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Case No.

Hagans vs. Wizlemus, 42 Phil 880

Digested by Erika Jane C. Absuelo

Doctrine:

There is a marked distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding." An action is a formal
demand of one's legal rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the
method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be
defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. In special
proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion.

Facts:

This is an original petition, presented in the Supreme Court, for writ of certiorari. The facts alleged in the
petition are admitted by a demurrer.

Issue:

Whether or not a judge of the Court of First Instance, in "special proceedings," is authorized under the
law to appoint assessors for the purpose of fixing the amount due to an administrator or executor for his services
and expenses in the care, management, and settlement of the estate of a deceased person.

Ruling:

No, judge of the Court of First Instance is without authority to appoint assessors. Section 154 provides
that "either party to an action may apply in writing to the judge for assessors to sit in the trial. Upon the filing of
such application, the judge shall direct that assessors be provided.

There is a marked distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding." An action is a formal
demand of one's legal rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the
method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be
defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in
special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required, unless the statute expressly so provides. The remedy in
special proceedings is generally granted upon an application or motion. Illustrations of special proceedings, in
contradistinction to actions, may be given: Proceedings for the appointment of an administrator, guardians, tutors;
contest of wills; to perpetuate testimony; to change the name of persons; application for admission to the bar,
etc., et

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Case No. 2

Pacific Banking Corporation Employees’ Organization vs CA, 242 SCRA 492

Digested by Erika Jane C. Absuelo

Doctrine:

A petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified a special proceeding and not an
ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress
of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or
omission nor state a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.

Facts:

Pacific Banking Corporation was placed under receivership by Central Bank of the Philippines and was
placed under jurisdiction. Liquidator contends that the Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of PaBC is a
special proceeding case.

Issue:

Whether a petition for liquidation is a special proceeding or an ordinary civil action?

Ruling:

A petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified a special proceeding and not an
ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress
of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or
omission nor state a cause of action that can be enforced against any person. The court's concern is with the
declaration of creditors and their rights and the determination of their order of payment. Furthermore, as in the
settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in proceedings for liquidation of an insolvent corporation.

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Case No. 3

Natcher vs CA, 366 SCRA 385

Digested by Erika Jane C. Absuelo

Doctrine:

It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
Thus, a Regional Trial Court acting in its general jurisdiction
in an action for reconveyance is devoid of authority.

Facts:

Graciano is married to Graciana, they have 6 children. They are the owners of a parcel
of land with an area of 9,322 SQ in manila. Upon the death of Graciana, Graciano together with his
6 children entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the said estate, they divided the property where a new title
was given.

Graciano donated to his children a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,494.30 leaving only
447 SQ registered under his name as covered by his title. Subsequently, his remaining lot has also been divided
and the other portion was sold to a third person.

Graciano married Natcher, during their marriage,Graciano sold his remaining land to
Natcher. Graciano died living Natcher and his 6 children as heirs.

The children of Graciano filed a complaint against Natcher that she employed fraud, misrepresentation
and forgery, acquired the land by making it appear that Graciano executed a deed of sale over the said land, in
consequence their legitime has been impaired.

Issue:

May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance
annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?

Ruling:

No, it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when
it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. An
action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to
settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake
of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided
for in the Rules of Court.

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Case No. 4

Vda. De Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 524

Digested by Erika Jane C. Absuelo

Doctrine:

That a special proceeding for the settlement of an estate is filed and intended to settle the entire estate.

Facts:

Pilar Ibañez Vda. de Zuzuarregui, is the surviving spouse of Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr., while petitioner
Beatriz de Zuzuarregui Vda. de Reyes was the daughter of the deceased by a mother different from that of his
aforesaid three (3) sons, their mother being Pacita Javier who was the niece of the herein respondent
administratrix. Beatriz, opposes the correction of the judgemenr and thw re-opening of the probate proceedings
to correct an alleged typographical error in the sqm of the Antipolo land in question, claiming that there was no
typographical error and the parties intended to share only the land.

Issue:

WON the decision that has become final can be subjected to corrections?

Ruling:

It is well settled that even if a decision has become final, clerical errors or mistakes or omission plainly
due to inadvertence or negligence may be corrected or supplied even after the judgment has been entered. The
correction of a clerical error is an exception to the general rule that no amendment or correction may be made
by the court in its judgment once the latter had become final. The court may make this amendment ex parte and,
for this purpose, it may resort to the pleadings filed by the parties, the court's findings of facts and its conclusions
of law as expressed in the body of the decision.

That a special proceeding for the settlement of an estate is filed and intended to settle the entire estate
of the deceased is obvious and elementary. It would be absurd for the heirs to intentionally excluded or leave a
parcel of land or a portion thereof undistributed or undivided because the proceeding is precisely designed to
end the community of interests in properties held by co-partners pro indiviso without designation or segregation
of shares.

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Case No. 5

Vda de Manalo vs CA, GR No. 129242

Digested by Erika Jane C. Absuelo

Doctrine:

It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments
and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling.

It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid
petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that are irrelevant and
immaterial to the said petition.

Facts:

Troadio Manalo who died on February 1992 was survived by his wife Pilar and 11 children. The
deceased left several real propertied in Manila and a business in Tarlac. On November 1992, herein respondents,
8 of the surviving children, filed a petition with RTC Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late
father and for the appointment of their brother Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof. Hearing was set and
herein petitioner were granted 10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition.

Issue:

Whether the settlement of estate of late Troadio is an ordinary civil action, which is adversarial in nature.

Ruling:

The settlement of the estate is a special proceeding.

It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments
and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling.

A careful scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of
Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92- 63626 belies petitioners’ claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil
action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of
a deceased person such as the fact of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as
his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death.

The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon which
all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest.

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Case No. 6

ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. L-24742October 26, 1973

Navarro, Samantha.

Doctrine: Rule 73, Section

Facts:

Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor sons, residing in
Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first
marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that
the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City. The petition
still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife(widow), filed a petition with CFI Rizal
(Quezon City) for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an
opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but the said court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition
until CFI Quezon City shall have acted on the probate proceedings. CFI Cebu, in effect deferred to the probate
proceedings in the Quezon City court. Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon City, on
ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Lourdes filed special civil action of
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent CA. CA favored Lourdes holding that CFI
Cebu had first acquired jurisdiction

Issues:

1. Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition against Quezon City court ordering it to refrain
from proceeding with the testate proceedings.
2. Whether or not CFI Quezon City acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI
Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate
proceedings.

Ruling:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon
City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and
actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator’s wish.
Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The residence of the decent or the location of his estate
is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. Conversely, such court,
may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another
court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and
their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent
died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition
before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate
of the decedent's alleged last will. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted
to probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes'
intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of
jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts.

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2. No. Under the facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon
City court. Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction
in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court
must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all
other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays
down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate
jurisdiction over the estate.

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Case No. 7

Uriarte vs, Court of First Instance33 SCRA 252May 29, 1970

Navarro, Samantha

Doctrine: Rule 73, Section 1

Facts: Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain and he left reasonable properties in the Philippines. Vicente Uriarte,
who is claiming to be the son and sole heir of the deceased, filed a petition for the intestate settlement of the
estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. However, said petition was opposed
by the nephews of Juan stating that there is a valid will left by the deceased in Spain, a copy of which is being
requested. Then, the nephews filed a settlement of the estate in the court of Manila, on the basis of the alleged
will of the deceased. Vicente filed an opposition to the settlement of estate in the court of Manila stating that the
court of Negros Occidental has already acquired original jurisdiction over the case. The opposition of Vicente
was dismissed together with the intestate settlement in the CFI of Negros. Hence, Vicente filed a petition for
certiorari questioning the dismissal of the intestate settlement in the CFI of Negros.

Issue:

Whether or not the intestate settlement should be dismissed.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the intestate proceeding is proper. Under the Rules on the
settlement of estate of the deceased person, testate proceedings enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
Therefore, in case intestate settlement was filed prior to the finding of the will of the deceased, then the intestate
proceedings shall be dismissed to give priority to the testate proceeding.

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Case No. 8

VICTORIO REYNOSO v. VICENTE SANTIAGO

Navarro, Samantha

Doctrine: Rule 79, Section 6

Facts:

Victorio Reynoso and Juan Reynoso apply for a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Vicente Santiago of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon to order the opening of a testate estate of the deceased Salvadora Obispo in
the place of special intestate proceeding No. 2914, and to appoint Victorio Reynoso as executor of the decedent's
last will and testament.

Leoncio Cadiz and other heirs of Salvadora Obispo presented an application in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon for the Victorio Reynoso and Juan Reynoso, Salvadora Obispo's surviving spouse and eldest son,
respectively, opposed the application and filed a document, which purported to be the last will and testament of
Salvadora Obispo, with a counter petition for its probate. Upon trial the court rejected that instrument as a forgery,
but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the finding of the court below, found the will authentic and drawn
with all the formalities of law. administration of the property of the deceased.

Thereafter Victorio Reynoso and Juan Reynoso filed two petitions, one in special proceeding No. 2914 and
another under a separate and new docket number (3107) and with a different title (Testate Estate of the deceased
Salvadora Obispo).

The first prayed that the special administrator, Meliton Palabrica, who had theretofore been appointed in special
proceeding No. 2914, be ordered to turn over the properties of the deceased and the proceeds of coprax, nuts
and other agricultural products to Victorio Reynoso, and to render an accounting within a reasonable time. It also
asked for the closing of the intestate proceeding. The other petition prayed that the estate be administered and
settled in special proceeding No. 3107 and that Victorio Reynoso be appointed executor of Salvadora Obispo's
last will and testament. It also contained a prayer for an accounting by Palabrica and delivery by him to the new
executor of the properties that came to his possession including the proceeds from the sales of coprax, nuts, etc.

The two petitions were decided separately by Judge Santiago. With respect to the opening of another expediente,
His Honor believed that the proposed change or substitution was "not only unnecessary but inconvenient and
expensive." An intestate proceeding like special proceeding No. 2914, he said, could and should be converted
into a testate proceeding in the same original expediente without the necessity of changing its number, name or
title.

Issues: Whether the intestate proceeding already commenced should be discontinued and a new proceeding
under a separate number and title should be constituted?

Ruling: This petition has no merit. Whether the intestate proceeding already commenced should be discontinued
and a new proceeding under a separate number and title should be constituted is entirely a matter of form and
lies within the sound discretion of the court. In no manner does it prejudice the substantial rights of any of the
heirs or creditors. Amor propio is perhaps the only thing that is at stake on this phase of the controversy.

As to the appointment of the deceased's husband as executor or administrator, the court said that action on the
petition should be withheld for the time being, because of the pendency on appeal of a case in which the special
administrator in special proceeding No. 2914 is plaintiff and appellee and Victorio Reynoso defendant and
appellant. It involves the question whether an extensive parcel of coconut land is conjugal property or the
exclusive property of the husband.

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If one other than the surviving spouse is appointed, which is possible, the feared conflict will not materialize. If
Victorio Reynoso is chosen, a special administrator may be named to represent the estate in the suit against
him. Section 8 of Rule 87 provides that "If the executor or administrator has a claim against the estate he
represents, he shall give notice thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special administrator
who shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have the same power and be subject to the same liability as the
general administrator or executor in the settlement of other claims." The situation in which Victorio Reynoso is
found with reference to the land in litigation between him and the estate, comes within the spirit if not exactly
within the letter of this provision.Subject to this observation, an administrator should be appointed without delay
in accordance with the final decision of the Court of Appeals. The appointment of a special administrator is
justified only when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal
from the allowance or disallowance of a will or some other cause. The Court of Appeals having decreed the
probate of the will and the appointment of an albacea, there is no valid reason for the further retention of the
special administrator. The appointment of a regular administrator is necessary for the prompt settlement and
distribution of the estate. There are important duties devolving on a regular administrator which a special
administrator can not perform, and there are many actions to be taken by the court which could not be
accomplished before a regular administrator is appointed.

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Case No. 9

Intestate estate of Wolfson

Navarro, Samantha

Doctrine: Rule 73, Section 1

Facts:

Rosina Marguerite Wolfson died on September 14, 1965 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On January 10,
1966, Atty. Manuel Y. Macias, herein petitioner-appellant, unaware that Rosina died with a will and testament,
filed in behalf of Ricardo Vito Cruz a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in his favor over the
estate in the Philippines of the late Rosina, which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 63866, entitled
"Intestate Estate of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson, deceased," and was assigned to Branch VIII of the Manila Court
of First Instance, then presided over by then Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, Manuel P. Barcelona.

Accordingly, Ricardo Vito Cruz was appointed Special Administrator for the estate of Rosina, qualified therefor,
took his oath and assumed the duties thereof.

It turned out that Rosina left a will executed in accordance with the laws of the State of New York and three
codicils executed in accordance with the laws of the State of California, U.S.A., naming therein the Wells Fargo
Bank as sole executor and the University of Michigan as the residuary beneficiary.

On September 24, 1965, said will and codicils of Rosina were presented for probate in the Superior Court of the
State of California, U.S.A.

On October 11, 1965, the said will and codicils were duly probated by said California court.

In a document dated November 10, 1965, duly notarized and authenticated, the Wells Fargo Bank, as the sole
executor designated in Rosina's will and codicils, appointed lawyers James M. Ross, Ewald Selph, Rafael D.
Salcedo, Arturo del Rosario, Jesus Bito, Joaquin L. Misa and Mariano Lozada, all of Manila, Philippines, as its
attorney-in-fact, with authority among others to file ancillary administration proceedings for the estate of Rosina
and to act as administrator or administrators of the estate

Pursuant to his appointment as attorney-in-fact of executor Wells Fargo Bank, Atty. Arturo del Rosario, filed on
August 13, 1966, a petition, in Special Proceedings No. 63866 before Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First
Instance, praying that, inasmuch as the decedent left a will and codicils which were duly probated by the Superior
Court of California, U.S.A., the intestate proceedings in Special Proceedings No. 63866 be converted into a
petition for the probate of Rosina's will and codicils.

Petitioner-appellant Macias, in his own behalf and without informing his client Ricardo Vito Cruz, filed a similar
but separate and independent petition, which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 67302 and assigned to
Branch VI of the Manila Court of First Instance. A series of motions of oppositions then happened.

Ruling:

The appeal is devoid of merit. Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court, 'the court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estates of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts.' Pursuant to this provision, therefore all questions concerning the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Rosina Marguerite Wolfson should be filed before Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance, then presided
over by former Judge, now Justice of the Court of Appeals, Manuel Barcelona, where Special Proceedings No.
63866 for the settlement of the testate estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson was filed and is still
pending.

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The salutary purpose of the rule is to prevent confusion and delay. It is not inserted in the law for the benefit of
the parties litigant but in the public interest for the better administration of justice, for which reason the parties
have no control over it. Consequently, every challenge to the validity of the will, any objection to its authentication,
every demand or claim by any heir, legatee or party in interest in intestate or testate succession must be acted
upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having
jurisdiction in the administration of the estate should take cognizance of the question raised, for he will be called
upon to distribute or adjudicate the property to the interested parties.

Section 1 of Rule 73, speaking as it does of "settlement of the estates of the deceased," applies equally to both
testate and intestate proceedings. And the conversion of an intestate proceeding into a testate one is "entirely
a matter of form and lies within the sound discretion of the court.

Generally, consolidation and joint hearing of the two cases would have been proper if they do not involve
settlement of the estate of a decedent, which is covered by a special provision of the Rules of Court, namely
Section 1 of Rule 73, the specific command of which should be obeyed. At any rate, motions for consolidation
are addressed to the sound discretion of the court

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Case No. 10

Guevara vs. Guevara

Navarro, Samantha

Facts:

Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests to his wife, stepchildren, wife in
the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged
Rosario as his natural daughter. Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there
any settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land which he adjudicated
to himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as well as
the devise given to her.

Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests to his wife, stepchildren, wife in
the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged
Rosario as his natural daughter. Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there
any settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land which he adjudicated
to himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as well as
the devise given to her.

Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a portion of a large parcel of
land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the assumption that the decedent died
intestate because his will was not probated. She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be
disregarded.

Issue:

Can a probate of a will be dispensed?

Ruling:

No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to circumvent the last will and
testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance is
essential and indispensable to its efficacy. Suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy for without
probate, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.

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Case No. 11

G.R. No. L-42088

ALFREDO G. BALUYUT vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA. DE BALUYUT,
JOSE ESPINO and CORAZON ESPINO

Digested by JASON A. AMPONG

DOCTRINE

Settlement of estates. - If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse
the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or
to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death
of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may
be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court
may select.

FACTS

Sotero Baluyut died on January 6, 1975 leaving an estate valued at not less than two million pesos. His nephew,
Alfredo G. Baluyut, filed a verified petition for letters of administration and alleged that the deceased was survived
by his widow who was mentally incapable of acting as administratrix. Alfredo surmised that the decedent had
executed a will. As a result, Alfredo was appointed as special administrator.
Mrs. Baluyut alleged that she was unaware that her deceased husband executed a will and denied being mentally
incapacitated, and prayed that she be named administratrix. The probate court terminated the appointment of
Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrators and appointed Mrs. Baluyut as regular administratrix.
Alfredo G. Baluyut in his manifestation of February 2, 1976 disclosed that Sotero Baluyut executed a notarial will
on April 14, 1973. In that will he bequeathed to Mrs. Baluyut his one-half share in certain conjugal assets and
one-fourth of the residue of his estate. The remaining three-fourths were bequeated to his collateral relatives
named Irene, Erlinda, Estrellita, Eliseo and Alfredo, all surnamed Baluyut, and Emerita, Emilio and Benjamin, all
surnamed Miranda. The testator designated Mrs. Baluyut as executrix. Espino is not mentioned in that will.

ISSUE

Whether or not the court a quo is correct in appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix.

RULING

No. A hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the person to be appointed administrator by
giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording oppositors a chance to contest the petition. In
this case the probate court briefly and perfunctorily interrogated Mrs. Baluyut in order to satisfy itself on her
mental capacity. The court did not give Alfredo G. Baluyut a chance to contest her qualifications.

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Case No. 12
G.R. No. L-55509

ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS vs. JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD MILLER
GRIMM II and LINDA GRIMM

Digested by JASON A. AMPONG

DOCTRINE

Allowance of wills. - No will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper
court.

FACTS

The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in an
intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after
a probate in the Utah district court).
Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati Medical Center. He was survived by
his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda
Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage
which ended in divorce.

He executed two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate which he described
as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second win disposed of his estate outside the
Philippines.

Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden) filed a petition for intestate proceeding. Maxine. Grimm’s second wife ,
opposed on the ground of pendency of the probate proceeding in Utah. She later filed a petition for probate of
the two (2) wills, already probated in Utah and prayed that the partition approved by Branch 20, the intestate
court, be set aside. This was approved by Branch 38 of Manila Court of First Instance.

ISSUE

Whether or not the testate proceeding is proper.

RULING

Yes. We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.

A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real
or personal property unless it is proved and allowed".

The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be
settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate
proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 15


Case No. 13
G.R. No. L-9282

MILIO ADVINCULA vs. HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE TEODORO, SR., and ENRIQUE A. LACSON.

Digested by JASON A. AMPONG

DOCTRINE

When a will has been proved and allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the person named
as executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the trusts, and gives bond as required by these rules.

FACTS

Emilio Advincula was appointed special administrator, then later regular administrator of his deceased wife’s
estate. After he qualified as administrator, his brothers-in-law submitted a document purporting to be the
deceased will. Emilio opposed the probate of the will on the ground that the signature was not his wife’s and
even if it was, the same was procured by fraud. One of the brothers-in-law, Enrique Lacson, prayed that he
(Enrique) be appointed administrator in lieu of Emilio. During the hearing, it was alleged that Emilio was
incompetent, incapable and unsuitable to act as administrator because Emilio is foreign to the estate”. The court
ruled in favor of Enrique’s motion. Emilio filed an MR but the same was denied so he instituted the present action
for certiorari to annul the lower court’s order.

ISSUE

Whether or not the lower court is wrong in granting Lacson’s motion.

HELD

Yes. The appointment of Lacson as administrator in lieu of Advincula is predicated on the fact that Lacson was
named executor of the deceased will. This provision, however cannot be enforced until the said will is admitted
to probate. The discovery of a will of the deceased does not ipso facto
nullify letters of administration already issued or even authorize the revocation thereof until the alleged will is
“proved and allowed by the court”.

Furthermore, the lower court appears to have followed the argument of the respondents that Emilio, being foreign
to the deceased’s estae is incapable of being an administrator. This argument is untenable because from the
viewpoint of logic and experience, a stranger maybe competent, capable and fit to be administrato of the estate
in the same way that a family member can be in competent, incapable and unfit to do so. Beside, Emilio as the
surviving spouse if a force heir of the deceased. He is entitled to ½ of all property apart from his share of the
other half thereof as heir of the deceased since “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership”

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 16


Case No. 14
G.R. No. 75017

THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION (SOLIDBANK)


vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND MARIA LUISA MADRIGAL VAZQUEZ,

Digested by JASON A. AMPONG

DOCTRINE

The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence
of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal
from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

FACTS

Don Vicente Madrigal died on June 6, 1972. For the settlement of his estate, Special Proceedings No. Q-916962
was filed with the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Quezon City.

Judge Enrique Agana was then temporarily detailed in Quezon City and was assigned to the sala where Special
Proceedings No. 916962 was pending. After his temporary detail, Judge Agana returned to his place of
assignment at Pasay City, bringing with him the records in Special Proceedings No. Q-916962.

On April 11, 1983, the probate court required the parties to show cause why the case should not be transferred
to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court pursuant to the Administrative Order issued by the Supreme Court,
limiting the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.

Two of the seven heirs, i.e., the heirs of Pacita Madrigal Gonzales and Mrs. Vazquez, manifested their desire
that the case be retained by the respondent probate court. Petitioner did not give its conformity, in effect, objecting
to the retention by the Pasay City probate court of the case for further proceedings.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioner has waived its right to contest the question of venue.

RULING

Yes. Objection to improper venue should be made in a motion to dismiss. Until this is done, venue cannot truly
be said to have been improperly laid. The Court agree with the petitioner that venue in this case should have
been laid in Quezon City, petitioner's inaction has worked against it. However, the Court agreed with the Court
of Appeals that Special Proceedings No. Q-16962 (sic) should have been sent to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City which was pointed out by the respondent court earlier but which position was not pursued.

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 17


Case No. 15

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE vs. CA, PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, 74 SCRA 189
(1976)

FACTS:

Virginia G. Fule filed a petition for letters of administration, alleging Amado G. Garcia died intestate, leaving real
estate and personal properties. She moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate.
Judge Malvar granted the motion.

Preciosa B. Garcia filed an MR contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix
was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served upon
all persons interested, and as the surviving spouse of Amado, she should be preferred in the appointment of a
special administratrix in lieu of Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing, alleging that Fule is a debtor
of the estate of Amado and thus has adverse interest against the estate and that she has shown herself
unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.

Judge Malvar denied the MR.

Preciosa moved for reconsideration insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a)
legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and
removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and effects
in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.

During the hearing, Preciosa presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three
months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Fule testified that Amado was residing in Calamba,
Laguna at the time of his death.

The CA rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Malvar for lack of jurisdiction.

Denied of their motion for reconsideration Fule elevated the matter on appeal by certiorari to the SC.

Before Fule could receive the decision of the CA, Preciosa had already filed a petition for letters of administration
before the CFI of Quezon City, with a motion for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Judge
Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa as special administratrix.

ISSUES:

Who is entitled as special administratix of the estate?

Ruling:

Preciosa B. Garcia’s challenge to Virginia G. Fule’s appointment as special administratrix is another issue of
perplexity. Preciosa claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides
that “(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal
from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession
and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or
administrators appointed.

Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate court.

Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more,
interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin.

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 18


On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix.

The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the
deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is
married to Preciosa B. Garcia.

Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio.

The petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule were denied.

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 19


Case No. 16
Jao v. CA
G.R No. 128314

Digested by Almira Flor J. Arellano

Doctrine:

As thus defined, "residence", in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person's actual
residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, and the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

Facts:

Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
over the estate of his parents. He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the assets of the
estate. Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue. He argued that the
deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. The
decedent's actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother used to run and operate a
bakery.

In his opposition, Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in Rodolfo's house in Quezon
City at the time of their deaths. Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the
decedents' residence on the death certificates in good faith and through honest mistake. He gave his residence
only as reference, considering that their parents were treated in their late years at the Medical City General
Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in his house was merely transitory, in the same way that they
were taken at different times for the same purpose to Perico's residence at Legaspi Towers in Roxas
Boulevard. The death certificates could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive evidence of the decedents'
residence in light of the other documents showing otherwise. Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate
proceedings be revived.

Rodolfo filed a motion to dismiss but was denied. He then filed a motion for reconsideration but was also denied
by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition for review.

Issue:

Whether the settlement proceedings should be had in Pampanga, where the decedents had their permanent
residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed before their demise.

Ruling:

Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:


Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of
his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death.
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration granted in the
proper court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to petitioner's Quezon City
residence. Furthermore, the decedents' respective death certificates state that they were both residents of

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 20


Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late mother's
death certificate.

To our mind, this unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized his deceased mother's
residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in Ignacio's death certificate,
accomplished a year earlier by respondent. We agree with the appellate court's observation that since the death
certificates were accomplished even before petitioner and respondent quarrelled over their inheritance, they may
be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the time of their parents' death.
The documents presented by petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of death, as required by the Rules
of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile. Petitioner's argument fails to persuade. Wherefore, n view of
the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 21


Case No. 17

Cayetano v. Leonidas
129 SCRA 522

Digested by Almira Flor J. Arellano

Doctrine:

Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code this respectively provides:

In intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. Moreover, capacity to succeed is governed by the
law of the nation of the decedent.

Facts:

Adoracion died in 1977 while visiting her sister Nenita in Malate, Manila. At the time of Adoracion’s death, she
was an American citizen permanently residing at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Before her death, Adoracion
executed her LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT according to the LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA in 1975, nominating
a certain Wilfredo Barzaga to be her administrator. This WILL was probated and registered in the Registry of
Wills at the County of Philadelphia. Barzaga, however, declined to be the administrator, leaving no one to
administer the properties left by the testatrix.

The void in the administration of the Adoracion’s properties prompted her sister, Nenita Paguia, to file a petition
for the REPROBATE of Adoracion’s will. According to the private respondents, the will has already been probated
by Pennsylvania’s court. Since Adoracion was an American citizen, American laws should apply as to the
INTRINSIC VALIDITY of the will as well as the AMOUNT OF SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS.

The decedent’s father, Hermogenes, initially opposed the reprobate of the will. Hermogenes, however, later on
filed a MOTION TO WITHDRAW his OPPOSITION to the petition, finding for the will’s veracity, confirming the
will as “to be truly the probated will of his daughter Adoracion.” This allowed the private respondents to present
evidence in their favor ex-parte.

CFI then issued the assailed order in January 1979, admitting and allowing probate of Adoracion’s will.

Subsequently, Hermogenes filed a Petion for Relief, averring that the probate of Adoracion’s will according to a
decree by a foreign court should not result in a probate of the will in the Philippines when the right of a forced
heir to his legitime was divested by said decree in which no provision is made for the forced heir, in complete
disregard of the Philippines laws on succession. The judge should have OUTRIGHTLY denied the reprobate of
the will, since said will resulted in the preterition of a compulsory heir, Hermogenes.

Issue:

Whether the probate of Adoracion’s will be allowed.

Ruling:

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 22


Yes. American laws apply to the decedent, who was an American citizen. Although on its face, the will appeared
to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the
private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American
citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.

The law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of
the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the
estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not
apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the
specific provisions of Philippine Law.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2)
and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply.

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 23


Case No. 18
Malig v. Bush
28 SCRA 449

Digested by Almira Flor J. Arellano

Doctrine:

In order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, and prevent conflict
among the different courts which mat properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that “the
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other court”

Facts:

Rose Bush Malig, Joe, Thomas and John all surnamed Bush, filed the complaint alleging that they were the
acknowledged natural children and the only heirs in the direct line of the deceased John T. Bush, having been
born of the common-law relationship of their father with Apolonia Perez.That during the conception of the
plaintiffs, were not suffering from any disability to marry each other; that they lived with their alleged father during
his lifetime and were considered and treated by. him as his acknowledge natural children; that said John T. Bush,
at the time of his death, left several real and personal properties; that the defendant, by falsely alleging that she
was the legal wife of the deceased was able to secure her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the
deceased in Testate Proceedings No. 29932 of the Court of First Instance of Manila; that she submitted to the
court for approval a project of partition, purporting to show that the deceased left a will whereby he bequeathed
his estate to three persons, namely: Maria Santos Bush, Anita S. Bush and Anna Berger; that the defendant then
knew that the plaintiffs were the acknowledged natural children of the deceased; and that they discovered the
fraud and misrepresentation perpetrated by the defendant only in July, 1962. They prayed that the project of
partition be annulled.

The defendant moved to dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action, res judicata and statute of limitations. The
plaintiffs opposed and the defendant filed a reply to the opposition. The lower court denied the motion.

After the issues were joined the case was set for hearing, but on the date thereof the hearing was postponed
upon the defendant’s manifestation that she would file a written motion to dismiss. The motion, when filed,
challenged the jurisdiction of the court, stating that since the action was one to annul a project of partition duly
Court. The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, not on the ground relied upon by the
defendant but because the action had prescribed. The plaintiffs moved to reconsider but were turned down;
hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether the lower court has jurisdiction to resolve the issues of the case.

Ruling:

Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court which says:

Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent,

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 24


or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court,
in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

It will be noted that the foregoing rule fixes jurisdiction for purposes of the special proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of a deceased person, “so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate.” The matter really concerns venue, as the caption of Rule cited indicates, and in order to
preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that “the court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of
all other courts.”

In the final analysis this action is not necessarily one to annul the partition already made and approved by the
probate court, and to reopen the estate proceeding so that a new partition may be made, but for recovery by the
plaintiffs of the portion of their alleged inheritance of which, through fraud, they have been deprived. This Court
believes that the plaintiffs’ cause should not be foreclosed without a hearing on the merits. Wherefore, the orders
appealed from are set aside and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 25


Case No. 19
Timbol v. Cano
111 Phil 923, 926

Digested by Almira Flor J. Arellano

Doctrine:

In probate proceedings, the court orders the probate of the will of the decedent, grants letters of administration
to the party best entitled to any qualified applicant, supervises and controls all acts of administration, hears and
approves claims against the estate of the deceased, orders payment of lawful debts, authorizes the sale,
mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate and directs the delivery of the estate to those entitled thereto. The
court acts as trustee, and as such trustee, should jealously guard the estate and see to it that it is wisely and
economically administered, not dissipated.

Facts:

Mercedes Cano died, leaving as her only heir her son Florante Timbol then only 11 years old. Jose Cano, brother
of the intestate, was appointed administrator. Jose Cano filed a petition, proposing that the agricultural lands of
the intestate be leased to him for an annual rental of P4,000.00 to be used for the maintenance of the minor and
the payment of land taxes which was approved by the court. On 1956, upon motion of the administrator and the
conformity of the minor heir, approved the reduction of the annual rental of lands of the intestate leased to the
administrator from P 4,000 to P 2,400 and the conversion of 30 hectares of the agricultural lands into subdivision.

In 1957, A project of partition was approved designation of Florante Timbol as the sole and exclusive heir of all
the properties of the intestate, and was subsequently appointed as the administrator in lieu of Jose Cano.

However, Cano presented objections averring that he is in possession under an express authority of the court,
under a valid contract, and may not be deprived of his leasehold summarily upon a simple petition.

Issue:

Whether the court, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to deprive the appellant of his right under the lease.

Ruling:

The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. In the case at bar, the debts had not yet
been paid, and the estate had not yet been delivered to the heirs as such heir.

Moreover, it has been held that that the declaration of the court that the lease of the agricultural lands of the
estate to the appellant Cano, who was the administrator at the time the lease was granted, is null and void not
only because it is immoral but also because the lease by the administrator to himself is prohibited by law. In view
of such declaration, it would seem proper that the administrator under the direction of the court take steps to get
back the lands leased from the appellant herein.

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 26


Case No. 20
Heirs of Reyes v. Reyes
345 SCRA 541

Digested by Almira Flor J. Arellano

Doctrine:

Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates, and the probate of wills of deceased
persons, including the appointment and the removal of administrators or executors.

Facts:

Spouses Ismael Reyes and Felisa Revita Reyes are the registered owners of parcels of land situated in Arayat
Street, Cubao, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificates of Title. The spouses have seven children, namely:
Oscar, Araceli, Herminia, Aurora, Emmanuel, Cesar and Rodrigo, all surnamed Reyes. Ismael Reyes died
intestate. Prior to his death, Ismael Reyes was notified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of his income
tax deficiency which arose out of his sale of a parcel land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. For failure to
settle his tax liability the amount increased and since no payment was made by the heirs of deceased Ismael
Reyes, the properties were levied, sold and eventually forfeited by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in favor of the
government. Petitioners predecessor Oscar Reyes availed of the BIRs tax amnesty and he was able to redeem
the properties upon payment of the reduced tax liability.

Private respondent Cesar Reyes, brother of Oscar Reyes, filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City praying for his appointment as administrator of the estate of the
deceased Ismael Reyes which estate included 50% of the Arayat properties. Oscar Reyes filed his conditional
opposition thereto on the ground that the Arayat properties do not form part of the estate of the deceased as he
(Oscar) had acquired the properties by redemption and or purchase.

Issue:

Whether the court a quo, has no jurisdiction to determine the issue of ownership.

Ruling:

The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and
the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of administrators, executors,
guardians and trustees.The question of ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter which the Probate Court
cannot resolve with finality Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not
be included in the inventory of estate proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve
title.

Moreover, in the case at bar the Court did not err in affirming the provisional inclusion of the subject properties
to the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes without prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought
thereafter in the proper court on the issue of ownership considering that the subject properties are still titled under
the torrens system in the names of spouses Ismael and Felisa Revita Reyes which under the law is endowed
with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law. The declaration of the
provisional character of the inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within
the jurisdiction of the Probate Court.

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 27


Case No. 21

Gr No. 141634, February 5, 2001, 351 SCRA 183

Heirs of Sps. Remedios R Sandejas vs Alex Lina

Digested by Bacoto, Christy C.

Doctrine: In settling the estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over matters incidental and
collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers. Such matters include selling, mortgaging or otherwise
encumbering realty belonging to the estate.

Facts:

On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition in the lower court praying that letters of
administration be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his wife, Remedios Sandejas. Letters of
Administration were issued by the lower court appointing Eliodoro as administrator.

On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned and among the records burned were the
records of the Court where Sandejas filed his petition.

On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention was filed by Alex A.
Lina alleging that Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, obligated to sell to Lina 4 parcels of land.

Eliodoro died sometime in November 1984 in Canada. His counsel is still waiting for official word on the fact of
the death of the administrator. He also alleged that the matter of the claim of Alex becomes a money claim to be
filed in Eliodoro’s estate. The lower court issued an order directing the other heirs of Sandejas to move for the
appointment of a new administrator within 15 days from receipt of the order.

On January 1986, Alex filed a Motion for his appointment as a new administrator of the Intestate Estate of
Remedios R. Sandejas on the following reasons: that Alex has not received any motion for the appointment of
an administrator in place of Eliodoro; that his appointment would be beneficial to the heirs; that he is willing to
give away his being an administrator as long as the heirs has found one. The heirs chose Sixto Sandejas as new
administrator. They were reasoning out that it was only at a later date that Sixto accepted the appointment. The
lower court substituted Alex Lina with Sixto Sandejas as administrator.

On November 1993, Alex filed an Omnibus Motion to approve the deed of conditional sale executed between
Alex A. Lina and Eliodoro and to compel the heirs to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of Alex. The lower
court granted Alex’ motion.

Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and respondent was
merely a contract to sell, not a perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the ownership of the four lots was to remain
in the intestate estate of Remedios until the approval of the sale was obtained from the settlement court.

Issue/s:

What is the settlement court’s jurisdiction?

Ruling:

Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent’s estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. One can
sell their rights, interests or participation in the property under administration. A stipulation requiring court
approval does not affect the validity and the effectiveness of the sale as regards the selling heirs. It merely implies
that the property may be taken out of custodia legis, but only with the court’s permission.

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 28


Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this action to proceed. The factual differences have no bearing on the intestate court’s
jurisdiction over the approval of the subject conditional sale. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the
settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate of wills (Rule 75-77) of deceased persons, including
the appointment and the removal of administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of a probate court’s recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or
otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the
estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed
by the heirs and the beneficiaries.

In the present case, the Motion was meant to settle the decedent’s obligation to Alex; hence, that obligation
clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file a separate action – on
whether petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.’s share of the disputer realty – will unnecessarily
prolong the settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased spouses.

RE: Intervenor’s Standing

Petitioners content that under said Rule 89, only the executor or administrator is authorized to apply for the
approval of a sale of realty under administration. Hence, the settlement court allegedly erred in entertaining and
granting respondent’s Motion for Approval.

There is no such limitation. Section 8, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, provides:

“SEC. 8. When a court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceased contracted to convey. Notice. Effect
of deed. – Where the deceased was in his lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed real property, or an
interest therein, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, on application for that purpose, authorize the
executor or administrator to convey such property according to such contract, or with such modifications as are
agreed upon by the parties and approved by the court; and if the contract is to convey real property to the executor
or administrator, the clerk of the court shall execute the deed.”

This provision should be differentiated from Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, specifically requiring only the
executor or administrator to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estate
for the purposes of paying debts, expenses and legacies (Section 2); or for authority to sell real or personal estate
beneficial to the heirs, devisees or legatees and other interested persons, although such authority is not
necessary to pay debts, legacies or expenses of administration (Section 4).

Section 8 mentions only an application to authorize the conveyance of realty under a contract that the deceased
entered into while still alive. While this Rule does not specify who should file the application, it stands to reason
that the proper party must be one who is to be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one who is to be entitled
to the avails of the suit.

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 29


Case No. 22

180 Scra 635 (1989)

Ramos vs CA

Digested by Bacoto, Christy C.

Doctrine: PROBATE JURISDICTION EXPLAINED. – The probate jurisdiction of the former court of first instance
or the present regional trial court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate
of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and
trustees. Subject to settled exceptions not present in this case, the law does not extend the jurisdiction of a
probate court to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceeding. The parties
concerned may choose to bring a separate action as a matter of convenience in the preparation or presentation
of evidence. Obviously, the approval by the probate court of the conditional sale was without prejudice to the
filling of the proper action for consolidation of ownership and/or reformation of instrument in the proper court
within the statutory period of prescription.

WHEN ACTING AS CADASTRAL COURT, HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER ACTION FOR CONSOLIDATION
OF OWNERSHIP. – The court of first instance or the regional trial court, acting as cadastral court, acts with
limited competence. It has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of an action for consolidation of ownership, much
less to issue an order to that effect, such action must have been filed in the former court of first instance, now in
the regional trial court, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. That remedy, and the procedure therefor, is now
governed by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court as a special civil action cognizable by the regional trial court in the
exercise of original general jurisdiction.

Facts:

Adelaida Ramos executed two deeds of conditional sale over Lots 4033 and 4221 as collateral for loans in favor
of her brother, Oscar Ramos, as creditor. When Adelaida failed to exercise her right of repurchase, Oscar and
his wife proceeded to consolidate their ownership over the two lots. Eventually, the CFI, acting as probate court
confirmed Oscar and his wife’s ownership over Lot 4033. The same court, as a cadastral court, affirmed the
petition for consolidation of ownership of the spouses over Lot 4221.

Despite the aforementioned events, Adelaida and Lazaro Meneses remained in possession of the properties until
1964 when the petitioners took possession of the lots. Sometime in 1968, the spouses Ramos instituted a case
against the petitioners for declaration of nullity of orders, reformation of instrument and recovery of possession,
with prayer for preliminary injunction and damages. The trial court found that the deeds of conditional sale were
in fact equitable mortgages. The CA affirmed the decision.

Adelaida’s heirs subsequently substituted her in the case and argued that the dispositive potion of the lower
court’s decision, affirmed by the Court of Appeals and this Honorable Court, did not direct the Spouses Oscar
Ramos and Luz Agudo to restore possession of the properties to Adelaida Ramos; and/or failed to instruct the
Register of Deeds of Tarlac to cancel the titles issued to Oscar Ramos and Luz Agudo, to the extent of the shares
of Adelaida Ramos in the properties. They filed a motion for clarification praying that the judgment of the trial
court be amended.

Issue/s:

WoN the amendment shall be allowed.

Ruling:

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YES. The amendment now being sought by the movants although coming long after the subject judgment had
matured into finality, would not at all be unauthorized or improper considering the peculiar but compelling
circumstances under and by reason of which such an amendment is necessitated.

The legal bases for the issuance of certificates of title to the lots in favor of petitioners and third persons having
been set aside by the judgment of the trial court in said Civil Case No. 4168, with its recognition of corresponding
rights thereover by private respondents, this again ineluctably implies that the corresponding certificates of title
thereover be issued in favor of private respondents or their successors, and that the certificates of title of
petitioners and their transferees be consequently canceled.

Thus the motion for clarificatory judgment was allowed and the portion of the judgment was amended.

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 31


Case Number: 23

187 Scra 661 (1990)

Reyes vs Mosqueda

Digested by Bacoto, Christy C.

Doctrine: The nature of the disposition made is the determinative factor which makes the donation – inter vivos
or – mortis causa and not the title given to a deed of donation.

Facts:

Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and was survived by his sister Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters,
herein petitioners Ruperto Reyes et. al. The heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M in the
CFI for the administration of Pascual’s estate. Ursula then filed a motion to exclude some properties included
alleging that these were donated to her in a donation mortis causa in 1966. This was granted by the CFI without
prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. An appeal was made to the SC. The SC then issued a
TRO enjoining the CFI from enforcing the order.

Among the properties donated to Ursula is lot 24 which was also donated in 1969 in a deed of donation inter
vivos in favor of Ofelia Parungao who was then a minor at the time of the donation. When she reached the age
of majority, she had the donation registered but found out that the certificate of title was missing so she filed a
petition for reconstitution of title which was granted and she registered the donation and was issued a new TCT
in her name.

Ursula then sold the lot in favor of the Reyes. Benjamin Reyes filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Ofelia’s
TCT which prompted Ofelia to file a petition for recovery of possession against Benjamin Reyes. The CFI issued
a joint decision for the 2 cases ruling that Ofelia’s TCT was null and void. The IAC affirmed thus an appeal to the
SC.

Issue/s:

1. WoN the probate has jurisdiction to exclude properties donated to Ursula.


2. WoN the donation executed in favor of Ursula was a donation inter vivos.

Ruling:

1. YES.

It was stressed in the order of the probate court that it was without prejudice to the final determination in a
separate action. It is well-settled that although a probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties,
it can determine whether or not the properties should be included in the inventory to be administered. Such
determination is not conclusive and is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action.

2. YES.

Although the donation was entitled donations mortis causa, it has been held that dispositions in a deed of
donation do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation. It is the body of the document which
should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor.

For a donation to be a donation mortis cause, the following characteristics should be present:

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 32


1. It conveys no title before the death of the transferor or the transferor retains ownership over the property.

2. Before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will.

3. The transfer is void should the transferor survive the transferee.

The following are not present in the case. The transfer of ownership was immediate and independent of the death
of the donor. The provision stating that the donor has reserved sufficient properties for himself to maintain him
for life confirms the intention of the donor to give naked ownership immediately after the execution of the deed
of donation.

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 33


Case No: 24

97 Phil 330, 334-335

Ongsingco vs Tan

Digested by Bacoto, Christy C.

Doctrine: A probate court cannot act on questions of ownership lest it exceeds its jurisdiction.

Facts:

Petitioner Tasiana Ongsingco is the wife and judicial guardian of Francisco de Borja, who was declared
incompetent by the CFI of Rizal in Spec. Pro. No. 1764. Francisco de Borja is the surviving spouse of Josefa
Tangco whose estate is being settled in Spec. Pro. No. 7866 in the same court. Respondent Jose de Borja is the
son of Francisco de Borja and administrator of the estate of Josefa Tangco.

After Francisco was declared incompetent, Tasiana took possession of two parcels of land situated in Santa
Rosa, Nueva Ecija and commenced the threshing of the palay crop standing thereon. Jose filed a motion in the
estate proceedings of Josefa praying that Tasiana be restrained from threshing the palays until the ownership of
the lands has been resolved by the court or by agreement of the parties.

Tasiana opposed the motion and stated that the question of ownership can only be threshed out elsewhere and
not by the probate court. She then filed an action in the CFI of Nueva Ecija to prevent Jose from interfering with
the harvest. The CFI of Nueva Ecija granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by Tasiana.

Meanwhile, the CFI of Rizal issued an order restraining Tasiana in the threshing of the palay harvested in the
disputed lands. Tasian filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. She then filed a petition for
certiorari with prohibition in the Supreme Court.

Issue/s:

WoN the CFI of Rizal has jurisdictiction to resolve the ownership dispute between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose
de Borja.

Ruling:

NO. In Franci vs O’Brien, it was held that “the question of ownership is one which should be determined in an
ordinary action and not in probate proceedings, and this whether or not the property is alleged to belong to the
estate”. In another case it was held that “the general rule is that questions as to title to property cannot be passed
pon in testate of intestate proceedings” or stating the rule more elaborately, “When questions arise as to the
ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person but claimed by some other person
to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administrative proceedings.”

Based from the foregoing, it thus appears obvious that the CFI of Rizal exceeded its jurisdiction in acting upon
the question of ownership in its capacity as probate court. Such question has been squarely raised in an action
pending in the CFI of Nueva Ecija. It is of no consequence that what respondent court merely did was look into
the identity of said properties. This question is necessarily imbibed in the greater issue of ownership and being
interwoven one can hardly draw the line of demarcation that would separate one from another.

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Case Number: 25

GR No L 42678, April 9 1987, 149 SCRA 186

Baybayan vs Aquino

Digested by Bacoto, Christy C.

Doctrine: Although the petitioners are not parties in the special proceedings, they, however, voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court.

A court of first instance acting as a probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate questions concerning ownership
of a property alleged to be part of a deceased person’s estate, which must be submitted to the Court of First
Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a court of first instance.

Facts:

The respondents filed a petition for summary settlement of the estate of Vincent Oria. The probate court issued
an order adjudicating the estate to the heirs of the decedent. However, when a representative of the private
respondents went to cultivate the portion adjudicated to them, he was prevented by Jose Diaz and Cipriano
Evangelista. As a consequence, petitioners filed a complaint for the quieting of title, plus damages and to refrain
the defendants from enforcing the writ of execution.

Meanwhile, the probate court found that the property in the question was registered in the names of the
petitioners. The same court ordered the petitioners to amend their complaint to determine whether lot E is part
of the decedent’s estate inasmuch as it is now the property claimed by Baybayan covered by a TCT. Pursuant
thereto, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion amending the complaint and dropping some defendants. The judge,
however, found that it did not comply with his order and dismissed the case. Petitioners now contend that the
judge has no authority to dismiss the case because the order to amend the complaint was issued in connection
with Special Proceeding 24-R, where they were not even parties.

Issue/s:

WoN the petitioners are bound by the judge’s ruling.

Ruling:

YES. The parties voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court when they filed Omnibus
Motion in Civil Case 231-R, praying for leave to amend their complaint in accordance with the order of the probate
court. They cannot be allowed to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the judge to who,
they submitted their cause voluntarily.

The findings of the judge as to the ownership of Lot E do not justify the order to amend the complaint since the
determination of the ownership of the said lot by the judge presiding over a court exercising probate jurisdiction
is not final or ultimate in nature and is without prejudice to the right of an interested party to raise the question of
ownership in a proper action.

When questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of a deceased person, by the
adverse party to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of
administrative proceedings. The CFI, acting as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions
which must be submitted to the CFI in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a court of first instance.

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The order to amend the complaint did not specify what the amendments should be or how the complaint should
be amended so that the petitioners could not be faulted. Thus, the petition for certiorari to review the lower court
is granted.

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Case Number: 26

A.M. No. RTJ-91-766

JOSE P. UY vs. HON. JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG

Enricco Albert P. Ballares

Doctine:

When title to land has already been registered and the certificate of title thereto issued, such Torrens
title cannot be collaterally attacked because the issue on the validity of the title can only be raised in an action
instituted expressly for the purpose.

Facts:

The records show that a certain Herminia R. Alvos filed with the RTC a petition for settlement of the
estate of Ambrocio C. Pingco. Two (2) days after, respondent Judge appointed said Herminia R. Alvos special
administratrix under Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. Upon order of respondent Judge, the Register of Deeds
reported on the status of the titles to the properties, informing the Court that a deed of absolute sale executed by
the spouses Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz was filed with the Register of Deeds, and, that by virtue of the deed
of sale, new transfer certificates of title were issued in the name of complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy

On 7 June 1989, respondent Judge ordered the cancellation of the titles in the name of complainant
Jose P. Uy and the reinstatement of the names of the spouses Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez or the
issuance of new titles in their name. On motion of counsel for the Special Administratrix, respondent Judge
ordered the Registers of Deeds of Valenzuela and Manila to cancel the titles in the name of Ambrocio C. Pingco
and Paz Ramirez and to issue new ones in favor of the persons mentioned in the approved project of partition.

Issue:

Whether or not the cancellation of the titles was proper?

Ruling:

No, the cancellation was not proper. Elementary in our statutory law is the doctrine that when title to land
has already been registered and the certificate of title thereto issued, such Torrens title cannot be collaterally
attacked because the issue on the validity of the title can only be raised in an action instituted expressly for the
purpose. Corollary to this is the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of his property without
due process of law. In cancelling the titles of complainants over their properties on mere motion of a party and
without affording them due process, respondent Judge violated her sworn obligation to uphold the law and
promote the administration of justice. It has been held that if the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as
if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 37


Case Number: 27

G.R. No. L-39532

Flora Valero VDA. De Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals

Enricco Albert P. Ballares

Doctrine:

For the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the
inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties.

Facts:

The issue in this case stems from the ruling of the probate court, in the intestate proceedings of the
estate of Jose Valero, excluding the two lots owned by Mrs. Rustia, and declaring further that the said properties
can no longer be subject to collation. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the CA contending that the 2 San
Lorenzo Village lots were really conveyed to Mrs. Rustia by way of donation because the consideration for the
sale was allegedly only one-fifth of the true value of the lots. Mrs. Rodriguez further contended that the order was
final in character.

The CA affirmed the RTC decision and held that the order of exclusion was interlocutory and that it could
be changed or modified at any time during the course of administration proceedings. It further held that it is
immaterial whether the two lots were donated or sold to Mrs. Rustia because only compulsory heirs are required
to make collation for the determination of their legitimes, and only heirs are involved in questions as to
advancement.

Issue:

Whether the RTC order of exclusion is final?

Ruling:

No, the order of the RTC is not final and merely interlocutory. The prevailing rule is that for the purpose
of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court
may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties.

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 38


Case Number: 28

G.R. No. 75773

Tomas Jimenez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Enricco Albert P. Ballares

Doctrine:

A probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally. The probate court's limited
jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action.

Facts:

In April 1979, Virginia Jimenez filed a petition before the Court of First Instance, praying to be appointed
as administratrix of the properties of the deceased spouses Lino and Genoveva.

On March 23, 1981, petitioner Virginia Jimenez was appointed administrator of the Intestate Estate of
Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy. On May 21, 1981, she filed an inventory of the estate of the spouses Lino
Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy wherein she included the five (5) parcels of land in Salomague, Bugallon,
Pangasinan. The probate court then ordered the exclusion of the five (5) parcels of land from the inventory on
the basis of the evidence of private respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr.

Issue:

Whether in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate) the lower court has jurisdiction to settle
questions of ownership:

Ruling:

No, as a general rule a probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally. Since the
probate, court's findings are not conclusive being prima facie, a separate proceeding is necessary to establish
the ownership of the five (5) parcels of land.

The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or
ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a
separate action.

All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or should
not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute
as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a
final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

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Case Number: 29

G.R. No. 128781

Teresita N. De Leon vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS

Enricco Albert P. Ballares

Doctrine:

A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title
provisionally. The probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties.

Facts:

Herein petitioner Teresita N. de Leon was appointed administratrix of the estate of Rafael C. Nicolas.

On September 19, 1994, private respondent Ramon G. Nicolas, filed a "Motion for Collation," claiming
that deceased Rafael Nicolas, during his lifetime, had given real properties to his children by gratuitous title and
that administratrix-petitioner Teresita failed to include the same in the inventory of the estate of the decedent.

On September 27, 1994, the RTC issued an Order directing Ramon "to submit pertinent documents
relative to the transfer of the properties from the registered owners during their lifetime for proper determination
of the court if such properties should be collated, and set it for hearing with notice to the present registered
owners to show cause why their properties may not be included in the collation of properties."5

On November 11, 1994, the RTC issued an Order, finding the properties to be collated to the estate
properties under present administration.

Issue:

Whether or not the probate court can pass upon the question of title.

Ruling:

A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title
provisionally. The rationale therefor and the proper recourse of the aggrieved party are expounded in Jimenez
v.Court of Appeals:

"The patent reason is the probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or
ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a
separate action. "All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a
dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action
for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so."

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Case Number: 30

G.R. No. L-62431-33

Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Enricco Albert P. Ballares

Doctrine:

The probate court "may" provisionally pass upon the question of exclusion, not "should". The obvious
reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result
to inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action.

Facts:

Nicolai Drepin died testate on August 23, 1972. He left behind three (3) parcels of titled land. Moslares
alleged that on October 9, 1970, Despin executed a deed of sale with mortgage executed by the decedent in his
favor. He also alleged that on June 25, 1971, Drepin and Moslares entered into a "Joint Venture Agreement"
where it was agreed that Drepin shall be the registered "owner" of the lots and denominated Moslares as
"developer" tasked with converting the lands into a residential subdivision. But before the agreement could be
implemented, Nicolai Drepin died.

Upon learning of the existence of Special Proceedings, Moslares informed the Judicial Administrator
that he is already the owner of the properties made subject matter of the Special Proceedings and proposed that
he be permitted to pay the balance on the sale with mortgage in accordance with the terms of his written proposal.
On September 25,1979, a Deed of Undertaking was entered into by respondent Moslares and the Administrator
to implement the Contract of Sale with Mortgage. Such deed provided for the mode of payment which Moslares
was to follow. Moslares failed to pay as agreed. Thus, the administrator reported the matter to the probate court
which approved the sale of the property to Pio Barretto Realty, Inc. The deed of sale was duly registered.

Issue:

Can the Court of Appeals act upon the issue of exclusion of properties in the estate when it is not passed
upon by the court a quo?

Ruling:

No, the question of whether the properties sold by Drepin to Petitioner should be excluded from the
probate proceedings below, cannot be determined with finality by the Supreme Court in this case, because in
this petition We are merely reviewing the acts of the respondent CFI as a probate court. Any ruling by the probate
court to include those properties "is only provisional in character and is without prejudice to a judgment in a
separate action on the issue of title or ownership"

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Case No. 31

CIRCA NILA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, TEODORO K. KATIGBAK and JENNIFER


EVIDENTEBAERTGES, Petitioners, v. HON. SALVADOR J. BAYLEN

G.R. Nos. L-69757-58. January 29, 1988

Bonachita, Cielo

Doctrine: A probate court is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction. It acts on matters pertaining to the estate but never
on rights to property arising from contract. It approves contracts entered into for and on behalf of the estate or
the heirs to it but this is by fiat of the Rules of Court. In that case, judicial approval is necessary for the validity of
such contracts.

Facts: On February 21, 1984, the Estates of Soledad and Ricardo Balatbat, subject of a settlement proceeding
pending with respondent Judge, entered into a "Property Management and Exchange Contract" with the
petitioners Circa Nila Development Corporation. The contract charged the petitioners with the development of
two parcels of real property, located in Valenzuela, Bulacan in which the respondent judge approved the said
contract.

Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate court, may compel performance under a
contract it had approved incidental to its office as such a special court.

Ruling: No. A probate court is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction. It acts on matters pertaining to the estate but never
on rights to property arising from contract. It approves contracts entered into for and on behalf of the estate or
the heirs to it but this is by fiat of the Rules of Court. In that case, judicial approval is necessary for the validity of
such contracts. Here, however, the petitioners never invoked the jurisdiction of the respondent Court. They took
part in the preparation of the "Property Management and Exchange Contract," they being parties thereto, but that
did not make them parties to the case, or give the respondent Court the jurisdiction to adjudicate on the rights of
the parties under that contract. The jurisdiction of a probate court is "merely the settlement of the estate and may
not be extended beyond."

The probate cannot adjudicate the rights and obligations of the parties thereto. Compliance with the
terms and conditions thereof may be compelled by specific performance, jurisdiction over which is vested in the
Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction.

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Case No. 32

G.R. No. L-31979 August 6, 1980

FILOMENA G. PIZARRO, MISAEL G. PIZARRO, AURELIO PIZARRO, JR., LUZMINDA G. PIZARRO,


DELIA-THELMA G. PIZARRO, ROGELIO G. PIZARRO, VIRGILIO G. PIZARRO, ROSALINDA G. PIZARRO,
JOSE ELVIN G. PIZARRO and MARIA EVELYN G. PIZARRO, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS

Bonachita, Cielo

Doctrine: Settlement of Estate; An order of the probate court approving the sale of the decedent’s property is
final. The heirs of the deceased may file a complaint in another court for the rescission of the sale. No judicial
interference by the court where the complaint for rescission was filed over the action of a co-equal court is in
involved. The probate court’s province is the settlement of the estate only.

Facts: Upon death Aurelio Pizarro Sr. he left his wife and children as heirs to his estate. Among his properties
were parcels of land situated in Agdao, J. Palma Gill, and Claro M. Recto Streets. The court, upon agreement of
the parties, appointed Corias as Administrator of the estate. The Administrator filed a Motion for Authority to Sell
the said properties and later on a Motion for the approval of the conditional sale in order to settle the debts of the
estate. The heirs opposed the Motion. But the Court approved the sale and denied heirs’ motion and their
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The heirs in a Motion prayed that Administrator Corias be asked to resign or be removed for having
abused his powers and duties. They also filed a "Motion for Cancellation or Rescission of Conditional Contract
of Sale" of the Agdao lot in favor of Angliongto. The Court denied rescission of the sale.

Issue: Whether or not he RTC has jurisdiction over the rescission case.

Ruling: Yes. The rescission of a sale due to failure of the vendees to pay the full consideration, which is a valid
ground for rescission, is under the jurisdiction of the RTC and not the Probate Court. Such cause of action is
beyond the jurisdictional bounds of the Probate Court since its main province was the settlement of the estate.
Hence the incumbent Judge of the Court of First Instance is hereby ordered to take cognizance of and hear and
decide Civil Case No. 5762 as expeditiously as possible.

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Case No. 33

ILDEFONSO LACHENAL, ELIAS LACHENAL, IRENEA L. SANTOS, FLORA L. SANCHEZ and NATIVIDAD
D. LACHENAL, Petitioners, v. HON. EMILIO V. SALAS

G.R. No. L-42257. June 14, 1976

Bonachita, Cielo

Doctrine: PROBATE COURT MAY PROVISIONALLY PASS UPON QUESTION OF TITLE WHERE A PARTY
MOVES FOR THE INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION OF PROPERTY FROM THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATES.
— Where a party in a probate proceeding pray for the inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of
property , the probate court may provisionally pass upon the question without prejudice to its final determination
in a separate action.

Facts: Victorio Lachenal died on November 20, 1969. His testate estate is pending settlement in the CFI. His
son, Ildefonso Lachenal, was named executor of his will. Among the properties included in the inventory of his
estate is a fishing boat called Lachenal VII.

The executor filed in that proceeding a motion to require the spouses Lope L. Leonio and Flaviana Lachenal
Leonio to pay the rentals for the lease of Lachenal VII and return the boat to Navotas, Rizal for drydocking and
repair.

Mrs. Leonio, who was a daughter of the testator, opposed the executor’s motion. She countered with a motion to
exclude fishing boat from the decedent’s estate. She claimed that she is the owner of the boat because she
purchased it from her father in 1967. The executor opposed the motion for exclusion.

Issue: Whether or not the probate court should be allowed continue the hearing on the ownership of the fishing
boat.

Ruling: No. The question of title to a property should be determined in a separate action before the Court of First
Instance , where it affects the lessee who is the decedent’s son-in-law, and who although married to his daughter
or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to the estate. The administrator may not push him
against his will, by motion, into the administrative proceedings. The general rule is that question as to title to
property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate proceeding but should be ventilated in a separate action.

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Case No. 34

MA. DIVINA ORTAÑEZ-ENDERES, Petitioners, v. CA, SEC, et al., Respondents

G.R. No. 128525. December 17, 1999

Bonachita, Cielo

Doctrine: Injunction may issue pendent lite only in cases of extreme urgency, where the right to the possession
during the pendency of the main case, of the property involved is very clear.

Facts: This case stems from a complaint filed by petitioners before the SEC, 1 for the annulment of transfer of
shares of stocks to private respondents, annulment of sale of corporate properties authorized by private
respondents who compose the management of the corporation, annulment of subscriptions on increased capital
stocks, accounting and inspection of corporate books and records, and damages. Petitioners also prayed for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against private respondents to enjoin
them from exercising their rights as stockholders of Philinterlife on the ground that their shares of stock were
acquired through illegal and fraudulent schemes.

Petitioners alleged that Philinterlife is a registered corporation founded in 1954 by the late Dr. Juvencio
Ortañez; that at the time of his death in 1980, Dr. Ortañez owned at least fifty-one percent (51%) of the capital
stock of the company; that special proceedings were pending with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 85, for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Dr. Ortañez, where Rafael S. Ortañez and
Jose S. Ortañez were jointly appointed as special administrators.

Petitioners further stated that after the death of Dr. Ortañez and without the prior authorization of the
intestate court, one-half (1/2) of the shares of stock of Dr. Ortañez were transferred in the names of private
respondents through the manipulations, devices and machinations.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the SEC when it ruled that petitioners had not established clear
existing legal rights to entitle them to a writ of injunction.

Ruling: No. Injunction may issue pendente lite only in cases of extreme urgency, where the right to the
possession, during the pendency of the main case, of the property involved is very clear; where considerations
of relative inconvenience bear strongly in favor of the complainant seeking the possession of the property
pendente lite; where there was willful and unlawful invasion on plaintiff’s right, over his protest and remonstrance,
the injury being a continuing one.

Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: (1) there must be a
right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction is to be directed
is a violation of such right.

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Case No. 35
G.R. No. L-65656 February 28, 1985
AMORANTE PLAN vs IAC and FEDERICO BAUTISTA

MENERVA B. CALAPAN

The Purchaser is Forced Intervenor in the Intestate Proceeding

FACTS:

In the intestate proceeding for the settlement of Regino Bautista's estate, his widow filed a motion fr authority to
sell to Plan the two lots. It was indicated in the motion that the children were notified through one child named
Milagros Bautista .

Judge Jose B. Jimenez granted the authority to sell to Plan the entire estate of the deceased so as to pay the
obligations of the estate "land it appearing that all the heirs have conformed thereto"

On that day, Florencia Topacio and Plan executed a deed of absolute sale with assumption of mortgage
obligations for the two lots.

Judge Jimenez signed the original deed under the word "Approved" to indicate that the sale was okayed by the
probate court.

After the sale, Federico Bautista filed an "Opposition to Agreement to Sell Absolute Sale, Project of Partition and
Request for Inventory and Accounting of Estate and for Furnishing of Orders, Notices and Pleadings".

Then, Federico filed "petition for relief from order". He alleged in his opposition that counsel for the administratrix
misrepresented to the court that all the heirs had approved of the sale and that there was fraud in not giving
notice to the heirs of the proposed sale.

He contended that because there was no compliance with section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court the sale was
void. He prayed that the order authorizing the sale be set aside "and the case tried upon its merits".

Federico Bautista filed a separate action against Plan, to nullify the sale. He did not implead his mother, brothers
and sisters.

ISSUE:

WON Federico Bautista could nullify in a separate action, instead of in the intestate proceeding for his deceased
father's estate, the sale of two conjugal lots.

HELD:

NO. SC hold that the Appellate Court erred in ordering Plan to reconvey the disputed property to Federico
Bautista.

Said judgment is bereft of factual and legal basis. Federico did not pray for reconveyance in his complaint. He
was not the owner of the property. He prayed for receivership, for nullification of the agreement to sell and the
sale itself and for the refund by Plan of all the income which he received from the property from the time he
possessed it in the concept of owner.

Article 1088 of the Civil Code does not justify legal redemption in this case because it refers to sale of hereditary
rights, and not to specific properties, for the payment of the debts of the decedent's estate as to which there is
no legal redemption.

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"In the administration and liquidation of the estate of a deceased person, sales ordered by the probate court for
payment of debts are final and not subject to legal redemption. Unlike in ordinary execution sales, there is no
legal provision allowing redemption in the sale of property for payment of debts of a deceased person"

In the instant case, Federico's remedy is in the intestate proceeding where his petition for relief has been pending
for nearly twenty years. He should amend it by impleading the present administratrix and Plan himself and serving
copies of the petition upon them. Plan, as the purchaser of the disputed property, is a forced intervenor in the
intestate proceeding. He should answer the amended petition for the annulment of the sale. The probate court
has jurisdiction over him.

The probate court, having authorized and approved the sale, should resolve the issue as to its validity.

More important is that if all the interested parties are heard, an amicable settlement may be reached.

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Case No. 36

G.R. No. L-7524 July 31, 1954

GASPAR M. LLAMAS
vs.
HONORABLE SEGUNDO MOSCOSO as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, RUFO RAGA, as
Acting Provincial Sheriff of Leyte, and CIRIACO ENRIQUEZ

MENERVA B. CALAPAN

Lease Subject to Approval of Court

FACTS:

Respondent Ciriaco Enriquez, as judicial administrator of the estate of his deceased wife, Manuela Dioso, which
was then the subject of an intestate proceeding leased to the herein petitioner Gaspar M. Llamas two parcels of
land. The lease had the approval of the court and was recorded in the Registry of Deeds.

A few months after the lease was entered into, Ciriaco Enriquez, his co-administrator Panfilo Enriquez, and the
rest of the heirs of the deceased submitted for the approval of the court a project of partial partition". Acting on
the petition, the court, handed down an order approving the partial partition on which date the respective parties
will take possession of the premises or estate ceded to them will with all the corresponding rights and privileges
of ownership."

After the issuance of the above order of Ciriaco Enriquez, filed a petition in the intestate proceedings asking for
the rescission of the lease in question. But the court denied both motions, holding that the rescission of the lease
should be the subject of a separate action by Ciriaco Enriquez in his own behalf and not as an administrator of
the estate.

Ciriaco Enriquez filed an ordinary civil action against the lessee Gaspar M. Llamas praying that the lease in
question be declared cancelled and terminated and Llamas ousted from the leased premises. With this action
still pending, Ciriaco Enriquez filed a motion in the intestate proceeding and praying for the issuance of a writ of
executive to enforce the said part of the order by commanding the sheriff to place movant in possession and
ejecting therefrom Llamas and his wife.

The court, upon complaint of Ciriaco Enriquez, issued an order warning Llamas and his wife and the occupants
of the building in question not to interfere with complainant's possession of said building, decreed that Llamas
and his wife must immediately vacate the lot.

ISSUE: WON the order of the probate court should be declared is null and void.

RULING:

YES. The petition should be granted. It is obvious that the orders complained of have the effect of depriving the
lessee of his rights under the lease without the lease having been terminated or annulled as the civil case
instituted for that purpose was still pending in court. The contention that the lease must be deemed terminated
by the order approving the project of preliminary partition which allocated the said lot to Ciriaco Enriquez and
authorized him to take possession thereof from August 1, 1948 "with all the corresponding rights and privileges
of ownership," is without merit, for the lessee was not a party to that partition and the court cannot, without any
legal ground and without proper proceedings for the purpose, annul the lease. The allegation that the lease has
been breached and should therefore be declared terminated, is a question that must be ventilated in the pending
civil action for the purpose as the same is not within the competence of the court in the exercise of its probate
jurisdiction.

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Case No. 37

G.R. No. L-31174 May 30, 1972

MANUEL Y. MACIAS
UY KIM, ANDRES CO, NEMESIO G. CO, NICASIO G. CO, MANUEL SOSANTONG and RELIABLE
REALTY CORPORATION

MENERVA B. CALAPAN

Jurisdiction to Exclusion of Other Courts

FACTS:

Petitioner-appellant filed a petition for review by certiorari against respondents alleging that he filed a complaint
dated for the annulment of a deed of sale, reivindicacion and damages against respondents and prays for
judgment (a) declaring the deed of sale over the aforementioned lots as null and void, (b) directing the
cancellation of the transfer certificates of titles issued in the name of Reliable Realty Corporation, (c) declaring
that the aforesaid five lots as his distributive share in the estate of Rosina as well as directing the register of
deeds of Manila to issue in his name new transfer certificates of title,

Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss appellant Macias' complaint in Branch X of the Manila Court of First
Instance on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of the suit; that the
complaint states no cause of action; that there is another action of the same nature pending in court; and alleging
specifically that:

(1) Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case since the
subject matter involved properly belongs exclusively to and is within the competence of Branch
VIII and Branch IV before which courts Special Proceedings Nos. 63866 and 57405 are pending
and petitioner's alleged claim of beneficiary interest in the estate of Julian and Rosina depends
on a recognition thereof by the probate court in said Special Proceedings.

ISSUE: WON claims to the estate of a deceased will prosper independently of a proceeding involving the same
issue already pending in another court.

RULING:

NO. The pretense of herein petitioner-appellant is without merit .

Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court, "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estates of
the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." Pursuant to this provision, therefore
all questions concerning the settlement of the estate of the deceased should be filed before Branch VIII of the
Manila Court of First Instance, then presided over by former Judge, where Special Proceedings No. 63866 for
the settlement of the testate estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson was filed and is still pending.

This Court stated the rationale of said Section 1 of Rule 73, thus:

... The reason for this provision of the law is obvious. The settlement of the estate of a deceased
person in court constitutes but one proceeding. For the successful administration of that estate
it is necessary that there should be but one responsible entity, one court, which should have
exclusive control of every part of such administration. To intrust it to two or more courts, each
independent of the other, would result in confusion and delay.

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xxx xxx xxx

The provision of section 602, giving one court exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person, was not inserted in the law for the benefit of the parties litigant,
but in the public interest for the better administration of justice. For that reason the parties have
no control over it.1

On the other hand, and for such effects as may be proper, it should be stated herein that any
challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication thereof, and every demand
or claim which any heir, delegate or party in interest in a testate or intestate succession may
make, must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a separate
action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shall take
cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called upon to
make distribution and adjudication of the property to the interested parties, ... . 2

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed.

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Case No. 38

G.R. No. L-56340 June 24, 1983

SPOUSES ALVARO PASTOR, JR. and MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR


vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN Y. REYES, JUDGE OF BRANCH I, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
CEBU and LEWELLYN BARLITO QUEMADA

MENERVA B. CALAPAN

The question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality

FACTS:

This is a case of hereditary succession.

Alvaro Pastor, died and survived by his wife Sofia Bossio their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr.
(PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate child, not natural, by the name of
Lewellyn Barlito Quemada .

QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of PASTOR, SR. The
PROBATE COURT, upon motion of QUEMADA and after an ex parte hearing, appointed him special
administrator of the entire estate of PASTOR, SR.

The PROBATE COURT issued an order allowing the will to probate.

For two years after remand of the case to the PROBATE COURT, QUEMADA filed pleading asking for payment
of his legacy and seizure of the properties subject of said legacy. PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA opposed these
pleadings on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit with another branch of the Cebu Court of First
Instance.

While the reconveyance suit was still being litigated in Branch IX of the PROBATE COURT issued the now
assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership and ruling in effect that the
legacy to QUEMADA was not inofficious.

The order being "immediately executory", QUEMADA succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and
Garnishment. The oppositors sought reconsideration thereof primarily on the ground that the PROBATE COURT
gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the question of ownership of the royalties and ordered the payment
of QUEMADA's legacy after prematurely passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will.

ISSUE:

WON the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity.

RULING:

NO. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of
the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9.) As a rule, the question of ownership
is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate
Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the
final decision in a separate action to resolve title.

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Issue of Intrinsic Validity of the Holographic Will -

(a) When PASTOR, SR.he was survived by his wife. There is therefore a need to liquidate the conjugal
partnership and set apart the share of PASTOR, SR.'s wife in the conjugal partnership preparatory to the
administration and liquidation of the estate of PASTOR, SR.

(b) So, also, as of the same date, there had been no prior definitive determination of the assets of the estate of
PASTOR, SR. The reconveyance or recovery of properties allegedly owned but not in the name of PASTOR,
SR. was still being litigated in another court.

(c) There was no appropriate determination, much less payment, of the debts of the decedent and his estate.

(d) Nor had the estate tax been determined and paid

(e) The net assets of the estate not having been determined, the legitime of the forced heirs in concrete figures
could not be ascertained.

(f) All the foregoing deficiencies considered, it was not possible to determine whether the legacy of QUEMADA -
a fixed share in a specific property rather than an aliquot part of the entire net estate of the deceased - would
produce an impairment of the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

(g) Finally, there actually was no determination of the intrinsic validity of the will in other respects. It was obviously
for this reason that more than 7 years after the Probate Order was issued the Probate Court a hearing on the
intrinsic validity of the will.

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Case No. 39

G.R. No. L-45494 August 31, 1978

BENITO BOLISAY and GENEROSA BUTED BOLISAY, petitioners,


vs.
HON. LEONARDO S. ALCID in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte,
Branch in Laoag City, and ANGELA BUTED PASCUAL, respondents.

MENERVA B. CALAPAN

A probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally.

FACTS:

Petition for certiorari to annul the order of respondent judge in Special Proceedings No. 4560-11 dated July 27,
1976 which in effect ruled that notwithstanding that the subject property is duly titled in the name of petitioners,
the administratrix of the intestate estate involved in said proceedings has the right to collect the rentals of said
property over the objection of the titled owners just because it is included in the inventory of said estate and there
is an ordinary action in the regular court over the ownership thereof and the estate is one of the parties therein.

Petitioner Bolisay and private respondent-administratrix Angela Buted Pascual are sisters, the daughters of the
deceased Luciana Abadilla whose intestate estate is being settled. The subject property is a lot in the name of
petitioners.

On the other hand, private respondent Angela Buted and Maria Buted filed an action for the annulment of the
Deed of Sale executed by their deceased mother Luciana in favor of petitioners, which deed was precisely the
basis of the aforementioned titles in the names of said petitioners. The complaint alleged lack of consideration
and disputed that petitioners were the ones who spent for the construction of the 7 door apartment.

Pending also before Branch I of the same court is an action of partition, Civil Case No. 2452-I, wherein a
compromise agreement was reached excluding the lot in question from the list of partitionable properties.

The foregoing notwithstanding respondent administratrix filed an inventory of the properties comprising the estate
of Luciana and included therein the property here in controversy. Said inventory was approved without opposition
.She filed a motion to collect rentals from the 7-door apartment in the actual possession of one Alfredo Palanca.
Without notice to either the petitioners, Alfredo Palanca or the tenants, respondent judge granted the motion on
July 27, 1976. On August 11, 1976, petitioners moved for reconsideration of said order.

ISSUE:

WON the order of respondent judge which in effect ruled that notwithstanding that the subject property is duly
titled in the name of petitioners, the respondent administratrix of the intestate estate involved in said proceedings
has the right to collect the rentals of said property, be set aside.

RULING:

YES. His Honor's order denying the motion for exclusion is somehow inconsistent, since it is in itself a
determination that for the purposes of Special Proceedings No. 4560-II, and accordingly, until the question of
ownership between petitioners and private respondent has been finally determined in appropriate ordinary action,
the disputed property must be deemed part of the intestate estate of Luciana Abadilla, hence the order to allow
the administratrix to collect the rentals due therefrom. Considering that as aforestated the said property is titled
under the Torrens System in the names of the petitioners, it does appear strange, in the light of the probate
court's own ruling that it has no jurisdiction to pass on the issue of ownership, that the same court deemed the

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 53


same as part of the estate under administration just because the administratrix, alleges it is still owned by the
estate and has in fact listed it in the inventory submitted by her to the court.

It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership, for,
on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with
incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does
not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons. In other words, the mere inclusion in the inventory submitted by the administrator of the estate
of a deceased person of a given property does not of itself deprive the probate court of authority to inquire into
the propriety of such inclusion in case an heir or a third party claims adverse title thereto. To hold otherwise would
render inutile the power of that court to make a prima facie determination of the issue of ownership recognized
in the above-quoted precedents. The correct rule is that the probate court should resolve the issue before it
provisionally, as basis for its inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory. It does not even matter than the issue
is raised after approval of the inventory because "apparently, it is not necessary that the inventory and appraisal
be approved by the Court."

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Case No. 40

G.R. No. L- 31048, January 20, 1968


Lucena Magallanes, petitioner
Vs
Hon. Union Kayanan, Presiding Judge of Branch IV, CFI, Quezon and Heirs of Eligio Magallanes

Casiño, Angelica

Doctrine: The probate court may only decide on issues involving ownership of the land only for the purpose of
determining whether or not a given property should be included in the inventory of the estate of the deceased,
but such determination is not conclusive and is still subject to a final decision in a separate action to be instituted
between the parties.

Facts:

On August 4, 1960, petitioner Lucena Magallanes filed a "Solicitud" praying that Lot No. 2657 covered by OCT
No. 1091 and one-half (½) of Lot No. 3465 covered by OCT No. 6447, both of the Register of Deeds of Tayabas
(Quezon) be partitioned and distributed among the heirs of the deceased Filomena Magallanes.

Subsequently, private respondents, the Heirs of Eligio Magallanes, filed their opposition and motion to dismiss
the "Solicitud" claiming title and ownership over the parcels of land in question and raising the issue that the trial
court is devoid of jurisdiction to resolve the issues raised in the pleadings.

On July 12, 1968, the private respondents filed a petition for summary judgment and petitioner files her opposition
to the petition for summary judgment on the ground that in a summary settlement of an estate, the Court has no
jurisdiction to pass finally and definitely upon the title or ownership over the properties involved therein; and that
summary judgment is not proper, there being a genuine issue or material controversy raised by the pleadings of
the parties.

On March 21, 1969, the lower court, rendered a summary judgment on the pleadings submitted by the parties
confirming the private respondents' (Heirs of Eligio Magallanes) absolute and exclusive right of ownership and
possession over the two properties and to cancel the Notice of Lis Pendens on Original Certificate of Title No.
1091 covering Lot No. 2657.

On April 22, 1969, the petitioner moved for reconsideration but the lower court denied the motion for
reconsideration and declared the March decision to be final and executory.

A writ of execution was issued and served upon the petitioner on July 14, 1969. However, even before said date,
petitioner was able to perfect her appeal on June 30, 1969, with the filing of the notice of appeal, appeal bond
and record on appeal.

ISSUES:

1. WON the trial court has jurisdiction to pass decision on the ownership of the lands
2. WON Summary Judgment is proper
3. WON a Motion for Reconsideration suspended the running of the period of Appeal

RULING:

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1. The Supreme Court held that the lower court has no jurisdiction to pass finally and definitely upon the
title or ownership of the properties involved in the summary settlement of the estate of the deceased Magallanes
instituted by the petitioner. Well established is the doctrine that the property, whether real or personal, which are
alleged to form part of the estate of a deceased person but claimed by another to be his property by adverse title
to that of the deceased and his estate and not by virtue of any right of inheritance from ' the deceased, cannot
be determined by the probate court.

Such questions must be submitted to the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction to try
and determine ordinary actions. The probate court may do so only for the purpose of determining whether or not
a given property should be included in the inventory of the estate of the deceased, but such determination is not
conclusive and is still subject to a final decision in a separate action to be instituted between the
parties. Likewise, the probate court may also determine questions of title to property if the parties voluntarily
submitted to its jurisdiction and introduced evidence to prove ownership.

In the case at bar, the action instituted by the petitioner was not for the purpose of determining whether or not a
given property should be included in the inventory of the estate of the deceased. The action was for partition and
distribution of the properties left by the deceased. Neither have all of the parties voluntarily submitted the issue
of ownership for resolution by the court.

As there is opposition by the petitioner upon the petition, it was therefore erroneous for the lower court to resolve
the question of title or ownership over the properties in said proceeding. It could only pass upon such a question
in the exercise of its general jurisdiction in an ordinary action.

2. Summary judgment can be availed of where no genuine issue as to any material fact is raised
in the pleadings. Where there is an issue or issues of fact joined by the parties or where the facts pleaded by
the parties are disputed or contested, neither one of them can pray for a summary judgment to take the place
of a trial. Summary judgment can be rendered only where there are no questions of fact in issue or where the
material allegations of the pleadings are not disputed.

Here, there is a genuine issue or material controversy raised where the issue on ownership and right to acquire
ownership of the lands are to be considered. This is a factual dispute which can only be properly settled by means
of a trial on the merits. Summary judgment was not proper.

3. A motion for new trial or reconsideration on the ground that the judgment is contrary to law,
which does not point out the supposed defects in the judgment is pro forma Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of
Court requires the movant for the new trial to point out the findings of fact or conclusions of law supposed to be
insufficiently borne out by the evidence or contrary to law.

The Supreme Court held that the motion for new trial or reconsideration cannot be considered as simply pro
forma where t not only states that the decision is contrary to law but also explains in detail relevant facts for
seeking its revocation. Since the motion for reconsideration is not pro forma the filing of the same on time stopped
the running of the period within which to appeal the decision. It was therefore an error on the part of the lower
court to issue a writ of execution of the decision in question before it has become final and executory.

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Case No. 41

Francisco Mallari, et. al, plaintiffs- appelants

vs Augusto Mallari, Defendant-Appellee

G.R. No. L-4656, February 23, 1953

Casiño, Angelica

Doctrine:

A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title
to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All
that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they could or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute about
the title, then the parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a
final determination of the conflicting claims because the probate court cannot do so (Baquial v. Amihan, supra,
p. 501.)

If an ordinary action is filed between the same parties in the probate proceedings and involving the same
properties, and the question in dispute is whether those properties form part of the estate of the testator, the
ordinary action should not be dismissed on the ground that it is a duplication of the probate proceedings.

Facts:

Maria Mallari died on April 17, 1949 without issue but leaving nephews and at least one niece. During her lifetime
Maria Mallari owned among other things three parcels of land and one-half of another parcel, in Pampanga, all
registered under the Torrens System.

On July 12, 1938, she was supposed to have donated the first parcel covered by transfer certificate of title No.
10048 to her nephew Domiciano C. Mallari, and the second, third and one-half of the fourth parcel covered by
transfer certificates to the same Domiciano C. Mallari, her nephew Francisco Mallari and her niece Catalina
Mallari.

The donees accepted the donations in the same deed or deeds and new certificates of title were issued to them
and took possession of the parcels donated to them.

In 1943, the donees Domiciano, Francisco and Catalina executed an extra-judicial partition of their joint
properties, Catalina received other pieces of property and in 1946, the extrajudicial partition was registered and
the certificates issued.

Maria left what purported to be a will and in that instrument the four parcels of land said to have been donated
by her to her nephews and niece were still listed as part of her estate.

On May 7, 1949, defendant Augusto Mallari, another nephew of Maria filed a petition for the probate of the will
of his aunt in special proceedings No. 450 in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Branch III) and Augusto
was appointed special administrator of the estate.

On June 11, 1949, the heirs of Domiciano who had already died, and Francisco and Catalina filed opposition to
the probate of the will based on statutory grounds and claiming that the four parcels of land could no longer be
disposed of in the will because they had previously been donated to them.

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Augusto as special administrator, petitioned the probate court to order the tenants of said four parcels under
penalty of contempt of court to deliver to him that portion of the harvest corresponding to the owner. This petition
was opposed by the heirs of Domiciano and by Francisco on the ground that they were in possession as owners
of the property and that therefore, the portion of the harvest corresponding to the owner belonged to them.

The heirs of Domiciano filed a complaint claiming that the 4 parcels of land in question belong to them by way of
donation. Augusto, on the other hand, instead of answering the complaint filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the complaint did not state the facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and that the court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint is proper in view that the institution of the complaint constitutes
duplication of the probate proceedings where the lands were also subject to litigation

Ruling:

The present action is not a duplication of the probate proceedings althoug the parties and subject-matter may be
identical. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed
to belong to outside parties.

All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. It is settled that when there
is ownership issues to be resolved, the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. (Fernando
Baquial v. Felix Amihan, Supra, p. 501 and authorities cited therein.)

The conflicting claims cannot be adjudicated in the probate proceedings and may only be done in an ordinary
action.

The order appealed from dismissing the complaint was set aside and the case was remanded to the RTC for
further proceedings.

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Case No. 42

Fernando Baquial vs Felix Amihan, Administrator of Juan Amihan and Hilaria Cabahug, deceased
spouse and Enrique Amihan

Casiño, Angelica

Doctrines:

1. The order of sale of property of decedent is not final until actual sale and confirmation thereof.

2. A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has the power and jurisdiction to determine
whether or not the properties included therein or excluded therefrom be prima facie to the deceased, although
such determination is not final in nature, and without prejudice to the right of interested parties, in a proper action
to raise the question bearing on the ownership or existence of the right or credit.

Facts:

This is an appeal of the CFI Bohol decision denying the motion to dismiss filed by defendants-appellants
Felix Amihan, the administrator of the Estate of Juan and Hilaria. Plaintiff herein instituted an action to recover
ownership and possession of real property in Bohol which was registered under the name of Juan Amihan,
married to Hilaria Cabahug.

The plaintiff alleges that he acquired the property through sale from the widow of Juan Amihan, Hilaria
for P2,000 in 1946. He was in possession of the land until in 1948 when the administrator entered into the land
and deprived him of his possession.

Juan Amihan died around 1946, before the land was sold to the plaintiff. Proceedings have been
instituted by Felix Amihan and asked the court the authority to sell the land in January 1949 averring that it is the
only real estate left by the decedent. It is against this petition that Baquial presented his an opposition, claiming
that the land had already been sold to him by the widow, as evidence by a Deed executed in November 1946.

The court denied this opposition and it declared the due execution of the sale in favour of Baquial was
not registered. The court approved the authorization prayed for. The court issued the order.

However, when the sale was presented to court for approval, the presiding judge held that the court had
no jurisdiction to try the question of ownership, and issued an order of holding the approval of the sale in abeyance
and instructing the parties interested to settle the dispute in a separate civil action to settle the ownership.

With this, Fernando Baquial instituted a civil action, of which a motion to dismiss was filed by Amihan
alleging that the order of the court issued by Judge Rodriguez dated March 26, 1949, dismissing Baquial's
opposition to the petition for authority to sell, was a final judgment or order binding upon Fernando Baquial. The
motion to dismiss having been denied, an appeal from the order of denial was prosecuted.

It is claimed on the appeal that the question of ownership was not decided by the question of ownership
was not decided by the order of the court dated March 26, 1949, and that what was determined was the invalidity
of the deed of sale executed by Hilaria Cabahug in favor of plaintiff-appellee, which the court found to be
fraudulent and null and void; that these findings cannot now be disputed in this action, as the order dismissing
plaintiff's claim is not an interlocutory but a final order, because it operates to dispose of plaintiff's claim with
finality, and no appeal was taken against said order.

Issue: Whether or not the order issued by the probate court is final and executory, hence the action instituted by
Baquial is barred by res judicata

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Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the probate court is without jurisdiction to to try the tile to property as
between the representatives of an estate and strangers thereto is too well established by the authorities to require
argument. The high court also expounded that where the court is without jurisdiction to determine questions of
title, as for example, as between the estate and persons claiming adversely, its orders and judgments relating to
the sale do not render the issue of title res judicata.

The rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so
protect the same, but not for a decision on their action.

The court ruled that to determine the title of a third person claiming land sought to be sold by the administrator
shall be decided upon the following grounds:

1. The order of the court for the sale of the property is not a final order or judgment on the question of the
validity of the sale executed by the widow of the decedent in favor of the plaintiff herein, or on the
question of the ownership of the property claimed by the plaintiff. The reason is that it never became
final, because it was suspended by the new order holding the approval of the sale in abeyance. The
order to sell the property was, therefore, suspended by the subsequent one holding the approval of the
sale in abeyance; hence it never acquired any finality.
2. It does not appear that when the court issued its order holding in abeyance the approval of the sale, the
administrator objected to said order and appealed therefrom. Having failed to do so, he can not now
claim that the previous order of March 26 1949, authorizing the sale, had not been modified and is a
final order.
3. No appeal can be taken against the order denying the motion to dismiss, because the said order is
merely interlocutory, not final.

The appeal is, therefore, hereby dismissed, with costs against the appellants.

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Case No. 43

G.R. No. L-1781 September 27, 1949


REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PAMPANGA and GONZALO PUYAT vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and PEDRO B. CRUZ
Casiño, Angelica

Doctrine: The probate court had no jurisdiction to cancel the mortgage, the order given by it approving the sales
of the properties of the estate and order set forth does not constitute res judicata

FACTS:

The parcels of land covered by transfer certificate of title No. 5377 of the office of the register of deeds of
Pampanga were registered in the name of Martin Gonzales. Among those parcels, there was a lot 1-J which is a
portion of lot No. 1 located in the municipality of Lubao, with an area of 3,045,848 square meters, more or less.
All the parcels of land described in the said certificate No. 5377, as well as those described in certificate No.
5379, original certificate, of title No. 11578 and original certificate of title No. 17261 and other parcels of land
located in Bataan, were mortgaged in favor of Gonzalo Puyat, to guaranty a loan of P250,000.

The above-mentioned mortgage was on October 23, 1943 registered in the office of the register of deeds of
Pampanga, and the corresponding annotation made on the back of the respective certificate of title (5377)
covering the lands affected by that encumbrance.

On September 8, 1944, a portion of lot No. 1-J consisting of 2,000,000 square meters was sold by Jose Gonzales
Carrion, as administrator of the estate of Martin Gonzales, to Pedro B. Cruz for the sum of P60,000. On October
3, 1945, the remaining portion of the said lot No. 1-J covering an area of 1,045,848 square meters was likewise
sold by the administrator to Pedro B. Cruz for P104,584.80.

By virtue of such sales, transfer certificate of title No. 5377 was partially cancelled as to the whole lot No. 1-J,
and transfer certificate of title No. 16342 was issued on November 26, 1945, in the name of Pedro B. Cruz, and
the only lien appearing thereon is the milling contract executed in favor of Pampanga Sugar Mills.

On January 4, 1946, Pedro B. Cruz mortgaged the whole of lot No. 1-J described in transfer certificate of title No.
16342 to the Philippine National Bank, Manila, for the sum of P50,000. Said mortgage was duly registered in the
office of the register of deeds of Pampanga.

It is contended by the register of deeds that Luis Panaguition, then acting vincial fiscal and ex-officio register of
deeds of Pampanga, "overlooked or failed to transfer in the title." the liens referring to the mortgage in favor of
Gonzalo Puyat (document No. 262).

The above petition was opposed by the Philippine National Bank on the ground that it will adversely affect the
interest of the mortgagee bank; it will defeat the primary object of the Torrens system, and it will not be in
accordance with law and the doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court.

But inasmuch as according to recent developments shown in the record, the oppositor Philippine National Bank
executed in favor of the other oppositor Pedro B. Cruz, a release of the mortgage for P50,000 annotated on the
back of transfer certificate of title No. 16342, and cancelled said mortgage, by virtue of the fact that Pedro B.
Cruz paid the Philippine National Bank the amount of his loan, counsel for oppositor-appellant Philippine National
Bank in his "Manifestation" attached to the record on August 24, 1949, stated that "the question raised in the
case at bar as ventilated by the parties in their respective briefs are now academical."

There remains now for us to consider the merit of the petition of the register of deeds and his co-petitioner
Gonzalo Puyat, who pray that an error committed by the predecessor of the register of deeds of Pampanga be
corrected.

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ISSUE:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF PAMPANGA HAS THE PERSONALITY TO FILE
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 112 ACT NO. 496.
2. WHETHER OR NOT the order of the probate court in approving the sale of the land is res judicata in the
present case.

HELD:

1. YES, THE ROD OF PAMPANGA HAS THE PERSONALITY TO FILE. UNDER SEC 112, ACT NO 496,
Any registered owner or other person in interest may at any time apply by petition to the court, upon the
ground that registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate,
have terminated and ceased, the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition after
notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of
a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring
security if necessary, as it may deem proper. IN THIS CASE, even assuming arguendo that the register
of deeds is not the "person in interest" referred to in section 112, such defect, if any, has been cured
when the mortgagee Gonzalo Puyat joined in the petition of the register of deeds by making it his own.

2. RES JUDICATA IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE. UNDER, SECTION 44 OF THE JUDICIARY
ACT (RA 296) IT STATES THAT, Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction in all matters of
probate, both of testate and intestate estates, appointment of guardians, trustees and receivers, and in
all actions for annulment of marriage, and in all such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise
provided for. HENCE, THE pronouncement regarding the existence or non-existence of encumbrances
regarding the lot it authorized to be sold to Pedro B. Cruz, was beyond its jurisdiction as probate court.
It is, therefore, undeniable that since the probate court had no jurisdiction to cancel the mortgage, the
order given by it approving the sales of the properties of the estate of Martin Gonzales to appellant Pedro
B. Cruz did not and does not, in any manner, affect the existence of the mortgaged executed by
Gonzales in favor of Gonzalo Puyat.

The petition made herein by the register of deeds of Pampanga and Gonzalo Puyat WAS granted.

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Case No. 44

GAMALIEL B. PALMA AND EDUARDO A. BELTRAN, petitioners,

vs COURT OF APPEALS, AMIGO Realty, and Yuseco respondents

Casiño, Angelica

Doctrine:

A probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and which are
equally claimed to belong to third parties. However, when an action has already been decided, and a decision
rendered final and executory, such can no longer be disturbed.

Facts:

1. In February 1984, Ireneo Zialcita filed before the RTC of Quezon City the probate of a will supposedly
executed by her half sister Basilia Zialcita.
2. The trial court temporarily appointed Hortensia Z. Yuseco as temporary administratrix for the payment
of taxes and to effect measures necessary to preserve the estate.
3. One of the properties bequeathed is a house and lot located Galas, Quezon City with TCT 33181.
4. When Yuseco paid the real estate taxes on said property, she found that the same has already been
sold last May 1988 by Paulino Taningco (the husband of deceased Basilia) to Ireneo Zialcita.
5. Ireneo Zialcita, with a title and tax declaration issued under his name sold the house and lot to Gamaliel
Palma and Eduardo Beltran, herein petitioners.
6. In November 1989, the same house and lot was sold by Palma and Beltran to the Carmelite Theresian
Missionaries, and the title and tax declaration were transferred under the Missionaries’ name.
7. In April 1990, Yuseco moved to declare void all the deeds of sale and transfers of the property
8. On June 5, 1990, the RTC ruled that the Deeds of Sale and Transfers were null and void in view of the
following:
a. the property cannot be the subject of any transaction without the probate court's approval; and,
b. the deed of sale dated 9 May 1988 between Paulino Taningco and Ireneo B. Zialcita, Jr., is a
"clear forgery" because the latter himself declared before the trial court that Paulino Taningco
died in February 1984.

The trial court likewise ordered the records be expunged from the records of the Register of Deeds
and the City Assessor and City Treasurer’s office and recommended the filing of a criminal case
against Ireno, Palma and Beltran.

9. On June 22, 1990, the probate court denied the probate of the will as the authenticity of Basilia’s
handwriting was not established. At the age of 90, the decedent was deemed to be “semi-invalid” and
suffering from dementia as of the time the holographic will was executed.
10. On September 24, 1990, Beltran and Palma filed for a motion for intervention and a petition for relief.
The trial court refused to take cognizance of the motion and petition for it has already lost jurisdiction
over the case considering that a petition for certiorari and mandamus was already filed by Ireneo with
the Court of Appeals of the decision rendered last June 5.
11. However, the motion for reconsideration filed by Yuseco in April 1991, was recognized by the Court of
Appeals, and revised its decision where it admitted that the sales transactions transpired during the
pendency of the probate proceedings.

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12. Undoubtedly, subject property was part of the estate of the deceased and therefore under the
jurisdiction of the probate court which, under settled jurisprudence, has the authority to approve any
disposition regarding properties under administration; and, (b) the trial court's challenged order of 5 June
1990 has become final and executory.
13. It has already been fully executed because subject property, with authority of the probate court, had
been sold to respondent Amigo Realty Development Corporation. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was denied in the resolution of 5 August 1991.

ISSUE: WON the RTC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in determining the question of ownership of
the property

Ruling: The Supreme Court recognizes that a probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to third parties. Further, the trial court
never issued any summons or notice to them in connection with the questioned order.

However, the high court ruled in favour of the respondents. The Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible
error in issuing its assailed decision and resolution.

The main deterrent to the success of the present petition is the fact that the order of the trial court of 5 June 1990
had been executed. As earlier mentioned, the subject property was sold to respondent Amigo Realty
Development Corporation with authority from the trial court.

It is ruled that once a judgment has been executed, it may no longer be amended, modified or altered. The case
is deemed terminated once and for all. The same ruling holds in the case of an order which has been enforced.

In view of the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by petitioners.

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Case No. 45

PCIB vs CA 344 SCRA 596

GR No. 103149 November 15, 2000

Doctrine:

When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried,
administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse.

Facts: Petitioner bank filed with the RTC a claim for payment of a loan against decedent Ang Sr. where in the
latter had previously executed a surety agreement and real estate mortgage. Petitioner bank caused the extra-
judicial foreclosure of the mortgage and its sale at public auction; however it failed to recover the full amount of
the obligation thus, filed a claim against the estate of the decedent Ang Sr. Meanwhile, Blanquita, surviving wife
of the deceased filed with the RTC a petition for preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioner and the other
defendants-in-intervention from consolidating title in the name of PCI Bank. Surviving spouse alleged that several
documents purporting to be promissory notes and real estate mortgages covering parcels of land included her
share in the conjugal property; however she denied being a party to any of those documents. Trial Court upon
notice and hearing allowed intervenor spouse to present evidence ex-parte. Court of appeals affirmed.

Issue: Whether or not there was adjudication of title to property to intervenor surviving spouse?

Ruling: The Probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which may or may
not be included in the estate proceedings, but such determination is provisional in character and is subject to
final decision in a separate action to resolve title. Thus, the allegations of Blanquita that her signatures on the
real estate mortgage documents were forged may be ventilated in a separate proceeding, requiring the
presentation of clear and convincing evidence.

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CASE NO. 46
CORTES VS COURT OF APPEALS
SEAN CATACUTAN
DOCTRINE:

FACTS: Menandro A. Reselva, private respondent Milagros R. Cortes, and Florante Reselva are brothers and
sister and children - heirs of the late spouses Teodoro T. Reselva and Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva, who died on
April 11, 1989 and May 13, 1987, respectively. During their lifetime, they acquired a property particularly a house
and lot consisting of 100 square meters, more or less, with address at 173 Ilaw St., Balut, Tondo, Manila. As can
be gleaned from the records, Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva died ahead of Teodoro T. Reselva. The latter executed
a holographic will which was probated in this case on July 31, 1991, with Milagros R. Cortes, as the appointed
Executrix. After having been appointed and qualified as Executrix, she filed a motion before respondent probate
court praying that Menandro A. Reselva, the occupant of the property, be ordered to vacate the property at No.
173 Ilaw St., Balut, Tondo, Manila and turn over to said Executrix the possession thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of
the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties.

RULING: No. In the present case, private respondent Menandro A. Reselva, who refused to vacate the house
and lot being eyed as part of the estate of the late Teodoro T. Reselva, cannot be considered an "outside party"
for he is one of the three compulsory heirs of the former. As such, he is very much involved in the settlement of
Teodoro's estate. By way of exception to the rule, "when the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional
upon them to submit to the probate court the question of title to property." Here, the probate court is competent
to decide the question of ownership. More so, when the opposing parties belong to the poor stratum of society
and a separate action would be most expensive and inexpedient.

In addition, Menandro's claim is not at all adverse to, or in conflict with that of, the decedent since the former's
theory merely advances co-ownership with the latter. In the same way, when the controversy is whether the
property in issue belongs to the conjugal partnership or exclusively to the decedent, the same is properly within
the jurisdiction of the probate court, which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to
determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among the heirs.

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CASE NO. 47
JUNQUERA VS BORROMEO
SEAN CATACUTAN

DOCTRINE: Orders of Inclusion or Exclusion of Properties From Administrator's Inventory are


Provisional, Not Final.

FACTS: Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of the City of Cebu, died on March 13, 1952, in
Parañaque, Rizal, at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of
Cebu. On April 19 of the same year, Jose H. Junquera, filed with the Court of First Instance of said province a
petition for the probate of a one page document as the last will left by said deceased, devising all his properties
to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and designating
Junquera as executor thereof Meanwhile, Tomas, Amelia and Fortunato Borromeo, manifestly on behalf of the
"Cebu Arcade Company, T. L. Borromeo y Cia.", a duly organized partnership controlled by them, filed a motion
to exclude from the inventory of the Estate previously filed by the new special administrator, thirteen parcels of
land situated in the City of Cebu with a total area of 2,148 square meters, alleging that during his lifetime the
deceased testator had sold said lots to them, as evidenced by the document now in the record as Exhibit F-1
executed on May 17, 1945, confirming the alleged previous sale. After due hearing, the court, in its order of July
16, 1954, denied the motion for exclusion, ruling that movants' remedy was to file a separate accion
reivindicatoria against the administrator.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in declining to decide with finality the question of who owns the
thirteen parcels of land subject-matter of the confirmatory sale and whether or not they should be included in or
excluded from the inventory of properties of the Estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo.

RULING: No. It appears that on February 11, 1954 Tomas, Amelia, and Fortunato Borromeo, through counsel,
filed a motion for the exclusion from the inventory of the Estate of the thirteen lots therein mentioned, with a total
area of 2,348 square meters, claiming that the same had been sold by the deceased Vito Borromeo during his
lifetime to the Cebu Arcade, T. L. Borromeo y Cia. This motion for exclusion was denied by the lower court in its
order of July 16, 1954, and the ruling was reiterated in the appealed decision "for the same reasons and
considerations" upon which it rejected the probate of the will. The ruling on the matter, however, was expressly
made provisional in nature. We believe, and so hold, that the resolution of the lower court on this matter is correct
because said court, acting in its capacity as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to determine with finality the
question of ownership involved. That such matter must be litigated in a separate action has been the established
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction except where a party merely prays for the inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory of any particular property, in which case the probate court may pass upon provisionally, the question
of inclusion or exclusion, but without prejudice to its final determination in an appropriate separate action.

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CASE NO. 48
BORROMEO VS CANONOY
SEAN CATACUTAN

DOCTRINE: Orders of Inclusion or Exclusion of Properties From Administrator's Inventory are


Provisional, Not Final.

FACTS: The lower court denied a motion filed on February 11, 1954 by Tomas, Amelia, and Fortunato Borromeo
for the exclusion from the inventory of the Estate submitted by the Special Administrator of thirteen lots or parcels
of land mentioned in said motion, claiming that the same had been sold by Vito Borromeo, during his lifetime, to
the Cebu Arcade, T. L. Borromeo y Cia. Thereafter, Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo,
commenced a Civil Case in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Jesus R. Gaboya, Special Administrator
of the Estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo, for the recovery of ownership and possession of the thirteen lots
already mentioned. After issues had been joined therein, the respondent judge set the case for trial, but before
the trial could be held the defendant filed a motion for a preliminary hearing on certain affirmative defenses
averred in his answer and, in effect, asked for the dismissal of the case on the ground principally that the
questions of ownership and right of possession over the thirteen lots subject matter of the action were already
involved in the previous case of Junquerra vs Borromeo — the appeal interposed by both parties from the
decision rendered by the same Court in the special proceeding for the probate of the will of the deceased Vito
Borromeo. This motion was denied and, as a result, the present action for prohibition was instituted.

ISSUE: whether or not the Court of First Instance of Cebu, exercising its jurisdiction as a probate court, had
authority to determine the question of ownership in relation to the thirteen lots

RULING: No. It appears that on February 11, 1954 Tomas, Amelia, and Fortunato Borromeo, through counsel,
filed a motion for the exclusion from the inventory of the Estate of the thirteen lots therein mentioned, with a total
area of 2,348 square meters, claiming that the same had been sold by the deceased Vito Borromeo during his
lifetime to the Cebu Arcade, T. L. Borromeo y Cia. This motion for exclusion was denied by the lower court in its
order of July 16, 1954, and the ruling was reiterated in the appealed decision `for the same reasons and
considerations' upon which it rejected the probate of the will. The ruling on the matter, however, was expressly
made provisional in nature.

We believe, and so hold, that the resolution of the lower court on this matter is correct because said court, acting
in its capacity as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to determine with finality the question of ownership involved.
That such matter must be litigated in a separate action has been the established jurisprudence in this jurisdiction
except where a party merely prays for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of any particular property, in
which case the probate court may pass upon, provisionally, the question of inclusion or exclusion, but without
prejudice to its final determination in an appropriate separate action.

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CASE NO. 49
RECTO VS DELA ROSA
SEAN CATACUTAN

DOCTRINE: JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURT

FACTS: The main controversy has to do with a real property situated in Batangas, which became in 1945 the
subject of Civil Case wherein the late Don Claro M. Recto which was counsel for the said civil case. The trial
court issued an order requiring the Register of Deeds of Batangas to annotate on the title of the subject property
"as attorney's charging lien the contract for (his) legal services", which, as agreed upon was a contingent fee of
one half thereof. A contract of sale on installment was entered into on January 6, 1975 between Pacita V. de los
Santos (Pacita Villanueva) and herein petitioner Rafael R. Recto, on the one hand, and the City of Batangas and
the Batangas City School Board. on the other, covering the property in question but before the execution of the
above contract of sale, petitioner had secured from respondent court the cancellation of the charging lien in favor
of Don Claro aforementioned and was "constituted as Vendor" in said contract "on the strength of his adverse
claim noted on September 9, 1974." Upon learning of what had been done by petitioner, her own son who is
administrator of the Estate of Don Claro, and claiming that her interest in said estate were adversely affected
thereby without her knowledge and consent, private respondent herein Doña Aurora R. de Barrera, the widow of
Don Claro, filed with respondent court on August 5, 1975 an urgent petition praying for an order setting aside the
order of cancellation of the charging lien and thereafter restoring the same, removing petitioner Rafael R. Recto
as administrator and requiring him to account for the proceeds of the sale, etc.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court, as a probate court, may not proceed to take cognizance of the
question of ownership of the land in dispute.

RULING: Yes. the respective counsel of all the parties herein agreed that it is not for the respondent court to
pass on the validity of the pertinent documents relied upon by the parties and the issue of ownership emerging
therefrom. Indeed, it is the Court's view that all that respondent court should do is to leave said matters to be
resolved in an appropriate action or proceeding outside of the probate court. The settlement proceedings of the
estate of Don Claro has already been practically closed by a partition approved by the respondent court, and that
approval has long been final. Now comes the widow and claims that a certain property belonging to the estate,
in the form of attorney's fees already converted into real property, belongs to the estate and yet was not included
in the partition evidently because it has been disposed of or is being disposed of by the administrator without the
knowledge and consent of the other heirs, including herself, but the administrator claims, on the other hand, that
his disposition thereof was made by him by virtue of certain documents, among them a quitclaim executed by no
less than his mother, the widow of the deceased, respondent Doña Aurora, but the latter denies the due execution
and legal efficacy of such quit claims adversely these premises, it is plain that the controversy between the parties
can be settled only in an appropriate action, since the issue involved is essentially the ownership of the property
in dispute between the estate and an heir who claims adverse ownership thereof on the basis of an alleged
settlement among all the heirs.

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Case No. 50

GR No. L-51291 | May 29, 1984


Francisco Cuizon, Rosita Cuizon, Purification C. Guido married to Teodoro Guido, and Juan Arche vs.
Hon. Jose R. Ramolete, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III, Domingo L.
Antigua and Segundo Zambo

CU, ANTHONY

Doctrine

Nature of orders in administration proceedings. – Order of inclusion or exclusion of properties from


administrator’s inventory are provisional and not final.

Facts
On December 29, 1971, Irene Cuizon executed a Deed of Sale with Reservation of Usufruct involving the said
salt beds in favor of the petitioners Francisco, Rosita and Purificacion, all surnamed Cuizon. At that time,
Francisco and Rosita were minors and assisted by their mother, Rufina, only sister of Irene. However, the sale
was not registered because the petitioners felt it was unnecessary due to the lifetime usufructuary rights of Irene.

Although the decision in L.R. Case No. N-179 was rendered way back in 1962, the decree of registration No. N-
161246 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. 0171 was issued only in 1976 in the name of
Marciano Cuizon. In that same year, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10477 covering the property in question was
issued by the Register of Deeds to Irene Cuizon. The latter died in 1978. In the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate, her alleged half-sister and sole heir Rufina adjudicated to herself all the property of the decedent including
the property in question. After the notice of the extrajudicial settlement was duly published in a newspaper of
general circulation, Rufina thereafter, executed a deed of Confirmation of Sale wherein she confirmed and ratified
the deed of sale of December 29, 1971 executed by the late Irene and renounced and waived whatever rights,
interest, and participation she may have in the property in question in favor of the petitioners. The deed was duly
registered with the Registry of Deeds and annotated at the back of TCT No. 10477. Subsequently, TCT No.
12665 was issued in favor of the petitioners.

Respondent Antigua as administrator filed an inventory of the estate of Irene. He included in the inventory the
property in question which was being administered by Juan Arche, one of the petitioners. On June 27, 1979,
respondent Antigua filed a motion asking the court for authority to sell the salt from the property and praying that
petitioner Arche be ordered to deliver the salt to the administrator.

Issue
Whether or not a probate court has jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a Transfer Certificate of
Title issued in favor of owner who are not parties to the intestate proceedings if said parcels have been included
in the inventory of properties of the estate prepared by the administrator.

Ruling
No. Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third parties and more
important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court
should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the
inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and
ownership of the property. Respondent court was clearly without jurisdiction to issue the order of June 27, 1979.
Thus, it was unnecessary for the petitioners to first apply for relief with the intestate court.

Even assuming the truth of the private respondents' allegations that the sale of December 29, 1971 was effected
under suspicious circumstances and tainted with fraud and that the right of Rufina as alleged half-sister and sole
heir of Irene remains open to question, these issues may only be threshed out in a separate civil action filed by
the respondent administrator against the petitioners and not in the intestate proceedings.

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Case No. 51

G.R. No. L-47125 | December 29, 1986

Leopoldo Morales and Princesita Santero Morales v. Court of First Instance of Cavite, Atty. Rolando
Diaz, et. al

CU, ANTHONY

Doctrine
Jurisdiction of a probate court; The probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to
be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do
as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list
of properties to be administered by the administrator.

Nature of orders in administration proceedings; Order of inclusion or exclusion of properties from


administrator’s inventory are provisional and not final and are not conclusive as to the title or ownership of the
property in question.

Facts
A saltbed fishpond located in Cavite was mortgaged by Simona Pamuti in favor of petitioner Princesita Morales.
Following extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, the property was sold at a public auction to Princesita and the
certificate of sale was registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cavite.

Simona had a son, Pablo Santero, with her son Pascual Santero. During Pablo’s lifetime, he had children with
three women, Adela Crisostommo, Anselma Diaz, and Feliberta Pacursa. Pablo had a child with Adela, seven
children with Anselma, and five with Feliberta. Princesita is Pablo’s eldest natural child with Feliberta.

Simona survived both her husband Pascual and Pablo. Letters of administration of the intestate estate of Pascual
and Pablo were filed by Juanito Santero, Pablo’s eldest natural child with Anselma. Princesita was an oppositor
in these proceedings. Clerk of Court Atty. Rolando Diaz was appointed administrator

Pending the settlement proceedings, Juanito filed a petition for guardianship over the properties of Simona. In
this guardianship proceeding, Atty. Diaz was appointed legal guardian of Simona. As guardian, he filed a motion
to use the funds of the estates of Pascual and Pablo to redeem Simona’s property that had been sold at public
auction to Princesita on the theory that the ward, Simona, as heir of Pablo, was entitled to a share in the money
in the possession of the guardian in his capacity as administrator of Pascual’s and Pablo’s estates.

Princesita opposed the motion on the ground that the funds that are in the possession of Atty. Diaz in his capacity
as administrator are held by him in trust for the benefit of Pascual's and Pablo's heirs who "have not yet been
judicially determined".

Simona Pamuti later died intestate. In the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Simona, where
one Felisa Pamuti-Jardin who claimed to be Simona's sole surviving heir was the petitioner, the herein petitioner
Princesita was allowed to intervene not as heir but as "creditors of the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti,
or as co-owners, together with said intestate estates, of certain properties as the interests of said oppositors may
appear". Atty. Diaz was appointed administrator of Simona’s estate.

On June 15, 1976, respondent Atty. Diaz in his capacity as administrator of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti,
filed a "Motion to Order the Provincial Sheriff of Cavite To Issue Certificate of Redemption" alleging that on July
17, 1975, before the expiration of the redemption period on August 4, 1975, payment of the redemption amount
had been tendered and accepted by the Provincial Sheriff of Cavite; that upon request of the sheriff, another
amount of P964.25 was tendered and accepted by the sheriff's deputy and that the sheriff, having received the
full redemption price, is duty bound to issue a certificate of redemption in favor of the estate of Simona.

Respondent court granted the motion, citing that the administrator has complied with the requirements of law for
the redemption of mortgage.

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Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that respondent probate court does not have
jurisdiction to resolve the validity of the redemption of the property in question and that there was no valid
redemption. The petitioners’ motion was denied and the court ordered petitioners to turn over the possession of
the subject property to the administrator, Atty. Diaz.

Issue
Whether or not the probate court can adjudicate and pass upon the validity of the redemption.

Ruling
No, questions on the validity of the redemption is outside the jurisdiction of the probate court.

As stated in Cuizon vs. Ramolete, 129 SCRA 495, 499 —

It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and
which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards
said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory
or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good;
but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate
court cannot do so (Mallari v. Mallari, 92 Phil. 694; Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil.
501).<äre||anº•1àw>

Similarly, in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, (91 SCRA 540) we held that for the
purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the
inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not
conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which
may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition,
pages 448449 and 473; Lachenal v. Salas,
L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).

In the case at bar, the question regarding the validity of the redemption which was supposed to have been made
by the respondent clerk of court as guardian and then later as administrator of the estate of Simona Pamuti, is
determinative of the ownership of the property in question. The Order of January 13, 1977 wherein the validity of
the redemption was upheld is effectively a judgment that the property is owned by the estate of Simona Pamuti
Contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, such order is not merely an implementation of the July 11, 1975
Order as reiterated in the August 4, 1975 Order. At that time, the petitioners had already asserted ownership
having executed the affidavit of consolidation on August 8, 1975, and the administrator of Simona's estate, on
the other hand had likewise asserted his redemption of the property, having deposited with the sheriff the check
in the amount which was believed to be the proper redemption price. Since the sheriff did not issue a final deed
in favor of the petitioners, and neither did he issue a certificate of redemption in favor of the estate of Simona,
there was, then, a clearly existing ownership contest between the parties.

The controversy was not whether or not the redemption ordered by the respondent court was done, but whether
or not such redemption, as done, was valid. According to settled jurisprudence, such controversy is outside the
jurisdiction of the probate court. Parenthetically, it must be mentioned that the respondent court itself had, at that
time, already determined that the petitioners are intervenors in the settlement proceedings of Simona's estate
not as heirs but as "co-owners" with the intestate estates, and the respondent court in fact would later state in
the January 13, 1977 order that the petitioners have "not been called to participate in the proceedings." The
petitioners, are, therefore, outside parties claiming title to property included in the inventory of properties under
administration.

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Case No. 52

GR No. L-56504 | May 7, 1987


Pompillo Valera and Eumelia Valera Cabado vs. Hon. Judge Sancho Y. Inserto, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch 1, and Manuel R. Fabiana

CU, ANTHONY

Doctrine
Nature of orders in administration proceedings. – Order of inclusion or exclusion of properties from
administrator’s inventory are provisional and not final.

Jurisdiction of probate courts. – A Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to
take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the
decedent.

Facts
In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent spouses, Rafael Valera and
Consolacion Sarrosa, in which petitioners Valera and Cabado had been appointed administrators, the heirs of a
deceased daughter of the spouses, Teresa Garin, filed a motion asking that the administratrix, Cabado, be
declared in contempt for failure to render an accounting of her administration. Cabado replied that an accounting
could not be had unless Jose Garin, Teresa’s husband, delivered to the administrator an fishpond in Iloilo, which
allegedly belonged to the estate.

The Court, presided over by Hon. Judge Midpantao Adil, viewed the Garin Heirs' motion for contempt, as well as
Cabado's prayer for the fishpond's return to the estate, as having given rise to a claim for the recovery of an
asset of the estate within the purview of Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. 5 It accordingly set said incidents
for hearing during which the parties presentee evidence in substantiation of their positions. Thereafter, the Court
issued an Order dated September 17, 1980 commanding the Heirs of Teresa Garin to reconvey immediately the
fishpond in question to the intestate Estate of the Spouses.

Jose Garin filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, asserting that the probate court had no competence to
decide the ownership of the fishpond. The motion was denied. He then initiated a special action for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus in the CA, which was granted.

Issue
Whether or not a probate court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property
claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent.

Ruling
No. Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine
the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the
Other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the
question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the
reason for the exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the
Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court

Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the fishpond was merely provisional, not
binding on the property with any character of authority, definiteness or permanence, having been made only for
purposes of in. conclusion in the inventory and upon evidence adduced at the hearing of a motion, it cannot and
should not be subject of execution, as against its possessor who has set up title in himself (or in another)
adversely to the decedent, and whose right to possess has not been ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate
action.

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Case No. 53

Teresa Garcia v. Luisa Garcia, et. al


G.R. No. 45430 | April 15, 1939

CU, ANTHONY

Doctrine
Nature of testate or intestate proceedings; jurisdiction; properties included or excluded. –A court which
takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the
properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased, although such a
determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the right of the interested parties, in a
proper action, to raise the question bearing on the ownership or existence of the right or credit.

Facts
Luisa Garcia was appointed special administratrix of the properties left by deceased Paulina Vasquez vda. de
Garcia and she thereafter filed with the competent court an inventory of the latter’s estate. Paulina’s daughter
and one of her heirs, Teresa Garcia, objected to the said inventory, citing that some items therein should be
included.

The probate court denied Teresa’s petition. She later filed a motion asking that court that she be appointed
special administratrix of Paulina’s estate for the sole purpose of bringing any actions which she may believe
necessary to recover for the benefit of the estate. The CFI of Manila denied the motion. Teresa filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied.

Issue
Whether or not the probate court has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon exceptions which an heir takes to an
inventory o the properties left by the deceased referring to the inclusion or exclusion of certain properties and
credits.

Ruling
Yes, the probate court has jurisdiction to hear Teresa’s opposition to the inventory filed by the special
administratrix, Luisa, as well as observations by the former that certain properties and credits should be included
or excluded from the inventory of Paulina’s estate.

It is the duty of every administrator, whether special or regular, imposed by section 668 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, to return to the court within three months after his appointment a true inventory of the real estate and
all the goods, chattels, rights, and credits of the deceased which come into his possession or knowledge, unless
he is residuary legatee and has given the prescribed bond. The court which acquires jurisdiction over the
properties of a deceased person through the filing of the corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control
over the said properties, and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by
the administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law requires the
administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance with this duty the court has also inherent power to
determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased should be included in or excluded from the
inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased person duly call the court’s attention
to the fact that certain properties, rights or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the court’s duty
to hear the observations. with power to determine if such observations should be attended to or not and if the
properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate
in nature as to the ownership of the said properties.

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which takes cognizance of testate or
intestate proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the properties included therein or
excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased, although such a determination is not final or ultimate in
nature, and without prejudice to the right of the interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question bearing
on the ownership or existence of the right or credit.

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Case No. 54

Teodora Guinguing v. Agapito Abuton and Calixto Abuton


G.R. No. L-23035 | October 13, 1925

CU, ANTHONY

Nature of orders in administration proceedings. – Order of inclusion or exclusion of properties from


administrator’s inventory are provisional and not final.

Facts
Ignacio Abuton died testate leaving two sets of children by two different wives. The testator’s will was probated
in court and allowed. Gabriel Binaoro was appointed administrator, who thereafter submitted to the court an
inventory of the properties belonging to the deceased at the time of his death. In this inventory he included only
the lands which the testator had devised to the children of the second marriage, omitting other lands possessed
by him at the time of his death and which were claimed by the children of the first marriage as having been
derived from their mother.

Teodora Guinguing, the second wife, in representation of herself and her four minor children, presented a motion
in court asking the administrator to be required to amend his inventory to include therein all property pertaining
to the conjugal partnership of Abuton and his first wife, Dionisia Olarte, who was already dead years before the
proceedings took place, including property actually in the hands of his children with Dionisia which had been
delivered to said children as an advancement. The children of the first marriage, Agapito and Calixto Abuton
opposed the motion.

Upon hearing the trial court judge found that no property had been acquired by the testator during his second
marriage and that the administration was concerned only with property that had been acquired before the death
of the first wife. The judge further found that after the death of Dionisia, Ignacio had liquidated the ganancial
estate and divided his deceased wife’s share among the children in the first marriage, except the home where
he stayed during his lifetime. The court issued an order directing the administrator to include in the inventory of
the estate of Agapito all the property which the testator possessed at the time of his death. Agapito and Calixto
opposed the order.

Issue
Whether or not the order for inventory is merely preliminary and provisional in nature.

Ruling
Yes, the order for inventory is merely provisional in nature and the improper inclusion of property therein or the
improper omission of property therefrom is not absolutely decisive of the rights of persons in interest.

The contention made in the first assignment of error, to the effect that an order of the character of that appealed
from cannot be made by a court without formal notice being given to all persons in interest, in the same manner
as if a new action had been begun, is clearly untenable, since all the heirs are already virtually represented in
the administration and are bound by all proper orders made therein, so far and so far only as such orders have
legal effect. This is not inconsistent with the proposition that contested claims of ownership between the
administrator and third persons should be tried in separate proceedings, which is entirely true. The question here
is merely between some of the heirs and the administrator, as representative of all persons in interest. Besides,
it should be pointed out, the inclusion of a property in the inventory does not deprive the occupant of possession;
and if it is finally determined that the property has been properly included in the estate, the occupant heir is liable
for the fruits and interest only from the date when the succession was opened (art. 1049, Civ. Code). The
provisions of the Civil Code with reference to collation clearly contemplate that disputes between heirs with
respect to the obligation to collate may be determined in the course of the administration proceedings.

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Case No. 55

Pereira vs. CA, G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989

Digested by Sittie Ayna Dia

Doctrine: Judicial administration and appointment of an administrator are superfluous when a deceased died
without debts.

Facts:

Andres de Guzman Pereira passed away without a will. He was survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months,
Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac. Nagac filed before the RTC for the issuance of letters
of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira. She alleged
in her verified petition that she and Victoria are the only surviving heirs and that there are no creditors of the
deceased. Victoria opposed contending that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration
and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating to the said estate
be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse. The RTC appointed Nagac as the administratrix of the estate.
The CA affirmed the appointment.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary when the decedent dies intestate
without leaving any debts?

HELD:

The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case
the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein. An exception to
this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74. Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and
there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the
judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.

It has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs;
whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration. In such case the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.

In the case at bar, the only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks appointment as administratrix is
for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for her own purposes. The court is of the
opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the
deceased.

WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac
are hereby revoked and the administration proceeding dismissed without prejudice to the right of private
respondent to commence a new action for partition of the property left by Andres de Guzman Pereira.

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Case No. 56

Pobre v. Gonong, GR No. L-60575, March 16, 1987

Digested by Sittie Ayna Dia

Doctrine: There was no denial of due process in the issuance of the order excluding certain properties from the
list of the properties for administration where the petitioner – administrator and his counsel were absent at the
hearings and he had filed several pleadings on the issues raised in the motion for exclusion. Orders of exclusion
of properties from administrator’s inventory are provisional, not final.

Facts:

After the death of Bonifacio Pobre and later, Teresa Blanco, all properties left by them intestate, consisting of 35
parcels of untitled agricultural lands, were inherited by Maxima Pobre de Quianzon and Jovita Pobre. Maxima
died without any issue and without any will. Thus, Jovita inherited the entire estate of her sister, Maxima. Upon
the death of Jovita, Petitioner Francisco E. Pobre, Private Respondent Iluminada Pobre Llanes, Violeta Pobre,
Cresencio Pobre, who are all children of the late Isidoro Pobre, (half-brother of Jovita and Maxima) became the
surviving heirs of the intestate estate of Jovita as they were the latter's nephews and nieces.

Petitioner Francisco E. Pobre filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte, praying that after due hearing and publication, letters of administration be issued to him for the
administration of the intestate estate of Maxima Pobre de Quianzon and Jovita E. Pobre, and that the said estates
of Maxima Pobre de Quianzon and Jovita E. Pobre be settled and distributed among their legal heirs.

Respondent Iluminada, assisted by her husband, Felix G. Llanes, filed her opposition to the Petition. She alleged
that Jovita had disposed all of her properties before her death and Respondent spouses Llanes, acquired by
purchase from Jovita parcels 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 19, 22, 23 (to the extent of 1/3 of the whole only) and
parcels 25, 26, 27, and 32, in the Inventory of Properties co-owned by Maxima and Jovita.

The lower court granted the petition and appointed Francisco as administrator of the estates. The latter then
submitted to the Court an Inventory and Appraisal of the Real and Personal Estate of the decedents Maxima and
Jovita.

A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Respondent Iluminada who insisted that they are the legal owners and
possessors of the real properties in the Inventory to the extent of one-third of the whole of the real properties in
question.

Francisco disputed the claim of Iluminada Llanes regarding the ownership and possession of the properties in
question contending that the instruments of sale and donation in favor of the Llaneses are fictitious; that the lot
claimed by respondents Llanes is titled under an OCT still registered in the name of Teresa Blanco; and that the
properties allegedly sold by the late Jovita to the Llaneses were not exclusive properties of Jovita, as the same
were owned by Teresa Blanco.

Respondent Iluminada filed a Motion to Exclude from the administration of Petitioner the properties being claimed
by her.

Respondent Judge then ruled in favor of Respondent Iluminada, and stated that respondents Llanes have been
in actual possession under claim of ownership of the properties in question in the Inventory. He ordered,
therefore, that these properties be excluded from the inventory under administration, and maintained the
possession asserted by Iluminada Llanes.

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ISSUE:

May the probate court exclude the questioned properties from the inventory?

RULING:

Yes. Respondent Judge provisionally passed upon the question of exclusion of property from the Inventory. His
conclusions regarding the ownership of said properties are not final but provisional.

The probate court "may" provisionally pass upon the question of exclusion. The obvious reason is the probate
court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result to inclusion in or
exclusion from the inventory of property, can only be settled in a separate action.

The final determination of the ownership of the properties is not to be made in an Intestate Proceeding, but in a
separate Civil Action. The exclusion in the intestate proceeding is merely an interlocutory order, because the
question of title of the properties excluded from the Inventory of the Administrator cannot be determined by the
intestate court.

Furthermore, the general rule is that question of title to property cannot be passed upon in a testate or intestate
proceeding. However, when the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the
probate court the question of title to property and, when so submitted, the probate court may definitely pass
judgment thereon.

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Case No. 57

Coca vs. Borromeo, G.R. No. L-29545 January 31, 1978

Digested by Sittie Ayna Dia

Doctrine: Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested
parties are all heirs or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption
of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of 'third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to decide the question of ownership.

Facts:

The spouses Pangilinan died intestate in 1943 and 1948. They possessed a homestead land composing of two
parcels. They were survived by Prima Pangilinan, Children of Concepcion Pangilinan Yamuta: Maria, Eusebio
and Apolinar, Children of Francisco Pangilinan; Francis, Algerian, Benjamin, Perla and Francisco, Jr., all
surnamed Pangilinan, and widow, Guadalupe Pizarras.

The lower deferred action on the project of partition until the ownership of the twelve hectares, which were
claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan and the six hectares, which were claimed by Crispen Borromeo
(eighteen hectares in all which were excluded from the inventory in the court's order of December 6, 1963) is
determined in an ordinary action.

On August 31, 1966 the lower court, after noting that no separate action had been filed to determine the
ownership of the twelve hectares, issued an order approving the project of partition but excluding the twelve
hectares claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan.

That order on its face appears to be incomplete because, after excluding the twelve hectares, the lower court did
not bother to decide how the remainder should be partitioned and whether Prima Pangilinan had a share in that
remainder.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court acting as a probate court can decide an issue of ownership?

Ruling:

Yes, generally, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the estate or intestate proceeding.
That question should be ventilated in a separate action. That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified
by expediency and convenience.

A probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of 'third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question
of ownership.

In the case at bar, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare
portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from title inventory The only interested parties are the
heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.

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As pointed out by the appellees, they belong to the poor stratum of society. They should not be forced to incur
additional expenses (such as filing fees) by bringing a separate action to determine the ownership of the twelve-
hectare portion.

The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

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Case No. 58

Mendoza vs. Teh, G.R. No. 122646. March 14, 1997

Digested by Sittie Ayna Dia

Doctrine: Probate proceedings for the settlement of the estate are within the ambit of either the RTC or the MTC
depending on the net worth of the estate. Whether a particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question
of procedure.

Facts:

Adelia Mendoza filed a complaint for reconveyance of title before RTC of Batangas. In her complaint, she alleged
that she represented the intestate estate of her deceased husband Norberto and asked the court that she be
appointed as judicial administratrix of the estate. The private respondents initially moved to dismiss the complaint
claiming lack of jurisdiction, that a special proceeding of appointment administratrix cannot be incorporated in
the ordinary action of reconveyance. After Adelia opposed the motion to dismiss, the respondents replied saying
that RTC Batangas had no jurisdiction as Norberto resided in Quezon City at the time of his death. Judge Teh of
RTC Batangas thereafter dismissed the complaint on the ground that rules governing ordinary civil actions and
special proceedings are different.

ISSUE:

Whether or not in an action for reconveyance, an allegation seeking appointment as administratrix of an


estate, would oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over the whole case

HELD:

No. Under BP 129, Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the
assessed value of property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)

The above law is clear. An action for reconveyance, which involves title to property worth millions of pesos, such
as the lots subject of this case, is cognizable by the RTC. Likewise falling within its jurisdiction are actions
incapable of pecuniary estimation, such as the appointment of an administratrix for an estate. Even the Rules on
venue of estate proceedings (Section 1 of Rule 737) impliedly recognizes the jurisdiction of the RTC over petitions
for granting of letters of administration. On the other hand, probate proceedings for the settlement of estate are
within the ambit of either the RTC or MTC depending on the net worth of the estate. By arguing that the allegation
seeking such appointment as administratrix ousted the RTC of its jurisdiction, both public and private respondents
confuses jurisdiction with venue. Section 2 of Rule 4 as revised by Circular 13-958 provides that actions involving
title to property shall be tried in the province where the property is located, in this case, - Batangas. The mere

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fact that petitioners deceased husband resides in Quezon City at the time of his death affects only the venue but
not the jurisdiction of the Court.

In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking appointment as estate
administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have invited the exercise of the
limited jurisdiction of a probate court. The above allegation is not even a jurisdictional fact which must be stated
in an action for reconveyance. The Court therefore, should have at least, proceeded with the reconveyance suit
rather than dismiss the entire case.

Jurisprudential rulings that a probate court cannot generally decide questions of ownership or title to property is
not applicable in this case, because: there is no settlement of estate involved and the RTC of Batangas was not
acting as a probate court. It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the RTC
in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere
question of procedure. Moreover, the instant action for reconveyance does not even invoke the limited jurisdiction
of a probate court. Considering that the RTC has jurisdiction, whether it be on the reconveyance suit or as to the
appointment of an administratrix, it was improper for respondent judge to dismiss the whole complaint for alleged
lack of jurisdiction.

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Case No. 59

Pascual vs. Pascual, G.R. No. L-48140 May 4, 1942

Digested by Sittie Ayna Dia

Doctrine: The general rule is that questions as to title to property cannot be passed upon in testate proceedings.
However, when, as in the instant case, the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased claiming title under
him, the question as to whether the transfer made by the latter to the former is or is not fictitious, may properly
be brought by motion in the testate or intestate proceedings on or before the distribution of the estate among the
heirs.

Facts:

While the proceedings for the probate of the will of the deceased Eduarda de los Santos were pending in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Sinforoso Pascual, instituted in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against
Ponciano S. Pascual and others, an action for the annulment of a contract of sale of a fishpond situated in Lubao,
Pampanga, supposedly executed without consideration by said deceased in her lifetime in favor of the
defendants. The complaint alleges that plaintiff and defendants are legitimate children of the testratix, Eduarda
de los Santos.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, alleging want of cause of action, limitation of action, wrong venue and
pendency of another action. They also argue that the action brought by the plaintiff is unnecessary, the question
involved therein being one that may properly be raised and decided in the probate proceedings.

Issue:

Whether or not questions as to title to the property can be passed upon testate proceedings.

Ruling:

The general rule is that questions as to title to property cannot be passed upon in testate proceedings. However,
when, as in the instant case, the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased claiming title under him, the
question as to whether the transfer made by the latter to the former is or is not fictitious, may properly be brought
by motion in the testate or intestate proceedings on or before the distribution of the estate among the heirs. This
procedure is optional to the parties concerned who may choose to bring a separate action as a matter of
convenience in the preparation or presentation of evidence, and accordingly, the action brought by the appellant
is not improper.

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Case No. 60

Alvarez Vs Espiritu
Gr no. L-18833

By: Umair M. Dimaporo

A probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question
of ownership.

Facts:

The lot in question located in Caloocan City originally formed part of the Friar Lands. Evangelista bought the lot
for P242.04. The balance of P182 for the full payment of the lot was to be paid in 18 annual installments.
Consolacion Evangelista married Pedro K. Espiritu. During their marriage, some of the installments on the price
of the lot were paid with conjugal funds and all the installments were completed. Consolation Evangelista made
a deed of assignment, having Pedro Espiritu as the assignee of the above mentioned lot. The lot was then
registered in the name of the spouses and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14527 was issued to them. Thereafter,
the spouses sold a half portion of the lot reserving to themselves the right to redeem it within 12 years. However,
before they could exercise their right of redemption, Consolacion Evangelista died, leaving a will in which she
bequeathed to her husband her half interest in the remaining unsold portion of lot. She was survived by her
husband, Pedro K. Espiritu, and by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claimed that the lot was the paraphernal property of
Consolacion Evangelista which she brought to her marriage with Pedro K. Espiritu. They, therefore, contended
that, as heirs of Consolacion Espiritu, they were entitled to three fourths (3/4) of the lot, only one-fourth (1/4)
having been disposed of in the will. On the other hand, Pedro K. Espiritu claimed that the lot was their conjugal
property, one-half of which was his share, in addition to one-fourth given to him in his wife's will.

Issue: WON a probate court may decide a question of title or ownership

Held:

The general rule is that questions of title to property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings.
The probate court can decide only provisionally questions of title to property for the purpose of inclusion into, or
exclusion from, the inventory, without prejudice to a final determination of the question in a separate action. It is
only when the parties interested are all heirs and they agree to submit to the probate court the question as to
title to property that the probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon. That is why, in Bernardo v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18148, February 28, 1963, we upheld the power of the probate court to adjudicate in the
testate proceedings the question as to whether the properties therein involved belonged to the conjugal
partnership or to the deceased exclusively.

In this case, however, there is no such agreement among the heirs to submit for determination of the probate
court the question of whether or not Lot No. 292 was conjugal partnership property. If this point was at all
considered by the probate court of Bulacan, it was only provisionally, for inventory purposes, and certainly
without prejudice to the final determination of the question in a separate action such as this one.

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Case No. 61
Trinidad v. Court of Appeals
202 SCRA 106 (1991)

By: Umair M. Dimaporo

Questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to estate of the deceased may be passed upon in
the Probate Court with consent of all the parties, without prejudice to third persons.

Facts:

Tomas Trinidad is the administrator of the estate of the late Nicolai Drepin. He was charged when he failed to
deliver the title of the lot which was bought by Francisca Dimabuyo.

He countered that since he was not yet given the go signal by the Probate Court, he cannot deliver the titles
yet.

Issue: WON administrator may proceed to execute the deed of absolute sale without the go-signal of the Probate
Court

Held:

Yes. Inasmuch as the owner-seller of the property was already deceased and there were proceedings in the
Probate Court, it was incumbent for the Probate Court to first give authorization to administrator of the estate to
deliver titles of lots which had previously been sold. The decedent after all, might be considered the alter ego of
the Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation. The private complainant had been duly instructs by the
accused herein to file the proper petition or motion wit the Probate Court for delivery of said title but said
complainant for one reason or another, disregarded said instructions. If at anybody should be blamed, it should
be private complainant herself for her failure to obtain the needed authorization fro the court. Indeed, questions
of title to any property apparent still belonging to estate of the deceased may be passed upon in the Probate
Court, with consent of all the parties, without prejudice to third persons such as the herein private complainant.
In fact, third persons may even intervene in the testate or intestate proceedings to protect their interest [See
Cunanan vs. Amparo, 45 O.G. (No. 9), 3796]. Just as ordinary claimant against the estate of the deceased are
duty bound to present claim before the Probate Court so was private complainant herein required to file her claim
for redress in said Probate Court. This is so because in the ascertainment of claims against the estate of the
decedent, the Probate Court must weigh the extent of the liability of the estate when compared vis-a-vis it
solvency. We uphold petitioner's contention therefore that if he had proceeded to immediately cause the delivery
of the title of private complainant herein, he could have been held liable for a blatant disregard of the jurisdiction
and function of the Probate Court. Truly, he was caught between the horns of a dilemma which was not of his
own making. We therefore see no criminal intent whatsoever on his part and accordingly the judgment of the
appellate court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs de officio.

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Case No. 62

Ermac v. Mendelo
64 SCRA 358, 359-360

By: Umair M. Dimaporo

Doctrine: Expanded jurisdiction, Value of the estate

Facts:

Spouses Ermac and Mariquit both died leaving a parcel of land as the only property to be inherited by
heirs MEDELO: grandson filed petition for summary settlement of the estate.ERMAC: moved for reconsideration
of the order of settlement claiming the land as belonging to him and his wife.

Issue: WON the approval of the project of partition was valid despite the claim of ERMAC in a separate civil
action?

Held:

The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased persons
with the least loss of time. Small estates: summary procedure dispensing with appointment of administrator Not
proper to delay the summary settlement of a deceased person just because an heir or a third person claims that
certain properties do not belong to the estate; properly ventilated in an independent action and probate court
should proceed to the distribution of the estate (subject to the results of suit). Appropriate step: proper annotation
of lis pendens.

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Case No. 63
Litam v. Espiritu
100 Phil. 364

By: Umair M. Dimaporo

A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the decedent is exclusively within the range of the
administration proceedings and cannot properly be made an independent action.

Facts:

On May 21, 1952, Gregorio Dy Tam instituted Special Proceeding No. 1537 of said court, entitled “In the matter
of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Rafael Litam”. The petition therein filed, dated April 24, 1952, states that
Petitioner is the son of Rafael Litam, who died in Manila on January 10, 1951; that the deceased was survived
by:cLi Hong Hap, Li Ho, Gregorio Dy Tam, et. Al, the children of the decedent “by a marriage celebrated in China
in 1911 with Sia Khin(deceased).

After the death of Rafael Litam, Petitioner and his co-heirs came to know” that the decedent had, during the
subsistence of said marriage with Sia Khin, “contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa
Rivera, Filipino citizen”ythat “the decedent left as his property among others, his one-half (1/2) share valued at
P65,000 in the purported conjugal properties between him and Marcosa Rivera, which partnership consisted real
property acquired during the marriage between him and Marcosa Rivera. And that the decedent had left neither
a will nor debt. Petitioner prayed, therefore, that, after appropriate proceedings, letters of administration be issued
to Marcosa Rivera.

In due course, the court granted this petition and letters of administration were issued to Arminio Rivera, who
assumed his duties as such, and, later, submitted an inventory of the alleged estate of Rafael Litam.

Meanwhile, Remedios R. Espiritu was appointed, in Special Proceeding No. 1709 of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, guardian of Marcosa Rivera, who had been declared incompetent. Thereafter, or on April 20, 1953,
Gregorio Dy Tam and his alleged brothers and sisters aforementioned, filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 2071
of the same court, against Remedios R. Espiritu, as guardian of Marcosa Rivera, and Arminio Rivera.

Issue: Are Appellants the legitimate children of Rafael Litam? (2) Is Marcosa Rivera the exclusive owner of the
properties in question, or do the same constitute a common property of her and the decedent?

Held: The finding of this Court that the properties in question are paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera,
having been bought by her with her separate and exclusive money, is further strengthened by the fact that, as it
is clearly disclosed by the evidence when Marcosa Rivera married Rafael Litam in 1922, she was already rich,
she having already earned and saved money as ‘consignataria’ while she was still single. It also appears that
she was born of a rich family, her father, Eduardo Rivera, being the owner of fishponds, commercial and
residential lands and buildings, (Exhibits 5 to 18, inclusive), with an assessed value of around P150,000.00
(Exhibits 25 and 42, inclusive), now worth approximately a million pesos, and most of which properties as may
be seen from the certificates of title were acquired by him way back in the years 1916 and 1919. When Eduardo
Rivera died on February 5, 1942, his cash and jewelry were inherited by his eldest daughter, Rafaela Rivera, and
when the latter died single on July 2, 1943, Marcosa Rivera inherited her cash amounting to P150,000.00,
Philippine currency, and and her pieces of jewelry. It is with this amount and with the proceeds of the sale of
some of said pieces of jewelry that Marcosa Rivera purchased the fishponds in question, situated in Macabebe,
Pampanga.

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Case No. 64
Pimentel v. Palanca
5 Phil. 436
By: Umair M. Dimaporo

A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper.

Probate court to distribute the estate and determine the heirs

Facts:

Margarita Jose, a native and citizen of the Philippine Islands, died in the city of Amoy, China, on the 4th of
February, 1902. Her last will was duly proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on the 15th
day of April, 1902, and on the same day EngracioPalanca was duly appointed administrator of the estate of the
deceased. He entered upon the discharge of his duties as such administrator, and is still engaged therein. As far
as appears from the bill of exceptions the estate still remains unsettled, and no final decree has ever been entered
therein.

By her said will Margarita Jose left all her property, amounting to over 50,000 pesos, to her two children, Vicente
Barreto, alias Tan-Keng, and Benito Carlos, alias Doon. On the 8th day of July, 1902, Juana Pimentel, the mother
of said Margarita Jose, commenced this, an ordinary action, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging that
the two children of Margarita Jose were illegitimate, and that she was the heir at law and entitled to the whole
estate. The prayer of the original complaint was that

the plaintiff be declared the lawful heir and entitled to all the property of her daughter, Margarita Jose.

The defendant named in this original complaint was the "Estate of Dona Margarita Jose." The summons in the
action was served upon the administrator, EngracioPalanca. He appeared and demurred, on the ground, among
others, that there was a defect of parties, and that the two sons should have been made defendants. This
demurrer was overruled. He took an exception to the overruling of the demurrer, and answered, denying generally
the facts stated in the complaint. A trial was had in the Court of First Instance, and judgment was entered in favor
of th defendant on the 28th of July, 1903, the court holding that Vicente Barreto was the legitimate son of
Margarita Jose Plaintiff made a motion for a new trial, which was granted on the 15th day of September, 1903.
On the 22d day of January, 1904, the plaintiff presented an amended complaint, naming as defendants
EngracioPalanca, as administrator of the estate of Margarita Jose, and Benito Carlos and Vicente Barreto.

The defendants all answered the amended complaint. A trial was had in the court below, and on the 7th of April,
1904, judgment was entered in favor of the defendants. The court held that Vicente Barreto was the legitimate
son of Margarita Jose; that Benito Carlos was an illegitimate son, and that Margarita Jose had a right to bequeath
her property to these sons to the exclusion of the plaintiff. He held also that the plaintiff, not having appealed
from the probate of the will, could not maintain this action.

Issue: WON the lower court erred in its decision.

Held: No, the lower court did not erred in its decision but not upon the ground stated in the decision of the court.

When a will has been proved, an administrator appointed, and the estate is in process of settlement in the Court
of First Instance in a special proceeding, as provided in Part II of the Code of Civil Procedure, and no final decree
has been entered therein, no ordinary action between parties can be maintained for the purpose of determining
who are the heirs of the deceased.

It seems clear from these provisions of the law that while the estate is being settled in the Court of First Instance
in a special proceeding, no ordinary action can be maintained in that court, or in any other court, by a person
claiming to be the heir, against the executor or against other persons claiming to be heirs, for the purpose of
having the rights of the plaintiff in the estate determined. The very purpose of the trial or hearing provided for in

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section 753 is to settle and determine those questions, and until they are settled and determined in that
proceeding and under that section no action such as the present one can be maintained.

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Case No. 65

G.R. No. 83484 (182 SCRA 119), February 12, 1990


CELEDONIA SOLIVIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA
By: Denise Durias

Doctrine: Special Proceedings; Settlement of Estate; Courts; Jurisidiction; Trial court has no jurisdiction to
entertain an action for partition and recovery of properties belonging to the estate of a deceased person, while
the probate proceedings for the settlement of said estate are still pending in another branch of the same court.

FACTS:

This case involves the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. He died a bachelor, without descendants,
ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are his two aunts namely; Petitioner
CeledoniaSolivio, the sister of his mother SalustiaSolivioand Private respondent Concordia Javellana-Villanueva,
sister of his deceased father. SalustiaSolivio brought to her marriage paraphernal properties which she had
inherited from her mother but no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr.

During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had expressed to his aunt Celedonia his plan to place his estate in a
foundation inhonorof his mother. Unfortunately, he died sooner without having set up the foundation. Two weeks
after his funeral, Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named
after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling.
Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased.

Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation
of the foundation. Celedonia then filed a special proceeding for her appointment as special administratrix of the
estate. Thereafter, she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. Four months later after the
court’s pronouncement, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
because she too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for
tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and
damages. The trial court ruled in favour of Concordia and ordered the execution of its judgment pending appeal
and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate. Celedonia filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this
instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery
of Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings (Spl.
Proc. No. 2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court.

RULING:

No. After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share
of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of
said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and
approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and
terminating the proceedings.

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It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that
brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the
administrator from his duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).

The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate of
Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order
directed the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate."

In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a
court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court.

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Case No. 66
G.R. No. L-4275 (13 Phil. 249), March 23, 1909
PAUL CONDE vs. ROMAN ABAYA
By: Denise Durias

Doctrine: Estates; Actions against Executors or Administrators

FACTS:

Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia died on the 1899. Paula Conde, as
the mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom she states she had by Casiano Abaya moved
the settlement of the intestate succession.

An administrator has been appointed for the said estate. However, Roman Abaya brother of Casiano came
forward and opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of the deceased.
The court declares Roman Abaya to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya and to be therefore entitled to take
possession of all the property of said estate.

Paula Conde filed a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya
but that she considered her right was superior to his and moved for a hearing on the matter. She prayed that she
be declared to have preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya.

ISSUE:

Whether in special proceedings for the administration and distribution of an intestate estate, an action might be
brought to enforce an acknowledgment of the natural child of a person from whom the inheritance is derived.

RULING:

No. This court has decided the present question in the manner shown in the case of Juana Pimental v. Engracio
Palanca (5 Phil. 436) to wit, that while an estate is in the course of settlement in a special proceeding, no ordinary
action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can be maintained by a person claiming to be an heir, against
the executor or administrator, for the purpose of having his rights in the estate determined.

Torres Dissenting Opinion:

While for those of the natural child, there is no provision in the code authorizing the same, although on the other
hand there is none that prohibits it. As a solution, the right of action to claim acknowledgment of a natural child
is transmitted by analogy to his heirs on the same conditions and terms that it is transmitted to the descendants
of the legitimate child under article 118, but no more. Since the children died while they were minors, they should
be allowed to file an action.

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Case No. 67
G.R. No. 18058 (44 Phil. 343), January 16, 1923
FABIOLA SEVERINO vs. GUILLERMO SEVERINO
By: Denise Durias

Doctrine: Recognition of Natural Child; Parties – In an action for a judicial declaration of the right of a person to
be recognized as a natural child of a deceased person, the potential heirs of the deceased are the necessary
parties.

FACTS:
Melecio Severino owned 428 hectares of the land, which was administered by his brother, Guillermo Severino.
After Melecio's death, Guillermo continued to occupy the land.

Cadastral proceedings were then instituted for the registration of the lands titles within the surveyed area. In the
said proceedings, Guillermo’s lawyer Hofileña filed answers in behalf of Guillermo claiming that Melecio’s lots
were the property of his client. Since no opposition was made in the said proceedings, the titles were eventually
decreed in Guillermo’s favor.

Fabiola Severino (the alleged natural daughter of Melecio) filed an action to compel Guillermo to convey to her
four parcels land, or in default to pay damages for wrongfully causing said land to be registered in his own name.

Felicitas Villanueva, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Melecio, filed a complaint in intervention
claiming in the same relief as the original plaintiff, except in so far as she prays that the conveyance be made, or
damages paid, to the estate instead of to the plaintiff Fabiola Severino.

The lower court rendered a judgment:


1. Recognizing the plaintiff Fabiola Severino as the acknowledged natural child of Melecio Severino and
2. Ordering the Guillermo to convey to Felicitas (as administratix of Melecio’s estate):
a. 428 hectares of the land in question
b. Proceeds in his possession of a certain mortgage placed thereon by him and to pay the costs.
From this judgment, only Guillermo appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred in finding that, under the evidence presented, plaintiff was the legally acknowledged
natural child of Melecio Severino.

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court agrees with the appellant that the trial court erred in making a declaration in the present
case as to the recognition of Fabiola Severino as the natural child of Melecio Severino. We have held in the case
of Briz and Remigio (43 Phil., 763), that "The legitimate heirs or kin of a deceased person who would be
prejudiced by a declaration that another person in entitled to recognition as the natural child of such decedent,
are necessary and indispensable parties to any action in which a judgment declaring the right to recognition is
sought." In the present action only the widow, the alleged natural child, and one of the brothers have not been
included. But, inasmuch as the judgment appealed from is in favor of the intervenor and not of the plaintiff, except
to the extent of holding that the latter is a recognized natural child of deceased, this question is, from the view
we take of the case, of no importance in its final disposition. We may say, however, in this connection, that the
point urged in appellant’s brief that it does not appear affirmatively from the time of the conception of Fabiola,
her mother was a single woman, may be sufficiently disposed of by a reference to article 130 of the Civil Code
and subsection 1 of section 1 of section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure which create the presumption that a
child born out of wedlock is natural rather than illegitimate. The question of the status of the plaintiff Fabiola
Severino and her right to share in the inheritance may, upon notice to all the interested parties, be determined in
the probate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.

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Case No. 68
G.R. No. 45736 (68 Phil. 227), May 26, 1939
CONCEPCION LOPEZ vs. ADELA LOPEZ, et.al.
By: Denise Durias

Doctrine: Parent and Child; Action for Recognition; Intervention in the Intestate Proceedings

FACTS:

Concepcion Lopez filed a petition in the intestate proceedings of the deceased Emeterio Lopez, claiming to be
an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased and praying that she be declared his universal heiress
entitled to a summary award of his estate, same being valued at less than six thousand pesos (P6,000). The
oppositors-appellants, thru Attorney Simplicio B. Peña, filed an opposition, denying petitioner’s claim and praying
that, as they are nephews and nieces of the deceased, they be adjudged entitled to the property let by him.
Concepcion Lopez filed later an amended petition, alleging that, according to a new assessment, the estate was
worth nine thousand pesos (P9,000) and that, therefore, its distribution could not be made summarily but thru
regular administration proceedings. Accordingly, an administrator was appointed who, thru Attorney Simplicio B.
Peña, filed later a motion for a declaration of heirs and prayed that the oppositors-appellants be so adjudged.
After hearing, the court issued an order declaring the petitioner an acknowledged natural daughter of the
deceased entitled to the rights accorded her by law. The oppositors appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether Concepcion Lopez is an acknowledged natural daughter of Emeterio Lopez who died intestate, leaving
no legitimate descendants, ascendants or widow.

RULING:

Contrary to appellants’ contention it is a well-settled rule that a person claiming to be an acknowledged natural
child of a deceased need not maintain a separate action for recognition but may simply intervene in the intestate
proceedings, by alleging and proving therein his or her status as such, and claiming accordingly the right to share
in the inheritance.

The petition filed by Concepcion Lopez in the intestate proceedings is alleged to be insufficient. It is said that
there is no prayer therein that she be declared an acknowledged natural child, but only that she be adjudged
universal heiress, of the deceased. In the body of the petition there is an allegation that she is a natural child of
the based and has been in an uninterrupted possession of such status. And inasmuch as the recognition of her
status is a prerequisite to her right to heirship, her prayer that she be declared universal heiress implies a like
prayer that she be recognized as an acknowledged natural child. Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule of pleadings,
applicable to motions or petitions, that the prayer for relief, though part of the pleading, is no part of the cause of
action or defense alleged therein, and the pleader is entitled to as much relief as the facts duly pleaded may
warrant. Order is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

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Case No. 69
G.R. No. L-46847 (70 Phil. 388), June 29, 1940
MAXIMINA MARCELINO vs. ROSARIO ANTONIO Y OTROS
By: Denise Durias

Doctrine: Jurisdiction to Distribute Estate

FACTS:

After legalizing the testament of the late Arcadia (Leocadia) Santos by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte,
his heirs Felisa Antonio and others, presented, on July 19, 1938, two motions requesting one of them to be
ordered to executors or administrators.

In the other motion, the testament of the deceased was requested to be declared void as to any legacy or interest
given in said last will to Calixta Peralta, daughter of Casimiro Peralta, one of the testament's witnesses. In the
memorandum presented on October 31, 1938 by the lawyer of the motionaries, they also requested the partition
of the inheritance left by the late Leocadia Santos excluding certain properties that did not belong to him. The
Court holding the opposition of Maximina Marcelina and Calixta Peralta, dismissed the motions by their order of
January 31, 1939, on the grounds that they raised issues that should be aired in ordinary action separately. The
motionaries appealed that order.

ISSUE:
Whether the court has jurisdiction to distribute the estate among the interested parties.

RULING:
Yes. After all debts of a testamentary or intestate have been paid, the court has jurisdiction to proceed with the
partition and distribution of the inheritance among the interested parties. In the exercise of that jurisdiction, the
court may or may not respect the distribution made in the will, depending on whether or not that distribution is in
accordance with the provisions of the law. The power, therefore, to determine the legality or illegality of
testamentary provisions, It is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court when proceeding to a fair and legal
distribution of the inheritance. As for the exclusion of the inventory of certain properties, although it is true, as a
general rule, that the court, in these proceedings, does not have the power to decide questions about title of
property, we have already stated, however, that it can do so, provisionally, when the purpose is only to determine
whether or not certain properties should be excluded from the inventory.
Not long ago we said the following: A Court that knows of a testamentary or abstained file has jurisdiction and
competence to determine whether the assets that have been included in or excluded from it belong or not prima
facie to the deceased, without their determination having the character of firm and definitive and notwithstanding
that the interested parties may in an appropriate trial ventilate the question regarding the ownership or existence
of the right or credit. (Garcia vs. Garcia, RG No. 45430, April 15, 1939.) Therefore, the appealed order is revoked,
with the costs to the appellants. That's how it is ordered.

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Case No. 70

Palanca v. Pecson, et al., 94 Phil. 419

Jel Arnett A. Evangelista

Doctrine: For the payment of such compensation shall he nevertheless have a lien "upon all judgments, for the
payment of money and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments rendered in the cases wherein his
services have been retained by the client."

Facts:

In Special Proceedings No. 12126 of the Court of First instance of Manila, Rafael Dinglasan was the attorney of
Sebastian Palanca, one of the heirs and an opposition to the probate of the will of his deceased father Carlos
Palanca y Tanguinlay.Thereafter, Atty. Dinglasan who in fact withdrew as Palanca's counsel after the appeal
from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila probating the will had been elevated to the Supreme
Court. On July 7, 1952, Atty. Dinglasan filed in the testate proceedings a notice of attorney's lien, alleging that
he was counsel of Sebastian Palanca from September 1950 until March 1952; that the reasonable value of his
services is at least P20,000; that Palanca had paid upon account only the sum of P3,083, leaving an unpaid
balance of P16,917; and praying that the statement be entered upon the records to be henceforth a lien on the
property or money that may be adjudged to Sebastian Palanca, or that may be ordered paid to him by the court.
However, it was denied for lack of merit.

Issues: Whether the notice of lien should be allowed.

Ruling:

No. We are not here concerned with the nature and extent of the contract between Palanca and Atty. Dinglasan
as to the latter's professional fees, and the principal issues arising from the pleadings are (1) whether the notice
of attorney's lien may be allowed at the stage when it was filed, namely, before final judgment in favor of Palanca
was secured by respondent attorney, and (2) whether the respondent Judge acted properly in entertaining the
petition to determine Atty. Dinglasan's fees and in holding in abeyance Palanca's petition for advance inheritance.
It is contended for petitioner Palanca that Atty. Dinglasan not having yet secured any decision or judgment in
favor of the former, the notice of attorney's lien could not be allowed under section 33, Rule 127 of the Rules of
Court which does not authorize a lien upon a cause of action.

Section 33 provides that an attorney "shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment
of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his
client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon
the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice
thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over
such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just
fees and disbursements." Under this provision we are of the opinion that the attorney may cause a statement of
his lien to be registered even before the rendition of any judgment, the purpose being merely to establish his right
to the lien.

In situations like that of respondent Dinglasan the lawyer may claim compensation only up to the date of his
dismissal. For the payment of such compensation he shall nevertheless have a lien "upon all judgments, for the
payment of money and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments rendered in the cases wherein his
services have been retained by the client." Section 24 does not state that the judgment must be secured by the
attorney claiming the lien.

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Case No. 71

Vita v. Montano., 194 SCRA 180

Jel Arnett A. Evangelista

Doctrine: It is not necessary to file a separate proceeding in court for the proper disposition of the estate of Isidra
Montanano. If both spouses died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either.

Facts:

A complaint was filed before the Court of First Instance of Laguna by plaintiff-appellant Nazario Vita, in his
capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of deceased Edilberto Vita, seeking to recover from defendants-
appellants Soledad Montanano, Estanislao Jovellano and Estebana Jovellano the possession of three (3) parcels
of land located in Barrio Talangan, Nagcarlan, Laguna and their annual yield since January, 1962 in the amount
of P1,100.00 a year.

Plaintiff claims that during the lifetime of Edilberto Vita, he was the owner and possessor of these three (3) parcels
of land covered by: Tax Declaration No. 1252,Tax Declaration No. 1231 and Declaration No. 1253. When he
died on January 23, 1962, defendants-appellants, through stealth and strategy, took possession of the above-
stated parcels of land and gathered the fruits therefrom. Notwithstanding demands from plaintiff-appellant,
defendants-appellants refused to surrender the possession of these parcels of land..

In their answer on December 1, 1964, defendants deny that the three (3) parcels of land belonging to the estate
of Edilberto Vita. Instead, they claim that the two parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1252 and Tax
Declaration No. 1231 belong to Soledad Montanano as these were conveyed to her by Isidra Montanano and
Edilberto Vita in a document signed and executed by them on November 22, 1938 and ratified by one Mr.
Matienzo, a Notary Public from Nagcarlan, Laguna. However, all copies of said document were lost during the
last war. The parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1253 is owned in common by Soledad Montanano,
her brother Jose and sisters Elena and Alodia. It originally belonged to Francisca Asilo, deceased sister of their
grandmother, Micaela Asilo. Its ownership was transferred to them under the arrangement sanctioned by
Edilberto Vita himself wherein all the proceeds from the yearly harvests therefrom shall be spent for the yearly
masses to be held for the souls of Francisca Asilo and Isidra Montanano.

Issues:

Whether or not the three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the complaint are included in the estate of Edilberto
Vita

Ruling:

Yes.Plaintiff-appellant avers that the trial court failed to consider that Edilberto Vita's right to the conjugal half in
the first two parcels as surviving spouse had ceased to be inchoate upon the death of Isidra in 1957, and that
such rights had been vested upon him by operation of law. With respect to the conjugal half pertaining to Isidra
in said two parcels, and the entirety of the third parcel as her paraphernal property, they were likewise vested
upon him by operation of law, subject only to the right of her nephew and nieces, pursuant to Articles 995 and
1001 of the New Civil Code.

In other words, plaintiff-appellant is again claiming that the parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1252
and Tax Declaration No. 1231 are conjugal properties of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita whereas the parcel
of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1253 is the paraphernal property of Isidra Montanano. We are in
conformity with the finding of the trial court that the three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the complaint were
paraphernal properties of Isidra Montanano, being supported by documentary and testimonial evidence.

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Whatever merit there may be in plaintiff-appellants claim that upon the death of Isidra Montanano, the ownership
of these parcels of land (except with respect to the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1253 (4, old)
which was validly donated to defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants by Isidra Montanano, as We shall
discuss later) are vested upon Edilberto Vita by operation of law, subject only to the right of her nephew and
nieces, liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita must be undertaken prior
to the adjudication of properties to the heirs. In this connection, contrary to the trial court's ruling, it is not
necessary to file a separate proceeding in court for the proper disposition of the estate of Isidra Montanano.
Under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, if both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be
liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. In the present case, therefore, the conjugal partnership
of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita should be liquidated in the testate proceedings of the latter.

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Case No. 72

Macadangdang v. CA., 108 SCRA 314

Jel Arnett A. Evangelista

Doctrine : The rules on dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains under the aforecited
provisions of the Civil Code would be applied effective January 4, 1973 when the decree of legal separation
became final. Upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the law governing the effects of the final
decree of legal separation, the law on intestate succession should take over in the disposition of whatever
remaining properties have been allocated to petitioner

FACTS:

Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang were married in 1946
after having lived together for two years and had 6 children. They started a buy and sell business and sari-sari
store in Davao City. Through hard work and good fortune, their business grew and expanded into merchandising,
trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate etc. Their relationship became
complicated and both indulged in extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so they separated in
1965 when private respondent left for Cebu for good. When she returned in Davao in 1971, she learned of the
illicit affairs of her estranged husband. She then decided to take the initial action. In April 1971, she instituted a
complaint for legal separation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has an effect on the legal separation.

RULING:

No.The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the legal separation. When the
decree itself is issued, the finality of the separation is complete after the lapse of the period to appeal the decision
to a higher court even if the effects, such as the liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor
terminated.

The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal property. Therefore, upon
the liquidation and distribution conformably with the effects of such final decree, the law on intestate succession
should take over the disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased spouse.

Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code,
Article 63 of the Family Code provides the effects of the decree of legal separation. These legal effects ipso facto
or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of
determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal asset.

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Case No. 73

Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin., 56 SCRA 266

Jel Arnett A. Evangelista

Doctrine: When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be
inventoried, administered and liquidated and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse. If both spouses died the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either.

Facts: The Hodges lived in the Philippines for almost half a century and died leaving substantial properties in
Iloilo and in the US. The missus died 5 years before the husband, providing in her will that her estate would go
to him, upon his death, the remainder should pass to her siblings.

The court held that this testamentary provision, while probably ineffectual as a substitution under the Civil Code,
is not actually a substitution, but is a valid and simultaneous institution of heirs, though the passing of title to the
inheritance to the others (the siblings) was made to depend on a resolutory condition (the husband’s death).
Case was remanded to the trial court for the determination of the proper application of the renvoi principle (conflict
of laws between Philippines and Texas law), and the proper distribution of Linnie’s, Charles’, and their conjugal
estates.

Issue: How should the estate be settled.

Held:

It is true that the last sentence of this provision allows or permits the conjugal partnership of spouses who are
both deceased to be settled or liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either, but precisely because
said sentence allows or permits that the liquidation be made in either proceeding, it is a matter of sound judicial
discretion in which one it should be made. After all, the former rule referring to the administrator of the
husband's estate in respect to such liquidation was done away with by Act 3176, the pertinent provisions of
which are now embodied in the rule just cited.

Thus, it can be seen that at the time of the death of Hodges, there was already the pending judicial settlement
proceeding of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and, more importantly, that the former was the executor of the latter's
will who had, as such, failed for more than five years to see to it that the same was terminated earliest, which
was not difficult to do, since from ought that appears in the record, there were no serious obstacles on the way,
the estate not being indebted and there being no immediate heirs other than Hodges himself. Such dilatory or
indifferent attitude could only spell possible prejudice of his co-heirs, whose rights to inheritance depend entirely
on the existence of any remainder of Mrs. Hodges' share in the community properties, and who are now faced
with the pose of PCIB that there is no such remainder. Had Hodges secured as early as possible the settlement
of his wife's estate, this problem would not arisen. All things considered, We are fully convinced that the interests
of justice will be better served by not permitting or allowing PCIB or any administrator of the estate of Hodges
exclusive administration of all the properties in question. We are of the considered opinion and so hold that what
would be just and proper is for both administrators of the two estates to act conjointly until after said estates have
been segregated from each other.

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Case No. 74

Picardal v. Lladas., 21 SCRA 1483

Jel Arnett A. Evangelista

Doctrine:The special acquiesced to the ejectment, the estate would still not be liable, because if section 5 Rule
85 of the Rules of Court makes the administrator himself liable for any waste committed in the estate through his
negligence, with more reason would he be personally responsible and not the estate for the consequences of his
unlawful act.

Facts: Bernardo Picardal entrusted to Cenon Lladas a piece of land at Lanao del Norte. This land formed part of
the properties belonging to the conjugal partnership between Bernardo and his wife, Aurea, and was under
judicial administration.

The property was not yet partitioned among the heirs. Cenon Lladas entered the landholding and was appointed
as special administrator of Aurea's estate. Picardal asked Lladas to vacate because of his unsatisfactory
practices. Lladas then filed a petition with CAR. Picardal answered that the landholding in question was a part of
the property of the late Aurea Burgos and was the subject of administration proceedings and that they have
never notified Cenon Lladas to vacate the premises, and that the landholding in question was under custodia
legis.

Lladas stopped harvesting after May 1960. Lladas amended his petition saying that he had been ejected from
the landholding and that as a result of the ejectment, he suffered damages in not receiving his share of the
produce. The CAR and the SC held that Lladas had been ejected

ISSUE: WON the estate, which is in the hands of the administratrix and not with herein petitioners, should be
liable for the damages

Held: No, the estate should not be liable for damages.

Bernardo Picardal and Sebastian Picardal were the ones who ejected Cenon Lladas, according to the finding of
the lower court. They, therefore, Should be the ones to suffer the consequences of their unlawful act.

The Picardals' responsibility for the damages cannot be shifted to the intestate estate for the following reasons:

Even if it be assumed, gratia argumenti, that the special administrator acquiesced to the ejectment, the estate
would still not be liable, because if Section 5, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court makes the administrator himself liable
for any waste committed in the estate through his negligence, with more reason would he be personally
responsible, and not the estate, for the consequences of his unlawful act.

The fact that the proceeds of the landholding in question, as claimed by petitioners, were turned over to the
estate, would neither render the estate liable, because the intestate estate did not really benefit from the
dispossession.

The intestate estate before partition is owned in common by all the heirs (Article 1078, Civil Code). A co-
ownership should not suffer the consequences of the unlawful act of any of the co-owners (Article 501, Civil
Code).

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Under A18 of the CC, petitioners themselves, and not the intestate estate, should indemnify the respondent for
the damages suffered by the latter on account of the unlawful dispossession

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Case no. 75

81 Phil. 461

Petition for the presumption of death of Nicolai Szatraw. CONSUELO SORS, petitioner-appellant. J.
Rodriguez Serra for appellant.

Charlotte Joanne P. Fortin

Doctrine: Declaration of presumption of death

Facts: Pleading under oath that she is the lawful wife of Nicolas Szatraw, a Polish citizen, to whom she was
married in Manila on November, 1936, whom she bore a child named Alexis Szatraw born on 8 September 1937,
with whom she had lived from the time they were married until February, 1940, when her husband, on the pretext
that he would call on some friends, departed from the conjugal abode carrying the child along with him and never
returned, about whose whereabouts she made inquiries from among her husband's friends and countrymen and
learned that her husband and child had left for Shanghai, where, according, however, to information obtained
from Polish citizens who had arrived from that place, he and the child had not been seen and could not be found;
that all her efforts to know the whereabouts of her husband and child were in vain; and that, because of her
husband's absence for more than seven years during which she has not heard any news from him and about her
child, she believes that he is dead, Consuelo Sors prays that her husband be declared dead and that her parental
authority over her child, should the latter be alive and later on appear, be preserved.

Issue: Whether or not this is a settlement of estate? Whether or not the petition for presumptive death can be
granted?

Ruling: No. The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not appear
that he possessed property brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no property during his married
life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume
that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been established.
Therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard
from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of
finality or become final.

Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years, would
have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined. If a judicial decree
declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had not been heard from in seven years, cannot become
final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for
such presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration
is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner.

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Case No. 76

124 SCRA 1983

August 31, 1983 EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. JOSEPHINE LUCERO, respondents.

Charlotte Joanne P. Fortin

Doctrine: Declaration of presumption of death

Facts: On October 31, 1979, Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.,
Company for short, as master/captain to its vessel M/V Eastern Minicon plying the HongkongManila route, with
the salary of P5,560.00 exclusive of ship board allowances and other benefits. Under the contract, his
employment was good for one (1) round trip only, i.e., the contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of
the vessel at the Port of Manila, unless renewed. It was further agreed that part of the captain's salary, while
abroad, should be paid to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila. On February 16, 1980, while the vessel
was enroute from Hongkong to Manila where it was expected to arrive on February 18, 1980, Capt. Lucero sent
three (3) messages to the Company's Manila office:February l6,1980 0700 GMT Via Intercom Second Message:
February l6/80 1530 GMT VIA INTERCOM, Third Message: FEBRUARY 16/80 2150 HRS. On the third message
he stated that sea waters were entering the vessel and they were preparing to abandon the ship. Acting on these
radio messages, the Company, respondent below, took the following steps:

Respondent informed of the grave situation, immediately reported the matter to the Philippine Coast Guard for
search and rescue operation and the same was coordinated with the U.S. Air Force based at Clark Air Base.
Respondent also released radio messages to all vessels passing the Hongkong/Manila route requesting them to
be very cautious and vigilant for possible survivors and to scan the area whether there are signs of debris from
the ill-fated vessel "EASTERN MINICON" which has foundered In the meantime, two (2) vessels of the
respondent were also dispatched to the area last reported by the Master for search and rescue operation, but
the collective efforts of all parties concerned yielded negative results.

Subsequently, the Lloyds of London, insurer of the M/V Eastern Minicon through its surveyors, confirmed the
loss of the vessel. Thereafter, the Company paid the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the crew
members, except respondent Josephine Lucero, who refused to accept the same.

On July 16, 1980, Mrs. Lucerofiled a complaint with -the National Seamen Board, Board for short, for payment
of her accrued monthly allotment of P3,183.00, which the Company had stopped since March 1980 and for
continued payment of said allotments until the M/V Minicon shall have returned to the port of Manila. She
contended that the contract of employment entered into by her husband with the company was on a voyage to
voyage basis, and the same was to terminate only upon the vessel’s arrival in Manila. The company refuse to
pay. The National seamen board upheld the complaint and the decision was affirmed by the NIRC.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for presumptive death can be granted?

Ruling: The NLRC based its judgment on Article 391 regarding the presumption of death at sea. They argue that
it was too early too presume That Mr. Lucero has died because under the law, Art. 391. The following shall be
presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board a
vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years
since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane; which is missing, who has not been heard for four years since its loss
of the vessel or aeroplane.

The Supreme Court however that the preponderance of evidence from the telegraph messages and the fact that
vessel was not heard It is undisputed that on February 16, 1980, the Company received three (3) radio messages
from Capt. Lucero on board the M/V Eastern Minicon the last of which, at 9:50 p.m. of that day, was a call for

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immediate assistance in view of the existing "danger": "sea water was entering the hatch"; the vessel "was listing
50 to 60 degrees port," and they were "preparing to abandon the ship any time.' After this message, nothing more
has been heard from the vessel or its crew until the present time.

There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss and disappearance of the M/V
Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing facts, quite logically. are sufficient to lead Us to a moral certainty
that the vessel had sunk and that the persons aboard had perished with it. upon this premise, the rule on
presumption of death under Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code must yield to the rule of preponderance of evidence.
As this Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro 4 "Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational
conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls."

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Case No. 77

66 Phil 303

Intestate estate of the deceased Luz Garcia. PABLO G. UTULO, applicant-appellee, vs. LEONA PASION
VIUDA DE GARCIA, oppositor-appellant. September 30, 1938

Charlotte Joanne P. Fortin

Doctrine: Intestate succession for purposes of administration of properties

Facts: Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, and in the proceedings instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac for the administration of his property (special proceedings No. 3475), Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia, the
surviving spouse and the herein oppositor, was appointed judicial administratrix. The said deceased left
legitimate children, named Juan Garcia, jr., Patrocinio Garcia and Luz Garcia who, with the widow, are the
presumptive forced heirs. Luz Garcia married the applicant Pablo G. Utulo and during the pendency of the
administration proceedings of the said deceased, she died in the province without any legitimate descendants,
her only forced heirs being her mother and her husband.

The latter commenced in the same court the judicial administration of the property of his deceased wife (special
proceedings No. 4188), stating in his petition that her only heirs were he himself and his mother-in-law, the
oppositor, and that the only property left by the deceased consisted in the share due her from the intestate of her
father, Juan Garcia Sanchez, and asking that he be named administrator of the property of said deceased. The
oppositor objected to the petition, opposing the judicial administration of the property of her daughter and the
appointment of the applicant as administrator. She alleged that inasmuch as the said deceased left no
indebtedness, there was no occasion for the said judicial administration; but she stated that should the court
grant the administration of the property, she should be appointed the administratrix thereof inasmuch as she had
a better right than the applicant. After the required publications, trial was had and the court, on August 28, 1936,
finally issued the appealed order to which the oppositor excepted and thereafter filed the record on appeal which
was certified and approved.

Issue: Whether upon the admitted facts the judicial administration of the property left by the deceased Luz Garcia
lies, with the consequent appointment of an administrator, and whether the appellant has a better right to the
said office than the appellee.

Ruling: According to the first, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate,
they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the
appointment of an administrator.

According to the second, if the property left does not exceed six thousand pesos, the heirs may apply to the
competent court, after the required publications, to proceed with the summary partition and, after paying all the
known obligations, to partition all the property constituting the inheritance among themselves pursuant to law,
without instituting the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator.

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Case No. 78

50 Phil. 74

Case Title: In re intestate estate of Epifanio Orozco, deceased. SERAFIN OROZCO, petitioner-appellee,
vs. ALBINA GARCIA, opponent-appellant. March 23, 1927

Charlotte Joanne P. Fortin

Doctrine: Premature Appeal.

Facts: On January 16, 1926, Serafin Orozco filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Albay, praying that
he be appointed special administrator of the estate of the deceased Epifanio Prozco pending the appointment of
a regular administrator, upon the ground that said Epifanio Orozco died in August, 1917, in the municipality of
Guinobatan, Albay, leaving real property to the value of P15,000 more or less; that the nearest relatives of said
deceased are the applicant, Serafin Orozco, Carmen, Mercedes and Arsenio Orozco, all natural children duly
recognized and declared as such by the said court in civil case No. 474, and the widow whom the said deceased
had no descendant; that the deceased Epifanio Orozco had not executed any will, and since his death his
property has been in the possession of his widow, Albina Garcia, who refuses to deliver to the petitioner and his
brothers and sisters their respective shares, and that the widow Albina Garcia and the herein petitioner and his
brothers and sisters have conflicting interests.

Albina Garcia, widow of Orozco, objected to said petition and the court, by an order of February 13, 1926,
appointed her administratix of the property left by said deceased Epifanio Orozco, upon the filing of bond in the
amount of P2,000 with solvent sureties.

Issue: Whether or not Orozco may be appointed as special administrator of the estate of the deceased father?

Ruling: "It is not a principle authorized by law that heirs of legal age may not, as alleged by the appellant, demand
the division of a real property, left them by their predecessor in interest and held by a coheir, without first initiating
special intestate proceedings during which a judicial administrator is to be appointed, who alone is vested with
the personality to claim the property that belongs to the succession. On the contrary, such heirs are expressly
authorized to do so, unless, for the reason of there being unpaid debts, judicial intervention becomes necessary,
which was not alleged as a special defense in this suit.”

Granted, that the appellant is in possession of the property left by the deceased father of the petitioner, and there
being no agreement between all the heirs of legal age for the extrajudicial partition of the estate, the objection of
the appellant based upon the ground that no indebtedness exists and that more than eight years had already
elapsed from the death of the deceased Epifanio Orozco to the filing of the petition of the appellees, is untenable.
Wherefore, the order appealed from must be, as it is hereby, affirmed, without any special finding as to costs,
and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. So ordered.

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Case No. 79

46 Phil. 317

INTESTATE OF SATURNINO FULE, deceased. CIRIACO FULE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ANASTASIO


FULE ET AL., opponents-appellees. Palma, Leuterio & Yamzon for Appellant. Ramon Diokno for
Appellees. September 30, 1924

Charlotte Joanne P. Fortin

Doctrine: Perfection of an Appeal

Facts: Saturnino Fule died on the 4th day of April, 1923, intestate. On the 2d day of July, 1923, Ciriaco Fule, one
of the heirs, presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Laguna for the appointment of
an administrator of the estate of Saturnino Fule, deceased, and prayed specially for the appointment of Cornelio
Alcantara as such administrator. The petitioner further prayed that during the pendency of the petition for the
appointment of an administrator, the said Cornelio Alcantara be then and there appointed as special administrator
for said estate. The petitioner alleged that at the time of the death of Saturnino Fule, he was the owner of real
and personal property located in the municipality of San Pablo, Province of Laguna, of the value of P50,000 with
a rental value of about P8,000 and that, in addition to said real and personal property, he also left about P30,000
in cash. The lower court on the day of the presentation of the petition appointed Cornelio Alcantara as special
administrator and required him to give a bond of P8,000. On the 26th day of July, 1923, the special administrator
presented in court an inventory of the alleged property of the deceased.

On the 31st day of July, 1923, the oppositors, through their attorney Mr. Ramon Diokno, appeared and presented
a motion alleging that they were children of Saturnino Fule and that they were all of age; that they opposed the
appointment of an administrator upon the ground that the deceased had left no debts and that his property had
already been partitioned among his children during his lifetime.

On the 4th day of August, 1923, the oppositors, through their attorney, presented a further opposition to the
appointment of an administrator for said estate, alleging again that the heirs of Saturnino Fule were all of age;
that the deceased had left no debts; that the property had been divided among his heirs during his lifetime; that
the special administrator had been appointed without any notification whatever, neither personal nor by
publication, to the heirs of the deceased, and that there was no necessity for the appointment of a special
administrator during the pendency of the question, nor for the appointment of an administrator.

On the 14th day of August, 1923, the petitioner answered the motion of the oppositors and opposed their petition
for the revocation of the appointment of a special administrator.

Issue: Was the appeal from the decision of the lower court perfected within the time required by law? Did the
court a quo commit an error in refusing to appoint an administrator for the estate of Saturnino Fule, deceased?

Ruling: The appellees argue that the appeal was not perfected within twenty days from the 15th day of August,
1923. They evidently overlooked the fact that the decree was not a final decree for the reason that it gave the
petitioner thirty days within to decide whether he would amend his petition or present an ordinary action.
Inasmuch, therefore, as the petitioner had thirty days within which to decide just what course he pursue, said
decision could not become final until after the expiration of thirty days or until the petitioner had decided just what
course he decide to take. That order of the court conceding him thirty days to decide the option therein given,
continued in force until the 17th day of September, when the court decided the motion for reconsideration and
granted to the petitioner to a final hearing and judgment on the 26th day of October, 1923, and the appeal from
the final judgment of that date was perfected within the time provided for in the above-quoted provision of Act
No. 190.

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Therefore, the judgment of the 15th day of August, 1923, was not final; that the final judgment rendered in the
cause was on the 26th day of October, 1923; that the appeal from the final judgment was perfected within time,
and therefore, the motion to dismiss the appeal for failure to perfect the same within the statutory period is hereby
denied.

Upon the second question, Did the court a quo commit an error in refusing to appoint an administrator for the
estate of Saturnino Fule? it may be said (a) that it is admitted by all of the parties to the present action, that at
the time of his death no debts existed against his estate and (b) that all of the heirs of Saturnino Fule were of
age. In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661 of the Civil Code, all of the
property, real and personal, of a deceased person who dies intestate, is transmitted immediately to his heirs.

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Case No. 80

Rufina Bondad Et Al., v. Venancio Bondad Et Al.,

Dancelo C. Gacutan II

Doctrine: Partition by mutual agreement of the parties is valid and binding as long as there is no debt against
the estate.

Facts:

Rufina Bondad had two brothers and two sisters, respectively named Venancio, Placido, Maria, and Paula. The
last named died leaving four children: Eleno, Estanislao, Raymundo, and Pedro, all surnamed Emlano. On May
6, 1911, Rufina Bondad brought suit against her said brothers, sisters, and nephews to secure the partition of
the property left to these defendants by their father or grandfather, respectively, Crisanto Bondad, upon his death
on March 17, 1902. She designates the lands to be divided, which are those specified in the complaint under the
letters (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), and (j). Documentary and parol evidence was introduced, and the Court
of First Instance of Laguna decided the case by dismissing the complaint and absolving defendants therefrom,
with the costs against the plaintiff.

Issue:

Whether or not the mutual agreement of partition is valid?

Ruling:

Yes. It has been repeatedly shown in the record that there are no debts outstanding against either
succession, and the complaint itself so states. In the decision rendered in the case of Ilustre v. Alaras Frondosa
(17 Phil. Rep., 321), this court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph"Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to
661), the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the
heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at
the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a
deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon
the administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they
desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The
Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they
cannot mutually agree in the division. When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no
occasion for the intervention of an administrator . . . The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence
of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right whatever to intervene in any way in the division
of the estate among the heirs . . . ."

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Case No. 81

Rodriguez v. Tan, G.R. No. L-6044, November 24, 1952 (92 Phil 273)

Dancelo C. Gacutan II

Doctrine: Administration proceedings against the estate is unnecessary when there is no pending obligation to
be paid.

Facts:

It is averred in the petition that Flaviano Rodriguez died on February 8, 1944, at Parañaque, Rizal, leaving
an estate with a value of P10,000; that the surviving heirs are the widow, Fortunata Vda. de Rodriguez, and six
children who are the petitioners and respondent Abelardo Rodriguez all the heirs, who were then already of age,
entered into a verbal agreement whereby they agreed not to make a liquidation of the estate but to place it under
the administration of the widow with the understanding that each of the six children would be entitled to receive
a portion of the income in equal shares from year to year for the needs of their families provided that they do not
exceed the participation to which they are entitled; that on March 19, 1952, or eight years after the death of
Flaviano Rodriguez, respondent Abelardo Rodriguez filed a petition for administration of their intestate estate of
said deceased in spite of his knowledge that the estate had no debts and all the heirs were of age; that on June
2, 1952, the other heirs, petitioners herein, objected to the petition invoking the rule that if the estate is free from
obligations and the heirs are all of age, no administration proceedings shall be allowed; that on August 11, 1952,
respondent Judge, after overruling the opposition, appointed Abelardo Rodriguez administrator of the estate
upon filing the requisite bond.

Issue:

Whether or not administration proceedings and appointing Abelardo Rodriguez as administrator of the estate is
proper?

Ruling:

No. Under section 1, rule 74 of the Rules of Court, if the decedent left no debts and the heirs are all of age, or
the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration,
divide the estate among themselves as they see fit, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary
action of partition. Otherwise stated, that when the estate has no pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether
of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration for the reason that it is superfluous
or unnecessary, and in most cases long and costly, in which case the way left to the heirs is to divide the estate
among themselves as they may see fit, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.

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Case No. 82

Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 (1953)

Dancelo C. Gacutan II

Doctrine: Settlement of an estate is filed and intended to settle the entire estate of the deceased because the
proceeding is precisely designed to end the community of interests in properties held by co-partners.

Facts:

Among the real properties in the project of partition is a parcel of land covered by and described in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 42643 located in Antipolo, Rizal. In said project of partition, its area is stated as 83,781
square meters, with an assessed value of P6,430.00. This statement of said area was repeated in said document
four time, that is, in adjudicating the corresponding portions of said land to Pilar (12/15), Antonio, Jr. (1/15).
Enrique (1/15) and Jose (1/15). The petitioner did not have a share in the aforesaid parcel of land because she
relinquished her right thereto in lieu of her bigger share in Antipolo, Rizal, real estate property.On January 29,
1973, the respondent administratrix and the other three distributees filed a motion to reopen Special Proceedings
No. Q-325 for the purpose of correcting an alleged typographical error in the description of the parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643 since, according to them, the correct land area is 803,781.51
square meters and not 83,781 square meters. The heirs of Mercado filed their opposition to said motion.

Issue:

Whether or not the settlement of the estate must involve the entire estate of the deceased?

Ruling:

Yes. A special proceeding for the settlement of an estate is filed and intended to settle the entire estate of
the deceased is obvious and elementary. It would be absurd for the heirs to intentionally excluded or leave a
parcel of land or a portion thereof undistributed or undivided because the proceeding is precisely designed to
end the community of interests in properties held by co-partners pro indiviso without designation or segregation
of shares.

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Case No. 83

Vda. De Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 1 9 9 SCRA 646

Dancelo C. Gacutan II

Doctrine: Partition made orally is valid and binding.

Facts:

During his lifetime, Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land approximately 70 hectares, located at Carmona Cavite.
He sought to bring said land registered under the Torrens system. Unfortunately, he died without the title having
been issue under his name. The application was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the
administrator of the said estate.

In 1963 the said property was subdivided by Gavino’s heirs. Later on the children of Gavino secured Tax
declarations for each shares. 20 years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of title for the whole
property was issued. It was kept by Poblete, son-in law of Marcelo who was then deceased already. This fact
was never known to the heirs of Gavino. On 1943, Rafael Reyes sold his share to Gardiola. On 1967, the surviving
heirs gave effect to the subdivision plan. They formally partitioned the property. Now the heirs of Rafael Jr. Sued
Gardiola contending that they are the true owners of the land which was sold to the latter. Gardiola’s defense
was that the property was already sold to him by Rafael Sr. and that Rafael Jr. Could not have inherited this land
for it was long disposed by his father way before he inherited it. The trial court ruled in favor of Rafael Jr’s heirs.
Stating that there was no evidence that the children of Gavino had a written partition agreement. The CA
reversed.

Issue:

Whether or not the oral partition made by the heirs of Gavino is valid and binding.

Ruling:

Yes. The CA correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino although oral, was valid and binding.
There is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid. In Hernandez v. Andal, supra, this
court, interpreting section 1 of rule 74 of the rules of court, held that the requirement that a partition be put in a
public document and registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection
of the heirs against tardy claims. The object of the registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It
follows then that the intrinsic validity of the partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come
into play when there are no creditors or the rights of the creditors are not affected. There is nothing in the said
section from which it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the
partition.

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Case No, 84

Borja v. Vda. de Borja, 46 SCRA 577

Dancelo C. Gacutan II

Doctrine: Compromise agreement is valid even if the will has not yet been probated.

Facts:

Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of his wife who died, Josefa Tangco, with the CFI
of Rizal. He was appointed executor and administrator, until he died; his son Jose became the sole administrator.
Francisco had taken a 2nd wife Tasiana before he died; she instituted testate proceedings with the CFI of Nueva
Ecija upon his death and was appointed special administatrix. Jose and Tasiana entered upon
a compromise agreement, but Tasiana opposed the approval of the compromise agreement. She argues that it
was no valid, because the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of
Francisco, and at the time the agreement was made, the will was still being probated with the CFI of Nueva Ecija.

Issue:

Whether or not the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yet been probated?

Ruling:

Yes, the compromise agreement is valid.

The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800,000 as full payment for her hereditary share in the estate
of Francisco and Josefa. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among
the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by
Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco
de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee.

And as a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the
death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to
a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such
death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.

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Case No. 85

G.R. No. L-6871 January 15, 1912

Jose Mcmicking, administrator of the estate of Margarita Jose, plaintiff-appellant, vs.


Benito Sy Conbieng, administrator of the estate of Pio de la Gurdia Barretto Sy Pioco, defendant-
appellee.

Digested by: Glenn Kirby A. German

Doctrine:
After the partition and division provided for in sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure have
been fully consummated, no further administration of the estate can be had unless there occur the following
requisites: 1.) There must have been discovered a claim against the estate "within two years after such settlement
and distribution of estate" and 2.) The creditor holding the claim must be the person who moves the court for the
appointment of an administrator.

Facts:
Margarita Jose died in 1902 and Engracio Palanca was appointed as the administrator with the will
annexed of the estate, and Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and Dy Cunyao became his sureties. After the
execution of the bond by Palanca, as administrator, he took possession of all the property left by Margarita Jose.

Issue:
Whether or not there can be administration of estate even after the partition and division has already
consummated.

Ruling:
No. No debt was discovered during the prescribed period which is "within two years after such settlement
and distribution of estate".

It was nearly four years after the partition of the estate and the taking possession by the heirs of their
respective portions before it was even discovered that Palanca had been guilty of converting the property of the
estate to his own use; and, so far as the records shows, it was nearly five years before the alleged claim against
the estate of Mariano Ocampo was fixed. And, no creditor made his application.

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Case No. 86

G.R. No. L-33172 October 18, 1979

ERNESTO CEASE, CECILIA CEASE, MARION CEASE, TERESA CEASE-LACEBAL and the F.L. CEASE
PLANTATION CO., INC. as Trustee of properties of the defunct TIAONG MILLING & PLANTATION
CO., petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (Special Seventh Division), HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA,
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Quezon, BENJAMIN CEASE and FLORENCE
CEASE, respondents.

Digested by: Glenn Kirby A. German

Doctrine:
Generally, a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from that of the
persons composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. By virtue of this
attribute, a corporation may not, generally, be made to answer for acts or liabilities of its stockholders or those of
the legal entities to which it may be connected, and vice versa.
Where the fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, defend crime,
confuse legitimate legal or judicial issues, perpetrate deception or otherwise circumvent the law, used as an alter
ego, adjunct, or business conduit for the sole benefit of the stockholders or of another corporate entity, the notion
of corporate entity will be pierced or disregarded, and the corporation will be treated merely as an association of
persons or, where there are two corporations, they will be merged as one, the one being merely regarded as part
or instrumentality of the other.

Facts:
Forrest Cease and five (5) other American citizens formed “Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company.
Eventually, the shares of the other original incorporators were brought out by Cease with his children. The
company’s charter lapsed in 1958. Forrest Cease died in August 1959. There was no mention whether there
were steps to liquidate the company. Some of his children wanted an actual division while other wanted a
reincorporation.
Two of his children, Benjamin and Florence, initiated Special Proceeding with CFI asking that the Tiaong
Milling and Plantation Company be declared identical to Forrest Cease and that its properties be divided among
his children as intestate heirs. Defendants opposed the same but the CFI ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Defendants
filed a notice of appeal from the CFI’s decision but the same was dismissed for being premature. The case was
elevated to the Supreme Court which remanded it to the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the lower court’s decision that the subject properties owned by
the corporation are also properties of the estate of Forrest Cease.

Ruling:
No. The trial court found strong support, one that is based on a well-entrenched principle of law.
In sustaining respondents' theory of "merger of Forrest L. Cease and The Tiaong Milling as one
personality", or that "the company is only the business conduit and alter ego of the deceased Forrest L. Cease
and the registered properties of Tiaong Milling are actually properties of Forrest L. Cease and should be divided
equally, share and share alike among his six children, ... ", the trial court did aptly apply the familiar exception to
the general rule by disregarding the legal fiction of distinct and separate corporate personality and regarding the
corporation and the individual member one and the same.

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Case No. 87

G.R. No. L-10474 February 28, 1958

BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners, vs.


THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA respondent.

Digested by: Glenn Kirby A. German

Doctrine:
Rules of Court provides that person’s deprived of their right due to the partition or self-adjudication must
bring their action within two years from the date of partition or self-adjudication. This rule applies only to persons
who have participated in the said proceedings and does not prejudice those who did not have the chance to
participate.
But as to those who did not take part in the settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent or
of the settlement, there is no direct or express provision is unreasonable and unjust that they also be required to
assert their claims within the period of two years.

Facts:
Teodoro Tolete died, leaving his wife and nephews and nieces who are children of his deceased brothers
and sisters. His wife executed an affidavit of self-adjudication saying that Teodoro had no children or dependents,
neither ascendants or acknowledged natural children, neither brothers, sisters, nephews nor nieces.
Then, his wife sold the property to Sampilo, then Sampilo sold it to Salacup. Sinopera instituted estate
proceedings asking for letters of administration. She alleged that Teodoro’s wife, Leonicia de Leon has no right
to execute the affidavit of self-adjudication for there are other heirs aside from her. The petitioners now argue
that Sinopera’s cause of action has already prescribed because according to the rules of court, person’s deprived
of their right due to the partition or self-adjudication must bring their action within two years from the date of
partition or self-adjudication.

Issue:
Whether or not the rule is applicable to persons who had no knowledge or not participated in extra
judicial settlement.

Ruling:
No. The said rule applies only to persons who have participated in the said proceedings and does not
prejudice those who did not have the chance to participate.
It is required that if there are two or more heirs, both or all of them should take part in the extrajudicial
settlement. On the other hand, it is also significant that no mention is made expressly of the effect of the
extrajudicial settlement on persons who did not take part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof. There
cannot be any doubt that those who took part or had knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby.
As to them the law is clear that if they claim to have been in any manner deprived of their lawful right or
share in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or interest within the period of
two years, and both the distributes and estate would be liable to them for such rights or interest.
Evidently, they are the persons in accordance with the provision, may seek to remedy, the prejudice to
their rights within the two-year period. But as to those who did not take part in the settlement or had no notice of
the death of the decedent or of the settlement, there is no direct or express provision is unreasonable and unjust
that they also be required to assert their claims within the period of two years. To extend the effects of the
settlement to them, to those who did not take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any express legal
provision to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right to due process of law.

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Case No. 88

G.R. No. 4625 December 18, 1908

VICENTE BRIONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs.


PETRA PLATON, Defendant-Appellee.

Digested by: Glenn Kirby A. German

Doctrine:
Heirs who have not participated in the partition of estates are not bound by such a transaction. To this
effect, neither of the heirs may recover the exclusive possession of the property.

Facts:
More than fifty years, Domingo Castillo and his wife died owning a tract of 25 cavanes de cabida
including the land in question, and leaving it in undivided shares among his four children. The last of them,
Domingo Castillo, died more than thirty years ago and this litigation has arisen between descendants of the
second and third degrees, the plaintiff alleging that in 1903 all the members of the family agreed upon a partition
which was carried into effect in 1907 by certain deeds which are in evidence.
It seems that none of the defendants took part in this partition nor had they any knowledge of it, one
witness, Epifanio Atienza, saying that, while none of the other heirs of that part of the family were present, he, as
the eldest male, assumed to represent the rest of that branch and to divide the land for them. Apparently he held
no power to that effect, either written or oral.

Issue:
Whether or not defendants are bound by such a transaction in which they did not take part.

Ruling:
No. It is plain that the defendants are not bound by an operation in which they took no part, and for that
reason the plaintiff cannot succeed in recovering the exclusive possession of the land occupied by them, which
is the object of his action.
To this effect, both plaintiff and defendants must assert in a proper way whatever rights may have
originally been theirs in the property in suit, whether as tenants in common or otherwise.

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Case No. 89
G.R. No. L-19060 May 29, 1964

IGNACIO GERONA, MARIA CONCEPCION GERONA, FRANCISCO GERONA and DELFIN


GERONA, petitioners, vs.
CARMEN DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE GUZMAN, CLEMENTE DE GUZMAN,
FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, RUSTICA DE GUZMAN, PACITA DE GUZMAN and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN,
respondents.

Digested by: Glenn Kirby A. German

Doctrine:
Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only
as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations
operates from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property.

Facts:
Petitioners herein, alleged that they are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de
Guzman; that the latter, who died on August 9, 1941 was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his
first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman married Camila Ramos,
who begot him several children.
Marcelo de Guzman died on September 11, 1945; respondents executed a deed of "extra-judicial
settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they
were the only surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, although they well knew that petitioners were,
also, his forced heirs; that respondents had thereby succeeded fraudulently in causing the transfer certificates of
title to seven (7) parcels of land, issued in the name of said deceased, to be cancelled and new transfer
certificates of title to be issued in their own name, in the proportion of 1/7th individual interest for each; that such
fraud was discovered by the petitioners only the year before the institution of the case; that petitioners forthwith
demanded from respondents their (petitioners) share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th interest thereon;
and that the respondents refused to heed said demand, thereby causing damages to the petitioners.
The petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying said deed of extra-judicial settlement, insofar
as it deprives them of their participation of 1/18th of the properties in litigation; ordering the respondents to
reconvey to them their aforementioned share. The trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioners' mother
was a legitimate child, by first marriage, of Marcelo de Guzman; that the properties described in the complaint
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman and his second wife and that petitioners' action has
already prescribed.
Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman,
the present action for partition of the latter's estate is not subject to the statute of limitations of action.

Issue:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is correct.

Ruling:
No. Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-
heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under
an adverse title.
The statute of limitations operates from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of
the property. Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-judicial settlement" upon
the ground of fraud in the execution thereof, the action therefore may be filed within four (4) years from the
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place, in the case at bar, on June 25, 1948,
when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name
of respondents exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitute constructive
notice to the whole world.

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Case No. 90

Lopez v Gonzaga, GR No. L-18788

Kotico, Nehemiah David E.

Doctrine:

The recording of judicial orders constitutes substantial compliance with the required recording of the will
itself, and is a constructive notice to the whole world.

Facts:

Soledad Gonzaga Vda. De Ferrer died intestate on 1935, leaving real and personal properties. She was
survived by the plaintiffs, who are her nearest of kin. During her lifetime, she expressed that as long as her
brother Luis Gonzaga, herein defendant, was engaged in his coconut oil experiments he could use the products
and rentals of Soledad’s properties for such purpose. Defendant failed to continue his experiments due to him
becoming totally blind by 1955. Plaintiff Lopez asks for a partition of the estate and cancellation of titles of lands
fraudulently transferred to the name of the defendant.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for res judicata and non-inclusion of parties but was denied. Thus, defendant
filed his answer, stating that there was no intestacy and there was a will of Soledad who instituted Gonzaga as
the sole heir, which was allowed and probated.

Issue:

Lacking the proof of an actual will, whether the failure of appellee to file with the Register of Deeds a
certified copy of his letters of administration and the will negates the validity of the judgement or decree of
probate.

Held:

No. Although defendant was for a time an administrator of Soledad’s properties, this is beside the point,
as defendant’s dealings with the lands, if any, during his tenure as an administrator is not here in question.
Additionally, the defendant sought judicial orders to effect the transfers to his name of the certificates of title after
the will was probated, and succeeded in having them so transferred. Although the step taken is not exactly what
Sec. 624 of Act 190 directs, the same purpose was achieved – that of notice to all strangers of the cause and
nature of the transfers; and it does not appear that anyone was prejudiced by the defect in registration complained
of. The recording of judicial orders sufficed as notice to interested parties, and was substantial compliance with
the required recording of the will itself. No one face by the recorder documents could ignore the reference therein
to the probated testament; and the rule is that knowledge of what might have been revealed by proper inquiry is
imputable to the inquirer.

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Case No. 91.

Balbin v Medalla, 108 SCRA 666

Kotico, Nehemiah David E.

Doctrine:

The registration of homestead or free patent grants of title constitute constructive notice to the whole
world.

Facts:

In 1962, private respondents bought from the heirs of Ladao a large parcel of agricultural land and sought
for the application for registration of their title. Their application was opposed by petitioners on the ground that
the latter were issued Original Certificates of Title through either Homestead or Free Patent grants.

The CFI of Occidental Mindoro rendered judgement in favor of respondents.

Issue:

Whether or not the CFI a quo erred in holding that private respondents’ cause of action has not yet
prescribed.

Held:

Yes. The action for reconveyance can only be instituted within 4 years after discovery of the alleged
fraud. Private respondents’ complaint was filed on 30 Aug 1973, however all of their patents were issued more
than 4 years before that, the latest was in 14 Oct 1959.

An action for reconveyance of property resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute of limitations,
which requires that the action shall be filed within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is
deemed to have taken place when the petitioners herein were issued original certificates of title through either
homestead or free patent grants, for registration of said patents constitute constructive notice to the whole world.

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Case No. 92

Perez v Ong Chua

Kotico, Nehemiah David E.

Doctrine:

The registration of the sheriff’s certificate of sale serves as constructive notice to the whole world and is
the starting point where prescription begins to run.

Facts:

On 13 April 1928, to secure their loan of $13,500.00, spouses Francisco Arcillas and Rosario Perez
executed a deed of mortgage in favor of Worcester over 23 parcels of land located in Zamboanga City, registered
in the spouses’ names.

An action of for foreclosure of mortgage was instituted by Worcester in grounds of violation of stipulation
of the contract. Francisco died during the pendency of the action. As no notice of death was filed with the court,
the trial Judge proceeded with the case without substitution of the deceased by his legal representative. A
judgement was subsequently rendered.

Upon registration of the sheriff’s certificate of sale and the order of confirmation, the certificates of title
of the spouses were cancelled and, in lieu thereof, transfer certificates of title were issued in the name of
Worcester. Worcester then sold the said lands to Enrique Ong Chua, who obtained new certificates of title in his
name, and possessed the properties as owner.

38 years later, or on 14 Oct 1968, Rosario and her children filed an action against the Ong Chuas for
annulment of their certificates of title and for reconveyance of the said lands, alleging that Worcester, Enrique,
and the trial judge at that time, conspired together and were guilty of fraud in transferring and acquiring the
properties.

Issue:

Whether or not the action is barred by prescription.

Held:

Yes. The petitioners’ cause of action to cancel the certificates of title in question accrued from 1930, the
year of the recording of the sheriff’s deed and the issuance of the certificate of title. 38 years had thus elapsed
before the petitioners instituted the present action. The continuous and public assertion of title by respondents
during this period was more than sufficient to extinguish the petitioners’ action. The period of extinctive
prescription under the Code of Civil Procedure, the law in force at the time, was only 10 years.

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Case No. 93

Municipality of Carcar v CFI of Cebu

Kotico, Nehemiah David E.

Doctrine:

An estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

Facts:

On 3 Sep 1954, the CFI of Cebu issued an order denying the petition of the Municipal Mayor of Carcar
which prayed that private respondent Alfarara et al be ordered to return to the Municipality of Carcar a portion of
land which, according to petitioner was erroneously included in the TCT No. 2183. Afterwards, petitioner filed a
case for reinvindicacion against respondents. The latter filed a motion to dismiss and was granted by the CFI of
Cebu on grounds of res judicata The order of dismissal was made on 18 Mar 1968 and was received by petitioner
on 25 March. Petitioner filed motions for reconsideration on 25 Apr and 18 May, or 31 and 56 days after the date
of receipt of order.

Petitioner prays that the order of 18 Mar be declared null and void and that said public respondent order
the reinstatement and trial of the case on the merits.

Issue:

Whether or not the action is barred by laches.

Held:

Yes. When respondent court disapproved petitioner’s record on appeal, the latter should have filed a
petition for mandamus within a reasonable time. As to what would constitute a reasonable time “it is apparent
that the delay in ordinary cases should not be more than the longest period allowed in the lower court for the
party to take action, which is thirty days. It is well settled that laches in making an application for a writ of
mandamus affords sufficient cause for its denial.”

In this case, it was 18 March 1968 when respondent court dismissed their case, and it was on 18 Aug
1968 when petitioner’s record on appeal was disapproved. By failing to act until 14 Feb 1970 when this petition
for certiorari was filed, petitioner was guilty of laches for not having taken action seasonably. Petitioner’s long
inaction for one and one-half years is certainly tantamount to laches and inexcusable neglect that it should be
barred from asserting its claim at all.

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Case No. 94

Heirs of Guminpin v Court of Appeals

Kotico, Nehemiah David E.

Doctrine:

It is a long-standing rule that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional
errors, judgements of courts should become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei
publicae ut finish sit litium. The interest of the State demands that there be an end to litigation.

Facts:

On 7 Jan 1955, Pedro Guminpin, filed a complaint for the recovery of possession with damages of the
disputed 24-hectare unregistered land situated at Tinglan, Salvacion, New Pinan Zamboanga del Norte, alleging
that respondent forcibly took possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of more than 30 years.

Guminpin alleged that respondents used misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, and insidious machination in
acquiring the disputed lands. The CFI of Zamboanga del Norte rendered a decision finding all the private
respondents possessors in bad faith of the land in question. The CA affirmed the CFI’s decision as to the
possessory right of petitioners but decided that respondents are the owners of the disputed land when it
considered the evidence bearing on the ownership thereof. The CA found the disputed land, as security for
mortgage, was brought to the Justice of the Peace for Guminpin’s non-payment of debt, which was then
foreclosed and sold to Rudas. Guminpin failed to redeem the property within 12 months after foreclosure.

Issue:

Whether or not the final and executory judgement by the Justice of the Peace of Dipolog and the
subsequent execution proceedings in the enforcement therein had legal and binding effect.

Held:

Yes. The judgement rendered by the Justice of the Peace Court of Dipolog was subsequently enforced
by the writ of execution. Thus, the proceedings consequent thereto now assailed by petitioner as irregular,
anomalous, fraudulent, and null and void, had ipso facto attained the character of finality aside from the fact that
it stood unchallenged for more than 10 years in the same court proceedings.

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Case No. 95

Guerrero v. CA

Charlton Lee

Doctrine: Possession/ Tenancy relationship

Facts:

In 1969, the Guerrero spouses hired Benitez to look after their cows (which stay in their coconut plantation.
Benitez was allowed to put up a hut within the plantation, and he and his family ended up living there.

In addition to tending to the cows, Benitez cleaned the fruit bearing coconut trees, burned dried leaves and grass,
and did other similar chores. During harvest time, he was also the one who gathered and picked coconuts. He
was paid 500 a year for this.

Sometime in 1973, he was no longer allowed to gather coconuts from the land. Benitez was upset and brought
the matter to the attention of the Office of the Special Unit in the Office of the President. Benitez and the Guerrero
spouses ended up compromising and they allowed him to work on the land. They agreed that their relationship
would be governed by The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines.

A few months later, he was - again - no longer allowed to gather coconuts. The Guerrero spouses also threatened
to hurt him if he continued to gather coconuts. They hired two others to gather coconuts and demolished part of
Benitez’s house.

Issue:

WON plaintiff is a tenant or a mere farmworker

WON plaintiff was unlawfully dispossessed

Held:

The law defines agricultural tenancy as the physical possession of land devoted to agriculture for the purpose of
production through labor. Here, the landowner and tenant divide the harvest. The records establish Benitez’s
status as an agricultural tenant. Benitez has physically possessed the landholding from 1969 until he was ejected.
Such long standing possession is an essential distinction between an agricultural laborer and a tenant.

Benitez built a house on the land. A mere laborer would not build a house at his expense at the risk of losing the
same upon termination.

Benitez also cultivated the land - another factor that determines the existence of tenancy relationships. Cultivation
includes the promotion of growth / care of the plans, something Benitez and his family has been handling since
they were brought to the plantation.

Petitioners and respondents also had an agreement to share the produce of harvest. And in their agreement
Benitez was referred to as a tenant.

Respondent’s status as a tenant should be without question. ALSO tenants have a right to continue working until
the relationship is extinguished by law.

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Case No. 96

De Castro vs. Tan GR No. L-31956 ; April 30, 1984

Charlton Lee

Doctrine: Sale of residential land to an alien but now already in the hands of a naturalized Filipino citizen valid.—
Independently of the doctrine of pari delicto, the petitioner cannot have the sale annulled and recover the lot she
herself has sold. While the vendee was an alien at the time of the sale, the land has since become the property
of respondent Joaquin Teng, a naturalized Philippine citizen, who is constitutionally qualified to own land.

Facts:

Filomena Gerona de Castro sold a 1,258 square meter residential lot in Bulan, Sorsogon to Tan Tai, a Chinese.
In 1956, Tan Tai died leaving his widow To O. Hiap, and children Joaquin Teng Queen Tan, Tan Teng Bio,
Dolores Tan and Rosario Tan Hua Ing. Before the death of Tan Tai on August 11, 1956, one of his sons, Joaquin
became a naturalized Filipino. Six years after Tan Tai’s death, his heirs executed an extra judicial settlement of
estate with sale whereby the disputed lot in its entirely was allotted to Joaquin. Petitioner de Castro then
commenced a suit against the heirs of Tan Tai for annulment of the sale for alleged violation of the 1935
Constitution prohibiting the sale to aliens.

Issue:

Whether or not the deed of sale can be annulled because of Joaquin Teng’s qualification to own the residential
land in dispute

Held:

No, the court ruled that as per the doctrine of pari delicto, petitioner De Castro cannot have the sale annulled and
recover the lot she herself sold. Further, while the vendee was an alien at the time of the sale, the land since
become the property of respondent Joaquin Teng, a naturalized Filipino citizen, who is constitutionally qualified
to own land.

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Case No. 97

Medija vs. Patcho

G.R. No. L-30310 October 23, 1984

Charlton Lee

Doctrine: RES JUDICATA/ LACHES

Facts:

Civil Case No. 1884 was an action for partition and damages filed by Ernesto Patcho, Lauriana Patcho, Tarcila
Batilona, Simeon Batilona, Teodoro Baroro, Donata Baluran and Marcelino Baluran (defendants herein) against
their uncle Agripino Morante, Cirila Morante, Ignacio Patcho and Saturnino Medija (plaintiff-appellant herein).
The subject matter of the action were five parcels of land owned by the late Lorenzo Florante who died in 1943
leaving the plaintiffs (defendants herein) as heirs. They claimed that the defendants have been unlawfully holding
and using portions of the lands since the death of Lorenzo Florante.

After trial, the lower court held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish the allegations of their complaint and
dismissed the same. The case was elevated on appeal to the then Court of Appeals.

On October 22, 1963, the Court of Appeals reversed the same in favor of the plaintiffs for the partition of those
portions not yet partitioned among the heirs of Lorenzo Morante being unlawfully held by defendants since the
death of aforesaid Lorenzo Morante in 1943 and for the payment of the proportionate produce corresponding to
the legitimate shares of the plaintiffs from the year 1943 (pp. 41-42, Record on Appeal, p. 5, rec.).

The case was remanded to the Court of First Instance anew with the specific order to partition among the
corresponding heirs of Lorenzo Morante the portion of the lands left unpartitioned and to receive evidence on the
damages to be paid by the defendants to the plaintiffs (defendants herein) and thereafter to render judgment.

On April 17, 1967, the lower court issued its order embodying the partition of those undivided portions of the land
and the damages to be paid by the defendants

Thereafter, on March 16, 1968, Saturnino Medija filed a complaint in the same Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental. This is the present Civil Case No. 2665 for quieting of title and damages with prayer for preliminary
injunction.

The plaintiff-appellant alleged that he is the legal owner of two parcels of land situated at Dapacan Alto, Calamba,
Misamis Occidental

The complaint states that Parcel I had been acquired by plaintiff-appellant from the defendants by virtue of
documents of sale executed by the latter at various dates between the years 1948 and 1952 while Parcel II had
been acquired by the plaintiff-appellant from one Agripino Morante.

The defendants filed their answer on April 17, 1968. They alleged that the procurement of the title of the plaintiff-
appellant is tainted with bad faith and fraud.

Issue:

Whether or not there are latches in the case

Held:

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An estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to asset it (Tijam
et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29). Its essence is the doctrine of estoppel, a concept derived from American
law that aims to bring out justice between parties, through the operation of the principle that an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against
the person relying thereon (Report of the Code Commission, p. 59). In other words, it precludes a person from
denying or asserting anything to the contrary of that which has, in contemplation of law, been established as the
truth, either by the acts of judicial or legislative officials or by his own deed or representation, either expressed
or implied.

In the instant case, the complaint of appellant states that Parcel I had been acquired by plaintiff-appellant from
the defendants by virtue of documents of sale executed by the latter at various dates between the years 1948
and 1952, while Parcel II had been acquired by the plaintiff-appellant from one Agripino Morante (p. 3, Record
on Appeal, p. 5, rec.). If this were the case, he should have presented the deeds of sale when Civil Case No.
1884 was filed on May 10, 1956. He did not. Neither did he present any claim of ownership when Civil Case No.
1884 was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Appellant did not contest the partition and the assessment of
damages made by the lower court in its order dated April 17, 1967 in Civil Case No. 1884. It was only when Civil
Case No. 1884 was being executed that appellant moved to file a complaint for quieting of title in the same Court
of First Instance of Misamis Occidental. Such conduct cannot be allowed.

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Case No. 98

Burgos v. Chief of Staff of the Phils.

G.R. No. L-64261

Charlton Lee

Doctrine: Use of some documents seized as evidence by person from same were seized, in the case filed
against him, does not estop him from questioning validity of their seizure.

Facts: Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and
“We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners
prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized
articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated
only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.

Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Held:

The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical
error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the
application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two
warrant.

As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao
Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by
the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other
person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar,
petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This
being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property
susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application
of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been
mere generalizations.

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Case No. 99

Corro v. Lising

Charlton Lee

Doctrine: Probable cause required before a search warrant may issue.

Facts:

Respondent RTC Judge Esteban Lising, upon application filed by Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo of the Philippine
Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service, issued a search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of
articles allegedly used by petitioner in committing the crime of inciting to sedition.

1. Printed copies of Philippine Times;

2. Manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine Times;

3. Newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times;

4. Subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners;

5. Typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines, video machines and tapes

Petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to return documents/personal properties alleging among
others that the properties seized are typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording
machines, video machines and tapes which are not in any way, inanimate or mute things as they are, connected
with the offense of inciting to sedition.

Respondent Judge Lising denied the motion. Hence, this petition praying that the search warrant issued by
respondent Judge Esteban M. Lising be declared null and void ab initio that the padlocked office premises of
the Philippine Times be reopened.

Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition stating that probable cause exists justifying the issuance
of a search warrant, the articles seized were adequately described in the search warrant, a search was conducted
in an orderly manner and the padlocking of the searched premises was with the consent of petitioner's wife.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a sufficient probable cause for the issuance of search warrant.

Ruling:

NO. Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides:

SEC. 3. ...no search warrant or warrant of arrest issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.

and, Section 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court, states that:

SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination

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under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Probable cause may be defined as "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, as will warrant a
cautious man in the belief that his actions, and the means taken in prosecuting it, are legally just and proper
(Burton vs. St. Paul, M & M. Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 189, cited in U.S. vs. Addison, 28 Phil. 566)."

An application for search warrant must state with particularly the alleged subversive materials published or
intended to be published by the publisher and editor of the Philippine Times, Rommel Corro. As We have stated
in Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, 133 SCRA 800, "mere generalization will
not suffice."

A search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. "The evident
purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly
described in the search warrant- to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they
should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be committed, — that abuses may
not be committed.

The affidavit of Col. Castillo states that in several issues of the Philippine Times:

... we found that the said publication in fact foments distrust and hatred against the government of the Philippines
and its duly constituted authorities, defined and penalized by Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1835; (p. 22, Rollo)

and, the affidavit of Lt. Ignacio reads, among others—

... the said periodical published by Rommel Corro, contains articles tending to incite distrust and hatred for the
Government of the Philippines or any of its duly constituted authorities. (p. 23, Rollo)

The above statements are mere conclusions of law and will not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. They
cannot serve as basis for the issuance of search warrant, absent of the existence of probable cause.

In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed seizure of printed copies of the
Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper dummies, subversive documents,
articles, etc., and even typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines.

Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include all conceivable records and equipment of petitioner
regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a
general warrant which is constitutionally objectionable.

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Case No. 100
Tejido v. Zamacoma
138 SCRA 78 ( 1985)

Lomondot, Sitty Hafsha B.

Doctrine:

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
it or declined to assert it.

Facts:

Two big tracts of land (haciendas herein) were originally registered under the Torrens System as early as June
14, 1907 in the name of the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiff. Prior to March 20, 1925, the said registered
owners obtained a loan from the late Pedro Uriarte, predecessor-in-interest of herein defendants, mortgaging in
consideration the aforementioned haciendas in favour of said Pedro. For failure of the registered owners to pay
the loan, Pedro filed before the CFI for foreclosure. In 1925, a compromise agreement was entered into with
Pedro for and in consideration of certain concessions, wherein the ownership of said haciendas were ceded,
transferred and conveyed unto Pedro. Consequently, TCTs were issued in the name of Pedro. Thereafter,
subsequent transfers were made by Pedro, among them, in favour of defendants.

In 1971, plaintiffs filed before the CFI a complaint for recovery of inheritance, accounting and damages against
several defendants, among whom are the herein defendants, seeking to recover the haciendas. Defendants
moved to dismiss the complaint on 3 grounds, one of which is that the cause of action is barred by the statute of
limitations by reason of prescription and laches.

Issues:

Whether or not the plaintiffs are guilty of laches in being delayed in filing this action.

Held:

Yes. It is likewise inescapable that plaintiffs had slept on their rights for about forty-five (45) years (from 1926 to
1971) when the complaint in this case was filed. By their long inaction or inexcusable neglect, they should be
held barred from asserting their rights to the litigated property. 19

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
it or declined to assert it. It follows from the foregoing that defendants-appellees must be declared as they are
hereby declared the lawful owners of the disputed parcels involved in the case at bar.

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Case No. 101.
Sps. Cimafranca v. IAC
147 SCRA 611 (Jan 31, 1987)
Lomondot, Sitty Hafsha B.

Doctrine:

An estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it

Facts:

Lot No. 86 was originally registered in 1919 in the names of Simplicia Bagsican, a widow; Delfina Gurdiel; Pedro
Gurdiel and Cristeto Gurdiel. In 1917, a portion of said lot was sold by Pedro to Perfecto Jalosjos, defendant’s
father. Simplicia died in 1934 and was survived by her children Delfina, Pedro and Cristeto. Delfina died in 1939
and was survived by her children while Cristeto just before the disappeared and was never heard, therefore
presumed dead.

In 1958, Pedro and the heirs of Delfina executed a deed of extrajudicial partition and confirmation of previous
sale. In the same document, Pedro further confirmed and ratified the sale made by him many years ago of ¼
interest in the said lot to Perfecto. Thereafter, TCT No. T-4569 was issued in the names of Pedro Gurdiel, ¾
share and Perfecto Jalosjos, ¼ share.

Afterwards, it was found out in a survey that the portion occupied by the petitioners had an area of 487 sqm while
the portion occupied by the private respondents had a an area of 1,109 sqm. Petitioners then filed a complaint
for partition and damages seeking the partition of the property in question and the reconveyance by private
respondents of the excess portion they had been allegedly illegally occupying.

Issues:

Whether or not after the lapse of fourteen (I 4) years respondent can still question the validity of the deed of
extrajudicial partition and subsequently TCT No. T-4569.

Held:

No.

An action for reconveyance of real property on the ground of fraud must be filed within four (4) years from the
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the certificates of title.
Respondents had only four years from October, 1958 or until 1962 to bring this action which respondents failed
to do.

Moreover, the records show that respondents and their predecessors can be charged not only with constructive
notice but with actual notice of the fraud, if any, in 1958, as welt. As pointed out by petitioners, an employee of
the Registry of Deeds testified that the ]person who presented the 1958 deed of partition for registration in the
Office of the Registry of Deeds was the late Perfecto Jalosjos himself and it was respondent Aracelita Jalosjos
who received owner's copy of TCT No. T-4569 and delivered the copy to her father who was still alive at that
time.

For laches to attach, the following elements must be present: (1) Conduct on the part of the defendant or one
under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks
remedy; (2) Delay in asserting the complainant's right, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the
defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) Lack of knowledge or notice

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on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) Injury
or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred

Respondents have not taken any step to have the deed of extrajudicial partition corrected, if it is true as they
claim it is, that what had been sold to their father is ¾ share of Lot 86 instead of ¼ share. It is now both too late
and bereft of basis to ask for the cancellation of TCT No. T-4569. In action and neglect of a party to assert a right
can convert a valid claim into a stale demand. An estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it

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Case No. 102

Amerol v. Bagumbaran

154 SCRA 396 (Sept 30, 1987)


Lomondot, Sitty Hafsha B.
Doctrine:

An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribed in ten years and
not otherwise.

Facts:

Respondent alleged that such subject land have been forcibly entered into by the petitioners and which
respondent now wants to recover possession. Respondent was given due course as a result of which Free Patent
was issued and duly registered with the office of the Register of Deeds whereupon an Original Certificate of Title
was duly issued, owner’s duplicate certificate having been furnished the respondent.

Petitioner had never known of respondent’s free patent application. Since the date he purchased the land from
Tondo, said petitioner has been and up to the present in continuous occupation and cultivation of the same.
Petitioner did not take appropriate action to annul the patent and title of the respondent within 1 year from the
issuance and that the 1st step taken by him to contest said patent and title was a formal protest dated 1964 after
the lapse of 9 years from the issuance of patent in favour of the respondent. The 2nd step he took was his
counterclaim reiterating his stand that respondent secured patent by means of deceit and fraud, wherefore,
petitioner prayed that said title be annulled or alternatively, plaintiff be ordered to reconvey such land to petitioner.

Issue:

What is the prescriptive period of an action for reconveyance of real property which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered under the Torrens System in another’s name.

Held:

The prescriptive period for such an action for reconveyance, as this case, is 10 years. The point of reference is,
or the 10-year prescriptive period commences to run from, the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over
the real property. Indubitably, the act of respondent in misrepresenting that he was in actual possession and
occupation of the property in question, obtaining a patent and Original Certificate of Title No. P- 466 in his name,
created an implied trust in favor of the actual possessor of the said property.

An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribed in ten years and
not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule.
Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. The only discordant note, it seems,
is Balbin vs. Medalla, which states that the prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is four years. However,
this variance can be explained by the erroneous reliance on Gerona vs. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the fraud
was discovered on June 25, 1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190, was applied, the new Civil Code not
coming into effect until August 30, 1950 as mentioned earlier. It must be stressed at this juncture that Article
1144 and Article 1456, are new provisions. They have no counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of
Civil Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period for an action
for reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false pretenses.

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Case No. 103

Marquez v. CA
300 SCRA 653 (Dec 29, 1998)
Lomondot, Sitty Hafsha B.

Doctrine:

It is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from
the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.

Facts:

Spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr and Felicidad Marquez begot 12 children. In 1945, the spouses acquired a parcel
of land, more particularly described in TCT No. 47572, wherein they constructed their conjugal home. Felicidad
died intestate.

Thirty years later or in 1982, Rafael Sr. executed an affidavit of adjudication, vesting unto himself sole ownership
to the property. The aforementioned TCT was cancelled and TCT No. 33350 was issued in his name.

In 1983, Rafael Sr. executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos covering the land as well as the house constructed
to 3 of his children (2 of which are private respondents), to the exclusion of his other children, petitioners herein.
As a result, TCT No. 47572 was issued in private respondent’s name.

When petitioners learned about the existence of TCT No. 47572, they immediately demanded that since they are
also children of Rafael Sr., they are also entitled to their respective shares over the land in question.

Petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyance and partition with damages before the trial court alleging that both
the affidavit of adjudication and the deed of donation inter vivos were fraudulent since the private respondents
took advantage of the advanced age of their father. Private respondents argued that petitioner’s action was
already barred by the statute of limitations, since the same should have been filed within 4 years from the date
of discovery of the alleged fraud.

Issues:

Whether or not the action for reconveyance has prescribed.

Held:

As such, when Rafael Marquez Sr., for one reason or another, misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he
was the only heir of his wife when in fact their children were still alive, and managed to secure a transfer of
certificate of title under his name, a constructive trust under Article 1456 was established. Constructive trusts
are created in equity in order to prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by
fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal, right to property which he ought not, in equity
and good conscience, to hold.

In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in
ten years from the isuance of the Torrens title over the property. 13 For the purpose of this case, the prescriptive
period shall start to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued, which was on June 16, 1982. Thus, considering that
the action for reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or approximately nine years later, it is evident that
prescription had not yet barred the action.

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Case No. 104

Caro v. CA
180 SCRA 401 (Dec 20, 1989)
Lomondot, Sitty Hafsha B.

Doctrine:

The erroneous application of the 4-year prescriptive period in an action for reconveyance based on implied trust
has been corrected, which should be 10 years from the date of the registration of the deed or the issuance of the
title.

Facts:

In 1946, Simeon Gallego bought a parcel of land, which was later on sold to Epifanio Caro in 1948. In 1962,
Epifanio Caro purchased 2 different parcels of land. Caro then had those 3 parcels of land surveyed and were
then designated as Lot No. 54 and the land claimed by the private respondents as Lot No. 55.

The private respondents claim that the questioned land was formerly owned by Pascuala Lacson and was
declared in her name under a tax declaration. Pascuala was married to Domingo Ronzales. Long before World
War 2, private respondents and their predecessor in interest had been living on the questioned land when Caro
bought a parcel of land from Gallego.

In 1964, another survey was conducted. The parcels of land claimed by Caro were denominated as Lot No.54
and the land claimed by the private respondents was denominated as Lot No. 55. Caro filed an answer for Lot
No. 54 and Purificacion, mother of private respondent Jose Ronzales, Jr. filed an answer for Lot. No. 55. No
other person or persons filed an answer for Lot. No. 55. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-6836
was issued in the names of the private respondents.

In 1975, Caro filed a complaint before the CFI (Civil Case No. 10235) for cancellation of Certificate of Title No .
0-6836, reconveyance, recovery of possession and damages on the ground of fraud. During the pendency of the
case, Caro died, so he was substituted by his heirs.

Issues:

Whether or not the action in Civil Case No. 10235 has prescribed.

Held:

The law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the
true owner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil
Code with Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code, supra, the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently
registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. In the
present case, therefore, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 10235 was filed on June 4, 1975, it was well-within the
prescriptive period of ten (10) years from the date of the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-6836 on
September 17, 1970.

Unfortunately for the petitioners, however, We agree with the respondent court and the trial court that the private
respondents did not employ any fraud in securing title to the questioned land. It is clear, therefore, that as early
as 1948, Epifanio Caro was already aware of the adverse claim of the private respondents. He should have been
vigilant of his right as the allegedly new owner of the questioned land. What he did was the reverse, he slept on
his rights for a number of years

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Case No. 105

Alfredo vs Borras G.R. No. 144225

Veronica Vera Socorro V. Lumantas

Doctrine: Prescriptive period in an action for reconveyance based on implied trust is ten years from the date of
registration of the deed or the issuance of the title.

Facts: In 1970, Spouses Carmen and Godofredo sold the Subject Land in favor of Armando and Adelia where it
was orally entered into and not in writing.

In January 1994, Armando and Adelia discovered that Godofredo and Carmen had re-sold portions of the Subject
Land to several persons which prompted them to seek reconveyance of the property from the Subsequent
Buyers.

Issue: Whether the action to enforce the alleged oral contract of sale brought after 24 years from its alleged
perfection had been barred by prescription and by laches.

Ruling: No, Action Not Barred by Prescription and Laches

To determine when the prescriptive period commenced in an action for reconveyance, plaintiff’s possession of
the disputed property is material. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years.
The ten-year prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the
plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains
in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run
against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for
quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.

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Case No. 106

Government Service Insurance System v. Santiago G.R. No. 155206

Veronica Vera Socorro V. Lumantas

Doctrine: Registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but the Torrens title does not
furnish a shield for fraud.

Facts:
Spouses Jose Zulueta and Soledad Ramos obtained various loans from GSIS from 1956 to 1957
secured by real estate mortgages over their parcels of land. The Zuluetas failed to pay their loans to defendant
GSIS and the latter foreclosed the real estate mortgages. On August 1974, the mortgaged properties were sold
at public auction with defendant GSIS being the highest bidder. Not all lots covered by the mortgaged titles,
however, were sold. Ninety-one (91) lots were expressly excluded from the auction since the lots were sufficient
to pay for all the mortgage debts.
Thereafter, GSIS caused the issuance of titles in its name over the subject lots, notwithstanding that
these were expressly excluded from the foreclosure sale.
On May 7, 1990, Antonio Vic Zulueta, represented by Eduardo M. Santiago, filed a complaint for
reconveyance of real estate against the GSIS.
The petitioner, as defendant therein, filed its answer alleging inter alia that the action was barred by the
statute of limitations and/or laches and that the complaint stated no cause of action.

Issue: Whether or not Petitioner’s defense on prescription is tenable

Ruling: NO. The petitioner’s defense of prescription is untenable. As held by the CA, the general rule that the
discovery of fraud is deemed to have taken place upon the registration of real property because it is "considered
a constructive notice to all persons" does not apply in this case. The CA correctly cited the cases of Adille v.
Court of Appeals and Samonte v. Court of Appeals, where this Court reckoned the prescriptive period for the filing
of the action for reconveyance based on implied trust from the actual discovery of fraud.

In ruling that the action had not yet prescribed despite the fact that more than ten years had lapsed between the
date of registration and the institution of the action for reconveyance, the Court in Adille ratiocinated:

It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been our
holding that the Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of
registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing
rule that registration operates as a universal notice of title.

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Case No. 107

Heirs of Saludares v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 128254

Veronica Vera Socorro V. Lumantas

Doctrine: Exception to prescription of actions - There is one instance when prescription cannot be invoked in an
action for reconveyance. That is, when the plaintiff is in position of the land to be reconveyed.

Facts: A parcel of land was owned by spouses Juan Dator and Pomposa Saludares, known as the Tanza estate.
Pomposa died and the surviving heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of the share of the Tanza estate.
Isabel Dator, one of the compulsory heirs, applied for a free patent over the entire Tanza estate in behalf of the
heirs thus it was awarded.
Private respondents filed an action for reconveyance against petitioner heirs. They alleged that they
were the owners in fee simple and they were in possession of the land, and Isabel Dator obtained free patent in
favor of the heirs by means of fraud and misrepresentation.
Petitioners alleged that they and their predecessors in interest had been in actual, continuous, adverse
and public possession of the land in the concept of owners since time immemorial, and the title to the lot was
issued to them after faithful compliance with the requirements for the issuance of a free patent.

Issue: WON the reconveyance and cancellation of title before the trial court eleven (11) years after a torrens title
over the property was issued in the name of the petitioners (had) prescribed.

Ruling: Yes. In a series of cases, this Court permitted the filing of an action for reconveyance despite the lapse
of ten years and declared that said action, when based on fraud, is imprescriptible as long as the land has not
passed to an innocent purchaser for value. But in all those cases including Vital vs. Anore on which the appellate
court based its assailed decision, the common factual backdrop was that the registered owners were never in
possession of the disputed property. Instead, it was the persons with the better right or the legal owners of the
land who had always been in possession of the same. Thus, the Court allowed the action for reconveyance to
prosper in those cases despite the lapse of more than ten years from the issuance of title to the land. The
exception was based on the theory that registration proceedings could not be used as a shield for fraud or for
enriching a person at the expense of another.

In the case at bar, however, it is the rule rather than the exception which should apply.

Even assuming that private respondents indeed validly acquired Lot in 1966 as they claimed, they nevertheless
slept on their right to secure title thereto. Their unexplained inaction for more than 11 years rendered their
demand for reconveyance stale.

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Case No. 108

Vitug v. Court of Appeals

183 SCRA 755

Veronica Vera Socorro V. Lumantas

Doctrine: A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person
disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death."

Facts: Husband and Decedent Wife executed a Survivorship Agreement with the Bank that after the death of
either of them, the money in their joint savings account would belong to the survivor.

Issue: Is the agreement valid?

Ruling: Yes, such agreement is valid. The conveyance is not a will because in a will, a person disposes of his
property. In this case, the bank account is part of the conjugal funds. Neither is the agreement a donation inter
vivos because it takes effect after death. It is a mere obligation with a term, the term being death.

A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes
of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death."

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Case No. 109

Maninang vs CA
GR no. L-57848
June 12, 1982

Mambuay, Nurhabib B.

Doctrine: Probate of the will is mandatory, general rule

Facts: Clemencia Aseneta left a holographic will when she died. In the said will, she left all of her properties to
Maninang and left nothing for her nephew and niece, as well as her adopted son whom she claimed made her
do things against her will.

Her adopted son opposed the probate, claiming pretiration. Maninang countered that it is a probate
proceeding hence, only the extrincict validity is the issue. The lower court granted the motion to dismissed the
probate proceedings.

Issues: Whether the dismissal of the Testate Case is proper.

Ruling: No, it is not.

Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory.


No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court.
The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is probated
and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be
rendered nugatory.
The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the
testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills.
It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency (sic) of the provisions, these may
be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The que0stions relating to these points
remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in Probate
proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law.

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Case No. 110

Ralla vs Untalan
GR no. L-63253-54
April 27, 1989

Mambuay, Nurhabib B.

Doctrine: Probate of the will is mandatory, no partition till after the probate of the will.

Facts: Rosendo Ralla filed a petition to probate his own will. Desiring to leave his entire estate to his son, Pablo,
while leaving his other son, Pedro nothing. Later on, Pablo filed a motion to dismiss the probate on the ground
that he is no longer interested in the allowance of the will but this motion was denied. The court declared Pablo
and Pedro as the only heirs of Rosendo.
Meanwhile, Pedro filed an action for the partition of the estate of their mother. The brothers then extra
judicially partitioned the parcels of land forming the estate of their mother, Paz Escarella, dividing it between the
two of them.
Several years later, Joaquin Chancoco filed a petition for the probate of the will of Rosendo Ralla on the
ground that the decedent owed him money. Teodorico Aimine was appointed special administrator. Pedro
objected the these. The heirs of Pedro moved to exclude from the estate of Rosendo the parcels of land from the
estate of Paz. Respondent Judge ruled that the parcels of land should be included and that the Probate
Proceedings filed by both Rosendo and Joaquin should proceed. Pedro's heirs sought reconsideration for the
exclusion of the parcels of land. It was granted.

Issue: Whether the partition done by the brothers are valid.

Ruling: YES, it is valid.

Verily, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will has been probated.
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the win.
Thus the rule invoked is inapplicable in this instance where there are two separate cases (Civil Case No. 2023
for partition, and Special Proceedings No. 564 originally for the probate of a will), each involving the estate of a
different person (Paz Escarella and Rosendo Ralla, respectively) comprising dissimilar properties.

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Case: 111

Mang-oy vs CA
GR no. L-27421
Sept 12, 1986

Mambuay, Nurhabib B.

Doctrine: Probate of the will is mandatory, exception, Article 1080 of the New Civil Code

Facts: Old Man Tumpao had 3 children during his first marriage. His second wife had 2 adopted children when
they got married.
He left a will giving his son Bando administrative powers over his estate given that he shall change
nothing in his already stated disposition. The beneficiaries named at that time were already occupying the
portions allotted to them. In the implementation, they also executed an agreement. They remained in possession
of the lots assigned to them.
Years later, private respondents executed an extrajudicial partition in which they divided the property of
their father among the three of them only. Petitioners learned of this title, hence they are suing for reconveyance.
Trial court sustained but was reversed by the CA.

Issue: Whether the extrajudicial partion of the siblings valid despite the lack of probate of the will.

Ruling: Yes, it is valid.


The settled principle, as announced in a long line of decisions in accordance with the Rules of Court, is
that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved or allowed in court.
We find, however, that the document may be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of
1899, which was in force at the time the said document was executed by Old Man Tumpao in 1937. The said
article reads as follows:
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivos, or by win, such
partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.

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Case: 112

Acain vs IAC
GR no. 72706
Oct 27, 1987

Mambuay, Nurhabib B.

Doctrine: Probate does not look into Instrinsic Validity, exeption, when on the face of the will there is pretiration

Facts: Nemesio Acain left a will stating that he is giving his properties to his brother, Segundo or in case his
brother pre-deceased him will be left to the children of Segundo.
One of Segundo's children filed an action to probate the will. It was opposed by Nemesio's wife and
adopted child, claiming they were pretirated.

Issue: Whether the probate courts can look beyond extrinsic validity of the will and include intrinsic validity.

Ruling: YES, the probate courts can include intrinsic validity of the will.
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent Court, the
general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or
efficacy of the provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra;
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and
Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 [1985]).
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is
not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will
(Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss
on the ground of absolute preteriton The probate court acting on the motion held that the will in question was a
complete nullity and dismissed
the petition without costs. On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by
practical considerations. The Court said:
"We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On
the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or
if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue
of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are
the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity
of the provisions of the will in question. After all there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution."

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 145


Case: 113

Nufable vs Nufable
GR no. 126950
July 2, 1999

Mambuay, Nurhabib B.

Doctrine: Probate Proceedings are limited only to passing upon the extrinsic validity of the will, general rule.

Facts: Edras Nufable died and was survived by his children. His children filed for an action to probate his will
and after it was admitted, the court approved the settlement of the estate submitted by the children. In it, they
agreed that the parcel of land remain undivided.

However, previously, Angel, one of his children, mortgage the entire property to DBP. It was then
foreclosed by DBP. Nelson, the son of Angel, purchased the said land from DBP.

The other children of Edras opposed the actions of Nelson, they filed a complaint to annul fraudulent
transactions and to Quite Title, and To Recover Damages. They claimed that 3/4 of the land belonged to them
and that the 3/4 should be declared as such. Nelson, on the other hand claimed that Angel was the exclusive
owner and had the right to mortgage the property, and him buying the foreclosed property became the sole
owner. The trial court sided with Nelson, while the CA reversed the decision.

Issue: Whether the will validly disposed of the decedent's estate.

Ruling: Yes, the will was admitted by the probate court and the heirs' settlement was approved.

As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited only to passing upon the extrinsic validity of
the will sought to be probated, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance
with the requisites or solemnities prescribes by law. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called to
rule on the rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the will.6 The question of the intrinsic validity of a will normally
comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.

The records show that upon petition for probate filed by the heirs of the late Esdras Nufable, an Order
dated March 30, 1966 was issued by then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, Branch II, admitting to
probate the last will and testament executed by the decedent.7 Thereafter, on June 6, 1966, the same court
approved the Settlement of Estate submitted by the heirs of the late Esdras Nufable wherein they agreed "(T)hat
the parcel land situated in Poblacion Manjuyod, Negros Oriental remains undivided for community ownership but
respecting conditions imposed therein (sic) in the will."8 In paragraph 3 thereof, they stated that "they have no
objection as to the manner of disposition of their share made by the testator, the expenses of the proceeding and
that they have already taken possession of their respective shares in accordance with the will." Verily, it was the
heirs of the late Esdras Nufable who agreed among themselves on the disposition of their shares. The probate
court simply approved the agreement among the heirs which approval was necessary for the validity of any
disposition of the decedent's estate.

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 146


Case No. 114

NUGUID vs. NUGUID


Jorg Fermin B. Maturan

Doctrine: Difference between Preterition and Disinheritance

Facts:
Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Survived by her legitimate parents; Felix
and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.

Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the
former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that
letter of administration be issued to her.

Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as
universal heir of the deceased, oppositors – who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line – were illegally
preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void.

Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of
heir.

Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of
preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.

Issue:
Whether the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir preterited the
compulsory heirs.

Ruling:
Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the
direct ascending line,her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits
their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.
Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because
they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited”. Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in
the legitime for a cause authorized by law”.

Where the one sentence will institute the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents of the
testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is void.
And intestate succession ensues.

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Case No. 115
SUMILANG vs. RAMAGOSA
Jorg Fermin B. Maturan

Doctrine: Probate of will of last will and testament

Facts:
Mariano Sumilang filed a petition for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will and testament
of Hilarion Ramagosa. Said document institutes Mariano as the sole heir of the testator.

The petition was opposed by two Saturnina Ramagosa, who questioned the due execution of the
document, claiming that it was made under duress and was not really intended by the deceased to be his last
will and testament. Saturnino and Santiago Ramagosa also claimed that they, instead of Mariano, were entitled
to inherit the estate of the deceased.

After Mariano presented evidence and rested his case, oppositors moved for the dismissal of the petition
on the ground that decedent revoked his will by implication of law six years before his death by selling the parcels
of land to Mariano Sumilang and his brother Mario so that at the time of the testator's death, the titles to said
lands were no longer in his name.

On the other hand, Mariano moved to strike out oppositors pleadings on the ground that the oppositors
have no interest in the probate of the will as they have no relationship with the decedent within the fifth degree.
The lower court ruled in favor of Mariano stating that the allegations of the oppositors go to the very intrinsic
value of the will and since the oppositors have no standing to oppose the probate of the will as they are strangers,
their pleadings are ordered stricken out from the record.

Issue:

Whether the probate court should pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will.

Ruling:

The petition being for the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity
only. The testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed
by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or
efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.

To establish conclusively as against everyone and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with
the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings for the probate of a will. The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing
more.

The alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing the validity
of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary
capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution

The revocation invoked by the oppositors is not an express one, but merely implied from subsequent
acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the
properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely the particular devise or
legacy.

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Case No. 116
VDA. DE KLAYKO vs. TENGCO
Jorg Fermin B. Maturan

Doctrine: Probate of will for the settlement of the estate

Facts:
Maria Lizares died and left her "testamento" in the possession and custody of her niece, Eustaquia
Lizares, who later filed a petition for the settlement of her estate. The probate court declared the will probated
and appointed Eustaquia as the executrix of the estate of Maria Lizares.

Eustaquia filed a project of partition, which was granted by the probate court. Eustaquia then filed an
urgent motion to reopen the testate proceedings in order that some properties of Maria Lizares which had been
omitted in the partition be adjudicated to her which was granted by the Court.

Eustaquia Lizares died single without any descendant. Celsa Vda. De Kilayko then filed a motion in
Special Proceedings to reopen once again the testate estate proceedings of Maria lizares.

The intestate heirs of the deceased Eustaquia then alleged that the court had no more jurisdiction to
reopen the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares as the order of closure had long become final and that
the testamentary provisions sought to be enforced are null and void

Later, the Court issued an order denying the motion to reopen the testate proceedings and holding that
inasmuch as the settlement of an estate is a proceeding in rem, the judgment therein is binding against the whole
world.

Issue:

Whether there can be a valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated.

Ruling:

No. In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and
notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered
nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the
testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a
will.

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Case No. 117

CORONADO vs. CA
Jorg Fermin B. Maturan

Doctrine: Probate of will for the transfer of ownership

Facts:
The property subject of this case is a parcel of land situated in Laguna. Said parcel of land is being
contested by Juana Albovias, herein private respondent.

Juana Albovias claims that the property in question is a portion of a bigger lot referred to as Parcel G in the last
will and testament executed by Melecio Artiaga, grandfather of JUANA and that the bigger lot was inherited under
that will by JUANA and others.
She further claims that her property was included together with the two parcels of land owned by Dalmacio
Monterola, which were sold by Monterola's successor-in-interest Leonida Coronado to Melania Retizos who in
turn sold the lots, including that one being claimed by JUANA, to the spouse Bernardino Buenaseda and Jovita
Montefalcon, now the present possessors thereof. Leonida Coronado and her co-petitioners claim that the
property in question was bequeathed to Leonida Coronado under a Will executed by Dr. Dalmacio Monterola.
Said will was probated but was opposed by Juana together with her husband.
As a result of the conflicting claims over the property in question, JUANA filed an action for quieting of title,
declaratory relief and damages against CORONADO.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of JUANA.

Issue:
Whether or not the transfer for ownership was ineffectual since the will was never probated.

Ruling:
While it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
the proper court under Article 838 of the Civil Code. The questioned will, however, may be sustained on the basis
of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time said document was executed by Melecio
Artiaga.
Under Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivos, or by
will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heir.
In this case, nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida Coronado is entitled to legitime from Melecio
Artiaga. The truth of the matter is that the record is bereft of any showing that Leonida Coronado and the late
Melecio Artiaga were related to each other.

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Case No. 118

ICASIANO vs. ICASIANO


Jorg Fermin B. Maturan
Doctrine: Probate of will of the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature.

Facts:
Celso icasiano filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and for his appointment as
executor thereof. It appears from the evidence that the testatrix died on September 12, 1958. She executed a
will in Tagalog and through the help of her lawyer it was prepared in duplicates, an original and a carbon copy.

On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the original copy of the will while
the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to sign one of the pages in the
original copy but admitted he may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead when he signed the will.
Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was signed by the testator and other witnesses in his presence.

Issue:

Whether the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his signature to a page is sufficient to
deny the probate of the will.

Ruling:

No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere inadvertence. Since the duplicated
bore the required signatures, this proves that the omission was not intentional. Even if the original is in existence,
a duplicate may still be admitted to probate since the original is deemed to be defective, then in law, there is no
other will but the duly signed carbon duplicates and the same can be probated. The Court holding that the will
and its duplicate are valid in all respects and satisfied that all the requisites for the validity of a will have been
complied with.

The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the
inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to
guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or
deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites.

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Case No. 119
Abangan v. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919)

Niño Jesus G. Murillo

Doctrine: In determining the extrinsic validity of the will, substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose
of the law has been satisfied.

Facts: Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first of which contains all of the disposition of the testatrix,
duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three
witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three
instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three
witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and these omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects
whereby the probate of the will should have been denied.

Issues: Should the will be admitted to probate?

Ruling: Yes, the object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore,
the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other
hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise
of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the
testator's last will, must be disregarded.

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Case No. 120

Rey v. Cartagena, 56 Phil. 282, 284-285 (1931)

Niño Jesus G. Murillo

Doctrine: In the interpretation of the solemnities required by law to a will, the court must bear in mind that that
purpose of the law is not to curtail the exercise of the right to make a will, but to safeguard it; and where a will
has been executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and
fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said will should be admitted to probate.

Facts: Rosario Rey filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the probate of the will of the deceased
Agustina Celiz. She also asked that she be appointed administratrix of the estate. To said petition Guillermo
Cartagena and four others filed an opposition, alleging that said will, Exhibit A, was not the last will and testament
of the deceased Agustina Celiz; that the signature appearing thereon was not her signature, and that said will
was not executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Upon the issue thus presented the cause
was brought on for trial. After hearing the evidence Conrado Barrios, auxiliary judge, reached the conclusion that
said will, Exhibit A, was the last will and testament of the deceased Agustina Celiz, and that it was executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law, and rendered a judgment admitting said will to probate. From
that judgment the opponents appealed, and now allege that the lower court erred in declaring that said will was
executed in compliance with the requisites of the law. Appellants earnestly contend that the attestation clause
fails to show that the witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof because it simply says “that we
the witnesses also signed in the presence of the testatrix and of each other”

Issues: Whether the attestation clause of said will is in accordance with the requirements of section 618 of Act
No. 190

Ruling: Yes, with reference to the sufficiency of said attestation clause, we are of the opinion that the same is in
substantial conformity with the requirements of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended. Said attestation clause,
among other things states: (a) That the will, Exhibit A, is composed of six pages; (b) that the testatrix signed the
same and on all the margins thereof in the presence of the witnesses; and (c) that the witnesses also signed in
the presence of the testatrix and in the presence of each other. This word also should, therefore, be given its full
meaning which, in the instant case, is that the witnesses signed the will in the same manner as the testratrix did.

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Case No. 121

Rodriquez v. Yap, 68 Phil. 126,128 (1939)


Niño Jesus G. Murillo

Doctrine: There should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the will in order to ensure its
authenticity, but at the same time we believe that formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do
not affect this purpose and which, when taken into account, may defeat the testator's will.

Facts: The probate of the will of deceased Josefa Ylana was denied, the court relied on the fact that the
attestation clause is substantially defective because of not containing the declaration that the testatrix signed at
the foot of the will in the presence of the witnesses or that the witnesses signed on the margin of its pages in the
presence of the testatrix and of each other.

Issues: Whether the will should be allowed probate.

Ruling: Yes, the drafting of the attestation clause of this will is not, technically, free from criticism, but it is
substantially in compliance with the law. The attestation clause states (c) that, as the testatrix did not know how
to write, her name was written by Celestino Rodriguez under her direction and in her presence and that of her
witnesses. While not so stated, this can only refer to the foot of the will, and not to the margin of the pages
thereof, because there is added, (b) that the name of the testatrix was written in all its pages, which would
otherwise have been necessary. The attestation clause also states that the witnesses signed the will in the
presence of the testatrix and of each other. While it is also stated that these signatures were written on the left
margin of the pages of the will, it should be so understood in view of the fact that these witnesses only signed on
the left margin of the pages of the will, for otherwise it would not be a fact that they, as they state, signed the will.

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Case No. 122

Leynez v. Leynez, 68 Phil. 745, 750 (1939)

Niño Jesus G. Murillo

Doctrine: Substantial compliance is sufficient in determining the extrinsic validity of the will.

Facts: The attestation clause of the controverted will failed to state that the testator and the three witnesses
signed each and every page of the will in the manner prescribed by law. There was a contention that the
requirement that the attestation clause, among other things, shall state "that the testator signed the will and every
page thereof in the presence of three witnesses, and that the witnesses signed the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other," was not complied with.

Issue: Is this attestation clause legally sufficient?

Ruling: Yes, an attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts
attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other
casualty, they may still be proved. A will, therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the
purpose of the law. The law-making body, in recognition of the dangers to which testamentary dispositions are
apt to be subject in the hands of unscrupulous individuals, has surrounded the execution of the wills with every
solemnity deemed necessary to safeguard it. This purpose was indicated when our legislature provided for the
exclusion of evidence aliunde to prove the execution of the will. We should not, however, attribute the prohibition
as indicative of a desire to impose unreasonable restraint or beyond what reason and justice permit. It could not
have been the intention of the legislature in providing for the essential safeguards in the execution of a will to
shackle the very right of testamentary disposition which the law recognizes and holds sacred.

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Case No. 123

Roxas v. De Jesus, Jr, GR No. L-38338, 28 Jan 1985, 134 SCRA 245, 249

Niño Jesus G. Murillo

Doctrine: If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although compliance is
not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is actually attained
by the form followed by the testator.

Facts: Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas was appointed administrator of the estate of the deceased Bibiana R. de
Jesus. Petitioner testified that after his appointment as administrator, he found a notebook belonging to the
deceased containing a letter-will addressed to her children and entirely written and signed by her hand. The will
is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my will which I want to be respected although it is not written by a
lawyer…”. Respondent Judge Colayco initially allowed the will probate. However, Respondent Luz Roxas de
Jesus filed a motion for reconsideration and alleged that the holographic Will of the deceased was not dated as
required by Article 810 of the Civil Code. She contends that the law requires that the Will should contain the day,
month and year of its execution and that this should be strictly complied with. Respondent Judge Colayco
reconsidered his earlier order and disallowed the probate of the holographic Will.

Issues: Whether the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus
is a valid compliance with the Article 810.

Ruling: Yes. The objection interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that the holographic Will is
fatally defective because the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will is not sufficient compliance with
Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to be entertained. As a general rule, the "date" in a
holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar,
there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is
established and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid
compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the
principle of substantial compliance.

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Case No. 124

226 SCRA 347 1993

ALAVARDO V GAVIOLA, JR.

LEIAN KAE NADUMA

DOCTRINE

Formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose

FACTS

“Huling Habilin” wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son, petitioner Cesar Alvarado, and expressly revoked a
previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate before the RTC of Laguna. According to Bayani
Ma. Rino, private respondent, he was present when the said notarial will was executed, together with three
instrumental witnesses and the notary public, where the testator did not read the will himself, suffering as he did
from glaucoma.

Rino, a lawyer, drafted the eight-page document and read the same aloud before the testator, the three
instrumental witnesses and the notary public, the latter four following the reading with their own respective copies
previously furnished them. Thereafter, a codicil entitled “Kasulatan ng Pagbabago ng Ilang Pagpapasiya na
Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado” was executed changing some
dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the testator’s eye operation. Said codicil was likewise not
read by Brigido Alvarado and was read in the same manner as with the previously executed will.
When the notarial will was submitted to the court for probate, Cesar Alvarado filed his opposition as he said that
the will was not executed and attested as required by law; that the testator was insane or mentally incapacitated
due to senility and old age; that the will was executed under duress, or influence of fear or threats; that it was
procured by undue pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary; and that the signature of the testator
was procured by fraud or trick.

ISSUE

W/N notarial will of Brigido Alvarado should be admitted to probate despite allegations of defects in the execution
and attestation thereof as testator was allegedly blind at the time of execution and the double-reading requirement
under Art. 808 of the NCC was not complied with.

RULING

YES. The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance
with the substantial requirements of law in order to ensure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections
should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only
defeat the testator’s will.

Cesar Alvardo was correct in asserting that his father was not totally blind (of counting fingers at 3 feet) when the
will and codicil were executed, but he can be so considered for purposes of Art. 808.

That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil.

However, in the case at bar, there was substantial compliance where the purpose of the law has been satisfied:
that of making the provisions known to the testator who is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when
he is illiterate) and enabling him to object if they do not accord with his wishes.

Rino read the testator’s will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses,
and the notary public.

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Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with
his instructions.

Only then did the signing and acknowledgment take place. There is no evidence that the contents of the will and
the codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. With four persons, mostly known
to the testator, following the reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the
testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten
documents.

The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the
will to himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to
object if they are not in accordance with his wishes.

Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of law in order to ensure the
authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and
which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator’s will.

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Case No. 125

139 SCRA 206 (1985)

NEPOMUCENO V CA

LEIAN KAE NADUMA

DOCTRINE

Compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law

FACTS

In 1974, Martin Jugo died and left a last will and testament. In said will, the testator named petitioner as executor
of his estate. It is clearly stated in the will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by
whom he had two legitimate children. Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his
lawful wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, testator and petitioner were married
before a Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, his legal wife and children, and the free
portion thereof to petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the will and asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary.
Private respondents filed an opposition. Lower court denied the probat of the will. Petitioner appealed to
respondent court, which set aside lower court’s decision. Respondent court declared the will to be valid except
the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil
Code.

ISSUES

W/N respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will?

RULING

NO. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the will to be validly drawn, it went to
pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination and
resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. The rule, however, is not absolute. Given exceptional circumstances,
the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do upon certain provisions of the will
especially when practical considerations demand the intrinsic validity of the will to be passed upon even before
it is probated. The court should meet the issue and there is also no dispute over the extrinsic validity of the will.

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Case No. 126

6 SCRA 874 (1962)

SAGUIMSIM V LINDAYAG

LEIAN KAE NADUMA

DOCTRINE

An “interested person” has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one
who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely
indirect or contingent.

FACTS

Maria V. Lindayag died intestate in Olongapo, Zambales. Her sister, Isabel V. Saguinsin filed with the Court of
First Instance of said province a verified petition for the issuance in her favor of letters of administration over the
estate of the deceased. Dionisio V. Lindayag, the surviving spouse, and in representation of the minors Jesus,
Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack
of interest in the estate, she being neither heir nor a creditor thereof. The motion alleged that the late Maria V.
Lindayag was survived by her husband — the movant — and their legally adopted minor children named Jesus,
Concepcion, and Catherine. In opposing the motion to dismiss, petitioner argued that only the facts alleged in
the petition should be considered in determining its sufficiency. After hearing on the motion, the Court issued the
order of dismissal: that the herein petitioner is obviously not an heir and has no interest in estate; and that the
surviving heirs oppose the instant petition on the ground that they want to settle the estate extra-judicially among
them to avoid unnecessary expenses in prosecuting the case.

ISSUES

w/n petitioner is "an interested person" in the estate of deceased Maria V. Lindayag?

RULING

NO. It is manifested from the facts that Petitioner is not an heir of her deceased sister and, therefore, has no
material and direct interest in her estate. According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an "interested person". An interested party is defined in this connection
as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such
as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa, 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in
civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto
must be material and direct, and not merely indirect. Petitioner's interest in the estate of the deceased Maria V.
Lindayag was disputed, through a motion to dismiss her petition, by the surviving spouse on the ground that said
deceased was survived by him and by three legally adopted children — thus excluding petitioner as an heir. In
the course of the hearing held in connection with said motion, evidence was introduced in support thereof which,
according to the lower court, established that said deceased was survived not only by her husband but by three
legally adopted children named Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag.

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Case No. 127

125 SCRA 137 (1983)

VDA DE BACANG V CA

LEIAN KAE NADUMA

DOCTRINE

Speedy and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion

FACTS

Subject matter in this case are hereditary shares in Hacienda Nuestra Señora del Pilar, Lots Nos. 275 and 276
of the Bais, Negros Oriental cadastre, with an area of 671 hectares, originally belonging to Manuel Abella.

Manuel Abella is the root of all evil aka the father, who of course died intestate in 1980.He had two children on
his first wife Enriqueta Teves who are Emilio and Joaquin and three children on his second wife Leona Teves
who are Manuela, Hermenigildo and Carmen.

Before Manuel’s death, he transferred his said hacienda to his children by means of a simulated sale to Joaquin
for his share and another simulated deed of sale which was in Emilio's name but partitioned 4 ways to include
the three other children who were still minors and lived with Emilio in the family home.

Emilio died in 1911, survived by his wife Pilar Lajato, and five children named Serafin, Julian, Manuel, Rosa and
Maria.

On September 26, 1912, the three children, Manuella, Carmen, and Hermenegildo, sold their hereditary shares
in the said hacienda for P10,500 to Pilar Lajato and her children.

Intestate proceedings for the settlement of Emilio Teves' estate were pending in the lower court from 1912 to
1919. In 1920, the three children in Civil Case No. 576 sued Pilar Lajato and her children for the annulment of
the said deed of sale and the recovery of their shares in the hacienda.

The trial court sustained the validity of the sale and dismissed the action. This Court dismissed the appeal of the
three children on February 1, 1924.

In the cadastral proceeding, the hacienda was claimed by the five children of Emilio Teves and OCT was issued
to them.

On October 3, 1975, more than 43 years from the issuance of title, the instant case was filed by the children of
Carmen Teves and the children and grandchildren of Manuela Teves against Serafin L. Teves and the children
of the deceased Manuel L. Teves and Julian L. Teves.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds, inter alia, of res judicata, prescription, laches and
estoppel.

The lower court denied the motion. The order of denial was assailed by certiorari and prohibition in the Court of
Appeals. In its decision of November 6, 1978, the Appellate Court reversed the order of denial of Judge Alejandro
R. Boncaros and dismissed the action.

Hence the plaintiffs appealed to this Court.

ISSUE

WON the CA erred in entertaining the petition for certiorari?

RULING

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No. The appeal is palpably bereft of merit. Petitioners' 1975 action is clearly barred by valid prior judgments and
prescription. Private respondents' Torrens titles over the hacienda have long become indefeasible. Since the
grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy and adequate
remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case.

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Case No. 128

236 SCRA 488 1994

AJERO V CA

LEIAN KAE NADUMA

DOCTRINE

disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law; what assures authenticity
is the requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself

FACTS

San was submitted for probate. Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the
testament’s body nor the signature therein was in decedent’s handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections
which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure
and undue influence.

The petition was also contested by Dr. Ajero with respect to the disposition in the will of a house and lot. He
claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.

However, the trial court still admitted the decedent’s holographic will to probate.

The trial court held that since it must decide only the question of the identity of the will, its due execution and the
testamentary capacity of the testatrix, it finds no reason for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply
with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix.

On appeal, the CA reversed said Decision holding that the decedent did not comply with Articles 313 and 314 of
the NCC. It found that certain dispositions in the will were either unsigned or undated, or signed by not dated. It
also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made had not been authenticated by decedent.

ISSUES

Whether the CA erred in holding that Articles 813 and 814 of the NCC were not complies with.

RULING

YES. A reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the
holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that
these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions
of Article 814.

Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or
on testator’s signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result
in disallowance of such changes.

It is also proper to note that he requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions
appear in provisions (Article 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the
validity of the holographic will (Article 810).

This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810 of the
NCC – and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 – are essential to the probate of a holographic will.

Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and Article 839 of the Civil Code enumerate the grounds for disallowance
of wills. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.

In a petition to admit a holographic will, the only issues to be resolved are:

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1. Whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent’s last will and testament;

2. Whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law;

3. Whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and

4. Whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud;
accordingly, laws on this subject should be interpreted to attain these primordial ends.

In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or
handwritten by the testator himself. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance
of a holographic will that is unquestionable handwritten by the testator.

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Case No. 129

G.R. No. L-47799 June 13, 1941

Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez. ELEUTERIO NERI, ET AL., vs. IGNACIA AKUTIN
AND HER CHILDREN

Reina Joyce A. Oropilla

Doctrine : Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited."

Facts:

On December 12, 1931, Agripino Neri y Chavez died. He had by his first marriage six children named Eleuterio,
Agripino, Agapito, Getulia, Rosario and Celerina; and by his second marriage with Ignacia Akutin, five children
named Gracia,Godofredo, Violeta, Estela Maria, and Emma. Getulia, daughter by his 1st marriage, died and was
survived by her 7 children. On March 21, 1932, Agripino Neri's testament, which was admitted to probate, willed
that his children by the first marriage shall have no longer any participation in his estate, as they had already
received their corresponding shares during his lifetime. During the declaration of heirs, the trial court found,
contrary to what was declared in the will, that all his children by the first and second marriages are intestate heirs
of the deceased without prejudice to one-half of the improvements introduced in the properties during the
existence of the last conjugal partnership, which should belong to Ignacia Akutin. Court of Appeals affirmed trial
court’s decision invoking Art 856 of the Civil Code which states that disinheritance without statement of cause is
not proven, therefore, shall annul the institution of heirs as to the prejudiced portion but shall not affect legitimes,
betterments, and other testamentary dispositions, in so far as they do no encroach upon.

Issues:

1. Whether or not there is preterition.

2. Whether or not there should be annulment of heirs due to preteretion.

Ruling:

Yes. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the compulsory heirs or any of them, either
because they were not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited. In the instant case, while the children of the first marriage were mentioned in the will, they
were not accorded any share as to the property, without being expressly disinherited. There is therefore
preterition as contended by appellants. The omission of the forced heirs or anyone of them, whether voluntary or
involuntary, is a preterition if the purpose to disinherit is not expressly made or is not at least manifest.

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Case No. 130

G.R. No. L-41971 November 29, 1983

ZONIA ANA T. SOLANO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, BIENVENIDO S. GARCIA, and EMETERIA S.
GARCIA

Reina Joyce Oropilla

Doctrine: Preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at
the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but
the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

Facts:

Bienvenido Garcia and Emeteria Garcia (GARCIAS), claimed to be the illegitimate children of Dr. Meliton
SOLANO, filed an action for recognition against him. In his Answer, Solano denied paternity. On February 3,
1970, Solano died and petitioner Zonia Ana Solano substituted for the decedent as the only surviving heir
mentioned in Solano’s Last Will and Testament probated on March 10, 1969, or prior to his death, in Special
Proceedings No. 842 of the same Court. Zonia entered her formal appearance as a "substitute defendant"
claiming that she was the sole heir of her father, Solano , and asking that she be allowed to assume her duties
as executrix of the probated Will with the least interference from the Garcias. Garcias countered praying that
Zonia impugnation of the latter’s recognition as an acknowledged child. Trial court’s decision ruled in favor of
the Garcias declaring them illegitimate children of Solano and the institution of Sonia Ana Solano as sole and
universal heir of the said deceased is declared null and void and the three (3) children shall share equally the
estate or one- third (1/3) each. Aggrieved, Zonia appealed, however, Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the Trial Court.

Issues: Whether or not there was preterition.

Ruling: Yes. This court ruled that the Trial Court and the Appellate Court had jurisdiction to conclude that, upon
the facts, the GARCIAS and ZONIA were in the same category as illegitimate children; that ZONIA's
acknowledgment as a "natural child" in a notarial document executed by SOLANO and Trinidad Tuagnon on
December 22, 1943 was erroneous because at the time of her birth in 1941, SOLANO was still married to Lilly
Gorand, his divorce having been obtained only in 1943, and, therefore, did not have the legal capacity to contract
marriage at the time of ZONIA's conception, that being compulsory heirs, the GARCIAS were, in fact, pretended
from SOLANO's Last' Will and Testament; and that as a result of said preterition, the institution of ZONIA as sole
heir by SOLANO is null and void pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code.

The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. .

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Case No. 131

G.R. No. 38050 September 22, 1933

In the matter of the will of Donata Manahan. TIBURCIA MANAHAN vs.


ENGRACIA MANAHAN

Reina Joyce A. Oropilla

Doctrine: Decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution of the will and it cannot be impugned
on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceeding

Facts: On August 29, 1930, Tiburcia Manahan instituted special proceedings for the probate of the will of the
deceased Donata Manahan, who died in Bulacan, Province of Bulacan, on August 3, 1930. On the day of the
hearing, no opposition was filed prompted the trial court to appoint petitioner on the said case. Thus, the will was
probated on September 22, 2019. However, on May 11, 1932, herein appellant filed a motion for reconsideration
and new trial with prayer that the order admitting the will to probate be vacated and such be declared null and
void ab initio. Appellant assigns seven (7) alleged errors as committed by the trial court. We summarize those
errors as the following: (1) That she was an interested party in the testamentary proceedings and, as such, was
entitled to and should have been notified of the probate of the will; (2) that the court, in its order of September
22, 1930, did not really probate the will but limited itself to decreeing its authentication; and (3) that the will is null
and void ab initio on the ground that the external formalities prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure have not
been complied with in the execution thereof.

Issue: Whether or not questions on probate may be raised on appeal?

Ruling: No. The appellant could no longer raise the issue on probate on appeal being inasmuch as the
proceedings followed in a testamentary case are in rem, the trial court's decree admitting the will to probate was
effective and conclusive against her, in accordance with the provisions of section 306 of the said Code of Civil
Procedure which reads as follows:

SEC. 306. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. — . . . .

1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the
administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal
condition or relation of a particular person the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the thing,
the will or administration, or the condition or relation of the person: Provided, That the probate of a will
or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or
intestate; . .

Hence, this court was at loss when the appellant managed to appeal due to the erroneous interpretation.
Therefore, the court declares that this question can no more be raised in this case on appeal. After due hearing,
the court found that the will in question was valid and effective and the order admitting it to probate, thus
promulgated, should be accepted and respected by all. The probate of the will in question now constitutes res
judicata.

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Case No. 132

G.R. Nos. L-40719-21 December 29, 1975

JOAQUIN C. YUSECO vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HECTOR S. RUIZ,

Reina Joyce A. Oropilla

Doctrine: Final judgments are entitled to respect and should not be disturbed; otherwise, there would be a
wavering of trust in the courts.

Facts: Petitioner Joaquin C. Yuseco had on August 17, 1973 secured after due trial as judgment from the Court
of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 83357 against Ruiz sentencing the latter to pay him some P17,000
plus costs. Earlier on July 23, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City dismissed two civil cases Nos.
759-0 and 771-0, which the said Ruiz had filed against petitioner. Ruiz took appeals in all three cases, and when
they reached the appellate court, all three cases were consolidated in one division. However, Atty. Eduardo R.
Balaoing, repondent's counsel of record, having failed to file his brief in all three cases prompted its dismissal
motu proprio by the Court of the Appeals. Thereafter, Atty. Balaoing moved for reconsideration claiming that the
failure was considered an excusable negligence, which the same was denied. The case was remanded back to
the CFI for execution and was partially satisfied. However, on March 30, 1975, respondent filed before the
court of appeals a petition to reinstate appeal which said court readily granted in its impugned resolution of April
10, 1975 without even giving petitioner a chance to be heard.

Issue: Whether or not the appeal may be reinstated.

Ruling: No. The supreme court ruled that the Court of Appeals has gone beyond the bounds of sound discretion.
Court appeals had already dismissed the appeal by reason of failure of the respondent's counsel to file its brief.
Moreover, the motion for reconsideration was denied, the dismissal became final and the trial court was already
in the process of executing its judgment when private respondent moved for the first time for the reinstatement
of his appeal. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals reopened the case without giving any reason for its action.

Here, the charge of Ruiz that his lawyer abandoned his cases because of a misunderstanding between them has
not in Our considered view been sufficiently shown in the allegations contained in respondent's pleadings.

More so, this court will always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless
inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their clients, of their
day in court, but understandably, We cannot reopen cases where the above-stated grounds, once denied by the
lawyer himself, are not adequately shown. It must be borne in mind that final judgments are entitled to respect
and should not be disturbed, as otherwise, there would be a corresponding wavering of trust in the courts.
Accordingly, every case where the above grounds for reopening are alleged must be treated according to its own
merits, depending on the degree of conclusiveness of the evidence submitted to prove the misconduct of the
lawyer.

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Case No. 133

G.R. No. L-45063 April 15, 1988

EDUARDO S. SAN JUAN vs.NIEVES RALLOS CUENTO, by and thru her Attorney-in-fact, NELITA
GALLITO CUENTO and COURT OF APPEALS

Reina Joyce A. Oropilla

Doctrine:Final judgments are entitled to respect and should not be disturbed; otherwise, there would be a
wavering of trust in the courts.

Facts: On June 3, 1971, petitioner-plaintiff Eduardo San Juan, instituted in the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasay City, an action for collection of a sum of money with damages against Nieves Rallos Cuento, her
son Romulo Cuento and the Rural Bank of Nagcarlan, Laguna, Inc.

Despite two extensions, counsel for defendants Atty. Alberto S. Plantilla failed to seasonably file an answer or a
responsive pleading. After the lapse of the second extension, he filed instead a motion for a bill of particulars.
Nonetheless, the case was set for pre-trial on November 18, 1971. Upon agreement of the parties, however, the
pre-trial was reset to December 16, 197.

Judge Agana declared the defendants as in default and allowed the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte. No
motion for reconsideration from this order was ever filed by the defendants or their counsel.

On October 29, 1973, defendants Nagcarlan Bank and Romulo Cuento filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction questioning the validity of the trial court's default order and judgment.
They alleged that because of the gross negligence of their lawyer they were deprived of due process and, as a
consequence, the decision was null and void. They averred that they only came to know of the adverse decision
on October 25,1973 when their counsel, Atty. Plantilla, handed a copy thereof to the Rural Bank.

On June 26, 1974, the Appellate Court rendered a decision nullifying the questioned default order and judgment
and permanently enjoining execution on the case.

On March 1975, Nieves Rallos Cuento instituted a special civil action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals,
seeking to set aside the trial court's default order and judgment on the ground that she had been deprived of due
process due to the incompetence and manifest negligence of her counsel, Atty. Plantilla.

Issue: Whether or not the special civil actio of certiorari would prosper in anulling the decision of the trial court.

Ruling: No. While the courts are usually disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by the reckless inattention
and downright incompetence of lawyers which have the consequence of depriving their clients of their day in
court, we cannot do so in the case of respondent Cuento. We must bear in mind that final judgments are entitled
to respect and should not be disturbed, as otherwise, there would be a wavering of trust in the cours. In the
absence of a reasonable appeal therefrom, the questioned judgment of Judge Agana, Sr. has become final and
executory. It is now the law of the case. Having been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction acting within
its authority, that judgment may no longer be altered even at the risk of legal infirmities and errors it may contain.
Certainly they cannot be corrected by a special civil action of certiorari which, as in this case, was filed long after
the judgment became final and executory.

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Case No. 134

G.R. No. L-30523


LEE BUN TING vs. Aligaen
GLEEN FORD T. OSIP

DOCTRINE: Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy and judicial time and the interests of litigants,
as well as the peace and order of society, all require that stability be accorded the solemn and final judgments of
the courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction. There can be no question that such reasons apply with greater
force on final judgments of the highest Court of the land.

FACTS:

On June 27, 1956, this Court rendered judgment in G. R. No. L-5996, entitled Rafael Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee
Bun Ting, et al., 1 In that case, We found that:

Petitioners-appellants sold to Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, predecessor in interest of respondents-appellees, a


parcel of land situated on the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Capiz (now Roxas City), Capiz,
designated as lot 398 and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389. After the sale Lee Liong constructed
thereon a concrete building which he used as a place for his lumber business and in part as residence for himself
and family. Petitioners had contended that the sale was a conditional sale, or one with the right of repurchase
during the last years of a ten-year period, but the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the sale was an
absolute one. Another contention of the petitioners-appellants is that the sale is null and void as it was made in
violation of the provision contained in the Constitution (Article XIII, section 5), but the Court of Appeals found that
the purchaser was not aware of the constitutional prohibition while petitioners-appellants were because the
negotiations for the sale were conducted with the knowledge and direct intervention of Judge Rafael Dinglasan,
one of the plaintiffs, who was at that time an assistant attorney in the Department of Justice. ... (P. 42-Q)

A copy of the decision rendered in the case of Rafael Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al., G. R. No. L-5996
is attached to the motion to dismiss.

In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that both parties violated the constitutional prohibition (Article XIII, see. 9)
for the purchaser was an alien and prohibited to acquire residential lot while the vendors, Filipino citizens, can
not also recover the property for having violated the constitutional prohibition, under the principle of pari delicto.
The vendee cannot own the property, neither ran the vendor recover what he sold.

Twelve (12) years later, on the basis of the decision of this Court in Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui
She, 2 private respondents Rafael A. Dinglasan, et al. filed a complaint on July 1, 1968 for the recovery of the
same parcel of land subject matter of the first-mentioned case. Said complaint was docketed as Civil Case No.
V-3064 before respondent court. Private respondents (plaintiffs before the court a quo) reiterated their contention
that the sale made to Lee Liong, predecessor-in-interest of petitioners (defendants a quo), was null and void for
being violative of the Constitution, and prayed that plaintiffs be declared as the rightful and legal owners of the
property in question

ISSUE:

whether the questions which were decided in Rafael Dinglagan, et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting et al., supra, could still
be relitigated in Civil Case No. V-3064

HELD:

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We resolve the issue in the negative. The decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-5996, "Rafael Dinglasan, et al. vs.
Lee Bun Ting, et al." constitutes a bar to Civil Case No. V-3064 before the respondent court. Said Civil case,
therefore, should have been dismissed because it is a mere relitigation of the same issues previously adjudged
with finality, way back in 1956, between the same parties or their privies and concerning the same subject matter.
We have consistently held that the doctrine of res judicata applies where, between a pending action and one
which has been finally and definitely settled, there is Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.

Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy and judicial time and the interests of litigants, as well as
the peace and order of society, all require that stability be accorded the solemn and final judgments of the courts
or tribunals of competent jurisdiction. There can be no question that such reasons apply with greater force on
final judgments of the highest Court of the land.

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Case No. 135

G.R. No. L-33924


BALAIS vs BALAIS
GLEEN FORD T. OSIP

DOCTRINE: When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties,
they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings.

FACTS:

Juan, Maria, Buenaventura, Adela, Rosita and Teresa all surnamed Balais filed a complaint against Petronilo
Eraya in the CFI of Leyte docketed therein as Civil Case No. 811 for recovery of real property and damages (p.
13, folder of Exhibits).

The lower court, rendered its judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

Declaring the sale of one-half (1/2) of the parcel of land more particularly described in paragraph
4 of the complaint by the widow Eutelia Masalig to the defendant Petronilo Eraya null and void and
ordering the latter to execute within thirty (30) days after the judgment becomes final a deed of
conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs of one-half (1/2) of the said parcel of land minus one-fourth
(1/4) thereof which is hereby declared validly sold to him by the widow XXXXXX.

Ordering that the hereditary estate of the deceased Escolastico Balais consisting of one-half (1/2)
of the whole parcel of land described in paragraph 4 of the complaint be divided into two-halves,
one-half (1/2) of which is hereby adjudicated to his two legitimate children Juan Balais and Maria
Balais (Article 888, new Civil Code); the share of each of the plaintiffs Buenaventura, Adela, Rosita
and Teresa, all surnamed Balais shall be equal to two-fifths (,2/5) of the share of either Juan Balais
or Maria Balais provided that their total shares in this particular case shall not exceed one-half
(1/2) of the free portion after the share of Eutelia Masalig is fully satisfied (Article 895, paragraph
3, new Civil Code) which share of the widow shall be equal to the share of each of the legitimate
children (Article 999 Civil Code); otherwise stated, the hereditary estate of the deceased which
consist of one-half (1/2) of the whole parcel of land described in the complaint shall be divided into
four (4) parts, two (2) parts of which shall belong to the two (2) legitimate children Juan Balais and
Maria Balais one (1) part to the widow Eutelia Masalig which is hereby deemed included in the
sale of the property to the defendant Petronilo Eraya and the remaining one (1) part to the
illegitimate children Buenaventura, Adela, Rosita and Teresa, all surnamed Balais.

Ordering the defendant to render an accounting of the value of the products of the shares of the
plaintiffs as above indicated from the time of the filing of the complaint, and to deliver the share to
the plaintiffs together with their shares; and

February 23, 1967 — Maria and Juan Balais and Petronilo Eraya filed a complaint in the CFI of Leyte, Civil Case
No. C-893 against defendants for the annulment of that portion of the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 811
awarding to the latter who are illegitimate children of the late Escolastico Balais (1/4) of the hereditary estate of
their deceased father.

ISSUE:

Does the court have jurisdiction to decree a partition in an action for reconveyance?

HELD:

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When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. ...

The court, in that event, acquires jurisdiction over such issues.

It may likewise be that although the court lacks the jurisdiction, it acquires one subsequently as when the
defendant invokes it, say, by asking for affirmative relief. In that case, jurisdiction by estoppel arises.

But as we stated, the error of the court notwithstanding, the case is a closed chapter, the decision having been
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. And, as noted by the trial court itself, it is the case that has become
final and executory, and in fact, in the process of execution. A decision, no matter how erroneous, becomes the
law of the case between the parties upon attaining finality.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

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Case No. 136

GR No. 101383

PALMA v. CA

GLEEN FORD T. OSIP

DOCTRINE: : A probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate
and which are equally claimed to belong to third parties.

FACTS:

Subject property is house and lot located at No. 65 Santo Tomas St., Galas, Quezon City, covered by TCT No.
33181. When respondent Yuseco took steps to pay the real estate taxes on the property, she discovered that it
had already been sold on May, 9, 1988 by Paulino Taningco, husband of the deceased, to Ireneo B. Zialcita, Jr.,
and TCT No. 383664 was issued in his name. In turn, the latter sold the property to petitioners Gamaliel B. Palma
and Eduardo A. Beltran for P1,000,000.00 through a deed of absolute sale dated 9 June 1988 for which they
were issued TCT No. 383686 and Tax Declaration No. 826 in their names. On 8 November 1989, the property
was again sold, this time by petitioners, to the Carmelite Theresian Missionaries, Inc., and TCT No. PR-17857
and Tax Declaration No. C-030-00730 were issued in its name.

On 2 April 1990, respondent Yuseco filed before the trial court a motion to declare void all the deeds of sale, tax
declarations and transfer certificates of title covering the property where Carmelite Theresian Missionaries, Inc.
appeared but petitioners did not. On June 5, 1990, the trial court issued the disputed order nullifying the
documents with the bases that: (a) the property cannot be the subject of any transaction without the approval of
the probate court; and (b) the deed of sale dated May 9, 1988 is a clear forgery because Paulino Taningco
declared that he died in February 1984. Zialcita, Jr. was able to acquire the property and transfer its ownership
to petitioners following the destruction of the surrendered owner’s duplicate copy surrendered to the Register of
Deeds when fire razed the Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1988.

On June 22, 1990, the trial court denied the probate of the holographic will of Basilia Zialcita Vda. De Taningco
for failure to establish the authenticity of the handwriting of the testatrix by at least 3 witnesses and for lack of
mental capacity, having established that she was semi-invalid and suffering from senile dementia as of the time
the holographic will was executed.

On September 24, 1990, petitioners file a motion for intervention and petition for relief. The court refused to take
cognizance of the motion and petition on the ground that it had lost jurisdiction over the case considering Zalciata,
Jr. already filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals assailing the order of the court.

The CA set aside the order of the trial court on the basis that: (a) a probate court cannot adjudicate or determine
title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and equally claimed by outside parties; and (b) Torrens titles
cannot be attacked collaterally.

Upon motion for reconsideration by respondent Yuseco, CA amended and reversed its decision.

Issue:

Whether subject property was under the jurisdiction of the probate court.

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Held:

YES. The Supreme court affirmed decision of the Court of Appeals upon the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent on the basis that: (a) sales transactions transpired in 1988 where special proceedings was filed in
1984 which undoubtedly made the subject property part of the estate of the deceased and under the jurisdiction
of the probate court which has the authority to approve any disposition regarding properties under administration;
and (b) the trial court’s challenged order of June 5, 1990 has become final and executory, and subject property
had been sold to Amigo Realty Development Corporation with authority from the trial court. Once a judgment has
been executed, it may no longer be amended, modified or altered. The case is deemed terminated once and for
all. The same ruling olds in the case of an order which has been enforced.

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Case No. 137

G.R. No. L-59581 December 29, 1989

TARCISIO ICAO vs. APALISOK

Facts: Tarcisio Icao was a provincial guard employed by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte. His chief function
was to guard prisoners confined in the provincial jail located at the provincial capital, Dipolog City. He was
charged with the felony of infidelity in the custody of prisoners in the Court of First Instance at Dipolog City, and
after due arraignment at which he pleaded innocent and trial, was eventually convicted by respondent Judge of
said crime and sentenced as follows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds accused TARCISIO ICAO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner, defined and punishable by Art. 224 of the Revised
Penal Code, by reason of which said accused has to be, as he hereby is, sentenced to serve an
imprisonment of FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor, maximum, with temporary
special disqualification.

Same accused is further sentenced to pay costs.

SO ORDERED.

Icao filed a petition for probation pursuant to the provisions of the Probation Law of 1976, and was released from
custody on his own recognizance. 4 He never thereafter sought to take an appeal or have the verdict reversed or
modified. According to the Solicitor General, Icao's application for probation was approved. Nothing in the record
clearly supports this assertion. Whether or not probation was granted is not, however, material. The case will be
resolved on other considerations.

Icao moved for reconsideration, arguing that the Court had already lost jurisdiction over the case.

Issue: Whether or not the Court had already lost jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:

Under the facts, the respondent Judge had clearly lost the authority to modify the judgment of conviction. Section
7, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court of 1964, reads as follows:

SEC. 7. Modification of judgment.- A judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside by


the court rendering it before the judgment has become final or appeal has been perfected. A
judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal,
or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has
expressly waived in writing his right to appeal.

The judgment in the case became final and executory because the fifteen-day period of appeal provided by law.
had lapsed without an appeal being taken. This circumstance renders unnecessary consideration and
adjudgment of the appellant's alternative argument that the judgment had become final even before the lapse of
the period for appeal for the reason that in accordance with Section 8 of the Rules on Probation, the filing of the
petition for probation was deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.

The judgment having become final on October 28, 1981, after the lapse of 15 days from its promulgation on
October 12, 1981, His Honor, to repeat, lost all power to amend it. 11 A rule of long standing and undeviating
observance is that a judgment which has become final and executory can no longer be amended or corrected
except only as regards clerical errors. 12 Hence, even the subsequent discovery of an erroneous imposition of a
penalty will not justify correction of the judgment after it has become final.

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Case No. 138

G.R. No. L-53546

HEIRS OF THE LATE JESUS FRAN v. SALAS

GLEEN FORD T. OSIP

DOCTRINE: A testate proceeding is proper where the testator died with two wills and no will shall pass either
real or personal property, unless it is proved and allowed.

Facts:

Remedios Tiosejo died with neither descendants nor ascendants. She left real and personal properties. In
her last will and testament, she bequeathed to her collateral relatives all her properties. When the will was
presented before the probate court, private respondents who are sisters of the deceased filed a manifestation,
alleging that they needed time to study the petition because some heirs have been intentionally omitted. However,
none file any opposition. The petition thus became uncontested.The probate court rendered a decision admitting
the will to probate. Then, a Project of Partition was submitted by the executor to the court. The private
respondents still did not make any objections. Thereafter, the probate court issued its Order approving the
partition. Later, the aforesaid branch which issued the order was converted to a Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court. The private respondents filed with the new branch a Motion for Reconsideration of the probate judgment
and the order of partition. The Petitions challenged the jurisdiction of the court because only the English
translation of the will was attached to the petition and the will was not even submitted to the court for their
examination. Respondent Judge issued an order declaring the testamentary disposition as void.

Issue:

Is it necessary that the original of the will be presented in order for the court toacquire jurisdiction?

Ruling:

No. In several rulings of the Supreme Court, it ruled that it is not necessary that the original of the will be attached
to the petition .That the annexing of the original will to the petition is not a jurisdictional requirementis clearly
evident in Section 1, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which allows the filing of a petition for probate by the person
named therein regardless of whether or not he is in possession of the will, or the same is lost or destroyed. In
the instant case, a copy of the original will and its English translation were attached to the petition and made
integral parts of the same. It is to be presumed that upon the filing of the petition the Clerk of Court, or his duly
authorized subordinate, examined the petition and found that the annexes mentioned were in fact attached
thereto. Hence, the order of partition issued by the old probate court is final and executor.

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Case No. 139

Leviste vs Court of Appeals

Ethaniel Evagrio R. Paderanga

Doctrine: laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or senseless
consequences.

FACTS: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any
risk or possibility of flight on his part. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked the
bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of
appeal should be exercised “with grave caution and only for strong reasons.” Petitioner now questions as grave
abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial
of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is
that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant
pending appeal.

ISSUE: In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of
imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean
that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?

HELD: NO, discretionary nature of bail mentioned in Section 5 of Rule 114 does not mean automatic grant of
bail in case of appeal.

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional
right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious,
such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused
was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-
standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail
and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial court’s initial
determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his
conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal
because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-
conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of
bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and
time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes.

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Case No. 140

Santos vs Castillo
Ethaniel Evagrio R. Paderanga

Doctrine: JURISDICTION. — In order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the case for the probate of a
will and for the administration of the properties left by a deceased person, the application must allege, in addition
to the residence of the ceased and other indispensable facts or circumstances, that the applicant is the executor
named in the will or is the person who had the custody of the will to be probated.

Facts: This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to have this court declare null and void the order issued by the
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna on January 26, 1937, dismissing the petition docketed
therein as case No. 3101. Said petition had been filed by the petitioner Emerita Santos, in her behalf and as
guardian of the minor acknowledged natural children of the deceased Nicolas Azores, for the purpose of applying
for the probate of the will, Exhibit A, which she claims to be the expression of the last will and testament of said
Nicolas Azores, who died in the municipality of San Pablo, Laguna, on January 5, 1937. At the hearing of said
motion which took place on January 13th, the herein respondents Jose, Sinforosa and Antonio Azores, legitimate
children of said deceased, opposed the court’s taking action thereon in the ground that it had not acquired
jurisdiction over the case, the allegations made in the petition being insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon said
court, because the petitioner did not allege that she had the custody of the will and, therefore, was not entitled to
present it for probate; and furthermore because that will that should be probated is the original and not a copy
thereof, as the one presented by the petitioner. the petitioner filed a motion praying that her amended petition be
admitted, that a special administrator and commissioners on appraisal be appointed and that Jose Azores and
Manuel Azores Concordia be required to present in said case the copies of the will and the codicil that they had
in their possession. It was opposed by the respondents Azores on the ground that as the jurisdiction of the court
to pass upon the original petition for probate filed by the petitioner is questioned, the amendment thereto could
not legally be considered until the previous question is decided by the court. The respondent Judge Modesto
Castillo issued the order in question, dismissing the petition filed by the petitioner which gave rise to the
proceeding docketed as case No. 3101 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. It is alleged in the petitioner’s
petition filed in this court that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction and acted arbitrarily and irregularly
in dismissing the petition for probate filed by her in case No. 3101 as well as in ordering the publication of the
notice of the hearing of the probate of the will in case No. 3104 instituted by the Azores brothers and sister before
the order of January 26, 1937, issued in said case No. 3101 became final. It is claimed that said judge also
exceeded his jurisdiction and acted arbitrarily and irregularly in giving preference to the petition for probate filed
by the Azores brothers and sister, disregarding the petition filed by the herein petitioner, instead of ordering said
respondents Jose Azores Et. Al. to present their copies of the will and alleged codicil in case No. 3101.

Issue: Whether the respondent Judge exceeded in his authority over his jurisdiction in hearing the probate of the
will

Held: In order to decide the question whether or not the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in dismissing
the petitioner’s application, we should first consider who was entitled to apply for the probate of the will of Nicolas
Azores. To get to the bottom of this question, it is necessary to ascertain beforehand who was bound by law to
apply for the probate of the will. Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that no will shall pass either
the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed. For this purpose, section 626 provides that the person
who has the custody of a will shall within thirty days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will
into the court which has jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will, and sections 628 and 629 prescribe
coercive means to compel a person having the custody of a will to deliver it to the court having jurisdiction.
Therefore, as the legitimate children of the deceased had custody of the originals of the will and of the codicil,
they alone could, had the right and were bound by law to apply for the probate of their father’s last will.
Consequently, the respondent judge, in dismissing the application presented by the petitioner, neither exceeded
his jurisdiction nor acted arbitrarily or irregularly, but reasonably made use of his sound discretion.

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Case No. 141

Salazar vs Court of First Instance


Ethaniel Evagrio R. Paderanga

Doctrine: The court may, in its discretion, consolidate proceedings instituted by different persons for the purpose
of having different instrument each probated as the last will and testament of decedent. Separate contests of a
will and a codicil, or of two wills, each claimed to be the last will of testator, may be consolidated by the court and
heard together.

Facts: The petitioner instituted special proceeding No. 3109 in the court of First Instance of Laguna and, in the
petition filed by him, prayed for the probate of the will allegedly made on May 13, 1924, by his deceased mother
Damiana Capistrano, who died in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna, on December 21, 1936. The petition
was opposed by the respondent Sabina Rivera, who filed a pleading entitled "Opposition and Counter-Petition."
In her pleading the respondent, after opposing the probate of said will for the reasons stated therein, prayed for
the probate of the will of the deceased alleged made on May 11, 1930, copy of which was attached thereto, and
for the issuance, to that effect, of the order setting the hearing thereof and directing such publications as required
by law.
The court denied the motion for publication and ordered the respondent to institute another proceeding and apply
separately for the probate of the alleged will. The court, on March 31, 19937, issued an order setting aside the
former one and directing that the will presented by the respondent be set for hearing, that the publications
required by law be made and that said will be heard jointly with the will presented by the petitioner in the same
proceeding instituted by the latter. Sometime later, the court ordered that the expenses for the publications made
in the newspapers be defrayed by the respondent. The petitioner filed two motions for reconsideration which
were denied and, finally, instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue: Whether the court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the counter-petition for the probate of the second
will.

Held: A Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction to probate a will when it is shown by evidence before it: (1)
That a person has died leaving a will; (2) in the case of a resident of this country, that he died in the province
where the court exercises territorial jurisdiction; (3) in the case of a nonresident, that he has left a estate in the
province where the court is situated, and (4) that the testament or last will of the deceased has been delivered to
the court and is in the possession thereof. The law is silent as to the specific manner of bringing the jurisdictional
allegations before the court but practice and jurisprudence have established that they should be made in the form
of an application and filed with the original of the will attached thereto. It has been the practice in some courts to
permit attachment of a mere copy of the will to the application, without prejudice to producing the original thereof
at the hearing or when the court so requires. This precaution has been adapted by some attorneys to forestall its
disappearance, which has taken place in certain cases. According to the facts alleged and admitted by the
parties, it is evident that the court has acquired jurisdiction to probate the second will, in view of the presence of
all the jurisdictional facts above-stated. The respondent's counter-petition should, in this case, be considered as
a petition for the probate of the second will, the original of which was filed by her on July 20, 1937.

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Case No. 142

Abut vs Abut
Ethaniel Evagrio R. Paderanga

Doctrine: A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the
petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of
the deceased.

Facts: On August 4, 1965 Generoso Abut, one of the children of the deceased Cipriano Abut by his second
marriage and the person named as executor in a will allegedly executed by the said deceased, filed a petition
before the court a quo praying that after due notice and hearing the said will be approved and allowed and that
letters testamentary issue in his favor. In an amended order dated September 1, 1965 the court a quo motu
proprio set the petition for hearing and further directed compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules
of Court.1 These procedural steps admittedly took place. Opposition to the petition was filed by the children of
Cipriano Abut by his first marriage, namely, Felipe Abut, Presentacion de Rodriguez and Absoluto Abut.
Generoso Abut, the original petitioner who initiated the probate proceeding, died on January 10, 1966. This
eventuality prompted Gavina Abut, a sister of Generoso Abut and an heir and devisee under the will of the testator
Cipriano Abut, to ask the court a quo to substitute her in lieu of Generoso Abut and to admit an amended petition
wherein she prayed that the probate of the will be allowed and that letters of administration with the will annexed
be issued in her favor. The court a quo dismissed the petition originally brought by the deceased Generoso Abut,
"without prejudice to the filing of another petition pursuant to the requirements of the Rules of Court.

Issue: whether or not the probate court correctly dismissed the petition simply because the original petitioner —
who was the executor named in the will sought to be probated — died before the petition could be heard and/or
terminated.

Held: We find the dismissal of the original petition for probate and the refusal of the probate court to admit the
amended petition without a new publication thereof to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the court became vested
upon the filing of the original petition and upon compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76. A proceeding for
the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's
jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The
fact that the amended petition named additional heirs not included in the original petition 3 did not require that
notice of the amended petition be published anew. All that Section 4 of Rule 76 provides is that those heirs be
notified of the hearing for the probate of the will, either by mail or personally.

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Case NO. 143

Angela Rodriguez, Maria Rodriguez, et.al vs. Hon. Juan de Borja


17 SCRA 418 June 21,1966
Pizarro, Maria Victoria Antonietta O.

Doctrine: The jurisdiction of the court becomes vested upon the delivery thereto of the will even if no petition
for its allowance was filed later.

Facts:
Celestino Rodriguez died on Feb. 12, 1963 in Manila. A month later, Apolonia
Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a last will and testament of Fr.
Rodriguez. Days later, Maria and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel, filed a petition for leave of court to allow
them to examine the alleged will. Before the court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn.
Subsequently, Maria and Angela filed before the CFI of Rizal a petition for the settlement of intestate
estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez is a resident of Parañaque and died
without leaving. will, and that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as special administratrix of the estate. On March
12, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probate of the will
delivered by them.
Rodriguez argues that since the intestate proceedings in the CFI of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on
March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the CFI of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date,
the latter court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate, citing Ongsingco Vda. De Borja vs Tan
de Borja.
Pangilinan and Jacalan argued that CFI of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery
by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963 and that the case in this court has precedence over
the case filed in Rizal on March 2,1963.

Issue:
Whether or not the CFI of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction.

Ruling:
Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto
of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until
later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and
place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section
3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):
SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. — When a will is
delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix
a time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and
shall cause notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time
appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of
a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament,
even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of
the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of
Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated
intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.
The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any
other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of
wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins that:
The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. (Sec. 1).

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Case No: 144
De Guzman vs. Angeles
162 SCRA 347
June 20,1988
Pizarro, Maria Victoria Antonietta O.

Doctrine: The notice by publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the
whole world, and when probate is granted the judgment is binding upon everybody, even against the State.

Facts:
On May 5, 1987, private respondent Elaine G. de Guzman filed a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Manolito de Guzman, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila.
On May 22, 1987, the private respondent filed a motion for writ of possession over five (5) — vehicles
registered under the name of Manolito de Guzman, alleged to be conjugal properties of the de Guzman's but
which are at present in the possession of the private respondent's father-in- law, herein petitioner Pedro de
Guzman. The motion stated that as co-owner and heir, the private respondent must have the possession of
said vehicles in order to preserve the assets of her late husband. On the same day, the lower court issued an
order setting for hearing the motion on May 27, 1987 directing the deputy sheriff to notify petitioner Pedro de
Guzman at the expense of the private respondent.
In the meantime, on May 28, 1987, the private respondent filed her "Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint
Petitioner as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Manolito de Guzman. In this same order, the lower court
directed that all the parties should be notified, however, no notice of the order was given to the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not a probate court may appoint a special administratrix and issue a writ of possession of
alleged properties of a decedent for the preservation of the estate in a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the said deceased person even before the probate court causes notice to be served
upon all interested parties pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Ruling:
No. In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the
proceedings upon the filing of a petition for the settlement of an intestate estate by the private respondent
since the petition had alleged all the jurisdictional facts, the residence of the deceased person, the possible
heirs and creditors and the probable value of the estate of the deceased Manolito de Guzman pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:


Court to set time for hearing. — Notice thereof. — When a petition for letters of administration
is filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition,
and shall cause notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to
any other persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the manner provided in sections 3
and 4 of Rule 76.

It is very clear from this provision that the probate court must cause notice through publication of the
petition after it receives the same. The purpose of this notice is to bring all the interested persons within the
court's jurisdiction so that the judgment therein becomes binding on all the world. (Manalo v. Paredes, 47 Phil.
938; Moran, Comment on the Rules of Court Volume 3,1980 Edition) Where no notice as required by Section
3, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court has been given to persons believed to have an interest in the estate of the
deceased person; the proceeding for the settlement of the estate is void and should be annulled. The
requirement as to notice is essential to the validity of the proceeding in that no person may be deprived of his
right to property without due process of law.
In the instant case, no notice as mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court was
caused to be given by the probate court before it acted on the motions of the private respondent to be
appointed as special administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased person
in the widow's favor, and to grant her motion for assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito de Guzman.

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All interested persons including herein petitioner who is the biggest creditor of the estate listed in the Petition
(P850,240.80) could have participated in the proceedings especially so, because the respondent immediately
filed a motion to have herself appointed as administratrix. A special administrator has been defined as the
"representative of decedent appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his estate until an executor
or general administrator is appointed." (Jones v. Minnesota Transfer R. Co. 1965 ed., at 106 cited in Fule v.
Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA 189). The petitioner as creditor of the estate has a similar interest in the
preservation of the estate as the private respondent who happens to be the widow of deceased Manolito de
Guzman. Hence, the necessity of notice as mandated by the Rules of Court. It is not clear from the records
exactly what emergency would have ensued if the appointment of an administrator was deferred at least until
the most interested parties were given notice of the proposed action. No unavoidable delay in the appointment
of a regular administrator is apparent from the records.

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Case No. 145
De Arenas vs. Galing
161 SCRA 628
May 28,1988
Pizarro, Maria Victoria Antonietta O.

Doctrine: The requirement of the law for the allowance of will was not satisfied by mere publication of notice
of hearing. Notice of hearing to the designated heirs, legatees and devisees is required.

Facts:
Private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, a
petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola
The petition specified the names and ad- dresses of herein petitioners as legatees and devisees. The probate
court set set the petition for hearing on May 5, 1986 at 8:30 A.M. which was published in the “Nueva Era”, a
newspaper of general circulation once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. On the date of the hearing, no
oppositor appeared. The hearing was then reset to 12 May 1986, wherein on the same day, private respondent
presented his evidence ex-parte and placed Arturo Arceo one of the testamentary witnesses, on the witness
stand. During the proceedings, private respondent was appointed executor.
On 14 May 1986, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 12 May 1986 alleging
that, as named legatees, no notices were sent to them as required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court
and they prayed that they be given a period of ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to the probate
of the will.
On 30 May 1986, the probate court, acting on the opposition of private respondent and the reply thereto of
petitioners, issued an order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition which was, however, referred
to the Court of Appeals. On 13 January 1987, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the
petition. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether or not personal notice to designated heirs, legatees and devisees are
required

Ruling:

Yes, personal notice is required.

Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court reads:


SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. — The court
shag also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their
places of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days
before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed
to the person named as executor, if he be not, the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not
petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days
before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.

It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the allowance of a will
shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines
at their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no question that the residences
of herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for the allowance of
the wigll itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the testator. 7 But despite
such knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement
of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three
(3) weeks

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Case No. 146

Araujo, et.al. vs Celis


6 Phil 223
April 30,1906
Pizarro, Maria Victoria Antonietta O.

Doctrine: The testimony was insufficient to establish in a satisfactory manner the loss of the alleged will.
Secondary evidence, to prove the contents of the will, ca, therefore, not be allowed, as the allowance of such
evidence is a violation of Section 321 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Facts:
Rosario Darwin Araujo inherited from her mother, Asuncion Araujo y Belen, the
hacienda known as Pangpang and other property. She subsequently married Jose Araujo y Celis, the
defendant’s son, and died on the 22d day of January, 1888, leaving no descendants or ascendants, but only
collateral relatives, of whom the plaintiffs in this case claim to be the nearest. They consequently alleged that
they should succeed to the estate of the said Rosario Darwin Araujo, and asked that the property inherited by
her from her mother be delivered to them as the heirs of the said Rosario. The property in question, according
to the complaint, is now held by the defendant, who took possession of the same after the death of her son,
Jose Araujo, the husband of the said Rosario, her died a year after the death of his wife — that is to say, in
1889.
The defendant admits that the property in question belonged privately and exclusively to the wife,
Rosario Darwin, but claims that Rosario died leaving a will in which she bequeathed all of her property to her
husband, Jose Araujo, and that the latter having died without a will she, the defendant, succeeded under the
law to all of his property, rights, and actions, thereby lawfully acquiring all the property that had formerly
belonged to her daughter-in-law, Rosario.

Issue:
Whether or not Rosario Darwin executed a legal and valid will in the form and
manner alleged by the defendant.

Ruling:
This point as to the will, however, was not as clearly established as it should have been. The
defendant introduced no will in evidence, offered secondary parol evidence as to its contents under the claim
that the original will had been lost. The court allowed this evidence over the objection of the plaintiffs, and this
is one of the errors assigned by them on this appeal. We are of the opinion that the plaintiffs’ objection to the
admission of such evidence was well taken and that it could therefore have been sustained.
The loss of the alleged original will has not been sufficiently established. The principal witness, Calixto
Delgado, who testified as to this point, stated that he had acted as procurador for the defendant in this case
about the year 1889 in action brought against her by one Jose Araujo in the justice’s court of Pototan involving
the hacienda of Pangpang, and that as such procurador or solicitor there came into his possession a copy of
the will of Rosario Darwin, duly recorded and probated, which was introduced in evidence in that action. He
further testified that he never saw the original of that will because the same was retained by the notary. He
was asked, "What was it that you saw?" He answered, "A copy of the original." He was also asked whether it
was a certified copy of the will or not, and instead of a direct answer he avoided the question, saying; "After
I had it in my possession for three days, I turned it over to my attorney and he presented it to the court with a
letter and a note attached." This answer, as will be seen, is not responsible to the question, and leaves the
point, a very important one, as to whether the copy in question was a simple or certified copy, in doubt.
As to the nature of the copy of the will in question and the alleged loss of the same, the testimony of
the witness Poral is no more conclusive than that of the other witness. We, therefore, deem it unnecessary to
refer to it, and what has been said before in regard thereto is equally applicable to the testimony of this witness.
These were the only witnesses presented by the defendant upon this point. Their testimony is
absolutely insufficient to establish in a satisfactory manner the loss of the alleged will of Rosario Darwin, and
the court below should not have, therefore, allowed the secondary evidence introduced by her as to the
contents of the will, particularly in view of the fact that, as it appears from the record, there had been pending

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since 1889 an action to declare this very will null and void. The undue allowance of such evidence by the court
was a violation of the provision of section 321 of the Code of Civil Procedure

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Case No. 147
Lim Billian vs Suntay
63 Phil 793

Pizarro, Maria Victoria Antonietta O.

Doctrine: Before secondary evidence may be admitted, the loss of the will should be proved.

Facts:
On May 14, 1934, Jose B. Suntay died in the City of Amoy, China. He married
twice, the first time to Manuela T. Cruz with whom he had several children now residing in the Philippines, and
the second time to Maria Natividad Lim Billian with whom he had a son.
On the same date, May 14, 1934, Apolonio Suntay, eldest son of the deceased by his first marriage, filed the
latter’s intestate in Court of First Instance of Manila (civil case No. 4892).
On October 15, 1934, and in the same court, Maria Natividad Lim Billian also instituted the present
proceedings for the probate of a will allegedly left by the deceased.
According to the petitioner, before the deceased died in China he left with her a sealed envelope (Exhibit A)
containing his will and, also another document (Exhibit B of the petitioner) said to be a true copy of the original
contained in the envelope. The will in the envelope was executed in the Philippines, with Messrs. Go Toh,
Alberto Barretto and Manuel Lopez as attesting witnesses. On August 25, 1934, Go Toh, as attorney-in- fact
of the petitioner, arrived in the Philippines with the will in the envelope and its copy Exhibit B. While Go Toh
was showing this envelope to Apolonio Suntay and Angel Suntay, children by first marriage of the deceased,
they snatched and opened it and, after getting its contents and throwing away the envelope, they filed.
In their Answer, the Suntay brothers stated that they did not have the said will and denied having
snatched it from Go Toh.
At the trial of the case, the petitioner put two witnesses upon the stand, Go Toh and Tan Boon Chong,
who corroborated the allegation that the brothers Apolonio and Angel appropriated the envelope in the
circumstances above-mentioned. The oppositors have not adduced any evidence counter to the testimony of
these two witnesses. The court, while making no express finding on this fact, took it for granted in its decision;
but it dismissed the petition believing that the evidence is insufficient to establish that the envelope seized
from Go Toh contained the will of the deceased, and that the said will was executed with all the essential and
necessary formalities required by law for its probate.

Issue:
Whether or not the loss of the will was proved.

Ruling:
The evidence is sufficient to establish the loss of the document contained in the envelope. Oppositors’
answer admits that, according to Barretto, he prepared a will of the deceased to which he later became a
witness together with Go Toh and Manuel Lopez, and that this will was placed in an envelope which was signed
by the deceased and by the instrumental witnesses. In court there was presented and attached to the case an
open and empty envelope signed by Jose B. Suntay, Alberto Barretto, Go Toh and Manuel Lopez. It is thus
undeniable that this envelope Exhibit A is the same one that contained the will executed by the deceased —
drafted by Barretto and with the latter, Go Toh and Manuel Lopez as attesting witnesses. These tokens
sufficiently point to the loss of the will of the decease d, a circumstance justifying the presentation of secondary
evidence of its contents and of whether it was executed with all the essential and necessary legal formalities.

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Case No. 148

Diaz vs De Leon (43 Phil 413)

Ri Ruben Ted Reyes

Doctrine: Animo Revocandi

Facts: The question raised in this case was whether there was sufficient revocation of a will made by Jesus de
Leon and was allegedly revoked by him.

From the evidence submitted in this case, it appears that the testator, shortly after the execution of the first will
in question, asked that the same be returned to him. The instrument was returned to the testator who ordered
his servant to tear the document. This was done in his presence and before a nurse who testified to this effect.
After some time, the testator, being asked by Dr. Cornelio Mapa about the will, said that it had been destroyed.

The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the established fact that the testator was anxious to withdraw
or change the provisions he had made in his first will. This fact is disclosed by the testator's own statements to
the witnesses Canto and the Mother Superior of the Hospital where he was confined.

Issue/s: WON the act of the testator was enough to consider the will revoked?

Ruling: YES, the will was revoked. The original will herein presented for probate having been destroyed
with animo revocandi, cannot now be probated as the will and last testament of Jesus de Leon.

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Case No.149

Gago vs Mamuyac (49 Phil 902)

Ri Ruben Ted Reyes

Doctrine: A lost will is presumed revoked unless evidence to the contrary is introduced

Facts: The deceased priest Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament in July 1918. After his death,
his sister, Narcisa Mamuyac-Gago and her husband, herein petitioner Francisco Gago, initiated probate
proceedings for the admittance of the 1918 will into probate. This was opposed by herein respondents. The
probate court did not probate the will upon the ground that the deceased had executed a NEW WILL AND
TESTAMENT on April 1919.

This APRIL 1919 Will was submitted for probate by the Gagos. Again, the respondents opposed, this time
averring that the 1919 will is just a CARBON COPY of the 1918 will. The probate court DENIED probate based
on its findings:
1. That the 1919 will was indeed just a carbon copy of the 1918 will;
2. That the original will was in the possession of the deceased; this fact was in a way corroborated by
Narcisa Mamuyac-Gago (Petitioner) herself, admitting that the original was in the possession of her
deceased brother;
3. That this will was REVOKED in 1920 by the deceased during his lifetime per testimony of Jose Fenoy,
who typed the will of the deceased;
4. That the cancellation was voluntarily done by the deceased after he sold his house and lot to a certain
Carlos Bejar; That per testimony of said Carlos Bejar, the deceased assured him that the will be revoked
after the sale.

Issue/s: WON the will should be probated?

Ruling: NO. In probate proceedings, the petitioner has to prove 1) that the will exists and 2) that the will was
executed with all the formalities required by law.

Here, the petitioners were able to prove that there was a will, per their presentation of the carbon copy of the
original will.

However, evidence shows that the original will was REVOKED by the deceased. First, it is not disputed that the
original will was in the possession of the deceased. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have
been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other
competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is
shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed
that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The
force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong
according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not
destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.

The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. It therefore
becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills. Here, however, the presumption of
revocation applies and was not overcome by contrary evidence by the petitioners.

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Case No. 150

Maravilla vs Maravilla (37 Scra 672)

Ri Ruben Ted Reyes

Doctrine: Statement of Attorney on the due execution of the Will is given great weight

Facts: During the Probate of Digna Maravilla’s will, her siblings Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina, all surnamed
Maravilla filed an opposition questioning the validity of the will on the grounds that the decedent and the witnesses
did not sign the alleged will in the presence of each other, there was undue influence, the testatrix is not of sound
and disposing mind, and that the alleged will was revoked by the decedent.

The RTC denied the probate of the will for the reason that they believe that the testimony of the surviving
witness and that of the lawyer who attested on the due execution of the will, Atty. Manuel Villanueva, did not
deserve full credit since it is tainted with bad faith and self interest.

Issue/s: WON the Court should give credit to the testimony of Atty. Villanueva?

Ruling: YES. The Supreme Court held that in weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the
statements of a competent attorney, who has been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper
execution of the instrument, is entitled to greater weight that the testimony of a person casually called to
participate in the act, supposing of course that no motive is revealed that should induce the attorney to
prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of a lawyer, being conversant with the requisites of proper execution of
the instrument, is more likely to become fixed on details, and he is more likely than other persons to retain those
incidents in his memory.

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Case No.151

Labrador vs Court of Appeals (184 Scra 170)

Ri Ruben Ted Reyes

Doctrine: It is sufficient if the will is really dated, although the date is not in its usual place

Facts: Melecio Labrador died in Zambales sometime in 1972, leaving behind a parcel of land, several heirs, and
a holographic will.

One of the heirs filed a petition for the probate of the will while two others filed their opposition thereto, alleging
that, even before the testator’s death, the parcel of land was already sold in their favor and, subsequently, they
already sold the said land.

The petition for probate was granted and the Deed of Sale was ordered to be annulled, asking respondents to
reimburse petitioners representing the redemption price of the property. Upon appeal, however, the Court of
Appeals reversed the said decision, disallowing the probate stating that it was undated and also reversing the
order of reimbursement.

Issue/s: WON the holographic will of Melecio was dated pursuant to Article 810 of the New Civil Code.

Ruling: YES. The holographic will is dated, although the date is not in its usual place.

The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements
are that the date be in the will itself and and executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present
in the subject will.

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Case No.152

Catral vs Court of Appeals (180 Scra 769)

Ri Ruben Ted Reyes

Doctrine: Holographic Wills were only recognized upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950

Facts: A parcel of land was owned by one Sebastian Dichoso in the province of Cagayan. Upon his death, his
heirs, his children, Mateo, Paula and Maxima all surnamed Dichoso, took possession of the property as co-
owners thereof and divided the same among themselves. On April 27, 1951, Mateo, with knowledge and consent
of his sisters Paula and Maxima sold a portion of his lot to Nicanor Catral herein petitioner.

Petitioner took possession of the land, cleared and cultivated the same and planted various crops thereon. He
declared the property in his name and paid the taxes thereon including the arrears from 1958 to 1969.

He enjoyed peaceful possession of the property until after the death of Mateo when the private respondents
wrested the possession thereof from him. Hence, this action for recovery of ownership and possession. The trial
court rendered a decision favoring herein respondents which was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals hence
this petition for review. One of the evidence submitted by respondents was an alleged holographic will from their
father Sebastian Dichoso. Petitioner on the other hand submitted an Escritura de Compraventa(Deed of Sale)
which were signed by respondent themselves.

Issue/s: WON the holographic will be allowed as evidence of proof of ownership?

Ruling: NO. The alleged holographic will of Sebastian Dichoso by which Domina allegedly derived ownership
thereof was not duly probated. Moreover, the same cannot be probated for at that time it was allegedly executed
in 1917 holographic wills were not yet recognized as valid instruments of transmission of hereditary rights under
the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190). It was only upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950 that
holographic wills were provided for as an instrument in the disposition of the property of the deceased.

On the contrary, what appears is that the property was in fact co-owned by Mateo Dichoso with sisters Paula and
Maxima, so much so that when Mateo sold the same to petitioner, Paula and Maxima signed their conformity to
the Deed of Sale.

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Case No. 153

134 SCRA 245 (G.R. No. L-38338 January 28, 1985)

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANDRES G. DE JESUS AND BIBIANA ROXAS DE
JESUS, SIMEON R. ROXAS & PEDRO ROXAS DE JESUS, vs.ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR.

Mary Louisse B. Rulona

DOCTRINE: Substantial Compliance Rule (Article 810 of the Civil Code)

FACTS:

After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, a special proceeding case for the
partition of the estate of the said spouses was filed by petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, the brother of the deceased
Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.

On March 26,1973, petitioner was appointed administrator. After Letters of Administration had been granted to
the petitioner, he delivered to the lower court a document purporting to be the Holographic Will of the deceased
Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.

The said Holographic Will was written in a notebook belonging to deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus containing a
“letter-will” on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, addressed to her children and entirely written and signed in her
handwriting. The will is dated “Feb./61”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus
is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code

RULING: YES.

As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its execution.
However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure
and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing
on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will
should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.

The Supreme Court have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith and
fraud in its execution nor was there any substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no question that the
holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and signed by the testatrix
herself and in a language known to her. There is also no question as to its genuineness and due execution. All
the children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the holographic Will of their mother and that she had the
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of said Will. The objection interposed by the oppositor-
respondent Luz Henson is that the holographic Will is fatally defective because the date "FEB./61 " appearing on
the holographic Will is not sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical
to be entertained.

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Case No. 154

132 SCRA 237, 242 (G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984)

ROSA K. KALAW, vs. HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Batangas,
Branch VI, Lipa City, and GREGORIO K. KALAW

Mary Louisse B. Rulona

DOCTRINE: A holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the
provisions of Article 814.

FACTS:

On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased
sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, for
the probate of her holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.

The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir. Hence, on
November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed probate alleging, in substance, that the holographic Will
contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of the
testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code. Rosa’s position was that the holographic will, as first written,
should be given effect and probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.

The trial court denied the probate of the holographic will of Natividad K. Kalaw.

ISSUE: Whether or not the original unaltered text after the subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by
the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with Rosa
Kalaw as sole heir.

RULING: No.

Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will
litem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as
respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.

However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was
altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full
authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for
the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will as
first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change
of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing
her full signature.

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Case No. 155

187 SCRA 743 (G.R. No. L-45302 July 24, 1990)

LATCHME MOTOOMULL, and MANUEL LACSON,


vs.JOFFRE DELA PAZ, FILOMENA ARANAS, LADHO CHUGANI, BHAGWANI CHUGANI, THE COURT OF
APPEALS, and THE SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION

DOCTRINE: The Court will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or
branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.

FACTS:
The Petitioners and the Respondents were the initial directors of the Sarkara Trading Corporation. The
Corporation issued a resolution authorizing the issuance of unissued stocks on a one is to one basis to its
stockholders. The resolution was then amended authorizing the issuance of unissued shares of stock on a two
is to one basis to its stockholders payable on Aug. 31, 1974. Petitioner sought issuance of a preliminary
injunction by the Court of Appeals to stop the enforcement of the SEC decision pending resolution of the appeal.
The Court however held that it had no jurisdiction according to RA 5434 which reads: Appeal shall not stay the
award, order, ruling, decision or judgment unless the officer or body rendering the same or the court, on motion,
after hearing, and on such terms as it may deem just, should provide otherwise. The propriety of a stay granted
by the officer or body rendering the award, order, ruling, decision or judgment may be raised only by motion in
the main case.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the word “court” refers to a trial court and not the Court of Appeals
2. W/N the Court of Appeals can grant a stay in the execution of the decision.

HELD:
Yes, the word court refers to the trial court. “The law unequivocally stated its declared objection that
appeal shall not stay the appealed decision, award, order.” The exception is given where the officer or body
rendering the same, or the court on motion, after hearing should provide otherwise. The law provides further
that the propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body rendering the award, order, decision or ruling may be
raised only by motion in the main case. More importantly where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed by reference to
associate words. Accordingly, an interpretation which leads to patent inconsistency must be rejected as not in
accordance with the legislative intent.

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Case No. 156

SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, vs.


HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan

Mary Louisse B. Rulona

DOCTRINE: Separate wills may be probated jointly; Article 816 on the extrinsic validity of Wills of Non-resident
Aliens;

FACTS:

Dr. Jose E. Cunanan and his wife, Dr, Evelyn Perez Cunanan, Filipino spouses who became American citizens,
filed separate wills with the same provisions on August 23, 1979 and August 27, 1979, respectively. Dr. Rafael
G. Cunanan, Jr. was appointed as trustee.

On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by fire that gutted their
home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr., as trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate
proceedings for the probate thereof in New York. These two wills were admitted to probate and letters
testamentary were issued in his favor.

On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan filed with the RTC Malolos,
Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two wills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York. Rafael
opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills were
executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers
and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to
give.

For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance
with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court
already issued an order, disallowing the wills.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed

RULING: YES.

The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country
upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his
country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.

Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is
imperative.

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the
Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator
has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such
country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure
and allowance of wills.

The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based
is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.

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Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to submit the pertinent
procedural and substantive New York laws but which request respondent Judge just glossed over. While the
probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive
the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate.

There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly.
Respondent Judge’s view that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should
be interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses
is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be "liberally construed in order to promote their object and to
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."

A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the delay in the administration of
justice.

What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testator’s reciprocal benefit or for the
benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses
executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which
in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held
a number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or
branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.

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Case No. 157

181 SCRA 322 (G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February 15, 1990)

JOSE RIVERA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO J. RIVERA

Mary Louisse B. Rulona

DOCTRINE: When the authenticity of the will is not being questioned there is no necessity of presenting the three
witnesses required under Article 811 of the Civil Code

FACTS:

On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio Rivera died. On July 28, 1975,
Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration over Venancio's estate. Docketed as SP No. 1076, this petition was opposed by Adelaido
J. Rivera, who denied that Jose was the son of the decedent. Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father and
did not die intestate but in fact left two holographic wills.

ISSUE: Whether or not the holographic wills are valid

RULING: Yes.

The respondent court considered them valid because it found them to have been written, dated and signed by
the testator himself in accordance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. It also held there was no necessity of
presenting the three witnesses required under Article 811 because the authenticity of the wills had not been
questioned.

The existence and therefore also the authenticity of the holographic wills were questioned by Jose Rivera. In his
own petition in SP No. 1076, he declared that Venancio Rivera died intestate; and in SP No. 1091, he denied the
existence of the holographic wills presented by Adelaido Rivera for probate. In both proceedings, Jose Rivera
opposed the holographic wills submitted by Adelaido Rivera and claimed that they were spurious. Consequently,
it may be argued, the respondent court should have applied Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:

In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting
and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator.
If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.

The flaw in this argument is that, as we have already determined, Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased
Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the
wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The testimony of
Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by their father,
was sufficient.

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Case no. 158

Suntay vs Suntay G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088

Darcy Peter B. Sabanal II

Doctrine: A lost will may be probated if such is proved to be in existence by two credible witnesses.

Facts: Jose B. Suntay died. Intestate proceedings were instituted in the CFI of Bulacan, where letters
of admin were granted to Apolonio. Apolonio died, so Federico was appointed admin of the estate of Jose. In
October of 1934, the surviving widow Maria filed a petition in the CFI of Bulacan for the probate of a will claimed
to have been executed by Jose in 1929. This petition was denied because of (1) the loss of said will after the
filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof and of (2) the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the
loss of the said will. After the liberation of Manila in the Pacific War, Silvino claimed to have found a will executed
by Jose in Chinese, filed, recorded, and probated in the Amoy District Court. He filed a petition in the intestate
proceedings praying for the probate of either the 1929 will (Philippines), or the 1931 will (the one found in China).
The CFI disallowed both.

Issue: Whether or not a lost will can be probated.

Ruling:

Anastacio’s testimony alone falls short of the legal requirement that the provisions of the lost will must be "clearly
and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses.

Credible witnesses mean competent witnesses and those who testify to facts from or upon hearsay are neither
competent nor credible witnesses.

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Case no. 159

HIX VS FLUEMER G.R. No. L-34259

Darcy Peter B. Sabanal II

Doctrine: Foreign laws must be proven as facts.

FACTS:

The petitioner is a special administrator of the estate of Edward Hix. He alleged that the latter’s will was executed
in Elkins, West Virginia on November 3, 1925 by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the
laws of that state govern. To this end, the petitioner submitted a copy of Section 3868 of Acts
1882, as found in West Virginia Code and as certified to by the Director of National Library. The Judge
of the First Instance however denied the probate of the will on the grounds that Sec 300 and 301 of the Code
of Civil Procedure were not complied with. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

W hether or not it is necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of such law in W est
Virginia as a prerequisite to the allowance and recording of said will.

RULING:

Yes.

The laws of the foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands
are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various states of the American Union. Such laws
must be proved as facts. Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no showing that
the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the state of West
Virginia, as provided in Sec 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the
certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State of W est Virginia as
provided in Sec 301. No evidence was introduced showing that the extract from the laws of W est
Virginia was in force at the time alleged will was executed. The court therefore did not err in denying
the probate of the will. The existence of such law in West Virginia must be proved.

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Case no. 160

LEON AND GHEZZI VS MANULIFE CO. 80 PHIL 495

Darcy Peter B. Sabanal II

Doctrine: Administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the Philippines.

FACTS:

Basil Gordon Butler, a former resident of the Philippines, died testate in Brooklyn, New York in 1945. In the same
year, his will was duly probated in the Surrogate’s Court of New York County. The will contained a residuary
clause by which the decedent allowed the named executors to purchase an annuity for the benefit of Mercedes
de Leon. In accordance therewith, one of the executors, James Madison Ross Jr., bought an annuity from the
Manufacturer’s Life Insurance Co. in Toronto, Canada with the contract stipulating a monthly payment of $57.60
to de Leon with the proviso that in the event of her death, the residue shall be paid to Ross Jr. or his successor.
With the object of getting hold the entire amount invested in the annuity, de Leon presented Butler’s will for
probate in the CFI of Manila and secured the appointment of Ada Loggey Ghezzi as administratrix. The latter
filed a motion praying that the Manager of the Manufacturer’s Life Insurance Co. Manila Branch to appear and
render a complete accounting of funds in its possession that purportedly belong to the estate of Butler. The CFI
denied the motion ruling. De Leon and Ghezzi appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Manila Court has authority over the assets involved

HELD:

No. Administration extends only to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was
granted, so that an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over property in another state
or country. The entire amount invested in a contract of annuity by virtue of which the beneficiary receives a
periodical sum during her lifetime, no longer forms part of a decedent’s estate and is beyond the control of the
probate court. It has passed completely into the hands of the company in virtue of a contract duly authorized and
validly executed. Whether considered as a trust or as simple consideration for the company's assumed obligation,
which it has been religiously performing, of paying periodical allowances to the annuitant, the proceeds of the
sale can not be withdrawn without the consent of the company, except, upon the death of the annuitant, the
residuary legatee may claim the remainder, if there be any. Neither the domiciliary or ancillary executor of Butler's
will, nor the trustee, nor the annuitant has disposition of any of these funds beyond the amounts and except upon
the conditions agreed upon in the contract for annuity.

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Case no. 161

B.E. Johannes, et al v. Honorable George R. Harvey, et al


Darcy Peter B. Sabanal II

Doctrine: What is sought in the Philippine Islands is an ancillary administration subsidiary to the
domiciliary administration

Facts:

Mrs. Carmen Theodora Johannes died intestate in SingaporeThere remained the husband, B. E. Johannes, the
brothers, Frederick Charles D'Almeida and Alfred D'Almeida, and the sister, Ida D'Almeida Johannes. Of these,
the husband, the brother Frederick, and the sister Ida, were residents of Singapore, while the brother Alfred was
in Manila.

The husband of the deceased was named the administrator of the property of the deceased wife, which was
locally situated within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Singapore.

The brother Alfred D' Almeida was, on his petition, appointed administrator of the Manila estate of the deceased
consisting of P109,732.55. This sum was on deposit in the Manila banks under and by virtue of guardianship
proceedings for the deceased, which were finally terminated by the discharge of the guardian, the Philippine
Trust Company,

The burden of the relator's contention is that the Honorable George R. Harvey, as CFI judge of the City of Manila,
has acted in excess of his jurisdiction in appointing Alfred D'Almeida administrator of the funds of the estate on
deposit in the Philippines, and that an administration in the jurisdiction is unnecessary.

Issue:

Whether or not administration in the Philippines is necessary

Ruling

Yes. Administration in the Philippines is necessary.It is often necessary to have more than one administration of
an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign
country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile
is termed the principal administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The
reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the
limits of the country in which it is granted. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving
in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the decedent,
liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.The proper course of procedure would be for
the ancillary administrator to pay the claims of creditors, if there be any, settle the accounts, and remit the surplus
to the domiciliary jurisdiction, for distribution among the next of kin.The principal administration in this instance is
that at the domicile of the deceased in Singapore. What is sought in the Philippine Islands is an ancillary
administration subsidiary to the domiciliary administration.

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Case no. 162

Hon. Remigio E. Zari v. Diosdado S. Flores

A. M No. 2170- MC P-1356, November 21, 1979


Clyde B. Saliring

‘Moral turpitude’ has been defined as an act of baseness, vilenese, or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellow men, to society in general contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It
implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not merely
be mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition
by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves
immoral but whose illegality lies in the fact of their being positively prohibited.

Facts

Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge of Branch VI City Court of Quezon City, recommended the dismissal
from service of Mr. Diosdado S. Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI, City Court, for having been convicted
for Libel a crime involving moral turpitude, and as such, Presidential Decree No. 807, Sec. 36(b) No. 10 provides
that one of the grounds for disciplinary action is conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Issue

Whether conviction of a crime of Libel involves moral turpitude and a ground for dismissal

Held

No. Supreme Court seems to imply that libel is not a crime involving moral turpitude. ‘Moral turpitude’ has
been defined as an act of baseness, vilenese, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellow men, to society in general contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It implies something immoral in itself,
regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not merely be mala prohibita, but the act itself
must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude.
Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies
in the fact of their being positively prohibited.

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Case no. 163

The Court Administrator vs. Lorenzo San Andres

A.M. No. P-89-345, May 31, 1991

Clyde B. Saliring

‘Moral turpitude’ has been defined as an act of baseness, vilenese, or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellow men, to society in general contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It
implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not merely
be mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition
by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves
immoral but whose illegality lies in the fact of their being positively prohibited.

Facts

This administrative complaint stemmed from a decision rendered in Criminal Casefor Illegal Recruitment
which convicted respondent Lorenzo San Andres, presently the Officer-in-Charge in Branch 57, Regional Trial
Court, Angeles City, recommending the dismissal of the respondent from the service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits on the grounds that the respondent having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
carries a penalty of dismissal from the service pursuant to P.D. 807; and for acts committed with manifest bad
faith, deceit and deliberate intent to hide the truth of having been charged or convicted of a crime when he
accomplished his information sheet for employment in the judiciary

Issue

Whether the conviction warrants dismissal on the basis of moral turpitude

Held

No. notwithstanding respondents' conviction, it should not be held against him because the crime committed
is not one involving moral turpitude. Moral Turpitude implies something immoral in itself regardless of the fact
that it is punishable by law or not. It must not merely be mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently
immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute, fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude
does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in the fact of their
being positively prohibited.

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Case no. 164

Tambunting de Tengco v. Tambunting

103 Phil. 1108

Clyde B. Saliring

It is important that an administrator should be able to devote his time and mind to the burden of his trust; as
administrator should not be in one place while the estate administered is in another place for he cannot efficiently
discharge his duties as administrator.

Facts

Presumably, because of the claims and representations made by the three attorneys Sarte, Barrios and
Gutierrez, Julieta Tambunting thru her new attorneys petitioned the probate court to set aside its order granting
to each of three respondent attorneys P70,000 as additional attorney’s fees and its order granting to Atty.
Gutierrez a separate fee of P30,000 for preparing the will of Clara Tambunting, all on the ground that the said
fees were procured through fraudulent misrepresentation that the value of the estate was P7,000,000 when in
fact said attorneys knew it to be only two million pesos, this, with the collusion of the administrators and their
respective attorneys, to the prejudice of the estate especially of the minor Vicente Legarda Price under the
guardianship of one of the co-administrators. Judge denied said petition apparently on the ground that it was filed
out of time, well beyond the period fixed by Rule 38 of the Rules of Court relative to petitions for relief; he also
denied a motion for reconsideration of this order of denial.

Issue

Whether the judge erred in denying the petition

Held

The judge is directed to consider and pass upon the petition anew and on its merits.The court is not
convinced that it was necessary to have three co-administrators to administer the estate, and each of them being
paid P30,000, and on top of that to have each co-administrator represented by a separate attorney who, excluding
the P70,000 additional fees now in question, have already been granted and paid P50,000 each. This does not
seem to be a case involving much if any litigation, or of numerous claims or complicated accounts.

It is important that an administrator should be able to devote his time and mind to the burden of his trust; as
administrator should not be in one place while the estate administered is in another place for he cannot efficiently
discharge his duties as administrator. In probate proceedings the probate court acts as a trustee of the estate
and as such trustee it should jealously guard the estate under administration and see to it that it is wisely and
economically administered and not dissipated.

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Case no. 165

In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Juliana Reyes, Paulina Santos de Parreño vs. Gregoria
Aranzanso

G.R. No. L-27657, August 30, 1992

Clyde B. Saliring

An administrator does not have to be an heir. He can be a stranger to the deceased.

Facts

When Juliana Reyes died intestate, Simplicio Santos filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition
for the settlement of her estate. In said petition he stated among other things that the surviving heirs of the
deceased are: he, as surviving spouse, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos, 27 and 17 years of age, respectively.
In the same petition, he asked that he be appointed administrator of the estate. Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging
that she is first cousin to the deceased, filed an opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator. For
her grounds she asserted that Simplicio Santos' marriage to the late Juliana Reyes was bigamous and thus void;
and that the adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was likewise void ab initio for want of the written
consent of their parents who were then living and had not abandoned them.

Issue

Whether it should be Gregoria Aranzanso who is a first cousin of the decedent or Paulina Santos de Parreño
who is an adopted child of the decedent should be the Administrator of the estate

Held

An administrator does not have to be an heir. He can be a stranger to the deceased. Paulina Santos de
Parreño having been appointed regular administrator of the intestate estate of Juliana Reyes may be removed
from her office but only for a cause or causes provided by law. Rule 82, Section 2, of the Rules of Court which
reads as follows:

Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death,
resignation, or removal.— If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate
according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or
absconds or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove
him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign. When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed
the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone
to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable
person.

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Case no. 166

Testate Estate of the late Gregorio Ventura vs. Gregoria Ventura,e t. al.

G. R. No. L-26306, April 27, 1988


Clyde B. Saliring

Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides for the order of preference in the appointment of Administrator
and categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence
to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to
imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason thereof.

Facts

Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio Ventura. Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura are the deceased’s legitimate children with his former wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Gregorio
Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which did not include his legitimate children, and Maria Ventura
although an illegitimate child, was named and appointed as executrix and administratrix of his estate. Thus,
oppositions were filed by the legitimate children to remove as executrix and administrator Maria Ventura. The
court annulled the institution of the heirs because of a clear case of preterition.

Issue

What shall be the order of preference in the appointment of Administrator

Held

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

When and to whom letters of administration granted.-If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, a petition shall be
granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court,
or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;"

The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the
decedent's property. It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant,
is preferred in the choice of administrator. 'Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the
amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred."

Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina
Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference over the
illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura.

Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be
appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as
nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to
represent both interests.

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Case No. 167

Gonzalez v. Aguinaldo, et al., 190 SCRA 112 (1990)


Melgen J. Sarra

Doctrine:

Interest in Estate as Principal Consideration. In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased
person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as
administrator. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy,
economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence
or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly.
Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as entitle them to protection from removal
without just cause.

Facts:

Doña Ramona is survived by her four (4) children who are her only heirs, namely, Asterio Favis, Beatriz F.
Gonzales, Teresa F. Olbes, and Cecilia Favis-Gomez. On 1983, the court a quo appointed petitioner Beatriz F.
Gonzales and private respondent Teresa Olbes as co-administratices of the estate. While petitioner Beatriz F.
Gonzales was in the United States accompanying her ailing husband who was receiving medical treatment in
that country, private respondent Teresa Olbes filed a motion, to remove Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix,
on the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust and had committed acts and omissions
detrimental to the interest of the estate and the heirs. Respondent Judge cancelled the letters of administration
granted to Beatriz F. Gonzales and retained Teresa Olbes as the administratrix of the estate of the late Ramona
Gonzales.

Issue:
WON the removal of Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix was justified.

Ruling:

No. The court based the removal of the petitioner on the fact of conflicts and misunderstandings between
petitioner and respondent Teresa Olbes which allegedly have prejudiced the estate, and the added circumstance
that petitioner had been absent from the country since October 1984up to 1985. The removal of an administrator
does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the belief of the
court that it would result in orderly and efficient administration. Court may remove or accept resignation of
executor or administrator if an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate
according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or
absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove
him, or in its discretion, may permit him to resign.

In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned
with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. The underlying assumption behind
this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the estate, or, on
the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest
and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. Administrators have such an interest in the
execution of their trust as entitle them to protection from removal without just cause.

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Case No. 168

De Guzman v. Limcolioc, 67 Phil. 404 (1939)


Melgen J. Sarra

Doctrine:
Interest in Estate as Principal Consideration. Executors and administrators of estates of deceased persons;
preference of widow to administer estate of her husband is not absolute. —If there are other reasons justifying
the appointment of an administrator other than the surviving spouse. If the interest in the estate is what principally
determines the preference in the appointment of an administrator of the estate of a deceased person, and if,
under the circumstances of each case, it develops that there is another who has more interest therein than the
surviving spouse, the preference established in the latter’s favor becomes untenable.

Facts:
Proceso died on 1937, without leaving a will. The deceased was first married to Agatona Santos, with whom he
had four children, named Nicolasa, Apolinario, Ana and Tomasa. After Agatona’s death, the deceased contracted
a second marriage with Angela Limcolioc, with whom he did not have any child. CFI of Rizal appointed Nicolasa
as judicial administratrix of the properties of the deceased Proceso de Guzman. Angela Limcolioc, widow of the
deceased, asked that this appointment be set aside and that she be named administratrix instead, on the ground
of her preference as the widow.

Issue:
WON the trial court erred in not appointing her administratrix of the estate of the deceased Proceso de Guzman
and in appointing Nicolasa de Guzman as such administratrix without first setting the case for hearing.

Ruling:
No, the court sustained the appointment of Nicolasa. The law takes into account in establishing the preference
of the widow to administer the estate of her husband, upon the latter’s death, because she is supposed to have
an interest therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership. But this preference established by law is not absolute,
if there are other reasons justifying the appointment of an administrator other than the surviving spouse. During
the marital life of the deceased with his first wife Agatona Santos, both, through their mutual labor, acquired all
the properties left by the deceased, not having acquired any property during his second marriage with Angela
Limcolioc. If the properties left by the deceased Proceso de Guzman were acquired during his marriage with
Agatona Santos, his children, among them Nicolasa, have more interest therein than his now widow, Angela
Limcolioc, who would only be entitled, by way of usufruct, to a portion equal to that corresponding to one of the
children who has received no betterment.

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Case No. 169

Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 413 (1992)


Melgen J. Sarra

Doctrine:
Interest in Estate as Principal Consideration. The purpose of having co-administrators is to have the benefit of
their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented, especially considering that in this
proceeding they will respectively represent the legitimate and illegitimate groups of heirs to the estate. Thereby,
it may reasonably be expected that all interested persons will be satisfied, with the representatives working in
harmony under the direction and supervision of the probate court.

Facts:

On May 12, 1988, after Domingo Gabriel died, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XI, a petition for letters of administration alleging, among others, that he is the son of the decedent, a
college graduate, engaged in business, and is fully capable of administering the estate of the late Domingo
Gabriel. Thereafter, the probate court issued an order, appointing private respondent as administrator of the
intestate estate of the late Domingo Gabriel. Petitioners praying for the recall of the letters of administration
issued to private respondent and the issuance of such letters instead to petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate
daughter of the deceased. In the petition for review on certiorari at bar, petitioners primarily aver that under
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, it is the surviving spouse who is first in the order of preference for the
appointment of an administrator. Petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel is the widow and legal surviving spouse of the
deceased Domingo Gabriel and should, therefore, be preferred over private respondent who is one of the
illegitimate children of the decedent by claimant. Aida Valencia. Secondly, they claim that assuming that the
widow is incompetent, the next of kin must be appointed. As between a legitimate and an illegitimate child, the
former is preferred, hence petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, must be preferred over private
respondent who is an illegitimate son. Thirdly, it is contended that the non-observance or violation per se of the
order of preference already constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Court
of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the petition.

Issue:
WON the court commit a grave abuse of discretion in not following the order of preference.

Ruling:
No. Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the issuance of letters
of administration, categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires
that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. In the instant case, a mere importunity by some of
the heirs of the deceased, there being no factual and substantial bases therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for
the removal of private respondent. Suffice it to state that the removal of an administrator does not lie on the
whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate. In addition, the court may also exercise
its discretion in appointing an administrator where those who are entitled to letters fail to apply therefor within a
given time.

Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators has been upheld for
various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests
represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and
perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony
for the best interests of the estate; and (5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to
have another competent person associated with him in the office.

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Case No.170

Capistrano, et al. v. Nadurata, et al., 46 Phil. 726 (1922)


Melgen J. Sarra

Doctrine:

Administration of estate of a decedent; discretion. — It lies within the discretion of the court to select an
administrator of the estate of a deceased person. Just as the order of preference is not absolute and may be
disregarded for valid cause.

Facts:
Petitioner-appellees, Guillerma Capistrano, et al., instituted a proceeding praying that Justo Buera be appointed
as administrator of the estate of the deceased Petra de los Santos. But appellants Pedro and Juan de los Santos
claiming to be the nearest relatives of the deceased opposed the application along with Leon Nadurata who
asserts to be the surviving spouse of the deceased. The lower court decided the case in favor of the Capistranos
and declared that Pedro de los Santos, Juan de los Santos, and Leon Nadurata, are not what they claim to be in
relation to the deceased.

Issue:
WON the appointment of Justo Buera as administrator of the estate of the deceased Petra de los Santos is valid.

Ruling:
Yes. The selection of an administrator of the estate of a deceased lies within the discretion of the court (sec. 642,
1 Code of Civil Procedure). And the record does not contain anything tending to show an abuse of discretion on
the part of the lower court. On the contrary, the act of the lower court in overruling the objection of the opponents
and confirming the appointment as administrator of the person proposed by the appellants is not only indicative
of sound discretion, but is right and just; for the evidence shows that Leon Nadurata is not surviving spouse of
Petra de los Santos, who died widow and not twice widow, and that the opponents Pedro de los Santos and Juan
de los Santos are not, as they pretend to be, brothers of the aforesaid deceased.

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 212


Case No. 171

Arevalo, Etc. v. Bustamante, et al., 69 Phil. 656 (1940)


Melgen J. Sarra

Doctrine:

Administration of estate of a decedent; discretion. Just as the order of preference is not absolute and may be
disregarded for valid cause. It lies within the discretion of the court to select an administrator of the estate of a
deceased person.

Facts:

Two years and a few months after Bernabe Bustamente died, his widow Rufina Arevalo was appointed by the
Court of First Instance of Manila as Judicial Administrator. Before the Court could act on the objections filed
against the inventory of the Judicial Administrator, Rufina died replaced by Ariston Bustamante, her nephew.
When this was learned by the heirs of the late Bernabe Bustamante, all opposed on the ground that Ariston
Bustamante, the new Administrator, is not an heir to the late Bernabe Bustamante or having interest in the said
estate. The Court revoked the appointment of Ariston.

Issues:
WON the revocation of the appointment of Ariston was grounded on valid cause.

Ruling:
Yes, for it is certainly not dismissal that caused him to cease as administrator, because dismissal always involves
correction or punishment, but revocation of the order under which he was appointed being a Judicial
Administrator, but because of disability. The removal of an Administrator for failing to render accounts or
administer the goods that were given to him, or for hiding, going crazy or inept to continue serving, which is not
the case. The appointment of the position of Judicial Administrator is for the one considered most qualified to
defend and guard with freedom and embarrassment, for the interests of a testamentary or an Intestate
proceedings. Just as the order of preference is not absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause. It lies within
the discretion of the court to select an administrator of the estate of a deceased person.

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Case No. 172
Rio y Compania vs. Maslog 105 Phil 452
Aleiza Rikka R. Suazo

Doctrine: Money claims against the decedent, arising from contract, do not survive and must be filed promptly
against the estate of the deceased debtor. (Sections 2 and 5 Rule 87)

Facts:
Rio y Olabarrieta (predecessor – in – interest of appellant Rio y Compania) and the late Anastacio
Manalo entered into a contract for the administration and exploitation of the former’s forest concession. Under
the contract, plaintiff – appellant was to extend credit to Manalo.
When Manalo died in May 1941, his daughter Elvira Maslog carried on his account and continued paying
until December 31, 1941. The debt was not fully paid.
On January 29, 1954, Compania filed a complaint for recovery of the debt due from Elvira Maslog (joined
by her husband) in her capacity as only heir of Manalo because through an affidavit of extra – judicial – settlement
of November 19, 1953 she had adjudicated to herself all properties of the late Anastacio Manalo.
Before the case was set for hearing, a motion to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action had
already prescribed was filed by the defendants – appellees.
The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that it was filed late.
Creditor – plaintiff filed an appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint because of prescription.

Ruling:
No.
The claim being for money and arising from contract, did not survive and should have been filed promptly
against the estate of the deceased debtor (Secs. 2 and 5, Rule 87). Plaintiff – appellant was aware of the death
of Manalo on said date, and it is not claimed that Rio y Compania (successor to original creditor) did not know
the existence of Manalo’s obligation.
As creditor, it was appellant’s duty to present its claim within a reasonable time after Manalo’s death in
the estate proceedings, and if none were had to file a petition for letters of administration, as authorized by sec.
6 (b) of Rule 79.
But inspite of creditor’s knowledge of the debtor’s death on May 30, 1941 and its awareness of the
existence of the obligation, it did not take steps to institute administration proceedings, or collect the debt in
question until January 29, 1954, more than 12 years from the death of the decedent.
The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of claims against the decedent’s estate
in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.

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Case No. 173
Py Eng Chong vs. Herrera 70 SCRA 130
Aleiza Rikka R. Suazo

Doctrine: The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of claims against the decedent’s estate
in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.

Facts:
Defendant – spouses Eduardo Uy Chiat and Cecilia G. Uy Chiat were ordered to pay jointly and severally
to petitioner. The petitioner likewise secured a writ of execution but was returned unsatisfied. Upon motion of
petitioner, a First Alias Writ of Execution was issued directing the Sheriff of Negros Occidental to levy on the
properties of the defendant – spouses, jointly and severally, especially their participation in the general
partnership of “Julia So De Chiat and Sons” but it was likewise returned unsatisfied.
A Second Alias Writ of Execution was issued on the same properties. The Provincial Sheriff levied upon
the rights, interests and participation of the Spouses over the 12 parcels of land registered in the name of
respondent general partnership Julia So De Chiat and Sons.
The partnership filed an Urgent Motion to Lift Levy on Execution alleging that the properties levied upon
belong exclusively to said partnership and that judgment debtors, the Spouses, have ceased to be members of
the partnership, having sold all their rights and participation therein to Julia So De Chiat, mother of judgment
debtor Eduardo Uy Chiat.
Petitioner filed opposition to the urgent motion alleging that the deed of sale allegedly executed by the
judgment debtors in favour of the mother of Eduardo Uy Chiat is a simulated sale “which the court has considered
as such, and, therefore, is not a legal obstacle to the continuance of the levy”; and that since the partnership is
merely a third – party claimant and not one of the parties in the case, it cannot legally intervene in the action.
The partnership interposed stating that the since the judgment is only a money claim and the debtor,
Eduardo Uy Chiat, died before final judgment has been rendered, the court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ
of execution against said deceased defendant. This was opposed by the petitioner who pointed out the fact that
the judgment in the case had long become final and executor before Eduardo died, and the judgment debt is
sought to be enforced by the Second Alias Writ of Execution can still be executed against successors – in –
interest of Eduardo.
Respondent judge granted motion to lift the levy by recalling the Second Alias Writ of Execution stating
that Eduardo died on March 30, 1968, hence, a writ of execution against him can no longer be enforced. It also
mentioned that the judgment against the spouses is really against the conjugal partnership of the defendant –
spouses.
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court was correct in recalling the Second Alias Writ of Execution.

Ruling:
Yes. defendant having died prior to the levy which was made by the Provincial Sheriff of Negros
Occidental on June 23, 1969, the judgment in favour of petitioner, being one for a sum of money, may no longer
be enforced by means of the said writ of execution, but must be filed in the proper estate proceedings. This is in
consonance with the rule laid down in Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. - All claims for
money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for
money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever,
except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring
against the claimants.
The above-quoted provision is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate
of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine
each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. 5 The plain and obvious design
of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the
distributees, legatees, or heirs. "The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of claims against
the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute
the residue.

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Case No. 174
Mendiola vs. Court of Appeals, et.al 190 SCRA 421 (1990)
Aleiza Rikka R. Suazo

Doctrine: If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law, or
to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by these or judgment of the court, or
a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable
to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or in its discretion, may permit him to resign.

Facts:
Petitioner and private respondents are the surviving heirs of the late Carlos Mendiola. A petition for
probate of a will was filed. A decision was had allowing the will and letters testamentary were issued in favor of
petitioner who was declared as executor of the estate of the deceased in the will.
A motion for removal of Reynaldo Mendiola as executor and another motion for the appointment of
Redentor Mendiola were filed by private respondents who were also children of the deceased.
The motion was granted and petitioner was removed as executor and the letters testamentary were
revoked.
A motion of reconsideration was filed by petitioner. The Court of Appeals aimed the judgment of the trial
court, hence this petition of review.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not annulling probate court’s order removing him as
executor.

Ruling:
No. The Court of Appeals is correct.
Sufficient evidence was adduced in the proceedings before the RTC that petitioner failed to pay the
estate tax. He also failed to render an accounting of the estate and settle the same according to law. Furthermore,
he involved the heirs in a transaction with Villarica Pawnshop which, because of petitioner’s failure to honor his
part of the bargain, resulted in filing of a suit by Villarica against the heirs.
According to Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, if an executor or administrator neglects to render
his account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty
expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to
discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or in its discretion, may permit him to resign.
The determination of a person’s suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent,
in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered
with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error.

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Case No. 175
Matute vs. Court of Appeals, et.al. 26 SCRA 768 (1969)
Aleiza Rikka R. Suazo

Doctrine: Appellate tribunals are disinclined to interfere with the action taken by a probate court in the matter of
removal of an executor or administrator unless positive error or gross abuse of discretion is shown.

Facts:
A petition for removal of Matias S. Matute as co – administrator was filed by Carlos S. Matute. Carlos
also filed for his appointment as co – administrator alleging that Matias is not only incompetent but also negligent
in his management of the estate. Matias interposed an opposition to the petition.
The court granted the petition and Matias was removed as co – administrator of the estate. Matias
interposed with the CA a petition for certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction praying that the order be set
aside as a nullity because he was not afforded due process in his removal and that the appointment of Jose S.
Matute was without the requisite hearing.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the removal of the respondent as co – administrator of the Matute estate
2. Whether or not the appointment of the petitioner as the new co – administrator is proper.

Ruling:
1. No. The settled rule is that the removal of an administrator under Section 2 of Rule 82 lies within the
discretion of the court appointing him. As aptly expressed in one case, “The sufficiency of any ground
for removal should thus be determined by the said court, whose sensibilities are, in the first place,
affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the
rules or the orders of the Court.”
In the case at bar, the Court was constrained to nullify the disputed order of removal because
it is indubitable that the probate judge ousted the respondent from his trust without affording him the full
benefit of a day in court, thus denying him his cardinal right to due process.

2. No. Even granting arguendo that the removal of Matias is free from infirmity, this Court is not prepared
to sustain the validity of the appointment of the petitioner in place of the former. To start with, the record
does not disclose that any hearing was conducted, much less that notices were sent to the other heirs
and interested parties, anent the petition for the appointment of Jose S. Matute, among others, as co-
administrator vice Matias S. Matute.
In this regard, it is pertinent to observe that any hearing conducted by the probate court was
confined solely to the primary prayers of the separate petitions of the other heirs seeking the ouster of
Matias S. Matute. The requirement of a hearing and the notification to all known heirs and other
interested parties as to the date thereof is essential to the validity of the proceeding for the appointment
of and administrator "in order that no person may be deprived of his right or property without due process
of law."
Moreover, a hearing is necessary in order to fully determine the suitability of the applicant to the
trust, by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording oppositors, if any, to contest
the said application.
The provision of Rule 83 that if "there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration
may be granted to any suitable person," cannot be used to justify the institution of Jose S. Matute even
without a hearing, because such institution has no factual basis considering that there was a general
administrator (Carlos V. Matute) who remained in charge of the affairs of the Matute estate after the
removal of Matias S. Matute. The abovecited provision evidently envisions a situation when after the
removal of the incumbent administrator no one is left to administer the estate, thus empowering the
probate court, as a matter of necessity, to name a temporary administrator (or caretaker), pending the
appointment of a new administrator after due hearing. Such circumstance does not obtain in the case at
bar.

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Case No. 176
Matias vs. Gonzales, et.al 101 Phil 852 (1957)
Aleiza Rikka R. Suazo

Doctrine: Where it appears that there are, at least, two factions among the heirs of the deceased, representing
their respective interest in the estate, and the probate Court deems it best to appoint more than one special
administrator, justice and equity demands that both factions be represented in the management of the estate of
the deceased.

Facts:
Aurea Matias initiated special proceedings for the probate of a document purporting to be the last will and
testament of her aunt, Gabina Raquel who died single. Aurea was likewise appointed therein as executrix.
Basilia Salud, first cousin of the deceased, opposed the proceeding which was sustained and the petition for
probate was denied. Aurea brought the matter on appeal. Meanwhile, Basilia moved for the dismissal of Horacio
Rodriguez as special administrator of the estate of the deceased and for the appointment in his stead of Ramon
Plata. Rodriguez was relieved as special administrator and Basilia was appointed as special administratrix, to be
assisted and advised by her niece, Victorina Salud, and to be helped by Ramon Plata, who is hereby appointed
as co – administrator.

Matias prayed that said order be set aside and that she be appointed as co – administratrix jointly with Horacio
Rodriguez upon the ground that Basilia is over 80 years of age, totally blind and physically incapacitated to
perform the duties of said office, and that said movant is the universal heiress of the deceased and the person
appointed by the deceased as executrix of her alleged will. The motion was denied. Later on, Basilia tendered
her resignation as special administratrix by reason of physical disability due to old age, and recommended the
appointment, in her place, of Victorina Salud. Matias objected to the appointment of Victorina and proposed that
the administration of the estate be entrusted to the PNB, the Monte de Piedad, the BPI, or any other similar
institution authorized by law, should the court be reluctant to appoint her as special administratrix of the estate.

Petitioner instituted an action against Judge Gonzales, Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata, for the purpose of
annulling the above – mentioned orders of respondent Judge, upon the ground that the same had been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion for not appointing the named
executrix and for appointing more than one special administratrix.

Ruling:
Yes, the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and it was not proper for him to appoint more than
one special administratrix. Although the probate of the alleged will and testament of Gabina Raquel was denied
by respondent judge, the order to this effect is not yet final and executor. It is pending review on appeal taken
my Aurea Matias. The probate of said alleged will being within the realm of legal possibility, Aurea Matias has --
- as universal heir and executrix designated in said instrument --- a special interest to protect during the pendency
of the appeal. Thus, in the case of Roxas vs. Pecson, “this Court held that a widow, designated as executrix in
the alleged will and testament of her deceased husband, the probate of which had been denied in an order
pending appeal, "has . . . the same beneficial interest after the decision of the court disapproving the will, which
is now pending appeal, because the decision is not yet final and may be reversed by the appellate Court. The
record shows that there are, at least two factions among the heirs of the deceased, namely, one, represented by
the petitioner, and another, to which Basilia Salud and Victorina Salud belong. Inasmuch as the lower court had
deemed it best to appoint more than one special administrator, justice and equity demands that both factions be
represented in the management of the estate of the deceased. The rule, laid down in Roxas v. Pecson, to the
effect that "only one special administrator may be appointed to administrator temporarily" the estate of the
deceased, must be considered in the light of the facts obtaining in said case. The lower court appointed therein
one special administrator for some properties forming part of said estate, and a special administratrix for other
properties thereof. Thus, there were two separate and independent special administrators. In the case at bar
there is only one special administration, the powers of which shall be exercised jointly by two special co-
administrators. In short, the Roxas case is not squarely in point. Moreover, there are authorities in support of the
power of courts to appoint several special co-administrators.

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 218


Case No. 177
CORONA V. CA ;G.R. No. L-59821 August 30, 1982

Tolinero, Renato Jr. F.

Doctrine: Objections to appointment of special administrator on grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship of
the special administrator overshadowed by mutual representation of deceased wife and surviving husband in the
management of the estate due to inability of executrix to serve.

Facts: In November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York, U.S.A., leaving two Wills: one, a
holographic Will dated October 3, 1980, which excluded her husband, respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as one of
her heirs, and the other, a formal Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or about three weeks thereafter, which
expressly disinherited her husband Romarico "for reason of his improper and immoral conduct amounting to
concubinage, which is a ground for legal separation under Philippine Law" ; bequeathed her properties in equal
shares to her sisters Exaltacion L. Allarde, Vicenta L. Faustino and Gloria L. Teoxon, and her nieces Rowena F.
Corona and Jennifer F. Way; and appointed Rowena F. Corona, herein petitioner, as her Executrix.

On November 21, 1980, Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the Wills before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch VI (Spec. Procs. No. 9398), and for the appointment of Nenita P. Alonte as Administrator because
she (Rowena) is presently employed in the United Nations in New York City.

On December 2, 1980, upon Rowena’s urgent Motion, the Probate Court appointed Nenita P. Alonte as Special
Administratrix, upon a P100,000.00 bond.

On December 12, 1980, the surviving husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an "Opposition and Motion" and prayed
that the Petition for Probate be denied and that the two Wills be disallowed on the ground that they were procured
through undue and improper pressure and influence, having been executed at a time when the decedent was
seriously ill and under the medical care of Dr. Antonio P. Corona; petitioner’s husband, and that the holographic
Will impaired his legitime. Romarico further prayed for his appointment as Special Administrator because the
Special Administratrix appointed is not related to the heirs and has no interest to be protected, besides, the
surviving spouse is qualified to administer.

Issue: Whether or not Nenita P. Alonte be appointed as Special Administrator

Ruling: Yes. The executrix’s choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide
latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will, is entitled to the highest consideration. Objections to
Nenita’s appointment on grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are overshadowed by the fact that justice
and equity demand that the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the surviving husband be represented
in the management of the decedent’s estate.

It is hereby ordered, in Special Proceedings No. 9398 pending before it, to appoint Nenita F. Alonte as co-Special
Administrator, properly bonded, who shall act as such jointly with the other Special Administrator on all matters
affecting the estate.

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 219


Case No. 178

VDA. DE DAYRIT V. REMOLETE et al.; GR No. L-59935 September 30, 1982

Tolinero, Renato Jr. F.

Doctrine: Justice and equity also demand that opposing sides in the probate proceeding be adequately
represented in the administration of the decedent’s estate.

Facts: Petitioner married Norberto L. Dayrit in 1934. She alleged that Norberto did not bring any property into
the marriage but that she brought a vast estate of paraphernal properties inherited from her parents. Her husband
managed said properties by tolerance and that out of the fruits thereof they acquired some conjugal assets.
Norberto abandoned her in 1972.

After 6 years of separation in fact, Norberto returned in 1978 and filed before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Cebu a "Complaint for Recovery of Administration of Conjugal Properties", which, according to petitioner
included paraphernal properties administered by her during their separation. Norberto was represented by
counsel, Atty. Vicente Jayme.

On February 14, 1981, Norberto died leaving a Will naming herein respondent, Atty. Vicente Jayme, as executor.
The latter then filed Special Proceedings No. 4004-R for probate of the Will and praying that he be appointed
Executor, and before admission of the Will to probate, as Special Administrator. Petitioner and their adopted
daughter, Lydia Dayrit, opposed respondent Jayme’s appointment alleging that petitioner was better qualified to
manage the estate. Petitioner likewise prayed for the disallowance of the Will and that the proceedings be
converted to intestacy.

On March 19, 1981, petitioner was appointed by the Probate Court presided by respondent Judge, as Special
Administrator, without bond.

In the meantime, petitioner prayed the Court for authority to assign 10 shares of Club Filipino, Inc., Cebu, to Atty.
Casimiro Madarang, Jr., her nephew and counsel, to act not only as her proxy but to sit in the Board of Directors.
The Probate Court allowed the assignment.

It was the foregoing series of Orders that prompted petitioner to resort to this Petition against respondent Judge
and private respondent Attys. Madarang and Jayme, claiming that Atty. Madarang’s replacement of petitioner on
March 3, 1982, as well as respondent Judge’s Orders of January 19, 1982, February 12, 1982, February 26,
1982, and March 15, 1982 were arbitrary, whimsical and done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not the lower courts were arbitrary, whimsical and done with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Ruling: Without delving into the other questions raised, which are unnecessary for the resolution of the principal
issue, it is our considered opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and
that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate
prior to the probate of the Will would be unfair to her proprietary interests. Justice and equity also demand that
opposing sides in a probate proceeding be adequately represented in the administration of the decedent’s estate

The court hereby ordered to appoint petitioner Flora de Gracia Regner Vda. de Dayrit as co-Special
Administrator, without bond, who shall act as such jointly with Atty. Casimiro R. Madarang, Jr., the other Special
Administrator, on all matters affecting the estate.

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Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 221
Case No. 179
VILLAMOR V COURT OF APPEALS Citation: G.R. No. L-41508 June 27, 1988
Tolinero, Renato Jr. F.

Doctrine: To ascertain what constitutes a discovery of the facts constituting the fraud, reference must be had to
the principles of equity; In actions in equity, the rule is that the means of knowledge are equivalent to actual
knowledge.

Facts:

Spouses Victor Cortes and Maria Castañeda had eight (8) children in which six died single and without issue.
Barbara Cortes, one of the children, begot a son by the name of Eustaquio Cortes. Rufino Cortes, another child
of the spouses, died on June 1909 left two alleged legitimate children, Ireneo Cortes Villamor and Paula Cortes
Villamor. The last to die of the Cortes children was Eugenia Cortes. She died on January 1931.

Eustaquio Cortes, son of Barbara, married one Sixta Ceniza. Born to them were five children, all surnamed
Cortes. All five remained unmarried and died without will nor forced heirs. Dionisio, Amancia and Agapita
predeceased their father Eustaquio.

Eustaquio died on October 1932, survived by his spouse and two sons, Bartolome and Nicanor. Bartolome who
was a Catholic priest, died on November 1937. Nicanor Cortes, also known as Father Gabriel Maria Cortes, died
as a monk of the Carthusian Order in Barcelona, Spain on August 1969. He was the last of the direct descendants
of the Barbara Cortes line. On the other hand, Paula Villamor, alleged daughter of Rufino Cortes, died single on
January 1967 and without issue. In a Special Proceedings for the settlement of Bartolome’estate, Fr. Diosdado
Camomot, a close friend of Bartolome, was named administrator.

On September 27, 1938, Paula Cortes Villamor and Ireneo Cortes Villamor, claiming to be the legitimate children
of Rufino Cortes, filed a petition for the administration of the estate of Rufino Cortes, under Special Proceedings
No. 343-C. On April 14, 1948, Judge S. C. Moscoso approved the project of partition, and on September 30,
1948, the administrators delivered the seven parcels of land to Ireneo and Paula Villamor. On October 1954, Fr.
Cortes executed a power of attorney before the Vice-Consul of the Republic of the Philippines in Spain,
constituting and appointing Fr. Diosdado Camomot as his attorney-in-fact.

On May 1962, Fr. Nicanor Cortes executed a Deed of Conveyance in favor of several persons wherein he
conveyed ten parcels of land which included those received by his mother under the Project of Partition. In the
complaint, respondent alleged inter alia that upon learning of the death of Fr. Nicanor Cortes, some of his nearest
of kin who are his surviving first cousins, the Cenizas [all from the side of Sixta Ceniza] initiated Special
Proceedings No. 3062-R for the settlement of the estate of the deceased monk; that prior to and in the course of
initiating said proceedings, the surviving first cousins came upon documents showing that Fr. Cortes during his
absence from the Philippines to pursue a monastic life was deprived of his inheritance by fraud, stealth and
stratagem perpetrated by Paula and Ireneo Villamor Petitioners, instead of filing an answer, filed a motion to
dismiss, alleging that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment and by the statute of limitations.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the partition can be annulled on the ground of fraud

2. Whether or not a stanger may be appointed as administrator.

Ruling:

1. No In his testimony, Fr. DiosdadoCamomot declared categorically that he informed Fr. Nicanor Cortes about
Special Proceedings No. 343 and that he sent him a copy of the project of partition. Highly significant is the fact
that among the witnesses who testified before the trial court, it was only Fr. Camomot who had personal
knowledge of the events leading to the execution of the project of partition. Notwithstanding, the trial court, instead
of according great weight to his testimony, summarily brushed it aside and even reached the unwarranted
conclusion that he was in collusion with Ireneo and Paula Villamor. The testimony of Fr. Diosdado Camomot,
however, is too detailed and straightforward to be a mere product of concoction or fabrication or a device to

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 222


cover-up the collusion imputed to him by the trial court. Furthermore, said testimony is corroborated by other
evidence on record that sustains its veracity. That he communicated with Fr. Nicanor Cortes was corroborated
by Roure Ceniza-Sanchez, a witness for therein plaintiff-administratrix Daniela CenizaUrot. She testified that
being the administrator, it was Fr. Camomot who informed Fr. Nicanor Cortes about the properties of his parents.
In the Deed of Conveyance dated May 9, 1962 executed by Fr. Nicanor Cortes, wherein he ceded and transferred
ten [10] parcels of land in favor of several persons. The portions of Fr. Cortes' letters and Deed of Conveyance
show beyond any iota of doubt that he was kept posted on the developments in the Philippines. He know that his
mother received some lands as "share" and that Candelario had acquired lands. By reason of this circumstance,
Fr. Nicanor Cortes is charged with knowledge of Special Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343 as well as the Project
of Petition.

2. Yes. The Court do not consider as "intriguing" the observation of the lower court and concurred in by the Court
of Appeals that in both Special Proceedings in question, the administrators appointed were complete strangers
to the decedents. There is nothing repulsive in this nor is this an indicium of fraud and collusion as found by the
courts. Section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the persons who can act as executors and
administrators. It provides that in case the persons who have the preferential right to be appointed are not
competent or are unwilling to serve, administration may be granted to such other person as the court may appoint.

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 223


Case No. 180

RELUCIO V SAN JOSE; GR No. L-4783 May 26, 1952

Tolinero, Renato Jr. F.

Doctrine: Pending an appeal from the order of substitution, the old administrator has the right to continue as
such. If the order of substitution was immediately executed, the new administrator would act.

Facts: Herein petitioner, Julita Relucio, was appointed administratrix of the testate estate of Felipe Relucio, Sr.
Upon petition by Lorenzo, Rolando and Leticia Relucio, to which the petitioner filed an opposition, the CFI of
Manila issued an order, appointing Rolando Relucio as administrator in substitution of the petitioner. Petitioner,
upon falling to obtain a reconsideration, filed a notice of appeal. Before the appeal could be perfected, Rolando
Relucio moved for the immediate execution of the order appointing him as administrator. The court merely made
reference to the letters of administration issued in favor of Rolando Relucio and did not pass on the motion for
immediate execution. Rolando Relucio filed a motion praying that the petitioner be declared in contempt of court
for failing to deliver to him, after demand, all papers, documents, titles and properties of the estate under her
administration which the CFI Manila denied. The court appointed the Equitable Banking Corporation as special
administrator pending the appeal of the petitioner from the order appointing Rolando Relucio as administrator.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in appointing EBC as special administrator pending appeal of herein
petitioner.

Ruling: Yes. The respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in appointing the respondent EBC as special
administrator.

The cases in which a special administrator may be appointed are specified in section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules
of Court which provides as follows: "When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration
occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, or from any other cause, the court may
appoint a special administrator to collect and take charge of the estate of the deceased and executors or
administrators thereupon appointed." A special administrator may also be appointed in a case covered by section
8 of Rule 87 which provides as follows: "If the executor or administrator has a claim against the estate he
represents, he shall give notice thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special administrator
who shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have the same power and be subject to the same liability as the
general administrator or executor in the settlement of other claims. The court may order the executor or
administrator to pay to the special administrator necessary funds to defend such claim."

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 224


Case No. 181

LEON AND GHEZZI V. MANULIFE; GR No. L-3677 November 29, 1951

Tolinero, Renato Jr. F.

Doctrine: When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with
the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator
in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed
of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as
is provided bylaw in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state
or country.

Facts: The case involves the estate of Basil Gordon Butler, formerly a resident of the Philippines died in
Brooklyn, New York City, in 1945, leaving a will which was duly probated in New York County and of which James
Ross, Sr., James Madison Ross, Jr. and Ewald E. Selph were named executors. The estate having been settled,
the proceedings were closed on July 17,1947. The contained this residuary clause bequeathing the remaining
estate to Mercedes de Leonwho is to receive an amount sufficient for her current needs. James Madison Ross
was appointed as trustee. Ross bought an annuity from the Manufacturer's life Insurance Co. at its head office
in Toronto, Canada, paying in advance $17,091.03 as the combined premiums. The contract stipulates for a
monthly payment of $57.60 to Mercedes Benz during her lifetime. De Leon has been receiving the stipulated
monthly allowance through the Insurance Company's Manila Office. To get hold of the entire amount, de Leon
presented the will for probate in CFI, Manila with Ghezzi as administrator. After having qualified, the administratrix
filed the motion to demand accounting from Manulife which Judge Amparo has denied.

Issue: Whether or not De Leon can demand accounting from Manulife.

Ruling: Section 4 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides:

Estate, how administered -When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of
administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the
estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the
residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided bylaw in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to
persons who are inhabitants of another state or country. It is manifest from the facts before set out that the funds
in question are outside the jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Having been invested in an annuity in
Canada under a contract executed in the country, Canada is the suits of the money. The party whose appearance
the appellant seeks is only a branch or agency of the company which holds the funds in its possession, the
agency's intervention being limited to delivering to the annuitant the checks made out and issued from the home
office. There is no showing or allegation that the funds have been transferred or removed to the Manila Branch

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Case No. 182

DIEZ v. TOMAS SERRA G.R. No. 27650

Veronica Vera Socorro V. Lumantas

Doctrine: When a Court of First Instance declares itself with jurisdiction to act in the distribution of an estate, so
far as it depends upon the place of residence of a person or the location of his estate, its jurisdiction cannot be
contested except by an appeal in the original case, or when lack of jurisdiction appears in the record at the time
the court declares itself with jurisdiction.

Facts: Segundo Diez applied to the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros for letters of administration of
the estate of the deceased Florencia Diez alleging that he is a brother of the said Florencia Diez, who died in the
municipality of Cadiz, Province of Occidental Negros, in which municipality she resided at the time of her death;
that the deceased at the time of her death was a widow and left no will.

The court granted the application, ordering the appointment of Segundo Diez as administrator.

Tomas Serra, as guardian of his six minor brothers and sisters, the children of the deceased Florencia
Diez, put in a special appearance, contesting that court's authority to take cognizance of this intestate estate, on
the ground that the deceased Florencia Diez resided in the municipality of San Joaquin, Province of Iloilo, at the
time of her death

Issue: WON the court a quo had jurisdiction to grant the letters of administration applied for

Held: Yes, when a Court of First Instance declares itself with jurisdiction to act in the distribution of an estate, so
far as it depends upon the place of residence of a person or the location of his estate, its jurisdiction cannot be
contested except by an appeal in the original case, or when lack of jurisdiction appears in the record at the time
the court declares itself with jurisdiction.

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Case no. 183

Trillana v. Crisostomo

G. R no. L-3378, 22 August 1951, 89 Phil. 710

Clyde Saliring

Doctrine:

Interested party as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who hass a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor; this interest must be material and direct, not merely indirect or contingent.

Facts:

The deceased Damasa Crisostomo, allegedly made two wills. One will was made on August 16, 1948 and
the other will on October 19, 1948. Trillana, the administrator of the estate, presented the subsequent will
executed on October 19 for probate, and was granted by the Court. Crisostomo and others, claiming to be
nephews and nieces of the deceased, filed a petition for relief of the judgment by the probate court to disallow
the subsequent will and allow the former, alleging that the proceedings during the probate of the subsequent will
was attended by fraud, as a result, their legacies were declared invalid or legatees are incapable to inherit.

Issue:

Whether the nephews and nieces in the present case are entitled to appeal

Held:

No. In civil actions actions and special proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law, the interest in order that
a person may be a party on appeal must be material and direct, so that he will be materially and directly benefited
or injured by the court’s order, decree or judgment and not indirect contingent. The interest claim by the parties
is purely contingent or dependent upon several uncertain and future events such as: (1) disallowance of the
second will, (2) allowance of the first will, and (3) invalidation of certain legacies left in said will of August 16,
1948

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Case No. 184

G.R. No. L-43955-56 July 30, 1979


Lazatin vs. Campos

Sittie Ayna Dia

Doctrine:
Adoption is never presumed but must be affirmatively proved. The proof required to establish adoption of child is
thru judicial decree of adoption. Absence of proof of order of adoption by the court cannot be substituted by parol
evidence.

Facts:
Spouses Mariano and Margarita Lazatin died. In the separate proceedings to settle their estates, petitioner
Renato Lazatin filed a motion to intervene as an adopted child of the spouses. The lower court, presided by
respondent Judge Campos, denied the motion because Renato’s evidence is not sufficient to prove the fact of
the alleged adoption.

Issue:
WON the respondent court erred in denying petitioner’s petition to declare as established the fact of his adoption?

Ruling:
NO. Petitioner was not able to prove the fact of his adoption by the spouses Mariano and Margarita Lazatin.

Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that
which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance
with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural
law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly
carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity.

The fact of adoption is never presumed but must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence.
The destruction by fire of a public building in which the adoption papers would have been filed if existent does
not give rise to a presumption of adoption nor is the destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding to be
presumed. On the contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a presumption of its
non-existence.

Where, under the provisions of the statute, an adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court
constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established.

Petitioner’s flow of evidence in the case below does not lead us to any proof of judicial adoption. We cannot pluck
from his chain of evidence any link to the real existence of a court decree of adoption in his favor.

Petitioner merely proceeds from a nebulous assumption that he was judicially adopted between the years 1928
and 1932. By what particular court was the adoption decreed or by whom was the petition heard, petitioner does
not even manifest, much less show.

Apparently on the assumption that the adoption was commenced in Manila, petitioner’s counsel secured
a certification from the CFI-Manila which, however, negatively reported that among the salvaged records now
available in their Office, there has not been found, after a diligent search, any record regarding the adoption of
Mr. Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara allegedly filed sometime in the years 1928 to 1931 by the spouses
Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin and Margarita de Asis de Lazatin.

The certification of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila that their pre-war records relative to decisions of the Court
of First Instance were either destroyed or burned during the Liberation of the City of Manila, does not furnish any
legal basis for a presumption of adoption in favor of petitioner.

Moreover, if there was really such adoption, petitioner could have conveniently secured a copy of the newspaper
publication of the adoption or a certification of the publishing house to that effect.

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And of course, if the adoption records were indeed destroyed or burned during the war, the clear right and duty
of petitioner was to duly reconstitute the records as provided by law. The absence of proof of such order of
adoption by the court, as provided by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived
with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a child to establish such adoption. Even evidence of
declaration of the deceased, made in his lifetime, that he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that he had
adopted him, and of the fact that the child resided with the deceased, as a member of his family, from infancy
until he attained his majority, is not sufficient to establish the fact of adoption. Nor does the fact that the deceased
spouses fed, clothed, educated, recognized and referred to one like petitoner as an adopted child, necessarily
establish adoption of the child.

We do not discount though that declarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are admitted on the principle
that they are natural expressions of persons who must know the truth. But, in proving an adoption, there is a
better proof available and it should be produced.

Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of adoption proceedings were actually lost or
destroyed. But, prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former
existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents; although
this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.

As earlier pointed out, petitioner failed to establish the former existence of the adoption paper and its subsequent
loss or destruction. Secondary proof may only be introduced if it has first been established that such adoption
paper really existed and was lost. This is indispensable.

We cannot entertain the plea of petitioner that the sanction of Rule 29 should be applied to consider as
established the fact of his adoption due to the refusal of respondent Nora L. de Leon to produce the document
of adoption, because:

1. the fact or real existence of petitioner’s adoption had not been established
2. there is no proof that such document of adoption is in the possession of respondent Nora L. de Leon
3. the motu proprio order of the court for Nora de Leon to produce the items retrieved from the safety
deposit box cannot be treated as a mode of discovery of production and inspection of documents under
Rule 27
4. The items deposited in the safety deposit box have already been surrendered by respondent Nora L. de
Leon
5. no document of adoption in favor of petitioner was listed as found in the safety deposit box.

As a necessary consequence, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara cannot properly intervene in the
settlement of the estate of Margarita de Asis as an adopted child because of lack of proof thereof. For one to
intervene in an estate proceeding, it is a requisite that he has an interest in the estate, either as one who would
be benefited as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor.

The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. He must prove
compliance with the statutes relating to adoption in the jurisdiction where the adoption occurred.

Whatever be his theory and his course of action and whether or not he may be duly allowed to intervene in the
proceedings below as such alleged admitted illegitimate child, his recourse in the event of an adverse ruling
against him is to make a formal offer of proof and of his excluded evidence, oral and documentary, and seek a
reversal on an appeal in due course.

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Case No. 185

Insurance Company of North America v. C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc

Waminal, Alma Chezka G.

Doctrine: Lack of capacity to sue should be raised in motion to dismiss.

Facts: Seventy-four cases of automotive parts were shipped from Antwerp, Belgium to Manila aboard MS
"Hannover." The shipment was consigned to the Manila Trading & Supply Co., and insured by Insurance
Company of North America.

All the cases were received in good order except two. After paying the consignee for the afore-stated loss and
damage the insurer filed in the CFI of Manila a suit to recover the damages aforementioned as subrogee to the
consignee.

Answering thereto, DELBROCO, as an alternative defendant with CF Sharp, disclaimed liability, alleging that the
goods were delivered in the same condition as when they were discharged from the carrier. As to defendant C.F.
Sharp & Co., Inc., it settled part of the claim, leaving only about P328.00 unsatisfied.

Subsequently, the trial having been completed, the case was submitted for decision. However, DELBROCO then
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Since the suit against DELBROCO was
not in admiralty, and the amount involved was reduced to P328.00 only, it was argued that it pertained to the
municipal court's jurisdiction.

CFI sentenced DELBROCO to pay the plaintiff the sum of P328.73 plus interest.

Thus, this appeal on questions of law.

Issue: Whether the lack of capacity to sue should be raised in motion to dismiss

Ruling: YES

Finally, appellant would contend that plaintiff has no capacity to sue and is not the real party in interest. It is now
too late to raise these objections here. These should have been asserted in the motion to dismiss filed by
defendant below. Not having been included therein, they are now barred by the rule on omnibus motion.

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Case No. 186

Eusebio vs. Valmores

Waminal, Alma Chezka G.

Doctrine: Person not legally adopted has no interest in the estate; proof of adoption required.

Facts: Francisco Valmores claims to be the adopted son of the spouses Domingo Valmores and Rosalia
Saquitan. Upon death of Rosalia Saquitan and due to age and condition of Domingo Valmores, Francisco, as
the petitioner recommends the appointment of Eulogio Eusebio as administrator.

Counsel for the petitioner proved the publication of the notice of hearing and, afterwards, presented his witness,
one by the name of Raymundo Delmindo, who declared that he is the brother of Francisco Valmores that his
brother had been adopted by the spouses Domingo Valmores and Rosalia Saquitan, that Rosalia Saquitan did
not leave any will, that her nearest relative is her surviving husband who is 80 years of age and incapable of
administering the estate. Counsel for petitioner also explained to the court that the surviving spouse Domingo
Valmores had filed an affidavit adjudicating to himself all the estate left by the deceased wife, evidently under the
provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Upon the presentation of the said testimony and the
above manifestation of counsel for petitioner, the court entered an order appointing Eulogio Eusebio administrator
of the estate of the deceased. Thereafter proceedings for the settlement of the estate took place in rapid
succession.

Domingo Valmores impugned the appointment of Eulogio Eusebio as administrator on the ground that he is a
stranger to the family and to himself, and praying that he be appointed administrator of the properties of the
deceased, and that the case be set for hearing so that he can present his evidence.

Issues:

1. Whether a person not legally adopted has an interest in the estate

2. Whether a person not legally adopted shall be denied appointment of administration

Ruling: NO and NO

Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:

A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to
the petitioner: The evidence submitted in the hearing does not satisfactorily prove that the petitioner was legally
adopted; hence, he did not have any interest in the properties of the deceased Rosalia Saquitan. Under ordinary
circumstances, such defect would authorize the dismissal of the proceedings especially in view of the fact that
the surviving spouse of Rosalia Saguitan had filed an affidavit of adjudication under the provisions of Section 1
of Rule 74 of the Rules.

Counsel for Domingo Valmores, however, had not objected to the application for the appointment of an
administrator; he only objected to the appointment of the said stranger Eulogio Eusebio as administrator, claiming
to have the right as surviving spouse to be appointed as such administrator. By this act of Domingo Valmores,
surviving spouse of the deceased, therefore, the fatal defect in the petition may be considered, as cured. In other
words, the filing of the petition for the appointment of an administrator may be considered as having been ratified
by the surviving husband, Domingo Valmores, and for this reason the proceedings may not be dismissed.

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Case No. 187

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Dumlao

Waminal, Alma Chezka G.

Doctrine: The allegation that a petitioner seeking letters of administration is an interested person does not fall
within the enumeration of jurisdictional facts. Court defined an interested party as one who would be benefited
by the estate, such an heir or one who has a claim against the estate such as a creditor.

Facts: Ricardo Gonzales, District Manager of Shell Philippines for Mindanao, filed a petition with the RTC of
Agusan del Norte and Butuan City praying that he be appointed as judicial administrator of the estate of the
deceased Regino Canonoy.

The heirs of the deceased opposed the issuance of letters of administration filed by Gonzales based on the
following grounds:

1. Gonzales is a “complete stranger to the intestate estate” of the deceased;

2. He is not even a creditor of the estate but a mere employee of an alleged creditor (Shell Philippines,
Inc.) and so “he would not be able to properly and effectively protect the interest of the estate in case of
conflicts”; and

3. He is a resident of Davao City, and thus if appointed as administrator of the estate, the bulk of which
is located in Butuan City, “he would not be able to perform his duties efficiently”.

The heirs instead propose and pray that Bonifacio Canonoy, one of the deceased’s sons, be appointed
administrator of the said intestate estate and that the corresponding letters of administration be issued in his
favour. The trial court, after due hearing, appointed Bonifacio Canonoy as administrator of the estate of the
deceased.

Upon joinder of the issues on the said claim, the trial court set the pre-trial. The administrator filed a Motion to
Dismiss the claim alleging that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature thereof
because the petitioner therein, Mr. Gonzales, is not the “interested person” as contemplated by Rule 79, Section
2 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Shell countered the motion, contending that the interest of Mr. Gonzales in the
estate is not a jurisdictional fact that needs to be alleged in the petition.

Issue: Whether the jurisdictional facts that need to be stated in a petition for letter of administration under Rule
79, Section 2 of the Rules of Court include the specific assertion that the petitioner therein is an “interested
person”

Ruling: No. Rule 79, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 2. Contents of petition of letters of
administration – A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so
far as known to the petitioner:

a) The jurisdictional facts;

b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;

c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

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But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

The jurisdictional facts alluded to are: the death of the testator, his residence at the time of his death in the
province where the probate court is sitting or, if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate
in such province. These facts are amply enumerated in the petition filed by Mr. Gonzales.

Clearly, the allegation that a petitioner seeking letters of administration is an interested person does not fall within
the enumeration of jurisdictional facts. A Motion to Dismiss may lie not on the basis of lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the court, but rather on the ground of lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings.

In Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, the Court defined an “interested party” as one who would be benefitted by the estate,
such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; this interest must be material and
direct, not merely indirect or contingent. As an exemption, an objection to a petition for letters of administration
on that ground may be barred by waiver or estoppel.

Private respondents’ failure to move for a dismissal amounted to a waiver of the abovementioned ground. Rule
15, Section 8 of the Rules of Court provides that: “A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all
objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.”

By proposing that Bonifacio Canonoy be appointed as administrator instead of Mr. Gonzales, private respondents
have in fact approved or ratified the filing of the petition by the latter. There can be no dispute that the trial court
had acquired jurisdiction over the case.

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Case No. 188

Manalo v. Paredes,

Waminal, Alma Chezka G.

Doctrine: Through the publication of the petition for the probate of the will, the court acquires jurisdiction over all
such persons as are interested in said will; and any judgment that may be rendered after said proceeding is
binding against the whole world.

Facts: Florencio Manalo, as guardian of the minors Lazaro and Daria Mendieta, filed for the issuance of a writ
of mandamus addressed to the Honorable Isidro Paredes, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and
the Philippine Food Co., ordering the publication of the petition for the probate of the will of the deceased
Francisco Villegas; and injunction commanding the respondent judge to suspend the proceedings in the
registration case wherein the Philippine Food Co. is the applicant and the minors Lazaro and Daria Mendieta
opponents, until the termination of the proceeding for the probate of the will of Francisco Villegas, in which said
minors are named legatees of the land involved in said registration case.

Laureana Hidalgo, surviving spouse of Francisco Villegas, filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna an
application for letters of administration of the estate left by her deceased husband, who, according to the
application, died intestate.

In the course of said administration, Justina Mendieta, the minor heirs, and Melecio Fule, supposed testamentary
executor, filed a motion with the court, praying for the probate of the supposed will of Francisco Villegas, wherein
most of his property was given as a legacy to said Justina Mendieta, the latter's children and the legitimate wife
of the deceased Francisco Villegas. However, this was opposed by some who assured that said will had not
been executed by Francisco Villegas in accordance with law, and that the executor Melecio Fule no longer took
interest in the case.

Notwithstanding the foregoing motions, the court ordered the publication in the newspaper El Debate, of Manila,
of the application of Melecio Fule and of Justina Mendieta, Lazaro Mendieta, and Daria Mendieta for the probate
of the supposed will of the deceased Francisco Villegas, setting said application for hearing.

Justina Mendieta, together with her children Lazaro Mendieta and Daria Mendieta, filed another application for
the probate of the same will and a motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for said minors, which was
later approved.

The parties later submitted to the court an agreement wherein Justina Mendieta stated that she withdrew her
application for the probate of the supposed will of the deceased Francisco Villegas on the ground that the
evidence was insufficient to justify the probate of said will, and consequently, she prayed that said will be held
not allowable to probate and that the deceased died intestate, without leaving any more heirs than his legitimate
wife, Laureana Hidalgo, and his two adulterous children, Lazaro and Daria Mendieta, and that the property of the
deceased be distributed in accordance with said agreement, which the court approved and rendered judgment.

However, one Gelacio Malihan later, who claimed to be first cousin of the deceased Francisco Villegas, filed with
the court a new application for the probate of the same supposed will of the deceased Francisco Villegas.

Issues: Whether the court acquires jurisdiction over all the persons interested through the publication of the
notice.

Ruling: YES, The proceeding for the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem, and the court acquires jurisdiction
over all the persons interested through the publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and any order that may be entered is binding against all of them.

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Through the publication ordered by the Court of First Instance of Laguna of the application for the probate of the
supposed will of Francisco Villegas, said court acquired jurisdiction over all such persons as were interested in
the supposed will, including Gelacio Malihan.

The court having tried said application for probate, hearing all the testimony of the attesting witnesses of the said
supposed will, all the parties became bound by said judgment, and if any of them or other persons interested
were not satisfied with the court's decision, they had the remedy of appeal to correct any injustice that might have
been committed, and cannot now through the special remedy of mandamus, obtain a review of the proceeding
upon a new application for the probate of the same will in order to compel the respondent judge to comply with
his ministerial duty imposed by section 330 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This remedy, being extraordinary,
cannot be used in lieu of appeal, or writ of error, especially when the parties interested have agreed to disregard
the testamentary provisions and divide the estate as they pleased, each of them taking what pertained to him.

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Case No. 189

De Guzman v. Guadiz

Waminal, Alma Chezka G.

Doctrine: The object for the appointment of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into
the hands of a person fully authorized to preserve it for the benefit of creditors and heirs.

Facts: Feliciano de Guzman filed petition for probate of a will alleged to have been executed by Catalina Bajacan
with the will instituting Feliciano as Catalina’s sole and universal heir. The will also named Feliciano as Executor

Families of Villegas and Matias, the Private Respondents, opposed the petition by filing a motion to dismiss
arguing that they now own all the properties of Catalina by virtue of a donation inter vivos executed by Catalina
in their favor.

Feliciano, while the Motion to Dismiss was still pending, filed a motion to be appointed as the Special
Administrator. He argued that the unresolved motion to dismiss would necessarily delay the probate of the will
and the appointment of an executor. He noted that it is necessary that someone represent the estate to collect
and receive the palay harvests/yield from the decedent’s 80 hectares of first class agricultural rice land pending
the probate of the will.

The RTC denied the motion for the appointment of a special administrator noting that since the properties are in
the custody of the oppositors/respondents who claim that they own the property, there is no need to appoint a
special administrator to take care of the properties. Thus, this petition for certiorari.

Issues: Whether a Special Administrator should have been appointed to administer the properties of the estate
even when there are oppositors who claim ownership over and are in possession of the property for
administration.

Ruling: YES

Under the Rule 80 (1), the probate Court may appoint a special administrator should there be a delay in granting
letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the appointment of a special administrator lies in the discretion
of the Court. This discretion, however, must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice, equity,
or legal principle.

The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad enough to include any cause or reason
for the delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration as where a contest as to the will is being carried
on in the same or in another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the proceeding on the removal of
an executor or administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree among themselves. It is obvious that
the phrase "by any cause" includes those incidents which transpired in the instant case clearly showing that there
is a delay in the probate of the will and that the granting of letters testamentary will consequently be prolonged
necessitating the immediate appointment of a special administrator.

The reason for the practice of appointing a special administrator rests in the fact that estates of decedents
frequently become involved in protracted litigation, thereby being exposed to great waste and losses if there is
no authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets in the interim. The occasion for such an
appointment usually arises where, for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the will,
regular administration is .delayed. No temporary administration can be granted where there is an executor in
being capable of acting, however.

Principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to preserve estate until it can pass into hands of
person fully authorized to administer it for benefit of creditors and heirs.

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All the facts which warrant the appointment of a special administrator in accordance with Rule 80, Sec. 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court are present in the case at bar.

The respondent judge, in this case, has failed to distinguish between the partisan possession of litigants from
that of the neutral possession of the special administrator under the Rules of Court. When appointed, a special
administrator is regarded, not as a representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment, but as
the administrator in charge of the estate, and in fact, as an officer of the court. The accountability which the court.
which attaches to the office of a special administrator to be appointed by the court is absent from the personal
possession of private respondents

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Case No. 190

De Gala vs Gonzales and Ona, G.R. No. L-30289 March 26, 1929

Digested by Sittie Ayna Dia

Doctrine: The appointment of a special administrator in a probate case lies in the sound discretion of the court,
and he may be removed without reference to section 653 of the Civil Procedure.

Facts:

On November 23, 1920, Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala, a niece of Severina, was
designated executrix. The testatrix died in November, 1926, leaving no heirs by force of law. Serapia, through
her counsel, presented the will for probate.

On April 2, 1927, Serapia de Gala was appointed special administratrix of the estate of the deceased. On
September 20, 1928, the Court of First Instance ordered Sinforoso Ona, the surviving husband of the deceased,
to deliver to Serapia de Gala all the property left by the Severina. Instead of delivering the property as ordered,
Sinforoso filed a motion asking the appointment of Serapia de Gala as special administratrix be cancelled and
that he, Sinforoso, be appointed in her stead. The motion was opposed by both Apolinario Gonzales and by
Serapia de Gala, but on March 3, 1928, it was nevertheless granted, Serapia was removed, and Sinforoso was
appointed special administrator in her place, principally on the ground that he had possession of the property in
question and that his appointment would simplify the proceedings.

Serapia de Gala appealed from the order removing her from the office of special administratrix.

Issue:

Whether or not a Special Administrator can be removed for causes not mentioned in Section 653 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.

Ruling:

Yes, Section 653 can only apply to executors and regular administrators, and the office of a special administrator
is quite different from that of regular administrator. The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the
sound discretion of the court; the function of such an administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of
the deceased and to return an inventory thereof; he cannot be sued by a creditor and cannot pay any debts of
the deceased. The fact that no appeal can be taken from the appointment of a special administrator indicates
that both his appointment and his removal are purely discretionary. In removing Serapia de Gala and appointing
the present possessor of the property pending the final determination of the validity of the will, the court probably
prevented useless litigation.

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Case No. 191
G.R. No. L-24563. November 29, 1966
MILAGROS PACHECO RIVERAv. HON. ARSENIO SANTOS

Doctrine:
ADMINISTRATOR AND EXECUTOR; APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR; ISSUES OF FITNESS
OR UNFITNESS NEED NOT BE PASSED UPON. — For purposes of the specific and limited powers of a special
administrator, the selection of whom is left to the sound discretion of the court, there is no need to first pass upon
and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator.

Facts:
Glorificador R. Tiglao filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration in the Court of First Instance of
Manila in settlement of the intestate estate of his deceased wife Emerenciana S. Pacheco-Tiglao.

On March 31, 1964, Tiglao moved ex-parte to be appointed special administrator. On April 11, 1964, Milagros
Pacheco- Rivera, alleged only sister of the deceased, opposed Tiglao’s motion, claiming that as heir and as co-
owner of the deceased she is entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of the estate and thus should be the one appointed
as administratrix. She later filed a motion praying that instead of the proposed hearing on the appointment of a
special administrator, the same be changed to one on the appointment of a regular administrator.

Tiglao petitioned to be allowed to perform acts of preservation over the D. R. Pacheco Private Detective and
Special Watchman Agency, which he thereunder alleged to be one of the properties of the estate in settlement.
Rivera opposed said petition, on the ground that she owns three-fourths (3/4) of said agency — one-half (1/2) as
co-owner and one-fourth (1/4) as heir of her deceased sister Emerenciana — and is thus better entitled to
administer and manage said agency as she has been doing since the death of her sister.

CFI appoints Tiglao as administrator.

Issue: Whether or not Tiglao can be appointed as Administrator

Ruling:

Without his fitness or unfitness for the position first being passed upon. It is rather clear that the appointment
extended to Tiglao was that of special administrator. And it is the rule followed here that: "The appointment of a
special administrator lies entirely in the sound discretion of the court" (De Gala v. Gonzales, 53 Phil. 104, 106).

As provided in the Rules of Court, Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 80; It follows that for purposes of the specific and
limited powers of a special administrator, the selection of whom is left to the sound discretion of the court, the
need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness as would be proper in the case of a regular
administrator, does not obtain. The April 19, 1965 order of the respondent Judge, therefore, insofar as it provided
for (1) the publication of notice to file claims, (2) rendition of accounts and (3) payment of estate and inheritance
taxes, as set forth in its dispositive portion afore-quoted, is perfectly valid.

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CASE NO. 192
ROXAS VS PECSON
SEAN CATACUTAN

DOCTRINE: SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR

FACTS: Pablo M. Roxas died leaving properties in Bulacan. The other respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas,
sister and brother respectively of the deceased, filed a petition for the administration of the estate in special
intestate proceeding and Maria Roxas was appointed special administrix upon an ex-parte petition. The petitioner
Natividad Vela, de Roxas, widow of Pablo M. Roxas, filed a petition for the probate of an alleged will of her
deceased husband, and for her appointment as executrix of his estate designated in said will with the same court.
Upon agreement of both parties, the intestate proceeding was dismissed and ordered closed by the court. In
view of the opposition to the probate of the will by the respondents, the petitioner was appointed special
administratrix. The respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas renewed their petition for the appointment of Maria
Roxas as a special administratrix or special co-adminatrix. The respondent judge rendered his resolution
appointing the petitioner as special adninistratrix only of all the conjugal properties of the deceased, and Maria
as special adminatrix of all capital or properties belonging exclusively to the deceased Pablo M. Roxas.

ISSUE: Whether the appointment of two special co-administrator of the estate of the deceased is proper.

RULING: No. As under the law only one general administrator may be appointed to administer, liquidate and
distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows that only one special administrator may be appointed
to administer temporarily said estate, because a special administrator is but a temporary administrator who is
appointed to act in lieu of the general administrator. There is nothing wrong in that the respondent judge, in
exercising his discretion and appointing the petitioner as special administratrix, had taken into consideration the
beneficial interest of the petitioner in the estate of the decedent and her being designated in the will as executrix
thereof. But the respondent's subsequent act of appointing her as special administratrix only of the conjugal or
community property, and Maria Roxas as special administratrix of the capital or exclusive property of the
decedent, does not seem to be in conformity with logic or reason.

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Case No. 193

G.R. No. L-21917 November 29, 1966


Testate Estate of the Deceased Carlos Gurrea, Marcelo Pijuan v. Manuela Vda de. Gurrea

Doctrine: The preference, accorded by Section 5 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court to the surviving
spouse, for appointment as administrator or administratrix of the estate of the deceased, exists "if no executor is
named in the will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person
dies intestate."
This right of preference refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, not to that of a special administrator.

Facts:

Mrs. Gurrea and Carlos Gurrea were married in Spain. Carlos Gurrea abandoned Mrs. Gurrea and moved to
the Philippines with his son, Teodoro. Carlos Gurrea lived with Rizalina Perez by whom he had 2 children.

Years later, Mrs. Gurrea went to the Philippines. But, Carlos Gurrea refused to admit her in his residence.

Mrs. Gurrea instituted a civil case for support.

RTC granted the petition but the CA reduced it to P1000.

Carlos Gurrea died, leaving a document purporting to be his last will and testament, in which he named Marcelo
Pijuan as' executor thereof and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and their son, Teodoro

Pijuan instituted a special procedings in CFI-Negros Occidentail for probate of said will, upon his ex parte motion,
he was appointed as special administrator of the estate, without bond.

Mrs. Gurrea filed in said Special Proceedings No. 6582, a motion alleging that the aforementioned alimony,
pendente lite, of P1, 000 a month, had been suspended upon the death of Carlos Gurrea, and praying that the
Special Administrator be ordered to continue paying it pending the final determination of the case.

Mrs. Gurrea also moved for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased.

Mrs. Gurrea’s contention: the lower court erred in denying her petition for appointment as administratrix, for, as
widow of the deceased, she claims a right of preference under Section 5 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

Issue: WON Mrs. Gurrea has a right of preference for appointment as administratrix

Held: NO.

The preference, accorded by Section 5 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court to the surviving spouse, for
appointment as administrator or administratrix of the estate of the deceased, exists "if no executor is named in
the will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate." This right of preference refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, not to that of a special
administrator.

None of these conditions obtains, however, in the case at bar. The deceased Carlos Gurrea has left a document
purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it cannot be said, as yet, that he has died intestate.

Again, said document names Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is incompetent
therefor. What is more, he has not only refused the trust, but, has, also, expressly accepted it, by applying for his
appointment as executor, and, upon his appointment as special administrator, has assumed the duties thereof.

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It may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court
to the surviving spouse refers to the appointment of a regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a
special administrator, and that the order appointing the latter lies within the discretion of the probate court,and is
not appealable

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Case no. 194

RODRIGUEZ VS SILVA 90 PHIL 752

Darcy Peter B. Sabanal II

Doctrine: Amount of the executor's fee is at the discretion of the probate court.

Facts: This appeal is from an order of the CFI of Manila authorizing the cancellation of the bond of Pablo M.
Silva who had resigned as joint administrator of the intestate estate of Honofre Leyson, deceased, and allowing
Silva P600 as compensation for his services. The appellants are the remaining administrator and an heir of the
deceased.

ISSUE: May the court fix an administrator's or executor's fee in excess of the fees prescribed by section 7 of
Rule 86, which follows?

Ruling: Yes. It will be seen from this provision that a greater sum may be allowed "in any special case, where
the estate is large, and the settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of
capacity on the part of the executor or administrator." And so it has been held that "the amount of an executor's
fee allowed by the CFI in any special case under the provisions of Section 680 of the Code of Civil Procedure is
a matter largely in the discretion of the probate court, which will not be disturbed on appeal, except for an abuse
of discretion."

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Case No. 195

Ozaeta v. Pecson

93 Phil. 416

Veronica Vera Socorro V. Lumantas

Doctrine: Rules of Court grants discretion to the probate court to appoint, or not to appoint, a special
administrator but the fact that the judge is granted discretion does not authorize him to become partial, or to make
his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passion to rule his judgment, and there is no reason why the
same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into
account in the appointment of the special administrator.

Facts: Carlos Palanca died leaving a will executed by him. In the will, petitioner Roman Ozaeta was named
executor if General Manuel A. Roxas fails to qualify. Upon Palanca’s death, and General Roxas having died
previously, petitioner presented a petition for the probate of the will, at the same time praying that he be appointed
special administrator. The Judge admitted the will for probate, however, appoints as special administrator any
person other than Roman Ozaeta who was named as executor in the will. Petitioner moved to reconsider the
order, but his motion was denied, and thereupon the present petition was filed. In its order the court held that it
has discretion to choose the special administrator and is not bound to appoint the person named therein as
executor, because the order had been appealed.

Issue: WON the probate court commit an abuse of discretion

Ruling: Yes. While the choice of the person lies within the court’s discretion, such discretion should not be a
whimsical one, but one that is reasonable and logical and in accord with fundamental legal principles and justice.
The fact that a judge is granted discretion does not authorize him to become partial, or to make his personal likes
and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Such discretion must be based on reason and
legal principle, and it must be exercised within the limits thereof. And there is no reason why the same
fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into account
in the appointment of the special administrator.

The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose
of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his
confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this
right may be considered as a curtailment of the right to dispose. And as the rights granted by will take effect from
the time of his death, the management of his estate by the administrator of his choice should be made as soon
as practicable, when no reasonable objection to his assumption of the trust can be interposed any longer. It has
been held that when a will has been admitted to probate, it is the duty of the court to issue letters testamentary
to the person named as executor upon his application It is the testator that appoints his executor, as the question
as to his peculiar fitness for such a position or his want of ability to manage the estate can not be addressed to
the discretion of the county judge.

Special Proceedings | S.Y. 2019 – 2020 Page 244

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