, De Man’s (1978) essay is particularly revealing, since
he discloses the metaphoricity of scientific language and illustrates how
even texts by Locke, Condillac and Kant, who are committed to a
conception of science that relies on the traditional Aristotelian distinc-
tion between science and literature, abound in figures of speech that
imply normative standpoints.7 Following on from this, poststructuralist
works on metaphor emphasize the value of literary analysis in the social
sciences since metaphors are ubiquitous in virtually all domains.
Second, poststructuralist approaches and cognitive approaches also
share a common ground with respect to the constitutive nature of
metaphors. As pointed out above, Lakoff and Johnson also emphasize
the power of metaphors to create reality. By underlining the notion that
metaphors create rather than discover likeness between two elements,
the cognitive approach stands in sharp contrast to the comparison thesis
prominent in classical approaches to metaphors. Yet, on closer inspec-
tion, it becomes clear that the apparent consensus between cognitive
linguistic and poststructuralist approaches to metaphors masks funda-
mental disagreements with respect to what it means exactly to say that
language or metaphors have a constitutive character (Bono 1990: 60).
In line with conceptual metaphor theory, metaphors constitute reali-
ties because they influence our thoughts, which in turn impact on our
actions. From a poststructuralist point of view, realities are not con-
stituted through thought processes but through discourses. Metaphors
construct structures of meaning that constitute realities.
Finally, a poststructuralist ontology is generally characterized by both
an anti-realist and anti-idealist standpoint. This theory rejects the
notion of a real and knowledge-independent world and at the same
time criticizes the methodological individualism that underpins cog-
nitive approaches according to which existence is essentially tied to
experience. Moreover, poststructuralist thinking is based on the idea of
radical contingency of social relations and identities, or on what some
authors term an ‘ontology of lack’ (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 100).
7
For a similar endeavor of deconstructing the metaphoricity of different episte-
mological theories see Shapiro (1985).
Such thinking focuses on an ‘irreducible negativity’ and the ‘constitutive

failure of any objectivity to attain a full identity’ (ibid.: 110, empha-
sis in the original). With respect to metaphors, this ontological baseline
implies that the relationship between the source and the target domain
(as given by Lakoff and Johnson) is contingent. The analogies created by
metaphors are neither something fixed by natural similarities nor some-
thing built into the structures of human thought: ‘There is an ultimate
arbitrariness, therefore, in the metaphorical presentation of the facts of
one sort as if they belonged to another’ (Miller 1979: 161). Anything
can theoretically be compared in a metaphor; it is only the existing
discursive structure that makes some metaphors more intelligible than
others are.
In general terms, poststructuralist theories of subjectivity are embedded
in an ontological theory of lack that was sketched out in Chapter 2.
‘[B]ecause each discursive construct is never fully constituted, but essen-
tially incomplete and lacking, the subject is also incomplete and lacking’
(Glynos and Howarth 2007: 127). The term ‘decentred subjectivity’ aims
to capture the idea of the subject as a discursive construct that is never
fully constituted and whose identity is dependent on other subjects
(ibid.: 127). This clarification is of vital importance as it differentiates
poststructuralist conceptions of subjectivity from others that merely per-
ceive the subject as a passive effect of structures. At the same time, this
understanding of subjectivity clearly departs from the concept of agency
prominent in positivist works. Subjects are not autonomous and cannot
wilfully choose the metaphors they employ. Thus, a poststructuralist
theory of metaphor leaves little room for agency. While the cognitive
school emphasizes that metaphors cannot be modified arbitrarily, since
the usage of metaphors is significantly dependent on bodily experiences
and cultural context factors, this notion of the social dependency of
metaphors is even more radicalized in a poststructuralist approach: the
emergence of new metaphors is not attributable to any individual but
is instead dependent on discursive structures. Table 3.1 succinctly sums
up the discussion on the classical rhetoric, the cognitive linguistic and
the poststructuralist theories of metaphor.
Discursive metaphor analysis
Having outlined the building blocks of a poststructuralist reading of

metaphor theories, this section is concerned with the concrete applica-
tion of metaphor analyses. For this purpose, I will delineate a method of
metaphor analysis that is in line with poststructuralist discourse theory,
Table 3.1 Theories of metaphors
Classical rhetoric Cognitive Poststructuralism

linguistics
Main subject of language cognition discursive structures

interest
Definition of narrow broad broad
metaphor
Function of decorative heuristic, Linking integrative
metaphor persuasive highlighting & highlighting & hiding
emotive hiding
Ontology realist idealist anti-realist and
anti-idealist/‘ontology
of lack’
Conception of instrumental constitutive constitutive
language
Theory of sovereign subjects partially decentred subjectivity
subjectivity sovereign subjects
which I therefore denote as discursive metaphor analysis (for a similar

suggestion see Hülsse 2003a; Walter and Helmig 2008).
The starting point of a discursive metaphor analysis is that metaphors
are ubiquitous – a proposition that has already been made by cogni-
tive linguistic approaches to metaphors. The definition of metaphors is
very broad and the approach radically negates the distinction between
figurative and non-figurative language. Ever since Lakoff and Johnson’s
groundbreaking book Metaphors We Live By (2003), it has been widely
acknowledged that metaphors are part and parcel of our everyday lan-
guage and are not mere ornaments employed primarily in the world of
arts and humanities. The idea of the all-pervasiveness of metaphors is
shared by both cognitive linguistic and poststructuralist approaches to
metaphors. Yet, despite this emphasis on the ubiquity of metaphors in
theoretical writings, empirical metaphor analyses in the field of political
science focus mainly on ‘creative’ or ‘novel’ metaphorical expressions in
which the transfer of meaning from one conceptual domain to another
is immediately recognizable by the typical contemporary language user.
However, given that ‘what is entrenched is most powerful’ (Müller 2008:
10), this study takes the claim of the ubiquity of metaphors seriously,
and argues that empirical research can profit from focusing more inten-
sively on highly conventionalized metaphorical expressions in order to
reconstruct underlying discursive structures.
Text selection and intertextuality
The text corpus on which the empirical analysis is based primarily

consists of legitimacy-related documents issued by the European Com-
mission between 1973 and 2013. These texts provide the background
for the descriptive empirical chapter mapping the development of
legitimacy discourses in the same time period (Chapter 4).
However, in order to fully understand the discursive dynamics that
occurred in the 1980s and 1990s (see chapters 5 and 6), a broader
research perspective had to be adopted and intertextual references taken
into account. Official discourses are always set in a wider intertextual
web structured around supportive or disproving texts (Hansen 2006: 60).
Understanding this intertextual web is of vital importance if discursive
dynamics are to be reconstructed. I will first describe the basic text-
selection procedure before dealing with the issue of intertextuality in
greater detail.
The selection of legitimacy-relevant documents posed a challenge
because the issue of legitimacy cuts across different policy fields and
issue areas. There were times when the Commission was primarily
concerned with legitimacy when discussing communication, educa-
tion or cultural policies. At other times, legitimacy became salient in
the context of institutional reform debates. And yet there were others
instances – in particular in the time period between 2001 and 2004 –
when issues of legitimacy were negotiated in the context of institu-
tional efficiency and effectiveness, and were tightly linked to the ‘better
lawmaking’ agenda. This means that if a comprehensive overview of the
legitimacy debate in the European Commission were to be obtained,
documents produced by one Directorate-General or speeches given by
Commissioners responsible for one specific portfolio would constitute a
biased restriction. Therefore, another procedure had to be found.
I started out with a first cursory reading of documents that were
general in scope and had a programmatic or retrospective character,
assuming that the Commission would at least touch upon issues of
legitimacy in such documents. More specifically, I focused on the work
programmes and general reports, which were published by the Com-
mission on an annual basis between 1973 and 2013. In addition, the
core text corpus comprised programmatic speeches held by Commission
presidents. These include: (1) speeches held in the European Parliament
presenting the work programmes and general reports; (2) state of the
union speeches; and (3) speeches held to celebrate Europe Day or to
commemorate the signing of the Treaties of Rome.
I read this core text corpus in order to gain an idea about the con-
texts in which legitimacy debates unfolded in each year, specifically
looking for further references to legitimacy-relevant documents issued
by the Commission. For some years, I could not find any references to
legitimacy debates held in the Commission. Work programmes, gen-
eral reports and the selected speeches did not include legitimacy-related
text passages, nor did these documents refer to other legitimacy-relevant
documents. By contrast, in other years, the texts of the core corpus
abounded in legitimacy language and extensively referred to further
documents that shaped the Commission’s inner-institutional debate on
legitimacy. In these cases, I supplemented the core text corpus (general
reports and work programmes plus speeches) with further documents
that the Commission itself considered vital for the inner-institutional
legitimacy debate. Due to this flexible procedure, the number of doc-
uments varies for each year. In sum, the analysed text corpus consists
of text passages taken from 183 documents. All texts of the extended
text corpus contain at least one passage with pieces of legitimacy lan-
guage. These passages were further analysed with the help of metaphor
analysis. The objective of this procedure was to get to grips with those
documents the Commission itself considers crucial with respect to the
issue of legitimacy.
The retrieved text sample does not constitute a full sample of Com-
mission texts dealing with legitimacy. There are many more texts, in
particular speeches held by different Commissioners that touch on
legitimacy. Nevertheless, I consider these documents to be ‘canonical’
(Neumann 2009: 67), in the sense that they were referred to by the Com-
mission as being crucial for the inner-institutional legitimacy debate;
they constitute the core of a broader legitimacy debate held in the
Commission between 1973 and 2013.
Moreover, the procedure applied for choosing the relevant passages
within the text corpus needs to be clarified; text analysis was only con-
ducted with those passages containing legitimacy language. A context-
sensitive procedure had to be applied since the nature of the legitimacy
language changed significantly during the time period researched. What
I term as ‘legitimacy language’ is composed of two types of semantics.
First, legitimacy language comprises of direct references to the legiti-
macy of the EC/EU. More often, however, the Commission employed
synonymous terms when dealing with legitimacy. References to evi-
dence or lack of ‘(public) support’ to the EC/EU’s ‘credibility’, or the
‘confidence’ and ‘trust’ people have in the Community constitute prime
examples. Second, terms and phrases dealing with the relationship
between citizens and institutions such as ‘to bring people closer to the
Community’, ‘to associate people with the EC’, ‘to engage people’ and
‘to place citizens at the centre of EU activities’ as well as references to the
‘gap between citizens and institutions’ were also interpreted as exam-
ple usage of legitimacy language. Often, these terms and phrases were
followed by a longer discussion on what would make the EC/EU more
legitimate in the eyes of its constituencies, giving closer insights into
the meanings of legitimacy prevalent in the Commission. The following
quotation constitutes an illustrative example of legitimacy language:
Facilitating and encouraging citizens’ participation in the democratic

life in the Union is crucial for bringing the citizen’s [sic] closer to the
European project. Increased turnout at European Parliament elections
is a shared ambition. The right of citizens to vote and be elected
for local European elections where they reside should be further
promoted and strengthened. The Citizens’ Initiative is a powerful
boost for European citizens’ rights and the democratic legitimacy of
the Union.
(Commission 2010a, emphasis added)
As this text passage includes the key phrase ‘bringing the citizens
closer to the European project’ and ‘democratic legitimacy’, it was
incorporated in the corpus. Each passage was then analysed in depth,
concentrating on representations of a legitimate EC/EU.
This basic text-selection procedure provided the background for the
broad overview of legitimacy discourses presented in Chapter 4. In order
to understand discourse dynamics more fully, this procedure had to
be supplemented by a smaller additional corpus of texts that influen-
tially shaped the Commission’s articulations on legitimacy originating
in other discursive arenas. The Commission’s standpoint on legitimacy
did not emerge in a vacuum but drew on text sources from the broader
discursive context. Understanding this discursive context and the web
of texts within which the Commission’s articulations were embedded is
essential to get a more comprehensive picture of the discursive changes
that took place in the Commission’s legitimacy discourses in the 1980s
and 1990s. Reconstructing this wider web of texts was undertaken by a
close intertextual analysis of the Commission’s official documents.
In poststructuralist studies, intertextuality emerged as a central con-
cept through which the importance of textual influence can be theo-
rized, overcoming the sole focus on the inner structure of a text that
characterizes structuralist works. Texts, so the argument proposed by
modern theorists such as Julia Kristeva goes, who coined the concept of
intertextuality in the 1960s, do not have an independent meaning and
only become meaningful in a network of textual relations. ‘To interpret
a text, to discover its meaning, or meanings, is to trace those relations’
(Allen 2000: 1). The concept was originally developed in literary and
cultural studies, but has meanwhile spread to be extensively employed
in poststructuralist social sciences (Hansen 2006; Freistein 2012). In gen-
eral, the concept of intertextuality shifts focus to the indirect influences
on the production of texts. In more concrete terms, intertextuality
denotes the ‘presence of actual other elements of other texts within
a text’ (Fairclough 2003: 39). An intertextual analysis focuses on the
discursive elements drawn upon when a text is produced and tracks the
presence and traces of them in the text (Fairclough 1992: 104).
Intertextual references can take different forms (Hansen 2006: 56–59);
they can be constituted by explicit quotations or by explicit references
to other, older texts. For instance, in the basic text corpus compris-
ing legitimacy-relevant documents produced by the Commission in
the 1980s, there is an abundance of direct references to and quota-
tions taken from documents produced in the European Council and the
Tindemans Committee. These intertextual references revealed that the
two discursive arenas influentially shaped the Commission’s launching
of the European identity concept and thus significantly contributed to
a change in the Commission’s articulations on legitimacy at that time
(see Chapter 5). In order to understand this discursive shift properly and
in order to get an idea of the discursive context within which the Com-
mission’s turn towards European identity unfolded, the basic text corpus
had to be supplemented by pertinent documents issued by the European
Council and the Tindemans Committee. Similarly, the democracy turn
in the European Commission in the 1990s was stabilized by a range
of explicit intertextual references to texts produced by the European
Parliament and in particular the Committee on Institutional Reforms.
Intertextual references can, however, also be far more implicit. Con-
cepts and catchphrases taken from other texts might, for instance,
constitute key intertextual references. The concept of a ‘democratic
deficit’, which was practically non-existent in previous decades and first
appeared in the Commission’s articulations on legitimacy in 1989, is
a case in point. The emergence of the concept in Commission texts
indicates that the Commission did indeed acknowledge the academic
debate on the Community’s democratic credentials that increasingly
gained impetus at the same time. The academic debate on the demo-
cratic deficit that emerged with the ratification of the Single European
Act constitutes one important discursive arena that influentially shaped

the Commission’s articulations on legitimacy. Therefore, the discourse
analysis conducted in Chapter 6 had to be sensitive to texts produced in
academia dealing with the democratic deficit of the late 1980s in order
to fully understand the turn towards democracy in the Commission’s
articulations.
Implicit intertextual relations can only be fully grasped by carefully
studying the socio-political context of the analysed discourse and by
engaging in an in-depth reading of secondary literature. Studying the
socio-political context enables the researcher to read presuppositions
and underlying assumptions in Commission texts.
Identifying metaphors
Metaphor analysis is invariably confronted with the crucial question of

identifying metaphorical expressions in the text material. Despite the
controversial debate held on the procedure of metaphor identification
over the past few decades, the issue still remains a bone of contention.
Max Black’s rather fatalistic position which negates the possibility of
ever finding a clear-cut procedure for the identification of metaphors
constitutes one side of the spectrum: ‘There is an important mistake
of method in seeking an infallible mark of the presence of metaphors
(. . .). Every criterion for a metaphor’s presence, however plausible, is
defeasible in special circumstances’ (Black 1993: 36).
Other authors have proposed fine-grained, mechanistic procedures
to solve this methodological issue (Pragglejaz Group 2007; Steen et al.
2010). I tend towards Black’s position and his plea to give up the search
for infallible criteria in identifying metaphors, and go on to propose a
procedure of analysis that is context-sensitive and acknowledges that
every proposition on the (non-)existence of a metaphorical expression
is ultimately an interpretive decision. In this section, I will therefore first
engage in a critical evaluation of existing metaphor-identification pro-
cedures before developing my own approach to metaphor analysis in
greater detail.
As a starting point for the question of how to identify metaphors,
it is useful to recollect the definition of metaphors proposed by
poststructuralist works on the subject. This study draws on Maasen and
Weingart’s definition of metaphors introduced at the beginning of the
chapter, according to which a transfer of meaning constitutes a defining
characteristic of metaphors: a metaphor is a term or phrase that is trans-
ferred from one specific context to another. This definition of metaphor
breaks with the substitution thesis that is typical of the classical rhetoric
approach – which still at least implicitly underlies many contemporary

definitions – and departs from the rigid distinction between figurative
and non-figurative language. At the same time, it constitutes a max-
imalist definition of metaphors in the sense that it proposes a very
broad conception of metaphors. Every term or phrase can potentially
be metaphorical if the researcher can meaningfully argue that it was
transferred from a different context. As such, the definition is partic-
ularly suitable for analysing even highly conventionalized metaphors
and thus, getting to grips with discursive structures that endow subjects,
objects and practices with meaning.
The decision as to whether a piece of language is actually trans-
ferred from one delineable context to another is undoubtedly highly
dependent on the researcher’s interpretation. Yet most metaphor-
identification procedures do not fully recognize the act of interpretation
that is part and parcel of any decision regarding the metaphoricity of
language.
The most prominent and elaborate metaphor-identification procedure
is the one developed by the Pragglejaz Group (2007) and its successors
(Steen et al. 2010). Their procedure rejects a rigid distinction between
figurative and non-figurative language and instead proposes a more flex-
ible one between the contextualized and standard meaning of a word.
The Pragglejaz Group succinctly describes their metaphor-identification
procedure as follows:
1. Read the entire text–discourse to establish a general understanding

of the meaning
2. Determine the lexical units in the text–discourse
3. (a) For each lexical unit in the text, establish its meaning in con-
text, that is, how it applies to an entity, relation, or attribute in the
situation evoked by the text (contextual meaning). Take into account
what comes before and after the lexical unit. (b) For each lexical
unit, determine if it has a more basic contemporary meaning in other
contexts than the one in the given context. For our purposes, basic
meanings tend to be
–More concrete [what they evoke is easier to imagine, see, hear, feel,
smell and taste];
–Related to bodily action;
–More precise (as opposed to vague);
–Historically older.
Basic meanings are not necessarily the most frequent meanings of the
lexical unit.
(c) If the lexical unit has a more basic current–contemporary meaning

in other contexts than the given context, decide whether the contex-
tual meaning contrasts with the basic meaning but can be understood
in comparison with it.
4. If yes, mark the lexical unit as metaphorical.

(Pragglejaz Group 2007: 3)
Before engaging in a critical discussion of this identification procedure,

I first want to apply this procedure to a concrete example in order to
illustrate the procedure more clearly.
Consider the following statement, taken from the text corpus:
The Union seeks to serve its citizens, to deliver results (. . .).

(Commission 2007a)
A reading of the entire document, step 1, suggests that the text is con-
cerned with the relation between EU institutions and European citizens,
and proposes a number of measures to alleviate the EU’s legitimacy
problems. Thus, the document was classified as a legitimacy-related doc-
ument and was included in the text corpus. With respect to step 2,
the Pragglejaz Group recommends choosing words as lexical units, only
allowing for some exceptions to this rule (e.g. proper names).8 Thus, the
lexical units of the sentence can be determined as follows:
The/ Union/ seeks/ to/ serve/ its/ citizens/ to/ deliver/ results (. . .)
Following on from this, the Pragglejaz Group suggests checking the

metaphorical character of each lexical unit. Since I am only interested
in metaphorical constructions of a legitimate EC/EU, I can simplify the
procedure suggested by the Pragglejaz Group in focusing on only those
lexical units that in some way or another refer to the EU. In the exam-
ple, the lexical units that are related to the target domain, that is, the
legitimacy of the EC/EU, are in italics. A legitimate Union is one that
8
This rather narrow conceptualization of lexical units has been attacked as being
too strict since it disregards the fact that metaphorical expressions can be found
in longer stretches of language (Cameron and Maslen 2010: 105).
serves and delivers. Thus, these are the two lexical units that the analysis
has to concentrate on.
The contextual meaning of both serve and deliver may be reformu-
lated as ‘to adopt policies’ or even ‘to adopt policies that please the
citizens’ (step 3a). By isolating these two lexical units and considering
them independently, it becomes evident that the two words have a more
basic meaning in other contexts (step 3b). The basic meaning of serve is,
according to the Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners, and
recommended by Steen et al. (2010: 6) as a trusted source, to ‘provide
food/drink’ or to ‘perform duties’; on the other hand, deliver denotes the
physical transfer of goods. Since the contextual meaning contrasts with
the basic meaning but can still be understood in comparison with it,
the two lexical units serve and deliver can be classified as metaphorical
expressions (step 4).
The merit of the approach proposed by the Pragglejaz Group is
that it offers a clear and comprehensible procedure for the identi-
fication of metaphors – an issue rarely addressed in social scientific
works on metaphor analysis. It surely enables the researchers to conduct
metaphor analyses in a methodologically controlled way. What is more,
the procedure is based on a wide definition of metaphor, which makes
it possible to identify even conventionalized metaphorical expressions.
The authors emphasize: ‘the procedure adopts a maximal, not a minimal
approach such that a wide range of words may be considered as con-
veying metaphorical meaning based on their use in context’ (Pragglejaz
Group 2007: 2). One essential characteristic of the approach is that
the text is broken down into differing units and that the researcher is
encouraged to consider both the contextual and the basic meaning of
each unit. This meticulous procedure contributes towards the researcher
realizing the metaphorical meaning of certain expressions. As such, the
identification procedure suggested by the Pragglejaz Group helps to rec-
ognize highly conventionalized metaphors that tend to be overlooked
in standard social scientific analysis.
However, the Pragglejaz Group’s procedure also has some drawbacks.
Above all, I argue that the procedure proposed is too mechanistic and
not context-sensitive enough for in-depth qualitative studies. The sug-
gestion of deciding the metaphorical or non-metaphorical character of
language according to allegedly objective criteria, such as dictionary
entries, is flawed, because such a procedure is not sensitive enough to
the discursive context. Nor is the problem solved if the decision of basic
meaning is founded on corpus-based findings as proposed by Semino,
Heywood and Short (2004). The authors suggest complementing the
procedure proposed by the Pragglejaz Group with corpus-based findings

depicting the most frequent concordances of particular words in order
to get an idea of the typical contexts these words are used in and to
determine the basic meaning. Such a procedure would, however, con-
stitute a modified attempt at fixing objective criteria to decide on the
metaphoricity of language.
As against this view I argue that what is standard and what is not
is highly dependent on the discursive context? Consider for instance
the adjective accountable, which first appeared in the early 1990s in the
Commission’s discourse on a legitimate EC/EU. The typical contempo-
rary language user would not see any metaphoricity in this adjective
and the metaphor-identification procedure suggested by the Pragglejaz
Group would reject any interpretation of accountable as a metaphori-
cal word. The Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners defines
accountable as being ‘in a position where people have the right to criti-
cize you or ask you why something happened’. This is also roughly the
meaning that is relevant in the context in which the term was used in
the 1990s. As a consequence, the basic meaning and contextual mean-
ing are rather similar, a domain incongruity does not apply and the
existence of a metaphor has to be denied.
Yet, considering the initial broad definition of metaphors discussed
at the beginning of the chapter highlighting a metaphor as a term or
phrase transferred from one context to another, I argue that account-
able is a metaphorical word in this context. In conducting a diachronic
in-depth discourse analysis of Commission documents dealing with
legitimacy from 1973 onwards, I have a deeper contextual knowledge
than the typical contemporary language user. From the analysis of
previous documents, I knew that the adjective ‘accountable’ had not
been commonly used in representing a legitimate EU/EC previously.
Accountable is a new attribute introduced in the 1990s to construct a
legitimate EU/EC. Obviously, accountable was not a word that was typ-
ically employed for the target domain LEGITIMATE EU/EC, and therefore
must have been transferred from another context (arguably from the
domain NATION STATE or from the domain ECONOMY) to that of the
EU/EC. If a metaphor analysis is conducted in a highly context-sensitive
manner, one can argue that accountable is a metaphorical word in this
sentence.
Further similar examples are phrases such as European identity,
European culture and European civilization that came up in the 1980s in
the legitimacy discourse of the Commission. Identity, culture and civ-
ilization are not by themselves metaphorical words; however, if they
are employed in the context of a discussion on the legitimacy of the

EC/EU, they are metaphorical because these words are transferred from
the context of NATION STATE to the context of the EC/EU. The same
applies for the words effective and efficient to describe a legitimate EC/EU;
they do not reflect standard ways of construing the legitimacy of the
EC/EU and have been transferred from the domain of MACHINE or ECON-
OMY to the domain of LEGITIMATE EC / EU . In other words, the difference
between a basic meaning and contextual meaning is not as clear-cut
as the Pragglejaz Group (2007) and its successors (Steen et al. 2010)
suggest. This point is also emphasized by Schmitt (2011: 53) when
arguing that metaphors need to be understood and cannot merely be
identified. What is standard and what is a deviation from the stan-
dard is also heavily dependent on the historical discursive context.
A researcher who conducts an in-depth diachronic discourse analysis
can have a different notion of a basic meaning than the one defined in
a dictionary.
To conclude, the question of whether the meaning of a word or phrase
is transferred from one domain to another can be answered synchroni-
cally by consulting dictionaries and corpus-based findings to define the
basic and the contextual meaning of a word or phrase. However, it can
also be answered diachronically by conducting an in-depth analysis of
a discourse, tracing its development over a longer period of time. In the
latter case, the researcher can distinguish between the standard ways of
talking about a given subject (such as the legitimacy of the EC/EU) and
can easily detect novel words and phrases that have been transferred
from other contexts. Each instance of such a novel word or phrase, then,
has to be classified as metaphorical. The metaphor analysis conducted
in this study follows the second diachronic approach. Such a procedure
is highly context-sensitive and acknowledges that the decision on the
(non-)existence of a metaphor is an interpretive act conducted by the
researcher who has an in-depth knowledge of the text and the context
within which metaphorical expressions occur.
Undoubtedly, such a procedure significantly widens the scope of
the concept ‘metaphor’ and is at the same time highly sensitive to
conventionalized metaphorical expressions. Every word or phrase can
potentially constitute a transfer of meaning from one delineable context
to another and it is the task of the researcher to interpret the mate-
rial to hand in deciding on the existence of a metaphorical expression.
Such a broad conceptualization of metaphors takes the poststructuralist
claim of the ubiquity of metaphors seriously and is sensitive to highly
entrenched discursive structures.
Reconstructing conceptual metaphors
After identifying metaphors, the second step of every metaphor analysis

is the reconstruction of conceptual metaphors, that is, of constructing a
system of source and target domains that underlies a wide range of dif-
ferent metaphorical expressions. It is only through this reconstruction
of conceptual metaphors that the discursive structures of the text can
be unveiled. As already indicated at the beginning of the chapter when
discussing the cognitive linguistic approach to metaphors, a concep-
tual metaphor is situated on a more abstract level than a metaphorical
expression and is constituted by a source and a target domain.9
To illustrate the difference between a metaphorical expression and a
conceptual metaphor, and to clarify the concept of source and target
domains, it is useful to cite an example from the analysed text corpus:
It is for us (. . .) to put some flesh on the Community’s bones and (. . .)

give it a little more soul.
(Delors 1989a)
In this metaphorical expression, the image of the European Com-

munity is construed through terms and phrases that are typical of
different discursive contexts or – as cognitive linguists would argue –
with terms and phrases belonging to a different conceptual domain.
Flesh, bones and soul belong to the conceptual domain of ORGANISM,
and the conceptual domain of ORGANISM is here transferred to the
domain of political systems or, more specifically, to the EC. A conceptual
metaphor typically has the formula: conceptual domain A is concep-
tual domain B. Thus, the conceptual metaphor underlying Delors’
9
While rejecting a cognitivist conceptualization of metaphors, the study still
sticks to the terminology introduced by Lakoff and Johnson’s seminal work on
metaphors, in particular to the terms ‘conceptual metaphor’, ‘source’ and ‘target
domain’, despite the cognitivist premises underlying these concepts (Kövecses
2010: 4), for pragmatic reasons. These terms have meanwhile established them-
selves as terms that are also used by scholars who promote a discursive approach
towards metaphor analysis. A redefinition of these crucial concepts, in particular
of the concept ‘conceptual metaphor’ that is more in line with discourse theory,
has been proposed by Drulák. He states that conceptual metaphors are situated
on a more abstract level and connect two conceptual domains while metaphori-
cal expressions connect concrete elements of these conceptual domains (Drulák
2006: 504). In this respect, the definition of conceptual metaphors corresponds
to the definition of discursive structures in a Foucauldian understanding: as rules
which make possible certain statements but not others (ibid.).
metaphorical expression is EC IS ORGANISM. The domain from which

a metaphorical expression draws meaning in order to construe a cer-
tain phenomenon is called the source domain (here: ORGANISM). On the
other hand, the target domain is the domain that is construed (here: EC).
The source and target domain both constitute the conceptual metaphor.
Depending on the degree of incongruity between the source and target
domain, one can classify metaphorical expressions on a scale from ‘cre-
ative’ to ‘conventional’ down to ‘dead’ (Charteris-Black 2004: 17–19;
for a critical discussion of this distinction, particularly the notion of
a dead metaphor, see Müller 2008). In the example above, the degree
of incongruity between the two domains is high: the typical con-
temporary language user would immediately recognize the semantic
tension in this sentence, classifying the relevant phrases as creative
metaphors.
The source and target domain are constitutive of every conceptual
metaphor, and every metaphor analysis has to show clearly how it
reconstructed both domains from the empirical material. I will first
comment on the target domain of the conducted metaphor analysis
before going into greater detail with regard to source domains. Typi-
cally, it is the researcher who fixes the target domain at the beginning
of each metaphor analysis. Most metaphor analyses conducted in the
social sciences are not so much interested in all metaphorical expres-
sions occurring in texts than in the metaphorical construction of certain
subjects, objects or practices. This means that a metaphor analysis is
often only conducted with those text segments that refer to the sub-
ject, object or practice of interest. Clearly fixing the target domain at
the beginning of the analysis is of vital importance for the clarity and
coherence of an empirical study.
The target domain of the present study is LEGITIMATE EC/EU. This
means that I only focused on those text segments in the empirical
material that referred to the subject position of a legitimate EC/EU. The
analysis was comparatively strict on this issue. Any statements that did
not refer to a legitimate EC/EU as a whole but merely dealt with partic-
ular institutions of the EC/EU, for instance the European Commission
or the European Parliament, were excluded from the analysis. A state-
ment was only included in the analysis if it was clearly concerned with
perceptions of a legitimate EC/EU.
For the analysis of subject positions in texts, the studies carried out
by the critical discourse analysis school, in particular, the work by
Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 44–56) on self-constructions, were particularly
useful. Self-constructions can be analysed by focusing on nomination
and predication. Taking up this distinction, the empirical analysis con-

centrated on the two following questions: (1) how is a legitimate
EC/EU named and referred to linguistically (nomination)? (2) What trait
characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to it (predication)?
Both nomination and predication can contain metaphorical words
and phrases of the EC/EU. (Self-)constructions or (self-)representations
(terms used synonymously in this study) of a legitimate EC/EU are
often embedded in sentences regarding how the EC/EU should ide-
ally look and are predominantly formulated in terms of demands (the
EC/EU has to/should/must . . .) or in terms of citizens’ expectations (the
citizens/member states expect the EU/EC to . . .).
Finally, the crucial question arises of how to proceed to the last step,
that is, the construction of source domains. Going back to the example
of an ‘accountable EU’, mentioned before, how do I decide whether the
source domain of this representation of a legitimate EU is, for instance,
ECONOMY or NATION STATE or even a different one?
As is the case with the identification of metaphors, the second step
in any metaphor analysis cannot be accomplished in a formalistic
way either. The question as to which source domain underlies any
metaphorical expression is likewise open to interpretation. Formalistic
solutions, for instance suggesting an etymological procedure be adopted
and the source domain of the word determined by looking up the ‘orig-
inal’ meaning, do not solve the problem either, nor do suggestions of
consulting contemporary dictionaries and linguistic corpuses, because
such procedures would not be able to reconstruct the systematicity
underlying many metaphorical expressions, despite different etymolog-
ical roots and standard meanings. Rather than deducing the source
domain from a seemingly objective criterion such as a word’s origi-
nal or basic meaning, a context-sensitive analysis must be adopted,
taking the structures governing a specific text as a starting point and
reconstructing source domains on the basis of these structures. Simi-
lar to metaphorical expressions more generally, source domains cannot
simply be identified or deduced from objective criteria but have to
be read and interpreted within specific contexts. I will expand upon
this aspect with the help of a further example. Consider the following
statement:
In October 2005, the Commission presented its own Plan D for

Democracy, Dialogue and Debate on the future of Europe, proposing
new ways of involving citizens.
(Commission 2007b)
The sentence is located in a text passage dealing with the broader issue
of how political support for the EU can be generated. Therefore, it
was categorized as a legitimacy-related text passage according to the
procedure outlined above. A legitimate EU is here constructed as one
that involves citizens. Such representations of a legitimate EU, highlight-
ing that active involvement of citizens is crucial, slowly began to gain
ground in the 1990s and to proliferate after 2001. Such representations
had not been part of the Commission’s legitimacy discourse in previ-
ous decades. Citizen involvement was not a phrase typically employed to
construct the target domain LEGITIMATE EC/EU and must therefore have
been transferred from a third context to that of the EU, which is why
I coded it as a metaphorical expression.
Still the question remains: to which source domain does the phrase cit-
izen involvement belong? In the course of the analysis, I discovered that
the emergence of this term was coupled with a variety of other new and
similar terms (citizens’ engagement, participation, association, etc.) which
all emphasized that proximity between institutions and citizens is of
crucial importance for democratic legitimacy.10 ‘Bringing the EU closer
to the citizens’ became a panacea for the legitimacy problems of the
EU after 1990. Therefore, I coded statements that highlight proximity
between EU political institutions and European citizens as belonging
to the source domain PATH. The procedure depicted shows that the
reconstruction of source domains is a highly context-sensitive proce-
dure. Whether an expression is categorized in one or another source
domain also depends on the context of the expression and the terms
and concepts to which it is linked (Schmitt 2011).
To ensure as systematic a procedure as possible despite the
interpretative variability that is necessarily involved in constructing
different source domains, I followed the procedure recommended by
Schmitt (2005, 2011). He advocates an extensive preparatory phase in
which the researcher extensively reflects on the context of the object
of analysis. He suggests collecting as much background information
on existing metaphor analyses as possible before engaging in an anal-
ysis of source domains in the empirical material. The researcher should
scrutinize possible source domains by sketching out existing metaphor
analysis of the target domain and should conduct an unsystematic anal-
ysis of other sources that are relevant for the target domain (academic
10
See also Walters and Haahr (2005), who have reconstructed the Foucauldian
logic of proximity in the Commission’s discourse.
texts, encyclopaedias, pieces of writing for the general public, etc.). Such
a procedure makes the researcher sensitive to the scope and to the
variety of source domains that exist for a given target domain.
An extensive preparatory phase also has an important practical advan-
tage since it provides the researcher with a more complete picture of
possible source domains. Constructing conceptual metaphors on the
basis of existing analytical work on the target domain also helps to
indicate alternatives if certain conceptual metaphors are not realized
in the empirical material. Such an approach can ‘identify conceptual
metaphors which have yet to find their way into the political discourse’
(Drulák 2006: 505).
More specifically, for the given study, I profited from three sources
of inspiration in the preparatory phase: first, I undertook an in-depth
study of the literature on state and society metaphors (Weldon 1947;
Mannheim 1953; Landau 1961; Rigney 2001; Ringmar 2007). This
drew my attention to the two most common source domains typically
employed to represent the state, namely ORGANISM and MACHINE. Sec-
ond, specific research on the metaphorical constructions of the EU/EC
was of vital importance (Chilton 1996; Hülsse 2003a; Musolff 2004;
Drulák 2006, 2008; Schieder 2014); these key works made me not only
sensitive to typical source domains for the metaphorical construction
of the EC/EU such as PATH and BUILDING, but also to the scope of these
source domains. For instance, Chilton’s extensive study on metaphorical
EC/EU constructions points out the different notions of PATH, including
those of movement, end and starting points and of distance and close-
ness. In a final step, I conducted a cursory examination of metaphorical
constructions of the source domain LEGITIMATE EC/EU in Beetham and
Lord’s (1998) seminal work Legitimacy and the European Union, which
served as main source for reconstructing the five models of legitimacy
that guided the empirical analysis. This made me aware of the con-
ceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EC/EU IS SCIENCE at an early stage of
the analysis. Since metaphorical expressions drawing on this concep-
tual metaphor were almost completely marginalized in Commission
documents of the 1970s and 1980s, I might not have recognized this
conceptual metaphor had I relied on a completely inductive procedure
of conceptualizing source domains.
This preparatory phase provided me with a preliminary list of possi-
ble source domains for the target domain LEGITIMATE EC/EU. This list
was then applied to the empirical material with the aim of grouping
metaphorical expressions. It turned out that the list of possible source
domains had to be modified. There were metaphorical expressions that
could not be subsumed under one of the source domains reconstructed
in the preparatory phase. Although some of these appeared systemat-

ically together, they could not be attributed to the preliminary list of
source domains. In the text corpus analysed, there were a number of
metaphorical expressions that were inspired by the idea of fantasy or
imagination, which is why the conceptual metaphor legitimate EU/EC
is Fantasy was added to the list of possible conceptual metaphors after a
first reading of metaphorical expressions. In other cases, the scope of the
category of particular source domains was extended. For instance, the
source domain FAMILY was extended to include metaphorical expres-
sions implying that for the EC/EU to be legitimate, a certain basis of
feelings between Europeans was essential. By constructing new source
domains and extending the scope of other source domains, the initial
list of possible source domains was modified and completed. After a sec-
ond analysis of all metaphorical expressions, most of them could be
categorized as belonging to one of the retrieved conceptual metaphors,
leaving only a small group of sentences collected in the category
‘other’.
Exemplary analysis
To live up to the standards of transparency and reflexivity, the method-

ological chapter ends with an exemplary analysis of a text segment.
The following statement is taken from a core document that had an
immense impact on the legitimacy discourse of the European Commis-
sion in the period after the failed referenda on the ‘Treaty Establishing
a Constitution for Europe’ in The Netherlands and France in May and
June 2005. The document is entitled: ‘The Commission’s Contribution
to the Period of Reflection and Beyond: Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue
and Debate’, published in October 2005 and explicitly addressing the
legitimacy crisis the EC/EU was faced with at that time. In the docu-
ment, the Commission extensively discusses reasons for falling public
support for the integration project. As such, it can be categorized as a
legitimacy-relevant document.
Consider the following statement:
Ultimately, Plan-D for democracy, dialogue and debate is a listen-

ing exercise so that the European Union can act on the concerns
expressed by its citizens. The objective of the Commission is to stim-
ulate this debate and seek recognition for the added value that the
European Union can provide. The democratic renewal process means
that EU citizens must have the right to have their voices heard.
(Commission 2005a)
A. Reconstruction of representations of a legitimate EC/EU
Within the pool of selected documents, only those passages were coded
that were linked to the issue of legitimacy and that contained words and
phrases that delineated how a legitimate EC/EU would look. In this step
of the analysis, I focused on how the EC/EU is named and referred to
(nomination) and on the traits, characteristics, qualities and features
that are attributed to a legitimate EC/EU (predication). In the given
text segment, no special naming of a legitimate EC/EU is employed.
It is referred to as the ‘European Union’ or the ‘EU’. Yet, there are a
number of attributes employed to construct a legitimate EU, which are
marked in italics. In order to reconstruct representations of a legitimate
EC/EU from the selected documents, every sentence of a relevant pas-
sage was reformulated into stylized sentences in a way that makes the
often-implicit attributes more explicit. All of the stylized sentences have
the form ‘(in) a legitimate EC/EU . . .’. From the above-cited quotation,
four such stylized sentences can be formulated in chronological order:
1. A legitimate EU acts on the concerns expressed by the citizens.

2. In a legitimate EU, there is a debate.
3. A legitimate EU provides an added value.
4. In a legitimate EU, citizens make their voices heard.
One could argue that the first sentence of the text passage also contains
a relevant representation in the form of ‘in a legitimate EU there is a
listening exercise’ or even ‘a legitimate EU listens’. Yet, given that this
phrase refers to the policy paper of Plan D and not to the EU generally,
it was excluded from the analysis, because the target domain is ambigu-
ous and cannot clearly be classified as ‘legitimate EC/EU’. The reference
point of the phrase, ‘a listening exercise’, is the Plan D policy and not
the political system of the EU.
B. Reconstructing the relevant legitimacy model
For every stylized sentence analysed, the underlying legitimacy model

was coded. Every self-construction of a legitimate EU was categorized as
articulating the intergovernmental, the technocratic, the performance,
the identity or the democratic model of legitimacy (see Introduction).
Those self-representations that could not clearly be assigned to a legit-
imacy model were collected in an ‘other’ category. Sentences 1 and 3
emphasize that the output of the EU is of vital importance for its legit-
imacy. Therefore, they can be classified as relating to a performance
model of legitimacy. Sentences 2 and 4, in contrast, highlight the

communicative dimension for legitimate governance; they imply that
the EU is legitimate if citizens manage to voice their preferences effec-
tively and if these preferences resonate in some way in the political
system of the EU. I interpreted these articulations as pertaining to the
democratic model of legitimacy.
D. Reconstructing source domains
For each of the stylized sentences, a source domain was reconstructed.

According to the procedure applied and outlined above, the stylized sen-
tences were classified as belonging to the following source domains: the
metaphorical word ‘act’ in sentence 1 can, quite obviously, be classi-
fied as belonging to the source domain ACTOR. In sentences 2 and 4,
the words and phrases in italics were interpreted as being connected to
the domain of communication and were coded as manifestations of the
source domain COMMUNICATION. Similarly, in sentence 4, ‘added value’
is interpreted as belonging to the source domain ECONOMY. Accord-
ingly, the following conceptual metaphors underlie the four stylized
sentences.
1. LEGITIMATE EU IS ACTOR
2. LEGITIMATE EU IS COMMUNICATIVE SPACE
3. LEGITIMATE EU IS ECONOMY
4. LEGITIMATE EU IS COMMUNICATIVE SPACE
This procedure has been applied to all legitimacy-relevant text passages

containing representations of a legitimate EC/EU. In sum, for the time
period between 1973 and 2013, I reconstructed 2011 self-constructions
of a legitimate EC/EU in 183 documents.
4
Change and Continuity of
Legitimacy Discourses in the
European Commission between
1973 and 2013
What does the European Commission mean when it talks about legiti-
macy? This is the guiding question of the following descriptive empirical
chapter. I will show that legitimacy means different things to the Com-
mission in different periods of time. At times, legitimacy is presented
as being merely an issue of performance while at others democracy and
legitimacy become closely intertwined. There were also phases in the
history of the Commission in which the institution was preoccupied
with the social preconditions of legitimate governance, equating the
latter with the existence of a commonly shared European identity. Dif-
ferent discourses vie to suture the space of ‘legitimate Europe’, and the
objective of this chapter is to shed light on the dynamics and resilience
of these discourses. For this purpose, a broad time period was chosen for
an in-depth analysis of the Commission’s articulations on legitimacy.
The analysis starts in 1973, a year in which an intense legitimacy debate
unfolded within EC institutions, culminating in the ‘Declaration on a
European Identity’ (Heads of State and Government 1973) and ends
in 2013.
This chapter has a threefold aim: one, an in-depth description of the
structure of legitimacy discourses prevalent in certain time spans. Two,
to set the empirical findings in the context of normative debates on
the legitimacy deficit in the EU as depicted in the Introduction: if the
Commission talks about democracy, what model of democracy does it
draw on? If the Commission presents performance as a resource of legiti-
macy, does it propose a democratic or non-democratic understanding of
performance? Similarly, if the Commission contemplates the social and
political preconditions of legitimate governance and ponders over the
94
Change and Continuity of Legitimacy Discourses 95
characteristics of a European identity, does it rely on a civic or ethnic, a

past or future-oriented conception of European identity? The categories
employed to structure the normative debate on the legitimacy deficit of
the EU will be applied to the empirical material to interpret the Com-
mission’s articulations on legitimacy. Finally, this chapter also sets out
to take up the plea, recently voiced by Diez (2014a), who argues that the
critical power of discourse analyses could be strengthened if researchers
not only focused on the substantive meaning constructed through dis-
courses, but also looked more closely at ‘the ways in which discourses
inscribe the boundaries of what can be articulated’ (ibid.: 8). By focus-
ing on the restraining or delimiting function of discourses, that is, on
the articulations excluded by a certain discursive configuration, this
chapter also aims at critically engaging with commonsensical meanings
of legitimacy prevalent in the Commission.
The chapter is structured as follows: in the first part, I will present
the results of the document analysis, pointing out the intensity of the
legitimacy debate within the Commission in the last four decades. Then,
I will give a broad overview of the development of the Commission’s
legitimacy discourses, proposing that it can be divided into four periods.
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to an in-depth description of
the legitimacy discourses prevalent in the Commission, presenting the
results of the metaphor analysis. The chapter ends with a conclusion
summing up the main empirical results.
The rise and fall of legitimacy debates in the European

Commission
The Commission has not always talked about legitimacy with the same
degree of intensity. There have been times in which the issue of legit-
imacy was high on the agenda and others in which the Commission
hardly engaged in questions of legitimate governance. The number
of legitimacy-relevant documents retrieved per year for this study will
roughly indicate the intensity of legitimacy debates within the Com-
mission (see Figure 4.1). Together with the background knowledge
I acquired through document analysis, a detailed picture of the intensity
of legitimacy debates within the Commission emerged.
The mid- and late 1970s constitute a period in which the Commis-
sion dealt extensively with questions of legitimacy. In the early 1970s,
the EC suffered severely from what might be called its ‘first legitimacy
crisis’ (Schrag Sternberg 2013: 71). The issue of legitimacy was partic-
ularly salient at that time: the euphoria over the exceptionally good
12
10
0
73
75
77
79
81
83
85
87
89
91
93
95
97
99
01
03
05
07
09
11
13
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Figure 4.1 Number of analysed legitimacy-relevant documents per year
economic development of the Community in the 1960s was fading

and currency fluctuations and rising inflation rates in the late 1960s
and the energy crisis at the end of 1973 had serious economic conse-
quences in some member states revealing how economically vulnerable
the Community was. In addition to this, the Community did not react
effectively to these challenges due to its drift towards intergovernmental
summitry and the refusal of some member states to implement pol-
icy guidelines that emerged from the Paris and Copenhagen Summits
in 1972 and 1973 (Burgess 1989: 79–81). There even seemed to be a
risk of the Community disintegrating (Ortoli 1975a). Due to the Com-
munity’s performance difficulties, the legitimation narrative that had
hitherto been proposed, emphasizing the Community’s ability to effec-
tively tackle common problems and to safeguard prosperity, was now
under threat (Schrag Sternberg 2013: 70). The Community was faced
with harsh criticism, condemning it of failing to deliver on its claim
that economic progress was guaranteed. As Theiler notes, these devel-
opments led to the perception ‘mainly within the European Parliament
and the Commission, that popular support for European integration was
not solid and that this threatened the future development and even sur-
vival of the Community’ (Theiler 2005: 2). The increased salience of
legitimacy was also facilitated by the institutional reform debate and the
debate on the future of the European Community that intensified in the
late 1960s and reached a new zenith in the mid-1970s. After the block-
ages of the integration process caused by the failure of the Fouchet Plan
and the ‘empty chair crisis’, the heads of state and government settled
their disputes in The Hague Summit in 1969 and decided to relaunch
the integration process. In this respect, the Paris Summit in October
1972 constitutes a watershed (Franck 1987): an ambitious programme

for further integration was mapped out and the member states com-
mitted themselves ‘to transform before the end of the present decade
the whole complex of their relations into a European Union’ (Heads
of State and Government 1972). Community institutions were asked
to report on their achievements towards further integration. These so-
called ‘Reports on Political Union’ often included extensive coverage
of questions related to legitimacy. Apart from the comparatively large
number of documents issued by the Commission and which explic-
itly dealt with the problem of falling public support, the Commission’s
rising interest in legitimacy in the 1970s is also reflected in the fact
that the first surveys were carried out by the Commission in February
and March 1970 which systematically investigated the public attitude
towards the integration process (Commission 1973a). Since then, public
opinion surveys have been conducted on an annual basis.
Throughout the 1980s, the Commission’s interest in legitimacy was
rather modest, although between 1985 and 1987 a slight intensification
of the debate can be discerned. As was so often the case, the Com-
mission’s active interest in legitimacy was closely linked to debates on
institutional reforms that were gaining ground at the time. After the
Community recovered from the second oil shock in 1979 and institu-
tional inertia and internal battles on the British rebate were temporarily
overcome in 1984, ideas on deepening integration fell on fertile ground.
In the mid-1980s, these ideas were voiced from various sides (Dinan
2004: 192–201). The European Commission pressed for the completion
of the internal market and, in a number of influential communica-
tions, outlined the advantages to be gained. The European Parliament
went even further and ferociously advocated far-reaching institutional
reforms. In the early 1980s, the so-called Crocodile Club – an informal
group of members of the European Parliament around Altiero Spinelli –
began to draft proposals advocating deeper political and economic inte-
gration which gave rise to the draft Treaty on European Union adopted
by the European Parliament in February 1984. Agitation between the
Commission, the European Parliament and some member states culmi-
nated in the Fontainebleu Summit in June 1984, where the heads of state
and government decided to set up an ad hoc Committee on Institutional
Affairs, chaired by James Dooge, which was to prepare the impending
revision of the founding treaties. This committee was flanked by the
Adonnino Committee also established during the Fontainebleu Sum-
mit. After the low turnout at the European Parliament elections which
took place just one week prior to the summit on 14 to 17 June 1984,
the Adonnino Committee was explicitly established to shore up pub-

lic support for European integration in the context of the upcoming
institutional reform process (Theiler 2005: 59–60). The reports of the
Adonnino Committee had an immense impact on the Commission’s
articulations on legitimacy – all reports and statements on legitimacy
issued by the Commission in the years that followed were in one way
or another related to the concept of a ‘people’s Europe’ as advocated by
the Adonnino Committee (see Chapter 6).
After the signing of the Single European Act in 1986, the legitimacy
debate was not completely silenced. The success of the single market
programme put the issue of Economic and Monetary Union back on
the agenda. Shortly after the decision to launch an intergovernmental
conference on Economic and Monetary Union, the EC faced additional
political challenges resulting from historic developments in Eastern
Europe and the German reunification process. The political upheavals
in Germany and Eastern Europe initiated a political reform process in
the European Community (Dinan 2004: 241–245; McAllister 2010: 186).
In a historic speech in Bruges, Delors explicitly linked the transforma-
tion process in Eastern Europe with a political reform in the European
Community and endorsed the idea of a ‘political union’, closely tying
this idea to issues of democratic legitimacy (Delors 1989b). The institu-
tional debate on political union intensified after June 1990 when the
European Council met in Dublin and formally decided that an inter-
governmental conference on political union be convened alongside one
on Economic and Monetary Union. After several draft treaties and a
contentious negotiation process in which the Commission repeatedly
intervened (Wester 1992), the Treaty on European Union was finally
signed in Maastricht in February 1992. Yet, the debate on the legiti-
macy of the EC continued to haunt the Commission and even reached
a new peak because of the problem-stricken ratification process and the
rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by the Danish Referendum in June
1992 and the unexpected small majority in favour of it in the French
Referendum in September of the same year. The unexpected popular
opposition towards the integration process reignited discussions within
several EU institutions on the democratic credentials of the European
Community. As a result, an ‘Inter-Institutional Declaration on Democ-
racy, Transparency and Subsidiarity’ (Commission 1993a) was signed
by the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission. In this
declaration, the three Community institutions pledged to implement a
diverse set of measures to increase the Community’s legitimacy. The rest
of the 1990s is characterized by a modest intensity of the legitimacy
debate. Only the preparations for the intergovernmental conference,
which started in 1995, ultimately culminating in the signing of the

Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, led to a provisional increase in legitimacy
discussions in the Commission. The document ‘Report on the Opera-
tion of the Treaty on European Union’ published by the Commission
on 10 May 1995 meticulously spells out the Commission’s stand on
legitimacy at that time.
Similar to the early 1990s, the early 2000s constitute a period in
which the Commission was preoccupied with the issue of legitimacy.
This intensified interest on the side of the Commission has to be seen in
the context of the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999 after
allegations of fraud and mismanagement and a resulting administrative
reform process (Kassim 2004). Furthermore, what gave the legitimacy
debate impetus was the ‘future of Europe’ debate that emerged after a
rather unsatisfactory agreement on the Nice Treaty, the rejection of the
treaty in a referendum in Ireland in June 2001 and the Laeken European
Council in December 2001, when member states decided to set up the
Convention on the Future of Europe to prepare for the next round
of intergovernmental conferences. In this atmosphere of fundamental
change, the new European Commission under Romano Prodi proposed
an innovative solution to the legitimacy problems in its ‘Strategic Objec-
tives 2000 to 2005’ by ‘promoting new forms of European governance’
(Commission 2000). The long announced ‘White Paper on European
Governance’ finally appeared in July 2001 (Commission 2001a). It rep-
resents one of the most detailed accounts of the Commission’s approach
towards legitimacy and left an unmistakable mark on many legitimacy-
relevant documents produced by the Commission in the following
years. The inter-institutional legitimacy debate was again spurred by the
Convention on the Future of Europe, which started its work in Febru-
ary 2002. The Commission contributed to the debate by issuing two
central documents – both of which also touched on issues of legitimacy.
One document dealt with the general expectations the Commission had
towards the Convention (Commission 2002a) and the other depicted
more clearly the Commission’s vision of the institutional architecture
designed to underpin the European project (Commission 2002b).
The debate on the legitimacy of the Union receded somewhat in the
years between 2003 and 2004 – a period when member states strug-
gled to find a compromise on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe. Unsurprisingly, the issue became salient again when Dutch and
French citizens rejected the ‘Constitutional Treaty’ in a referendum in
May and June 2005. In the ‘period of reflection’ announced by heads of
state and government in June that same year, the Commission shaped
the inter-institutional debate on the legitimacy of the Community
through a variety of communications, the most important of which was

certainly ‘Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate’ (Commission
2005a). The measures proposed in ‘Plan D’, which put stress on the gen-
eration of a public debate on European issues, were dovetailed by the
European Transparency Initiative launched by Siim Kallas in November
2005 (Commission 2005b, 2006a), by the ‘Citizens for Europe’ pro-
gramme to promote active European citizenship (Commission 2005c),
and by the ‘Action Plan to Improve Communicating Europe’ (Com-
mission 2005d), which culminated in the ‘White Paper on a European
Communication Policy’ (Commission 2006b). In the context of the
‘period of reflection’, the Commission also published the ‘Citizens’
Agenda’ (Commission 2006c), a document that stresses effective pol-
icy output as a means to reinvigorate citizens’ support for the European
project.
While the Commission dealt with the legitimacy of the Union on a
hitherto unknown scale, suggesting very different legitimation measures
between 2001 and 2007, the years after the outbreak of the financial cri-
sis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis are marked by a conspicuous
absence of noteworthy legitimacy debate in the Commission. Work pro-
grammes for 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 do not, or only rarely, include
references to issues of public support. No substantively new contribu-
tions to the issue of legitimacy have been made by the Commission
since 2008, despite the fact that staunch opposition to European inte-
gration manifested itself in the failed referendum on the Lisbon Treaty
in Ireland in 2008 and in drastically falling levels of trust in the EU (TNS
Opinion & Social 2013: 5). A modest increase in the legitimacy debate
can be discerned in 2013. The call for a ‘political union’ famously voiced
by the former presidents of the Commission and the European Coun-
cil, Barroso and Van Rompuy, European Central Bank President Draghi
and then-President of the Eurogroup, Juncker (Van Rompuy et al. 2012),
put the democratic credentials of the European Monetary Union back
on the agenda. In addition to this, the launch of the ‘New Narrative
for Europe’ campaign by the European Parliament and the European
Commission (Barroso 2013a), which was designed explicitly to confront
increasingly influential anti-European and populist voices, testifies to
the Commission taking a renewed interest in legitimacy.
Overview: Periods of legitimation
Having outlined the intensity of the legitimacy debate in the European

Commission over the past four decades, this section will give a broad
overview of the substantive meanings ascribed to legitimacy. In the

Introduction, I differentiated between five fundamentally different
models of legitimacy: the democracy, the identity, the performance,
the technocratic and the intergovernmental models of legitimacy. These
models of legitimacy served as a heuristic device for the empirical anal-
ysis of the Commission’s articulations on legitimacy. The constructions
of a legitimate EC/EU made by the Commission were ordered according
to the model of legitimacy underlying them.
A quantitative overview of the reconstructed representations of a
legitimate EC/EU illustrates that the meaning of legitimacy does not
vary arbitrarily but that certain trends of legitimation can be discerned.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the relative share of constructions of a legitimate
EC/EU according to the five models of legitimacy. The sum of repre-
sentations of a legitimate EC/EU drawing on one particular model of
legitimacy constitutes one type of legitimacy discourse. Thus, termi-
nologically speaking, there are five legitimacy discourses (democracy,
identity, performance, technocracy and intergovernmental discourses)
struggling to suture the field of legitimate governance. Figure 4.2 shows
that certain legitimacy discourses are far more common in particu-
lar periods of time than in others. In general, the performance, the
identity and the democracy discourses prove to be most influential.
The technocracy discourse temporarily proliferated between 2001 and
2004. The intergovernmental discourse is, unsurprisingly, virtually non-
existent in the Commission’s articulations relating to legitimacy.
Based on Figure 4.2, I suggest that the development of legitimacy
discourses can be divided into four periods.
(1) From 1973 to 1982, articulations drawing on the performance

model of legitimacy largely prevailed, yet democratic represen-
tations of the EC were comparatively often evoked. In 1979 in
particular, the year of the first direct elections of the European
Parliament, democratic constructions of a legitimate EC became
particularly relevant.
(2) Between 1983 and 1988, there was a proliferation of EC/EU repre-
sentations building on the identity model of legitimacy.
(3) The years between 1989 and 2000 constituted a watershed in the
Commission’s legitimacy discourse; not only did the democracy
discourse proliferate, but other legitimacy discourses were almost
completely marginalized.
(4) From 2001 to 2013, the Commission’s articulations on legitimacy
are marked by the dominance of democratic constructions, albeit
80
102
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
4 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 13
197
3– –19 –19 –19 –19 –19 –19 –19 –19 –19 –19 –19 –19 –20 –20 –20 –20 –20 –20 –20 20
7 75 977 979 981 983 985 987 989 991 993 995 997 999 001 003 005 007 009 011
19 19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
Identity Performance Democracy Technocracy Other/unspec.
Figure 4.2 Development of legitimacy discourses (1973–2013) (%)

to a lesser degree than in the early 1990s. Performance-related

and technocratic representations also became relevant particularly
between 2001 and 2004. In addition, the performance discourse
gained strength between 2011 and 2012.
In the following, I will trace the development of legitimacy discourses

(focusing on the four periods outlined above), describing the struc-
ture of the most influential legitimacy discourses. I will differentiate
different degrees of change in the Commission’s articulations relating
to legitimacy. When discourse dynamics are positioned at the most
fundamental level, a discursive change occurs, that is, a certain type
of legitimacy discourse acquires a dominant position at the expense
of another type. In the analysed time span, such a drastic change
occurs twice. First, between 1983 and 1989, when the identity discourse
became increasingly influential at the expense of the formerly preva-
lent performance discourse and second, after 1990, when the democracy
discourse acquired a hitherto unknown dominant position. Second, a
change can also occur at a lower level, that is, at the level of con-
ceptual metaphors; a metaphorical change occurs if the relative weight
of conceptual metaphors constituting one specific type of legitimacy
discourse changes or if new conceptual metaphors begin to shape a spe-
cific discourse. For instance, democratic representations of the EC in
the 1970s and 1980s significantly relied on the conceptual metaphors
LEGITIMATE EC IS MACHINE and LEGITIMATE EC IS BUILDING. After 2001,
however, representations of a democratic EU have increasingly been
shaped by the conceptual metaphors LEGITIMATE EU IS COMMUNICATION
and LEGITIMATE EU IS PATH. Finally, the change might also take place at
an even lower level, that is, at the level of metaphorical expressions.
Such a change of expression occurs if new metaphorical expressions enter
the discourse or if the relative weight of expressions making up one
particular conceptual metaphor changes. For instance, the conceptual
metaphor LEGITIMATE EC/EU IS BUILDING constituted a structural thread
in democratic representations throughout the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and
even after 2000. In the 1970s and 1980s, the democracy discourse
abounded in articulations stressing the democratic foundations, struc-
ture and bases of the EC, while, after the 1990s, it is rather the openness
and the accessibility of the EU that is highlighted. Yet, both kinds
of articulations belong to the conceptual domain BUILDING. Between
the 1970s and 2013, the conceptual domain BUILDING, thus, slightly
changes its meaning. The analytical distinction of a discursive change, a
metaphorical change and a change of expression will help to characterize
more effectively the degree of change of legitimacy discourses during

particular time spans.
Legitimacy between performance and democracy

(1973–1982)
In a first phase between 1973 and 1982, the discursive struggle between
the performance and the democracy discourses is striking. The perfor-
mance discourse was prevalent, yet at the same time, the democracy
discourse was also comparatively influential in shaping the limited space
of meaning attributed to legitimacy.
The metaphor analysis of legitimacy-relevant documents suggests that
the performance discourse was built primarily on the two source domains
MACHINE and PATH in the 1970s and early 1980s. A specificity of the
discourse at that time is, furthermore, that the conceptual metaphor
LEGITIMATE EC IS ORGANISM played a significant role.1
In general, the analogy between a machine and a state constitutes
one of the oldest and most prominent state metaphors (Mannheim
1953; Rigney 2001: 41–62). In its most basic sense, the meaning of
machine can be summed up as follows: ‘The machine is something put
together by somebody in order to do a particular job’ (Weldon 1947:
48). A defining characteristic of a machine is its output. A machine
is an instrument that produces something. Accordingly, I coded those
statements as manifestations of the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE
EC IS MACHINE in which the EC is primarily represented as a gadget or
an instrument producing an output of some kind or other. A highly
instrumentalist notion of the EC is highlighted in representations that,
for instance, construct the latter as a ‘vital force for solving the prac-
tical day-to-day problems facing the man in the street’ (Commission
1977a); as an entity that has an ‘impact on [the] daily lives’ (Ronan
1975) of European people; as something that ‘affects him [the man in
the street] in his daily life’ (Commission 1976); and as an entity in
which ‘common policies’ are ‘reactivate[d]’ (Commission 1975a), given
‘new impetus’ and which makes use of ‘its inner driving force’ (ibid.).2
These and similar articulations arguably employ mechanic semantics as
1
Other source domains such as actor and economy were also evoked at that time.
For reasons of clarity, however, this chapter only focuses on the most typical
conceptual metaphors structuring the performance discourse. For a detailed list of
conceptual metaphors as well as stylized metaphorical expressions see Table 4.2.
2
All terms indicating a particular source domain are written in italics.
they highlight the delivery of an output as being central for legitimate

governance.
What is more, the performance discourse in the 1970s abounded in
self-representations building on the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE
EC IS PATH . The path metaphor has generally been well researched in
European Integration studies, with a variety of empirical studies delin-
eating the contours of the analogy ‘EC/EU’ and ‘path’ (Chilton 1996;
Hülsse 2003a; Musolff 2004; Drulák 2006; Schieder 2014). According to
these studies, one of the central components of the conceptual domain
path is the notion of movement. A path is something people use to
go from one point to another; it is inherently linked to movement or
motion.3 Based on this understanding of the conceptual domain path,
I reconstructed a range of articulations that rely on the notion of move-
ment. In this sense, the EC is considered to be legitimate if ‘meaningful
steps can be taken to improve living conditions’ (Commission 1979), if
it makes ‘progress (. . .) on the issues of special interest to the citizens of
Europe’ (ibid.), or is able ‘to keep up effectively with changes in European
society’ (Commission 1975a). The notion of movement is all-pervasive
in these sentences; they construct the Community as an entity in flux,
with its legitimacy dependent on it maintaining a degree of dynamics.
Arguably these are neofunctionalist representations of the EC in imply-
ing that only if the Community is constantly moving on and pressing
ahead with common policies will it remain legitimate (Beetham and
Lord 1998: 24–25).4
In addition, the performance discourse comprises of a range of
articulations that highlight a different component of the conceptual
domain PATH. As path is closely linked to the notion of destination,
it implies a direction towards an endpoint (Chilton 1996: 252). There-
fore, the path metaphor arguably underpins articulations highlighting
the ends and purposes of the EC, constructing the latter as an entity
that has to move towards an endpoint, in other words, an entity that
needs a sense of purpose in order to be legitimate. In the 1970s and
1980s, there were various instances in which the Commission lamented
that the ultimate purpose of the Commission to safeguard peace and
prosperity no longer convinced the people. Instead, ‘objectives, within
the reach of ordinary man and of direct interest to him’ were called for
3
In fact, some authors prefer to speak of the motion metaphor instead of the
path metaphor (e.g. Drulák 2006).
4
For neofunctionalist undertones of the path metaphor see Drulák (2006, 2008).
(Commission 1973a). The new ‘endpoint’ or ‘aim’ of the integration pro-

cess, the Commission argued, should be ‘more ambitious’ (Commission
1975a). The notion that a legitimate EC has to move towards a certain
endpoint is, for instance, also hinted at in the following statement:
The Community pursues essentially economic goals; it is hardly sur-

prising, therefore, if the progress achieved so far has been largely
in the economic sphere. European Union has a wider aim, how-
ever. For several years as political pressure has been growing, certain
issues of direct concern to the citizens of Europe have been under
consideration and these are now being discussed by Community
bodies.
(Commission 1979)
Finally, a characteristic feature of the performance discourse in the

1970s is its reliance on the conceptual domain ORGANISM. The con-
ceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EC IS ORGANISM builds upon a variety of
expressions constructing the EC as a living entity, juxtaposing it with
an abstract machinery. This contrast is not always made explicit, often
only implied in expressions emphasizing that a legitimate Commu-
nity is one which citizens ‘come into direct contact with’ (Ronan 1975),
a Community that is ‘revitalize[d]’ (Commission 1981a), or one that
‘can come through every crisis unscathed’ (Thorn 1981a). The image of
ORGANISM is also conjured up in sentences criticizing the ‘intangible’
(Ronan 1975) nature of the Community. The implication is that if the
Community performed in a way that made citizens feel, see and expe-
rience it as a living thing, it would significantly gain legitimacy. Such
articulations constitute first instances of organic semantics in the legiti-
macy discourses in the Commission; their use increased significantly in
the 1980s.
It is striking that the Commission’s performance-related articulations
were largely non-democratic in the 1970s and early 1980s. In the
Introduction, I introduced the distinction between a democratic and
non-democratic understanding of performance. This distinction can
effectively be applied to performance-related articulations of the Com-
mission in the time period analysed. In particular, the representations
drawing on the conceptual metaphors LEGITIMATE EC IS ORGANISM and
LEGITIMATE EC IS MACHINE testify to a non-democratic understanding
of performance. The ‘tangible Europe’ rhetoric as well as expectations
that the Community should have and be seen to have an impact
on European citizens’ daily lives are rooted in a ‘support-for-benefits
logic’ (Steffek 2013): the Commission proposed that if European citizens

became aware of the concrete benefits and advantages of European inte-
gration, they would support the integration project. Delivering concrete
and immediate policy output is, however, different from safeguarding
the public interest of European citizens. Only the latter demand corre-
sponds to a democratic understanding of performance (see also Steffek
2012: 86).
Similarly, the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EC IS PATH was to a
large extent constituted by statements that implied a non-democratic
understanding of performance. The Community was constructed as
being legitimate if it successfully kept up with broader societal changes.
These articulations tend to reduce performance to effective problem-
solving, which likewise constitutes a non-democratic interpretation of
performance. Justifying the authority of international organizations on
the basis of mere necessity in order to deal with global problems more
effectively is different from justifications that imply a European public
interest. Only occasionally were there references to a common European
interest or a European common good. Consider the following:
The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission stand

to remind Europeans of their common interest and identity in an
increasingly dangerous world. There can be no more practical way
to do this than to make 1983 a year for progress towards European
Union.
(Commission 1983a)
Such explicit references to a common interest were, however, rare in

the 1970s. More often, articulations referred to a ‘common European
interest’ more implicitly, for instance, by broaching the issue of the
Community’s fundamental objectives and purposes. These statements,
also categorized under the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EU/EC IS
PATH , are, arguably, in some way or other, linked to the idea of a com-
mon European interest, as they address the fundamental direction of the
integration project.
In sum, the 1970s and early 1980s constitute a period in which the
grand old legitimation narrative of the EC safeguarding prosperity had
become fragile, while the other basic purpose of guaranteeing peace
had slowly lost appeal. The Commission filled this void by engaging
in support-for-benefit and problem-solving rhetoric. A non-democratic
understanding of performance gained ground. The Commission recur-
rently proposed that in order to gain legitimacy, citizens had to be made
aware of concrete policy output produced by the EC with direct impact

on its citizens. A wider understanding of performance is only occasion-
ally implied in articulations dealing with the search for a new aim or
endpoint of the integration process. References to what might constitute
‘a common European interest’ were very rare.
Similar to the performance discourse, the democracy discourse was
structured by a variety of conceptual metaphors of which LEGITIMATE
EC IS MACHINE and LEGITIMATE EC IS BUILDING were the most influen-
tial. A third comparatively prominent group of articulations drew on the
conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EC IS COMMUNICATION.
The machine metaphor did not only influentially structure the per-
formance discourse between 1973 and 1982, the image was also evoked
when the Commission ‘talked democracy’ in the same period of time.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, democracy was primarily discussed in
terms of procedures, mechanisms and systems, with the Commission recur-
rently proposing that decision-making mechanisms and institutional
procedures had to be reformed in order to democratize the EC and
emphasizing that institutions needed to ‘function democratically’ (Ortoli
1973). Institutional reform debates were piled high with mechanic
semantics, in particular when the Commission referred to the strength-
ening of the European Parliament. The mechanic image of the political
system of the EC was evoked in sentences in which the direct elections
of the European Parliament were represented as a ‘new factor of direct
legitimacy into the institutional system’ (Commission 1975a) and as a
mechanism by which ‘the man in the street will be involved in the
Community’s decision making processes (. . .) at regular intervals and will
be called on to confirm (. . .) where Community policies should be head-
ing’ (Commission 1977b). At the same time, the democracy discourse
was preoccupied with democratic control – a concept that arguably also
belongs to the mechanic conceptual domain. Control devices were con-
structed as being of paramount importance for democratic governance,
as the following quotation makes clear: ‘Community decision-makers
can be effectively (. . .) controlled only by a Community Parliament,
elected by Community constituents’ (Jenkins 1979a).
These statements depict the EC political system as a functional
entity that works according to designed procedures. Gaining legiti-
macy was depicted primarily as a matter of institutional engineering.
Like redesigning functional units of a machine, the EC had to reform
its institutions to be legitimate. The analogy to the machine high-
lights the notion of an artefact. Describing political institutions as
machines strongly suggests that political institutions are not entities
that grow naturally and should thus not be taken for granted (see also
Weldon 1947; Mannheim 1953: 169; McCloskey 1963). The concept of
a machine juxtaposes with the concept of an organism. The machine
as an artefact is a human invention, open to redesign. In comparing
a machine with political institutions, the possibility of an active and
conscious reconstruction of the political order is opened up.
In a similar mode, the second prevalent conceptual metaphor that
LEGITIMATE EC IS BUILDING also depicts the EC political system as an
artefact. The building and the machine metaphor share the ‘modern
notion that the social world is a human invention’ (Rigney 2001: 58)
and that we, therefore, might choose to reinvent and rebuild it. From
this perspective, the machine metaphor has much in common with
the building metaphor and could, indeed, be subsumed under the for-
mer (ibid.: 49–52). In the analysed text corpus, frequent references
were made to the base, the basis or the foundations of the Community.
Democracy and, more specifically, the direct election to the European
Parliament were constructed as the democratic foundation of the Com-
munity. For instance, in 1975 in a speech held in connection to the
anniversary of the Schuman Declaration, François-Xavier Ortoli, then
Commission President, emphasized that the Community ‘is founded on
the idea of democracy and organized in a democratic framework’ (Ortoli
1975b). Similarly, the Commission stressed, ‘to have Parliament elected
by direct universal suffrage is the most important political step taken
in 1976, and will give a firmer democratic foundation to the progress of
building Europe’ (Commission 1977b).
Direct elections to the European Parliament were believed to
strengthen the ‘democratic base’ (Commission 1981a) or to provide a
‘solid foundation’ (Jenkins 1979a) for the Community. In a similar vein,
the discourse was replete with expressions highlighting that for the
EC to be legitimate, the ‘institutional structure’ (Jenkins 1979b), the
‘institutional framework’ (Commission 1979), or the ‘institutional set-
up’ (Commission 1980) should be democratized. As is the case with
the machine metaphor, the building metaphor emphasizes that the EC
only has to reform its institutional pillars and its foundation to become
democratic: democratization becomes a matter of institutional reform.
Finally, it needs to be mentioned that the democracy discourse in
the 1970s and early 1980s was not only shaped by the source domains
BUILDING and MACHINE ; talking of the EC in terms of COMMUNICA -
TION also became increasingly common. There are several documents
in which the Commission elaborated on the communicative conditions
necessary for a working democracy. This observation has also been made
by scholars from the field of political communication: they empha-

size that a new approach towards information evolved in the early
1970s when the Commission started being increasingly concerned with
the image it had with the wider public. An extended understanding
of information was promoted that included the general public as rel-
evant addressees (Terra 2010: 51–54). The first direct elections to the
European Parliament functioned as a catalyst for information efforts
directed towards the public at large (Altides 2009). This new empha-
sis on informing the wider public is also reflected in the democracy
discourse that was analysed. The conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EC
IS COMMUNICATION emerged as an influential structural component of
the democracy discourse in the 1970s and continued to gain significant
ground throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.
In the 1970s, communication had a prevalently one-way meaning; a
legitimate Community was constructed as a political system that makes
aware, informs and promotes understanding: it was represented as an entity
that has the aim ‘to provide European opinion with information that is
as understandable and complete as possible’ (Commission 1975b); that
‘makes the electorate aware of what the European venture is all about’
(Commission 1978); that ‘is capable of making its activities intelligible’
(Ronan 1975); and that ‘contributes to a better understanding’ of the Com-
munity (Commission 1981b). Rarely were there articulations stressing
that a legitimate Community was in need of a more interactive mode of
communication.
Overall, the prevalence of the machine and the building metaphors
indicates that the democracy discourse in the early 1970s and early
1980s built largely upon a liberal-representative understanding of
democracy. When the Commission ‘talked democracy’, it typically
referred to democratic procedures and mechanisms and represented
the European Parliament as the locus of democracy. Democratizing
the EC was equated with strengthening the European Parliament
(Schrag Sternberg 2013: 49). The machine and building metaphors high-
lighted that democracy depended to a great extent on the redesigning
and restructuring of political institutions, particularly the European
Parliament.
What is more, one could also interpret the analysed data as evidence
for the dominance of the state model in the Commission’s democracy
discourse. Democracy was envisioned in analogy with the nation state,
where unified people are represented by a parliament that controls the
executive. The concept of parliamentary representation is based on the
notion of a unity that can be represented through parliament or that can
be forged through the act of establishing parliamentary representation

(Diez 1996: 270). The demand to strengthen the European Parliament,
making it equivalent to national parliaments, was in line with an image
of Europe that conceives of the latter in terms of a ‘United States of
Europe’ – a federal state with a unitary territory and a more or less uni-
tary group of people constructed as a political community (Diez 1997:
294–296; Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung 1998: 420).
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to answer the question as to
why such a narrow perception of democracy prevailed at that time.
Suffice it to say that a poststructuralist approach would emphasize
that a liberal-representative meaning of democracy with its focus on
the European Parliament did not evolve in a vacuum but must be
seen in the broader discursive context of the time. In the 1970s, the
Commission’s demand for more democracy was influenced by a more
general discourse on federalism which is deeply rooted in EC institutions
(Burgess 1989; see also Rittberger 2003) and which also shaped member
states’ articulations on European democracy (Diez 1996; Jachtenfuchs
et al. 1998). Originally, federalism constituted a concept that was devel-
oped to accommodate diversity within a state. The federalist strategy of
political unification came to be linked to particular governance ideas
and institutional reform plans, which, above all, underlined the need
for a strong European Parliament, for it is parliament, according to the
federalist ideology, that is considered crucial in giving voice to and
consolidating the plurality of will within a federation (Burgess 1989:
4). Reasoning along the lines of federalism became a solid antidote to
the functionalist discourse of the European Community that had been
dominant in the1950s and 1960s, but was severely strained in the early
1970s. Federalist discourse offered a different route of legitimating the
Community. At the same time, the dominance of the federalist dis-
course precluded the possibility of talking about democratic legitimacy
in other terms than those provided by the liberal-representative concept
of democracy. Thus, the ‘arena of possibilities’ (Walters and Haahr 2005:
72) within which the Commission could manoeuvre was significantly
constrained by meanings about democratic legitimacy such as the ones
provided by federalist discourse.
The rise of the identity discourse (1983–1988)
The quantitative overview of representations of a legitimate EC/EU sug-

gests that a radical discursive change took place after 1983. The identity
discourse of legitimacy became increasingly dominant, marginalizing
the democracy discourse and displacing the performance discourse from

its governing position. Given that the performance discourse in the
mid- to late 1980s did not significantly differ from the one in the 1970s
and early 1980s, I will concentrate on the structural components of the
identity discourse, which experienced a hitherto unknown prominence
after 1983.
In general, articulations constituting the identity discourse of legit-
imacy shift the focus from the vertical level of legitimation (relations
between citizens and institutions) to the horizontal level (relations
between citizens). While the democracy discourse is characterized by
representations highlighting certain features of the political system of
the EC, the identity discourse is preoccupied with the social prereq-
uisites of legitimate governance and abounds in all kinds of represen-
tations of a European people: a legitimate European Community is
constructed as one where people share a sense of community or a feeling
of belonging together (see Introduction).
The fact that the European Commission became preoccupied with the
social preconditions of legitimate governance and increasingly engaged
in ‘identity talk’ has also been acknowledged by a number of authors.
Shore stresses that a focus on culture and identity in the 1980s as an
‘integrative mechanism and a possible solution to the riddle of European
unification marks a fundamental shift in official EU discourses on inte-
gration’ (Shore 2000: 42). Laffan (1996: 96) suggests the term ‘politics of
identity’ to denote the ‘deliberate process of manufacturing and legit-
imising a European identity from the top-down’ that began in the late
1970s. In a similar vein, Neunreither (1995), Obradovic (1996), Pantel
(1999) and Theiler (2005) also emphasize that an ‘identity turn’ took
place in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the Community’s approach
towards legitimacy.
Metaphor analysis shows that the identity discourse built mainly
upon the two conceptual metaphors LEGITIMATE EC IS ORGANISM and
LEGITIMATE EC IS FAMILY , but other conceptual domains such as FAN -
TASY and PATH also played a role in the 1980s. In general, the organism
metaphor is one of the oldest metaphors by which political thinkers
have tried to grasp political and social orders. The metaphor is to
be encountered in Plato’s political thinking as well as in Aristotle’s
notion of the city state as the ‘body politic’ (Rigney 2001: 17). Yet, as
Karl Mannheim has pointed out, the organism metaphor could only
fully establish itself in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when
the analogy between state and organism developed in direct juxtaposi-
tion to the mechanic metaphor (Mannheim 1953: 165). The organism
metaphor is premised on the idea that social life and the political sys-
tem are parts of a larger whole, intimately related and organically unified
(Ringmar 2007). In comparison to the mechanic metaphor, the mutual
constitutiveness of the individual parts in relation to the whole is under-
lined. It is not only the functionality of the parts, but the very act of
being alive that is constituted by the whole. Thus, when establishing an
analogy between political systems and organisms, the indivisibility and
unity of social orders is stressed. Wendt underlines this aspect:
The parts of a machine are separate from the whole; the properties of
a piston do not depend on a car. While the ability of the piston to
do work depends on a car there is no sense in which the car consti-
tutes the identity of the piston itself. (. . .) In contrast, the parts of an
organism are intrinsically dependent on the whole. Take a leg off a
laboratory rat and by definition the leg dies; the constitution is here
both bottom-up and top-down, and as such perfect decomposition
into pre-existing parts is impossible.
(Wendt 2004: 307)
The source domain ORGANISM is certainly one of the fundamental build-

ing blocks of the identity discourse in the 1980s. One of the most
significant articulations coded under the source domain ORGANISM are
those in which European people are represented as sharing a European
identity – a concept that immensely proliferates in the 1980s. A legit-
imate EC is increasingly represented as a political system in which
people share a collective European identity. A strong sense of sameness
and unity between European people is typically implied in articulations
emphasizing the existence of a European identity: ‘Symbols play a key
role (. . .) but there is also a need to make the European citizens aware of
the different elements that go to make up his European identity, of our
cultural unity with all its diversity of expression’ (Commission 1988a).
A further related articulation that highlights a fundamental sameness
and unity among European people involves references to a ‘European
consciousness’ (Commission 1977c) shared among the people.5 What is
more, the identity discourse in the 1980s abounds in representations
of a legitimate EC which tap into the myth of common ancestry.
5
Somewhat contradictory to these articulations relying on a strong sense of
unity among European people are articulations that came up in the late 1980s
which emphasized that European people are characterized by (mainly cultural)
diversity. These articulations became even more pronounced in the early 1990s
An emphatic expression of this can be found in a central communi-

cation dealing with the programme of ‘A People’s Europe’, in which
the Commission emphasized that ‘European identity is the result of
centuries of shared history and cultural and fundamental values’ (Com-
mission 1988a). Further examples that construct a continuous history
and emphasize that Europeans are of common descent refer to a ‘cultural
heritage’ (Commission 1987a) that all Europeans share, to a common
‘civilization’ (Commission 1987b), to the ‘heritage of shared values’
(Delors 1985a), or the ‘extraordinary fund of cultural and intellectual
resources’ (Delors 1985a). They constitute examples of organic mean-
ing structures prevalent at that time in that they represent the EC as
a quasi-natural phenomenon that has evolved over time and imply a
high degree of sameness among Europeans.
Yet, the conceptual domain ORGANISM is not the only basis of the
identity discourse; expressions drawing on the source domain FAMILY
were also an integral part of the discursive repertoire of the Commission
at that time. Thinking about political orders in terms of a family has
a long history in political philosophy (Rigotti 1994) and has been sub-
ject to detailed research in European Integration Studies (Hülsse 2003a;
Musolff 2004; Schieder 2014). Thinking of the Community in terms of
a family suggests that it is made up of lasting and close relationships.
A defining feature of a family is that its members share strong emotional
bonds. Correspondingly, there is a variety of statements emphasizing
the emotional ties that bind Europeans. References are commonly made
to the ‘feeling of belonging to the same Community’ (Commission 1988a),
to ‘a convergence of feeling’ (Delors 1989b), to a ‘spirit of solidarity’
(ibid.), or a ‘European solidarity’ (ibid.) that either exists or should be
reinforced, or the need ‘to feel bound by the links which unite European
society’ (Delors 1988). Thus, like the organism metaphor, the family
metaphor suggests a thick concept of community. But in sharp con-
trast to the former, the concept of a family is not founded on a strong
notion of unity and latent primordialism. The family concept allows
for a greater degree of heterogeneity and even for a certain amount of
conflict and multiple allegiances. Thus, an identity discourse that draws
more strongly on the conceptual domain FAMILY theoretically allows
for a less ethnic and less exclusive conceptualization of the European
people.
when ‘unity in diversity’ became a central policy motif of the European Commis-
sion (McDonald 1996; Delanty and Rumford 2005: 56–63; Shore 2007; see also
Chapter 6).
More representations of a European people are those drawing on

the source domains FANTASY and PATH which, however, only played
a marginal role in the identity discourse at the time. The conceptual
metaphor LEGITIMATE EC IS FANTASY comprises of statements that refer
to the EC in terms of a dream, a spirit or a vision. In contrast to state-
ments utilizing the two source domains FAMILY and ORGANISM, political
loyalties and identities are here conceptualized more in forward-looking
terms. Examples of articulations coded under the conceptual metaphor
LEGITIMATE EC IS FANTASY include references to ‘a big vision’ (Delors
1989b) or to ‘the great European dream’ (Delors 1985b) that needs to
be nourished among Europeans for the Community to gain legitimacy.
Finally, the conceptual domain PATH underlies statements which
emphasize that Europeans have a ‘common destiny’ (Commission
1987c); movement towards a fixed endpoint is evoked in this phrase.
Analysing the context of this phrase suggests that its point of departure
is a strong notion of interdependence: Europeans share a common des-
tiny because they are faced with similar problems and difficulties with
respect to their economic, social and environmental affairs. Both the
path metaphor and the fantasy metaphor constitute an attempt to prop-
agate a notion of a European people that is open to foreigners and not
an exclusive entity. In an interdependent and increasingly globalized
world, Europeans might have a shared destiny with people from other
nation states affected by similar problems. Similarly, different people
with diverging traditions, cultures and histories might have a shared
vision of a common future.
All in all, the identity discourse as it evolved in the 1980s fore-
grounded particular meanings of a European people at the expense of
others. The conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EC IS ORGANISM is par-
ticularly powerful in this context. The dominance of this conceptual
metaphor paved the way for an utterly ethnic conception of European
people. According to Anthony D. Smith’s seminal work, an ethnic
conception of peoplehood is defined as being based on the myth of
common ancestry, a common culture and shared historical memories,
the existence of a specific ‘homeland’ and a sense of solidarity for sig-
nificant sectors of the population (Smith 1991: 20–21). As outlined
above, the notion of a common ancient civilization was part and par-
cel of the Commission’s understanding of a European people in the
1980s (Martiniello 2001: 63; see also de Witte 1987; Shore 1993). The
dominant feature of this period was the construction of a continuous
historiography that tried to forge a straight line and link between
ancient history and the European Community with a conception of
European values that relied on a pre-established cultural foundation.6

Indeed, the discourse included representations of a European people
that were more open, in that they allowed for multiple allegiances
and were less exclusionary towards foreigners – in particular, those
articulations coded under the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EC IS
PATH and LEGITIMATE EC IS FANTASY and to a certain extent those sub-
sumed under the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EC IS FAMILY –, yet
these articulations were increasingly sidelined in the course of the 1980s.
What is more, the meaningfulness of the discursive configuration
that consolidates itself in the 1980s can be pinpointed more clearly
if one considers the articulations that were excluded by the relatively
fixed and bounded discourse on a European identity. By highlighting
cultural and ethnic components, the identity discourse excluded truly
open and reflexive representations of a European people. For instance,
civic components of a European identity, which were prominently prop-
agated in academic circles in the context of the debate on European
citizenship in the early 1990s, were completely excluded from the dis-
course. As I have already outlined in the Introduction, a European
identity can also denote an allegiance to civic and political norms rather
than to ethno-cultural ties (Habermas 1992; Delanty 1995). Yet, notions
of a European identity corresponding to what Habermas called ‘con-
stitutional patriotism’ were practically non-existent in the 1980s. The
discourse increasingly drew on cultural and even ethnic interpretations
of a European identity.
Moreover, it has been argued that both civic and cultural interpreta-
tions of European belongingness tend to nourish the fictive myth of a
unitary people, and both conceptions constitute an attempt to construct
a common sense of belonging along the lines of the nation state (Diez
1997: 294–296; Delanty and Rumford 2005: 75–86). Taking issue with
both cultural and civic interpretations of a European identity, alterna-
tive forms of collective allegiances, be they postmodern (Diez 1997) or
cosmopolitan (Delanty and Rumford 2005; Delanty 2006; for a related
argument see also Risse 2004), have been proposed in academic circles.
These conceptions break with the notion of a unitary people and high-
light the multiplicity of attachments that people in Europe have. Yet,
such representations of a European people with multiple relations of
membership in a variety of functional and regional groups were not
6
For a suggestion on how an alternative history of discontinuity can be perceived
see McDonald (1996).
part of the space of representations in which a European people was

imagined in the 1980s.
The dominance of the democracy discourse (1989–2000)
The period after 1989 constituted a watershed for legitimacy discourses

in the European Commission; a discursive change was taking place: the
democracy discourse became increasingly influential while the perfor-
mance discourse had significantly lost ground and the identity discourse
had almost completely vanished (see Figure 4.2). This pattern of a
close link between legitimacy and democracy continued throughout
the 1990s. The discursive change was accompanied by a significant
metaphorical change: the emergence of the conceptual domain PATH,
which began to shape the articulations on EU democracy influentially.
Finally, a number of noteworthy changes of expressions can be discerned:
the conceptual domains MACHINE, BUILDING and COMMUNICATION,
which had dominated the democracy discourse in previous decades,
continued to play an influential role. Yet, these source domains encom-
passed an increasingly wider range of articulations. I will comment on
both types of change in turn.
A profound metaphorical change was constituted by the increased rel-
evance of the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EC/EU IS PATH. This
change is worth noting because the source domain PATH constitutes
an important conceptual domain that has increasingly influenced the
Commission’s democracy discourse and that continues to play a central
role even today. As outlined above, the source domain PATH was very
productive in structuring the performance discourse of legitimacy in
the 1970s. I subsumed all articulations under the source domain PATH
that underline the notion of motion or orientation towards an end-
point. In contrast, in the democracy discourse, the source domain PATH
manifests itself in a range of articulations of a different kind: it is the
notion of proximity and distance that is mapped on the target domain
LEGITIMATE EC / EU . In other words, as far as the democracy discourse
is concerned, the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EC/EU IS PATH com-
prises of those articulations in which the proximity between institutions
and citizens is considered central for democracy while distance is rep-
resented as being detrimental. Walters and Haahr (2005: 65–90) make
a similar point when emphasizing that the Commission increasingly
made use of what they call ‘technologies of proximity’. The latter draws
on governmentality studies inspired by Foucault and denotes ‘all those
discourses and practices which imagine democracy in terms of positive
experiences of local engagement, participation and connection’ (ibid.:

76). Walters and Haahr (2005: 77) emphasize that technologies of prox-
imity are in line with participatory understandings of democracy and
are at odds with the realist theory of liberal democracy.
In the 1990s, the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EC/EU IS PATH
primarily manifested itself in articulations in which ‘bringing the Com-
munity closer to its citizens’ served as a panacea against the legitimacy
deficit of the Community. Most significantly, both the Commission’s
transparency regime and its articulations on subsidiarity were linked
to the overarching aim of closing the gap between citizens and Com-
munity institutions. In addition, a new range of articulations emerged,
insisting that citizens be genuinely involved and engaged in the politi-
cal process. In addition, in the late 1990s, the concept of participation
became a new buzzword structuring the democracy discourse. These
articulations may also be regarded as belonging to the conceptual
domain PATH as they imply that legitimate governance is crucially
dependent on the close interaction between citizens and EU insti-
tutions while remoteness is constructed as being detrimental. If we
consider the statement made by Prodi, when presenting his five-year
programme to the European Parliament in 2000, we cannot but notice
his stress on the democratic value of proximity between citizens and EU
institutions:
People want a much more participatory, ‘hands on’ democracy. They

will not support the European project unless they are fully involved
in setting goals, making policy and evaluating progress. And they are
right.
(Prodi 2000a)
Similarly, the 1990s witnessed the emergence of articulations stress-

ing that a democratic EU was one that ‘facilitate[s] participation of the
public’ (Commission 1993b) and that ‘ensures that citizens are gen-
uinely involved in the Community’s activities’ (Commission 1990a).
It should be stressed that in the 1990s, the Commission was not only
propagating closer involvement of ‘citizens’ or ‘the public’, but also
promoted the closer engagement of non-governmental organizations,
interest groups, the Economic and Social Committee and the Commit-
tee of the Regions as being crucial for EU democracy. In addition, after
preparations for the 1996 intergovernmental conference had started,
articulations demanding the involvement of national parliaments tem-
porarily proliferated (de Búrca 1996).
A further significant metaphorical change was constituted by the emer-

gence of the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EC/EU IS SIGHT, which
gained impetus in connection with the launch of far-reaching trans-
parency initiatives in the early 1990s. Constructions proliferated in
which a legitimate EC/EU was represented as a political system that
was wholly transparent. Similarly, metaphorical expressions employing
images of light and darkness also make up the conceptual metaphor
LEGITIMATE EC / EU IS SIGHT. Prodi solemnly pledged that he wanted to
bring Europe ‘into the light of public scrutiny’ (Prodi 2000b). ‘People
should be able to look over my shoulder and check that the Commission
is dealing with the issues that most concern them’ (ibid.). In contrast
to the 1970s and 1980s when democratic control was primarily con-
ceived in terms of parliamentary control, alternative control methods
were emphasized which could arguably be categorized as being part of
the source domain SIGHT: transparency, clarity, screening and the shedding
of light are terms that the Commission employed in addressing ways by
which the public could control EC/EU institutions.
On the level of changes of expression, there were a number of
notable developments in the 1990s. The diversification of articulations
constituting the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EU IS MACHINE is
particularly remarkable. On the one hand, there is the image of the EU as
an abstract artefact composed of different procedures and mechanisms,
whose arrangements allow for control devices, which continued to be
evoked in the legitimacy discourse. On the other hand, a significant
change of expression can be observed: in the early 1990s, the Commission
increasingly represented the Community as being composed of differ-
ent levels and units that needed to work in balance – an image that still
taps into mechanic imagery.7 The Commission stressed, for instance,
that the ‘principle of institutional balance’ must always be borne in
mind ‘if we want to make fundamental changes to the system estab-
lished by the ECSC Treaty’ (Delors 1990). What is more, the concept of
subsidiarity was often connected to the mechanic conceptual domain
or, more specifically, to the concept of institutional balance. When elab-
orating on the idea of a functional hierarchy, which is central to the
concept of subsidiarity, an analogy to a machine was frequently drawn.
7
According to Landau, who has analysed the metaphorical language in the
Federalist Papers, the very idea of checks and balances is ‘set squarely on the
foundations of mechanism’ (Landau 1961: 89). The concept of checks and bal-
ances evokes the image of a closed system consisting of functional units based on
the principles of ‘action and reaction, thrust and counterthrust’ (ibid.: 89).
In its work programme for 1990, the Commission, for example, asserted
that ‘[t]he principle of subsidiarity will have to act as a constant coun-
terweight to the natural tendency of the centre to accumulate power’
(Commission 1990b). Thus, in contrast to the 1970s and 1980s, when
articulations coded under the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EC IS
MACHINE tended to concentrate on mechanisms and procedures of the
institutional machinery, the 1990s witnessed the emergence of a new
type of mechanic articulation. Democratic representations increasingly
emphasized that the EC was composed of different levels and units that
needed to work in balance in order for the EC to be legitimate.
Similar to the machine metaphor, the scope of the conceptual
metaphor LEGITIMATE EC IS BUILDING – which continued to play a
significant role in the democracy discourse – was slightly broadened.
Whereas the democracy discourse in the 1970s and early 1980s tended
to highlight the bases, foundations, structure and the general set-up that
needed to be adapted in order to maintain legitimacy, the democracy
discourse in the early 1990s centred around the analogy between the
political system of the EC and a building that is open to the general
public. Linked to the fact that transparency was becoming a key con-
cept actively promoted by the Commission in a number of documents
(see Chapter 7), the discourse abounded in Community representations
that stressed the openness and the accessibility of the Community – two
concepts that did not feature prominently in the democracy discourse of
earlier decades. An ‘open door policy’ (Commission 1993c) which ‘makes
issues and decisions more accessible’ (Commission 1993d) and which
‘brings Europe out from behind closed doors’ (Prodi 2000b) becomes of
paramount importance.
What is more, the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EC IS COMMU-
NICATION , which was already present in the 1970s and early 1980s,
continued to constitute a structural thread of the democracy discourse
in the early 1990s. In general, the unidirectional view of communi-
cation that was most influential in the earlier decades continued to
prevail. The legitimate Community tended to be constructed as one
that ‘explain[s] its action more clearly, provid[es] more information about
its work’ and ‘convey[s] a comprehensible message’ (Commission 1993d),
and as an institution that ‘inform[s] the public’ and ‘make[s] them [the
European people] more aware of Community policies’ (Commission
1993c). At times, the democratic deficit was equated with a ‘deficit
of explanation’ (Delors 1992a) or an ‘information deficit’ (Commission
1993e) or a ‘lack of understanding’ (Commission 1996). In addition to
these rather paternalistic representations, the democracy discourse also
comprised of representations highlighting a more interactive notion of

communication, that is, one premised on a dialogue between citizens
and institutions:
It [the Commission] has a responsibility to better inform the Commu-

nity’s citizens about its policies and to engage in an ongoing dialogue
with them. In order to inform and communicate successfully it must
listen to what the public has to say.
(Commission 1993e)
Moreover, articulations emphasizing the need for an informed public

debate were gaining ground. The legitimate Community was increas-
ingly represented as one in which there was public debate on Com-
munity issues. The Commission stressed that ‘conditions must be
created in which a more informed public debate on the Community
and its future can flourish’ (Commission 1993b) and emphasized that
the Community should aim at ‘stimulating a more informed and
involved debate on Community policy matters’ (Commission 1993c).
These articulations show that an informed public debate was officially
acknowledged as a basis of democracy in the EC/EU. In this context,
the issue of transparency was often brought up. The Commission
proposed that decision-making procedures should be more transpar-
ent since this would significantly facilitate the emergence of public
debate on European issues and eventually generate a European pub-
lic sphere (Lodge 1994; Schrag Sternberg 2013: 136). As a result, the
analysis of constructions relying on the conceptual domain LEGITIMATE
EC IS COMMUNICATION suggests that, in the early 1990s, the Commis-
sion’s discourse contained a broad range of representations oscillating
between highly paternalistic representations of the Community and
other representations that highlighted a more interactive notion of
communication.8
Summing up the changes of expression in the 1990s, the scope of the
three source domains MACHINE, BUILDING and COMMUNICATION was
significantly broadened: the EC/EU was increasingly represented as a
closed system of functional units working in balance (MACHINE), as
8
The proposition that the Commission propagated different and even conflict-
ing views of communication in the early 1990s has been confirmed by research
on the Commission’s public communication policy, highlighting the fact that
the Commission’s approach was undergoing a significant change at that time
(Brüggemann 2008: 120–126; Altides 2009: 26–28).
a building that was being opened up (BUILDING) and as a sphere in

which dialogue and debate between political institutions and citizens
took place (COMMUNICATION).
The metaphor analysis of the democracy discourse of the European
Commission in the 1990s indicates that the meaning of democracy had
broadened. During the 1970s and early 1980s, a liberal-representative
conception of democracy, which significantly built on the two con-
ceptual domains MACHINE and BUILDING, provided the background
of the Commission’s approach. As a result, demands for democracy
were equated with demands for strengthening the European Parliament.
In the early 1990s, these articulations still existed and they continued
to play a decisive role, however, they were complemented by different
kinds of articulations that conceived of democracy beyond majoritarian
parliamentary conceptions. As a result, the democracy discourse became
broader as it began to be underpinned by a variety of different traditions
of democratic theory. Apart from representations rooted in liberal-
representative democratic theory, the democratic EC was increasingly
being represented as a communicative space, characterized by dialogue
between its citizens and institutions, and by informed public debate
taking place on European issues. What is more, the emergence of the
path metaphor points to the fact that proximity was becoming a mea-
sure against which the democratic legitimacy of the EC was assessed;
the underlying assumption being that the closer the ties between insti-
tutions and citizens were, the more democratic the political system
would be. The Commission’s articulations on subsidiarity and trans-
parency were linked to broader aims of reducing the gap that had
allegedly existed between the EC and the citizens. Thus, at least within
the Commission, alternative concepts of democracy, arguably rooted in
deliberative and participatory democratic thought, began to be evoked
alongside majoritarian parliamentary conceptions, concentrating on the
European Parliament as the locus of democratic legitimacy.
The broadening of the democracy discourse is all the more remarkable
if we consider that these articulations envisioned the future shape of the
EU beyond the realm of traditional statehood. The focus on subsidiarity
and the emphasis on the different levels and units that make up the
Community – in other words, the image of the Community correspond-
ing to what was later called a multilevel governance system – marks a
departure from the model of the modern territorial state. What these
articulations hint at is an image of a political system that has aptly been
described as a network (Diez 1997; Jachtenfuchs et al. 1998). The image
of the EC as a network entails a broad ‘involvement of individuals as
well as particular groups in decisions by which they are affected, not

only by indirect means such as elections, but as far as possible by direct
and effective participation’ (Jachtenfuchs et al. 1998: 421). The outlined
articulations emphasizing the value of proximity and the EC’s charac-
ter of a multilevel system of governance testify to cracks in the hitherto
dominant image of a ‘United States of Europe’. Alternatives to the fed-
eral state model emerged. The emphasis on post-parliamentary forms of
legitimation such as subsidiarity and transparency testify to an alterna-
tive, network-like image of the EU that slowly constituted itself.9 The
image of a network even began to be evoked very explicitly in the
late 1990s, by Prodi in particular. The following quotation nicely illus-
trates the Commission’s departure from hierarchical state-like forms of
governance at that time:
It [the Commission, D.B.] will explore ways and means to achieve

a more democratic form of partnership between the different lev-
els of governance in Europe. A partnership I call ‘Network Europe’
with all levels of governance shaping, proposing, implementing and
monitoring policy together.
(Prodi 2000b)
Parallel signs of a broadening of the democracy discourse can also be

found in the academic literature; in the 1990s, a number of articles
began to shape academic debate in which the concept of democracy was
detached from its intimate link to the European Parliament (Dehousse
1995; Christiansen 1998; Héritier 1999; Schmitter 2000). These con-
tributors argued that new modes of legitimation had to be found
that acknowledged the sui generis character and that the ‘majoritarian
avenue’, that is, the demand to strengthen the European Parliament,
which had hitherto dominated the debate, might even be detrimental
to the democratic legitimacy of the EC (Dehousse 1995; Christiansen
1998). These authors constitute a very heterogeneous group and their
9
Diez (1996) and Jachtenfuchs et al. (1998) show that the analogy of the nation
state and the EC was also criticized in some member states in the early 1990s.
Particularly the Green Party in Germany and Great Britain, and Plaid Cymru, the
Welsh regionalist party, evoked the image of a network when envisioning the
future shape of the Community. Their empirical results underline the fact that
talking about democracy in terms of decentralization, proximity between institu-
tions and citizens and increased competencies for regional and local communities
became increasingly influential, not only, as shown in this chapter, within the
Commission, but also within prominent political forces in some member states.
argument is based on very different models of democracy. Yet, what all

of the authors have in common is that they conceptualize legitimation
mechanisms beyond parliamentarization.
The diversification of meanings of legitimacy (2001–2013)
Having dealt with the two most significant changes in the legitimacy
discourses between 1983 and 1988 as well as between 1989 and 2000 in
detail, this final section will now concentrate on the most recent history
of the Commission’s articulations on legitimacy, that is, post-2001. This
period is characterized by a diversification of articulations dealing with
legitimacy. While legitimacy tended to be interpreted primarily in terms
of democratic legitimacy throughout the 1990s, the focus shifts slightly
after 2001. The performance discourse increasingly gains ground and
the technocracy discourse temporarily proliferated between 2001 and
2004 (see Figure 4.2).
The early 2000s witnessed the emergence of a new concept that sig-
nificantly affected the Commission’s legitimacy discourse: European
governance. Various authors have dealt with different facets of the ‘gov-
ernance turn’ in EU studies and have mapped the different uses and
meanings of the concept as well as its origins (for an overview see
Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006; Shore 2011). The rise of the concept
in EU institutions can be traced to events occurring in the early 2000s
(Shore 2000: 289). It was significantly shaped by the Commission’s For-
ward Studies Unit10 and the report written by de Schutter, Lebessis and
Paterson (2001; see also Kohler-Koch 2000: 523; Sloat 2003) and was
wholly embraced by Prodi, who announced a sea change to the way the
Community was governed by ‘promoting new forms of European gover-
nance’ in his strategic objectives for 2000 to 2005 (Commission 2000).
The governance concept gained full force with the publication of the
‘White Paper on European Governance’ (Commission 2001a) – one of
the most influential texts of the legitimacy debate at that time. The rise
of the governance concept that shaped many legitimacy-relevant doc-
uments after 2001 paved the way for the comparative strength of the
10
The Forward Studies Unit is the precursor of the European Bureau of Policy
Advisors (BEPA). It was established in 1989 as a small think tank reporting directly
to the Commission President, Delors. Even today, the BEPA is still concerned
with ‘long term prospects and structural tendencies (. . .) specialized in long-term
forecasting and planning’ (BEPA homepage) and collaborates with a variety of
external research institutes.
performance and the technocracy discourses. Since 2001, an emphasis

on performance and expertise has constituted a structural thread of the
Commission’s articulations on legitimacy.
Technocratic self-construction proliferated particularly in the period
between 2001 and 2004 (see Figure 4.2). At this time, the Commission’s
articulations on legitimacy were closely linked to a ‘better lawmaking’
agenda which had a strong technocratic impetus. Better lawmaking
covered a set of policy instruments and programmes with diverse objec-
tives ranging from deregulation to the provision of high-level regulation
(Radaelli 2007).
The first signs of a better lawmaking agenda appeared as far back as
the late 1990s out of the debate on the subsidiarity principle. The Com-
mission decided that the scope of the concept of subsidiarity ‘should
be extended to include all action aimed at improving legislation in
a broad sense’ (Commission 1999). Following the slogan ‘doing less
but doing it better’, repeatedly voiced by the Commission in the late
1990s, the subsidiarity debate slowly transformed into a discussion on
improved lawmaking. Since 1995, reports on better lawmaking have
been submitted on an annual basis and have largely substituted the
reports on subsidiarity issued earlier on an annual basis.
From 2001 onwards, better lawmaking became a priority issue on the
EU agenda after a group of experts – instructed by the EU Ministers
of Public Administration – produced a blueprint for better regulation.
The Commission actively furthered the issue by taking up the so-called
Mandelkern Report (2001) and by producing a number of communi-
cations, the most important being those related to the action plan
‘Simplifying the Regulatory Environment’ (Commission 2001b, 2002c).
The better lawmaking agenda was strongly influenced by the gover-
nance debate spawned by the ‘White Paper on European Governance’.
The Commission justified its position on enhancing better lawmaking
by referring to the ‘White Paper on European Governance’. The Com-
mission’s first essential contribution to the better lawmaking debate was
thus influenced by the more general discussion on new modes of gov-
ernance that dominated normative debates within the Commission in
the early 2000s.
The better lawmaking agenda is of particular relevance for this study
because between 2001 and 2004 the two types of articulations – those
on the better lawmaking agenda and on legitimacy – merged. This
conspicuous intersection becomes evident in a number of intertextual
references. Articulations on legitimacy are taken up in better lawmaking
communications issued by the Commission and, vice versa, texts such
as general reports and work programmes typically dealing with issues of

legitimate governance became populated with semantics rooted in the
better lawmaking agenda.
For instance, in one of its influential communications on better
lawmaking issued in 2001, the Commission explicitly presented better
lawmaking as a solution to the legitimacy problems of the Union:
The need to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the European

project means that the EU has to work towards legislation which is
better, simpler, more responsive to the real problems, and more acces-
sible. This is a sine qua non if EU action is to be better understood,
better applied and more readily accepted by the people of Europe.
(Commission 2001b)
This quotation is significant because demands to provide better and sim-

pler legislation were explicitly introduced in the context of legitimacy.
New demands for better legislation were linked to the older demands
of responsiveness and accessibility that had shaped the Commission’s
articulations on legitimacy for at least a decade. Similarly, in the gen-
eral report of 2001 under the heading of ‘Governance’, the Commission
discussed a variety of means to enhance the legitimacy of the political
system of the Union. In this context, the aim ‘to improve the quality
of policies and legislation’ is mentioned together with a variety of other
solutions (Commission 2003).
On a more subtle level, the intersection of the better lawmaking
agenda and articulations on legitimacy becomes obvious due to the
fact that the latter was suddenly full of technocratic representations,
relying on the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EU IS SCIENCE. The
source domain SCIENCE manifests itself in articulations, in which sci-
entific knowledge is presented as a source of legitimacy. Statements
coded as elements belonging to the source domain SCIENCE often refer
directly to expertise as a source of legitimate governance. For instance,
articulations underlining that for a legitimate EU ‘access to scientific
advice and expertise is notably a must’ (Commission 2008) constitute
prime examples. The activity of seeking scientific or technical advice
was very often expressed in terms of ‘consulting’. When the Commission
underlined that ‘consultation processes’ (Commission 2006a) were sig-
nificant for legitimate governance, such wording was often connected
to the notion of scientific or technical expertise. Moreover, there were a
number of words and phrases transferred from the realm of science into
the discourse on the legitimacy of the EU which relate to the quality of
the legislative process. A legitimate EU was constructed as one in which

‘European law is of highest quality’ (Prodi 2001), which ‘improve[s] the
quality of the policy outcome’ (Commission 2002d) and which promotes
‘high standards of professionalism and performance’ (Commission 2005e).
In order to ensure this high quality of legislation, ‘evidence-based policy-
making’ (Commission 2012) and ‘impact assessments’ understood as a
‘vital tool in helping to ensure that policy is made in full knowledge of
the facts’ (Commission 2005e) were recommended. In fact, the very idea
of ‘better legislation’ as evoked by the Commission in the early 2000s
was transferring the logic of scientific inquiry to the domain of politics.
These statements read as if policy-making amounts to little more than
an effort in the coordination and accumulation of information.
Interestingly, the issue of better regulation remains high on the
agenda until the end of the analysed time span in 2013. The Com-
mission continued to develop programmes to achieve ‘smart regulation’
and stressed that it aimed at effectively ‘manag[ing] the quality of leg-
islation’ (Commission 2012). Since 2004, these articulations were no
longer discussed in terms of legitimacy, and better regulation no longer
served to ‘strengthen the Community’s credibility in the eyes of the
citizens’ as was solemnly proclaimed in the ‘Action Plan: Simplify-
ing and Improving the Regulatory Environment’ (Commission 2002c).
Instead, documents after 2004 only point out the economic benefits of
a smart regulation agenda for small businesses, meaning that the bet-
ter lawmaking agenda has become disconnected from articulations on
legitimacy.
The technocracy discourse is constituted by articulations that are
to a large extent non-democratic; it nurtures the non-democratic idea
that the political sphere can be rationally and scientifically ordered.
By emphasizing scientific and technical solutions, the discourse hides
the political and social dimensions of problems (Fischer 1990: 23).
As Kohler-Koch has pointedly argued: ‘No one would object to “better
legislation” – but the choice is not between the bad and the better, but
about alternative options. There are different preferences, different cri-
teria of evaluation and last, but not least, distributive and re-distributive
effects that have to be taken into account’ (Kohler-Koch 2001: 179).
Given the scope and depth of EU authority, the Commission’s attempt
to present politics as a one-sided, truth-finding exercise is problematic,
since it turns a blind eye to political conflict and may lead to a reinvigo-
ration of elitist and non-democratic articulations that were constitutive
for the Commission’s approach towards legitimacy in the formative
years of the Community (Walters and Haahr 2005: 21–41).
In contrast to the technocracy discourse, which was only reinvigo-

rated for a short period between 2001 and 2004, the performance discourse
remains influential throughout the whole time span. If compared to the
performance discourse of the 1970s and 1980s, only moderate changes
can be discerned. Since I have already commented on the structure of
the performance discourse in earlier decades in detail, I will limit the
description of the performance discourse for the years between 2001
and 2013 to a few noteworthy points.
The performance discourse as has evolved since 2000 is character-
ized by a few remarkable metaphorical changes: the conceptual domain
ORGANISM has almost completely vanished. In the 1970s and 1980s,
the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EU IS ORGANISM mainly encom-
passed statements corresponding to a ‘tangible Europe’ rhetoric: a
legitimate Community was constructed as one that citizens could feel,
see and experience first-hand. These kinds of statements are practi-
cally non-existent in the performance discourse after 2001. In a similar
vein, the path metaphor has lost significance; in the 1970s and 1980s
articulations coded under the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EU IS
PATH had been, to a large extent, underpinned by a functionalist logic,
according to which the legitimacy of the EU is dependent on it main-
taining a certain dynamic to be able to respond to common global
challenges. These articulations still continue to shape the performance
discourse, albeit in a less significant manner.
In its place, the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EU IS ECONOMY has
gained ground. The economy metaphor comprises of articulations refer-
ring to cost–benefit calculations and efficiency as a crucial source of
legitimacy. Examples include constructions in which a legitimate EU is
represented as a political system ‘add[ing] most value’ (Barroso 2013b)
and one where Europeans ‘benefit from the Single Market’ (Barroso
2005a).
What is more, the machine metaphor, influential in structuring the
performance discourse, is increasingly constituted by a broader set of
articulations. In other words, a modest change of expression can be dis-
cerned. The legitimate EU is represented by articulations that mirror
those of previous decades as a political system in which ‘institutions
will continue to function fully’ (Barroso 2005b), which provides ‘effective
policy delivery’ (Commission 2005f), which has an ‘impact on every-
day lives’ (Commission 2005d), which ‘carr[ies] out its fundamental
tasks’ (Commission 2002b) and which produces legislation that ‘is
more attuned to the problems posed’ (Commission 2002c). In addition
to this, two further articulations are added to this list of mechanic
representations: after 2001, the legitimate Union is increasingly con-

structed as a political system that ‘will streamline decision-making’
(Commission 2011) and that ‘has been working to simplify the EU
rulebook’ (Commission 2009a).
The performance discourse, in the same way as the technocracy dis-
course, may also be criticized for its strong non-democratic impetus.
There is an abundance of articulations maintaining that legitimacy
could be gained if institutions only worked more effectively and effi-
ciently. In addition to this, the ‘support-for-benefit logic’, according to
which political support for European integration could be maintained
if the citizens realized the concrete benefits it brought, is all-pervasive:
a legitimate EU is constructed as a political system that ‘delivers the
benefits of the Internal Market to its citizens’ (Commission 2007a), that
‘makes benefits more tangible’ (Commission 2011) and that ‘represents a
real plus for Europeans’ (Barroso 2009a). Similar to the 1970s and 1980s,
there are some references to a sophisticated conception of performance
implying the existence of a European common interest. This is backed
up by such utterances as follows:
The Union must give added depth to a project with which its peo-
ple can identify and which brings them prosperity and solidarity,
and a quality of life based on preserving the environment, ensuring
the viability of universally accessible high-quality services of general
interest, and a high level of social protection.
(Commission 2002b)
This statement constitutes an example, which puts forward a broader

and more current understanding of a common European interest,
which goes beyond the guarantee of peace and prosperity. Yet, such
articulations are in the minority, undermined by the vast majority of
articulations centring on a non-democratic understanding of perfor-
mance.
I will now proceed to provide my results of the dynamics of the
democracy discourse. If compared to the democracy discourse in pre-
vious decades, significant metaphorical changes can be observed. Com-
pared to the 1970s and 1980s, democratic representations of the EU
after 2001 rely on a different set of source domains. The conceptual
metaphors LEGITIMATE EU IS PATH and LEGITIMATE EU IS COMMUNICA-
TION increasingly dominate democratic representations of the Union
together with the conceptual metaphors LEGITIMATE EU IS BUILDING and
LEGITIMATE EU IS SIGHT, the latter of which first emerged in the 1990s.
In contrast, the conceptual domain MACHINE has increasingly lost rele-

vance. These developments are dovetailed by a number of noteworthy
changes of expressions within each conceptual metaphor. I will depict
the developments for each conceptual domain in turn.
The range of expressions constituting the conceptual metaphor LEGIT-
IMATE EU IS PATH has been considerably broadened. The democracy
discourse continues to be structured by articulations that have been
present since the 1970s. It is replete with suggestions to ‘bring the Union
closer to its citizens’ (Commission 2009b), to ‘take decisions (. . .) as
closely as possible to the citizens’ (Commission 2005g) and to ‘reduce
the distance between the public and the administration at its service’
(ibid.). Bringing the Union closer to its citizens serves as a panacea
for the democratic deficit of the Union. These articulations are sup-
plemented by more pronounced expressions demanding the increased
participation of European citizens.11 A whole web of articulations has
emerged, stressing closeness between EU institutions and citizens, which
arguably also belongs to the conceptual domain PATH. Constructions of
a democratically legitimate EU as a political system that ‘involves cit-
izens’ (Commission 2012), that ‘facilitates and encourage[s] citizens’
participation in the democratic life of the Union’ (Barroso 2009b), that
makes a determined effort to ‘engage ordinary European citizens’ (Com-
mission 2002e) and that facilitates a ‘coming together between the people
of Europe and the European Union’ (Barroso 2013a) have become com-
monplace. These relatively new articulations stressing participation,
engagement with and involvement of citizens fit in well with the over-
arching aim of closing the gap between citizens and institutions that has
recurrently been voiced for decades.
Similar to the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EU IS PATH, the con-
ceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EU IS COMMUNICATION also moved centre
stage in the democracy discourse after 2001. Following the slogan
that ‘communication is essential to a healthy democracy’ as prop-
agated in the ‘White Paper on a European Communication Policy’
(Commission 2006b), the Commission’s efforts to reform its commu-
nication policy in the wake of the failed constitutional referenda in
the Netherlands and in France have become tightly linked to questions
of legitimate governance. Articulations representing a legitimate Union
as a communicative space have changed since the problem-stricken
11
For a history of the concept of participation in EU institutions see Smismans
(2003), Kohler-Koch (2009) and Saurugger (2010).
ratification process of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe,

signalling a decisive change of expression: since 2001 and even more
so since 2005, the Commission has increasingly considered a two-way
dialogue between citizens and institutions to be crucial for gaining legit-
imacy. An institutional rethink of the role of communication and its
relation to legitimate governance has taken place (Michailidou 2007:
31–36; Statham and Trenz 2013: 30–36). The Commission solemnly
pledges:
The European Commission is therefore proposing a fundamentally

new approach – a decisive move away from one-way communica-
tion to reinforced dialogue, from an institution-centred to a citizen-
centred communication, from a Brussels based to a more decentralized
approach.
(Commission 2006b)
Imagining the Union as a space of dialogue and vibrant debate is not as

new as the Commission suggests. Similar representations of the Com-
munity highlighting an interactive notion of communication already
existed in the early 1990s. Yet, since 2005, these articulations have
proliferated. For the Union to be legitimate, a ‘genuine dialogue between
the people and the policymakers and lively political discussions among
citizens themselves’ (Commission 2006b) have to be encouraged, citi-
zens should be given ‘a bigger voice’ (Commission 2010b) while the insti-
tutions should aim at ‘listening to people’s views’ (Commission 2006b).
The overall aim, so the Commission’s argument goes, is to facilitate the
‘development of a European public space, where European issues are dis-
cussed and debated from a European standpoint’ (Barroso 2012). In sum,
the communicative conditions of legitimate governance as envisaged by
the Commission have become more sophisticated since 2001, construc-
tions of a European public sphere and of a dialogue between institutions
and citizens are not uncommon, while paternalistic representations,
which dominated the Commission’s approach towards communication
in earlier decades, are less often evoked.
Further building blocks of the democracy discourse after 2001 are
the conceptual metaphors LEGITIMATE EU IS BUILDING and LEGITIMATE
EU IS SIGHT . Because of the principle of transparency, which contin-
ues to play a significant role, these two conceptual metaphors remain
closely intertwined. The Commission wants to ‘shine more light on the
way we work’ (Commission 2005g), to ‘clear the fog’ (ibid.), to make the
‘legislative and executive process (. . .) clearer’ (Commission 2001a) and
it also suggests ‘allowing greater access to its processes’ (Commission

2010b) and ‘mak[ing] the EU institutions more (. . .) open’ (Commission
2006b). The building metaphor continues to evoke the image of the
EU as a political system that is opened up for the general public and is
often linked to the sight metaphor emphasizing the transparency and
clearness of institutional procedures in the EU.
Finally, the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EU IS MACHINE contin-
ues to structure the discourse, albeit to a significantly lesser degree than
between the 1970s and 1990s. Very often, these representations focus
on the democratic working of institutional mechanisms and proce-
dures and on the inter-institutional dimension, that is, the relationship
between the European Parliament and the Council, or the European
Parliament and the Commission, respectively. The legitimate Union is,
for instance, represented as a political system, which manages to ‘reor-
ganize the way our three institutions – the Council, Parliament and
Commission – operate and co-operate’ (Prodi 2001), which improves ‘coor-
dination among its institutions’ (Commission 2010b) and guarantees an
‘institutional balance’ (Prodi 2001).
Moreover, within the field of articulations coded under the con-
ceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EU IS MACHINE, a noteworthy change of
expression occurs: articulations relating to democratic control – often
directly linked to the demand to strengthen the European Parliament –
which made up a large share of statements of the mechanic metaphor
in the 1970s and 1980s – are practically absent. The years after 2000
are marked by a conspicuous absence of the question of how EU insti-
tutions can effectively be controlled. Political control is substituted by
highly malleable concepts belonging to a range of conceptual domains
such as scrutiny, monitoring, screening, shedding of light, accountability, etc.,
whose connection to principles of public control and political equality
is unclear in the Commission’s discourse. Table 4.1 gives an overview of
the changes of expression that occurred in the democracy discourse in
the last four decades.
Taken together, the empirical results clearly show that the terminol-
ogy employed increasingly borrows from deliberative and participatory
democratic theory. A tight web of terms such as debate and dia-
logue, European public sphere, citizen participation and civil society
involvement populates the democracy discourse. The widening of the
meaning of democracy that began in the 1990s still continues today.
Post-parliamentary modes of legitimation continue to gain ground; the
federal state model, with its focus on the European Parliament as the
locus of democratic legitimacy, loses significance.
Table 4.1 Change of expression in the democracy discourse: Overview
Source domain Stylized metaphorical expressions
Typical expressions in the Typical expressions since

1970s/80s 2001
MACHINE A legitimate EC has A legitimate EU connects with

democratic decision-making citizens; has institutions that
procedures/processes/ stand up to scrutiny; has
mechanisms/institutional working monitoring
arrangements; guarantees mechanisms; is characterized
democratic control, etc. by a clear division of tasks, by
institutional balance, by
decentralization, etc.
BUILDING A legitimate EC has a A legitimate EU is open,
democratic foundation, accessible, etc.
base, pillar, institutional
structure/framework/ set-up,
etc.
SIGHT No articulations A legitimate EU is
transparent, clear, etc.
PATH A legitimate EC is close A legitimate EU
to citizens; brings EC involves/engages/interacts
institutions closer to citizens; with citizens; forges links
reduces gap/gulf between with citizens; improves
citizens and institutions, etc. participation, etc.
COMMUNICATION A legitimate EC informs; A legitimate EU listens;
conveys a message; explains; engages in dialogue;
makes aware, etc. communicates; justifies;
hears messages; provides
opportunities for citizens to
make their voices heard, to
express their views, to debate,
to discuss; has a European
public sphere, etc.
In contrast to other scholars who emphasize a participatory

(Saurugger 2010) or deliberative turn (Sonnicksen 2010; Friedrich 2013)
and maintain that a radical break with previous ideas of legitimate
governance has taken place (Yang 2013), the results presented here
suggest a different kind of development: articulations stressing that
a communicative relationship and proximity between citizens and
institutions are crucial can be traced back to the early 1970s; these
articulations were only modified and expanded, embracing notions of
dialogue and debate as well as the participation and active involvement

of citizens after the mid-1990s. Since 2001, articulations pertaining
to the conceptual metaphors LEGITIMATE EU IS COMMUNICATION and
LEGITIMATE EU IS PATH have become dominant in the Commission’s
democracy discourse. Thus, rather than a drastic change of the mean-
ing of democracy, I argue that the type of change is more incremental.
The structure of the current democracy discourse is the result of slight
but continuous transformations that have been taking place in the last
four decades.
In order to engage in a more critical evaluation of the outlined
discursive structures, it is indispensable not only to map these structures
out but also to indicate meaning components that are marginalized
or excluded. Discourse analysis ‘involves not only the identification of
emerging and persisting discourses but also (. . .) the identification of
the field of discursivity and the discursive outside’ (Thomassen 2005:
304; Diez 2014a). In my critical evaluation of the democracy discourse,
I want to focus on the two most significant conceptual metaphors and
the corresponding metaphorical expressions after 2001, namely LEGIT-
IMATE EU IS PATH (referring to concepts such as citizens’ participation,
involvement, etc.) and LEGITIMATE EU IS COMMUNICATION (referring to
concepts such as debate, dialogue, etc.).
The Commission’s articulations relating to citizens’ involvement and
participation have already been the object of intense academic debates
(Armstrong 2002; Magnette 2003; Smismans 2003; Bignami 2004; Finke
2007; Kohler-Koch 2009). It is widely acknowledged that the meaning
of participation currently prevalent in the Commission has a strong
technocratic bias. Often, participation is considered valuable ‘because
it contributes to knowledge and expertise, thus leading to better pol-
icy’ (Bignami 2004: 76). This is particularly the case if participation
is linked to ‘governance’ (Finke 2007: 6). Still, there are instances in
which the Commission embraces a more democratic notion of participa-
tion. Yet, the Commission’s articulations to ‘get citizens more involved’
(Commission 2009b) and ‘encouraging citizens’ participation’ (Commis-
sion 2010a) as well as related articulations belonging to the conceptual
domain LEGITIMATE EU IS PATH take no account of processes that would
guarantee popular control and would force decision makers to look after
citizens’ interests. It has been widely criticized that if greater participa-
tion merely means that citizens are given the opportunity to express
their views, which then have no consequences in the decision-making
process, it can hardly be regarded as contributing to the democratization
of the Union (Kohler-Koch 2001).
Furthermore, the meaning of citizen involvement that the Com-

mission evokes can be criticized on the grounds that, if at all, it
is embedded in a highly instrumental understanding of civil society
involvement, which excludes more ambitious meanings of participa-
tion. From the perspective of a civic republican variant of democracy,
the educative and skill-building contributions of participation are cru-
cial.12 Republican proponents of citizen involvement value it because
it facilitates the development of civic skills and virtues, which elevate
citizens to critical political activists eventually leading to the democra-
tization of political systems. While such a conception of participation
is hinted at in some Commission documents (Commission 2005c), it is
clearly marginalized and underdeveloped (Armstrong 2002; Magnette
2003; for similar criticism see Smismans 2003). Conceptions of citi-
zen involvement typical of associative theories of democracy are even
less common. In such a conceptualization which Smismans (2003: 497)
has termed ‘civil society as decentralisation’, ‘associations take over the
functions of central public authority’ as a reply to ‘the shortcomings of
centralised decision-making’ (ibid.). From this perspective, a legitimate
EU is envisioned as a political system in which power ‘is dispersed
among semi-autonomous yet publicised private bodies’ (Bellamy and
Warleigh 1998: 466; see also Tully 2007). These conceptions of citi-
zen involvement are, however, clearly excluded from the Commission’s
discourse (see also Smismans 2003).
A similar limited and one-sided meaning is also attached to the con-
cepts of dialogue and debate, which experienced an immense boost in
the years following 2005. At first sight, this process indicates a positive
development and hints at a departure from older propagandistic and
paternalistic meanings of communication prevalent in the Commission
in earlier decades (Brüggemann 2010b: 72), yet, a closer analysis reveals
that the notion of dialogue and debate evoked by the Commission is
very limited.
What is striking is the Commission’s overarching consensus orienta-
tion and its implicit rejection of genuine political conflict in the public
sphere (Magnette 2003; Trenz 2006; Trenz and Vetters 2006). The mean-
ing of dialogue and debate that the Commission endorses leaves no
space for dissenting anti-European voices. Deepening integration and
the constitutionalization of the EU are beyond question. The envisioned
12
For an overview of different functions ascribed to civil society involvement in
different variants of democratic theory see Fung (2003).
European public sphere is restricted by taboos that serve the overarching

aim of building up a new consensus. Consider the following statement:
Plan-D is not limited to the period of reflection. It is an exercise that

must run throughout the lifetime of this Commission, and beyond.
The current crisis can be overcome only by creating a new consensus
on the European project, anchored in citizens’ expectations.
(Commission 2005a, emphasis added)
As Trenz and Vetters have pointedly argued, the Commission’s ‘con-

sensual ideology aims at transforming opponents into partners [and]
conflict into cooperation’ (Trenz and Vetters 2006: 2). In its ‘White Paper
on a European Communication Policy’ (Commission 2006b), the Com-
mission explicitly terms its reform proposals as a ‘partnership approach’,
a concept which was often taken up by Barroso in his speeches at
that time.
Opposition towards the EU is often regarded as a result of apa-
thy and lack of knowledge, that is, as a ‘gap in awareness’ (Barroso
2009a). ‘Rarely do EU politicians or officials concede that public oppo-
sition to EU initiatives might stem from reasoned principle or legiti-
mate disenchantment with the EU and its project’ (Shore 2011: 292).
Criticism against the EU is dismissed as unreasonable and immature.
Very often, criticizing the EU is denounced as an act of scapegoating:
We must break out of the negative trap where politicians are quick to
take the credit for the positive achievements of Europe, and quick
to blame ‘Brussels’ or ‘Strasbourg’ for everything they don’t like.
We need a more mature dialogue with our citizens on decisions that
affect their daily lives.
(Barroso 2009a, emphasis added)
Thus, despite its emphasis on dialogue and debate, the Commission

does not acknowledge the existence of conflict and insurmountable dif-
ferences manifest among European citizens. Such an approach towards
political communication clearly hampers the politicization of the Union
and as such, the discourse marginalizes more ambitious meanings of
public dialogue and debate, for instance, those of a republican variant.
A truly republican perspective would take political conflict and a critical
public debate seriously, and would make sure that controversies in the
public arena are reflected in the decisions taken in its political system
(Thiel 2012: 203–204).
Conclusion
The empirical analysis of constructions of a legitimate EC/EU suggests

that the space of legitimate governance is structured by four compet-
ing discourses – the performance, the identity, the technocracy and
the democracy discourses – which compete with each other to acquire
a hegemonic position over particular time spans. The standards by
which the legitimacy of the EC/EU is judged do not vary arbitrarily.
There are certain periods in which particular meanings of legitimacy are
more common within the Commission than in others. Talking of legit-
imacy in terms of performance was prevalent throughout the 1970s,
yet more sophisticated standards of legitimate governance belonging to
the realm of democracy already played a role. After 1983, the Commis-
sion’s articulations on legitimacy were marked by a strong focus on the
social foundations of a legitimate community, more specifically the exis-
tence of a European identity. A real sea change occurs in the 1990s, since
democratic standards of governance acquired a hitherto unknown dom-
inant position. After 2001, the dominance of the democracy discourse is
compromised by a reinvigoration of the technocracy and performance
discourses associated with the ‘governance turn’ (Kohler-Koch and
Rittberger 2006).
The in-depth analysis of these four types of legitimacy discourses
with the help of metaphor analysis constituted a useful supplementary
analysis. It revealed that all four legitimacy discourses are structured by
a limited number of conceptual metaphors (see Table 4.2). Metaphor
analysis constituted a useful approach to get to grips with the discursive
structure of each of the four most common types of legitimacy dis-
courses.
The metaphor analysis has revealed that the structures of these four
discourses have changed, resulting in a remarkable transformation of
meaning. Changes at the level of conceptual metaphors and metaphor-
ical expressions have been remarkable, particularly with respect to the
democracy discourse. The meaning of democracy in the 1970s starkly
differs from the one after 2001. In the 1970s, the prevalent liberal-
representative understanding of democracy constructed the European
Parliament as the locus of democratic legitimacy. In the course of
the 1980s and 1990s and again after 2001, the meaning of democ-
racy broadens considerably and includes components derived from
participatory and deliberative theories of democracy. At the level of
conceptual metaphors, this change of meaning is reflected in the
marginalization of the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EU IS MACHINE,
138
Table 4.2 Legitimacy discourses, source domains and stylized metaphorical

expressions
Legitimacy Source domain Stylized metaphorical expression

discourse
SCIENCE A legitimate EC/EU seeks advice/expertise/technical

information; consults; produces law of high quality;
Technocracy conducts evidence-based policy-making/impact
assessments; stands up to high standards of
professionalism; etc.
MACHINE A legitimate EC/EU connects with citizens; has

democratic decision-making procedures/processes/
mechanisms/institutional arrangements; has
institutions that stand up to scrutiny; has working
monitoring mechanisms; has mechanisms ensuring
democratic control/democratic overview; is
characterized by a clear division of tasks, by
institutional balance, by decentralization, etc.
BUILDING A legitimate EC/EU has a democratic foundation,
base, pillar, institutional structure/framework/set-up;
is open, accessible, no longer decides behind closed
doors; in a legitimate EC/EU, citizens are part of the
process of building Europe, etc.
Democracy PATH A legitimate EC/EU is close to citizens; brings
EC/EU institutions closer to citizens; reduces
gap/gulf between citizens and institutions;
involves/engages/interacts with citizens; forges links
with citizens; improves participation, etc.
COMMUNICATION A legitimate EC/EU informs; conveys a message;
explains; listens; makes aware; engages in dialogue;
communicates; justifies; hears messages; provides
opportunities for citizens to make their voices heard,
to express their views, to debate, to discuss; in a
legitimate EC/EU, citizens offer opinions, have a say,
etc.
ECONOMY A legitimate EC/EU is accountable; is a business for
every citizen; in a legitimate EC/EU, citizens take
ownership of policies, citizens have a stake in EU
policies, etc.
SIGHT A legitimate EC/EU is transparent/clear; sheds light on
decisions, shines more light on the way it works, etc.
ORGANISM A legitimate EC/EU has a democratic nature; is a
healthy democracy/a democracy that flourishes;
evolves democratically; has a democratic life/a
democratic core; has strong Community bodies; is
characterized by diversity; etc.
139
ORGANISM A legitimate EC/EU has roots, a common civilization, a

European consciousness, a European identity; a
personality, a sense of oneness; is characterized by
unity; has a fund of cultural resources, a cultural
heritage, is characterized by diversity, etc.
FAMILY In a legitimate EC/EU, there is a sense of
Identity solidarity, a feeling of belonging, mutual
trust/understanding/confidence, a sense of community,
a convergence of feeling, allegiance to the EC/EU, etc.
PATH A legitimate EC/EU has a common destiny; draws
people together; brings Europeans together; has a closer
community of Europeans, etc.
FANTASY A legitimate EC/EU seizes the public imagination; in a
legitimate EC/EU, Europe constitutes a dream, a vision,
etc.
MACHINE A legitimate EC/EU functions; rationalizes; modernizes,

simplifies; streamlines; reactivates common polices;
performs/carries out tasks; delivers; serves; has impact
on/effects; is effective; acts on the most effective level,
etc.
PATH Constructions highlighting the notion of an endpoint:
a legitimate EC/EU has an aim, goal, objective, purpose
destination, outlook, new bearings; heads in a certain
direction, etc. Constructions highlighting the notion of
motion: a legitimate EC/EU presses ahead, forges ahead;
carries forward; goes further; makes progress; overcomes
obstacles; makes fresh moves; leads; makes a leap; steps
up; etc.
Performance ORGANISM A legitimate EC/EU is revitalized; reinvigorated; is a
living Community; is tangible; has been injected
with new vigour; has a human face/heart; has a
personal/human dimension; is a real Community; gains
strength; has an essence/a substance; etc.
ECONOMY A legitimate EC/EU provides an added value, benefits,
advantages, a real plus, good records; is efficient; is
characterized by common interests, preferences; is well
managed; in a legitimate EC/EU, citizens gain, profit,
etc.
ACTOR A legitimate EC/EU acts; has a political will; has
strategies in place to address challenges; achieves,
succeeds, accomplishes, guarantees fundamental rights,
provides for freedom of movement; does less but does it
better; etc.
COMMUNICATION A legitimate EC/EU understands challenges of the
future and responds/addresses them/comes up with an
answer, etc.
which influentially shaped the democracy discourse in the 1970s, and

the rise of the conceptual metaphors LEGITIMATE EU IS COMMUNICA-
TION and LEGITIMATE EU IS PATH after 1990 and even more so after
2001. Democratic legitimacy increasingly becomes an issue of proximity
and communicative exchange between EU institutions and its citizens.
Closely linked to this, the articulations on legitimacy made by the Com-
mission are characterized by a proliferation of concepts that correspond
to this new rationale. Participation, citizen involvement, European public
sphere, and dialogue and debate become buzzwords that structure the
Commission’s articulations.
From the perspective of poststructuralist discourse theory, the Com-
mission’s articulations on legitimacy can be regarded as rather diverse.
There is not a commonly agreed standard by which the EC/EU’s legit-
imacy has been judged. Instead, there is a condition whereby no
particular discourse is hegemonic (Walters and Haahr 2005: 67). Instead,
diverse standards of legitimate governance are employed simultane-
ously, some of which become more dominant than others do during
particular time spans. In this respect, the Commission’s articulations on
legitimacy reflect broader academic and public discourses on the legiti-
macy of the EU, which are likewise characterized by their diversity. But
if there is no hegemonic discourse about the legitimacy in the EU, ‘this
does not preclude the analysis of some of the competing political and
theoretical projects which are vying to suture the space of legitimate
Europe’ (ibid.). Two such projects stand out as an attempt at hege-
monizing the discursive space: the identity discourse after 1983 and,
subsequently, the democracy discourse after 1990. The objective of the
next two more analytical chapters will be to shed light on discursive
operations that made the rise of the identity discourse and, later, the
democracy discourse possible. For this purpose, I will rely on the con-
ceptual and analytical apparatus outlined in the theoretical part of the
study and will trace the workings of hegemonic operations.
5
The Failed Hegemonic Project: The
Identity Discourse in the 1980s
In the 1980s, there was a significant discursive shift in the Commission’s

articulations on legitimacy. The European Commission became preoc-
cupied with the social structures of a European community, and the
existence of a collectively shared European identity1 was constructed
as being crucial for legitimate governance. Despite its initial success,
however, the identity discourse did not fully manage to hegemonize
the field of meanings attached to legitimacy and it was only domi-
nant for a comparatively short period between 1984 and 1988. In the
1990s, it was succeeded by the democracy discourse that acquired a hith-
erto unknown dominant position. Going beyond mere description, this
chapter aims at applying the analytical tools to account for discourse
dynamics developed in the theoretical part of the book (see Chapter 2)
to understand the rise and fall of the identity discourse in the mid- and
late 1980s.
The main argument of this chapter is that the identity discourse
disposed of crucial components of a hegemonic project, which
1
An important terminological clarification is necessary with respect to the mean-
ing of ‘European identity’ used in this chapter. I will use the concept in line with
the way it is used by the European Commission. In texts issued by the Commis-
sion, the meaning of ‘European identity’ is very specific. It is a term that describes
a collective phenomenon and denotes a fundamental sameness among members
of a community (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 7). The term signifies specific group
attachments that manifest themselves, for instance, in collective we-feelings, a
collective consciousness and collective feelings of belonging or related concepts.
As such, the way European identity is employed by the Commission clearly
departs from the way it is used in poststructuralist studies. In the latter case,
‘identity’ is conventionally used in a very broad sense and denotes the ascription
of meaning to a particular discursive entity. In this understanding, ‘European
identity’ is used synonymously with ‘meaning of Europe’ or ‘representation of
Europe’ prevalent in particular discourses (Torfing 2005b).
141
contributed to its rise in the mid-1980s. At the same time, the dis-
course was highly ambiguous and inherently fraught with tension,
which prevented it from acquiring a hegemonic position. The discursive
operations that are part and parcel of every hegemonic project were
deficient. Above all, the identity discourse fundamentally lacked an
empty signifier that fulfilled the function of representing the newly
emergent chain of equivalence, which would have significantly stabi-
lized the discourse. Inherent instabilities of the identity discourse and
fundamental changes in the discursive context finally led to its demise
in the early 1990s. The cultural-ethnic reading of European identity
prevalent in the Commission during this period, which implicitly relied
on a sharp differentiation between Western and Eastern Europe, funda-
mentally clashed with articulations proliferating in Central and Eastern
European countries, demanding that these countries should ‘return to
Europe’.
The chapter is structured as follows: I will first present the discursive
context within which the identity discourse emerged in the European
Commission in the 1970s. Then, I will discuss each hegemonic oper-
ation in greater detail and specify the factors that were conducive to
the rise of the identity discourse. At the same time, I will also point to
significant signs of fractures and instabilities in the discourse, ultimately
leading to its failure in the early 1990s. Finally, I will point to the produc-
tivity of the identity discourse during the 1980s. Before being sidelined
by the democracy discourse in the 1990s, the identity discourse man-
aged to assume an influential position in the 1980s. At that time, the
discourse was highly productive in that it paved the way for new types
of legitimation policies, here defined as ‘identity policies’. Between 1980
and 1989, the Commission launched a cascade of programmes and mea-
sures, particularly in the field of education and culture, with the explicit
objective of inculcating a sense of Europeanness among European peo-
ple. The chapter ends with a concise summary of the main empirical
findings.
The discursive context and the emergence of the identity

discourse
New discourses never appear out of the blue nor are they ‘invented’
by powerful actors who manage to site certain statements in influen-
tial discursive arenas. This theoretical baseline has been very pointedly
formulated by the historian Bo Stråth, who has extensively dealt with
historic constructions of Europeanness:
The Failure of the Identity Discourse 143
The construction of community is never construction in the sense of

a subject who applies his or her will to raw materials and creates the
desired object. The constructor is always forced to make use of the
materials at hand, and so construction is never free invention. It is
always derivative, never original, always the best version of a thing
made with materials that come from another ‘author’.
(Stråth 2000: 23)
Stråth underlines that in order to understand the emergence and rise

of new discourses, it is necessary to take into account the discursive
context and to get an idea of the ‘materials at hand’ (ibid.) from which
new discourses are woven together. Every text is embedded in a wider
web of texts and it is from this wider web that new articulations are
incorporated.
Grasping this wider web of texts can be accomplished by intertextual
analysis (see Chapter 3). In the case of the Commission’s identity
discourse, intertextual references were comparatively explicit. In the
documents produced in the 1970s, the Commission explicitly named
the sources that influentially shaped its standpoint on legitimacy and
its shift towards identity. The central building block of the discourse,
the very term ‘European identity’, was transferred from meetings among
heads of state and government2 and from the Tindemans Committee.
I will comment on both discursive arenas and their role in shaping the
Commission’s identity discourse in turn.
The origins of the concept of a European identity lie in the
Copenhagen Declaration proclaimed by the heads of state and govern-
ment in December 1973. The way the concept was introduced in the
Copenhagen Declaration has been widely criticized for being ‘woolly
and confusing’ (de Witte 1987: 134) and basically ‘anodyne’ (Shore
2000: 44). It was primarily launched as a foreign policy concept which
entailed governments seeking to stand united against international
upheavals. In this declaration, the member states of the Community
argued that ‘[t]his [a European identity] will enable them [the mem-
ber states] to achieve a better definition of their relations with other
countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy
in world affairs’ (Heads of State and Government 1973). When using
2
The European Council was only established in 1975 as an informal body. That
is why I will use the term ‘meeting of heads of state and government’ or sim-
ilar expressions when referring to reports and declarations made within this
discursive arena before 1975.
the term ‘identity’ in this foreign policy context, the concept ‘refers
expressively to nothing more than a common position of European
governments’ (de Witte 1987: 135). Thus, the first articulations on a
European identity emerging in European Community institutions, par-
ticularly in the European Council, were marked by a strong focus on
foreign policy and denoted little more than the aspiration to promote a
common standpoint in external relations – hardly any connection was
drawn to issues relating to legitimacy.
A significant step towards a more cultural interpretation of the con-
cept of European identity can be found in the Tindemans Committee’s
‘Report on European Union’ (Tindemans 1975). This report, which sig-
nificantly influenced the institutional reform debate in the following
years, was written in the economic and financial turmoil of the late
1960s and early 1970s. Currency fluctuations and rising inflation rates
as well as the energy crisis revealed how economically vulnerable the
EC was. The Community had to face vehement criticism condemn-
ing its failure to deliver on its proclaimed task: guaranteeing economic
progress. For the first time in its own history, the Community was con-
fronted with marked public opposition which triggered Community
institutions into taking an increased interest in issues of legitimacy.
Heads of state and government were determined to tackle the problems
the Community was facing and initiated an institutional reform debate.
After the Paris Summit in December 1974, the Belgian Prime Minister
Leo Tindemans was invited to draw up a report on how to transform the
Community into a European Union. It devoted a whole section under
the heading of ‘A Citizen’s Europe’ to the question of how the Com-
munity could succeed in attracting popular loyalties and commitment.
In its interpretation of a European identity, the report linked back to and
at the same time significantly departed from its original foreign policy
context:
Our peoples are conscious that they embody certain values which
have had an inestimable influence on the development of civiliza-
tion. Why should we cease to spread our ideas abroad when we have
always done so? Which of us has not been surprised to see the extent
to which European identity is an accepted fact by so many of the for-
eigners to whom we speak? It is not only from within that there is a
call of the countries of Europe to unite.
(Tindemans 1975)
The concept of a European identity as proposed in the Tindemans

Report was remarkable with regard to two aspects: first, European
identity attained a new meaning; a thick reading of the concept was pro-
posed, which connected with latent ethnic articulations such as cultural
heritage, civilization, etc. Second, the concept of a European identity
became closely associated with legitimacy concerns. Fostering a com-
mon sense of belonging was constructed as being crucial for legitimate
governance. These articulations were taken up by the Commission in a
number of communications (Commission 1977c, 1977d, 1977e). During
the late 1970s, it became commonplace within the European Commis-
sion to argue that a European identity was based on commonly shared,
culturally founded values and that a collective feeling of belonging
together was paramount for legitimate governance. These were propo-
sitions that had been practically non-existent in the previous decades.
Arguably, they were imported from discussions held among heads of
state and government and from the Tindemans Committee.
One of the most significant documents issued by the Commission at
that time, in which a link is forged between legitimacy and a thicker
conception of European identity, is a report sent to the European Coun-
cil on 17 November 1977, in which the Commission demanded that a
European Foundation be established to promote activities in the field of
education and culture in order to facilitate ‘a greater degree of mutual
understanding between the peoples of the Member States’ (Commis-
sion 1977c). Reviewing reasons for lack of support for the EC, the
Commission concluded:
In these conditions, a continued high level of popular support for

the Community cannot be taken for granted. Direct elections to the
European Parliament will offer an important occasion to renew inter-
est in, and support for it. But such elections will only take place
every five years. A sustained effort is needed on a much larger scale
than in the past. An independent Foundation equipped with suffi-
cient resources to reach the grass roots of European public opinion
would provide a means of making all citizens aware of the meaning
of Europe in the widest sense and of firing their interest in it. Its work
should seek to develop the European citizens’ sense of belonging to
one and the same community with a common heritage from the past
and a common destiny for the present and future.
(Commission 1977c, emphasis omitted)
This statement illustrates first that issues of legitimacy and the concept
of European identity became closely intertwined, and that a cultural
and even latently ethnic reading of a common European identity
became commonplace in the Commission by the mid-1970s (Theiler
2005: 57–62). A thick and cultural interpretation of a European iden-

tity was occasionally also employed by other Community institutions.
The ‘Solemn Declaration on European Union’ proclaimed by the heads
of state and government after the European Council in Stuttgart in
June 1983, which explicitly demanded ‘closer cooperation in cultural
matters in order to affirm the awareness of a common cultural her-
itage’ (European Council 1983), is a case in point. Overall, however,
the cultural-ethnic reading of a European identity was particularly
influential in the Commission.
To conclude, with the help of an intertextual analysis of the Com-
mission’s documents dealing with legitimacy, I was able to reconstruct
two discursive arenas that were particularly influential in shaping the
Commission’s articulations on a European identity: the European Coun-
cil and the Tindemans Committee. Heads of state and government
first introduced the term ‘European identity’ mainly in a foreign pol-
icy context, denoting little more than a common standpoint in external
relations. In the course of the 1970s, further meanings were attached
to the term ‘European identity’. In the Tindemans Committee, the
term was unhinged from its original external relations’ context and was
linked to a broader discourse on legitimacy, and a cultural-ethnic read-
ing of a European identity was first prominently articulated. In the 1970s
and 1980s, this reading of a European identity was increasingly taken
up by the Commission. It became commonplace to argue that a strong
sense of European identity was a prerequisite of legitimate governance.
Hegemonic operations at work
In the discussion of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, I emphasized

that in order to understand the emergence of hegemonies in concrete
discourses it is necessary to analytically differentiate three operations
that are typically part of every construction of hegemonic discourses
(see Chapter 2). In a first step, hegemonic projects are dependent on
the construction of chains of equivalences between distinct elements of
a discourse. In a second step, an antagonistic division of the discursive
space takes place, which is fundamentally linked to the constitution
of radical otherness. In the final stage of every hegemonic operation,
one discursive element becomes representative of the chain of equiva-
lence. Consequently, an empty signifier emerges, functioning as a nodal
point of the discourse and thereby consolidating the hegemonic order.
In what follows, I will reconstruct the Commission’s articulations on
legitimacy from 1973 to 1989 by relying on this heuristic in order to gain
an in-depth understanding of the emergence of the hegemonic project

that accompanied the ‘identity turn’ (Laffan 1996) in the Commission
at that time. At the same time, I will also point to important signs of
tension that prevented the discourse from acquiring a fully hegemonic
position. After all, the identity discourse did not manage to fully suture
the space of legitimate Europe and was quickly circumvented by the
democracy discourse in the 1990s.
As outlined above, since its emergence in the early 1970s, the term
‘European identity’ has acquired a variety of different meanings and
became crucially linked to legitimacy in the Commission’s discourse
in the 1970s. I already indicated that the signifier ‘European identity’
became linked to a variety of further terms. In this section, I will describe
in greater detail this newly emergent discursive configuration. Show-
ing that ‘European identity’ was situated in a wider web of further
discursive elements, constituting a new chain of equivalence is the first
step to account for the consolidation of the identity discourse in the
1980s. Since I have already depicted the structure of the identity dis-
course in more detail in the previous chapter, I will merely summarize
the main findings at this point.
The identity discourse as it emerged in the 1970s and 1980s was con-
stituted by a unique linkage of representations of a legitimate EC. The
bulk of representations of the EC that were linked together drew on
the two conceptual metaphors LEGITIMATE EC IS ORGANISM and LEGIT-
IMATE EC IS FAMILY . The source domain ORGANISM manifested itself in
articulations in which the Commission emphasized that the members
of the European Community have common roots, are part of one civiliza-
tion, that the EC has a fund of cultural resources, a cultural heritage and
that Europeans have a collective consciousness. These and similar expres-
sions drew on the source domain ORGANISM because they constructed
the European people as a natural phenomenon that had evolved over
time. Organic metaphorical expressions were typically accompanied by
a slightly different type of articulation that drew on the conceptual
domain FAMILY and that made recourse to commonly shared feelings
and a common European sentiment: a legitimate EC was constructed
as one in which Europeans shared a feeling of belonging, mutual under-
standing and trust, had a sense of solidarity or a sense of community.
Occasionally, these articulations were linked to a range of further rep-
resentations that build on the conceptual domain LEGITIMATE EC IS
FANTASY and LEGITIMATE EC IS PATH. The conceptual domain FANTASY
comprises of articulations that refer to a legitimate EC in terms of a
vision or a dream. In these articulations, it is not the history but the
future that is used as a vehicle to advance belonging within the EU (see

also Petersson and Hellström 2003). The articulations coded under the
conceptual domain PATH typically refer to a common destiny that all
Europeans share or to the fact that Europeans should be drawn together
more closely (see Figure 5.1).
As a result, a range of different articulations was rendered equiva-
lent in the identity discourse. The equivalential chain was constituted
by ethnic articulations that represented the EC as a community of
descent, united by a cultural heritage and collectively shared memories,
articulations that emphasized the emotional ties that bind Europeans,
articulations that represented the EC as a future-oriented community in
which people share a common vision or dream and articulations empha-
sizing a strong notion of interdependence among Europeans, who share
a common destiny.
In the course of the 1980s, the cultural-ethnic meaning compo-
nents became ever more prevalent. The notion of a European identity
‘became progressively transformed and reified and then presented as a
fixed, bounded and “natural” category through successive policy initia-
tives’ (Shore 1993: 788). Since the 1980s, the scope of the concept had
considerably been narrowed down in the Commission’s discourse and
predominantly encompassed ethno-cultural meaning components.
Despite the linkage of a diverse range of articulations which allegedly
stabilized the identity discourse, the newly constituted chain of equiv-
alence remained ambivalent, at times even contradictory. On the one
hand, the Commission’s discourse constructed the European people
as unified and as sharing strong cultural-ethnic ties. In the context
of these types of articulations, national diversity was presented as a
main obstacle for the emergence of a unified European people in the
1970s. Consider, for instance, the following statement made in the
Commission’s communication on a European Foundation:
It has become almost commonplace to say part of Europe’s wealth is,

and should remain, the diversity of its cultures. Each people within
the Community has a past, rich in history, as well as a lively cultural
scene today. (. . .) Their very diversity can indeed be one of the main
obstacles, hence the need which we have emphasized for people to
improve their command of languages and thereby learn more of each
other’s countries. (. . .) Only by increasing cultural contacts can we
help European citizens to recognize the ‘common heritage’ which is
made so much of in attempts to define European civilization.
(Commission 1977c, emphasis added)
EC is EC is EC is EC is
ORGANISM FAMILY FANTASY PATH
Identity Civilization Diversity Solidarity Belonging Mutual Dream Vision Imagination Common Closer
trust destiny community
Moment of an Relation of
equivalential chain Conceptual
equivalence metaphor
Figure 5.1 Chain of equivalence of the identity discourse

149
In this statement, diversity is excluded from the identity discourse.

National and cultural diversity is constructed as a main obstacle for the
generation of a European civilization. On the other hand, and in con-
tradistinction to articulations that emphasized a high degree of homo-
geneity, the Commission recurrently emphasized that ‘there has to be
respect for the diversity that is our most precious asset’ (Delors 1992b).
Here, cultural pluralism is constructed as a central building block of
constructions of a legitimate Community. The identity discourse in the
1980s integrated these two rather incompatible representations of the
EC: the EC was constructed both as a unified cultural-ethnic entity and
at the same time as a space of diversity, an amalgamation of many cul-
tures (Shore 2007: 7). Both articulations became part of the same chain
of equivalence constituting the identity discourse. The two articulations
continued to persist after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and
culminated in the slogan ‘unity in diversity’ which became ‘a central
policy motif’ of the Commission (Shore 2007: 16; see also McDonald
1996; Sassatelli 2002), yet the fundamental contradiction of this slogan
was not solved, as Shore pointedly concludes:
‘Unity in diversity’ – like the Latin motto, ‘in uno plures’ – offers EU
policymakers a convenient rhetorical mediation between the incom-
patible goal of forging a singular European consciousness, identity
and peoplehood on the one hand, and claims to be fostering cul-
tural pluralism on the other. However, the tension between these
contradictory impulses is not reconciled by this verbal sleight of
hand.
(Shore 2007: 20–21)
Thus, the identity discourse of the 1980s was fraught with tension
as it combined two rather incompatible articulations: representations
of the EC emphasizing a united peoplehood and representations of
the EC stressing national and cultural pluralism. This tension certainly
constituted a moment of instability in the discourse.
The second crucial step in the construction of a hegemonic dis-
course is the antagonistic division of the discursive space. As outlined
in the theoretical part of this study, the antagonistic division of a
discursive space denotes an operation that goes beyond a mere rela-
tion of difference; the relation of difference is categorically different
from antagonistic relations (see Chapter 2). An antagonistic other is not
merely another, for instance, more radical other. It is a different type of
otherness that is constituted by the antagonistic other. An antagonistic
other only emerges in the course of the construction of hegemonic

projects. Its central characteristic is that it negates all the moments of
a chain of equivalence and thus significantly contributes to the polar-
ization of the discourse. With the antagonistic other, a division of the
discursive space takes place. Discursive entities are ordered on one of
the sides of the antagonistic frontier: they belong either to the antago-
nistic or to the antagonized camp. By setting a clear boundary between
these two camps, the emergence of the antagonistic other significantly
contributes towards consolidating a hegemonic project.
Methodologically, this entity can be analysed by reconstructing neg-
atively evaluated terms that subsume a variety of negative represen-
tations in the text. In the analysed discourse, I reconstructed two
types of other that can arguably be interpreted as antagonistic others
dichotomizing the discursive space: a ‘technocrat Europe’ and a ‘com-
mon market Europe’. Both function in stabilizing the construction of
the EC as a cultural community based on a collectively shared European
identity.
There is an abundance of statements in which a cultural Community
with a collectively shared European identity was juxtaposed with a com-
mon market Europe, that is, representations that construct the EC as
being mainly concerned with economic performance. The dominance
of the economic image of the EC, so the argument goes, prevents the
Community from developing into a cultural entity with a true European
people. ‘An emphasis only on the material benefits of integration will
not guarantee continued commitment to the process. As Jacques Delors
once remarked “You don’t fall in love with a common market; you need
something else” ’ (Laffan 1996: 95).
In line with this argumentation, the Commission stressed that the
Community should ‘transcend the economism’ which has stamped
European integration (Delors 1985a) and emphatically asserted that ‘we
have a true European Community and not just a “Community of mer-
chants” ’ (Ronan 1975), a ‘Community of traders’ (Commission 1974a),
or a ‘Common Market’ (Commission 1975b). In other words, it is an
image going ‘beyond the purely mercantile’ (Commission 1973a) which
the Commission was looking for in this period. A common market
Europe and a cultural Europe are also juxtaposed in the two following
examples:
Europe’s cultural identity is nothing less than a shared pluralistic

humanism based on democracy, justice and freedom. Expressed in
the diversity of our local, regional and national cultures, it is the basis
for European Union, which has goals other than economic and social
integration, important though these may be.
(Commission 1987a)
Let me say again that the stakes are enormous, for Europe cannot live
by economic performance alone. Our civilization, our culture, our
creative artists demand that we seize an historic opportunity.
(Commission 1987b)
The second central other of the identity discourse is a ‘technocrat

Europe’. The discourse was dominated by an exceedingly biased under-
standing of technocracy, with the Commission tending to associate
technocracy with complex, technical rules and a sense of remoteness
and elitism, rejecting these attributes as illegitimate:
Parliament has laid particular stress on devising a policy which

involves European citizens in the creation of a living Community
and on transforming the technocrat Europe into a ‘people’s Europe’.
(Commission 1988a)
But I would like to make clear, here and now, that Europe and
hence the Community, is not run solely by ‘Brussels’, by stateless
technocrats far-removed from day-to-day-reality.
(Thorn 1981b)
In the course of the 1980s, the technocrat Europe and common market
Europe became the typical, ideal other that stood in sharp contrast to a
concept of a legitimate EC in terms of a cultural community. Both oth-
ers were tendentially emptied of their original meaning and assumed
new and different layers of meaning opposed to those moments of the
equivalential chain constituting the self. Directly in opposition to rep-
resentations of the EC as a cultural community united by a common
sense of belonging, the technocrat Europe and common market Europe
were constructed as remote, elitist and intangible, lacking vigour and
therefore unable to awaken feelings of belonging. Furthermore, these
representations were criticized for lacking association with the European
people, implying a cumbersome and ineffective decision-making pro-
cess, which allegedly hampered the striving for a common good. In sum,
technocrat Europe and common market Europe negated all moments of
the equivalential chain that constituted the identity discourse.
Interestingly, both types of other arguably represent formerly com-
mon self-constructions of the EC. Constructing common market
Europe as the antagonistic other can be interpreted as a legacy of

neofunctionalism. Representations depicting the EC as being primar-
ily concerned with maximizing wealth were particularly powerful in
the formative years of the EC. Wallace and Smith (1995), for instance,
stress that Jean Monnet and Walter Hallstein were strongly influenced
by neofunctionalist ideas, believing that the question of popular con-
sent was crucially dependent on economic performance. It was believed
that popular consent would be forthcoming, ‘once the new institu-
tions were established and Europe’s public had time to understand and
appreciate the greater benefits they brought in comparison to those
which states acting separately could offer’ (ibid.: 144). Existing liter-
ature regarding legitimacy conceptions of political elites suggests that
neofunctionalism provided a theoretical basis for a widespread justifica-
tion of the EC. Neofunctionalists assumed that people attribute loyalty
to those institutions which provide growth and welfare.3 In this respect,
neofunctionalists are ‘economic determinists’ (ibid.: 145) in that they
assumed that modern European society would be preoccupied with satis-
fying its material needs.4 In contrast to the formative years of the 1970s,
neofunctionalist representations of the EC were evaluated negatively in
the identity discourse of the 1980s. The externalization of economic
representations of the EC underlined the attempt to marginalize a neo-
functionalist understanding of legitimacy according to which political
support fundamentally relied on economic performance.
The same is true of technocrat Europe. A formerly dominant reading
of the EC was here again turned negative. A technocratic concept of the
Community underpinned ideas of legitimacy put forward by leading
figures such as Jean Monnet. Knowledge and expertise were represented
3
In sum, the neofunctionalist logic of legitimacy generation relies on a ‘positive
feedback loop’ (Risse 2005: 293) in which instrumental interests lead to an initial
stage of integration which, in turn, leads to identification with the new politi-
cal order. Haas himself pointed this out quite clearly: ‘Perhaps the most salient
conclusion we can draw from the community-building experience is the fact that
major interest groups as well as politicians determine their support of, or oppo-
sition to, new central institutions and policies on the basis of a calculation of
advantage. (. . .) [T]he process of community formation is dominated by nation-
ally constituted groups with specific interests and aims, willing and able to adjust
their aspirations by turning to supranational means when this course appears
profitable’ (Haas 1968: xxxiv).
4
Thomas Risse has summed up this process succinctly by reframing it in David
Easton’s words: ‘Specific support for the institutions’ output would lead to diffuse
support for the institution as such’ (Risse 2005: 294).
as valid sources of authority and as a valuable means of realizing the

public good (Featherstone 1994; Walters and Haahr 2005: 21–41). ‘Early
legitimacy discourses saw expert rationality and technocratic planning
as promising better results than mass politics and political passions’
(Schrag Sternberg 2013: 36). This is especially true for the Commis-
sion. ‘[T]he Commission’s claim to legitimacy and to representing the
European interest rested centrally on its technocratic expertise and
“technical capacity” ’ (ibid.: 37).
Thus, both antagonistic others that emerged in the 1980s can arguably
be interpreted as temporal others (Hansen 2006: 40): formerly common
representations of the EC, that is, those representing the EC mainly as
an economic community and as a technocracy, assumed negative con-
notations and were seen as obstacles preventing the EC from becoming
legitimate in the eyes of European citizens. The temporal other became
the antagonistic other against which a new meaning of legitimacy was
established.5
What is more, one could also argue that the identity discourse, in par-
ticular its cultural-ethnic meaning components, implicitly relied on a
spatial other, namely Central and Eastern Europe. This point is argued
by Delanty, who conducted a history of ideas on the discourse of a cul-
tural Europe and points out that ‘[d]efinitions of a European identity
in terms of a universalizing cultural discourse that supposedly began
in ancient Greece and Rome, continued through the (. . .) Renaissance,
(. . .) was affirmed by the Enlightenment and somehow survived the
rise of modern nationalism and the world wars’ (Delanty 1995: 31)
implicitly rely on a separation between Western European and Eastern
European as well as Asian cultures. In the 1980s, the EC tended to con-
struct a European cultural community as one based on the ‘the spiritual
heritage of the West’ (ibid.). Quenzel’s (2005) discourse analysis of cul-
tural policy documents issued by EU institutions points to a similar
aspect. She maintains that constructions of a cultural Europe and of
a European cultural heritage tend to build on Eastern Europe as the
5
The argument that the emergence of a new discourse is often dependent on the
negation of a previously dominant discursive configuration is also proposed by
Boltanski and Chiapello with respect to the capitalism discourse. They highlight
that the emergence of a new form of a capitalist discourse is typically linked to
a radical rejection of a previous stage of profit maximization: ‘In fact, the impo-
sition of a new managerial norm is nearly always accompanied by criticism of
a prior state of capitalism and a previous way of making profit, both of which
must be abandoned to make way for a new model’ (Boltanski and Chiapello
2007: 64).
central other (Quenzel 2005: 167). Yet, the analysed identity discourse
did not explicate the contours of a cultural-ethnic Europe: Eastern and
Central Europe were not explicitly represented as the other against
which a Western cultural Community is constructed. Such a construc-
tion of other at best tended to underlie cultural-ethnic representations
of Europe.
Having outlined the negative identity, that is, the technocrat Europe
and common market Europe serving as a point of negative reference for
representations constructing a legitimate Community and having also
hinted at the initial constitution of a chain of equivalence of different
constructions of a legitimate Community, we can now turn to the final
stage of the hegemonic project: the emergence of the empty signifier, with
a signifier taking on the task of representing not only the links between
demands but also the chain in its entirety. Some authors have therefore
referred to this final stage as an operation of ‘universal representation’
(Laclau 2000: 304; see also Nonhoff 2006: 216–221; Herschinger 2011:
95): one signifier acquires a certain centrality by embodying the total-
ity of the series (Laclau 2007: 95). It is a discursive operation that
significantly stabilizes the discourse and ultimately contributes to its
hegemonic position.
Is it possible to reconstruct such a discursive operation in the analysed
material? My argument is that the outlined identity-related articulations
ultimately lacked an empty signifier embodying the totality of equiv-
alential articulations. A promising candidate for the empty signifier,
‘cultural community’, frequently employed in the discourse in the
1980s, failed to acquire a more universal meaning. The meaning of cul-
tural community was too restrained and the signifier was not able to
represent the chain in its entirety. What is more, envisioning the EC
in terms of a cultural community was not credible in other discursive
areas, compounded by the fact that the use of the term was largely
restricted to the Commission, rarely taken up by other EC institu-
tions and even less so by member states. In poststructuralist terms,
one could maintain that there were not enough subjects to identify
with the signifier ‘cultural Europe’ for it to transform into an empty
signifier.
Instead, another vague signifier became the common reference point
of representations of a legitimate EC in the course of the 1980s: a ‘peo-
ple’s Europe’. It was adopted by a variety of EU institutions and member
states that employed the term to denote a common vision of a legitimate
EC. Its meaning was vague from the beginning and was used to express a
range of very different visions of a legitimate EC. Thus, a people’s Europe
can be interpreted as an empty signifier of the legitimacy discourse at

that time.
The term ‘people’s Europe’ was officially born at the Fontainebleu
Summit of 25 and 26 June 1984 when the member states appointed
a committee chaired by the Italian MEP, Pietro Adonnino, to examine
ways in which the Community could ‘strengthen and promote its iden-
tity and its image both for its citizens and for the rest of the world’
(European Council 1984). The decision to set up a committee was taken
in the context of an unexpectedly low turnout at the European Par-
liament elections in June 1984 and the upcoming institutional reform
debate that led to the Single European Act (Theiler 2005: 59–60). The
Adonnino Report abounded in legitimacy vocabulary referring to the
common culture and identity of Europeans and proposing a whole range
of measures aimed at strengthening the legitimacy of the Community.
Imprecision and vagueness characterized the concept of a people’s
Europe from the beginning in that it expressed a variety of different
meanings of a legitimate Community. The signifier ‘people’s Europe’
not only incorporated those identity-related representations of a polit-
ical Community outlined above, but also linked them to a variety of
performance-related representations of a legitimate Community.
In more concrete terms, a people’s Europe denoted a Europe that
seized public imagination, was based on a sense of belonging and
mutual trust, had a cultural heritage and common civilization, and was
a Europe in which people were closely drawn together. In other words,
all the building blocks of the identity discourse expressed themselves
through the representation of a people’s Europe. These belong to the
first type of representation that is represented by the signifier ‘people’s
Europe’. The following statements also illustrate the link between the
signifier ‘people’s Europe’ and the identity discourse.
Creating a people’s Europe also means creating symbols that enable

us all to feel we belong to a Community with which we can identify.
(Delors 1985a)
A people’s Europe will spring up once we are all fully aware of the
roots, values and options for the future which we have in common.
(Commission 1990c)
The second type of representation that tied in with the discourse on

a people’s Europe strongly relied on the performance model of legiti-
macy. The Commission emphasized that constructing a people’s Europe
implied launching ‘measures which will have an impact on people’s

everyday lives’ (Commission 1986) and that a people’s Europe would
enable citizens ‘to benefit from the European dimension’ (Commis-
sion 1988a). At times, constructing a people’s Europe was even used
synonymously with completing the internal market:
The proposal is part of the follow-up to the conclusions of the

Fontainebleu European Council, which called for measures to create
a ‘people’s Europe’ (. . .). It is based on the fundamental principle that
people should be able to move freely across borders between Member
States whatever the mode of transport used.
(Delors 1985a)
While much has already been achieved, the Commission feels that
this is only the base on which to continue building a people’s Europe.
Implementation of the Single European Act and completion of the
large internal market without frontiers by 1992 are also bound to
provide even greater impetus, helping to revitalize European society
which is already in the throes of rapid change.
(Commission 1989)
These articulations suggest that it was the performance of the Commu-

nity and the material benefit that the Community provided that was
constitutive of a people’s Europe. In comparison to former articulations
that stressed the sense of community and the cultural basis, a legitimate
EC is here constructed as one that provides a tangible policy output for
the European people.
Arguably, these latter types of representations constituting the equiv-
alential chain of a people’s Europe were a variant of older neofunc-
tionalist constructions of the Community. The core proposition of
these constructions was that support for the Community could auto-
matically be generated once European people became aware of the
advantages of the integration process. Somewhat departing from a strict
neofunctionalist logic, the Commission was not only constructing eco-
nomic advantages as a source of legitimacy. Tangible benefits outside
the delineated area of the economy, arising for instance from the free
movement of persons and the mutual recognition of diplomas (Com-
mission 1990d), were also represented as a tangible output that would
ultimately lead to a rise in support. Thus, the meaning of output was
extended beyond the narrow confines of the economy. The Commis-
sion proposed that legitimacy could also be generated through policy
output that affected the everyday life of European citizens. Yet, the ratio-
nale underlying the Commission’s articulations on legitimacy remained
the same as in the neofunctional era of the 1960s and 1970s: popular
support ultimately relied on performance.
Invested with a range of empty terms, ‘people’s Europe’ succeeded
in acquiring a more universal meaning and became a focal point for
a variety of representations of a legitimate Community in the mid- to
late 1980s. Figure 5.2 illustrates the structure of the people’s Europe
discourse as it consolidated itself in the mid- to late 1980s. A chain
of equivalence was constructed between articulations constituting the
identity discourse of legitimacy and articulations constituting the per-
formance discourse on legitimacy. As far as the identity part of the
people’s Europe discourse is concerned, the discourse drew particularly
on the conceptual metaphors LEGITIMATE EC IS ORGANISM and LEGITI-
MATE EC IS FAMILY . Thus, the people’s Europe discourse was constituted
by linking cultural-ethnic representations of the EC depicting the latter
as a cultural community united by a common civilization (ORGANISM)
and of representations emphasizing strong emotional ties (FAMILY).
In addition, the people’s Europe discourse also integrated performance-
related articulations, particularly those relying on the source domains
MACHINE and – again – ORGANISM . The articulations subsumed under
the machine metaphor built on an instrumental understanding of the
EC. The legitimate EC was constructed as one that was effective and that
had an impact on people’s everyday lives. The emergence of the source
domain ORGANISM in the performance discourse in the 1970s and 1980s
constitutes a historical specificity (see also Chapter 4). An abundance
of articulations emerged at that time stressing that only if people saw,
felt and experienced the EC would it be legitimate. These articulations
were part of the performance discourse for they were premised on the
proposition that policy output was crucial for legitimate governance.
Yet, by delineating itself from older neofunctionalist justifications of
the integration project, the Commission argued that policy output had
to be directly experienced by European people. Representations of a
living Community that is reinvigorated and tangible proliferated at that
time and became a building block of the Commission’s people’s Europe
discourse. All these diverse representations of a legitimate Community
expressed themselves through the vague common reference point of a
people’s Europe. In other words, a people’s Europe embodied the total-
ity of equivalential articulations constructing a legitimate EC and was
juxtaposed with an image of the EC that depicted the latter primarily in
technocratic and economic terms.
Technocrat Europe Common market Europe
People’s Europe
ORGANISM FAMILY MACHINE ORGANISM
Identity Civilization Diversity Solidarity Belonging Mutual Effective Impact Impetus Tangible Living Reinvigo-
trust rated
...
Identify discourse Performance discourse
equivalence
metaphor
Other/empty signifier Antagonistic

frontier
159
Figure 5.2 Structure of the people’s Europe discourse

Nevertheless, the people’s Europe discourse was also fraught with ten-
sion; the discursive configuration that emerged in the early 1980s was
fragile because functionalist representations of the Community were sit-
uated on both sides of the antagonistic frontier. On the one hand, the
tangible output that the EC provided was constructed as a central build-
ing block of legitimacy. On other hand, the Commission recurrently
emphasized that material benefits alone would not suffice to guarantee
popular support. Constructions of common market Europe were sharply
juxtaposed with legitimate governance (see section above). In other
words, the provision of material benefits was sometimes constructed as
a central building block of the EC’s legitimacy; at other times, focusing
on the provision of material benefits was criticized as hampering the
emergence of a cultural community that went beyond mere economic
integration. This contradiction obstructed the antagonistic division of
the discursive space into a clearly delineated legitimate and illegitimate
Community and ultimately constituted a moment of instability in the
discourse.
What is more, the discourse on a people’s Europe integrated two some-
what conflicting types of legitimacy discourses: the identity and the
performance discourses of legitimacy. Thus, the chain of equivalence
constituting the people’s Europe discourse was very long and ranged
from neofunctionalist representations of the Community emphasizing
the performance of the Community to cultural-ethnic representations.
However, this long chain of equivalence constituting the people’s
Europe discourse prevented the establishment of strong interdiscursive
links between different discursive arenas. Although as outlined above,
articulations relating to a people’s Europe were taken up by a number
of Community institutions, different institutions meant fundamentally
different things with regard to a people’s Europe. The European Coun-
cil tended to highlight the performance dimension of the people’s
Europe discourse; for this institution, a people’s Europe basically signi-
fied an image that brought more tangible benefits for European citizens.
The Commission, by contrast, tended to draw on highly exclusion-
ary cultural-ethnic meaning structures when talking about a people’s
Europe. Thus, strong interdiscursive links could not be established
between institutions and the chain of equivalence that constituted itself
in the mid-1980s was constantly threatened with breaking up.6
6
This is, indeed, what happened in the early 1990s. In its work programmes and
general reports, the Commission still referred to the objective of creating a ‘peo-
ple’s Europe’. Yet, by that time, establishing a people’s Europe meant little more
Generating legitimacy through identity policies
In parallel to the outlined rise of the concept of a European identity

in the Commission’s legitimacy discourse, the 1980s constitute a period
of time in which significant advancements in the field of legitimation
policies were made. On 29 May 1986, the European flag was hoisted for
the first time in the forecourt of the Commission’s Berlaymont building
and the European anthem was played to celebrate the occasion (Com-
mission 1987d). This event represents only the tip of the iceberg of
major advances in the field of cultural and educational policies that
took place in the Community in the mid-1980s. These policies stand
for an entirely new approach towards generating legitimacy: they con-
stitute an attempt to transfer the nineteenth-century historic project of
nation-building to the European Community (de Witte 1987; McDonald
1999). From the early 1980s onwards, cultural and education policies
increasingly aimed at inculcating a cultural-ethnic understanding of
Europeanness in the people.
I argue that the emergence of this new type of legitimation policy
was enabled by the discursive shifts depicted in this chapter. Despite its
fractures, the people’s Europe discourse acquired a relatively dominant
position within the Commission and was constitutive for new types
of legitimation policies that are subsumed here under the category of
‘identity policies’.
In order to reconstruct the role of discourses for the launch of certain
policies, a poststructuralist study has to show how certain articulations
dominant within a specific period of time were linked to concrete poli-
cies (see Introduction). In the analysed time period, a close link was
established between the people’s Europe discourse and cultural and edu-
cation policies. Tentative measures in the field of culture and education
already existed in the 1970s, yet it was not until the 1980s that these
two policy fields became linked to the people’s Europe discourse. This
link made the emergence of new types of legitimation policies possi-
ble. In the 1980s, talking about legitimate Community in terms of a
‘people’s Europe’ became commonplace and identity policies were con-
structed as the natural means to generate legitimacy. To develop this
argument, it is necessary to trace the development of cultural and edu-
cation policies in the Community institutions. I will first focus on the
than providing a tangible policy output for European citizens (e.g. Commission
1990).
development of cultural policies before turning to the Commission’s

approach to education.
Preparations for Community action in the cultural field go back to the
late 1960s and early 1970s (Commission 1983b). During this period,
heads of state and government stressed the need for Community action
in the cultural field in a number of EC summits and, in May 1974,
the European Parliament adopted a resolution on this subject (Commis-
sion 1977e). The European Commission responded to these initiatives:
in 1973, it set up a cultural department and in 1977, it issued its first
action programme for the cultural sector (ibid.). In 1982, the Commis-
sion published a further communication on community action in the
cultural field (Commission 1982), thus ‘operating de facto cultural pol-
icy long before the Maastricht Treaty gave it the legal right to do so’
(Shore 2000: 46).
What is striking is that these early advances in the cultural field fol-
lowed an economic logic: the objective was to open the cultural sector
to the Single Market. Initiatives therefore focused on the freedom of
trade in cultural goods and on measures to improve the living and
working conditions of people working in the cultural field. The Com-
mission’s economic justification of cultural policies is aptly summarized
by Theiler:
[T]he Commission ‘economised’ many of these [cultural] initiatives.

Its main declared cultural objective became the creation of a border-
less ‘cultural space’ in which ‘cultural goods and services’ could be
exchanged freely. This fit in well with the mobility-centredness of the
Single Market programme and it pushed back the conceptual bound-
ary between cultural policy (where the Community had no mandate)
and economic and social policy (where it did have a mandate) in
favour of the latter.
(Theiler 2005: 63)
In the course of the people’s Europe campaign, a different kind of ratio-

nale for Community action in the field of culture gradually gained
ground. The Commission began to justify cultural policies by highlight-
ing that a strengthened sense of European identity was needed to shore
up support for European integration (Theiler 2005: 63; Shore 2007).
In other words, a link was created between cultural policies and the peo-
ple’s Europe discourse, particularly its identity-related articulations. As a
result, cultural policies were increasingly launched to generate a sense
of identity among Europeans (Pantel 1999); such a rationale for cultural
policies had not existed before. The reinterpretation of cultural policies

was made possible by the prevalence of identity-related articulations
made available by the people’s Europe discourse. The following exam-
ple nicely illustrates the new link created between the identity-related
representations of a legitimate Community and cultural policies:
It is 30 years since the signature in Rome on 25 March 1957, of the

treaty which is more or less a constitution of the European Com-
munity. The Community continues to strengthen its identity and to
make progress towards one of its fundamental objectives: a Europe
that is more united and closer to its people. Symbols and the gestures
of sport can help.
(Commission 1987d)
The people’s Europe discourse manifested itself in an impressive range

of measures launched in the 1980s with the explicit aim to shore up
popular support for the integration process: the European Commu-
nity increasingly engaged in propagating European symbols.7 The most
important of these measures included the creation of a European flag
and a European anthem. What is more, ‘Europe Day’ was born: in 1985
during the European Council in Milan, heads of state and government
agreed that 9 May (the anniversary of the Schuman Declaration) should
be commemorated as a day on which the European Community was
brought closer to its citizens. Additionally, celebrating the anniversary
of the Treaties of Rome – which had been done on a regular basis before
the 1980s – was revived. Pompous ceremonies were held in 1982 and
1987 in order to celebrate the 25th and 30th anniversaries, respectively.8
Other symbolic vehicles for communicating the European idea included
the Commission pushing for the introduction of a European passport,
which member states finally agreed upon in 1982, and for a European
driving licence, which was implemented in two stages in 1983 and 1986.
Further measures to inculcate a sense of Europeanness among the peo-
ple included the launch of European sports events (for instance the first
European Yacht Race and a cycling race – the ‘Tour of the Future of the
European Community’ in 1986) and initiatives in the audio-visual sector
(e.g. the European Cinema and Television Year).
7
For a more detailed discussion of these symbolic policies see Bruter (2005:
75–98) and Shore (2000: 40–65).
8
For a comparative analysis of these commemorative events see Hansen-
Magnusson and Wüstenberg (2012).
As far as education policies are concerned, a similar link to identity-

related articulations of the people’s Europe discourse can be observed.
The origins of the EC education policy go back to the 1973 report ‘For a
Community Policy in Education’ issued by an independent expert group
chaired by Henri Janne (Commission 1973).9 The Commission officially
became active in the field of education one year after the publication of
the Janne Report in 1974 with proposals for ‘Education in the European
Community’ (Commission 1974b). Yet, major advances in the field only
came about later in connection with the people’s Europe campaign: in
1985 and 1986, the Commission submitted its first proposals for the
Comett and Erasmus programmes as well as for the YES for Europe pro-
gramme, all of which aimed at facilitating inter-educational exchange
within Europe. The justification of education policies was ambiguous,
as was also the case for cultural policies with a focus on benefits for the
economy. For instance, in the Commission’s first communication on the
issue in 1974, the Commission referred to the role of education policies
as follows:
(. . .) the objective should be to provide the population as a whole

with the opportunities for general and vocational education, further
education and lifelong education, which will adequately allow indi-
viduals (. . .) to follow skilled occupation in an economy in which the needs
are constantly changing.
(Commission 1974b, emphasis added)
However, later policy documents, particularly those relating to edu-

cational exchange programmes, drew more closely on identity-related
9
Interestingly, the Janne Report in 1973 had already drawn a link between edu-
cation policies and the need to legitimize the EC. It pointed out the necessity
of introducing a European dimension in education policy to prevent legitimacy
problems: ‘[T]he feeling of political, social and cultural belonging can no longer
be exclusively national if a part of the attributes of the nation-state has gone over
to the Community: that is to say, the territory to the extent that borders disap-
pear, decisions are transferred to supranational bodies and jurisdiction, the right
of establishment of aliens is introduced, etc. All this and many other things, point
the road towards a common destiny lived in the diversity of nations. This being
so, can we escape from the idea that teaching should include a European dimen-
sion, wherever possible?’ (Commission 1973). The Commission, however, only
adopted this line of argumentation in the 1980s. An exception is the Communi-
cation of a European Foundation (Commission 1977) which drew on a number
of identity-related arguments in justifying European intervention in the field of
culture and education.
arguments. In an information brochure on Community advances in

the education field, the Commission maintained that the objective
of the YES for Europe programme was ‘to perceive more clearly, and
strengthen, the European identity’ (Commission 1988b). Here again,
the people’s Europe discourse paved the way for different kinds of argu-
ments. Educational exchange programmes became one of the central
pillars in the Commission’s attempt to construct a unified European
people.
In sum, while the Commission made initial advancement in the field
of cultural and education policies in the 1970s, the logic pursued was
mainly of an economic nature, with the main aim being to facilitate eco-
nomic integration and to prepare the European people for an economy
which was claimed would pose increasingly challenging demands. Only
in the 1980s was a relatively stable link established between the people’s
Europe discourse and education and cultural policies. Identity forma-
tion became a pointedly political objective in these two policy fields.
Since then, education and cultural policies have largely turned into
identity policies, aiming to improve the legitimacy basis of the EC by
strengthening a common sense of belonging. The link between cultural
and education policies and the then dominant people’s Europe discourse
gave identity polices impetus, with the Commission launching myriads
of initiatives and programmes towards this aim.
Conclusion
The descriptive overview of the Commission’s articulations on legiti-

macy in Chapter 4 showed that the Commission was starting to ‘talk
identity’ in the 1980s (see Figure 4.2). A collective European identity was
to be constructed as a precondition for legitimate governance. A read-
ing of legitimacy that focused on the social structures of a political
community had not been present before this period. In fact, the very
term ‘European identity’ was largely unknown in Community institu-
tions before the 1970s. How can we understand the emergence and rise
in influence of the identity discourse in the 1970s and 1980s within
the Commission? By applying hegemonic discourse theory in the tra-
dition of the Essex school, this chapter puts forward the following
suggestions: the term ‘European identity’ was imported from a foreign
policy context in other discursive arenas, for example, deliberations held
between heads of state and government. In the course of the 1970s,
the signifier was linked to the legitimacy debate and acquired a largely
cultural-ethnic meaning. European identity became associated with a
range of further terms such as civilization, cultural heritage and collec-

tively shared values. During the same time period, the identity discourse
was stabilized by a variety of factors. The very fact that the signifier
‘European identity’ became embedded in a web of further signifiers con-
stituted a first step in stabilization. The identity discourse was further
stabilized by constructions of an antagonistic other leading to a divi-
sion of the discursive space. The two illegitimate others against which a
legitimate EC as a cultural community with a collective European iden-
tity was constructed were ‘technocrat Europe’ and ‘common market
Europe’; these two constructions sharpened the contours of the iden-
tity discourse and ultimately contributed to the power of the discourse
within the Commission.
Nevertheless, the identity discourse only managed to remain influ-
ential for a short period of time and never managed to completely
hegemonize the field of legitimate governance, since alternative inter-
pretations of legitimacy remained influential. In this chapter, I have also
pinpointed signs of fracture within the discourse that possibly led to its
demise in the 1990s.
First, the link between identity-related articulations fundamentally
lacked an empty signifier through which they could have expressed
themselves. In other words, the most fundamental hegemonic practice,
decisive for the consolidation of a hegemonic discourse, the emer-
gence of an empty signifier, failed. The identity discourse did not
dispose of a signifier that integrated the diverse range of identity-
related articulations that proliferated in the 1980s. Instead, another
signifier emerged that served as a vague common point of reference
for representations of a legitimate EC/EU: a ‘people’s Europe’. However,
the empty signifier of a ‘people’s Europe’ linked both identity-related
articulations and performance-related articulations: this discursive oper-
ation ultimately led to the demise of the identity discourse. The chain
of equivalence was radically extended, blurring the distinction between
self and the other. The antagonistic division of the discursive space
between a people’s Europe on the one side and a technocrat Europe and
common market Europe on the other was fragile because functionalist
representations of the Community existed on both sides of the antago-
nistic frontier. A focus on performance as a vital source of legitimacy was
in some texts constructed as the other that needed to be overcome, while
in other texts, generating a tangible policy output was represented as an
integral part of the Commission’s conception of a people’s Europe. The
antagonistic frontier was noticeably weakened since it was recurrently
criss-crossed by articulations from both sides of the camp.
As a result, a people’s Europe meant fundamentally different things in

different discursive arenas. Since the chain of equivalence constituting
the people’s Europe discourse was long, different Community institu-
tions relied on fundamentally different interpretations when talking
about a people’s Europe. The European Council tended to highlight the
performance dimension of the people’s Europe discourse while the Com-
mission focused on the identity dimension of a people’s Europe, even
propagating a cultural-ethnic understanding of the latter. The chain
of equivalence became ever longer and threatened to break up: in the
course of the 1980s, interpretations of a people’s Europe increasingly
diverged.
Second, the cultural-ethnic reading of a European identity that
asserted itself within the Commission in the 1980s became problematic
after the radical change of the discursive context in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. Even if the geographical contours of the identity discourse
were not made explicit, the discourse was premised on a sharp distinc-
tion between Western and Eastern Europe. Other studies that delved
more deeply into the Commission’s understanding of European iden-
tity and cultural community stress that it relied on a historiography
that ran ‘from Greco-Roman antiquity to the European Community’
(McDonald 1996: 51). When the Commission talked about a European
civilization on which a collective identity is based, it primarily referred
to the Western European cultural heritage (Delanty 1995; McDonald
1996; Quenzel 2005). Such an exclusionary reading of a European
identity indicated a weak spot in the discourse, particularly after the
democratic revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe, which put the
issue of enlargement on the agenda. By the 1990s at the latest, the
cultural-ethnic interpretation of a European identity as proposed by the
Commission could no longer be upheld, since it was radically at odds
with Central and Eastern European countries’ articulations propagating
their ‘return to Europe’.
Despite these fractures, the people’s Europe discourse reflected impor-
tant characteristics of a hegemonic project which ultimately contributed
to its dominant position in the mid- to late 1980s. In the last section of
the chapter, I have illustrated that the Commission’s identity talk was
also influential with regard to legitimation policies; articulations made
available by the people’s Europe discourse, particularly by its identity
component, were linked to a variety of concrete policy proposals made
by the Commission and taken up by other Community institutions.
The rationale for Community-based cultural and education policies
changed: while economic justifications for these policies were prevalent
in the 1970s, with the argument that they would prepare European
citizens for the common market, later Commission documents in the
1980s highlighted the necessity of cultural and education policies at the
Community level to forge a common European identity and to create a
common sense of belonging. Thus, articulations constituting the peo-
ple’s Europe discourse were linked to concrete policy proposals from
the sphere of culture and education. As a consequence, a new type of
legitimation policy was created: identity policies. Policies known from
the nation state context aiming to recreate a collective identity became
popular: a European flag and a European anthem were launched and
‘Europe Day’ was born.
6
Democracy as a Successful
Hegemonic Project in the 1990s
The early 1990s constituted a watershed for the Commission’s

articulations on legitimacy, marking an immense proliferation of demo-
cratic representations of a legitimate EC while other concepts of legit-
imacy were almost completely marginalized (see Figure 4.2). When
the Commission talked about legitimacy, it was invariably referring
to democracy. In other words, the democracy discourse had assumed
a hegemonic position. How had this drastic discursive change been
made possible? I will answer this question in two steps. First, I argue
that the rise of the democracy discourse has to be seen within the
broader discursive context of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The polit-
ical upheavals and democratic transformation processes in Central and
Eastern Europe confronted European political elites with an image of the
Community that had long been ‘forgotten’, namely that of a ‘political
union’ based on democratic principles and the rule of law. Demo-
cratic representations of the EC proliferated not only in the Central
and Eastern European context, but also in a variety of other discursive
arenas, providing the discursive background against which the Commis-
sion’s democracy discourse unfolded. The proliferation of democratic
representations of the EC in different discursive arenas, however, is only
the first step in understanding the rise of the democracy discourse. The
stabilization of this discourse and its hegemonic position can only be
fully understood if seen in the context of the three discursive operations
that are part and parcel of every hegemonic project: the construction
of chains of equivalences, the antagonistic division of the discursive
space and the emergence of an empty signifier. Having dealt with the
discursive context and the structure of the democracy discourse illu-
minating how this specific discursive configuration gained precedence,
I will go on to show that far from being mere ‘cheap talk’, the newly
169
emergent democracy discourse was momentous with respect to legiti-

mation policies. I will illustrate how the democracy discourse paved the
way for a variety of new legitimation policies, which I denote as poli-
cies of closeness and which have continued to be one of the central
legitimation policies of the Commission until the present. The chapter
concludes with a short summary of the main arguments.
The discursive context and the proliferation of democratic

representations of Europe
In this section, I argue that the discursive context in the early 1990s
provided fertile ground for the rise of the democracy discourse in the
European Commission. In order to grasp fully the wider web of texts
within which the Commission’s texts were embedded, I utilize an in-
depth intertextual analysis of the Commission’s democracy discourse.
Compared to the identity discourse in the 1980s, intertextual references
in the Commission’s democracy discourse were more implicit in as far
as they could only be reconstructed by studying the socio-political con-
text of the Commission’s democracy discourse together with a range of
secondary sources. In what follows, I will delineate a discursive web of
four discursive arenas that provided the ‘raw material’ from which the
Commission’s democracy discourse was woven.
First, the democratic transformation processes in Central and Eastern
European countries played a crucial role. The European Community
was suddenly confronted with alternative meanings of Europe that had
long been marginalized in Community institutions. For many Central
and Eastern European countries, ‘Europe’ and the ‘West’ had been ‘the
insignias of liberation, democracy and political and economic mod-
ernization’ (Malmborg and Stråth 2002: 20; see also Krzeminski 2001;
Törnquist-Plewa 2002; Biegoń 2006). Values such as freedom, justice
and democracy were closely tied to prevalent meanings of Europe and
the discourse did not differentiate between broader images of Europe
and that of the European Community. The EC became the central ref-
erence point of the vague but value-laden broader democracy discourse
on Europe and the West (Biegoń 2006).
A close reading of Commission documents dealing with legitimacy
at that time makes it clear that democratic representations of Europe
proliferating in the Central and Eastern European context did, indeed,
play a crucial role within the Commission. In the early 1990s, there are a
number of examples in which the Commission hints at Europe being the
locus of democracy and freedom, as conjured up in Central and Eastern
Democracy as a Successful Hegemonic Project in the 1990s 171
Europe. For instance, in Delors’ famous Bruges speech on 17 October

1989, in which he implicitly responded to Margaret Thatcher’s infa-
mous antifederalist manifesto, held at the same place a year earlier, he
pleads for a democratic renewal process within the European Commu-
nity and links his demand to the image of Europe prevalent in Central
and Eastern Europe at the time:
As many European leaders have already stressed, it is our Community,

a Community based on the rule of law, a democratic entity and a
buoyant economy, that has served as the model and the catalyst for
these developments. The West is not drifting eastwards, it is the East
that is being drawn towards the West.
(Delors 1989b)
The second topical issue I would like to raise is ‘democratization’. This

is a vital task. I often have the impression that what we have done in
the past 40 years – and especially the past five, where the economic
aspect has predominated – has been rather elitist in its approach and
remote from the ordinary citizen. One way to bring ourselves closer
is democratization. The mere idea, of course, sends a shiver of appre-
hension through some of our governments – and parliaments too. Yet
this is very strange indeed – a contradiction even – when they them-
selves never tire of telling the countries of Eastern Europe that one of
the conditions for success – including material success – is to apply
the recipe of pluralist democracy and direct popular representation.
(Delors 1990)
These statements make it clear that the Commission’s articulations on

legitimacy were increasingly infused with democratic representations
originating in the Central and Eastern European context. The demand
to democratize the European Community was markedly linked with
constructions of the EC as a pluralist democracy arguably prevalent
in Central and Eastern Europe. In other words, a link was established
between the democracy discourse in the European Commission and the
broader Central and Eastern European democracy discourse.
Second, the democratic legitimacy of the European Community also
became a topical issue in academia in the early 1990s. The term ‘demo-
cratic deficit’ had already been coined for the context of the EC in the
1970s by David Marquand, who employed the term to criticize the fact
that the European Parliament was still composed of indirectly elected
members (Mény 2003: 8). However, it was only in the late 1980s after
the ratification of the Single European Act that the problem description
of a democratic deficit gained impetus.
According to a common line of argumentation, academic interest in
the democratic constitution of the EC was spurred on by treaty revisions
of the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty, which revealed
the ‘gap between powers transferred to the Community and the efficacy
of European Parliamentary oversight and control’ (Williams 1990: 299).
While there is hardly any debate on the democratic credentials of the
European Community in the 1980s, the picture drastically changes in
the early 1990s. In 1994, Neunreither published an article on the issue
of democracy in the EC and the role of national parliaments, beginning
with the observation: ‘during recent years, the notion of the democratic
deficit has become (. . .) one of the most popular subjects for conferences
on European Union’ (Neunreither 1994: 299).1 This statement tellingly
illustrates the academic domain as having fully embraced the concept
of a democratic deficit in the early 1990s.
Although there are no explicit references to the academic debate,
there is still tentative evidence that the democracy discourse in
academia also left its mark on the democracy discourse in the Com-
mission. In fact, the mere use of the term ‘democratic deficit’, which
sharply increased in Commission documents dealing with legitimacy,
might be considered to constitute an intertextual reference. While the
term was non-existent in Commission documents before 1989, Com-
mission texts increasingly employed this term in a legitimacy context
after 1989. Further evidence of the influence of academic debate in
shaping the Commission’s discourse is the fact that the President of the
Commission, Delors, also referred to prominent ideas that were being
widely discussed in the academic debate on the democratic legitimacy of
the EC. In the following statement, for instance, Delors sums up the the-
sis on the end of the ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold
1970) that was being put forward in academic circles at that time:
It is as if European integration, with all its ups and downs had

made progress up to that point despite the apathy of the elected
representatives. European integration was taken for granted in a way.
That is no longer true, and I for one welcome the change.
(Commission 1993d)
1
For some of the first contributions to the academic debate on the democratic
deficit, which primarily focused on the weak accountability of the Council and
the Commission to the European Parliament, see Boyce (1993), Laursen (1992),
Williams (1990) and Weiler (1991).
A further influential discursive arena where the discourse on the demo-

cratic legitimacy of the EC proliferated is member states’ public spheres.
The ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty was accompanied by
vibrant public debate in many member states. Referenda on the treaty
were held in Denmark and France in June and September 1992. Schrag
Sternberg (2013: 103–127) analysed the public debates surrounding the
problem-stricken ratification process in France and Germany between
the beginning of 1991 and the end of 1993. Her analysis demonstrates
that the concept of democracy, which was until then only relevant
for the national level, began to be applied to the Community level.
Democracy became a central normative yardstick in many member
states against which the legitimacy of the EC was to be judged. ‘The
Maastricht debates constituted a stage for the formulation and promul-
gation of a novel, or formerly relatively marginal critiques of the EU
[and] effectively changed the discursive landscape against which the
EU and its legitimacy could be discussed in the years to come’ (Schrag
Sternberg 2013: 105).2
Popular opposition towards the integration process, manifest in the
negative outcome of the referendum in Denmark and the unexpect-
edly close positive outcome in France, did not leave the Commission
unaffected. Explicit intertextual references can be found in the Com-
mission’s immediate reaction to the referendum results. Delors engaged
in a ‘crusade for democracy’ (Commission 1993d) and held a series of
fervent speeches on democracy in the European Parliament, in which
he explicitly linked his considerations to the outcome of the refer-
enda (1992b, 1992c, 1992d). Most strikingly, after the referenda, the
democracy discourse within the Commission became more pronounced,
consolidating on the concepts of subsidiarity and transparency as guid-
ing principles of democratic governance. In Commission documents
issued at the time on the subjects of transparency and subsidiarity, a
number of intertextual references were made to member states’ public
deliberations. The following example illustrates the Commission link-
ing the launch of the subsidiarity principle to member state criticism of
the Community:
2
A similar point is made by Jachtenfuchs et al. (1998), who analysed European
polity ideas in political debates in Germany, France and Great Britain for different
periods of time ranging from the 1950s to 1994. They maintain that democratic
representations of the EC have populated ideas of polity in different political
parties for decades. Similar to Schrag Sternberg, they observe that the later periods
(including the period that encompasses the Maastricht debate) are characterized
by an increase in democratic input criteria such as participation (ibid.: 425).
However, the absence of a list of national powers creates a political

problem to the extent that local authorities and, indeed, the general
public in certain Member States conclude that there are no precise
limits to intervention by the Community, which stands accused of
being able to meddle where it pleases.
(Commission 1992a)
Finally, the European Parliament’s deliberations on democracy, which

intensified in the early 1990s, also constitute a vital discursive context
within which the Commission’s discourse developed. The European Par-
liament put forward an ‘essentially maximalist view’ (McAllister 2010:
187) of the democratization of the Community by pressing for greater
powers in legislation through co-decision. Between 1989 and 1990,
the Committee on Institutional Reforms produced a range of reports
on ‘political union’, extensively depicting their vision of supranational
democracy in the European Community (Laursen 1992). The so-called
Martin and Herman Reports provided a valuable source of inspiration for
the Commission, which hinted at these reports in different documents
and pledged that the Commission’s contribution to the democracy
debate would be maintained in ‘close dialogue’ with the European
Parliament (Commission 1990a).
Last but not least, it needs to be stressed that the Commission’s
emerging democracy discourse in the 1990s drew on discursive struc-
tures that had existed within the Commission for decades. As I argued
in Chapter 4, democratic representations of the EC had already been
very common in the 1970s and were closely tied to the federal-
ist discourse prominently propagated by Altiero Spinelli and others
in the European Parliament (Burgess 1989). At the same time, the
Commission’s articulations on democracy substantially diverged from
those of the 1970s. While the democracy discourse in the 1970s was
firmly anchored in conceptions of parliamentary democracy, the 1990s
witnessed the emergence of alternative constructions of democratic
governance.
In sum, an overview of the discursive context shows that the democ-
racy discourse proliferated in a number of different discursive arenas
(Eastern and Central Europe, academia, the public, European Par-
liament), put simply: democracy was ‘in the air’. Considering the
discursive context of the Commission’s articulation on legitimacy in the
early 1990s, it is no wonder that the Commission started to ‘talk democ-
racy’ at that time. The proliferation of democratic representations of the
EC in a variety of discursive arenas was a precondition for the rise of the
democracy discourse in the Commission. It provided the articulations

taken up and reconfigured in the Commission’s democracy discourse.
Yet, to understand how exactly the Commission’s democracy discourse
managed to stabilize itself and to acquire such a hegemonic position
marginalizing alternative constructions of legitimate governance, one
has to engage in a more detailed analysis of hegemonic operations. I will
turn to this task in the next section.
Hegemonic operations at work
As in the previous chapter, I will now reconstruct the process by which

the democracy discourse acquired a hegemonic position within the
Commission’s articulations on legitimacy by relying on the heuristic
devices developed in Chapter 2. I argue that the ‘democracy turn’ in
the European Commission in the early 1990s can be more comprehen-
sively understood if attention is paid to hegemonic operations at work
within discourses.
In Chapter 5, I outlined the fragility of the discourse around the
empty signifier of a ‘people’s Europe’. This discourse was fraught with
tension as it linked both identity- and performance-related articulations.
Thus, a clear-cut delineation of the self from the other was not possible
since performance-related articulations were situated on both sides of
the antagonistic frontier. These moments of tension became ever more
pervasive in the early 1990s with the emergence of the two ‘heteroge-
neous entities’3 subsidiarity and transparency. These two articulations
fundamentally structuring the legitimacy debate in the early 1990s
could be neither meaningfully integrated into the chain of equiva-
lence constituted by the empty signifier ‘people’s Europe’, nor did they
form part of the antagonistic other. In other words, the two heteroge-
neous entities could not be integrated in any structural location within
the antagonistic camp, which is why I denote them as heterogeneous
entities.
At the same time, a new chain of equivalence began to emerge; links
began to be established between the moments of the formerly domi-
nant discursive chain and the newly emerging heterogeneous entities.
Most significantly, articulations stressing the cultural diversity of the
European people, a central building block of the identity discourse
and prominently propagated by the Commission (see Chapter 5), were
3
The category of heterogeneity is discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
linked to articulations emphasizing the principle of subsidiarity. In his

Bruges speech, Delors declared that a ‘wholehearted acceptance of plu-
ralism’ was of vital importance for legitimate governance and explicitly
linked this proposition to the principle of subsidiarity: ‘Acceptance of
subsidiarity implies respect for pluralism and, by implication diversity’
(Delors 1989b). Such links between moments of the identity discourse
and newly emerging discursive elements such as subsidiarity unhinged
the formerly dominant people’s Europe discourse and played a major
role in the demise of the latter (Figure 6.1). The chain of equivalence
finally broke up and the empty signifier ‘people’s Europe’ was filled
with particular components of meaning. In the 1990s, creating a peo-
ple’s Europe meant little more than consolidating the internal market:
the discourse was primarily constituted by performance-related rep-
resentations of the EU and increasingly lost relevance. The same is
true of the identity component of the discourse: ultimately, the peo-
ple’s Europe discourse proved unsuitable to integrate newly emerging
democratic articulations because of the reparticularization of the empty
signifier.
The emergence of articulations relating to transparency and
subsidiarity was accompanied by a reconfiguration of discursive ele-
ments: the previously influential chain of equivalence constituting the
people’s Europe discourse broke up and a ‘new’ chain of equivalence
took its place. This newly emergent chain was constituted by three kinds
of articulations. First, older articulations constructing a legitimate EC
as a democratic political system rooted in the federalist discourse were
revived. Second, articulations from the identity discourse were reconfig-
ured and became linked to the newly emerging democracy discourse.
Finally, these two types of articulations joined forces with further ‘new’
articulations arguably imported from different discursive arenas. Since
I described the central building blocks of the democracy discourse of
the 1990s in Chapter 4, I will now only briefly summarize the main
findings.
The five source domains most clearly structuring the democracy
discourse of the Commission were MACHINE, BUILDING, SIGHT, COM-
MUNICATION and PATH . I will comment on each type of articulation,
outlining the changes of expression that took place in each conceptual
domain in the early 1990s.
As outlined in Chapter 4, the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EC
IS MACHINE had previously structured the democracy discourse for
decades. A legitimate EC had been constructed as a political sys-
tem constituted by democratic procedures and democratic institutional
People’s Europe
Identify discourse Performance discourse
ORGANISM FAMILY MACHINE ORGANISM
Identity Civilization Diversity Solidarity Belonging Mutual Effective Impact Impetus Tangible Living Reinvigo-
trust rated
...
Subsidiarity
equivalence
metaphor
Other/empty signifier Heterogeneous entity
Figure 6.1 Break-up of the people’s Europe discourse

177
arrangements from as far back as the 1970s. These older representations

re-emerged and were linked to new articulations connected to the
subsidiarity debate and the concept of institutional balance. The legiti-
macy debate was full of articulations representing the EC as being com-
posed of different levels and units that needed to work in harmony in
order to be legitimate. Articulations emphasizing decentralization, checks
and balances and the importance of institutional counterweights became
all-pervasive. Similar to the machine metaphor, articulations consti-
tuting the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EC IS BUILDING changed
slightly. Older articulations originating in the 1970s and 1980s stressing
the democratic foundation, base and general set-up of the Community
were linked to new articulations centring on the analogy between the
political system of the EC and a building opened up to the general
public. In the 1990s, the discourse abounded in articulations stress-
ing the openness and accessibility of the Community – two concepts
that did not feature prominently in the democracy discourse of ear-
lier decades. What is more, the building metaphor is often linked to
the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EC IS SIGHT, the latter of which
underlines the transparency and clarity of institutional procedures as
being central for democratic legitimacy. In a similar vein, a change of
expression can also be reconstructed within the group of articulations
constituting the conceptual metaphor LEGITIMATE EC IS COMMUNICA-
TION . Paternalistic representations of the EC emphasizing the notion
that a legitimate EC needs to explain itself and to better inform its citi-
zens were increasingly accompanied by articulations building on a more
interactive notion of communication and the need for attentive listen-
ing, dialogue and debate. Finally, in the 1990s, the democracy discourse
is structured by articulations drawing on the conceptual metaphor
LEGITIMATE EC IS PATH. Proximity between institutions and citizens
is increasingly constructed as being central for legitimate governance.
A legitimate Community was represented as one that is close to its cit-
izens and one that reduces the gap between institutions and citizens.
Similar statements can already be found in the 1970s and 1980s, yet
in the early 1990s, these statements proliferate and become linked
to more pronounced articulations demanding citizen involvement and
participation.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the basic structure of the democracy discourse as
it emerged in the early 1990s. The figure illustrates that the new democ-
racy discourse emerging in the 1990s tended to draw on conceptual
metaphors that had existed in the Commission’s democracy discourse
EC is EC is EC is EC is EC is EC is
SIGHT BUILDING MACHINE COMMUNICATION PATH ORGANISM
Trans- Foundation Access Open- Inst. Inst. Decentra- Explain Dialogue Debate Close- Involve- Partici- Diversity
parency ness process balance lization ness ment pation
Moment of an Relation of Conceptual

equivalential chain equivalence metaphor
Figure 6.2 Chain of equivalence of the democracy discourse, early 1990s

179
for decades. Notwithstanding, the integration of new democratic repre-

sentations of the EC significantly changed the meaning of democracy
that became dominant at that time.
Overall, the discourse on democratic legitimacy as it constituted itself
in the early 1990s was characterized by a unique linking up of diverse
representations of the Community. Democratic representations corre-
sponding to a liberal-representative understanding of democracy (with
a strong focus on strengthening the European Parliament) were linked
with articulations on alternative conceptions of democratic governance
(emphasizing post-parliamentary modes of democratic legitimation
such as transparency, civil society involvement and subsidiarity). Com-
pared to the 1970s and 1980s, the meaning of democracy had been
significantly widened.
According to poststructuralist discourse theory, a historically specific
linking up of discursive elements (here, democratic representations of
the EC) is stabilized by the emergence of an antagonistic other that
dichotomizes the discursive space. In the 1980s, this function was
fulfilled by the two representations of ‘common market Europe’ and
‘technocrat Europe’, juxtaposed to positively connotated representa-
tions of a ‘people’s Europe’. Is it possible to reconstruct as similar
development in the early 1990s? What entity was constructed as the
antagonistic other juxtaposed against democratic representations of the
Community? Who or what was the other standing in the way of con-
structing a truly democratic Community? My argument is that the
role of the antagonistic other was fulfilled neither by common market
Europe nor by technocrat Europe. These two constructions of the EC
lost significance in the democracy discourse in the early 1990s and were
replaced by a new other emerging to dichotomize the discursive space:
intergovernmental Europe.
In the 1990s, a variety of articulations appeared within the Com-
mission emphasizing that the project of a democratic Europe was
threatened by the predominance of individual nation states and their
unwillingness to relinquish power for the sake of a common European
good. Understanding the European Community as an intergovernmen-
tal cooperation was construed to be a threat to European democracy, as
is testified by the following:
Many envy us our Community based on the rule of law and this
explains its growing influence. What a model our institutions, which
allow every country irrespective of its size to have its say and make
its contribution, offer the nations of Eastern Europe. They, and
many other nations besides, admire the practical, forward-looking
application of pluralist democracy within our borders. In these cir-

cumstances how can anyone expect us to accept absorption into a
larger, looser structure along intergovernmental lines? We would be
abandoning a bird in the hand for two in the bush. It would be a
tragic mistake for Europe.
(Delors 1989b)
This, frankly, is what we most lack today. I can say, with both feet
on the ground, that the theory of the bogeyman-nation has no place
in the life of our Community if it wants to be a Community worthy
of the name. The inevitable conflicts of interests between us must be
transcended by a family feeling, a sense of shared values.
(Delors 1989b)
The pursuit of national interests and the project of an intergovernmen-

tal Europe – a Europe in which member states are the central actors –
were regarded as detrimental to the democratization of the Community.
National interests were denounced as facilitating ‘intra-European bick-
ering’ (Delors 1991) which would ultimately paralyse the Community.
A ‘diluted’ (Commission 1990b) Community or a ‘watering-down of the
Community’ (Commission 1993d) was seen as jeopardizing the project,
with criticism often levelled at the Council of Ministers – the symbol of
national wrangling:
How can you expect the man in the street, who did not go to univer-
sity, who works away at his job, worries about his children’s future,
and who sees unemployment rising, how is he to understand that
we are in the process of constructing a big united family when every
time the Council of Ministers comes together we are presented with
the image of a battlefield where national vanity and selfish interests
clash?
(Delors 1992a)
The quotation illustrates that disunity, fragmentation and quarrels over

national interests were presented as a threat to democracy in the
Commission’s legitimacy discourse in the early 1990s.
The rise of an intergovernmental Europe as a central threat in the
democracy discourse of the Commission becomes more understand-
able if the discursive context is taken into account. The model of
an intergovernmental Europe became more powerful in a number of
discursive arenas in the late 1980s. Again, the political transformation
processes in Central and Eastern Europe played an important role; the
political developments taking place there triggered discussions about

a possible enlargement of the Community, since Central and Eastern
European countries were quick to express eagerness for EC member-
ship. As is well known, some powerful member states, in particular
the United Kingdom, welcomed these demands for EC membership,
as they hoped this would weaken the EC politically and put an end
to plans aiming at deepening European integration (Dinan 2004: 243).
Representations of an intergovernmental Europe were revived and force-
fully advanced by Margaret Thatcher in a famous feud between her and
Jacques Delors (Burgess 2000: 204–205) which culminated in her infa-
mous Bruges speeches, leading to a polarization of the debate on the
future of Europe in 1989 (ibid.: 242–243). In poststructuralist theoreti-
cal terms, the discourse on intergovernmental Europe found a powerful
subject (Margaret Thatcher) who identified with it, which undoubtedly
increased the social significance of the discourse.
Representations of an intergovernmental Europe were constituted by
a diverse range of articulations stressing that nation states remained key
actors in the integration process and that the legitimacy of the EC was
fundamentally dependent on member states’ democracies. Secondary
sources suggest that the discourse on intergovernmental Europe was
not confined to the United Kingdom: during intergovernmental con-
ferences on ‘political union’, serious attempts were made by a couple
of member states to strengthen the intergovernmental mode of inte-
gration and to heavily curtail the power of the European Commission,
more specifically, to limit the Commission’s exclusive right of initia-
tive (Wester 1992: 208). In a number of his speeches in the European
Parliament, Jacques Delors severely criticized these attempts and feared
that the Commission would be degraded to a Secretariat General for
the Council (Wester 1992: 209; Dinan 2004: 252). What these develop-
ments illustrate is that representations of an intergovernmental Europe
took precedence in a number of influential discursive arenas, most sig-
nificantly in some member states and, by extension, the Council of the
European Union and the European Council.
In the democracy discourse of the Commission, this discursive con-
text is reflected in the fact that intergovernmental Europe was increas-
ingly represented as a threat to democracy. Any demands to reform the
Community along intergovernmental lines, including the demand to
strengthen the role of national parliaments, were derided as a threat to
the institutional balance of the Community and thereby undemocratic.
The democracy discourse excluded the discourse on intergovernmen-
tal Europe as a threatening other. As Jacques Delors forcefully pointed
out: ‘the theory of the Bogeyman-nation has no place in the life of
the Community’ (Delors 1989b, emphasis added). Intergovernmen-

tal Europe is radically excluded from the discursive space filled by
democratic Europe.
This radical exclusion and the construction of a clear other undoubt-
edly stabilized the democracy discourse in the 1990s. Proponents
of a far-reaching democratization of the Community, most signifi-
cantly the Commission and the European Parliament, had an ‘enemy’
against which they constructed their own positive vision of Europe: a
supranational Europe built on solid democratic foundations.
The last step of every hegemonic discourse is constituted by the emer-
gence of an empty signifier. In the early 1990s, it was the signifier ‘political
union’ that took over this role. The concept of political union has a
long history in the institutions of the European Community. The term
was prominently employed for the first time in the early 1960s during
negotiations for stronger cooperation in external relations, or ‘politi-
cal cooperation’ as it was labelled at the time. In February 1961, heads
of state and government agreed to establish a committee under the
chairmanship of Christian Fouchet to examine the possibility of polit-
ical cooperation. In Bonn in July 1961, they agreed to meet at regular
intervals to compare views on foreign policy, that is, ‘to reach common
positions in order to further the political union of Europe’ (Heads of State
and Government 1961, emphasis added). The term ‘political union’
became closely associated with the unsuccessful diplomatic initiative by
the then French President, Charles de Gaulle, to strengthen cooperation
in external relations and to design the Community along intergovern-
mental lines (Bodenheimer 1967; Koopmann 2006). Since then, the
phrase has usually been narrowly confined to forms of cooperation in
external relations (Burgess 2000: 203).
In the late 1980s, the concept was revived and its meaning compo-
nents were significantly widened. Political union came to denote more
than closer cooperation in high politics such as foreign and defence pol-
icy, and in sharp contrast to its original usage (in the debate on the
Fouchet Plans), the phrase was increasingly employed by those demand-
ing the intergovernmental mode of political integration be abandoned
in favour of a supranational one. The phrase thus becomes closely con-
nected to the federalist discourse (ibid.). By avoiding the unpopular
and highly contentious concept of federalism, political union offered
a new and catchy phrase for a vision of Europe founded on a strong
supranational basis (Somek 2013: 567).
Arguments favouring a political union have to be seen in the specific
historical context of the late 1980s. After the ratification of the Single
European Act, the European Parliament and the European Commission
claimed that deeper integration and stronger Community institutions

were an absolute necessity if the cherished goal of completing the
single market was to be achieved. Without further empowerment of
Community institutions, the internal market would become fragile and
vulnerable since every time a member state encountered difficulties,
the adjustment process would be halted. They argued that there was
‘a fundamental contradiction between the ambitious goals of the sin-
gle market and the Community’s institutional capacity to solve them’
(Burgess 2000: 200). Political union was constructed as an essential
counterpart to the single market programme and to plans evolving
within the Commission to launch the project of European Monetary
Union.4 This position was not only propagated by the European Com-
mission and by the European Parliament, but was also famously shared
by the German delegation as well as by a number of further member
states during negotiations for the Maastricht Treaty (Burgess 2000: 204;
Dinan 2004: 244): political union was constructed as inevitable; if com-
petences of Community institutions were not strengthened, a European
Monetary union would be obstructed by national interests and ulti-
mately fail. Typically, this argumentation was accompanied by demands
to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the EC. The increase of
competences, the argument claimed, made further democratization of
the EC indispensable.
In sum, the concept of political union as it evolved at that time
primarily denoted a political system founded on a solid supranational
4
‘Political union’ disappeared from the European debate before re-appearing in
the context of institutional reform debates triggered by the outbreak of the finan-
cial crisis in 2008. At the time of writing, the concept was extensively discussed
both in academic circles (Bofinger, Habermas and Nida-Rümelin 2012) and within
the political sphere (Van Rompuy Durão Barroso, Juncker and Draghi 2012;
Barroso 2013). Interestingly, the meaning attributed to ‘political union’ most
recently is strikingly similar to the one in the early 1990s. Now, the term denotes
a mode of political integration that goes beyond intergovernmental cooperation
and is linked with demands to strengthen the competence of Community insti-
tutions. What is more, the arguments justifying the project of a political union
are also very similar to those in the 1990s. Political union is constructed as a
necessity to remedy the construction failures of the European Monetary Union.
In order to rescue the latter, we have to move on with European integration and
strive towards political union, so the argument goes (Somek 2013: 567). Fiscal
integration, banking union, stronger macroeconomic supervision, a European
‘gouvernance économique’ and even closer cooperation on social policies are,
depending on the author, all part of the package of a political union (Hacker
2011; for an overview see Dullien and Torreblanca 2012).
basis and linked more directly with the European people. In addi-
tion, the phrase retained its older components of meaning of closer
cooperation in external relations, as illustrated in the Commission’s
description of political union in its ‘General Report on the Activities
of the Communities in 1990’:
It was with these considerations in mind that the European Council,

having set the ball rolling in April, agreed in Dublin in June that a sec-
ond intergovernmental conference on political union should be held
in December. This conference was to discuss ways of achieving greater
democratic legitimacy, developing a common policy on external
relations and security, promoting the idea of European citizenship,
extending and strengthening the Community and improving the
effectiveness of its institutions.
(Commission 1991)
We are shown the diverse range of components of meaning attached to

political union. The term was fundamentally vague and encompassed
different aspects roughly falling into the field of foreign policy, broad-
ening EC competences and democratic legitimacy (Burgess 2000: 203).
These three fields are also taken up in the Commission’s main communi-
cation on political union in preparation for the 1991 Intergovernmental
Conference (Commission 1990a). Yet it is exactly this vagueness of the
term which considerably contributed to the stability of the democ-
racy discourse: the articulation on political union came to represent
the chain of equivalence on democratic legitimacy as a whole. All of
the representations of a democratic Community expressed themselves
through the construction of political union. In other words, political
union became the common positive reference point of articulations
constructing a democratic Europe and was juxtaposed with intergov-
ernmental Europe, which assumed the position of the antagonistic
other threatening the democratic legitimacy of the Community (see
Figure 6.3).5
5
Figure 6.3 only illustrates the discursive structure of the democracy discourse at
that time. In fact, the equivalential chain constituting the empty signifier ‘polit-
ical union’ was even longer and, as outlined above, encompassed articulations
dealing with the strengthening of EC institutions and foreign policy. These
articulations are, however, not included in the figure because they were not part
of the analysis. Only articulations connected to the issue of legitimacy are listed
in Figure 6.3.
186
Intergovernmental Europe
Political Union
EC is EC is EC is EC is EC is EC is
SIGHT BUILDING MACHINE COMMUNICATION PATH ORGANISM
Trans- Foundation Access Open- Inst. Inst. Decentra- Explain Dialogue Debate Close- Involve- Partici- Diversity
parency ness process balance lization ness ment pation
Moment of an Relation of Conceptual

equivalential chain equivalence metaphor
Other/ Antagonistic
empty signifier frontier
Figure 6.3 Structure of the political union discourse

In hindsight, three conditions can be reconstructed as contributing

to the emergence and success of the empty signifier. First, the signi-
fier was available. The concept of political union had been present in
institutional reform debates for decades and in the 1990s, it offered
an alternative to influential representations of the EC that reduced
the latter to intergovernmental cooperation. Second, the empty sig-
nifier ‘political union’ was credible because the moments constituting
the chain resonated well with established federalist representations of
the EC, depicting the latter as a supranational democracy. These repre-
sentations were particularly common in the 1970s. In the early 1990s,
they were revived and linked to new articulations such as transparency
and subsidiarity. Finally, the vagueness of the term enabled a vari-
ety of different subjects to identify with the empty signifier of ‘political
union’. As outlined above, the concept was propagated by almost all
Community institutions and a range of influential member states at
that time.
Compared to the people’s Europe discourse in the 1980s, the discourse
on political union did not display significant fractures. The antagonistic
division of the discursive space was much clearer; there are hardly any
articulations criss-crossing the antagonistic frontier. The chain of equiv-
alence was also more coherent. While the people’s Europe discourse
incorporated two rather conflicting legitimacy discourses (the perfor-
mance and the identity discourses), the political union discourse was
firmly embedded in a democratic understanding of legitimacy. All repre-
sentations of the EC constituting the discourse on political union in one
way or another made recourse to different interpretations of democracy
as a basis of legitimate governance. The performance and the identity
discourses on legitimacy were successfully expelled from the discursive
field constituting a legitimate Europe.
Arguably, a moment of tension was brought into the discourse by the
empty signifier ‘political union’. As argued above, this signifier was origi-
nally employed in a foreign policy context. In the 1980s and early 1990s,
it acquired a new meaning and was linked to legitimacy debates. Yet,
older meaning components from the foreign policy context remained
part and parcel of the discourse on political union. As was the case with
the people’s Europe discourse, the chain of equivalence constituting the
political union discourse constantly threatened to break up. In different
discursive arenas, the empty signifier was revived with particular com-
ponents of meaning: this became evident in negotiations during the
1991 Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union. The European
Parliament, for instance, primarily linked its demand for political union
to an extension of its legislative powers. Others, such as the British dele-

gation, foregrounded the aspect of decentralization when talking about
political union and other delegations tended to reduce the concept of
political union to closer cooperation in external relations (Laursen and
Vanhoonacker 1992). Thus, on the one hand, the empty signifier ‘polit-
ical union’ significantly stabilized the discourse, since it constituted a
reference point by which all democratic representations of the EC could
express themselves. But on the other hand, the length of the chain of
equivalence represented via the empty signifier constituted a moment
of instability: different subjects tried to refill the empty signifier with
particular components of meaning. Such processes threatened to break
up the equivalential chain, initiating the demise of the discourse on
political union.
Policies of closeness as legitimation policy
The democracy discourse of the early 1990s was particularly powerful

and enabled a range of new legitimation policies to emerge, which I here
denote as ‘policies of closeness’. The term draws on Walter and Haahr’s
(2005) Foucauldian-inspired governmentality study on the EU. They
claim that during the 1990s, the Commission increasingly made use of
what they call ‘technologies of proximity’ signifying ‘all those discourses
and practices which imagine democracy in terms of positive experience
of local engagement, participation and connection’ (ibid.: 76). Similarly,
I claim that the early 1990s saw the emergence of new types of legitima-
tion policies that were launched with the explicit objective of bringing
citizens closer to the Community. The proposition that underlay these
policies was that legitimate governance was significantly dependent on
direct political experience and personal engagement. Both the vast array
of transparency measures and the politics of subsidiarity introduced at
that time were based on this basic proposition. By emphasizing the
value of closeness and direct engagement, these policies fundamen-
tally diverged from former legitimation policies tending to focus on
strengthening the European Parliament. As Lodge has pointedly argued,
‘[s]ince before the first Euro-elections in 1979, many had argued that
this democratic deficit would only be remedied if the Council and
the European Parliament became a bicameral legislature with roughly
equal powers’ (Lodge 1994: 345). By contrast, in the early 1990s, atten-
tion was diverted away from the role of the European Parliament, with
legitimation policies focusing on closing the gap between citizens and
Community institutions by facilitating means of citizen engagement:
transparency and subsidiarity became the central means of achieving

this goal.
Relying on the model of combinability as conceptualized by Hansen
(2006: 28–31), I argue that the emergence of policies of closeness was
made possible by a historically specific discursive link between demo-
cratic representations of the Community that gained an increasingly
dominant position in the early 1990s and policies of transparency and
subsidiarity. As Hansen has pointed out, a poststructuralist study aiming
to reconstruct the influence of certain representations of the EC on poli-
cies has to scrutinize the links between particular representations and
policies. The rise of democratic representations alone does not suffice
in trying to understand the rise of policies of closeness. As described in
Chapter 4, democratic representations of the EC had already been very
common in the Commission in the 1970s, yet, policies of closeness did
not exist at the time. Similarly, the concept of subsidiarity had been
on the Commission’s agenda for decades (Endo 1994). However, early
articulations on subsidiarity advanced by the Commission were not
linked to any meaningful broader discourse and remained inconsequen-
tial. It was only in the early 1990s when subsidiarity and transparency
became linked to the then dominant democracy discourse in the Com-
mission that policies of closeness gained ground. In order to understand
the link between subsidiarity and transparency on the one hand and the
democracy discourse on the other, it is necessary to trace the origins of
both principles in Community institutions.
The origins of the principle of subsidiarity lie in Catholic social
doctrine (Kersbergen and Verbeek 1994: 221–225) and it has been on
the reform agenda in Community institutions since the mid-1970s
(McAllister 2010: 91). For example, it was mentioned by the Commis-
sion in its first ‘Report on European Union’ in 1975, however, without
an explicit link to legitimacy (Commission 1975c: para.12). An early
clear link between legitimacy and subsidiarity can be found in com-
munications issued by the European Parliament, as in its Draft Treaty
on Establishing the European Union adopted in 1984, where a refer-
ence to subsidiarity can be found in the preamble (European Parliament
1984). In this document as well as in the deliberations surrounding
the drafting of the document, subsidiarity becomes part of a wider dis-
course on decentralization and autonomy preservation, representing
the latter as a central characteristic of legitimate governance. Such a
conceptualization of subsidiarity was largely confined to the European
Parliament (Wilke and Wallace 1990: 23–25; Kersbergen and Verbeek
1994: 217). Around 1989, the first signs of a genuine interest in the
principle within the Commission can be found. In his famous Bruges

speech, the then-President of the Commission, Delors, elaborated on
the idea of subsidiarity and linked it to the broader federalist ideol-
ogy and to Denis de Rougement more specifically. He emphasized the
enormous impact of ‘federalism’ on his political thinking and pledged
that active citizen participation, decentralization, local autonomy and
respect for personal differences were crucial for legitimate, democratic
governance – all of which, he believed, were realized in the principle
of subsidiarity (Delors 1989b). Thus, subsidiarity became linked to a
broader discourse on democratic governance. During the intergovern-
mental conferences, subsidiarity was pushed by a variety of different
subjects such as the European Parliament, the German Länder and
Delors (Endo 1994; Marquardt 1994) and it was finally included in
the Maastricht Treaty in Article 3b. After the Danish rejection of the
Treaty in June 1992, subsidiarity was propagated by the Commission as
a key remedy for the democratic deficit. The Commission furthered the
inter-institutional debate on subsidiarity with its communication ‘The
Principle of Subsidiarity’ (Commission 1992a), which it prepared for
the Birmingham European Council in October 1992, and with its 1993
‘Report on the Adaptation of Community Legislation to the Subsidiarity
Principle’ (Commission 1993f).
Unlike subsidiarity, which has a long history in Community insti-
tutions, articulations on transparency did not feature prominently in
the discourses of the Community; they were imported from other
discursive arenas, most importantly from the member state discourses
on democracy. During the intergovernmental conferences, articulations
on transparency were put forward by member countries with long-
standing traditions of open government, that is, Denmark, Finland,
the Netherlands and Sweden (Lodge 1994; Curtin 1995; Bignami 2004).
Curtin (1995: 96) mentions the zeitgeist of the 1960s and asserts that
during this period ‘there was a noticeable and growing belief in these
countries [the member states of the European Community] (. . .) that a
more open approach to the operation of government would increase the
possibility of improving control over the workings of the administration
of government’. In the 1990s, these articulations were transferred to the
European Community. Transparency and openness of government were
introduced as cornerstones of democracy not only in individual mem-
ber states but also within the Community as a whole. The European
Parliament showed a genuine interest in the issue of transparency when
adopting a resolution calling for the introduction of legislation on open-
ness of government as early as 1984. Moreover, the draft Treaty on
European Union adopted by the European Parliament in the same year

also included an article on the opening up of Council meetings and
explicitly linked it to concerns about democratic governance (Curtin
1995: 100). In the Commission’s discourse, the first signs of a discursive
link between transparency and democracy can be reconstructed in
1992 in a variety of fervent speeches held by the then Commission
President Jacques Delors (1992b, 1992c, 1992d) in the European Parlia-
ment. Alongside these statements, the Commission issued a number of
important documents to further the inter-institutional debate on trans-
parency (Commission 1992b, 1993b, 1993c). In the course of the 1990s,
the Commission became a key figure, pressing for the implementation
of a rigid transparency regime within its own institution and other
Community institutions (Peterson 1995; Brüggemann 2008: 165–169).
Between 1992 and 1993, a strong alliance emerges between democ-
racy and policies of subsidiarity and transparency. The Commission
repeatedly made recourse to this threefold alliance as follows:
So I think that if we are to tackle the problems created by the indiffer-

ence in which European integration has progressed with its complex
text, excessive bureaucracy, technocracy if you like, it is essential to
proceed to a review. The Commission began this a long time ago on
the threefold basis of transparency, subsidiarity and democracy.
(Delors 1992a, emphasis added)
Such links between the democracy discourse and subsidiarity and trans-
parency were by no means necessary, as the history of the democracy
discourse in the Commission shows. As emphasized above, articulations
on subsidiarity and democratic legitimacy existed separately in Com-
mission discourse in previous decades. It was only in the early 1990s
that a connection was established between democracy and subsidiarity,
also taking on board the newly emergent articulations on transparency.
By then, the democracy discourse had already acquired a hegemonic
position and was stabilized by a range of intertextual links. It became
commonplace to talk about the Community in terms of democracy;
subsidiarity and transparency were constructed as the natural means to
achieve democratization of the Community.
Policies of closeness implemented in the 1990s encompassed both the
codification of the subsidiarity principle in the Maastricht Treaty and the
variety of measures launched to improve transparency. The subsidiarity
principle obliged all Community institutions to judge carefully whether
Community action was necessary or whether, instead, legislative acts
could better be accomplished at a national or local level. Ultimately, this

provision led to the withdrawal or crucial revision of a number of Com-
mission proposals (Endo 1994: 1982). With respect to transparency, the
measures implemented in the course of the 1990s primarily affected the
Commission and the Council. Measures launched by the Commission
focused on more timely access to Commission documents in order to
give interested parties the opportunity to engage in the policy process at
an early stage, a comprehensive set of measures ensuring open access to
documents6 and early attempts to regulate lobbyism (Lodge 1994: 350).
As far as the Council is concerned, legitimation policies concentrated
on the opening up of Council deliberations; debate on the democratic
deficit both in academia and in the member states ‘has brought into
sharp relief the fact that the most powerful legislator in the EU sys-
tem legislates behind closed doors’ (Curtin 1995: 98). Reacting to this
criticism, the Council decided to open its doors for the first time in its
history. General policy debates on work programmes were televised for
viewing in the press area of the Council (Lodge 1994: 356). In a similar
vein, the Council decided to lay its voting records on binding legislative
acts open, to provide explanations for the votes taken and to improve
access to documents.
As far as the concrete implementation of policies of closeness is
concerned, severe criticism has been levelled at both subsidiarity and
transparency measures. As far as subsidiarity is concerned, it was argued
that the vagueness of the concept significantly impaired its utility.
Because of the hazy nature of the legal provisions, it is often argued,
subsidiarity only had a marginal impact on EC practices (Marquardt
1994: 628–631). With respect to transparency measures, Curtin (1995)
severely criticizes the legal basis of the openness provisions. He argues
that by relegating these rules to the non-fundamental and discretionary
status of internal rule-making, for instance, by codifying them in the
Council’s rules of procedure, transparency measures lost their effective-
ness. Furthermore, it has been criticized that the measures that were
implemented were not far-reaching enough (Lodge 1994; Curtin 1995).
6
The radical shift in the Commission’s standpoint towards access to docu-
ments is illustrated by the Zwaetveld case. In 1990, the Commission strictly
rejected demands to freely provide access to information on request from its
archive. At that time, the Commission still argued that its archive was ‘invio-
lable’ and would therefore not be opened to the general public (Curtin 1995:
101). In 1993, the picture changed completely: the Commission was quick to
adopt a comprehensive package of measures improving access to documents.
These are certainly valid points. Yet, it is beyond the scope of this
chapter to assess the reasons for the policy’s failure. Instead, this chapter
sets out to adopt a long-term diachronic perspective and to point to
new developments in the Commission’s legitimation policies in the
early 1990s. Considering the legitimacy discourses in the Commission
since the 1970s, the turn towards subsidiarity and transparency and the
link to democracy is, indeed, remarkable and constitutes a new phase
in the Commission’s legitimacy discourse. It paved the way for a new
type of legitimation policy. For the first time in the history of the Com-
munity, remedies for the democracy problems of the Community were
not sought in the European Parliament. Instead, a new type of legitima-
tion policy emerged, advocating closeness between European citizens
and Community institutions as the key to the democratization of the
Union. This constitutes a turning point for the Commission’s legitima-
tion policies: in the course of the 1990s and even more so after 2000,
post-parliamentary legitimation policies have increasingly gained in sig-
nificance. This is particularly the case for transparency measures: while
subsidiarity measures quickly faded into the background and were incor-
porated in the better lawmaking agenda at the end of the 1990s, thus
losing their initial objective of democratizing the EU, transparency mea-
sures have remained high on the agenda and are constructed as a central
means to democratize the EU.
Conclusion
The early 1990s constituted a unique period as far as the legitimacy

discourses in the Commission are concerned. Democracy and legiti-
macy became closely intertwined. The European Commission took for
granted that legitimacy was one and the same thing as democratic
legitimacy. This is remarkable given the long history of performance-
oriented meanings of legitimacy in the European Commission. How was
this radical shift made possible? In this chapter, I have argued that the
emphasis on democracy within the Commission has to be seen within
the broader discursive context. Based on the analysis of intertextual
references within the Commission’s democracy discourse, I was able
to reconstruct different discursive arenas that were particularly influ-
ential in shaping the Commission’s articulations on democracy. First,
the Central and Eastern European political transformation processes in
the late 1980s and early 1990s brought to the fore representations of
the EC as a locus of liberal democracy that had long been marginal-
ized. Furthermore, the treaty revisions leading to the Single European
Act and the Maastricht Treaty spurred academic interest in the demo-
cratic credentials of the EC. The democratic deficit became a buzzword
both in academia and among the member states’ publics, which in turn
influenced the Commission’s articulations on legitimacy. Finally, the
European Parliament in its tireless struggle to democratize the EC was
increasingly supported by the Commission and helped to revive older
articulations rooted in federalist ideology that were already present in
the Commission in the 1970s. The proliferation of democratic represen-
tations of the EC in these discursive arenas provided a fertile ground for
the Commission’s turn towards democracy.
What is more, in the course of the 1990s, the democracy discourse
was significantly stabilized by three interrelated discursive operations.
First, a chain of equivalence was constructed linking together a vari-
ety of different democratic representations of the EC and associating
newly emergent demands for more transparency and subsidiarity. Sec-
ond, an intergovernmental Europe was constructed as the symbol of
an illegitimate Europe against which a positive democratic vision of
the EC was able to assert itself. Finally, the discourse on a democratic
Europe was able to significantly consolidate itself with the emergence
of the term ‘political union’ that integrated the variety of democratic
representations of the EC. Rooted in a foreign policy context, the term
‘political union’ acquired a different layer of meaning in the early 1990s
and became the epitome of a legitimate EC. These three operations
contributed to the power of the democracy discourse which acquired
a hegemonic position in the Commission’s discourse in the early 1990s,
paving the way for the emergence of policies of closeness.
7
Conclusion: Towards an Alternative
Horizon – Democracy and Dispute
One of the core tasks of discourse analytical studies is to problematize

the seemingly unproblematical, to contest what is uncontested and to
interrogate the familiar (Diez 2014a: 322, see also 2014b, 2008). The
conclusion of a book is the ideal place to get back to this core task.
So far, the primary goal of this study has been to describe the discursive
structures of different legitimacy discourses prevalent in the Commis-
sion (Chapter 4) as well as to illustrate how they paved the way for the
launch of new types of legitimation policies (chapters 5 and 6). A critical
undertone can certainly be discerned in each of the empirical chapters
of this work, yet a critical position has not yet been fully spelled out.
In order to accomplish this task, I want to concentrate on the most
recent development of the democracy discourse in the European Com-
mission and problematize the ‘dialogue and debate fad’. Emphasis on
increased dialogue and debate with Europe’s citizens slowly evolved in
the European Commission after 2001 and gained ever more strength
after the failed constitutional referenda in 2005 (see Chapter 4). Since
then, the Commission has presented an intensified dialogue with its cit-
izens as a vital means of democratizing the EU. Dialogue and debate
is also a key building block of the Commission’s most recent legiti-
mation policy: the ‘New Narrative for Europe’ campaign, launched in
cooperation with artists and intellectuals in April 2013. The discussion
of democratic articulations related to this campaign is an ideal case to
problematize the meaning of dialogue and debate evoked by the Com-
mission, since the campaign drew on many structural components of
the democracy discourse as it evolved after 2005.
At first sight, it seems rather odd to problematize the idea of more
dialogue and debate for the democratization of the EU. A more interac-
tive mode of communication between citizens and political institutions
195
is generally accepted as a positive and valuable undertaking and poli-

cies of ‘participatory engineering’ (Zittel 2008)1 have not only gained
ground in the EU but also in Western democracies more generally (Fung
and Wright 2003).
However, as I have discussed in Chapter 4, the rise of the term ‘dia-
logue and debate’ is accompanied by significant discursive closures. It is
a specific, highly consensus-oriented meaning of dialogue and debate
that is prevalent in the Commission, while a more conflict-oriented
understanding of debate is largely excluded. This restrained meaning
of dialogue and debate is also conveyed by the Commission when relat-
ing to the New Narrative for Europe campaign. In his state of the union
speech in September 2012, Barroso was already depicting his notion for
the New Narrative for Europe campaign in the following terms:
I would like to see the development of a European public space, where

European issues are discussed and debated from a European stand-
point. We cannot continue trying to solve European problems just
with national solutions. This debate has to take place in our societies
and among our citizens. But, today, I would like to make an appeal
also to European thinkers. To men and women of culture, to join this
debate on the future of Europe.
(Barroso 2012)
This statement sets the stage for the new campaign: Barroso envisions
the development of a ‘European public space’ where ‘European issues are
discussed and debated’. These articulations tie into the new emphasis
on dialogue and debate that has structured the Commission’s discourse
on democracy since 2005. At the same time, the statement indicates
the highly restrained notion of debate that underpins the New Narra-
tive for Europe campaign. Issues should be discussed from a ‘European
standpoint’ while ‘national solutions’ are represented as outdated. The
debate that Barroso envisions is primarily a debate among those who
favour deeper integration. The New Narrative for Europe campaign tries
1
Policies of participatory engineering are defined as ‘attempts of political elites
to positively affect the level of political participation by increasing institutional
opportunities to participate’ (Zittel 2008: 120). This type of legitimation pol-
icy encompasses both the increased consultation of civil society organizations
(Bignami 2004; Zittel 2008; Kohler-Koch and Quittkat 2011) and the extension
of participatory instruments to ordinary citizens by way of a variety of different
transnational deliberation forums (Boussaguet and Dehousse 2008; Abels 2009;
Boucher 2009; Hüller 2010; Karlsson 2010; Kies and Nanz 2013).
Conclusion: Towards an Alternative Horizon 197
to forge a link between intellectuals and scientists and to get them to

stand up for Europe. As the campaign unfolds, the restrained meaning
of dialogue and debate becomes even more evident:
A new narrative for Europe [is needed, D.B.] not because we don’t
remain loyal to the raison d’être of the European community and the
European Union; of course this remains valid. But because I think we
need, in the beginning of the XXI century, namely for the new gen-
eration that is not so much identified with this narrative of Europe,
to continue to tell the story of Europe. Like a book: it cannot only
stay in the first pages, even if the first pages were extremely beautiful.
We have to continue our narrative, continue to write the book of the
present and of the future. This is why we need a new narrative for
Europe.
(Barroso 2013a)
The type of debate that is depicted here is unidirectional. With the help
of the intellectual and cultural elite, people should be made aware of
the value of the EU. The campaign partly reads like a return to for-
mer propagandistic articulations prevalent in the 1970s and 1980s. The
cultural and intellectual pro-European elite is asked to create a new
narrative to tell people a story about why the EU is good for them.
This unidirectional and arguably even propagandistic image of com-
munication is even more clearly evoked by Androulla Vassiliou, then
Commissioner for Education, Culture, Multilinguism and Youth, in her
speech presenting the launch of the campaign on 23 April 2013:
The ‘New Narrative for Europe’ must convince young people that
Europe is and will remain a shared space of opportunities and a
credible federator for a more human and fair world (. . .)]. The new
narrative needs to frame issues that can have a positive impact on
the majority. We hear a lot about rising percentages of mistrust in the
institutions and in the rule of law, we hear a lot about mistrust linked
to corruption, we hear about an elitist Europe of the few. We need to
frame these questions in a positive and relevant way.
(Vassiliou 2013)
What is problematic about these articulations is, among other things,

their underlying conception of the citizen: the European citizen is here
implicitly constructed as passive and ignorant. She cannot make up her
mind herself and needs the cultural and intellectual elite to ‘tell her a
story’ about the EU. The possibility of an active citizen, who willingly
engages in political debates and actively influences the future course of
the EU, is precluded.
Even more worrying is the way critical voices are dealt with. Euro-
sceptic voices, for instance, those who advocate a stronger say of the
nation state in European issues, have no place in the debate (Barroso
2012: ‘We cannot continue trying to solve European problems just with
national solutions’). At times, reservations against the EU are denounced
as ‘European fatigue’ or as ‘a lack of understanding’ (Barroso 2013a).
The fact that Euro-sceptic opinions might be reasonable, a result of
careful consideration, seems to be a logical impossibility for the Com-
mission. As a result, critical voices are dismissed as outdated, irrational
or ignorant and thereby excluded from the debate. The aim is to find a
new consensus among those who unconditionally support the EU. The
debate is primarily held between those who are ‘loyal’ (Barroso 2013a,
see quotation above) to the EU.
A derogatory representation of critical voices, in particular of those
positions favouring a stronger intergovernmental design of the EU, has
a long tradition in the Commission (see for instance Chapter 6). Yet,
the denouncing of critical voices has become even more drastic in the
last few years. Euro-scepticism and anti-Europeanism are emerging as
the central ‘other’ in the New Narrative for Europe campaign (and in
other texts dealing with legitimacy published by the Commission since
2012). A very radical other construction can be found in a speech given
by Barroso during the third general assembly of the campaign:
Populism, xenophobia, extreme nationalism, all these demons we

have been fighting are now pushing back. And if you think about
it there is something common: some of those movements are against
foreigners, they are xenophobic, some are against trade, they are
against globalisation, they want new walls, new protectionism, some
are extreme nationalist. But if you look you see that all of them
have one Leitmotiv in common: they are very strongly against the
European Union. They see the need for destroying the European
Union, precisely because they know that the European Union is a
model of openness that is the opposite of extremism and extreme
nationalism.
(Barroso 2014)
Voices critical of the EU are here described in starkly negative terms.

Anti-Europeanism is associated with ‘other evils’ such as xenophobia
and nationalism. Voices against the EU are demonized and constructed

as something to be combated.
What is more, a diverse range of critical positions is over-hastily pre-
sented as anti-European attacks. Voices critical of the workings of the
EU, in particular its neoliberal agenda (arguably those who are, in the
words of the Commission, ‘against trade’ and ‘against globalisation’), are
put on a par with populists and nationalists, and are constructed as dif-
ferent parts of the new other, namely anti-Europeanism. This is clearly
a new development in the Commission’s articulations on legitimacy.
Overall, with the New Narrative for Europe campaign, a radicaliza-
tion of the discourse on dialogue and debate can be observed. To put
it bluntly: when the Commission talks about dialogue and debate, it
relies on a very restrained meaning of the term that comes closer to
persuasion. The objective is to construct a new consensus among those
supporting the EU. The dialogue that the Commission proposes is pri-
marily one held between staunch supporters of the EU. Different voices
criticizing the EU have no place in the debate. Their position is even
demonized.
What the analysis in Chapter 4 and the cursory investigation of the
New Narrative for Europe campaign conducted here illustrate is that the
Commission’s articulations on dialogue and debate are by no means
innocent or neutral. They are premised on the foregrounding of a partic-
ular interpretation of dialogue and debate while excluding others. In the
remainder of the conclusion I will, therefore, interrogate the boundaries
of the Commission’s discourse on dialogue and debate. What are the
limits of the discourse? What articulations are excluded in the Com-
mission’s conception of dialogue and debate? In this, I will attempt to
sketch out an alternative ‘horizon’2 within which democracy in the EU
can be considered. The objective is to open up the restrained space of
meanings within which democracy is articulated in the Commission
based on a critical reading of the Commission’s recent emphasis on the
democratic value of dialogue and debate.
My argument is that rudimentary elements of such an alternative
are already present in the Commission. Yet, the contours of an alter-
native can be depicted more clearly if one takes into account the
broader discourse on the democratic deficit in the EU, particularly in
academia. More specifically, the contributions of those who suggest
2
On the difference between the two concepts of ‘model’ and ‘horizon’ see Diez
(1997: 290–291).
adapting republican democratic theory (Bellamy and Castiglione 2000;

Tully 2007; Thiel 2012, 2014) or agonistic democratic theory (Mouffe
2000, 2012; Tsakatika 2007; Vink 2007; Bruell, Mokre and Pausch 2009)
in the context of the EU, and those arguing in favour of the politi-
cization of the EU (Hix 2006; Magnette and Papadopoulos 2008; de
Wilde and Zürn 2012; Statham and Trenz 2013) are particularly per-
tinent. These works construct an alternative reading of dialogue and
debate than the one that is dominant in the Commission.
What all these contributions to the debate on the democratic deficit
of the EU highlight is the merit of dispute and conflict in the political
process. According to these voices, the first step towards the solution
of the European democratic deficit is politicization, understood broadly
as a process of social exchange of controversial opinions and positions
(Thiel 2012: 203).3 The object of political decisions has to be conceived
as changeable, contingent and unpredictable. The degree of politiciza-
tion in a given political system is high if a diverse range of contested
and adversarial positions is voiced with regard to a political question.
With respect to the EU, Mouffe defines the concept of politicization in
the following terms: ‘There needs to be a politicisation of the political
project that would allow citizens of the various demoi to engage in con-
frontation, and to articulate adversarial perspectives and visions on the
future of the EU and its place in the world’ (Mouffe 2012: 637).
Those favouring a stronger politicization and a more agonistic form
of democracy for the EU are generally critical of the concept of consen-
sus. The ideal of a rational consensus that is prominently propagated in
deliberative democratic thought is denounced as a ‘conceptual impossi-
bility’ (ibid.: 98). Power cannot be bracketed from social interactions.
As such, a consensus can only exist as a ‘temporary result of a pro-
visional hegemony’ (ibid.: 104). Thus, it always entails some form
of exclusion. Instead, an agonistic approach emphasizes the value of
dispute and contestation:
A well-functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic

political positions: If this is missing there is the danger that this
democratic confrontation will be replaced by a confrontation among
3
This definition of politicization is a little narrower than the one famously
endorsed in the field of International Relations by Zürn et al. (2012: 74). Broadly
speaking, they define politicization as rising societal awareness and contestation
of international organizations. The definition proposed here highlights the
second aspect, that is, an increase of contestation for issues related to the EU.
other forms of collective identification as is the case with identity

politics.
(Mouffe 2000: 104)
Dispute and contestation in the public sphere is considered to have

a democratizing effect because it filters passions and emotions into
the democratic process, because it encourages the active involvement
of citizens and, more generally, because it makes a political system
more receptive to the multiplicity of voices that a pluralist democracy
encompasses.
Without wanting to go into the full details of an agonistic model
of democracy for the EU, the discussion so far already indicates that
by taking into account the broader discourse on the democratic deficit
of the EU, an alternative notion of debate and dialogue is think-
able. An agonistic reading of debate would emphasize the notion of
dispute and contestation. The aim of a dispute is not to construct
a new narrative or consensus on the future of Europe, but to radi-
cally open the political space up for highly contentious and adversary
positions.
Even more importantly, an agonistic reading of dialogue and debate
in terms of dispute also entails a different way of dealing with criti-
cal voices towards the EU than the one implied by the Commission.
Instead of interpreting criticism as blatant attacks on European poli-
cies, instead of demonizing Euro-sceptic voices or denouncing them as
ignorant, an agonistic interpretation of debate would emphasize a more
constructive approach towards criticism and Euro-scepticism more gen-
erally. As Mouffe has succinctly argued, in an agonistic confrontation,
enemies are transformed into adversaries who at least to some degree
recognize the legitimacy of their claims (Mouffe 2012: 632–633). When
an opponent is regarded as an enemy and when her positions are com-
pletely rejected, no dispute is possible. In disputes, ‘speakers represent
differing positions but see each other as adversaries and not as enemies’
(Bruell and Mokre 2009: 182).
More concretely, according to the alternative horizon proposed here,
apathy towards the EU should be interpreted as the result of closures
of the political system, and its destabilizing effects should be problema-
tized (Thiel 2012: 204) and not denounced as a ‘lack of understanding’
(Barroso 2013a). Critical voices should be taken more seriously, differ-
entiating between radical anti-Europeanism and criticism of current EU
policies. Finally, even anti-European positions favouring a stronger say
of the nation state in European issues should be recognized by the
Commission as reasonable voices in disputes on the future course of

the EU.
Undoubtedly, the plea for more dispute in the EU can be attacked
on many grounds (Bartolini 2006; Moravcsik 2006; Hurrelmann 2007).
Above all, politicization can only be a first step in the process of democ-
ratizing the EU, since discussions and contestations must also have an
impact on institutions and must be reflected in the political decisions
taken (Thiel 2014). This is not the place to engage in a detailed dis-
cussion on the advantages and disadvantages of a more republican or
agonistic model of democracy for the EU. Based on the critical read-
ing of the most recent development of the democracy discourse in the
European Commission with its strong emphasis on dialogue and debate,
the aim of the conclusion is merely to open up the discursive space
within which democracy can be articulated and to sketch an alterna-
tive horizon. In light of the recent sharp decline of political support for
the integration project after the financial crisis and the European debt
crisis (TNS Opinion & Social 2014), and considering the rise of Euro-
scepticism throughout Europe (de Wilde, Michailidou and Trenz 2013),
thinking about alternative meanings of democracy is more pressing
than ever.
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Index
accessibility, 120, 178 Committee of Regions, 118

see also transparency Committee on Institutional Reforms
accountability, 88, 132 (of the European Parliament), 79,
Adonnino Committee, 97–8, 156 174
agency, 35, 74 common good, European, 17, 22,
see also subject 106–7
ambivalence, 43 common market, 151–5, 159–60
see also vagueness communication, 65, 66, 93
antagonism, 43–6 communication policy, 2, 24, 76, 100,
antagonistic frontier, 49–57 109–110, 130–1, 135–8
anthem, European, 161, 163 communicative dimension of
anti-Europeanism, see Euro-scepticism legitimacy, 7–8
Aristotle, 60–2 community, political, 20–1, 114–15
articulation, 26, 38, 49–50 see also identity
attitudes, political, 5–8 comparison thesis, 62, 73
see also legitimacy beliefs consensus, 108–201, 136, 196
authority, political, 4–5, 7, 9–12, 30–1 constructivism, social, 32–7, 48
availability, 48 context, 15, 26, 36, 60, 68, 74, 77–9,
143–4, 170
Barker, Rodney, 5, 9–10 contingency, 32, 38, 41, 73–4
Barroso, José Manuel Durão, 128–31, contradiction, 44, 160
135–6, 198 control, political, 14, 21, 108, 118–19,
Beetham, David, 4–7, 10–11, 13 132–3
belief systems, 64, 69
Convention on the Future of Europe,
Bellamy, Richard, 16, 21–2, 135
99
better lawmaking, 124–7
Copenhagen Declaration, 143
Bohman, James, 21–2
cosmopolitanism, 116
Burgess, Michael, 111
Council of Ministers, 33, 131, 181,
191–2
causality, 25–7, 36
counter-hegemonic operation, 40, 50,
Central and Eastern Europe, 142, 154,
54–8
170–1
credibility, 48
chain of equivalence, see logic of
critical discourse analysis, 62, 64,
equivalence
67–8, 87
change, 29–39, 67–70, 103
cultural heritage, European, 19–20,
change of expression, 103
113, 145, 147–8, 166–7
discursive change, 103
cultural policies, 24, 161–8
incremental change, 134
metaphorical change, 103 culture, European, 20, 84, 112, 145–6
Chilton, Paul, 64, 90
civil society, 21, 132, 135, 196 debate, see dialogue with citizens
see also participation decentralization, 178–9
combinality, model of, 26–7, 189 de Gaulle, Charles, 183
228
Index 229
democracy, 21–2 European Council, 79, 143–4, 146, 167

deliberative model, 22, 122, 132, Europe Day, 76, 163, 168
137, 200 European Monetary Union, 98, 100,
liberal-representative model, 21, 184
110–11 Euro-scepticism, 1, 198, 201–2
republican model, 22, 135–36, experience, 66–71, 73–4
200–2 expertise, 16–17, 124–6, 153–4
democratic deficit, 79–80, 120, 171–2, explanation
188, 190–4 institutional, 29–32
demos, European, 19–20 actor-centred, 32–6
see also identity
Delanty, Gerard, 20, 116, 154 Fairclough, Norman, 68, 79
Delors, Jacques, 98, 151, 171–3, 181–3, federalism, 110–11, 123, 132, 174, 190
190–1 figures of speech, 60, 71–3
de Saussure, Ferdinand, 37 flag, European, 161–3
dialogue with citizens, 100, 120–1, Føllesdal, Andreas, 5, 21
131–40, 195–202 Forward Studies Unit, 124
Diez, Thomas, 13, 15, 20–1, 44, 116, Foucault, Michel, 38, 117
122, 195 Fouchet Plan, 96, 183
discourse
analysis, 3, 62, 64, 74–5, 80 Gilley, Bruce, 4, 5
definition of, 37–8 governance
dynamics, see change governance turn, 99, 124, 126
limits of, 50–4 multilevel governance, 122
theory, 3, 40–6, 57, 59, 70, 86 White Paper on European
dislocation, 51–2 Governance, 99, 124–5, 130
Dooge, James, 97 Gramsci, Antonio, 41
Drulák, Petr, 70, 86, 90 Great Britain, 182, 188
Eastern Europe, 98, 142, 154–5, Habermas, Jürgen, 20, 116, 184
167–75, 180–2, 193 Hansen, Lene, 3, 26–7, 44–5, 76, 79,
Easton, David, 8, 9, 23 189
Economic and Social Committee, 35, hegemonic discourse, 37, 39–40, 49
118 hegemonic operation, 40–6, 146–60,
economic crisis, 96, 100, 144, 184, 202 175–88
education policies, 33, 161–8 hegemonic project, 40
effectiveness, 23, 85, 100, 106–7, 128, hegemony, 39–41
158 Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 37,
efficiency, 22–3, 85, 128 51–2
elections, European, 78, 97, 101, heritage, cultural, 19–20, 114, 145,
108–9, 145, 156, 188 147, 154, 166–7
element, 38, 42 heterogeneity, 52–8, 175, 177
Empty Chair Crisis, 96 Hix, Simon, 5, 21, 200
enemy, 44–5, 53, 201 Howarth, David, 3, 37–40, 73–4
epistemology, 16, 59 Hülsse, Rainer, 70, 72, 75, 90, 105
equality, 14, 21, 132
Eriksen, Erik O., 13 idealism, 67, 68, 73
Essex School, 3, 165 ideas, 29, 35–6, 48, 173
Eurobarometer, 97, 100 identification, 39, 48, 182
230 Index
identity, European legitimation object, 8

civic, 20–1, 116 legitimation policies, 25–8, 161–5,
ethnic, 20–1, 116, 149 188–93
general, 111–16, 141, 147 Lenin, 41
postmodern, 20–1, 116 logic of difference, 42–3, 44–5, 51–4
incomplete, 37, 38, 74 logic of equivalence, 42–3, 146–9,
input-legitimacy, 18, 173 176–9
institutional reforms, 76, 96–9 Lord, Christopher, 5, 13–16, 18–19
interdiscursivity, 160 lumpenproletariat, 53
Intergovernmental Conference, 98,
99, 118, 185, 187, 190 Majone, Giandomenico, 16–17
intergovernmentalism, 96, 180–6 Mannheim, Karl, 90, 104, 109, 112
interpretative approach, 14, 15, 32–3, meaning
60, 81, 89 basic, 81–5
intertextuality, 26, 76–80 contextual, 83–8
metaphor
Jachtenfuchs, Markus, 111, 122 conceptual, 86–97
Janne, Henri, 164 conventional, 87
Johnson, Mark, 63–75 creative, 87
dead, 87
Kallas, Siim, 100 definition of, 80–1
Kantner, Cathleen, 19, 21 identification of, 80–5
Kielmansegg, Peter Graf von, 19, 20 metaphor analysis, 80–93
Kohler-Koch, Beate, 21, 29, 35 metaphor theory
classical rhetoric, 60–2
Lacan, Jacques, 38 cognitive linguistic, 62–70
Laclau, Ernesto, 3, 8, 37–57, 67 poststructuralist, 70–5
Lakoff, George, 63–75 models of legitimacy
language democratic, 21–2
constitutive role of, 4, 59 identity, 19–21
figurative vs. non-figurative, 81, intergovernmental, 18–19
83–4 performance, 22–3
theory of, 36–7, 62, 66, 67, 72–3 technocratic, 16–18
legitimacy moment, 42
definition of, 4–5 Moravcsik, Andrew, 19, 202
dimensions of (communicative, motives, individual, 5, 36, 37
behavioural and attitudinal), Mouffe, Chantal, 41, 201
7–8 see also Laclau
models of, 13–23
legitimacy beliefs, 5–8 nation state, 14, 20–1, 84–5, 110, 116,
legitimacy constituency, 13, 18 168
legitimacy discourses, 2, 4, 8, 9, 11–12, neofunctionalism, 105, 153, 158, 160
23–6, 100–3 network, 20, 122–3
legitimacy language, 77–8 nodal point, see signifier
legitimacy theory nomination, 87–8
empirical, 5–7 Nonhoff, Martin, 15, 26, 38, 40–6, 48,
normative, 4–5 53
legitimation, 8, 12 norm diffusion, 33–4
legitimation criteria, 9, 13 norm entrepreneurs, 34–5
Index 231
norms, 29, 33, 36 Santer, Jacques, 99

Nullmeier, Frank, 7, 8, 10, 24, 26 Scharpf, Fritz W., 19, 20, 22
Schuman Declaration, 109, 163
objectivism, 43, 44, 66 self-legitimation, 9–11
ontology, 38, 62, 66–8, 72–5 Shapiro, Michael J., 70, 72, 73
of lack, 73–4 Shore, Cris, 112, 114, 124, 143, 150,
openness 162–3
see also transparency signifier
Ortoli, François-Xavier, 108, 109 empty, 42, 46–8, 50, 146, 155–6,
other 183–7
antagonistic other, 42, 45 floating, 42, 45, 50, 57
definition of, 44–5 source domains
output-legitimacy, 22–3 actor, 104, 139
see also efficiency; effectiveness; building, 103, 108–10, 120, 121, 178
performance communication, 93, 103, 109–10,
120–1, 129–32, 199–201
Parliament definition of, 64, 87–91
European, 14, 21, 32–3, 35, 79, economy, 84, 88, 93, 104, 128,
97, 110–11, 121–3, 174, 189, 138–9
193 family, 91, 114–15, 158–9
national, 182 fantasy, 91, 115, 147–8
participation, 21, 25, 34–5, 89, machine, 104, 108, 119, 176
117–18, 129–30, 140, 178 organism, 86–7, 106, 112–15, 147
participatory engineering, 25, 196 path, 90, 103–7, 116–17, 128–30
passport, European, 163 science, 90, 126
people’s Europe, 155–60 sight, 119, 129, 131, 178
performance, 22–3, 101–7 Spinelli, Altiero, 97, 174
permissive consensus, 1, 172 statehood, 13, 14, 122
Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Steffek, Jens, 4, 5, 18, 21–3, 107
Debate, 88, 91–2, 100 subject, 24, 38–9
polarization, 56, 182 subsidiarity, 98, 118, 119, 122–4, 173,
political union, 97–8, 100, 174, 175–8, 188–93
183–8, 194 Suchman, Marc C., 6–7
politicization, 29, 30–1, 136, 200, support, political, 8, 23, 153
202 support-for-benefit logic, 23, 106,
populism, 100, 198–9 107, 129
Pragglejaz Group, 80–5 supranationalism, 32, 153, 174,
predication, 88 183–4
Prodi, Romano, 99, 118, 123, 124 symbols, 113, 156, 163
public spere, 21, 131–3, 135, 201
target domain, 64, 66, 87
quality of legislation, 126–7 technocracy, 16–17, 101, 124–7,
152–4
realist ontology, 62, 68 text selection, 76–80
referendum, 31, 98, 99, 100, 173 Thatcher, Margaret, 171, 182
rhetoric, 32, 34 Tindemans Committee, 79 , 143–6
rightfulness, 4–5, 8 Torfing, Jacob, 3, 8, 38, 51, 59
Ringmar, Erik, 90, 113 transparency, 33, 98, 100, 103,
Risse, Thomas, 116, 153 118–22, 173, 176, 178, 189–94
232 Index
transparency initiative, 100 undecidability, 38, 39

Treaties United Kingdom, see Great Britain
Single European Act, 98, 156, 157, unity in diversity, 113, 150
172
Treaty Establishing a Constitution vagueness, 47, 185–7
for Europe, 99 values, European, 20, 116, 144–5
Treaty of Amsterdam, 99
Treaty of Lisbon, 100 Weber, Max, 6, 9
Treaty of Maastricht, 2, 98, 172–3,
184 Yes for Europe programme, 164, 165
Treaty of Nice, 99
trust, 19, 147 Zürn, Michael, 10, 29–31

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Transformations of the State

Transformations of the State Series Standing Order

List of Figures and Tables vi

Series Preface vii

1 Introduction: Legitimacy as a Discursive Battleground in

3 Reconstructing Meanings of a Legitimate EC/EU: Discursive

4 Change and Continuity of Legitimacy Discourses in the

5 The Failed Hegemonic Project: The Identity Discourse in

6 Democracy as a Successful Hegemonic Project in the 1990s 169

7 Conclusion: Towards an Alternative Horizon – Democracy

2.1 Temporally ﬁxed hegemonic discourse 49

1.1 Models of legitimacy 16

• the monopolization of the means of force;

Transformations of the State (Stephan Leibfried, Evelyne Huber, Matthew

Writing a book is both an extremely strenuous and satisfying activity.

In addition, I am grateful to the ‘plan m’ group of women who pro-

legitimacy signiﬁes in the case of the EC/EU.1 As such, it touches on the

and communication. This present study aims to integrate these different

I employ metaphor analysis in my study of constructions of legit-

The social construction of legitimacy

[P]ower is legitimate where the rules governing it are justiﬁable

If research on the normative legitimacy of a political order is under-

in empirical legitimacy research and argues that such an approach

A given power relationship is not legitimate because people believe

This conceptualization of empirical legitimacy shifts the focus from an

Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions

as a whole, and articulations evaluating the acceptance of single poli-

Legitimation as a discursive struggle between rulers

The purpose of switching the focus away from individual legitimacy

In the world of everyday government, the language etiquette, and

Other authors have engaged in empirical investigations of the self-

First, self-legitimation can be conceptualized as direct and strategic

A poststructuralist account of legitimation processes shifts the focus

In order to make the Commission’s articulations on legitimacy

original role ascribed to the Commission in the integration process,

to the epistemological perspective taken in this study and emphasize

Table 1.1 Models of legitimacy

Model of Legitimacy Legitimation Authors

Technocratic European Expertise Majone (1996)

empirical/analytical methodologies of scientiﬁc decision-making, or

attempts to normatively justify a technocratic model of legitimacy for

acknowledgement (Beetham and Lord 1998: 13). Moravcsik remains one

do not a priori exclude the possibility that a collective European iden-

as Diez’s notions of a European political community are very different

(Bellamy and Warleigh 1998: 466) which relies on a ‘robust connection

for members of international organizations. Both understandings of

Legitimacy discourses and legitimation policies

So far, I have discussed the notion of legitimation as a discursive bat-

transparency regime and the subsidiarity principle (Chapter 6). Finally,

of action possible while restraining others. The constraining function of

Whether a discourse articulates a stable relationship between identity

In chapters 5 and 6, I will deal with two inﬂuential legitimation poli-

Plan of the book

The work is structured as follows: the next chapter (Chapter 2) deals

legitimacy discourses possible. More speciﬁcally, Chapter 5 deals with

One of the central objectives of this book is to contribute to an

Dynamics of legitimacy discourses: Overview of

The ﬁrst explanation given for the dynamics of legitimacy discourses,

forward by authors from the ﬁeld of International Relations tackling the

always depends on divergent interpretations. There is no such thing as

Since the phenomenon in question is not seen to emerge by any

A poststructuralist perspective speculates that the rising inﬂuence of

power in the institutional system of the EC/EU. In contrast, (2) the