WEEK 7-9

CANON 10

Sevilla vs. Zoleta, A.C. No. 31, March 28, 1955

 1. Lawyers falsely stating in a deed of sale that property is free from all liens and
encumbrances when it is not so (Sevilla v. Zoleta, A.C. No. 31, March 28, 1955);

Martin vs. Moreno, A.C. No. 1432, May 21, 1984

GEORGE MARTIN and VICTORIANA MARTIN, Complainants, v. ATTYS. JUAN

MORENO and EULALIO VENTURA, Respondents.

Teodoro R. Banzon, for Petitioners.

The Solicitor General for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; FALSIFICATION IN STATEMENTS MADE

IN PLEADINGS; PENALTY. — Respondent member of the Philippine Bar who, as counsel
for the claimants in an application for death benefits, prepares a Motion to Dismiss the
application which the claimants signed, wherein it is stated that they are willing to
dismiss the claim in consideration of payment by the employer to them of the amount
of P2,000.00, the amount of P4,000.00 having already been received by the deceased
from his employer during his lifetime, when in fact the deceased never received the said
amount, will be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month severely
censured, and warned that a repetition of the offense of falsification shall be visited
with a more drastic punishment. Respondent counsel’s ready admission of the
falsification coupled with his explanation and plea for forgiveness had inclined the Court
not to be severe in dealing with him. Moreover, his act did not cause material damage
to anyone.

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting.

1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; FALSIFICATION; PENALTY IN CASE AT

BAR TOO LENIENT. — Where respondent, a member of the Philippine Bar took
advantage of the ignorance of complainants as to the allowable compensation of
P6,000.00 the penalty of one month suspension is too lenient.
DECISION

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

In a verified complaint, the spouses George and Victoriana Martin sought the
suspension of Juan Moreno and Eulalio Ventura as members of the Philippine Bar. They
alleged that the two respondents had conspired to defraud them of compensation due
their son Virgilio who died of tuberculosis in the course of his employment as a driver
for BLU-CAR Taxi.chanrobles law library
The complaint was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The comprehensive report of the Solicitor General states, among other things, that the
deceased Virgilio Martin was not actually the son of the complainants; that they were
but his guardians and hence not entitled to the benefits of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act; that because of such fact the complainants requested Atty. Juan
Moreno to enter into an amicable settlement with BLU-CAR Taxi; that the settlement
was embodied in a Motion to Dismiss which was prepared by Atty. Moreno; that the
settlement was for the payment of P2,000.00 to the spouses but the Motion to Dismiss
also stated that Virgilio had received from BLU-CAR Taxi during his lifetime the amount
of P4,000.00 so that the dismissal would be with prejudice; and that the Motion to
Dismiss was explained to the spouses by Atty. Eulalio Ventura, counsel for BLU-CAR
Taxi who gave them a check for P2,000.00.

The complaining spouses in effect accuse Attorney Moreno of pocketing the P4,000,00
mentioned in the Motion to Dismiss and both Attorneys Moreno and Ventura of
pocketing part of the P2,000.00 settlement. However, the Solicitor General
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is admitted that some amount of money was received on April 26, 1973, when said
Motion to Dismiss was signed by complainants George Martin and Victoriana Martin for
the death of Virgilio Martin (pp. 23-24, 27, tsn., March 9, 1976). However, complainant
Victoriana Martin claims she actually received only P750.00 (p. 24, tsn., March 9, 1976),
while Atty. Eulalio Ventura claims that P2,000.00 was paid to complainant (pp. 91-92,
tsn., March 30, 1976). Atty. Juan Moreno also claims P2,000.00 was paid to
complainant (pp. 7, 15-16, tsn., April 27, 1976; p. 3, Atty. Moreno’s Memorandum).
Considering that the sworn motion to dismiss signed by complainant, which was
translated to her and George Martin before they signed it, states that complainant
received P2,000.00 (Exh. E, p. 5, rec.; p. 89 tsn., March 30, 1976), the fact that seems
to have been established is that P2,000.00 was paid to complainant.

"Complainants cannot charge that the late Virgilio Martin did not receive the other
amount of P4,000.00 which Atty. Moreno allegedly pocketed as his own after receiving
the same from the Blu-Car Taxi because there is no competent evidence to prove the
charge. Virgilio is now dead. Apart from complainant’s denial, there is no other evidence
to show that Atty. Moreno received the P4,000.00 from the Blu-Car Taxi and failed to
deliver the same to the late Virgilio Martin. The records of the Blu-Car Taxi could have
been presented if there is truth that Atty. Moreno received the same, but no such
evidence was presented. Atty. Moreno’s claim that the P4,000.00 was never paid to him
(p. 22, rec.) should be sustained." (Report, pp. 12-13.)

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Solicitor General has accused Atty. Moreno of
knowingly making a false statement in the Motion to Dismiss,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"2. That on April 26, 1973, in Mandaluyong, Rizal, he filed a sworn Motion to Dismiss
with the Rizal Provincial Office, Workmen’s Compensation Unit, Mandaluyong, Rizal,
stating that Virgilio Martin during his lifetime received P4,000.00 from the BLU-CAR
TAXI as illness compensation benefits, although in truth and in fact as he was fully
aware of, no such amount was paid to Virgilio Martin (Exh. E, p. 6, rec; Exh. B, p. 23,
rec.);

"3. That such utterance of falsehood violates the lawyer’s oath." (Rollo, p. 62.).
Required to file an answer to the complaint, Moreno did admit the falsification but
explained that he had to do it for legal and technical reasons. He averred
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . In the instant case, the employer, for humanitarian purposes, agreed to pay the
claimants P2,000.00, to which compromise the claimants agreed. A mere motion to
dismiss the claim based on the payment of the P2,000.00 would not be sufficient under
the law.

‘. . . such agreement in order to be valid, shall provide, at least, the same amount of
compensation as that prescribed by the Act . . .’ (Sec. 29, Workmen’s Compensation
Act). In order to fill the gap, the parties herein — the employer and the claimants, as
duly approved by the Commission, had to devise a procedure by making it appear that
the difference of P4,000.00 was already paid in advance. So P4,000.00 plus P2,000.00
makes up P6,000.00 which amount is the maximum the employer would be liable on
the assumption that the claim is compensable." (Rollo, p. 68.)

Moreno pleads for leniency thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Yes, Your Honors, with deep regret and repentance I admit, I have committed a
mistake, which mistake, however, it seemingly sanctioned by law, if we are to go deep
into the spirit of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, and for which reason,
I humbly implore the forgiveness of this Highest Tribunal." (Id., p. 69.)

Moreno’s ready admission of the falsification coupled with his explanation and plea for
forgiveness incline Us not to be severe in dealing with him. Moreover, his act did not
cause material damage to anyone.

WHEREFORE, respondent Juan Moreno is hereby suspended from the practice of the
law for one (1) month, severely censured and warned that a repetition of the offense of
falsification shall be visited with a more drastic punishment.

Respondent Eulalio Ventura is exonerated.

SO ORDERED.

Bautista vs Gonzales [A.M. No. 1625. February 12, 1990]

16OCT
[Per Curiam]

FACTS:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was
charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath.
Required by this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed a motion for
a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by
making his charges more definite. In a resolution the Court granted respondent’s
motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. Complainant submitted
an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the
following acts:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado,
Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to
pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the
value of the property in litigation.

xxx

4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him on
August 30, 1971 for the development into a residential subdivision of the land involved
in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty
percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney’s fees from the Fortunados, while knowing
fully well that the said property was already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971,
by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of Deeds of
Iligan City;

xxx

Pertinent to No. 4 above, the contract, in No. 1 above, reads:

We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent
Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed serious misconduct involving a champertous
contract.

HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for six (6) months.

RATIO:
The Court finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados
contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer
may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also
Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith,
advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The
agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for
reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement
whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client’s
rights is champertous [citation omitted]. Such agreements are against public policy
especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his
own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute
[citation omitted]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship
between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative
sanctions.

Retuya vs. Gorduiz, A.C. No. 1388, March 28, 1980

Facts:

o Ana F. Retuya filed for a claim of workmen’s compensation against Eastern

Shipping Lines, the employer of her husband who died in 1968.
 o In a decision by the Workmen’s Compensation Unit at Tacloban City, Ana was
awarded a sum for compensation benefits, medical and hospitalization expenses,
burial expenses, and attorney’s fees of Atty. Inego Gorduiz (P300).
o In the appeal, a compromise claim was proposed, and subsequently accepted by
Ana. The employer paid a reduced award.
o Ana sent the receipt and release, wherein she also explained that Gorduiz did not
sign the joint motion to dismiss the claim because he wanted 20% of the
award as his attorney’s fees. She was willing to give him 10% only.
o After cashing the check, she was not able to contact Gorduiz and pay his fee.
Unexpectedly, she was served with a warrant of arrest. To avoid detention, she
posted bail.
o It turned out that Atty. Gorduiz executed an affidavit stating that Ana had
misappropriated his attorney’s fees amounting to three hundred pesos,
that he had demanded payment but she had refused to make payment.
So she went to Cebu.
o On the basis of such affidavit, the acting chief of police filed against Ana a
complaint for estafa.
o She filed a motion to quash where she explained that she did not accede to his
demand. She stated that the estafa case was filed merely to harass her.
The motion to quash was denied and Judge Equipilag required Ana to produce a
copy of the decision awarding her workmen’s compensation.
o The case of estafa was not tried. Instead, Atty. Diola, lawyer of Ana, offered
Gorduiz a sum of five hundred pesos as settlement of the case. The offer
was accepted.
o The dismissal was eventually released.
o Despite the dismissal, Ana felt aggrieved and asked for the disbarment or
suspension of Atty. Gorduiz and Judge Equipilag.

Held/Ratio:

o Court found no justification in suspending respondent judge. He is however

admonished to be more prudent.
o In the case of Gorduiz, the Solicitor General, disagreeing with the
recommendation of the provincial fiscal of Southern Leyte, filed in this court a
case against Gorduiz a complaint where he prayed that Gorduiz be suspended
for six months because in filing the estafa case, he had promoted a
groundless suit.
o Ana testified that she was willing to pay Gorduiz an amount of P650 but he
demanded a bigger amount. He then filed an estafa case against her, which
was later dismissed when Ana paid Gorduiz a sum of P500.
o In his testimony, Gorduiz denied that he demanded attorney’s fees higher than
P300. He explained that he filed the estafa case because after Ana received the
payment of the award, she did not turn it over desmise promises and demands.
o He further declared that it was only filed to evade payment of attorney’s fees. He
also filed the case because he thought that Ana had absconded when she stayed
in Cebu for a long time. He also said that he used his own money in looking for
evidence in the workmen’s compensation case.
o The Court finds justification for suspending the respondent.
o The respondent acted precipitately in filing a criminal action against his
client for the supposed misappropriation. It is not clear that the client had
swindled him, and there is basis that contrary to his lawyer’s oath, he
had filed a suit against her and had harassed and embarrassed her.
 o Rule 20.02: A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning
his compensation and shall resort only to judicial action only to prevent
imposition, fraud, or injustice.
o Canon 20: A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.

G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU,

FGU INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU,
and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M.
OLBES and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

FACTS: The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU
Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building
Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still
members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate CBAs with the
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to
as the Companies).

Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter
was formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular
Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such
acting president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade
the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National
Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail.
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy
Board of the Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter
part of 1956 as assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal
Department. Enaje was hired as personnel manager of the Companies, and was
likewise made chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective
bargaining with the Unions.
Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies; negotiations were conducted on
the Union’s proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union
shop, as a result of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for
“deadlock on collective bargaining.” The issue was dropped subsequently (in short,
nagkasundo). But, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory
result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases.
Meanwhile, 87 unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in
salary nor in responsibility while negotiations were going on in the
Department of Labor after the notice to strike was served on the Companies.
These employees resigned from the Unions.
On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president,
sent to each of the strikers a letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows:
We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing.

However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may:

1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do so.
2. Take your meals within the office.
3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the
office where comfortable cots have been prepared.
4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.
5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours.
6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families.
7. The decision to make is yours — whether you still believe in the motives of the
strike or in the fairness of the Management.

Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were
convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter

From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31,
1958, some management men tried to break thru the Unions’ picket lines xxx
succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building,
thus causing injuries to the picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to
the resistance offered by some picketers.
Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of
photographs as evidence, the Companies then filed criminal charges against
the strikers with the City Fiscal’s Office of Manila.xxx
Another letter was sent by the company to the individual strikers:

The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.

Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of
our decision.
We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions
open for long. We have continued to operate and will continue to do so with or without
you.

If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if
there are no criminal charges pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June 1958
to report for work at the home office. If by this date you have not yet reported, we may
be forced to obtain your replacement.

Before, the decisions was yours to make.

So it is now.

Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the
members of the Unions, except 3, were dismissed by the fiscal’s office and by
the courts. These three cases involved “slight physical injuries” against one striker and
“light coercion” against two others.
At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them
as well as the ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to
their jobs or else be replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike and
to report back to work on June 2, 1958.

* However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to
secure clearances from the City Fiscal’s Office of Manila but also to be screened by a
management committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The
screening committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges.
However, all non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the
breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately by the Companies without being
required to secure clearances from the fiscal’s office. Subsequently, when
practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal’s office, the
Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34
officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on
the ground that they committed “acts inimical to the interest of the
respondents,” without however stating the specific acts allegedly
committed. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified months later that
they were being dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay
checks computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to now have
not been readmitted although there have been no formal dismissal notices given to
them.

CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies under
Republic Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering
with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action, by
sending out individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and return to
work, with a promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime,
and, subsequently, by warning them that if they did not return to work on or before
June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2) discriminating against the members of
the Unions as regards readmission to work after the strike on the basis of their union
membership and degree of participation in the strike.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent company is guilty of ULP

HELD: YES

The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike

following unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated
the next day and that their jobs were open for them should they want to come in has
been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an active interference with the right of
collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually instead
of through their collective bargaining representatives.
Although the union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the
union as the employees’ bargaining representative.

Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his
representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking,
constitutes unfair labor practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor
practices because they tend to undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an
activity to which they are entitled free from the employer’s molestation.

Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to “bribe” the
strikers with “comfortable cots,” “free coffee and occasional movies,” “overtime” pay for
“work performed in excess of eight hours,” and “arrangements” for their families, so
they would abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking
and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an
attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees
individually, when they are represented by a union, since the employees thus offered
reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of returning to work
would be.

ULP also: (super short cut na to) Hiring of Enage and Garcia with attractive
compensations; respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without increase
in salary or in responsibility, in effect compelling these employees to resign from their
unions; respondents, thru their president and manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes,
brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who,
despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings occupied by the
Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide and in the process,
crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life Building.
This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers;
respondents brought against the picketers criminal charges, only three of which were
not dismissed, and these three only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of these
criminal actions, the respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the court of
first instance restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free
and peaceful use of the Companies’ gates, entrance and driveway and the free
movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies’ buildings.
Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the
letters, exhibit A and B, yield the clear inference that the said letters formed of the
respondents scheme to preclude if not destroy unionism within them.

II. The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They
separated the active from the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or
lack of it, on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the first category were refused
readmission even after they were able to secure clearances from the competent
authorities with respect to the criminal charges filed against them.

It is noteworthy that — perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from

charges of discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning to work — the
respondents delegated the power to readmit to a committee.

III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not a single dismissed
striker was given the opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges
against him. As earlier mentioned, when the striking employees reported back for work
on June 2, 1958, the respondents refused to readmit them unless they first secured the
necessary clearances; but when all, except three, were able to secure and subsequently
present the required clearances, the respondents still refused to take them back.

Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do
not indicate sufficient basis for dismissal.

PABLO R. OLIVARES and/or OLIVARES REALTY

CORPORATION, Complainants, v. ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint1 for disbarment and suspension2 against respondent Atty. Arsenio C.
Villalon, Jr. by Pablo R. Olivares and/or Olivares Realty Corporation for violation of Rule
12.02, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the rule on forum
shopping.

In his complaint, Olivares alleged that respondent's client, Sarah Divina Morales Al-
Rasheed, repeatedly sued him for violations of the lease contract which they executed
over a commercial apartment in Olivares Building in Parañaque.3

In 1993, Al-Rasheed filed an action for damages and prohibition with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.4 The case was
dismissed for improper venue.5

Six years later, on July 1, 1999, Al-Rasheed filed an action for breach of contract with
damages in the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274.6 The case, docketed as
Civil Case No. 99-0233, was dismissed for failure to prosecute.7 Al-Rasheed, through
counsel Atty. Villalon, sought a review of the order dismissing Civil Case No. 99-0233
but the Court of Appeals did not give due course to her appeal.8 The subsequent
Petition for Review on Certiorari filed in the Supreme Court was likewise denied.9

On January 29, 2004, Al-Rasheed re-filed the 1999 suit in the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque, Branch 27410 where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 0J-04-009.11 It was
dismissed on the grounds of res judicataand prescription.12

Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that he was only performing his legal obligation
as a lawyer to protect and prosecute the interests of his client.13 He denied that he was
forum shopping as his client, in her certificate of non-forum shopping,14 disclosed the
two previous cases involving the same cause of action which had been filed and
dismissed.15 Respondent further claims he could not refuse his client's request to file a
new case because Al-Rasheed was the "oppressed party" in the transaction.16

This Court referred the complaint, together with respondent's comment, to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.17

The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP found that respondent assisted Al-
Rasheed in repeatedly suing Olivares for the same cause of action and subject
matter.18 It opined that respondent should have noted that the 1999 case was
dismissed for lack of interest to prosecute.19 Under Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court, such dismissal had the effect of an adjudication on the merits.20 The CBD
recommended the suspension of respondent for six months with a warning that any
similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely.21

The IBP adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rule
12.02, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the proscription
on forum shopping. It, however, modified the recommended penalty to reprimand.22

We adopt the findings of the IBP except its recommendation as to the

penalty.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an empty
formality. When they take their oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit
of justice. They accept the sacred trust to uphold the laws of the land.23 As the first
Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility states, "[a] lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes."24 Moreover, according to the lawyer's oath they took, lawyers should "not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same."25

With all this in mind, respondent should have refrained from filing the second complaint
against Olivares. He ought to have known that the previous dismissal was with
prejudice since it had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. There was no excuse
not to know this elementary principle of procedural law.

The facts of this case reveal that Atty. Villalon purposely filed the second complaint.
Respondent appealed the 1999 case to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to this
Court. Both actions were dismissed for lack of merit, not on mere technicality. The
certificate of non-forum shopping attached to the 2004 complaint disclosed that Al-
Rasheed previously sued Olivares for violating their lease contract. As if such disclosure
was a sufficient justification, Atty. Villalon unapologetically reproduced his
199926 arguments and assertions in the 200427 complaint. Respondent obviously knew
the law and tried to go around it. This Court therefore concludes that respondent
willfully violated Rule 12.02, Canon 12 which provides that:

A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

Furthermore, he violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility:

A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.

A lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and
justice.28 Lawyers have the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. Filing multiple actions constitutes an abuse of the Court's processes. It
constitutes improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade justice. Those
who file multiple or repetitive actions subject themselves to disciplinary action for
incompetence or willful violation of their duties as attorneys to act with all good fidelity
to the courts, and to maintain only such actions that appear to be just and consistent
with truth and honor.29

Everything considered, this Court finds that a reprimand is insufficient and rules instead
that CBD's recommendation for a six-month suspension from the practice of law to be
more commensurate to the violation committed. However, in view of respondent's
death on September 27, 2006,30 the penalty can no longer be imposed on him. This
development has, in effect, rendered this disciplinary case moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

CANON 11

LUIS N. DE LEON, complainant, v. JOSE Y. TORRES, Respondent.

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Adolfo Brillantes for complainant

judge.

Jose Y. Torres in his own behalf.

SYLLABUS

1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; POSTPONEMENTS; PARTIES ENTITLED TO A TIMELY

NOTICE OF DENIAL OF MOTION FOR POSTPONEMENT. — While attorneys should not
assume that a motion for postponement would be granted, they are nonetheless
entitled to a timely notice of its denial, to know what to do to protect the interest of
their client, it being the business or concern of the law office representing the party
(and not for the court to assume) to determine whether one or the other of two or
more partners can handle the trial.

DECISION

LABRADOR, J.:

The respondent in the above-entitled administrative case is charged with having

appeared as lawyer in several civil, land registration and criminal cases in the Court of
First Instance of Capiz, and having conducted trials therein, examining and cross-
examining witnesses, moving for postponement of hearings and filing a notice and a
record on appeal, after he was suspended from the practice of law by Judge Luis N. de
Leon of the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The respondent does not deny that he
appeared in the cases and on the occasions mentioned in the complaint filed against
him before Us, but he alleges that the order suspending him from the practice of law is
a part of a vindictive scheme or design of the complainant to persecute him
systematically; that the order suspending him from the said practice of law was issued
without due process of law and without giving him his day in court.

Upon the filing of the respondent’s answer, complainant moved for a judgment on the
pleadings, as the respondent had not denied the material allegations of the complaint.
We did not, however, resolve this motion, but remanded the case to the Solicitor-
General for investigation and report. The Solicitor-General in turn endorsed the case to
the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz for investigation and report. The Provincial Fiscal found
that as the acts of the respondent herein are related to his acts in relation to another
case for contempt (People v. Boanerjes Venturanza, G.R. No. L-7974), wherein
respondent was ordered to pay a fine of P500, the case is now moot or academic and,
therefore, recommended its dismissal. The Solicitor-General concurs in this
recommendation.

When the case was submitted to this Court, respondent filed a reply to the report of the
Solicitor-General, reiterating his claim that the order declaring his suspension from the
practice of law is null and void, because it was issued without giving respondent
opportunity to appear and defend himself.

The record discloses that on December 19, 1953, complainant Judge of First Instance of
Capiz, entered an order requiring respondent to appear in court on December 21, 1953,
at 9:00 a.m., to show cause why he should not be dealt with severely and suspended
from the practice of law for having sent the following telegram to the
judge:chanroblesvirtual 1awlibrary

"COLLECT JUDGE DE LEON

CALIBO.

REQUEST SET ASIDE YOUR ORDERS CONFISCATED BOND AND MY ARREST BEING
VINDICTIVE ABUSE USE POWERS UNJUST MALICIOUS AS YOU ARE OFFENDED PARTY
OTHERWISE WILL CHARGE YOU CRIMINALLY CIVILLY AND ADMINISTRATIVELY . . .

ATTY. TORRES"chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Respondent did not appear in court on December 21, 1953, as ordered. He merely
submitted a medical certificate to the effect that he was sick. On December 25, 1956,
he filed a motion praying that instead of appearing personally in court he should be
allowed to file a written answer, because of pressure of work and because he was
leaving for Manila for some important matters. Complainant took steps to have the
respondent arrested, but the latter could not be located. The reason is that he had
come to Manila. In his motion of December 25, 1953, however he
says:chanroblesvirtual 1awlibrary

". . . it is respectfully prayed that the promulgation of the decision in the contempt
proceedings mentioned in said order be postponed to January, 1954, at 9:30 a.m. and
if this is not possible he hereby waives to be present in the reading of said decision and
if the decision is against him he hereby gives notice of his intention to appeal . . ."(p.
14 of the Record.)

As the complainant must have believed that respondent purposely refused to appear,
he entered the order dated December 29, 1953, ordering respondent "suspended from
the practice of law in any court of the Islands from the date of the notification of this
judgment, until further action on the premises by the Honorable Supreme Court." It is
this order, duly transmitted to Us, that is now before Us for final decision.

There is no question that defendant has violated the order of suspension; his
appearances in court have not been denied by him in his answer or in his reply
memorandum. The only defense put up by him is that he has had no sufficient
opportunity to defend himself. We find that this defense is without merit. His conduct
upon receiving the order of December 19, 1953 shows that he did not like to appear
before the complaining judge. He refused to appear, alleging illness, and when the
judge attempted to have him arrested, he escaped arrest and came to Manila. These
acts of the respondent do not evince a desire to defend himself against the charges of
contempt filed by the complaining judge against him.

He also had waived his right to be present and contest the order in the court below. In
view of his failure to appear and the waiver of this right, the complaining judge had no
other recourse but to decide the charges against him ex-parte, in accordance with the
last sentence of Section 29, Rule 127, cited by respondent himself in his reply
memorandum.

It is, therefore, apparent that notwithstanding the fact that respondent had been
suspended from the practice of law and was advised of this order of December 29,
1953, he openly defied the prohibition by appearing as a lawyer in court, defending
cases, examining and cross-examining witnesses, filing pleadings and papers in relation
to the cases he was defending. These things he had committed from January 25, 1954
to June, 1954, the date of the filing of the petition by the complainant in this Court. For
all we know, notwithstanding the order, he has been continuously appearing for clients
in the courts of justice and openly defying the order suspending him from the practice
of law.

We desire to call attention to the fact that courts’ orders, however erroneous they may
be, must be respected, especially by the bar or the lawyers who are themselves officers
of the courts. Court orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them
should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be
extended to the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely essential if our
Government is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not
because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in
them. Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branch of the Government
to which they belong, as well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system.

In order to impress upon the members of the bar the duty of respect towards judicial
authorities, we have decided, after a careful deliberation, that the acts of the
respondent, which were committed in open defiance of judicial authority, should not be
allowed to go unpunished. In consonance with this desire, we hereby suspend
respondent Jose Y. Torres from the practice of law for a period of three months from
the date he is notified of this decision. Copies of this decision shall be furnished the
courts where respondent has pending cases, for faithful compliance therewith.

ROSA YAP PARAS, Petitioner, v. JUSTO J. PARAS, Respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

This case presents another occasion to reiterate this Court's ruling that
the Guidelines set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Ronidel Olaviano
Molina1 "do not require that a physician should examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party's psychological condition."2

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, are the (a) Decision3 dated December 8, 2000 and (b)
Resolution4 dated April 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915,
entitled "Rosa Yap-Paras, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Justo J. Paras, Defendant-Appellee."

On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy,
Negros Oriental. They begot four (4) children, namely: Raoul (+), Cindy Rose (+),
Dahlia, and Reuel.

Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a complaint for annulment of her
marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No.
10613. She alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential
obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances:

(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage
transaction;

(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her;

(c) he did not give financial support to his children; andcralawlibrary

(d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father.

To substantiate her charges, Rosa offered documentary and testimonial evidence.

This is her story. She met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. She was then a student of San
Carlos University, Cebu City.5 He courted her, frequently spending time at her
"Botica."6 Eventually, in 1964, convinced that he loved her, she agreed to marry him.
Their wedding was considered one of the "most celebrated" marriages in Bindoy.7

After the wedding, she and Justo spent one (1) week in Davao for their
honeymoon.8 Upon returning to Bindoy, they resided at her parents' house. It was their
residence for three (3) years until they were able to build a house of their own.9 For the
first five (5) years of their marriage, Justo did not support her and their children
because he shouldered his sister's schooling.10 Consequently, she was the one who
spent for all their family needs, using the income from her "Botica" and store.11

Justo lived the life of a bachelor.12 His usual routine was to spend time with his
"barkadas" until the wee hours of the morning. Oftentimes, he would scold her when
she sent for him during lunchtime.13 He also failed to provide for their children's well-
being.14 Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It
was her family who paid for her medication. Also, in 1984, their son Raoul was
electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed
her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the habit of climbing
the rooftop.15

To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to the United States. Her
sisters supported them throughout their two-year stay there. However, after three
months, Justo abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the
Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy in debt.
She then realized Justo was a profligate. At one time, he disposed without her consent
a conjugal piece of land.16 At other times, he permitted the municipal government to
take gasoline from their gas station free of charge.

She endured all of Justo's shortcomings, but his act of maintaining a mistress and siring
an illegitimate child was the last straw that prompted her to file the present case. She
found that after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching.
Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose, obviously named
after her (Rosa) and Justo's deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras.17

As expected, Justo has a different version of the story.

He met Rosa upon his return to Bindoy after taking the bar examinations in Manila.18 He
frequently spent time in her store.19 Believing he loved her, he courted her and later on,
they became sweethearts. In 1963, they decided to get married. However, it was
postponed because her family demanded a dowry. Their marriage took place in 1964
upon his mother's signing a deed of conveyance involving 28 hectares of coconut land
in favor of Rosa.20

He blamed the subsequent dissipation of their assets from the slump of the price of
sugar and not to his alleged profligacy.21 Due to his business ventures, he and Rosa
were able to acquire a 10-room family house, expand their store, establish their
gasoline station, and purchase several properties. He also denied forging her signature
in one mortgage transaction. He maintained that he did not dispose of a conjugal
property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar crop
loan before the bank's authorized employee.22

As to their marital relationship, he noticed the change in Rosa's attitude after her return
from the United States. She became detached, cold, uncaring, and overly focused on
the family's businesses.23 He tried to reach her but Rosa was steadfast in her "new
attitudinal outlook." Before other people, he merely pretended that their relationship
was blissful.24

He did not abandon his family in the United States. It happened that they only had
tourist visas. When they were there, their children's tourist visas were converted into
study visas, permitting them to stay longer. For his part, he was granted only three (3)
months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he immediately returned to the
Philippines.25

He spent for his children's education. At first, he resented supporting them because he
was just starting his law practice and besides, their conjugal assets were more than
enough to provide for their needs. He admitted though that there were times he failed
to give them financial support because of his lack of income.26

What caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosa's act of embarrassing him during
his birthday celebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the guests. When
confronted, she retorted that she has nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced
him of her lack of concern.27 This was further aggravated when she denied his request
for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a mountainous and NPA-infested area.28

As to the charge of concubinage, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress, but
her secretary in his Law Office. She was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle
Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.

After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity
of the marriage. It found that: (a) Justo did not abandon the conjugal home as he was
forced to leave after Rosa posted guards at the gates of their house;29 (b) the conjugal
assets were sufficient to support the family needs, thus, there was no need for Justo to
shell out his limited salary;30 and (c) the charge of infidelity is unsubstantiated.31 The
RTC observed that the relationship between the parties started well, negating the
existence of psychological incapacity on either party at the time of the celebration of
their marriage.32 And lastly, it ruled that there appeared to be a collusion between them
as both sought the declaration of nullity of their marriage.33

Justo interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.

In the interim, Rosa filed with this Court a petition for disbarment against Justo,
docketed as A.C. No. 5333, premised on the same charges alleged in her complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage. On October 18, 2000, this Court rendered its Decision
finding him guilty of falsifying Rosa's signature in bank documents, immorality,
and abandonment of his family. He was suspended from the practice of law, thus:

In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wife's signature in bank
documents and other related loan instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR from the
practice of law on the charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family,
the penalties to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this Decision be spread in
respondent's record as an attorney, and notice of the same served on the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

On December 8, 2000 or nearly two months after this Court promulgated the Decision
in A.C. No. 5333, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case,
holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required by
law to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justo's alleged defects or
idiosyncracies "were sufficiently explained by the evidence," thus:

Certainly, we cannot ignore what is extant on the record - first, the income which
supported their children came from the earnings of their conjugal properties and not
singularly from Rosa's industry; second, Justo gave his share of the support to his
children in the form of allowances, albeit smaller than that derived from the conjugal
property; third, he was booted out from their conjugal dwelling after he lost his bid for
re-election and as such did not voluntarily abandon his home; and fourth, although
unjustifiable in the eyes of the law and morality, Justo's alleged infidelity came after he
was driven out of his house by Rosa. x x x.

The Court of Appeals likewise held that Rosa's inability to offer the testimony of a
psychologist is fatal to her case, being in violation of the tenets laid down by this Court
in Molina.34 Thus, she failed to substantiate her allegation that Justo is psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential obligations of marriage.35

Rosa filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari .

Rosa contends that this Court's factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment
are conclusive on the present case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in
rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant complaint
sometime in May, 1993, well before this Court's pronouncement in Molina relied upon
by the Court of Appeals. She states that she could have presented an expert to prove
the root cause of Justo's psychological incapacity had she been required to do so. For
relief, she prays that her marriage with Justo be annulled on the bases of the
Court's conclusive factual findings in A.C. No. 5333; or in the alternative, remand this
case to the court a quo for reception of expert testimony in the interest of due process.

In his comment on the petition, Justo asserts that the present case is a "new matter
completely foreign and removed" from A.C. No. 5333; hence, the factual findings of
this Court therein are not conclusive on this case. Besides, no hearing was conducted in
A.C. No. 5333 as it was decided merely on the bases of pleadings and documents.

The parties' opposing contentions lead us to the following three (3) vital issues:
first, whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the
present case;

second, whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on
the root cause of Justo's alleged psychological incapacity is necessary; andcralawlibrary

third, whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the
part of Justo.

The petition is bereft of merit.

Whether the factual findings of this Court in

A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case.

Rosa, sad to say, had made much ado about nothing. A reading of the Court of Appeals'
Decision shows that she has no reason to feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court
even assumed that her charges "are true," but concluded that they are insufficient to
declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. The pertinent
portion of the Decision reads:

Applying these parameters to the sifted evidence, we find

that even if we assume Justo's alleged infidelity, failure to support his family
and alleged abandonment of their family home are true, such traits are at
best indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father.
However, by themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage void
due to an incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do
not manifest that he was truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must
assume and discharge as a married person. While they may manifest the "gravity" of
his alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily show 'incurability', such
that while his acts violated the covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily show
that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which
prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future.36

The Court of Appeals pointed this out in its Resolution denying Rosa's motion for
reconsideration, thus:

Even as we are fully cognizant of the findings of the Supreme Court in the disbarment
case appellant filed against her husband, namely, appellee's falsification of documents
to obtain loans and his infidelity, these facts, by themselves, do not conclusively
establish appellee's psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the
Family Code. In fact, we already went as far as to presume the existence of
such seeming depravities in appellee's character in our earlier judgment.
However, as we emphasized in our Decision, the existence of such
eventualities is not necessarily conclusive of an inherent incapacity on the
part of appellee to discern and perform the rudiments of marital obligations
as required under Article 36.37

Clearly, Rosa's insistence that the factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 be considered
"conclusive" on the present case is unmeritorious. The Court of Appeals already "went
as far as to presume the existence" of Justo's depravities, however, even doing so could
not bring about her (Rosa's) desired result. As Rosa's prayer for relief suggests, what
she wants is for this Court to annul her marriage on the bases of its findings in A.C. No.
5333.38 Obviously, she is of the impression that since her charges in A.C. No. 5333 were
found to be true, justifying the suspension of Justo from the practice of law, the same
charges are also sufficient to prove his psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential marital obligations.

Her premise is of course non-sequitur.

Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of

their own. They are distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal
cases. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether
different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first
two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.39 The Court's exposition
in In re Almacen40 is instructive, thus:

x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to
inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n]
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there
can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Accordingly, one's unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean one's unfitness
as a husband or vice versa.41 The yardsticks for such roles are simply different. This is
why the disposition in a disbarment case cannot be conclusive on an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage. While Rosa's charges sufficiently proved Justo's
unfitness as a lawyer, however, they may not establish that he is psychologically
incapacitated to perform his duties as a husband. In the disbarment case, "the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such." Its purpose is "to protect the court and the public from
the misconduct of officers of the court." On the other hand, in an action for declaration
of nullity of marriage based on the ground of psychological incapacity, the question for
determination is whether the guilty party suffers a grave, incurable, and pre-existing
mental incapacity that renders him truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. Its
purpose is to free the innocent party from a meaningless marriage. In this case, as will
be seen in the following discussion, Justo's acts are not sufficient to conclude that he is
psychologically incapacitated, albeit such acts really fall short of what is expected from
a lawyer.

II

Whether a remand of this case to the RTC is necessary.

The presentation of an expert witness to prove psychological incapacity has its origin in
Molina.42 One of the Guidelines set forth therein states:
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

In the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos,43 the Court clarified that the
above Guideline does not require that the respondent should be examined by a
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage. What is important is "the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition."

Interestingly, in the same year (2000) that Marcos was decided, the Court backtracked
a bit when it held in Republic v. Dagdag44 that, "the root cause of psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by
experts" and this requirement was not deemed complied with where no psychiatrist or
medical doctor testified on the alleged psychological incapacity of one party.

Significantly, the New Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,45 promulgated by this Court on March 15, 2003,
geared towards the relaxation of the requirement of expert opinion. Section 2,
paragraph (d) states:

(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically
allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the
time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

In Barcelona v. Court of Appeals,46 this Court categorically explained that under

the New Rules, a petition for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code
need not allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity or on its root
cause. What must be alleged are the physical manifestations indicative of said
incapacity. The Court further held that the New Rules, being procedural in nature,
apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption.

Later, in 2005, the Court reiterated the Marcos doctrine in Republic v. Iyoy.47 Thus:

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement

that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer
necessary to allege expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the
totality of the evidence presented during the trial.

Significantly, the present case is exactly akin to Pesca v. Pesca.48 Pesca stemmed from
a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 filed by a battered
wife sometime in April 1994. The trial court, in its Decision dated November 15, 1995,
decreed the marriage void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the
part of the husband. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's Decision, applying
the Guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals49 and Molina.50 When the matter
was brought to this Court, the wife argued that Santos and Molina should not have
retroactive application, the Guidelines being merely advisory and not mandatory in
nature. She submitted that the proper application of Santos and Molina warranted only
a remand of her case to the trial court for further proceedings, not a dismissal. The
Court declined to remand Pesca51 on the premise that the Santos and Molina Guidelines
"constitute a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted," thus:

The 'doctrine of stare decisis,' ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of
the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim - 'legis interpretado legis vim
obtinet' that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has
the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as
so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of the law as of
the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds
itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have
to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and
have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of 'lex prospicit,
non replicit. -

The Court then opted to examine the evidence. It affirmed that the wife failed, both in
her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of
psychological incapacity on the part of her husband. The Court then concluded that
"emotional immaturity and irresponsibility" cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity.

Applying the foregoing cases, Marcos, Barcelona, Iyoy, and Pesca, to the instant case,
there is no reason to remand it to the trial court. The records clearly show that there is
sufficient evidence to establish the psychological condition of Justo.

III

Whether the totality of evidence in the case

shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo
as to justify the declaration of nullity of marriage.

The last issue left for this Court's consideration is whether the totality of the evidence is
sufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity on the part of Justo so as to
justify the dissolution of the marriage in question.

At this juncture, it is imperative that the parties be reminded of the State's policy on
marriage. Article XV of the Constitution mandates that:

SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
SEC. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.

This State policy on the inviolability of marriage has been enshrined in Article 1 of the
Family Code which states that:

ART. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union, between a man and a

woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law, and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

Given the foregoing provisions of constitutional and statutory law, this Court has held
fast to the position that any doubt as to the validity of a marriage is to be resolved in
favor of its validity.52 Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.

Of course, the law recognizes that not all marriages are made in heaven. Imperfect
humans more often than not create imperfect unions. Thus, when the imperfection is
psychological in nature and renders a person incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations, the State provides refuge to the aggrieved spouse under Article 36
of the Family Code which reads:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

In Molina,53 the Court laid down the Guidelines for the interpretation and application of
Article 36, thus:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, were mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

The foregoing Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements mandated by the Court in
Santos,54 to reiterate: psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)
juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.

A review of the complaint, as well as the testimonial and documentary evidence, shows
that Rosa's main grounds in seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Justo
are his infidelity, profligacy which includes the falsification of her signature in
one of the loan documents, failure to support the children, and abandonment
of the family. Both the courts below found the charges unsubstantiated and untrue.
However, this Court, in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment, found the evidence sufficient to
support Rosa's charges of sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature, and
abandonment of family, thus:

ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANT'S SIGNATURE

The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation on the

signatures of complainant Rosa Yap Paras and respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis - à-
vis the questioned signature "Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the questioned bank loan
documents, contracts of mortgage and other related instrument, yielded the following
results:

CONCLUSION:

1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were written by
one and the same person.

2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA YAP PARAS were not
written by one and the same person. (Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)

The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent forged the signatures of
complainant. However, an analysis of the above findings lead to no other conclusion
than that the questioned or falsified signatures of complainant Rosa Y. Paras were
authored by respondent as said falsified signatures were the same as the sample
signatures of respondent.

To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)

executed in his favor by complainant to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan from
the Bais Rural Bank of Bais City. Instead of exculpating respondent, the presence of the
SPA places him in hot water. For if he was so authorized to obtain loans from the
banks, then why did he have to falsify his wife's signatures in the bank loan
documents? The purpose of an SPA is to especially authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign
for and on behalf of the principal using his own name.

ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE

The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit-statements of his

children and three other persons who used to work with him and have witnessed the
acts indicative of his infidelity more than satisfy this Court that respondent has strayed
from the marital path. The baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose Paras where
respondent was named as the father of the child (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his naming
the child after his deceased first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn
Ching and the child to live in their house in Dumaguete City bolster the allegation that
respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms. Ching, the mother of his illegitimate
child.

While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa, such
as sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature, abandonment and
inadequate support of children, are true, nonetheless, there is nothing in the
records showing that they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part. In other
words, the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to show that Justo is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The records indicate that the marriage between the parties had a good start, resulting
in the birth of their four (4) children. The early days of their cohabitation were blissful
and harmonious. Justo was deeply in love with Rosa, even persuading his mother to
give her a dowry. They were able to build a 10-room family home and acquire several
properties, thus, proving themselves to be responsible couple. Even Rosa admitted that
Justo took care of their children when they were young. Unfortunately, the passage of
time appeared to have taken its toll on their relationship. The acts committed by Justo
appeared to have been the result of irreconcilable differences between them caused by
the death of their two (2) children and financial difficulties due to his failure to win the
mayoralty election and to sustain his law practice. Furthermore, the superior business
acumen of Rosa, as well as the insolent attitude of her family towards Justo, busted his
ego and lowered his self-esteem.

There is no evidence that Justo's "defects" were present at the inception of

the marriage. His "defects" surfaced only in the latter years when these events took
place; their two children died; he lost in the election; he failed in his business ventures
and law practice; and felt the disdain of his wife and her family. Surely, these
circumstances explain why Rosa filed the present case only after almost 30 years of
their marriage.

Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justo's "defects" are incurable or
grave.

The following catena of cases provides an adequate basis why the marriage between
Justo and Rosa should not be annulled.

In Dedel v. Court of Appeals55 which involved a promiscuous wife who left her family to
live with one of her many paramours, this Court ruled that the acts of sexual
infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity absent
a showing of the presence of such promiscuity at the inception of the
marriage, thus:

x x x. In this case, respondent's sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It
appears that respondent's promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the
inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a
blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and
which produced four children.

Respondent's sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves

constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither
could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological
incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity, or sexual
promiscuity.

In Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,56 the wife's inability to conceive led her husband to

other women so he could fulfill his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and
blood. This Court ruled that this is not a manifestation of psychological incapacity in the
contemplation of the Family Code. In Choa v. Choa,57 this Court declared that a mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not
constitute psychological incapacity. And, again, in Iyoy,58 a Filipina left her husband,
married an American and had a family by him, which she flaunted to her former
husband. This Court ruled that these acts, while embarrassing and hurting to
the latter, did not satisfactorily establish a serious or grave psychological or
mental defect of an incurable nature present at the time of marriage; and
that irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity, and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment per se do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36.
What is clear in this case is a husband who has gone astray from the path of marriage
because of a conflicting relationship with his wife and her family and repeated life's
setbacks. While these do not justify his sins, they are not sufficient to establish that he
is psychologically incapacitated.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability

to take cognizance of and assume the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.59 As this Court
repeatedly declares, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes thereof manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225
of the Family Code.60

Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need
not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,
moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity,
and abandonment, and the like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner refers
only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.61

In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
While this Court commiserates with Rosa's plight, however, it has no choice but to apply
the law. Dura lex sed lex.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

In Re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562

19JUL
FACTS:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a “Petition to Surrender the Lawyer’s Certificate of
Title” to the Supreme Court as a sign of his protest as against to what he call a
tribunal “peopled by people who are calloused to our pleas for justice…”. He also
expressed strong words as against the judiciary like “justice… is not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb.” . The petition rooted from the case he lost due to the absence of time
and place in his motion in the trial court. His appeal was dismissed in the Court of
Appeals by reason of jurisprudence. In a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, it
was again dismissed thru a minute resolution. With the disappointments, he thought of
this sacrificial move. He claimed that this petition to surrender his title is only in trust,
and that he may obtain the title again as soon as he regained confidence in the justice
system.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for his acts.

HELD:
YES. Indefinite suspension imposed.
RATIO:
It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that there is no one to blame but Atty.
Almacen himself because of his negligence. Even if the intentions of his accusations are
so noble, in speaking of the truth and alleged injustices,so as not to condemn the
sinners but the sin, it has already caused enough damage and disrepute to the
judiciary. Since this particular case is sui generis in its nature, a number of foreign and
local jurisprudence in analogous cases were cited as benchmarks and references.
Between disbarment and suspension, the latter was imposed. Indefinite suspension
may only be lifted until further orders, after Atty. Almacen may be able to prove that he
is again fit to resume the practice of law.

ATTY. DAMASO S. FLORES, Complainant, vs. HON. BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City (now Deputy Court
Administrator), Respondent.

In re: Contempt Proceeding v. ATTY. DAMASO S. FLORES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

NARVASA, C.J.:

This is a resolution treats of the liability of Atty. Damaso S. Flores for contempt of court
in relation to several actions and proceedings in which he was a party.

Flores was the defendant in Civil Case No. Q-45825 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon city (Branch 85). The case involved an admitted indebtedness of Flores to the
plaintiff, Rolando Ligon, of about 1.8 million pesos. A judgment based on compromise
was rendered on September 26, 1985 by the late Judge Jose Castro, providing for
payment of the debt in stated installments and, in the event of default, acceleration of
the obligation and the surrender of the Paranaque Cockpit Stadium (held by Flores
under lease) to Ligon for the latter to manage and operate.

On April 10, 1986, the Trial Court promulgated an order declaring Flores to have
breached the compromise judgment and directing execution thereof; and on May 22,
1986, a writ of execution issued. Flores appealed the Order of April 10, 1986 to the
Court of Appeals, his appeal being docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 10259; and to nullify
the writ of execution, he filed a certiorari action in the same Court, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 09061.

CA-G.R. SP No. 09061 was decided on September 19, 1986 in Flores favor -- vindicating
his right to possess the cockpit on a finding that he had not infringed the compromise
judgment. Ligons petition for review in the Supreme Court, G.R. No. 76039, was
dismissed on February 23, 1987, and his motion for reconsideration denied on March
10, 1988.

Flores then asked the Trial Court to restore possession of the cockpit to him in light of
this dispositions of the Court of Appeals and this Court. His motion to this effect, dated
April 5, 1988, was granted by Judge Abesamis, but only on April 20, 1988, because the
latter (a) had to wait for the mittimus, which was not received until April 13, 1988, and
(b) had to study the pleadings filed by Ligon and Flores on the issue, dated April 14 and
15, 1988, respectively.
Despite Judge Abesamis Order of April 20, 1988 -- and two other orders of substantially
the same tenor dated May 2, 1988 and August 31, 1988 in response to Flores motions
dated June 9, 1988 and August 15, 1988 -- Flores was still unable to regain possession
of the cockpit. This was due to Ligons actions in the Court of Appeals.

In that Court Ligon challenged the order of execution of April 20, 1988 by a special civil
action of certiorari, CA-G.R. SP No. 14588, and obtained a temporary restraining order.
CA-G.R. SP No. 14588 was consolidated with CA-G.R. CV No. 10259. The cases were
jointly decided on August 9, 1988 in Flores favor; and Ligons motion for
reconsideration, denied on November 23, 1988. Ligons appeal to this Court, G.R. No.
84644 again resulted in failure. His review was denied on August 29, 1989, and
reconsideration denied on October 23, 1989.

It is noteworthy that in G.R. No. 84644, in an attempt to obtain a favorable verdict,

Ligon drew attention to the fact that some years back he had purchased the Paranaque
Cockpit Stadium from its owner (Flores lessor) and argued that this gave him a right of
possession superior of that of Flores. The Court however declined to take cognizance of
the matter and observed -- in its Resolution of October 23, 1989 denying Ligons motion
for reconsideration was finality -- that any supervening event should properly be
addressed to the Trial Court, not to this Court.

Judge Abesamis received notice of the judgment of August 9, 1988 in the consolidated
cases of CA-G.R. No. 14588 and CA-G.R. CV No. 10259 on August 16, 1988; and after
considering the pleadings presented by the parties, the last being a rejoinder dated
August 26, 1988, ordered issuance of an alias writ of execution on August 31, 1988, to
revert possession of the cockpit to Flores.

But enforcement of the alias writ of execution was again effectively delayed by still
other circumstances, to wit: (1) another temporary restraining order -- issued by the
Court of Appeals on October 27, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 14588 above mentioned --
which was not lifted until November 23, 1988; (2) a temporary restraining order issued
on December 5, 1988 by the Second Division of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 84644,
not lifted until October, 1989; and (3) the pendency in Civil Case No. Q-45825 itself of
the matter of the appointment of a special sheriff sought by Flores precisely to carry out
the writ.

Surprisingly -- although aware of these circumstances precluding enforcement of Judge

Abesamis order for reversion of the cockpit to him -- Flores filed criminal and
administrative cases against said Judge, accusing him of partiality, evident bad faith,
and gross negligence, as well as of serious misconduct, inefficiency and ignorance of
the law, in deliberately delaying actions on his motion to obtain possession of the
cockpit. These cases were:

(a) Criminal Case No. OMB-0-89-01209 filed on May 22, 1989 in the Office of the
Ombudsman;

(b) A.M. No. 90-11-332-SBA, the administrative aspect of Case No. OMB 0-89-
01209, supra, of which this Court took cognizance; and

(c) A.M. No. RTJ-89-348, filed with this Court on June 27, 1989.

OMB Case No. 0-89-01209 was short-lived. It was dismissed by the Office of the
Ombudsman on September 13, 1989 for lack of merit and insufficiency of evidence
upon a finding that Judge Abesamis had acted promptly and properly on Flores
motions. Indeed, upon the facts just recited, it was legally impossible to ascribe inaction
or intent to delay to His Honor as regards Flores attempts to regain possession of the
cockpit.

Now, on November 20, 1989 -- after Ligons motion for reconsideration of the judgment
in G.R. No. 84644 was denied with finality in the Resolution of October 23, 1989 --
Abesamis authorized the issuance of still another writ of execution in Flores favor. But
again Ligon challenged this writ in yet another special civil action in the Court of
Appeals, CA-G.R. SP No. 19348. The case was decided adversely to him on January 22,
1990.

Once more, Flores asked the Regional Trial Court to restore possession of the cockpit to
him, and once more Ligon opposed to him, this time asserting that such restoration was
no longer legally possible because barred by a supervening event -- which, according to
this Courts Resolution of October 23, 1989 in G.R. No. 84644, should properly be
addressed to the Trial Court, not to this Court, supra. Ligon pointed out that since he
had become the owner of the cockpit, his right of possession must be deemed superior
to that of Flores, lessee of the former owner.

After hearing the parties, Judge Abesamis sustained Ligons contention, in an Order
dated February 16, 1990. That Order was later upheld by Judge Teodoro Regino,
Abesamis pair judge, who acted on a subsequent motion of Flores to get back the
cockpit while Abesamis was on leave. In his Order of April 16, 1990, Judge Regino ruled
that Ligons lawful acquisition of title to the cockpit and Flores continuing failure to pay
his debt of about P1.8 million to the former were supervening events warranting Ligons
retention of the cockpit and precluding its restoration to Flores. Flores filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was acted on by Judge Abesamis who had by then returned to
duty. The motion was denied by Order of June 6, 1990.

Flores challenged these three (3) orders -- of February 16, 1990 (of Abesamis), of April
16, 1990 (of Regino) and of June 6, 1990 (of Abesamis) -- in a certiorari suit filed with
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 22201.

He also initiated on May 14, 1990, an administrative proceeding against Judge Teodoro
Regino, docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-90-505, in relation to his Order dated April 16,
1990, supra.

The Court of Appeals, however, found no merit in Flores certiorari action (CA-G.R. SP
No. 22201), and in a Decision promulgated on October 31, 1990 (shortly after the
actions commencement), dismissed the same. It later denied reconsideration thereof,
by Resolution dated February 26, 1991. Flores appeal to this Court, docketed as G.R.
No. 97556, also failed.

Also dismissed by this Court for lack of merit, about two and a half years later, were the
administrative case against Judge Regino (A.M. No. RTJ-90-505) as well as those
against Judge Abesamis (A.M. No. RTJ-90-11-332-SBA) and (A.M. No. RTJ-89-348).
That Resolution of dismissal, dated September 14, 1993, reads as follows:

**. Acting on the separate complaints filed by Damaso Flores in (a) A.M. No. RTJ-89-
348 charging respondent Judge Bernardo P. Abesamis with serious misconduct,
inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law relative to Civil Case No. Q-45825, entitled
`Rolando R. Ligon vs. Damaso S. Flores' as well as the respondents comment thereon
dated May 7, 1990 and the complainants reply (there)to **; and (b) A.M. No. RTJ-90-
505 charging respondent Judge Teodoro P. Regino (who took over as pairing judge
when Judge Abesamis was on sick leave) with serious misconduct, inefficiency and
gross ignorance of the law for having issued in Civil Case No. Q-45825 his order of April
16, 1990 which, according to the complainant, unlawfully interpreted the final judgment
he was supposed to enforce, and in doing so, he callously arrogated unto himself the
power to reverse and said aside the said final judgments and rendered the same
useless and nugatory as well as the respondents reply/memorandum dated November
14, 1990 filed in compliance with the Resolution of the July 16, 1990, the Court
resolved to DISMISS all the charges against respondent Judge Bernardo P. Abesamis in
A.M. no. RTJ-89-348 for lack of merit. Similarly, considering that the extensive
discussion made by respondent Judge Teodoro P. Regino in A.M. No. RTJ-90-505 in his
order of April 16, 1990 of the pertinent facts and law involved is utterly inconsistent
with the truth of the charges levelled at him, all the charges against Judge Teodoro P.
Regino in A.M. No. RTJ-90-505 are hereby likewise DISMISSED.

Further, the Court Resolved to DISMISS, for lack of merit, the charges against Judge
Abesamis in the administrative aspect of OMB Case No. 0-89-01209, entitled `Damaso
S. Flores vs. Hon. Bernardo P. Abesamis' in A.M. No. 90-11-332-SB, considering that the
charges therein are fundamentally similar and are based on the facts and incidents as in
A.M. No. RTJ-89-348.

But two years after promulgation of this Resolution of September 13, 1993, or more
precisely on December 21, 1995, Damaso Flores once more filed in the Office of the
Ombudsman a complaint against Judge Abesamis, with respect to his Orders of
February 16, June 6, and December 10, 1990. Specifically, he accused Judge Abesamis
of transgressing Section (e) of R.A. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act): for
alleged bias and prejudice in granting a partys motion which caused undue injury to
complainant.

The case was docketed as CPL No. 95-3618, and was referred by Assistant Ombudsman
Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. on February 27, 1996 to the Office of the Court
Administrator, where it was docketed as A.M. No. SC-96-1. The case was dismissed for
utter lack of merit in this Courts Decision of December 23, 1996. The decision also
ordered Flores -

** to EXPLAIN within ten (10) days from notice hereof why ** he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with for wilful disregard of this Courts judgment and orders and those
of the Court of Appeals; abuse of the processes of the courts; and forum-shopping.

Flores submitted his explanation, denominated Compliance, under date of January 14,
1997. In it he reviews in some detail the relevant facts and submits that in filing all the
cases, whether civil or administrative, he did not wilfully disregard the judgments and
orders of this ** Court and those of the Court of Appeals, ** has not abused the courts
processes nor engaged in forum-shopping, ** (having filed said cases in the firm belief)
that they were meritorious and not intended for delay or to harass anyone or to abuse
the courts processes**, and with a pure motive and that was to obtain justice -- to get
what was due to him**.

It is in light of the material facts narrated herein (and in the Decision of December 23,
1996), in relation to Atty. Flores aforesaid explanation (Compliance) of January 14,
1997, that the Court now addresses the matter of Flores liability for disciplinary
sanction.

1. His first complaints against Judge Abesamis in the OMB and this court were clearly
without basis whatever and not susceptible of exculpatory explanation.
The common theory under which he sought to hold Judge Abesamis administratively
and criminally responsible -- in Case OMB 0-89-01209 (filed on May 22, 1989), A.M. No.
90-11-332-SB (the "administrative aspect" of OMB 0-89-01209) and A.M. No. RTJ-89-
348 -- was that His Honor had unduly delayed action on several motions filed by him to
regain possession of the Paranaque Cockpit Stadium in accordance with the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 09061 dated September 19, 1986, affirmed by this
Courts Resolution of February 23, 1987 in G.R. No. 76039, reconsideration being
thereafter denied on March 10, 1988. The motions were allegedly those dated April 5,
1988, June 9, 1988, August 15, 1988, October 14, 1988, and November 24, 1988.

But, as already stated, since Judge Abesamis received the mittimus from the Court of
Appeals only on April 13, 1988, he could not have acted earlier on Flores motion of April
5. Moreover, he had to study the pleadings exchanged by Ligon and Flores himself on
the issue (dated April 14, and 15, 1988, respectively). Five days afterwards, or on April
20, 1988, he granted the latters motion for execution. In other words, he acted on the
incident within five (5) days after it could be properly regarded as submitted for
resolution.

The trouble is, above related, Flores adversary, Ligon, lost no time in challenging Judge
Abesamis order of execution of April 20, 1988, and other orders for restoration of
possession of the cockpit to Flores, in a series of actions in the Court of Appeals and in
this Court, in the course of which temporary restraining orders were issued against
Abesamis. It was not until October 23, 1989, when Ligons motion for reconsideration
was denied with finality in G.R. No. 84644, that the judicial restraints on Judge
Abesamis were finally removed. Under the facts, to repeat, it is not possible fairly to
ascribe inaction or intent to delay to His Honor as regards Flores motion for execution.

It was precisely in light of these circumstances, among others, that the Office of the
Ombudsman quickly threw out Flores complaint against Judge Abesamis. That Office
found that -

** (contrary to Flores claims) practically all of ** (his motions) before ** (Abesamis)

sala have been favorably acted upon by the latter and with dispatch excepting those
cases only where a directive had been received from the Court of Appeals ordering **
(him) to desist from restoring possession of subject cockpit to herein complainant until
further orders ** or in cases where Ligon ** filed his Opposition to ** (Flores motions)
and the latter filed his Answer/Comment thereto.

And it was for the same reasons that this Court, on September 14, 1993, dismissed the
administrative cases against Judge Abesamis -- A.M. No. RTJ-89-348 and A.M. No. 90-
11-332-SB, as well as that filed by Flores against Judge Teodoro Regino, Abesamis pair
judge.

2. Also patently without foundation in fact and incapable of tenable explanation, is the
case filed by Flores on December 21, 1995 against Judge Abesamis in the Office of the
Ombudsman -- CPL No. 95-3618 (A.M. No. SC-96-1) for alleged bias and prejudice
attendant upon the Orders of February 16, June 6, and December 10, 1990. For on
December 21, 1995, Flores was fully aware of the following material events indubitably
demonstrating the absence of any cause for complaint on his part:

a. Judge Reginos Order dated April 16, 1990 had been upheld in no uncertain terms by
this Courts Resolution of September 14, 1993 (A.M. No. RTJ-90-505) which declared
that the pertinent facts and law involved were utterly inconsistent with the truth of the
charges levelled at him. The ruling is implicit but no less clear affirmation of the
correctness of two Orders of Judge Abesamis (1) that of February 16, 1990 -- which
Judge Regino sustained in his aforesaid Order of April 16, 1990 -- and (2) that of June
6, 1990 -- which denied reconsideration of Judge Reginos order of April 16, 1990.

b. Indeed, he (Flores) had directly assailed (a) Judge Abesamis Order of February 16,
1990, (b) Judge Reginos Order of April 16, 1990 confirming said Order, and (c) Judge
Abesamis Order of June 6, 1990, denying Flores motion for reconsideration of Reginos
Order of April 16, 1990, in a certiorari action in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No.
22201), and said Court had confirmed the correctness of all three orders, in its decision
dated October 31, 1990. The Appellate Court then denied reconsideration, by
Resolution of February 26, 1991; and Flores appeal to this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
97556, was dismissed for lack of merit.

c. So, too, Flores challenges to two other Orders of Judge Abesamis -- of June 25, 1990
(denying Flores motion for his inhibition) and of December 10, 1990 (decreeing
execution in favor of Ligon after Flores refused to present countervailing evidence on
the matter) -- were decided adversely to him by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
22881 (motion for reconsideration of decision denied on August 12, 1991). (N.B. Later,
said orders were also sustained by this Courts First Division in G.R. No. 101152, decided
jointly with G.R. No. 97556 on July 29, 1996).

It is clear, in other words, that when Flores initiated CPL No. 95-3618 (A.M. No. SC-96-
1), he knew that the specific Orders of Judge Abesamis upon which his criminal
complaint was grounded had already been sustained by higher courts, and
consequently, his complaint was completely devoid of merit.

3. Even assuming arguendo that there was reasonable ground on belief of Flores part
that Judge Abesamis was refraining form acting on his motions, out of bias or hostility
or other improper motive, there were obvious judicial remedies readily available to him
to obtain relief -- the existence and availability of which precluded his resort to criminal,
civil or administrative proceedings against the Judge.

As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or
irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal
in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or
application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for
reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial),
and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be
deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of
power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as
the case may be.

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal
actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for
these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of
these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or
proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of
the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after
the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have
spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal. Civil, or administrative
liability may be said to have opened, or closed.
Flores resorted to administrative prosecution (or institution of criminal actions) as a
substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review provided by law
from court judgments or orders, on the theory that the Judges orders had caused him
undue injury. This is impermissible, as this Court has already more than once ruled.
Law and logic decree that administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative
nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the
result thereof (SEE In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382, 417-418 [1987]; In
Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, 241 SCRA 405 [1995]. Indeed, since judges must be free to
judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they should not be
subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts
they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and
functions; and it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that
judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in
good faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of the judge can be had only if there be
a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the
manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and ** also evidence
of malice or bad faith, ignorance of inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in
rendering said judgment or order or under the stringent circumstances set out in Article
32 of the Civil Code (SEE In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, at pp. 464-465).

Flores thus abused the processes of the court. He resorted in 1989 and 1990 to the
administrative procedure for disciplining Judges prescribed by law, and even to criminal
prosecution, notwithstanding that determination of the correctness of the orders of
Judges Abesamis and Regino -- upon which the viability of his recourse depended --
had not yet been done by the Court of Appeals or this Court before which said orders
when then pending review. For obviously, until and unless there was an authoritative
pronouncement that those orders were indeed tainted by anomaly, as was his
contention, there was no ground whatever to prosecute Judge Abesamis or Regino,
either administratively or criminally, for rendering them. In fine, Flores filed his
administrative and criminal complaints prematurely, before ascertainment of the
existence of the foundation therefor; and it would appear that improper motives
underlay the filing of his complaints: either to vent his wrath against someone, anyone,
because of his frustrations in his attempts to regain possession of the cockpit, or to so
intimidate the respondent Judges as to make them more malleable in their subsequent
actuations with respect to his future motions.

What is worse is that after his administrative and criminal accusations filed in 1989 and
1990, as well as his judicial assaults against particular orders of Judge Abesamis, had
been thrown out for lack of merit, Flores again filed on December 21, 1995 charges
involving same matters against Deputy Court Administrator Abesamis, in the Office of
the Ombudsman where it was docketed as CPL No. 95-3618. As above stated, this
complaint was later made the basis of another administrative proceeding in this Court,
identified as A.M. No. SC-96-1, which Flores actively prosecuted. He thereby manifested
what can only be considered an insolent disregard of this Courts adjudgments. Knowing
that his earlier accusations and theories had already been ruled by this Court to be
without merit and accordingly rejected, he resort to re-ventilate the same theories and
accusation two years later, completely ignoring, and demonstrating disdain for, this
Courts resolutions thereon.

Not only was the complaint he filed utterly without merit, as very well knew; in filing it
he also utilized the administrative disciplinary procedure provided by law for his own
purposes. His motives must again be as suspect, as those attendant upon his earlier
accusations.
 Finally, his initiation of the complaint was forum-shopping of the most blatant sort, a
clear attempt to re-ventilate or re-litigate issues already passed upon and definitively
resolved by this Court, affirming action on the same issues by the Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Court.

In fine, Flores is more than preponderantly shown by the evidence to have, more than
once: (a) instituted criminal as well as administrative proceedings against Judge
Abesamis (and Judge Regino) which he knew to be completely without basis in fact; (2)
resorted to administrative and criminal prosecution contemporaneously with, and prior
to exhaustion of, judicial remedies against the acts complained of; and (3) engaged in
forum-shopping. He is guilty of abuse of the process or proceedings of the courts, and
of improper conduct tending to obstruct or degrade the administration of justice
(Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court).

It would appear that Flores cannot accept the fact that the earlier judgments and
orders rendered in his favor by this Court and others in several actions have already
been superseded and rendered functus officio by later verdicts, in light of supervening
events. Notwithstanding the pronouncements in said later verdicts which have since
become final and executory, not to mention his long unpaid debt to Ligon, he remains
inordinately obsessed with the prior adjudgments, insisting they have not been
superseded and continually referring to them in his motions and pleadings as a source
of right, even after their supersession; in fact, with no little obduracy, he has quite
recently adverted to them again -- in substantiation of his claim of unjust deprivation of
the cockpit in question -- in (1) a tract entitled Appeal for Justice Only for the Purpose
of Securing Justice and Not To Malign or Smear Any One, which he has caused to be
printed and distributed, as well as in (2) a pleading entitled Petitioners Appeal for
Justice, filed without authority under date of April 18, 1997. It may well be that he felt
and still feels sorely aggrieved by the procedural maneuvers of his adversary, Ligon,
who thereby succeeded in not only delaying but eventually preventing execution of the
previous orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, the Court of Appeals and
this Court, and which maneuvers, it may be mentioned, were denounced in no certain
terms as repetitious and dilatory, by the Court of Appeals. But those feelings of
resentment and frustration engendered by Ligons maneuvers cannot justify the
oppressive acts perpetrated against completely blameless Judges, and for which he
(Flores) is himself made responsible in the contempt proceeding at bar.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Damaso S. Flores is DECLARED GUILTY of contempt of court and

SENTENCED to pay a FINE OF ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Urbina v maceren
A.C. No. 288-J. June 19, 1974
Teehankee, J.

FACTS

Atty. Urbina and Atty. Gesmundo lost a case in the sala of Judge Maceren. The two lawyers
then filed a criminal case against Maceren for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.
Prior to dismissal by the fiscal, Urbina received a phone call from another lawyer who
threatened him that if he shall not withdraw the criminal case, he will be killed; that
said threat was made by Judge Maceren through Atty. Esguerra.
Judge Maceren stated that he issued the judgment in good faith and that he made no threats
against Urbina considering that if Urbina did withdraw, there is still Atty. Gesmundo
who can continue the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not Urbina’s suit should prosper.

HELD: No. Ths Supreme Court gave credence to Maceren’s statement as opposed to Urbina’s
bare allegations which were not supported by evidence.

The Supreme Court also condemned Urbina’s use of disrespectful language. A lawyer owes
fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients and that the filing on behalf of disgruntled
litigants of unfounded or frivolous charges against inferior court judges and the use of
offensive and intemperate language as a means of harassing judges unduly burdens the
courts.

CANON 12

A.C. No. 5653 February 27, 2006

JOHN SIY LIM, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CARMELITO A. MONTANO, Respondent.

FACTS:

In the case at bar, complainant John Siy Lim charged respondent Atty. Montano with
gross misconduct relative to his filing of Civil Case No. C-19928. Complainant alleged
that respondent filed the complaint in the said civil case out of malice, indicating that it
involves the same parties, the same causes of action and relief prayed for as that of
Civil Case No. C-14542. In respondent’s comment, he denied the allegations against
him. While he admitted filing the civil case stated herein as a counsel for plaintiff
therein, he asserted that it was not filed with malicious intent. Moreover, while the new
case involved the same party, it was for a different cause of action and relief, and, as
such, the principle of res judicata did not apply. He further explained that the complaint
in Civil Case No. C-14542 was for declaratory relief or reformation of instrument, while
Civil Case No. 19928 was for annulment of title. He accepted the case based on "his
professional appreciation that his client had a good case." In his reply, the complainant
stressed that the respondent was guilty of forum shopping; Civil Case No. C-19928 was
nothing but a revival of the old complaint; and "the lame excuse of the respondent that
the present case is an action in rem while the other case is an action in personam" did
not merit consideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent violated Canon 12 of Code of Professional Responsibility and

is liable of forum shopping.

HELD:
In this case, it is clear that respondent is guilty of forum shopping. By his own
admission, he was aware that Civil Case No. C-14542 was already final and executory
when he filed the second case (Civil Case No. C-19928). His allegation that he "was not
the original counsel of his clients" and that "when he filed the subsequent case for
nullity of TCT, his motive was to protect the rights of his clients whom he believed were
not properly addressed in the prior case for reformation and quieting of title," deserves
scant consideration. As a responsible member of the bar, he should have explained the
effect of such final and executory decision on his clients’ rights, instead of encouraging
them to file another case involving the same property and asserting the same rights.

The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the
doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. By his actuations, respondent
also violated Rule 12.0225 and Rule 12.0426 of the Code, as well as a lawyer’s mandate
"to delay no man for money or malice."27

While we rule that the respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, we also note
that the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution, to be imposed only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment should never be
decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired. Thus, respondent
lawyer is suspended from practice of law for six months.

CANON 13

RICARDA GABRIEL DE BUMANGLAG, Complainant, v. ESTEBAN T.

BUMANGLAG, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, J.:

In the Court’s decision of September 24, 1973, the Court found respondent guilty of
gross immoral conduct and ordered his suspension from the practice of law for a period
of two (2) years. Respondent filed several motions for reconsideration, all of which
were denied per the Court’s Resolutions of November 20, 1973, December 19, 1973,
January 9, 1974 and October 30, 1974.

On March 31, 1975, the Clerk of Court received a 1st Indorsement dated February 21,
1975 from then Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora "requesting comment
and/or appropriate action" on the therewith enclosed petition of respondent to the
President of the Philippines that he "promulgate(s) a decree that the order of
suspension by the Supreme Court be set aside and that your humble self be allowed to
become an active member of the New Society."

The Court per its Resolution of June 16, 1975 directed the Clerk of Court "to furnish the
Office of the President through Assistant Executive Secretary Zamora with copies of the
Court’s decision of September 24, 1973 wherein the Court in a spirit of liberality by
majority vote imposed a lesser penalty of two-year suspension instead of disbarment
(as voted by a minority composed of Justices Castro and Makasiar) and of the Court’s
resolutions of November 20, 1973 and December 19, 1973 denying for lack of merit
respondent’s two motions for reconsideration dated October 18, 1973 and December
12, 1973" ; and further resolved "to require respondent to show cause within ten (10)
days from notice why he should not be subjected to further disciplinary action for
making false statements and misrepresentations in his petition to the President that he
has been allegedly deprived of due process of law contrary to the facts of record as
stated in the Court’s decision, and for gross ignorance of the law and of the Constitution
in asking the President to set aside by decree this Court’s decision imposing upon him
two-year suspension from the practice of law."

In a 2nd Indorsement of June 18, 1975 and received by the Clerk of Court on the same
day, then Assistant Executive Secretary Zamora forwarded respondent’s letter of the
same date to the President stating that" (T)he undersigned by now (has) come to
realize that I made a big mistake by making said letter to you, Your Excellency, because
the Honorable Supreme Court may believe that I may be challenging the decision which
is already final and executory and as such do not observe the doctrine of protocol of
separation of power(s)", and withdrawing and asking the President to disregard his first
letter.chanrobles law library : red

Respondent in his Explanation of July 23, 1975 cited the fact that he had "immediately"
withdrawn his letter asking for the President’s intervention and that "lately, however, he
has fully realized that the Chief Executive is bereft (of) any authority to set aside or
modify the decision of this Honorable Supreme Court" and "with folded hands begs and
asks an apology from the members of this Honorable Court, with the full assurance that
nothing of this sort will be repeated by him in the future"

Respondent served his two-year suspension, as duly noted in the Court’s Resolution of
November 7, 1975. Since respondent has apologized for his "big mistake" and now
appreciates that under the fundamental principle of separation of powers enshrined in
both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, a decision of this Court may not be set aside by
the President, the Court is disposed to view his misconduct and/or ignorance with
liberality and will administer a reprimand with warning of severe action on any future
transgressions, considering respondent’s unenviable record.

A final word is called for on respondent’s statement in his Explanation inferring that he
was led to file his petition with the President by the fact that his motions for
reconsideration "were only denied by the Clerk of Court without any comment
whatsoever." As the Court has had occasion to state in People v. Catolico, 38 SCRA 389
and earlier cases, this remark of respondent exposes his lack of appreciation or regard
of the time-honored usage of the Court that minute resolutions, summons and
processes of the Court, upon being duly adopted and recorded are transmitted to the
interested parties by and upon the signature of the Clerk of Court who is duly
authorized to do so. With the thousands of resolutions approved monthly by the Court,
it would unduly tax the time and attention of the Chief Justice and members of the
Court to the prejudice of the administration of justice if all such papers, other than
decisions, could be released only upon their own signatures.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby administered a reprimand for gross ignorance of

the law and of the Constitution in having asked the President to set aside by decree the
Court’s decision which suspended him for two years from the practice of law, with
warning that the commission of any transgression in the future of his oath and duties
as a member of the bar will be severely dealt with. SO ORDERED. .

Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.

 THE LAWYER AND THE CLIENT

CANON 14

57. VILLAFUERTE v. CORTEZ

A.C. No. 3455, April 14, 1998

FACTS: Complainant Arsenio A. Villafuerte seeks the disbarment of Atty. Dante H.

Cortez, for neglect in the handling of his cases, despite the latter's receipt of P1,750.00
acceptance and retainer fees.Sometime in January 1987, complainant went to the office
of respondent lawyer to discuss his case for "reconveyance." During their initial
meeting, complainant tried to reconstruct before respondent the incidents of the case
merely from memory prompting the latter to ask complainant to instead return at
another time with the records of the case. Complainant returned but still without the
records. He requested respondent to accept the case, paying to the latter P1,750.00
representing the acceptance fee of P1,500.00 and P250.00 retainer fee from January
1987. The respondent averred that he accepted the money with much reluctance and
only upon the condition that complainant would get the records of the case from, as
well as secure the withdrawal of appearance of, Atty. Jose Dizon, the former counsel of
complainant. The complainant allegedly never showed up thereafter until November
1989 when he went to the office of respondent but only to leave a copy of a writ of
execution in a case for ejectment, which, according to respondent, was never
mentioned to him by complainant. Indeed, said respondent, he had never entered his
appearance in the said ejectment case.

Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP

(CBD):
--‐ concluded that the facts established would indicate sufficiently a case of neglect of
duty on the part of respondent. It recommended to the IBP Board of Governors the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three months.

IBP Board of Governors:

--‐ adopted and approved the CBD’s recommendation

ISSUE: WON respondent should be disbarred.

HELD: No. Although there is neglect in duties, the Court only suspended the
respondent. The Court reduced the recommended period of suspension of the IBP from
three months to one month. The Court agrees with the IBP-CBD in its findings and
conclusion that respondent lawyer has somehow been remiss in his responsibilities.
A lawyer-client relationship has arisen between respondent and complainant. His
acceptance of the payment effectively bars him from altogether disclaiming the
existence of an attorney-client relationship between them. It would seem that
respondent hardly has exerted any effort to find out what might have happened to his
client'scases. A lawyer's fidelity to the cause of his clientrequires him to be ever mindful
of the responsibilities that should be expected of him. He is mandated to exert his best
efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interests of his client. The Code of
Professional Responsibility cannot be any clearer in its dictum than when it has stated
that a "lawyer shall servehis client with competence and diligence," decreeing further
that he "shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him."
Penalty: SUSPENSION for a period of one
month from notice hereof, with a warning that a
repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more
severely

DOCTRINE: The Code of Professional

Responsibility cannot be any clearer in its dictum
than when it has stated that a "lawyer shall serve
his client with competence and diligence,"
decreeing further that he "shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him."

CANON 15

A.C. No. 959 July 30, 1971

PEDRO OPAREL, SR., complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DOMINADOR ABARIA, respondent.

R E S O L UT I O N

FERNANDO, J.:

This administrative proceeding was started by Pedro Oparel, Sr., who identified himself
as a pauper in his complaint filed with this Court on August 27, 1970 against
respondent Dominador Abaria, a member of the Philippine Bar. The charge was that
respondent, whose services were retained to assist complainant recover damages from
his employer for injuries suffered, acted dishonestly. Apparently, a settlement was
reached, complainant having been made to sign a receipt in the sum of P500.00 for his
claim, out of which was deducted P55.00 as attorney's fees, when the truth, according
to the complaint, was that respondent did receive the much larger amount of
P5,000.00. In a resolution of September 14, 1970, the respondent was required to file
an answer within ten days from notice. It was duly filed on October 19, 1970 with a
vehement denial on the part of the respondent, alleging that the complaint was
"irresponsible, baseless and [should] not merit even the scantiest consideration" of this
Court. He further alleged that while complainant was asking only for P200.00, he was
able to secure a settlement from the employer in the sum of P500.00, admitting that he
was given as fees the aforesaid AMOUNT of P55.00. He accounted for the alleged sum
of P5,000.00 by stating that P3,500 was spent by the employer for plaintiff's operation
and medical bills, another P1,000.00 given to complainant's family during his
confinement in the hospital, and then the P500.00 received in cash by way of additional
settlement. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed.

This Court, in a resolution of October 23, 1970, referred the matter to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. Such report and
recommendation was submitted on June 2, 1971. It was therein stated that the city
fiscal of Bacolod City, who was designated to act as investigator, as the parties were
residents of the place, submitted on March 2, 1971 a report recommending dismissal
due to the desistance of complainant. It appeared that when the case was called for
investigation on February 17, 1971, the complainant manifested that he was no longer
interested in pushing through his complaint against respondent. In his affidavit of
desistance, he admitted that the administrative charge arose out of a misunderstanding
between him and respondent. He likewise admitted that there was no deception
practiced on him by respondent when he was made to sign the affidavit of September
20, 1966 wherein it appeared that the amount received by him was P500.00, no
mention being made therein of the other P4,500.00 which, as noted in the answer of
respondent, consisted of P3,500.00 for expenses incurred for complainant's operation
and medical bills and P1,000.00 given to his family for support while he was staying in
the hospital. The Solicitor General agreed with such a recommendation and prayed that
the case be dismissed.

While it would appear that under the circumstances no case lies against respondent
Dominador Abaria, it is not amiss to impress on members of the Bar that the utmost
care be taken to minimize occasions for any misunderstanding between them and their
clients. The relationship being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the
latter being adequately and fully informed of the mode and manner in which their
interest is defended. They should not be left in the dark. They are entitled to the fullest
disclosure of why certain steps are taken and why certain matters are either included or
excluded from the documents they are made to sign. It is only thus that their faith in
counsel may remain unimpaired.

Where, as did happen here, the client happens to be poor and unlettered, seeking to
enforce what he considers his just demands against an employer, it is even more
imperative that matters be explained to him with all precision and clarity. More than
that, no effort should be spared for him to get fully what he is entitled to under the law.
The same zeal should characterize a lawyer's efforts as when he is defending the rights
of property. As it is, there is even the fear that a lawyer works harder when he appears
for men of substance. To show how unfounded is such a suspicion, he must exert his
utmost, whoever be his client.

More specifically, in a case like the present, he should not invite loss of trust by
inadvertence or even by a failure to use the simplest and most understandable
language in communicating matters. For he may lend himself to the suspicion that he is
lacking in candor and may be taking undue advantage of his client for his own profit
and advantage in any dealing with the adverse party. At any rate, with complainant
having been satisfied with the explanation of respondent, he could not be justly
charged of being recreant to his trust for personal gain. The dismissal of this case is
therefore warranted.

WHEREFORE, the administrative case filed by Pedro Oparel, Sr. against respondent
Dominador Abaria is dismissed.

[A.C. NO. 6424 : March 4, 2005]

CONSORCIA S. ROLLON, Complainant, v. Atty. CAMILO NARAVAL, Respondent.

 DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Lawyers owe fidelity to their clients. The latter's money or other property coming into
the former's possession should be deemed to be held in trust and should not under any
circumstance be commingled with the lawyers' own; much less, used by them. Failure
to observe these ethical principles constitutes professional misconduct and justifies the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions.

The Case and the Facts

Before us is a letter-complaint against Atty. Camilo Naraval, filed by Consorcia S. Rollon

with the Davao City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on November
29, 2001. The Affidavit1 submitted by complainant alleges the following:

"Sometime in October of 2000, I went to the office of Atty. Camilo F. Naraval together
with my son, Freddie Rollon, to seek his assistance in a case filed against me before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities Branch 6, Davao City entitled 'Rosita Julaton v. Consorcia
S. Rollon' for Collection of Sum of Money with Prayer for Attachment;

"After going over the documents I brought with me pertaining to the said case, Atty.
Naraval agreed to be my lawyer and I was required to pay the amount of Eight
Thousand Pesos (Php 8,000.00) for the filing and partial service fee, which amount was
paid by me on October 18, 2000, a copy of the Official Receipt is hereto attached as
Annex 'A' to form part hereof;

"As per the instruction of Atty. Naraval, my son, Freddie, returned to his office the
following week to make follow-up on said case. However, I was informed later by my
son Freddie that Atty. Naraval was not able to act on my case because the latter was so
busy. Even after several follow-ups were made with Atty. Naraval, still there was no
action done on our case;

"Sometime in November 29, 2001, I decided to withdraw the amount I paid to Atty.
Naraval, because of the latter's failure to comply with our mutual agreement that he will
assist me in the above-mentioned case;

"My son Freddie Rollon went to Atty. Naraval's office that same day to inform Atty.
Naraval of our decision to withdraw the amount I have paid and to retrieve my
documents pertaining to said case. Unfortunately, despite our several follow-ups, Atty.
Naraval always said that he cannot return the documents because they were in their
house, and that he could not give us back the amount we paid him (Php 8,000.00)
because he has no money;

"Having failed to obtain any response, I decided to refer the matter to Atty. Ramon
Edison Batacan, IBP President of Davao City and to Atty. Pedro Castillo, the
Commissioner on Bar D[i]scipline;

x x x

In an Order dated March 12, 2002,2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
through Director Victor C. Fernandez, directed respondent to submit his answer to the
Complaint. The same directive was reiterated in the CBD's May 31, 2002 Order3 issued
through Commissioner Jovy C. Bernabe. Respondent did not file any answer despite his
receipt of the Orders.4
Not having heard from him despite adequate notice, the CBD proceeded with the
investigation ex parte. Its Order5 dated November 11, 2002, issued through
Commissioner Bernabe, required complainant to submit her position paper within ten
days from receipt thereof, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for
resolution.

The CBD received complainant's Position Paper6 on December 10, 2002.

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

In his Report and Recommendation dated October 16, 2003, Investigating

Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for one (1) year for neglect of duty and/or violation of Canons 15
and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Report reads in part as follows:

"Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his
client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively
liable x x x.

"In the case at bar, the deplorable conduct of the respondent in misrepresenting to the
complainant that he will render legal services to her, and after receiving certain amount
from the latter as payment for 'filing fee and service fee' did nothing in return, has
caused unnecessary dishonor to the bar. By his own conduct the respect of the
community to the legal profession, of which he swore to protect, has been tarnished.

xxx xxx xxx

"In fact, complainant claimed to have been shortchanged by the respondent when he
failed to properly appraised her of the status of her case which she later on found to
have become final and executory. Apparently, the civil suit between Rosita Julaton and
the complainant have been decided against the latter and which judgment has long
become final and executory. However, despite full knowledge by the respondent of
such finality based on the documents furnished to him, respondent withheld such vital
information and did not properly appraise the complainant. Thus, respondent violated
the mandate in Canon 15 x x x."7

IBP Board of Governors' Resolution

On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-64
upholding the above-quoted Report. The Board recommended the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years for violation of Rules 15 and 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and the restitution of complainant's P8,000.

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondent's Administrative Liability

Ordinarily, lawyers are not obliged to act either as advisers or as advocates of any
person who may wish to become their client.8 They may decline employment and refuse
to accept representation, if they are not in a position to carry it out effectively or
competently.9 But once they agree to handle a case, attorneys are required by the
Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost
devotion.10

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives

rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause.11 Every case accepted by a lawyer
deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance.12 The
Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

Hence, practising lawyers may accept only as many cases as they can efficiently
handle.13 Otherwise, their clients would be prejudiced. Once lawyers agree to handle a
case, they should undertake the task with dedication and care. If they do any less, then
they fail their lawyer's oath.14

The circumstances of this case indubitably show that after receiving the amount
of P8,000 as filing and partial service fee, respondent failed to render any legal service
in relation to the case of complainant. His continuous inaction despite repeated
followups from her reveals his cavalier attitude and appalling indifference toward his
client's cause, in brazen disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Not only that. Despite her
repeated demands, he also unjustifiably failed to return to her the files of the case that
had been entrusted to him. To top it all, he kept the money she had likewise entrusted
to him.

Furthermore, after going through her papers, respondent should have given her a
candid, honest opinion on the merits and the status of the case. Apparently, the civil
suit between Rosita Julaton and complainant had been decided against the latter. In
fact, the judgment had long become final and executory. But he withheld such vital
information from complainant. Instead, he demanded P8,000 as "filing and service fee"
and thereby gave her hope that her case would be acted upon.

Rule 15.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers give their
candid and best opinion to their clients on the merit or lack of merit of the case, neither
overstating nor understating their evaluation thereof. Knowing whether a case would
have some prospect of success is not only a function, but also an obligation on the part
of lawyers.15 If they find that their client's cause is defenseless, then it is their bounden
duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than to traverse the
incontrovertible.16 The failure of respondent to fulfill this basic undertaking constitutes a
violation of his duty to "observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients."17

Likewise, as earlier pointed out, respondent persistently refused to return the money of
complainant despite her repeated demands. His conduct was clearly indicative of lack of
integrity and moral soundness; he was clinging to something that did not belong to
him, and that he absolutely had no right to keep or use.18
Lawyers are deemed to hold in trust their client's money and property that may come
into their possession.19 As respondent obviously did nothing on the case of complainant,
the amount she had given - - as evidenced by the receipt issued by his law office - -
was never applied to the filing fee. His failure to return her money upon demand gave
rise to the presumption that he had converted it to his own use and thereby betrayed
the trust she had reposed in him.20 His failure to do so constituted a gross violation of
professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.21

The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes and the
courts,22 but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with
the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship.23 Respondent
clearly fell short of the demands required of him as a member of the bar. His inability to
properly discharge his duty to his client makes him answerable not just to her, but also
to this Court, to the legal profession, and to the general public.24 Given the crucial
importance of his role in the administration of justice, his misconduct diminished the
confidence of the public in the integrity and dignity of the profession.25

WHEREFORE, Atty. Camilo Naraval is found GUILTY of violating Rule 15.05 and
Canons 16, 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective
upon his receipt of this Decision. Furthermore, he is ORDERED TO RESTITUTE, within
thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision, complainant's eight thousand pesos
(P8,000), plus interest thereon, at the rate of six percent per annum, from October 18,
2000, until fully paid. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of
the Bar Confidant, as well as the National Office and the Davao City Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

MICHAEL RUBY vs. ATTY. ERLINDA B. ESPEJO and ATTY. RUDOLPH DILLA
BAYOT, Respondents.

A.C. No. 10558, February 23, 2015

Facts:

The complainant alleged that he and his mother, Felicitas Ruby Bihla (Felicitas),
engaged the services of the respondents in connection with a case for cancellation and
nullification of deeds of donation.

. Pursuant to the retainer agreement2 dated August 29, 2009, the complainant and
Felicitas would pay Atty. Espejo the amount of P100,000.00 as acceptance fee

The complainant and Felicitas likewise agreed to pay the amount of P5,000.00 as
appearance fee for every hearing

On September 15, 2009, the complainant gave Atty. Espejo the amount of P50,000.00
as payment for filing fee. However, the actual filing fee that was paid by her only
amounted to 7,561.00; she failed to account for the excess amount given her despite
several demand letters therefor. Atty. Espejo allegedly asked the complainant to give
Atty. Bayot the amount of P30,000.00 – the remaining balance of the acceptance fee
agreed. The complainant asserted that the same was not yet due, but Atty. Espejo told
him that Atty. Bayot was in dire need of money. The complainant gave Atty. Bayot the
amount of P8,000.00 supposedly as partial payment.
On September 25, 2009, Atty. Espejo called the complainant informing him of the need
to file a separate petition for the issuance of a TRO. She allegedly asked for P50,000.00
to be used as "representation fee."

On October 23, 2009, the complainant deposited the amount of P4,000.00 to the bank
account of Atty. Bayot as appearance fee for the hearing on the motion to serve
summons through publications, however, Atty. Bayot allegedly did not appear in court
and instead met with the complainant at the lobby of the Quezon City Hall of Justice,
telling them that he already talked to the clerk of court who assured him that the court
would grant their motion

Thereafter, the complainant alleged, the respondents failed to update him as to the
status of his complaint. He further claimed that Atty. Bayot had suddenly denied that he
was their counsel. Atty. Bayot asserted that it was Atty. Espejo alone who was the
counsel of the complainant and that he was merely a collaborating counsel.

This prompted the complainant to file an administrative case with the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Espejo
and Atty. Bayot.

Atty. Bayot claimed that he was not the counsel of the complainant; that he merely
assisted him and Atty. Espejo. He averred that Atty. Espejo, with the complainant’s
consent, sought his help for the sole purpose of drafting a complaint. He pointed out
that it was Atty. Espejo who signed and filed the complaint in the RTC. He further
pointed out that he had no part in the retainer agreement that was entered into by the
complainant, Felicitas, and Atty. Espejo. As to the P12,000.00 that was given him, he
claimed that he was entitled to P4,000.00 thereof since the said amount was his
appearance fee. On the other hand, the P8,000.00 was paid to him as part of the
acceptance fee. He denied requesting from the complainant the amount of P4,000.00
as appearance fee, alleging that it was the latter who insisted on depositing the same in
his bank account.

Atty. Bayot claimed that he is not the counsel of record of the complainant in the case
before the RTC. He pointed out that he had no part in the retainer agreement entered
into by the complainant and Atty. Espejo. Thus, Atty. Bayot claimed, the complainant
had no cause of action against him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a lawyer-client relationship exists between Atty. Bayot and the
complainant?

RULING:

YES.

It is undisputed that Atty. Espejo was the counsel of record in the case that was filed in
the RTC. Equally undisputed is the fact that it was only Atty. Espejo who signed the
retainer agreement. However, the evidence on record, including Atty. Bayot’s
admissions, points to the conclusion that a lawyer-client relationship existed between
him and the complainant.
Atty. Bayot was the one who prepared the complaint that was filed with the RTC. He
was likewise the one who prepared the motion to serve summons through publication.
He likewise appeared as counsel for the complainant in the hearings of the case before
the RTC. He likewise advised the complainant on the status of the case.

More importantly, Atty. Bayot admitted that he received P8,000.00, which is part of the
acceptance fee indicated in the retainer agreement, from the complainant. It is true that
it was Atty. Espejo who asked the complainant to give Atty. Bayot the said amount.
However, Atty. Bayot admitted that he accepted from the complainant the said
P8,000.00 without even explaining what the said amount was for.

The foregoing circumstances clearly established that a lawyer-client relationship existed

between Atty. Bayot and the complainant. "Documentary formalism is not an essential
element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To
establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is
sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession."28 Further, acceptance of
money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship.29 Accordingly, as
regards the case before the RTC, the complainant had two counsels – Atty. Espejo and
Atty. Bayot.

Accordingly, Atty. Bayot owes fidelity to the cause of the complainant and is obliged to
keep the latter informed of the status of his case. He is likewise bound to account for all
money or property collected or received from the complainant. He may be held
administratively liable for any inaptitude or negligence he may have had committed in
his dealing with the complainant.

LYDIA CASTRO-JUSTO VS. ATTY. RODOLFO GALING, AC#6174, 11/16/2011 –

Respondent accepted Complainant’s engagement and wrote in her behalf a

demand letter to Ms. Koa for dishonored checks. Subsequently, he filed a
motion for consolidation and appeared as counsel for Ms. Koa in the estafa and
BP22 cases filed against her by Complainant. The latter charged this as
representation of conflicting interests. Supreme Court suspended Respondent
from law practice holding that, a lawyer-client relationship can exist despite
close friendship. This relationship was established the moment Complainant
sought Respondent’s legal advice regarding the dishonored
checks. Respondent confirmed this relationship by drafting the demand letter
and referring to Complainant therein as “my client”. The fact that the demand
letter was not utilized in the criminal complaint filed and that Complainant hired
another lawyer is of no moment. Non-payment of professional fee will not
exculpate Respondent from liability. Absence of monetary consideration does
not exempt lawyers from complying with the prohibition against pursuing cases
with conflicting interests (Canon 15) which prohibition attaches from the
establishment of attorney-client relationship extending beyond its duration. This
prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. In the
course of the relationship, the lawyer learns facts connected with the client’s
case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of the
relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.
Lawyers must not only keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also avoid
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.
 Lee vs. Simando
A.C. No. 9537 June 10, 2013

FACTS:
Atty. Simando was the retained counsel of complainant Dr. Lee. Atty. Simando
went to see Dr. Lee and asked if the latter could help a certain Felicito M.
Mejorado (Mejorado) for his needed funds. Mejorado was Atty. Simando’s client
in a case claiming rewards against the Bureau of Customs. Dr. Lee initially refused
to lend money but Atty. Simando persisted and assured her that Mejorado will
pay his obligation. He even offered to be the co-maker of Mejorado and assured
her that Mejorado's obligation will be paid when due. Due to Atty. Simando's
persistence, his daily calls and frequent visits to convince Dr. Lee, the latter gave
in to her lawyer's demands, and finally agreed to give Mejorado sizeable amounts
of money. When the said obligation became due, despite Dr. Lee's repeated
demands, Mejorado failed and refused to comply with his obligation. Since Atty.
Simando was still her lawyer then, Dr. Lee instructed him to initiate legal action
against Mejorado. Atty. Simando said he would get in touch with Mejorado and
ask him to pay his obligation without having to resort to legal action. However,
even after several months, Mejorado still failed to pay Dr. Lee, so she again asked
Atty. Simando why no payment has been made yet. Dr. Lee then reminded Atty.
Simando that he was supposed to be the co-maker of the obligation of Mejorado,
to which he replied: "Di kasuhan din ninyo ako!" Despite complainant's repeated
requests, respondent ignored her and failed to bring legal actions against
Mejorado. Thus, complainant was forced to terminate her contract with Atty.
Simando and demand payment from him as well.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interest.

HELD:
Guilty. 6-month Suspension. Clearly, it is improper for respondent to appear as
counsel for one party (complainant as creditor) against the adverse party
(Mejorado as debtor) who is also his client, since a lawyer is prohibited from
representing conflicting interests. He may not, without being guilty of
professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflict with
that of his present or former client. Respondent's assertion that there is no
conflict of interest because complainant and respondent are his clients in
unrelated cases fails to convince. His representation of opposing clients in both
cases, though unrelated, obviously constitutes conflict of interest or, at the least,
invites suspicion of double-dealing. Moreover, with the subject loan agreement
entered into by the complainant and Mejorado, who are both his clients, readily
shows an apparent conflict of interest, moreso when he signed as co-maker