CANON 10 CASES devotion of the attorney to the client.
As stated in a case, his I nigh vocation is to
SANTA PANGAN, complainant
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent,
(A.M. No. 1053; September 7, 1979)
RESOLUTION
ANTONIO, J.:
This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite respondent
Dionisio Ramos for contempt. It appears from the record that on September 7, 1978
and March 13, 1979, the hearings in this administrative case were postponed on the
basis of respondent's motions for postponement. These motions were predicated on
respondent's allegations that on said dates he had a case set for hearing before
Branch VII, Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People v. Marieta M. Isip
(Criminal Case No. 35906). Upon verification, the attorney of record of the accused
in said case is one "Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Dona Salud Bldg., Dasmarinas
Manila." Respondent admits that he used the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before
said court in connection with Criminal Case No. 35906, but avers that he had a right
to do so because in his Birth Certificate (Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro Dionisio
Ramos", and -his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, and that the D.D. in
"Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw his other given name
and maternal surname.
This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name appearing in the "Roll of
Attorneys" is "Dionisio D. Ramos". The attorney's roll or register is the official record
containing the names and signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A
lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of
Attorneys in his practice of law.
The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no
falsehood". As an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable
obligations of "truthfulness, candor and frankness". 1 Indeed, candor and frankness
should characterize the conduct of the lawyer at every stage. This has to be so
because the court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth. In
representing himself to the court as "Pedro D.D. Ramos" instead of "Dionisio D.
Ramos", respondent has violated his solemn oath.
The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor cannot
be overempahisized. These injunctions circumscribe the general duty of entire
correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in
doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He violates Ms oath of office ,when
he resorts to deception or permits his client to do so." 2
In using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead of the name by
which he was authorized to practice law - Dionisio D. Ramos - respondent in effect
resorted to deception. The demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts.
The circumstance that this is his first aberration in this regard precludes Us from
imposing a more severe penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is severely
REPRIMANDED and warned that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his
suspencion or disbarment from the practice of law.
It appearing that the hearing of this case has been unduly delayed, the Investigator
of this Court is directed forthwith to proceed with the hearing to terminate it as soon
as possible. The request of complainant to appear in the afore-mentioned hearing,
assisted by her counsel, Atty. Jose U. Lontoc, is hereby granted.
SO ORDERED
ESTEBAN M. LIBIT, complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. EDELSON G. OLIVA and FLORANDO A. UMALI, respondent.
(A.C. No. 2837; October 7, 1994)
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In civil Case No. 84-24144 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled "Pedro
Cutingting, plaintiff versus Alfredo Tan, defendant", the Honorable Presiding Judge
Domingo Panis issued the following order:
The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is hereby ordered to
conduct an investigation with the end in view of determining the author of the
Sheriff's Return which appears to have been falsified and to institute such
criminal action as the evidence will warrant. (p. 1, Final Report.)
After conducting the necessary investigation, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), through herein complainant, charged respondents as follows:
 That sometime in May 1984 in the City of Manila, at the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XLI, Manila, Philippines, the above-named Respondents, as Counsels for
PEDRO CUTINGTING in Civil Case No. 84-24144, entitled PEDRO CUTINGTING,
Plaintiff vs. ALFREDO TAN, Defendant, did then and there, knowingly, willfully
introduced/presented in evidence before the aforesaid Regional Trial Court, a
falsified Sheriff's Return of Summons during the hearing of the aforesaid Civil
Case thereby impending and/or obstructing the speedy administration and/or
dispensation of Justice. (p. 2, Final Report, ff. p. 69, Record.)
Respondents in their respective answers denied having any hand in the falsification
of the said sheriff's return.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the resolution of the Court En
Banc of April 12, 1988, the case was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
In view, however, of the report of the National Bureau of Investigation to the effect
that the signature above the typewritten name Florando Umali on the last page of
the complaint in said civil case is not his signature, complainant, through counsel,
agreed to the dismissal of the case with respect to Atty. Umali.
With respect to Atty. Edelson G. Oliva, the IBP submitted the following report and
recommendation:
There is ample evidence extant in the records to prove that
Atty. Oliva has something to do with the falsification of the Sheriff's Return on
the Summons in said Civil Case No. 84-24144.
The oral and documentary evidence of the complainant strongly tend to show
the following: (1) The Sheriff's Return of the Summon in the said civil case was
falsified as it was not signed by Deputy Sheriff Rodolfo Torella (Exh. "J" — Sworn
Statement of Rodolfo Torella dated February 1, 1985, and Exh. "S", which is the
falsified Sheriff's Return); (2) The summons was received from the clerk of the
Court of the Manila
RTC-Branch LXI by Ronaldo Romero, a messenger in the law office of Attys. Umali
and Oliva and said messenger brought the summons to the law office of the
respondents (Exh. "H" — Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Ronaldo Romero, and Exh. "G",
Exh. "I" — Sworn Statement dated February 28, 1985 of Mariano Villanueva,
Chief Staff Asst. 2, RTC, Manila; (3) On the basis of the falsified Sheriff's Return on
the Summons, Atty. Oliva, counsel for the defendant [should be plaintiff] in said
civil case, filed a typewritten Motion to Declare Defendant in Default (Exh.) "R" —
Motion to Declare Defendant In Default in said civil case signed and filed by Atty.
Oliva);
(4) On March 29, 1984, Atty. Oliva, in his capacity as Operations Manager of
Judge Pio R. Marcos Law Office, sent a final demand letter on Alfredo Tan, the
defendant in said Civil case, for payment of the sum of P70,174.00 (Exh. "T" —
Demand Letter dated March 28, 1984 of Atty. Oliva addressed to Alfredo Tan); (5)
The demand letter of Atty. Oliva (Exh. "T"), the complaint in said civil case (Exh.
"Q", "Q-1", and "Q-2"), the falsified Sheriff's Return on the Summons (Exh. "S"),
the Motion To Declare Defendant In Default dated October 30, 1984 signed and
filed by
Atty. Oliva (Exh. "R" and "R-1") were typed on one and the same typewriter, as
shown in the Questioned Document Report No. 198-585 dated 19 June 1985
(Exh. "Q", "Q-1" and "Q-2"; Exh. "V", "V-1" and
"V-2").
After the careful review of the record of the case and the report and
recommendation of the IBP, the Court finds that respondent Atty. Edelson G. Oliva
committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by the Court of its
disciplinary powers. The facts, as supported by the evidence, obtaining in this case
indubitably reveal respondent's failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in
consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics. A lawyer's responsibility to
protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action
propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.
At this juncture, it is well to stress once again that the practice of law is not a right
but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. It can
not be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the
expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer,
on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy the expectation. It is essential
that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their first duty is not to their clients but
rather to the courts, that they are above all court officers sworn to assist the courts
in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the
exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court (Chavez vs. Viola, 196 SCRA 10
[1991].
In this case, respondent Atty. Edelson Oliva has manifestly violated that part of his
oath as a lawyer that he shall not do any falsehood. He has likewise violated Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court nor
shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Accordingly, the Court resolved to impose upon Atty. Edelson Oliva the supreme
penalty of DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is CANCELLED
and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
The case is ordered dismissed as against Atty. Florando Umali.
SO ORDERED.
ATTY. LUIS V. ARTIAGA JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ENRIQUE C. VILLANUEVA, respondent.
(A.M. No. 1892; July 29, 1988)
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on April 2, 1978, Atty. Luis V. Artiaga Jr.
sought the disbarment of Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva for alleged unethical practices.
By a resolution dated May 24, 1978, this Court required respondent Atty. Enrique C.
Villanueva to answer the complaint. To the answer of respondent dated July 5, 1978,
complainant Atty. Luis V. Artiaga Jr. filed his reply of July 31, 1978.
After considering the answer of respondent, this Court resolved to refer the case to
the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. The solicitor
General forwarded to the Court his Report and Recommendation dated May 4, 1988
with the finding that respondent was guilty of misconduct and with the
recommendation that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of at
least six (6) months.
The complaint for disbarment arose from four (4) separate cases and several
incidental cases with Juliano Estolano, client of complainant Atty. Artiaga, Jr. and
Glicerio Aquino and/or Florentina Guanzon, clients of respondent Atty. Villanueva, as
adversaries in all of these cases involving the same property.
The factual background of these cases is summed up in the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP06600 dated November 16, 1977, a petition for certiorari
and prohibition, an offshoot of Civil Case No. 183-C for Recovery of Possession filed
by Estolano against Aquino and Guanzon before the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, Branch VI on June 11, 1974. Quoted hereunder are pertinent portions of the
Court's decision:
There were three parcels of land involved herein. All continuos and adjoining to
each other and located in Bambang, Los Banos, Laguna. The first covered an area
of 2.6793 hectares; the second, an area of one hectare; and the third, an area of
one-half hectare. On July 20,1950, petitioner Juliano Estolano was issued original
Certificate of Title No. P-286 in his name over the first parcel. There is no
controversy, therefore, in respect of this first parcel, the dispute being confined
to the second and third parcels.
The second and third parcels were the object of Revocable Permit Applications by
Paciano Malabayabas and Canuto Suyo, both filed on March 31, 1951. On June
12, 1956, Canuto transferred his right over the third parcel to petitioner. On
March 4, 1958, Malabayabas also sold his rights over the second parcel to
petitioner. On May 15, 1958, petitioner filed Insular Government Property Sales
Application No. 1772 (New) covering the second and third parcels.
On November 7, 1958, Glicerio Aquino, private respondent, filed his Revocable
Permit Application over an area of 8,000 square meters, which was later found to
cover a part of the first parcel already titled in favor of petitioner and of the third
parcel transferred to him by Suyo. On December 29, 1958, private respondent
Florentina Guanzon, Aquino's sister-in-law, also filed Revocable Permit
Application over the second parcel.
Eventually, the conflicts were taken cognizance of by the Bureau of Lands (B.L.
Conflict No. 3-953, and B.L.O. Conflict No. 236). On May 21, 1962, the Director of
Lands rendered a Decision against private respondents, as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is ordered that the Revocable Permit Application No. V-14105
of Glicerio Aquino be, as hereby it is, rejected, forfeiting in favor of the
Government whatever amount has been paid on account thereof. The
Revocable Permit Application No. V-14142 of Florentina Guanzon shall
remain, as it is, rejected. Glicerio Aquino and Florentina Guanzon shall vacate
the land within sixty (60) days from their receipt of a copy hereof The new
Insular Government Property Sales Application of Julian Estolano shall be
given due course after the survey of the land covered thereby.'
Private respondents moved for the reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision,
and the Director of Lands, in an Order of August 13, 1962, amended his previous
Decision as follows:
 WHEREFORE, our decision of May 21, 1962, is hereby modified by awarding
to protesting Glicerio Aquino preferential right to that area actually occupied
and cultivated by him, indicated as portion "K" in the sketch drawn on the
back hereof, and amending the Insular Government Property Sales
Application (New) of Juliano Estolano so as to exclude therefrom the said
portion. With this modification, the decision stands confirmed.
Petitioner and private respondents appealed the amended Decision of the
Director of Lands to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who,
in a Decision dated September 9, 1963, dismissed the appeals of private
respondents, set aside the Order of the Director of Lands dated August 13,
1962, and affirmed the latter's Decision of May 21, 1962. Respondent
Guanzon moved for the reconsideration of the Secretary's Decision but said
Motion was denied.
Respondent Aquino appealed the Decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to the Office of the President of the Philippines, which
likewise affirmed the Decision appealed from.
The Decision of the Director of Lands having become final, an order of
Execution thereof was issued on January 4, 1967, but this notwithstanding,
private respondents remained in possession of the subject property. For
failure to obtain possession thereof, petitioner filed, on June 15, 1974, the
principal case, (Civil Case No. 183-C) in the lower court which eventually gave
rise to the proceedings now challenged in this Petition." (pp. 3-7, Decision in
CA-G.R. No. Sp-06600)
The restraining order issued in Civil Case No. 183-C on October 27, 1976 enjoining
the Director of Lands from enforcing the Order of Execution was set aside by the
Court of Appeals and the writ of prohibition prayed for by petitioner Estolano was
granted.
Meanwhile, on April 13, 1974, respondent's clients, Aquino and Guanzon, filed a
complaint for forcible entry against complainant's client, Estolano, in the Municipal
Court of Los Banos Laguna docketed as Civil Case No. 192. This case was dismissed by
the Municipal Court on January 5, 1977. On appeal to the Court of First Instance
(CFI), the order of dismissal was affirmed on November 4, 1979 in Civil Case No. 386-
C. No appeal was interposed from this decision, thus it became final.
The third case for annulment of Estolano's title over the same land was filed by
respondent's client, Aquino, with the CFI on May 15, 1974 docketed as Civil Case No.
179-C which was dismissed on April 23, 1976. On appeal to the Court of Appeals
which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 62576-R, the dismissal by the trial court was
affirmed on June 25, 1981. On October 21, 1981, the case was remanded to the trial
court for execution.
Finally, while their petition for certiorari and prohibition over Civil Case No. 183-C
was pending before the Court of Appeals, respondent's clients, Aquino, filed a
complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) at San Pablo City docketed as
CAR Case No. 7043 against Estolano and the Director of Lands on July 1, 1977. On
July 2, 1977, the CAR issued an order requiring Estolano to respect Aquino's
possession. On May 18, 1979, the CAR dismissed the case and on appeal, its
dismissal was affirmed in a decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 5, 1981
in CA-G.R. No. 11635-CAR.
Respondent Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva is charged with the following unethical
practices: (1) That respondent had caused his client to perjure himself; (2) That he
lacks candor and respect toward his adversary and the courts; and (3) That he had
been abusive of the right of recourse to the courts.
We find respondent Atty. Villanueva guilty as above charged.
Anent the first charge, the complaint and amended complaint for forcible entry in
Civil Case No. 192 filed by respondent's client are clear proofs that respondent had
indeed caused his client Glicerio Aquino to perjure himself as to the date he lost
possession of the subject property so as to place the case within the jurisdiction of
the court.
Paragraph 5 of the original complaint filed on April 18, 1974 reads:
5. That sometime in the early part of 1960, defendant Julian Estolano was able
to dispossess plaintiffs spouses Glicerio Aquino and Lorenzo Magpantay of a
portion of the above-described parcel of land ... (Emphasis supplied.) 1
Paragraph 5 of the Amended Complaint dated June 19, 1974 reads:
5. That sometime in the early part of June, 1973, defendant Julian Estolano and
Segundo de los Santos unlawfully dispossessed and/or deprived or turned out
plaintiffs Sps. Aquino and Magpantay thru stealth, strategy, force and
intimidation of and/or possession over a certain portion (now caused by
defendant Segundo de los Santos to be planted to bananas now of less than a
year old as of the filing of the original complaint) located on the southern
portion of their above-described landholding . .... (Emphasis supplied. )2
In the original complaint, respondent's client alleged that he was dispossessed of the
subject land in 1960, while in the amended complaint, he alleged it was in June,
1973. Clearly, this was a ploy concocted by respondent to enable the court to
acquire jurisdiction over the case since a forcible entry case must be filed within one
year from the accrual of the cause of action under Rule 70, Section 1.
Such action of respondent counsel is a clear violation of his oath that "he will do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court." 3 A legal counsel is of course
expected to defend his client's cause with zeal, but not at the disregard of the
truth. 4 The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of
maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and
honor cannot be overemphasized. 5 His high vocation is to correctly inform the court
upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at
correct conclusions. He violated his oath of office when he resorted to
deception. 6 Worse, he had caused his client to perjure himself thus subjecting the
latter to criminal prosecution for perjury brought before the Municipal Court of Los
Banos, Laguna. 7 Instead of safeguarding the interests of his client as his
responsibility dictates, he did exactly the opposite by causing his client to commit a
felony.
From the foregoing, the lack of candor of respondent counsel towards the court is
evident. This lack of candor and honesty to the courts and his adversary is further
demonstrated by other acts of respondent.
In Civil Case No. 192, respondent's clients were restored to the possession of the 2-
1/2 hectares of the untitled portion of subject property by virtue of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the court on May 21, 1974 upon filing of
a property bond by respondent. Upon the dismissal of the case on January 5, 1977,
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was dissolved and respondent's clients
were ordered to restore possession of subject property to complainant's client
Estolano. However, respondent blocked the order by filing an urgent ex-parte
motion seeking clarification as to whether the dispositive portion of the order of
January 5, 1977 was immediately executory and asking the court to allow his clients
to remain in the meantime in the premises. Before the court could even resolve the
motion, respondent perfected his appeal from the order of January 5, 1977 on
January 25, 1977. Thus, when the court's order affirming its previous order came out
on January 26,1977, the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna refused to implement the orders
of January 5 and 26, 1977 until the appeal has been finally disposed of. On appeal,
the CFI of Laguna, affirmed the questioned orders of the Municipal Court. When the
decision of the CFI became final because respondent failed to appeal, his clients
refused to abide by the Order of Execution issued by the Municipal Court.
Consequently, Estolano filed an ex-parte motion asking that the Provincial Sheriff be
authorized to forcibly evict respondent's clients. On the date set for the hearing of
the motion, respondent did not appear and instead filed his "Opposition/
Manifestation" informing the court of a petition for certiorari filed against the
presiding judge before the Court of First Instance of Laguna. In deference to this
petition, the Municipal Court resolved to hold in abeyance the ex-parte motion of
Estolano until resolution of said petition.
Indeed, the manner in which respondent counsel handled the forcible entry case
filed against the client of complainant shows his total lack of candor and respect for
the courts and the rights of his adversary. He had employed every step necessary to
forestall complainant's client from taking rightful possession of subject property. He
has shown utter disregard of the proper rules of procedure to suit his purpose. While
he filed his urgent ex-parte motion for clarification, he chose not to wait for its
resolution and instead perfected his appeal to the Court of First Instance. When
finally the decision became executory because of his failure to appeal to the Court of
Appeals, he filed a petition for certiorari against the decision of the CFI which
petition is obviously frivolous and a mere tactic to delay enforcement of the court's
decision. In the meantime, the clients of respondents refused to obey the order of
execution.
A lawyer should obey all lawful orders and rulings of the court. 8 He should have
counseled his clients to submit to the order of the court instead of encouraging them
to resist such order. The actuations of respondent of employing dilatory tactics by
filing a clearly frivolous case amounts to obstruction of the administration of justice
which constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him. 9
Respondents counsel further demonstrated his questionable motive by filing another
case, this time for annulment of the title of complainant's client to the other 2-1/2
hectares of subject land with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI. This
case was dismissed on the ground of res judicata and prescription. Respondent
appealed this ruling to the Court of Appeals where it was pending resolution at the
time the instant complaint for disbarment was filed. The decision of the trial court
was affirmed and remanded to the lower court for execution.
Not satisfied with the above-mentioned appeal, respondent counsel brought another
case against complainant's client this time before the Court of Agrarian Relations
(CAR Case No. 7043) for determination allegedly of who had a better right over the
subject property when he was well aware e of the absence of any tenancy
relationship between the parties.
An examination of the records shows that respondent did not disclose before the
Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) prior law suits and decisions rendered relative to
the subject land. As a result, respondent was able to secure ex-parte from the CAR a
restraining order against the Director of Lands and Estolano on July 2, 1977. So when
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Civil Case No. 386-C affirming
the decision of the trial court in the forcible entry case No. 192 was rendered on
November 4, 1977 ordering the immediate restoration of subject land to Estolano,
because of the restraining order issued by the agrarian court, the execution of the
said decision cannot be fully satisfied, To make matters worse, respondent even filed
a criminal complaint against complainant and his client, among others, for alleged
violation of P.D. 316 and the restraining order issued by the Court of Agrarian
Relations in CAR Case No. 7043. 10 The CAR dismissed this case and on appeal, the
dismissal was affirmed.
We also note that after respondent filed the case with the CAR on July 1, 1 977, he
filed on July 5, 1977 in Civil Case No. 179-C before the CFI of Laguna, a motion to
dismiss the present action without prejudice to his clients' right to prosecute their
present action with the Court of Agrarian Relations. The lower court denied the
motion since it had already dismissed the case on some other ground and their
appeal was already perfected without plaintiffs' manifesting that they are
abandoning their appeal. Thus, respondent was able to elevate two (2) separate
appeals--CA-G.R. No. 62576-R re: annulment of title (Civil Case No. 179-C) and CA-
G.R. No. 11635-CAR arising from the CAR Case No. 7043, before the Court of Appeals
over the same issues involving the same subject property titled to Estolano.
The cause of respondent's clients is obviously bereft of merit. Respondent was aware
of this fact so he resorted to forum shopping, continuously seeking the court where
he may possibly obtain favorable judgment, thereby adding to the already clogged
dockets of the courts with the unmeritorious cases he filed. He grossly abused his
right of recourse to the courts by filing multiple petitions or complaints for a cause
that had been previously rejected in the false hope of getting some favorable action,
somehow, thus, obstructing the administration of justice.11 He was derelict in his
duty as counsel to maintain such actions or proceedings only as appears to him to be
just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the
law.12 He had thus prostituted his office at the expense of justice.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain
standards of mental and moral fitness. 13 For a counsel who has been sworn to assist
in the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, respondent has
miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar. Instead
of assisting in the speedy disposition of cases, he made a mockery of our system of
justice, thus deserving to be censured and penalized by this Court. No doubt,
respondent is guilty of gross misconduct in office.
WHEREFORE, the respondent is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice
of law from date of notice until such time that he can demonstrate to the court that
he has rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume the practice of law. Let this
decision be noted in the bar records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ISIDRO L. CARACOL, Respondent.
(A.C. No. 7325; January 21, 2015)
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Domiciano F. Villahermosa, Sr.,
against Atty. Isidro L. Caracol for deceit, gross misconduct and violation of oath
under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Villahermosa is respondent in two land cases3 involving cancellation of emancipation
patents and transfer certificates of title, cancellation of special power of attorney
and deeds of absolute sale and recovery of ownership and possession of parcels of
land derived from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 433 which covered 23.3018
hectares of land in Valencia, Bukidnon. Counsel on record for plaintiff was Atty. Fidel
Aquino.
OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who had two sons,
Fernando and Efren. As legal heirs of Micael, Fernando received 53,298 square
meters while Efren received 33,296 square meters. Subsequently, Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued in their respective names.
When the agrarian reform law4 was enacted on October 21, 1972, emancipation
patents and titles were issued to Hermogena and Danilo Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of
the program,who in turn sold the parcels of land to complainant’s spouse, Raymunda
Villahermosa. A deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of Raymunda.
On March 2, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
issued a decision ordering the cancellation of the emancipation patents and TCTs
derived from OCT No. 433 stating that it was not covered by the agrarian reform law.
This decision was appealed to and affirmed by the DARAB Central Board and the
Court of Appeals.
On September 25, 2002, Atty. Caracol, as "Add’l Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Movant," Aguirre, his real client, violating his oath as a lawyer. It thus recommended that Atty.
filed a motion for execution with the DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnon praying for the Caracol be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years.
full implementation of the March 2, 1994 decision.5
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation but modified
On December 20, 2005, Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ the penalty to one year suspension from the practice of law.16 Atty. Caracol moved
of Execution and Demolition6 which he signed as "Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren for reconsideration17 but was denied.18
Babela"7. Villahermosa filed this complaint8 alleging that Atty. Caracol had no
authority to file the motions since he obtained no authority from the plaintiffs and Atty. Caracol filed a notice of appeal19 which this Court returned to him since no legal
the counsel of record. Villahermosa posited that Efren could not have authorized fees are required in administrative cases.20
Atty. Caracol to file the second motion because Efren had already been dead9 for
more than a year. He claimed that Atty. Caracol’s real client was a certain Ernesto I. We adopt the findings of the IBP.
Aguirre, who had allegedly bought the same parcel of land. Villahermosa presented
affidavits of Efren’s widow10 and daughter11 both stating that Efren never executed a
The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a
waiver of rights and that the parcel of land was sold to Villahermosa through a deed
lawyer’s appearance on behalf of his client, hence:
of sale. Both also stated that they werefamiliar with Efren’s signature. They state
that the signature inthe waiver was different from his usual signature. Villahermosa
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is presumed to be properly
averred that Atty. Caracol committed deceit and gross misconduct.
authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of
attorney isrequired to authorize him to appear in court for his client, butthe
In addition, Villahermosa claimed that Atty. Caracol introduced falsified and
presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor
manufactured evidence intothe proceedings. Atty. Caracol, in introducing a
being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to
document denominated asWaiver of Rights where Efren waived all his rights in favor
produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever
of Ernesto Aguirre, was able to secure the execution of the judgment in one of the
pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may
cases12 in favor of Ernesto Aguirre. Villahermosa also filed a case13 for falsification of
thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorney willfully appearing in
public document and use of falsified document against Ernesto Aguirre and Atty.
court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be
Caracol.14
punished for contemptas an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions. (Emphases supplied)
Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to appear as "additional
counsel". He said that he had consulted Atty. Aquino who advised him to go ahead
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan Dev’t. Co.,21 this Court said that while a
with the filing. Moreover, he stated that he was not aware that there was a waiver of
lawyer is not required to present proof of his representation, when a court requires
rights executed in Ernesto Aguirre’s favor.
that he show suchauthorization, it is imperative that he show his authority to act.
Thus:
In its Report and Recommendation,15 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) found that Atty. Caracol committed deceitful
A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the client. In
acts and misconduct. It found that respondent did not present credible evidence to
fact, the absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the
controvert the allegation that he was not authorized by plaintiff or counsel of record.
acts performed by the counsel in his client’s name. However, [a] court, on its own
Respondent admitted that at the time of the filing of the second motion, Efren was
initiative or on motion of the other party may require a lawyer to adduce
dead. It noted that Atty. Caracol did not explain how he obtained the authority nor
authorization from the client.22
did he present any proof of the authority. However, there was insufficient evidence
to hold him liable for falsification.
Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a
person without being retained nor may he appear in court without being employed
The IBP CBD stated that Atty. Caracol clearly misled and misrepresented to the
unless by leave of court.23 If an attorney appears on a client’s behalf without a
DARAB, Region X that he was counsel of Efren to protect the interest of Ernesto
retainer or the requisite authority neither the litigant whom he purports to represent
nor the adverse party may be bound or affected by his appearance unless the
purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed authority.24 If a lawyer
corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a party toa case without authority, he
may be disciplined or punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has
misbehaved in his official transaction.25
We must also take into consideration that even if a lawyer is retained by a client, an
attorney-client relationship terminates upon death of either client or the lawyer. 26
Here, Atty. Caracol was presumed to have authority when he appeared in the
proceedings before the DARAB. The records are unclear at what point his authority
to appear for Efren was questioned. Neither is there any indication that Villahermosa
in fact questioned his authority during the course of the proceedings.
However, Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time he filed
the Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition. As an
honest, prudent and conscientious lawyer, he should have informed the Court of his
client’s passing and presented authority that he was retained by the client’s
successors-in-interest and thus the parties may have been substituted.27
We also note the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz in People v.
Mendoza28 where he stated:
I am bothered by the improvident plea of guilty made by accused Juan Magalop,
presumably upon the adviceof his counsel, Atty. Isidro L. Caracol of the CLAO (now
the PAO). It would seem that this lawyer was less than conscientious when he
advised his indigent client to admit a crime the man did no[t] commit. As the
ponenciaobserves, "outside of his improvident plea of guilt, there is absolutely no
evidence against him – presented or forthcoming. From the evidence of the
prosecution, there is no way by which Magalop could have been implicated."
It seems to me that if any one is guilty in this case, it is the PAO lawyer who, through
an incredible lack of zeal in the discharge of his duties, was apparently willing,
without any moral compunctions at all, and without proof, to consign an innocent
man to prison.
The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to condemn them without
cause.1âwphi1 The defense counsel in this case did not seem to appreciate this
responsibility when he prodded Magalop to plead guilty and waived the right to
submit evidence in his behalf.29
While this observation does not serve to exacerbate Atty. Caracol’s liability under the
present circumstances, we would like to highlight the important role of an attorney
in our judicial system. Because of the particular nature of an attorney’s function it is
essential that they should act with fairness, honesty and candor towards the courts
and his clients.30 Under Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
This flows out from the lawyer's oath which each lawyer solemnly swears to uphold
the law and court processes in the pursuit of justice. Thus, a lawyer must be more
circumspect in his demeanor and attitude towards the public in general as agents of
the judicial system.
Here, Atty. Caracol, as observed by the IBP CBD, has been less than candid about his
representation. We also observe that he has used underhanded means to attain his
purpose. Atty. Caracol's blatant disregard of his duties as a lawyer cannot be
countenanced. In view of his actions of contravening his lawyer's oath and in
violation of Canons 8 and 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility we deem it proper to suspend him from the practice of law for a
period of one year.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Isidro L. Caracol GUILTY. Accordingly, we
SUSPEND respondent Atty. Isidro L. Caracol from the practice of law for ONE YEAR
effective upon finality of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same
or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner,
vs.
FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL
SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents.
(G.R. No. 124893; April 18, 1997)
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May 2,
1996 of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc suspending her
proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay
San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
The facts are undisputed. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections nationwide was
scheduled to be held on May 6, 1996. On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for
registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her
application on the ground that petitioner, who was then twenty-one years and ten
(10) months old, exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng
Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.
On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang
Member and Voter" with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-Pagudpud-Adams-
Damalneg, Ilocos Norte. In a decision dated April 18, 1996, the said court found
petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as member and voter in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial
Court, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court,
however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association
with petitioner.
On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui,
Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April 23, 1996, respondent Election Officer
Dionisio F. Rios, per advice of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, disapproved
petitioner's certificate of candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner, however,
appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A. Asperin who set aside the order
of respondents and allowed petitioner to run.
On May 2, 1996, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her
of her ineligibility and giving her 24 hours to explain why her certificate of candidacy
should not be disapproved. Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC
officials, private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of
the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial
and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" against petitioner Garvida for falsely
representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. The petition was
sent by facsimile and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on
Elections National Office, Manila.
On May 2, 1996, the same day respondent Rios issued the memorandum to
petitioner, the COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board of Election
Tellers and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the
proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the election. The order reads as
follows:
Acting on the Fax "Petition for Denial And/Or Cancellation of Certificate of
Candidacy" by petitioner Florencio G. Sales, Jr. against Lynette G. Garvida,
received on April 29, 1996, the pertinent allegations of which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
5. That the said respondent is disqualified to become a voter and a candidate for
the SK for the reason that she will be more than twenty-one (21) years of age on
May 6, 1996; that she was born on June 11, 1974 as can be gleaned from her
birth certificate, copy of which is hereto attached and marked as Annex "A";
6. That in filing her certificate of candidacy as candidate for SK of Bgy. San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, she made material representation which is false
and as such, she is disqualified; that her certificate of candidacy should not be
given due course and that said candidacy must be cancelled;
xxx xxx xxx
the Commission, it appearing that the petition is meritorious, hereby DIRECTS the
Board of Election Tellers/Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui,
Ilocos Norte, to suspend the proclamation of Lynette G. Garvida in the event she
garners the highest number of votes for the position of Sangguniang Kabataan
[sic].
Meantime, petitioner is hereby required to submit immediately ten (10) copies of
his petition and to pay the filing and legal research fees in the amount of
P510.00.
SO ORDERED.
On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private
respondent's votes of 76. In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the
COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the
winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.
On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the
winner for the position of SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte. The proclamation was "without prejudice to any further action by the
Commission on Elections or any other interested party." On July 5, 1996, petitioner
ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the
municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of
the elected officials of the Pederasyon.
Petitioner raises two (2) significant issues: the first concerns the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC en banc to act on the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of
candidacy; the second, the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground
that she has exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective official of the SK.
I
Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the conduct of
the SK elections is under the supervision of the COMELEC and shall be governed by
the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX,
governs the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, viz:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. —
A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before
election.
In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective
office may be filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC on the ground that
the candidate has made a false material representation in his certificate. The
petition may be heard and evidence received by any official designated by the
COMELEC after which the case shall be decided by the COMELEC itself.
Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate
of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a
Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required
number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the
Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or
rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. It is
therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election cases.
This is clear from Section 3 of the said Rules thus:
Sec. 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions. — The Commission shall sit in two
(2) Divisions to hear and decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions,
special actions, special cases, provisional remedies, contempt and special
proceedings except in accreditation of citizens' arms of the Commission.
In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its
Divisions upon receipt of the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the petition and issued the order of
May 2, 1996.
II
The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the petition itself did
not comply with the formal requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. These requirements are:
Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. — Every pleading, motion and other papers must
be filed in ten (10) legible copies. However, when there is more than one
respondent or protestee, the petitioner or protestant must file additional
number of copies of the petition or protest as there are additional
respondents or protestees.
Sec. 2. How Filed. — The documents referred to in the immediately preceding
section must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the
Commission personally, or, unless otherwise provided in these Rules, by
registered mail. In the latter case, the date of mailing is the date of filing and
the requirement as to the number of copies must be complied with.
Sec. 3. Form of Pleadings, etc. — (a) All pleadings allowed by these Rules shall
be printed, mimeographed or typewritten on legal size bond paper and shall
be in English or Filipino.
xxx xxx xxx
Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or
typewritten in legal size bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies.
Pleadings must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC
personally, or, by registered mail.
In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2) copies
of the petition were filed with the COMELEC. Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its
Resolution on the basis of the petition transmitted by facsimile, not by registered
mail.
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and
reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a
specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over
regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to
reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct
shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed
record on paper referred to as a facsimile.
Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and
authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an
original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the
facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party
and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. The uncertainty of the
authenticity of a facsimile pleading should have restrained the COMELEC en
banc from acting on the petition and issuing the questioned order. The COMELEC en
banc should have waited until it received the petition filed by registered mail.
III
To write finis to the case at bar, we shall now resolve the issue of petitioner's age.
The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by Presidential Decree No. 684 in
1975 as the Kabataang Barangay, a barangay youth organization composed of all
residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of
age. The Kabataang Barangay sought to provide its members a medium to express
their views and opinions and participate in issues of transcendental importance. Its
affairs were administered by a barangay youth chairman together with six barangay
youth leaders who were actual residents of the barangay and were at least 15 years
but less than 18 years of age. In 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, then the Local
Government Code, raised the maximum age of the Kabataang Barangay members
from "less than 18 years of age" to "not more than 21 years of age."
The Local Government Code of 1991 changed the Kabataang Barangay into the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however, retained the age limit of the members laid down
in B.P. 337 at 15 but not more than 21 years old. The affairs of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan are administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) composed of a
chairman and seven (7) members who are elected by the Katipunan ng
Kabataan. The chairman automatically becomes ex-officio member of the
Sangguniang Barangay. A member of the SK holds office for a term of three (3)
years, unless sooner removed for cause, or becomes permanently incapacitated, dies
or resigns from office.
Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific qualifications laid
down by the Local Government Code of 1991, viz:
Sec. 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan. — The katipunan ng kabataan shall be
composed of all citizens of the Philippines actually residing in the barangay for
at least six (6) months, who are fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one
(21) years of age, and who are duly registered in the list of the sangguniang
kabataan or in the official barangay list in the custody of the barangay
secretary.
A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may become a candidate for the
Sangguniang Kabataan if he possesses the following qualifications:
Sec. 428. Qualifications. — An elective official of the sangguniang kabataan
must be a citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter of the katipunan ng
kabataan, a resident of the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately
prior to election, at least fifteen (15) years but not more than twenty-one (21)
years of age on the day of his election, able to read and write Filipino, English,
or the local dialect, and must not have been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude.
Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the barangay for at
least six months; (c) 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in
the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of
the Code requires that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a
Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of
the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15
years but not more than 21 years of age on the day of his election; (e) able to read
and write; and (f) must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude.
For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 in Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a
member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan becomes a qualified voter and an elective
official. Thus:
Sec. 3. Qualifications of a voter. — To be qualified to register as a voter in the SK
elections, a person must be:
a) a citizen of the Philippines;
 b) fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day
that is, he must have been born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981,
inclusive; and
c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and actually residing in
the barangay wherein he proposes to vote for at least six (6) months
immediately preceding the elections.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Qualifications of elective members. — An elective official of the SK must
be:
a) a qualified voter;
b) a resident in the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to
the elections; and
c) able to read and write Filipino or any Philippine language or dialect or
English.
Cases involving the eligibility or qualification of candidates shall be decided
by the city/municipal Election Officer (EO) whose decision shall be final.
A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may be a qualified voter in the May 6,
1996 SK elections if he is: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) 15 but not more than 21 years
of age on election day, i.e., the voter must be born between May 6, 1975 and
May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1)
year and an actual resident of the barangay at least six (6) months immediately
preceding the elections. A candidate for the SK must: (a) possess the foregoing
qualifications of a voter; (b) be a resident in the barangay at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the elections; and (c) able to read and write.
Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications of a member and
voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan.
Petitioner 's age is admittedly beyond the limit set in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2824. Petitioner, however, argues that Section 3 [b] of Resolution No.
2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and beyond the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the
Local Government Code of 1991. She contends that the Code itself does not provide
that the voter must be exactly 21 years of age on election day. She urges that so long
as she did not turn twenty-two (22) years old, she was still twenty-one years of age
on election day and therefore qualified as a member and voter in the Katipunan ng
Kabataan and as candidate for the SK elections.
A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a distinction between the
maximum age of a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of
an elective SK official. Section 424 of the Code sets a member's maximum age at 21
years only. There is no further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21
years of age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an
elective SK official is 21 years old "on the day of his election." The addition of the
phrase "or the day of his election" is an additional qualification. The member may be
more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he registers as member of
the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be more than 21
years old on the day of election. The distinction is understandable considering that
the Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK official than for a
member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. The courts
may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature
intended a distinction or qualification.
The qualification that a voter in the SK elections must not be more than 21 years of
age on the day of the election is not provided in Section 424 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. In fact the term "qualified voter" appears only in
COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Since a "qualified voter" is not necessarily an
elective official, then it may be assumed that a "qualified voter" is a "member of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan." Section 424 of the Code does not provide that the
maximum age of a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan is determined on the day
of the election. Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is therefore ultra
vires insofar as it sets the age limit of a voter for the SK elections at exactly 21 years
on the day of the election.
The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of
age on the day of his election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of
years, not months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood that
years are of 365 days each. One born on the first day of the year is consequently
deemed to be one year old on the 365th day after his birth — the last day of the
year. In computing years, the first year is reached after completing the first 365
days. After the first 365th day, the first day of the second 365-day cycle begins. On
the 365th day of the second cycle, the person turns two years old. This cycle goes on
and on in a lifetime. A person turns 21 years old on the 365th day of his 21st 365-day
cycle. This means on his 21st birthday, he has completed the entire span of 21 365-
day cycles. After this birthday, the 365-day cycle for his 22nd year begins. The day
after the 365th day is the first day of the next 365-day cycle and he turns 22 years
old on the 365th day.
The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond 21
years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days
or a fraction of a year because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. "Not
more than 21 years old" is not equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary to
petitioner's claims. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years
on election day.
In P.D. 684, the law that created the Kabataang Barangay, the age qualification of a
barangay youth official was expressly stated as ". . . at least fifteen years of age or
over but less than eighteen . . ." This provision clearly states that the youth official
must be at least 15 years old and may be 17 years and a fraction of a year but should
not reach the age of eighteen years. When the Local Government Code increased
the age limit of members of the youth organization to 21 years, it did not reenact the
provision in such a way as to make the youth "at least 15 but less than 22 years old."
If the intention of the Code's framers was to include citizens less than 22 years old,
they should have stated so expressly instead of leaving the matter open to confusion
and doubt.
Former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, the sponsor and principal author of the Local
Government Code of 1991 declared that one of the reasons why the Katipunan ng
Kabataan was created and the Kabataang Barangay discontinued was because most,
if not all, Kabataang Barangay leaders were already over 21 years of age by the time
President Aquino assumed power. They were not the "youth" anymore. The Local
Government Code of 1991 fixed the maximum age limit at not more than 21
years and the only exception is in the second paragraph of Section 423 which reads:
Sec. 423. Creation and Election. —
a) . . . ;
b) A sangguniang kabataan official who, during his term of office, shall have
passed the age of twenty-one (21) years shall be allowed to serve the
remaining portion of the term for which he was elected.
The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not
be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election. The only exception is
when the official reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency. Section 423
[b] of the Code allows him to serve the remaining portion of the term for which
he was elected. According to Senator Pimentel, the youth leader must have
"been elected prior to his 21st birthday." Conversely, the SK official must not
have turned 21 years old before his election. Reading Section 423 [b] together
with Section 428 of the Code, the latest date at which an SK elective official turns
21 years old is on the day of his election. The maximum age of a youth official
must therefore be exactly 21 years on election day. Section 3 [b] in relation to
Section 6 [a] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is not ultra vires insofar as it fixes
the maximum age of an elective SK official on the day of his election.
In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day
she registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-one
(21) years and nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11
months and 5 days old. When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years,
11 months and 20 days old and was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years
old. Petitioner may have qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but
definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for elective SK officials set by Section 428
of the Local Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No.
2824. She was ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang
Kabataan elections.
The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public
policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared
ineligible. In the same vein, if the candidate is over the maximum age limit on the
day of the election, he is ineligible. The fact that the candidate was elected will not
make the age requirement directory, nor will it validate his election. The will of the
people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility.
The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private respondent, the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections, to be declared
elected. A defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. Moreover,
despite his claims, private respondent has failed to prove that the electorate
themselves actually knew of petitioner's ineligibility and that they maliciously voted
for her with the intention of misapplying their franchises and throwing away their
votes for the benefit of her rival candidate.
Neither can this Court order that pursuant to Section 435 of the Local Government
Code petitioner should be succeeded by the Sangguniang Kabataan member who
obtained the next highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections. Section 435
applies when a Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman "refuses to assume office, fails to
qualify, is convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently
incapacitated, is removed from office, or has been absent without leave for more
than three (3) consecutive months."
The question of the age qualification is a question of eligibility. Being "eligible"
means being "legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen." Ineligibility, on the
other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or
the statutes for holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds
enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman.
To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deems it necessary to order
that the vacancy be filled by the SK member chosen by the incumbent SK members
of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte by simple majority from among
themselves. The member chosen shall assume the office of SK Chairman for the
unexpired portion of the term, and shall discharge the powers and duties, and enjoy
the rights and privileges appurtenant to said office.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is
declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6,
1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate her position as
Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte. The Sangguniang Kabataan member voted by simple majority by and from
among the incumbent Sangguniang Kabataan members of Barangay San Lorenzo,
Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall assume the office of Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of
Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of the term.
SO ORDERED.
PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO HERRERA, respondents.
Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner.
Abalos, Gatdula & Bermejo for private respondent.
(G.R. No. L-77691; August 8,1988)
SARMIENTO, J.:
The case dramatizes the unpleasant spectacle of a lawyer tangling with his own
client, more often than not, in the matter of fees. The lawyer, the petitioner himself,
would have his petition decided on pure questions of procedure, yet, the Court
cannot let pass unnoticed the murkier face of the controversy, wherein the law is
corrupted to promote a lawyer's selfseeking ends, and the law profession, debased
into a simple business dealing. Accordingly, we resolve it on the basis not only of the
questions raised by the petitioner pertaining to procedure, but considering its
serious ethical implications, on its merits as well.
We turn to the facts.
The private respondent was the registered owner of eight (six, according to the
petitioner) parcels of land located in Quezon City. Between 1977 and 1978, he
obtained various loans from the L & R Corporation, a financing institution, in various
sums totalling P420,000.00 As security therefor, he executed deeds of mortgage in
favor of the corporation over the parcels aforesaid. On August 28,1979, and upon
the maturing of said loans, the firm caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage
following his failure to pay, as a consequence of which, the said eight (six, according
to the petitioner) parcels of land were disposed of at public auction, and in which L &
R Corporation was itself the highest bidder.
Pending redemption, the private respondent filed a complaint for injunction against
L & R Corporation, to enjoin consolidation of title in its name, in which he succeeded
in obtaining preliminary injunctive relief. He was represented by the petitioner. Two
years later, and with no imminent end to the litigation in sight, the parties entered
into a compromise agreement whereby L & R Corporation accorded the private
respondent another year to redeem the foreclosed properties subject to payment of
P600,000.00, with interest thereon at one per cent per month. They likewise
stipulated that the petitioner shall be entitled to attorney's fees of P100,000.00. On
November 19, 1982, the court approved the compromise.
The private respondent, however, remained in dire financial straits — a fact the
petitioner himself concede — for which reason he failed to acquire the finding to
repay the loans in question, let alone the sum of P100,000.00 in attorney's fees
demanded by the petitioner. That notwithstanding, the petitioner moved for
execution insofar as his fees were concemed. The court granted execution, although
it does not appear that the sum was actually collected.
Sometime thereafter, the petitioner and the private respondent met to discuss relief
for the latter with respect to his liability to L & R Corporation on the one hand, and
his obligation to the petitioner on the other. The petitioner contends that the private
respondent "earnestly implored" him to redeem the said properties; the private
respondent maintains that it was the petitioner himself who 'offered to advance the
money," provided that he, the private respondent, executed a "transfer of
mortgage" over the properties in his favor. Who implored whom is a bone of
contention, but as we shall see shortly, we are inclined to agree with the private
respondent's version, considering primarily the petitioner's moral ascendancy over
his client and the private respondent's increasing desperation.
The records further show that the parties, pursuant to their agreement, executed a
"Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a document
that enabled the petitioner, first, to redeem the parcels in question, and secondly, to
register the same in his name. The private respondent alleges that he subsequently
filed loan applications with the Family Savings Bank to finance a wet market project
upon the subject premises to find, according to him, and to his dismay, the
properties already registered in the name of the petitioner. He likewise contends
that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem" on
file with the Register of Deeds (for Quezon City) had been falsified as follows:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE
in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Pl00,000.00) I,
FRANCISCO HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and convey unto TRANSFEREE,
Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, any and all my rights of the real properties and/or to
redeem from the Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties
foreclosed and sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subject
matter of the above Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. Q30679 ...
whereas it originally reads:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE
in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), I,
FRANCISCO HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and convey unto TRANSFEREE,
Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, any and all my rights of equity of redemption and/or
to redeem from the Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties
foreclosed and sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subject
matter of the above Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. Q30679. . .
As a consequence, the private respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim
upon the respective certificates of title embracing the properties. Upon learning of
the same, the petitioner moved for the cancellation of the adverse claim and for the
issuance of a writ of possession. The court granted both motions. The private
respondent countered with a motion for a temporary restraining order and later, a
motion to recall the writ of possession. He likewise alleges that he commenced
disbarment proceedings before this Court against the petitioner as well as various
criminal complaints for estafa, falsification, and "betrayal of trust" with the
Department of Justice. On December 1, 1983, finally, he instituted an action for
reconveyance and reformation of document, praying that the certificates of title
issued in the name of the petitioner be cancelled and that "the Deed of Sale and
Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem dated May 3, 1983 ...
be reformed to reflect the true agreement of Francisco Herrera and Paterno R.
Canlas, of a mortgage." He vehemently maintains that the petitioner's "agreement
with [him] was that the latter would lend the money to the former for a year, so that
[petitioner] would have time to look for a loan for the wet market which [the
petitioner] intended to put up on said property." Predictably, the petitioner moved
for dismissal.
The trial court, however, denied the private respondent's petition. It held that the
alteration complained of did not change the meaning of the contract since it was
"well within [the petitioner's] rights" "to protect and insure his interest of
P654,000.00 which is the redemption price he has paid;" secondly, that the
petitioner himself had acquired an interest in the properties subject of reconveyance
based on the compromise agreement approved by Judge Castro in the injunction
case, pursuant to Section 29(b), of Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, that had,
consequently, made him a judgment creditor in his own right; thirdly, that the
private respondent had lost all rights over the same arising from his failure to
redeem them from L & R Corporation within the extended period; and finally, that
the petitioner cannot be said to have violated the ban against sales of properties
in custodia legis to lawyers by their clients pendente lite, since the sale in question
took place after judgment in the injunction case abovesaid had attained finality. The
complaint was consequently dismissed, a dismissal that eventually attained a
character of finality.
Undaunted, the private respondent, on December 6, 1985, filed a suit for
"Annulment Of Judgment in the respondent Court of Appeals, praying that the
orders of Judge Castro: (1). granting execution over the portion of the compromise
agreement obliging the private respondent to pay the petitioner P100,000.00 as
attorney's fees; (2) denying the private respondent's prayer for a restraining order
directed against the execution: and (3) denying the motion to recall writ of
possession, all be set aside.
The petitioner filed a comment on the petition, but followed it up with a motion to
dismiss. On December 8, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the
first of its challenged resolutions, denying the motion to dismiss. On March 3, 1987,
the Appellate Court denied reconsideration.
Hence the instant petition.
As we stated, the petitioner assails these twin resolutions on grounds of improper
procedure. Specifically, he assigns the following errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING
AC G.R. NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS IN REALITY A PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI FILED OUT OF TIME AND SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN DUE COURSE.
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING
AC G.R. NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA
III.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
CONSIDERING AC G. R. 07860 AS MOOT AND ACADEMIC SINCE PETITIONER HAD
DISPOSED OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES LONG BEFORE THE FILING OF THIS SUIT.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DENYING
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS SOLELY ON THE GROUND THAT THE ARGUMENT
RAISED THEREIN ARE BUT REHASH OF THE ARGUMENTS IN HIS COMMENT TO THE
PETITION.
The petitioner argues that the petition pending with the respondent court "is
actually a petition for certiorari," disguised as a pleading for annulment of judgment
and that in such a case, it faces alleged legal impediments (1) It had been filed out of
time, allegedly two years from the issuance of the assailed orders, and (2) It was not
preceded by a motion for reconsideration. He adds that assuming annulment of
judgment were proper, no judgment allegedly exists for annulment, the aforesaid
two orders being in the nature of interlocutory issuances.
On purely technical grounds, the petitioner's arguments are impressive. Annulment
of judgment, we have had occasion to rule, rests on a single ground: extrinsic fraud.
What "extrinsic fraud" means is explained in Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation :
xxx xxx xxx
It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud,
however, that can serve as a basis for the annulment of judgment. Fraud has
been regarded as extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the rule, "where
it is one the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, or real contest,
or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon
matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but of the manner in which it
was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy." In other
words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the
litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the
defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by
fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.
A perusal of the petition of therein private respondent Herrera pending before the
respondent Court reveals no cause of action for annulment of judgment. In the first
place, and as herein petitioner Canlas correctly points out, the judgment itself is not
assailed, but rather, the orders merely implementing it. Secondly, there is no
showing that extrinsic fraud, as Makabingkil defines it, indeed vitiated the
proceedings presided over by Judge Castro. On the contrary, Herrera's petition in the
respondent court will show that he was privy to the incidents he complains of, and in
fact, had entered timely oppositions and motions to defeat Atty. Canlas' claims
under the compromise agreement.
What he objects to is his suspected collusion between Atty. Canlas and His Honor to
expedite the former's collection of his fees. He alleges that his counsel had
deliberately, and with malevolent designs, postponed execution to force him
(Herrera) to agree to sell the properties in controversy to him (Atty. Canlas) subject
to redemption. ("...[I]t was understandable that respondent Atty. Paterno R. Canlas
did not implement the writ of execution, instead he contacted petitioner in order
that petitioner would sign the questioned documents. This was the clincher of the
plan of respondent Atty, Paterno R. Canlas to divest petitioner of his properties. For
this purpose, it is obvious that respondent Atty. Paterno R. Canlas had to conspire
with the respondent court judge to achieve his plan." ) Aside from being plain
speculation, it is no argument to justify annulment. Clearly, it does not amount to
extrinsic fraud as the term is defined in law.
Neither is it proper for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Certiorari presupposes
the absence of an appeal and while there is no appeal from execution of judgment,
appeal lies in case of irregular implementation of the writ. In the case at bar, there is
no irregular execution to speak of As a rule, "irregular execution" means the failure
of the writ to conform to the decree of the decision executed. In the instant case,
respondent Herrera's charges, to wit, that Judge Castro had erred in denying his
motions for temporary restraining order and to recall writ of possession, or that His
Honor had acted hastily (". . . that respondent court/judge took only one [1) day to
resolve petitioner's motion for issuance of [a] [restraining] order. . ." ) in denying his
twofold motions, do not make out a case for irregular execution. The orders
impugned are conformable to the letter of the judgment approving the
parties'compromise agreement.
The lengths the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, would go to in a last-ditch bid
to hold on to his lands and constraints of economic privation have not been lost on
us. It is obvious that he is uneasy about the judgment on compromise itself, as well
as the subsequent contract between him and his lawyer. In such a case, Article 2038
of the Civil Code applies:
Art. 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence intimidation,
undue influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to the provisions of article
1330 of this Code ...
in relation to Article 1330 thereof:
Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable.
in relation to its provisions on avoidance of'contracts. The court notes that he had,
for this purpose, gone to the Regional Trial Court, a vain effort as we stated, and in
which the decision had become final.
We, however, sustain Atty. Canlas' position-on matters of procedure — for the
enlightenment solely of the bench and the bar. It does not mean that we find merit
in his petition. As we have intimated, we cannot overlook the unseemlier side of the
proceeding, in which a member of the bar would exploit his mastery of procedural
law to score a "technical knockout" over his own client, of all people. Procedural
rules, after all, have for their object assistance unto parties "in obtaining just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." If procedure were
to be an impediment to such an objective, "it deserts its proper office as an aid to
justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy." It was almost eight
decades ago that the Court held:
... A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply
schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and
destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully
and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as
wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of
procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels,
are not to be won by the a rapier's thrust ...
It is a ruling that almost eight decades after it was rendered, holds true as ever.
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera,
no financing entity was willing to extend him any loan with which to pay the
redemption price of his mortgaged properties and petitioner's P100,000.00
attorney's fees awarded in the Compromise Judgment," a development that should
have tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his interests
over and above those of his client, in opposition to his oath to "conduct himself as a
lawyer ... with all good fidelity ... to [his] clients." The Court finds the occasion fit to
stress that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants,
a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial notice, eluded not a few law
advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his own client are
not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to
"delay no man for money."
It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in spite of the fact that the
practice of law is not a commercial enterprise; but that does not furnish an excuse
for plain lust for material wealth, more so at the expense of another. Law advocacy,
we reiterate, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards
for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits
which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed
with a public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. Anent attomey's
fees, section 24, of Rule 138, of the Rules, provides in part as follows:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject
matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney... A written contract for services shall
control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable.
So also it is decreed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, reproduced in part, as follows:
Art. 2208 ...
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
We do not find the petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the sum of P100,000.00
reasonable. We do not believe that it satisfies the standards set forth by the Rules.
The extent of the services he had rendered in Civil Case No. 30679, and as far as the
records will yield, is not impressive to justify payment of such a gargantuan amount.
The case itself moreover did not involve complex questions of fact or law that would
have required substantial effort as to research or leg work for the petitioner to
warrant his demands. The fact that the properties subject thereof commanded quite
handsome prices in the market should not be a measure of the importance or non-
importance of the case. We are not likewise persuaded that the petitioner's stature
warrants the sum claimed.
All things considered, we reduce the petitioner's fees, on a quantum meruit basis, to
P20,000.00.
It is futile to invoke the rule granting attorneys a lien upon the things won in
litigation similar to that vested upon redemptioners. To begin with, the rule refers to
realty sold as a result of execution in satisfaction of judgment. In this case, however,
redemption was decreed by agreement (on compromise) between the mortgagor
and mortgagee. It did not give the petitioner any right to the properties themselves,
much less the right of redemption, although provisions for his compensation were
purportedly provided. It did not make him a redemptioner for the plain reason that
he was not named one in the amicable settlement. To this extent, we reverse Judge
Pedro Santiago's ruling in Civil Case No. 40066, recognizing Atty. Canlas' "legal right,
independent of the questioned deed of sale and transfer which was executed
subsequently on May 3, 1983, to redeem the subject realty from the L & R
Corporation pursuant to Sec. 29 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court." Whatever right
he had, it was, arguably with respect alone to his renumeration. It did not extend to
the lands.
Secondly, and assuming that such a right exists, it must be in proportion to the
"just fees and disbursements" due him. It is still subject to the tempering hand of
this Court.
The Court notes a hidden agenda in the petitioner's haste to execute the
compromise agreement and subsequently, to force the transfer of the properties to
himself. As we have observed, in spite of the issuance of the writ of execution, it
does not appear that the petitioner took pains to implement it. We find this
perplexing given his passionate and persistent pleas that he was entitled to the
proceeds. There can indeed be no plausible explanation other than to enable him to
keep an "ace" against the private respondent that led finally, to the conveyance of
the properties in his favor. To be sure, he would have us beheve that by redeeming
the same from the mortgagee and by in fact parting with his own money he had
actually done the private respondent a favor, but this is to assume that he did not
get anything out of the transaction. Indeed, he himself admits that "[t]itles to the
properties have been issued to the new owners long before the filing of private
respondents [sic] petition for annulment." To say that he did not profit therefrom is
to take either this Court or the petitioner for naive, a proposition this Court is not
prepared to accept under the circumstances.
We are likewise convinced that it was the petitioner who succeeded in having the
private respondent sign the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of
Redemption and/or to Redeem," a pre-prepared document apparently, that allowed
him (the petitioner) to exercise the right of redemption over the properties and to all
intents and purposes, acquire ownership thereof. As we have earlier averred, the
private respondent, by reason of bankruptcy, had become an easy quarry to his
counsel's moral influence and ascendancy. We are hard put to believe that it was the
private respondent who "earnestly implored" him to undertake the redemption
amid the former's obstinate attempts to keep his lands that have indeed led to the
multiple suits the petitioner now complains of, apart from the fact that the latter
himself had something to gain from the transaction, as alluded to above. We are of
the opinion that in ceding his right of redemption, the private respondent had
intended merely to forestall the total loss of the parcels to the mortgagee upon the
understanding that his counsel shall acquire the same and keep them therefore
within reach, subject to redemption by his client under easier terms and conditions.
Surely, the petitioner himself would maintain that he agreed to make the
redemption"in order that [he] may already be paid the P100,000.00 attorney's fees
awarded him in the Compromise Agreement," 43 and if his sole concern was his fees,
there was no point in keeping the properties in their entirety.
The Court simply cannot fag for the petitioner's pretensions that he acquired the
properties as a gesture of magnanimity and altruism He denies, of course, having
made money from it, but what he cannot dispute is the fact that he did resell the
properties.
But if he did not entertain intents of making any profit, why was it necessary to
reword the conveyance document executed by the private respondent? It shall be
recalled that the deed, as originally drafted, provided for conveyance of the private
respondent's "rights of equity of redemption and/or redeem" the properties in his
favor, whereas the instrument registered with the Register of Deeds purported to
transfer "any and all my rights of the real properties and/or to redeem," in his favor.
He admits having entered the intercalations in question but argues that he did so "to
facilitate the registration of the questioned deed with the Register of Deeds" and
that it did not change the meaning of the paper, for which Judge Santiago acquitted
him of any falsification charges. To start with, the Court is at a loss how such an
alteration could "facilitate" registration. Moreover, if it did not change the tenor of
the deed, why was it necessary then? And why did he not inform his client? At any
rate, the agreement is clearly a contract of adhesion. Its provisions should be read
against the party who prepared it.
But while we cannot hold the petitioner liable for falsification — this is not the
proper occasion for it — we condemn him nonetheless for infidelity to his oath "to
do no falsehood"
This brings us to the final question: Whether or not the conveyance in favor of the
petitioner is subject to the ban on acquisition by attorneys of things in litigation. The
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state as follows:
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his
guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been intrusted to
them, unless the consent of the principal have been given;
 (3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under
administration;
(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision
thereof, or of any government owned or controlled corporation, or institution,
the administration of which has been instrusted to them; this provision shall
apply to judges and government experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take
part in the sale;
(5) Justice judges prosecuting attorneys clerks of superior and inferior courts, and
other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the
property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court
within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers,
with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law.**
In Rubias v. Batiller, we declared such contracts to be void by force of Article 1409,
paragraph (7), of the Civil Code, defining inexistent contracts. In Director of Lands v.
Ababa however, we said that the prohibition does not apply to contingent contracts,
in which the conveyance takes place after judgment, so that the property can no
longer be said to be "subject of litigation."
In the instant case, the Court observes that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights
of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem" was executed following the finality of
the decision approving the compromise agreement. It is actually a new contract —
not one in pursuance of what had been agreed upon on compromise — in which, as
we said, the petitioner purportedly assumed redemption rights over the disputed
properties (but in reality, acquired absolute ownership thereof). By virtue of such a
subsequent agreement, the lands had ceased to be properties which are "the object
of any litigation." Parenthetically, the Court states that a writ of possession is
improper to eject another from possession unless sought in connection with: (1) a
land registration proceeding; (2) an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real
property; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has
possession and no third party has intervened; and (4) in execution sales. It is
noteworthy that in this case, the petitioner moved for the issuance of the writ
pursuant to the deed of sale between him and the private respondent and not the
judgment on compromise. (He was, as we said, issued a writ of execution on the
compromise agreement but as we likewise observed, he did not have the same
enforced. The sale agreement between the parties, it should be noted, superseded
the compromise.) The writ does not lie in such a case. His remedy is specific
performance.
At any rate, the transfer, so we hold, is not subject to the injunction of Article 1491
of the Civil Code. But like all voidable contracts, it is open to annulment on the
ground of mistake, fraud, or undue influence, which is in turn subject to the right of
innocent purchasers for value.
For this reason, we invalidate the transfer in question specifically for undue influence
as earlier detailed. While the respondent Herrera has not specifically prayed for
invalidation, this is the clear tenor of his petition for annulment in the Appellate
Court. It appearing, however, that the properties have been conveyed to third
persons whom we presume to be innocent purchasers for value, the petitioner, Atty.
Paterno Canlas, must be held liable, by way of actual damages, for such a loss of
properties.
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In
condemning Atty. Canlas monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the private
respondent has not settled his hability for payment of the properties. To hold Atty.
Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich said respondent at the expense of his
lawyer. The parties must then set off their obligations against the other. To obviate
debate as the actual amounts owing by one to the other, we hold Francisco Herrera,
the private respondent, liable to Atty. Paterno Canlas, the petitioner, in the sum of
P654,000.00 representing the redemption price of the properties, in addition to the
sum of P20,000. 00 as and for attomey's fees. We order Atty. Canlas, in turn, to pay
the respondent Herrera the amount of P1,000,000.00, the sum he earned from the
resale thereof, such that he shall, after proper adjustments, be indebted to his client
in the sum of P326,000.00 as and for damages.
Needless to say, we sustain the action of the respondent Court of Appeals in taking
cognizance of the petition below. But as we have stated, we are compelled, as the
final arbiter of justiciable cases and in the highest interests of justice, to write finis to
the controversy that has taxed considerably the dockets of the inferior courts.
Let the Court further say that while its business is to settle actual controversies and
as a matter of general policy, to leave alone moot ones, its mission is, first and
foremost, to dispense justice. At the outset, we have made clear that from a
technical vantage point, certiorari, arguably lies, but as we have likewise stated, the
resolution of the case rests not only on the mandate of technical rules, but if the
decision is to have any real meaning, on the merits too. This is not the first time we
would have done so; in many cases we have eschewed the rigidity of the Rules of
Court if it would establish a barrier upon the administration of justice. It is especially
so in the case at bar, in which no end to suit and counter-suit appears imminent and
for which it is high time that we have the final say. We likewise cannot, as the
overseer of good conduct in both the bench and the bar, let go unpunished what
convinces us as serious indiscretions on the part of a lawyer.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered.

1. ORDERING the petitioner, Atty. Patemo Canlas, to pay to the private respondent,
Francisco Herrera, the sum of P326,000.00, as and for damages;

2. ORDERING the petitioner to SHOW CAUSE why no disciplinary action may be

imposed on him for violation of his oath, as a lawyer, within ten (10) days from
notice, after which the same will be consolidated with AC No. 2625;

3. DISMISSING this petition and REMANDING the case to the respondent Court of
Appeals for execution; and

4. ORDERING the petitioner to pay costs.

SO ORDERED.