1

1-17-05

TITLE

From Welfare Reform to Welfare Justice: The Impact of TANF Implementation on Fair Hearing Appeals.

AUTHOR

Frank Ridzi, Le Moyne College Department of Sociology, Syracuse New York ridzifm@lemoyne.edu

ABSTRACT

The 1996 welfare reform is characterized by a decreased emphasis on welfare rights and an amplified

concern with welfare-to-work performance indicators and reducing caseloads. This paper examines the

outcomes of fair hearing appeals in New York State to determine the relationship between the reform’s

incremental implementation between 1997 and 2002 and the prevalence of welfare office violations of

client and applicant rights. Findings are that the onset of the reform corresponded with a rise in overall

fair hearing appeals and that rights violations as a proportion of family assistance caseloads increased

between 1997 and 2002. Data also indicate that changes in appeal outcomes were not uniformed across

the state and that further research is needed to determine why urban counties were more likely to

experience increased rights violations while rural areas were more likely to experience decreases.

INTRODUCTION

The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA, P.L.

104-93) marked a pivotal moment in the history of the U.S. welfare state. It ended welfare’s entitlement

status by replacing Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with Temporary Assistance to

Needy Families (TANF) and delegating the primary responsibility for TANF program design and

implementation to states. States gained a vast amount of flexibility through a shift from per client federal

reimbursement to block grant funding, but they were also constrained by federal ideology and policy

framework. The federal government’s imposition of time limits on the receipt of cash assistance,

reduction of support for education and human capital development, and insistence upon “work-first”
 2
strategies for achieving self-sufficiency placed a great amount of pressure on states to decrease caseloads

by moving clients from welfare to work.

Between August 1996 and March 2002 the national recipient caseload dropped by 12,242,125

individuals or 57.6%, an unprecedented fall (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2003).

Much of this decline is attributed to a radical transformation in the way in which welfare offices do

business. In the words of Besharov and Germanis (Besharov and Germanis 2002:4), “one of the most

fundamental changes that has occurred after welfare reform is the transformation of welfare offices from

places where mothers are signed up for benefits (with almost no questions asked beyond those concerning

eligibility) to places where they are helped, cajoled, and pressured to get a job or to rely on others for

support.”

Though many states are relieved by the way in which declining caseloads have allowed them to

avoid budget crises and attain work participation benchmarks set by the federal government, researchers

have begun to question what other public values have suffered in the race to push families off welfare

(Lichter and Jayakody 2002). The publicly acclaimed success of the 1996 welfare reform depends

considerably on the indicators used to measure it. While much media attention has been devoted to

caseloads, this paper demonstrates that a different conclusion can be reached about welfare reform’s

success by looking at the prevalence of welfare policy violations committed by staff, as indicated by fair

hearing outcomes.

Fair hearings were designed and instituted following the supreme court case Goldberg vs. Kelly

(1970) to ensure that welfare applicants and clients were not treated in ways that violated their rights to

access certain entitlements promised by the government (U. S. Supreme Court Goldberg v. Kelly 1970).

It guaranteed due process – including a pre-termination evidentiary hearing, an impartial legal decision

maker, and a chance to address reasons for welfare agency action through the confrontation of adverse

witnesses – to welfare clients who believe that benefits have been wrongfully denied, reduced or

discontinued (U. S. Supreme Court Goldberg v. Kelly 1970;Office of the State Comptroller 1998).
 3
The general absence of welfare justice and fair hearings from the national discussion of welfare

reform is an indicator of changing ideology and public opinion. Welfare state priorities change with the

tenor of the time. Fair hearings were created following grassroots claims to welfare rights that gained

prominent and sustained voice in the 1960’s. In the context of Goldberg v. Kelly, the prerogative of

welfare gatekeepers to vacillate between being excessively lenient and punitive when dealing with clients

had been well documented and targeted for reform (Handler 1973). The fair hearings process was

intended to place a check and balance on this power by instituting a path of recourse to clients whose

entitlement rights had been violated. The 1996 reform, however, has shifted the pendulum in the opposite

direction, delegating unprecedented discretion to local administrators in the distribution of benefits

(Brodkin 1997;Maloy et al 1998;The Office of Family Assistance 2004;Brock et al 2002;Hagen and

Owens-Manley 2002). This has effectively sent the message that, when it comes to decreasing caseloads

and motivating clients to meet workforce participation requirements, the end justifies the means.

In the present time, fair hearings remain an active mechanism and provide us with a barometer for

examining changes in implementers’ adherence to policy regulations. This is particularly useful in

studying the impact of welfare reform on overall trends in the observance of welfare clients’ rights as

dictated by policy. Though welfare reform’s impact on observance of welfare rights could be studied in a

similar way in many states, New York is used in this analysis because it has maintained its administrative

fair hearings structure despite national uncertainty as to the relevance of Goldberg v. Kelly under new

welfare reform policy (McClenny 2003;Zietlow 1996;Dehner 2002).

Welfare Reform in New York

The 1996 federal reform delegated the majority of administrative responsibilities to states with the

promise of less restrictive block grant funding and it provided states with a deadline for producing their

own welfare reform plan. New York state responded to this mandate by preparing a statewide plan in

October of 1996 and by passing “The Welfare Reform Act of 1997” on August 4th 1997 (OTDA 1997a).

The Governor signed the act on August 20th and an amended “TANF State Plan” was submitted to the
 4
federal department of Health and Human Services on September 19, 1997. On November 1, 1997 most of

the welfare reform changes became effective. Family Assistance (FA), New York’s TANF program, and

Safety Net Assistance (SN), the General Assistance program, were made retroactive to December 2nd

1996 and August 4th 1997, respectively (OTDA 1997a). Though New York is distinctive from many

smaller states in that it further delegated administrative responsibility to counties, its overall approach to

the reform was consistent with the general theme of the legislation and with the plans proposed by other

states (McKenna 1998). New York adopted a work-first approach that emphasized immediate

employment as the key to cultivating both the self-sufficiency desired among clients and the caseload

reduction goals set forth in federal and state legislation (Senate 1997;Hamilton and Scrivener 1999;NYS

DSS 1994).

Also consistent with federal legislation, New York State issued a series of participation rate

benchmarks to be met by each of its 57 counties and New York City. Participation rates are defined as

the minimum percentage of families on the caseload for which at least one adult or minor child head of

household must be engaged in work or approved work activities (NYS Instruction Manual. 1998). For the

federal fiscal year 1997, the benchmark was set at 25% of all families on FA/TANF for a minimum of 20

hours per week. In the same year, it includes the stipulation that 75% of two parent families on FA/TANF

be participating for a minimum of 35 hours per week.

The table below indicates the participation rate requirements for FA/TANF as listed in section

1300.8 of the NYS Welfare Reform Implementation Manual (NYS Instruction Manual. 1998). It also

lists benchmarks for Safety Net. Unlike many other states, New York is bound by its constitution to

provide for the poor. Those who do not qualify for TANF yet are poor are directed to Safety Net.

Table 1 about here.

As indicated in the above table, the participation rate requirements and the number of weekly hours of

work participation mandated increase throughout the first six years of TANF’s existence. This

incremental implementation both allowed counties time to adjust their administrative and street-level
 5
practice and presented a stern mandate that is reinforced through a series of financial penalties for

counties that fail to attain these levels (New York State Welfare Reform Act. 1997).

Literature has suggested that these benchmarks have produced a certain amount of local stress and

a sense of urgency with respect to decreasing caseloads (Hamilton and Scrivener 1999;Ridzi 2004). In

addition to reducing the denominator of caseloads and thus making participation rates easier to attain,

counties in New York (as well as states in general) were granted reductions in participation rate

requirements as a reward for successful caseload reduction in comparison to 1995 caseload levels

(Hamilton and Scrivener 1999;NYS Instruction Manual. 1998). This feature of the reform placed local

administrators and front-line workers (in New York as well as other states) in a situation in which they

were charged with both distributing aid and being increasingly parsimonious with the distribution of aid

as reform measures were incrementally enacted between 1997 and 2002.

The national “race to the bottom of the caseloads” that ensued has been well chronicled and

attainment of caseload declines and participation benchmarks have been presented by many as evidence

of welfare reform’s success (Pataki 2000). However, Lichter and Jayakody (Lichter and Jayakody 2002)

and others note that caseload declines and work participation rates do not necessarily indicate success for

an anti-poverty program and thorough policy analysis must not loose sight of the needs of the poor. The

research reported on in this paper seeks to assess the success of welfare reform with respect to the needs

of its vulnerable population of clientele by analyzing its impact on violations of applicant and client

rights. This paper addresses the following three research questions.

First, this paper asks, what impact did the 1997 New York State welfare reform act have on Family

Assistance (TANF), Safety Net and Medicaid caseloads and fair hearings as a whole? This is addressed

by examining patterns in statewide trends for each of these programs between 1989 and 2003. Second,

did the incremental implementation of welfare reform in New York State between 1997 and 2002

correspond with an increase or decrease in TANF welfare rights violations statewide? This is measured
 6
by comparing Family Assistance fair hearing appellant wins (agency reversals) as a percentage of

caseloads for each year between 1997 and 2002. Safety Net and Medicaid are used as comparison groups.

Third, did the incremental implementation of welfare reform in New York State between 1997 and

2002 correspond with changes in reversals as a percentage of caseloads, reversal rates, the percent of

requested hearings that are held, or the percent of outcomes favoring appellants on the county level? This

is assessed in summary form for all 57 counties and New York City in New York State through the use of

a paired sample comparison of means.

METHOD

Data for this research was obtained from several sources. The number of requested and heard

hearings per county, as well as the outcomes (affirmations, reversals, and correct when made) for Family

Assistance (FA), Safety Net (SN) and Medicaid (MA) were obtained by compiling annual charge back

reports provided by the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (Office of

Administrative Hearings 1998;Office of Administrative Hearings 1999;Office of Administrative Hearings

2000;Office of Administrative Hearings 2001;Office of Administrative Hearings 2002;Office of

Administrative Hearings 2003). These reports were obtained for years 1997 through 2002 and begin in

March of the indicated year and end at the conclusion of February for the following year. Annual

caseload data for Family Assistance (New York State’s TANF) and Safety Net (formerly Home Relief as

of 1997) were obtained from Statistics Reports for 1997 through 2002 which are also produced by the

New York State Office of Temporary and Disability services (OTDA 1997a;OTDA 2002;OTDA

2001;OTDA 2000;OTDA 1999;OTDA 1998;OTDA 1997b). Data from the same month, July1 was used

for all caseload comparisons between 1997 and 2002 in order to remain consistent and control for

seasonal fluctuation in caseloads. Caseload data for Medicaid during these years was obtained from the

NYS Department of Health and consists of the average monthly eligible2 participants, i.e. those who have

1
In one case, 2000, June is used because July data is unavailable.
2
Eligible participants are defined by the New York State Department of Health as “individuals who applied for and were
determined eligible for the Medicaid program”. This should not be confused with the number of beneficiaries, or those who
 7
applied for Medicaid and have been approved, during the years 1997 through 2002 (NYS DOH 2004).

Annual caseload data dating back to 1989 was obtained for all programs (FA, SN and MA) from

Statistical Abstracts of the United States and NYS Department of Social Service Annual Reports and

Statistical Supplements (U.S. Census Bureau 2005;NYS DSS 1993;NYS DSS 1997). Aggregate fair

hearing data for this same time period was obtained directly from the NYS Office of Temporary and

Disability Services Office of Administrative Hearings.

The variables that are compared in this research were created as follows. Each were calculated on

both the state and the county level and were multiplied by 100 to achieve percentages. Reversals as a

percentage of caseloads were calculated for Family Assistance, Safety Net and Medicaid by dividing the

annual number of reversals by the July caseload for that year. The reversal rate was calculated by

dividing the number of annual reversals by the total number of official outcomes. Total official outcomes

includes the sum of reversals, affirmations and correct when made rulings. The percent requested that

were held is the number of annual hearings held divided by the number of annual hearings requested.

Unlike the reversal rate calculated above, the percent of outcomes favoring appellants includes

informal outcomes such as agency withdrawals and appellant withdrawals. The percent of outcomes

favoring appellants was constructed by grouping all possible outcomes into two categories, one that

favors the welfare agency against which the appeal is being made, and one that favors the client making

the appeal. Affirmations and correct when made rulings were categorized as those favoring agencies,

since they either affirm that an agency’s actions remain correct, or that they were correct when taken and

may need to be modified due to changes in policy or client circumstances, but not due to agency

wrongdoing. Outcomes favoring the appellant, as grouped in this variable, include both reversals, in

which agency actions are reversed as a result of the hearing, and requested hearings that were not heard.

Requested hearings that were not heard include instances in which either the agency formally withdraws

actually received medical benefits in the given year. Eligible participants are used to indicate caseloads here because these are
the actual participants in the Medicaid program. Also, complete data for beneficiaries in 1997 was not available. For the
 8
their case prior to a hearing, formally conceding to the appellant, or the appellant withdraws their claim or

fails to follow through by attending the hearing, presumably because their reason for appeal has been

ameliorated3. The percent of outcomes favoring appellants is obtained through dividing the number of

outcomes favoring appellants by the sum of outcomes favoring appellants and outcomes favoring

agencies. The results presented below utilize the above variables by comparing trends on a state-wide as

well as a county-by county basis.

RESULTS

The Impact of Welfare Reform on Caseloads and Fair Hearing Activity

First, this paper asks, what impact did the 1997 New York State welfare reform act have on

Family Assistance (TANF), Safety Net and Medicaid caseloads and fair hearings as a whole? This is

addressed by examining patterns in statewide trends for each of these indicators between 1989 and 2003.

Chart 1 About Here

This chart reveals several associations between welfare reform in New York State and fair hearing

activities. First, welfare reform coincides with an increase in fair hearing requests. The federal

government enacted its PRWORA legislation in 1996 and New York State enacted its own version of

welfare reform in August of 1997. However, as noted in the literature review, some of these new policies

were retroactive and preparations in many counties began prior to the official state legislation, with some

beginning prior to 1996 under waiver grants (Riedinger et al 1999). New York State also began to make

transitions to welfare-to work programming and administrative infrastructure as early as 1994 (NYS DSS

1994;Riedinger et al 1999).

During these same years, the number of hearing requests increased by over 36,000 from its near

steady annual rate of 140,000 in 1994 to near 180,000 in 1995 (it eventually peaked at nearly 220,000 in

1998). Over this same period the number of appeals that resulted in a formal reversal of county actions

purposes of the comparisons made in this research both indicators were used with little difference. Only eligible participants
are reported in this paper.
 9
remained consistent with previous years. The number of hearings from which counties withdrew,

however, began a steady increase that would continue in future years and eventually decline as reform

measures became more fully implemented. Of additional importance, the number of fair hearings

requested but not held began an increase that would not return to pre-reform levels, even as of 2003.

By 1996, the first year of the federal welfare reform, New York State’s TANF (FA) and Safety

Net caseloads had already begun to decline (note in the chart above that Medicaid and AFDC/TANF/FA

are represented in tens while SN is represented in actual numbers). This pattern was consistent with

national caseloads which also began to decline prior to the reform (Besharov and Germanis 2002).

During this time and continuing through 1997, the first year of New York State’s reform legislation, as

caseloads declined, fair hearing requests increased. Between 1996 and 1998, the number of families on

TANF fell by approximately 379,000 and appeals increased by over 17,000. Also during this time the

number of county losses of appeals, defined by the state auditor as the aggregate of reversals and agency

withdrawals (Office of the State Comptroller 1998), peaked, rising by over 100,000 between 1995 and

1998.

These figures suggest that the initial years of the reform were characterized by not only rapidly

declining TANF and Safety Net caseloads and an increase in appeals, but also by a notable increase in the

number of instances in which counties either admitted fault or were found to be at fault through the

appeals process. Though it is not possible to disaggregate the reasons for these appeals, or even their

distribution among TANF, Safety Net and Medicaid for these years (due to record keeping limitations), a

pattern that links the reform with changes in fair hearings behavior, as compared with previous years,

appears to be present.

Despite the noted weaknesses (such as inability to disaggregate) in data collected prior to the

reform, improved record keeping between the years 1997 and 2002 allow for the disaggregation of TANF,

Safety Net and Medicaid cases by county for each of the years of TANF’s incremental imposition of

3
The assumption that clients withdraw because their reason for appeal has been ameliorated has been made in this research.
 10
participation rate performance measures. The following sections are dedicated to examining the changing

patterns of fair hearing activity during the years of reform implementation.

Welfare Implementation and Welfare Rights Violations Statewide Between 1997 and 2002

This section addresses the second question, namely did the incremental implementation of welfare

reform in New York State between 1997 and 2002 correspond with an increase or decrease in TANF

welfare rights violations statewide? This is measured by comparing the Family Assistance fair hearing

reversals as a percentage of caseloads for each year between 1997 and 2002. Safety Net and Medicaid are

used as comparison groups.

Chart 2 about here

The chart above shows a clear relationship between fair hearing reversals (appellant wins) and the

implementation of welfare reform. For Family Assistance, there is a two stage increase in reversals as a

percentage of caseloads that results in an ultimate increase from 3 percent of the caseload in 1997 to close

to 13 percent in 2002. This increase by a magnitude of four times is contrasted by Safety Net’s

fluctuations that include an increase from 12 percent in 1997 to a peak of 23 percent in 2001 and an

eventual fall to 8 percent in 2002. Medicaid, as might be expected since it was not directly impacted by

the reform, experienced close to no change.

Safety Net’s fall in comparison to FA appears to be largely due to changes in caseload size since

FA declined throughout the five-year time period and SN, which had followed this trend until the last

year, experienced an upward spike in 2002. This was quite likely due to the expiration of the first wave of

TANF five-year time limits at which point New York State’s guarantee of aid would have transitioned

those still financially eligible from the TANF-linked FA program to the entirely state-run SN program.

This data reveals that, on a state-wide level, fair hearings reversals, as a percent of caseload size,

increased among TANF clientele between 1997 and 2002. This, however, does not mean that each county

However, future research is needed to ascertain whether this assumption is correct.

 11
within the state shared a similar experience of rights violations with welfare reform. The following

section presents a more refined analysis that addresses this change on a county by county level.

Welfare Implementation and County-Level Fair Hearing Outcomes between 1997 and 2002

This section is devoted to the third research question which asks whether the incremental

implementation of welfare reform in New York State between 1997 and 2002 corresponds with changes

in appeals and reversals as a percentage of caseloads, reversals as a percent of rulings, the percent of

requested hearings that are held, and the percent of outcomes favoring appellants on the county level.

This is assessed in summary form for all 57 counties and New York City through the use of a paired

sample comparison of means.

The following table presents a comparison of means with paired t-test results that allow us to

examine observed differences between 1997 and 2002 for statistical significance. As might be

anticipated, no statistically significant changes were observed for Medicaid with any of the indicators

measured. For FA, however, comparison between values recorded on the first and final year of welfare

reform’s incremental implementation are more complex.

Table 2 about here.

Overall, these indicators suggest that between 1997 and 2002 the rate of fair hearing requests, as a

percentage of county caseloads, significantly increased for FA from an average of 2.6 percent to 5.9 and

decreased for SN from 20.7 to 12.3 percent. The late spike in SN caseloads described in the previous

section is the likely reason behind Safety Net’s decrease in fair hearing requests as a percentage of

caseloads. It is also the most probable reason for the significant drop in reversals as a percentage of SN

caseloads from 5.6 to 1.5 percent and the significant drop in the percent of requested hearings that were

held (from 45 to 33 percent) since this rise in caseloads is likely to have caused a backlog.

For FA, the situation is different. The overall increase in the proportion of appellants that

officially won their appeals (as a percentage of caseload) that was observed state-wide was also evident

on the county level, but was not statistically significant. This indicates an important caveat to the noted
 12
state-wide trend. The t-test result’s lack of significance is likely due to the high level of variance among

counties. Unlike the increase in hearings requested as a proportion of caseloads, that was experienced by

42 of the 58 counties or 72 percent, an increase in the rate of reversals as a proportion of caseloads was

only experienced by 23 of the 58 counties, or 40 percent. This suggests that, for the majority of counties,

there was either a decrease or no change in reversals as a percentage of their caseload between 1997 and

2002. Furthermore, the counties that experienced increased reversals tend to be among the larger, more

urban districts which have large enough populations to ensure that the state, overall, experienced a rise in

reversals as a percentage of caseloads.

These findings are reinforced by the fact that the reversal rate for FA, or the rate of reversals as

compared to other rulings, decreased from 23.7 to 14 percent. This significant decline in reversal rates

might be expected for three reasons. First, the period of time between 1997 and 2002 afforded local

welfare staff more time to become familiar with the legislation and to establish routines that comply with

regulations rather than violate client rights. Such as possibility is supported by learning theories of

implementation (Browne and Wildavsky 1983). Second, counties may have learned from the mistakes

that were brought to their attention in reversals made in early years, and thus avoided making such

mistakes in future years. This includes improvement of agency efforts to represent themselves in the best

light possible during hearings. This possibility is supported by ethnographic fieldwork conducted in six

counties as part of a larger study not reported on in this paper, as well as by documentary evidence that

suggests that local implementers were institutionally pressured to reduce reversal rates (Office of the State

Comptroller 1998;Dehner 2002).

The third reason is that local implementers have made a conscious effort to settle appeals

informally because they recognize the implications that high reversal rates have for their performance as

administrators of public policy. This is supported by ethnographic and interview evidence as well as by

documented evidence that intermediary protocols have been established to negotiate appeals prior to

hearings (Dehner 2002;New York State Office of the State Comptroller 2001). This possibility is also
 13
supported by the statistical significance of increases in the percent of outcomes favoring appellants for

both FA (from 55.6 to 64 percent) and SN (from 45 to 64 percent). For FA, 38 of the 58 counties, or 66

percent, experienced increases in outcomes favoring appellants as compared to the only 34 percent that

experienced increases in reversal rates between 1997 and 2002.

Unlike the reversal rate, which indicates the instances in which state arbitrators formally rule in

the favor of appellants and against counties, the percent of outcomes favoring appellants also accounts for

informal settlement of appeals. As detailed in the methods section, outcomes favoring appellants include

both reversals and the incidence of appeals that are not followed through to a fair hearing at the choice of

appellants. This statistically significant rise in the average that includes informal settlements, while based

on imperfect assumptions that do not account for structural barriers that may impede appellant ability to

successfully follow through with appeals (Gilliom 2001), raises important questions about the efficacy of

relying on officially recorded reversals as a measure of rights violations. It also invokes a broader social

services literature that describes street level and administrative efforts to manipulate performance

indicators to present positive images of their work (Lin 1997).

DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

In an attempt to discern the relationship between welfare reform and fair hearing appeals, this

paper raises both questions and dilemmas for future research and policy decisions. In this section I offer

two considerations for future research and two policy recommendations. The fact that statewide increases

in welfare rights violations as a proportion of caseloads are not reflected in county-level comparison of

means presents the first challenge for future research. While preliminary analysis suggests that rural and

urban identity serve as a major distinguishing factor, this does not apply universally. More research is

needed to distinguish what about certain counties make them more likely than others to experience

increases in rights violations. Previous research suggests that county size, enthusiasm for caseload

reduction, economic prosperity and the racial diversity of the population may all have an impact (Soss

2001;Schram 2002;Schram 1999). In addition to addressing the causes for this variation, efforts can be
 14
made to test the generalizability of these findings to other states and eventually the nation as a whole.

Though data collection at a national or multi-state level promises to be challenging, such analysis is

crucial to our ability to holistically assess the success of the 1996 federal welfare reform.

Somewhat related to the task of collecting national data, the first policy recommendation seeks to

address the reliability of using current administrative data to assess appeal outcomes. The evidence

presented in this paper suggests that intentional efforts to reduce reversal rates may result in the

subversion of their utility as a performance indicator. The conflation of all outcomes that do not involve

formal reversals as a favorable outcome for welfare offices underestimates the prevalence of valid

appellant claims and obstructs ability to monitor trends in rights violations. Indeed audits have also

suggested that other measures such as agency withdrawals, be considered when assessing county “losses”

(Office of the State Comptroller 1998). Research conducted on recent appeal outcomes in 2004 reveal

that, while no available records remain for 1997 through 2002, records that disaggregate hearings by

program area (i.e. FA, SN, and MA) were likely created but not preserved. These records also indicate a

series of possible outcomes that, if reliably recorded and preserved, would provide insight into the

prevalence of agency withdrawals, appellant withdrawals, appellant defaults and a number of other case

conclusions (Office of Administrative Hearings 2004). As reauthorization discussions for TANF

continue, consideration should be given to establishing a uniformed, mandated federal reporting protocol

for fair hearing data.

Finally, the evidence of increased welfare rights violations as a proportion of caseloads, though

not applicable to all counties, indicates that there is cause to incorporate emphasis on welfare justice in the

reform’s performance monitoring. The regard for justice held in previous decades seems to have fallen by

the wayside in welfare’s current iteration. However, justice is relevant now as much as ever. If welfare

clients are expected to make the challenging journey to self-sufficiency within the labor market, they must

be assured of fair and appropriate treatment as dictated by the welfare policies that have been created for

them. Previous research finds that front-line discretion is influenced by performance indicators (Ridzi
 15
2004). Accordingly, the performance measure structure now in place can be adjusted to include aspects

that pertain to welfare justice, just as mandatory and optional measures currently provide visibility and

urgency to decreasing caseloads, increasing child support enforcement, decreasing out of wedlock

pregnancy and increasing job retention.

CONCLUSION

This analysis claims a space for consideration of welfare rights violations within the realm of

reform performance indicators. It demonstrates that fair hearing appeal activity has been noticeably

impacted by the 1996 PRWORA and that New York State’s implementation of welfare reform is

associated with an increase in formally recognized policy rights violations as a proportion of caseloads

between 1997 and 2002. Though this increase was not universally experienced by all counties, and in fact

these violations appear to be concentrated in larger urban areas, there was a statistically significant

increase in the percent of appeal outcomes favoring appellants at the county level when informal

settlements are considered.

Future research is needed to determine the causes behind variations in rights violations among

counties and to determine how robust the present findings are by replicating this research in other states

and on a national basis. Finally, this research reveals important considerations for policy makers and

analysts. Changes need to be made to current data collection structures and to the priorities expressed by

reform legislation if welfare rights violations are to be observed with precision and effectively

discouraged.

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Social Services.

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Management Audit and State Financial Services.

 18
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TITLE

From Welfare Reform to Welfare Justice: The Impact of TANF Implementation on Fair Hearing Appeals.
 19
TABLE 1: Participation Rate Requirements for New York Family Assistance and Safety Net Caseloads

TANF/FA All Families TANF/FA 2-Parent Families Safety Net

Participation Number of Participation Number of Participation Number of
Rate (%) Weekly Rate (%) Weekly Hours Rate (%) Weekly
Hours Hours
1997 25 20 75 35 75 35
1998 30 20 75 35 75 35
1999 35 25 90 35 90 35
2000 40 30 90 35 90 35
2001 45 30 90 35 90 35
2002 50 30 90 35 90 35

Chart 1: Overall Trends in Caseloads and Fair Hearing Activity

New York State Means-Tested Caseloads and Aggregate Fair Hearing Requests and Outcomes
1989-2003 TOTAL New FH
450000 Requests in NYS

400000 TOTAL Reversed

350000
TOTAL Withdrawn

300000
Total Requested
Hearings Not Held
250000
Cases

Medicaid
200000 Recipients in Tens

150000 AFDC Recipients

in tens

100000
Safety Net
Recipients
50000

Total Official
0 County Losses
(Reversals and
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Withdrawals)

Year
 20
Chart 2: Change in Reversals as a Percent of Caseloads
Reversals as a Percentage of State Caseloads

25
FA Rev
20 as % of
Caseloa
Percentage

15 d
MA Rev
as % of
10 Caseloa
d
5 SN Rev
as % of
0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Year

Table 2: Comparison of Mean Differences between 1997 and 2002

Paired Samples Comparison of Means 1997 and 2002

Year Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean

FA Percent of Caseload Filing an Appeal* 1997 2.61 58 1.61 0.21
2002 5.92 58 10.59 1.39
FA Percent of Caseload Formally Winning an 1997 0.47 58 0.65 0.09
Appeal 2002 0.85 58 2.96 0.39
FA Reversal Rate** 1997 23.70 58 21.30 2.80
2002 14.27 58 16.49 2.17
FA Percent Requested Held 1997 37.91 58 14.64 1.92
2002 34.52 58 19.00 2.49
FA Percent Outcomes Favoring Appelants** 1997 55.57 58 27.11 3.56
2002 63.97 58 20.91 2.75
SN Percent of Caseload Filing an Appeal** 1997 20.71 58 12.76 1.68
2002 12.35 58 17.58 2.31
SN Percent of Caseload Formally Winning an 1997 5.63 58 5.93 0.78
Appeal** 2002 1.52 58 3.10 0.41
SN Reversal Rate 1997 19.90 58 14.12 1.85
2002 17.24 58 22.78 2.99
SN Percent Requested Held** 1997 45.19 58 14.62 1.92
2002 33.52 58 16.45 2.16
SN Percent Outcomes Favoring Appelants** 1997 45.22 58 15.61 2.05
2002 64.00 58 17.88 2.35
MA Percent of Caseload Filing an Appeal 1997 0.39 58 0.27 0.04
2002 0.36 58 0.46 0.06
MA Percent of Caseload Formally Winning an 1997 0.05 58 0.06 0.01
Appeal 2002 0.03 58 0.06 0.01
MA Reversal Rate 1997 17.26 58 17.57 2.31
2002 13.55 58 17.48 2.30
MA Percent Requested Held 1997 37.57 58 17.63 2.31
2002 37.92 58 17.83 2.34
MA Percent Outcomes Favoring Appelants 1997 62.17 58 17.79 2.34
2002 65.55 58 19.31 2.53

*p<.05, **p<.01