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Red Line North Underground

Ref: MOO 1 -ISG-MHT-LTR-00243


Date: 12th November 2017

MMHKT CONSORTIUM
Doha Metro Pro¡ect
West Bay
Doha, State of Qatar.

Attention Mr, Masaaki Kusunoki


Project Director

Project: Doha Metro Project - Red Line North Underground

Subject: ELECTROMAGNETTC (EMC) HAZARD ANALYSTS

Reference [1] M001-|SG-SSA-RPT-34029 Rev.2, dated 27July 2016

Dear Sir,

Please find enclosed ISG JV's Electromagnetic (EMC) Hazard Analysis design report, ref. [1], for your perusal and
consideration in your designs. This report has been already shared with you informally.

We understand you will prepare and submit an ICF in order to close out the Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)
-
interface (please refer to ER's Vol.5. Appendix A Responsibility lnterface matrix for Contractors Metro Phase 1)
shortly.

Yours si

¡$G JV
Massimo ceschi
Prqect Director & Contracto/s Representative
ISG Joint Venture

Enclosure: As stated
Cc: Mr. Daniel Leckel, The Engineer
Mr. Andrew McCracken, Engineer's Assistant
Mr. Kevin Dunning, PMC Deputy Pro¡ect Director (kdunninq pmc@qr.com.qa)
Mr. Colin Shepherd-Evans, PMC Engineering Manager (cshepherdevans pmc@qr.com.qa)
Mr. Robin Chen, QR Director Systems (rchen@qr.com.qa)

Reply Required: Yes ./ No

Response Required by Date: Receipt Acknowledged

A Jolnt V6ntur€ oporalinq ås:


llrPnEclLO-SK E&C-Gâlfar Al illsñôd JV Unit No. 601/602, 6'n Floor, Al Jazeera Tower
Conference Center Street, Diplomatic Area- West Bay Tel (+974) 401 941 00
,."'å,iä 'Ø rÞ*rØilor Building 186, Street 836, Zone 61
P.O. Box 30637, Doha- State of Qatar
Fax (+974) 40194205
info@isg¡v.qa
,4 Doha Metro
Red Line North Underground
Lot 1 .4 and Lot 1.5

Contract No: RTC/038/201 2

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EMC HAZARD ANALYSIS

SUBMffTALREASON: ISSUEDFORSONO
DESIGN PHASE: DETAIL DESTGI{ STAGE 2

DOCUMENTCODENO. I,|OO1-ISG-SSA'RPfÍ'34O29

VeRrRc¡roN AND APPnov¡u


Poslllon , Name ln Prlnt
Hlerôrchy

Prepared by RAMS Manager Andrea Ugurlu

Verified by System Assurance l.lanager Luca Glovannl Fäntaslã

Verlfled by Deslgn DlÍector Morten Collln \JG¿

Representatlve Earry Crouchman


+-,
Approved Contractor's

Revrsror,¡ Hsrónv & l¡¡ren¡¡ru CIO


Ver. No Descrlpüon of revls¡on Date Prepared Checked APProved

I lssued for SONO 3r.08.2015 A.Ugurlu M. A.Ugurlu


Ganl Frañclsl Ganl

2 Issued for SONO 27.97.20L6 A.Ugurlu M.Arceri A.Ugurlu


Ganl Ganl
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 4
1.1 PURPOSE ....................................................................................................................... 4

2 SYSTEM DEFINITION.......................................................................................................... 5
2.1 PROJECT OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................... 6
2.2 SYSTEM DEFINITION ........................................................................................................ 6

3 ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS.................................................................................................. 8


3.1 ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................................... 8
3.2 DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................................... 8

4 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 10
4.1 CONTRACT DOCUMENTS ............................................................................................... 10
4.2 ISG J.V. DOCUMENTS ................................................................................................... 10
4.3 OTHER STANDARDS ...................................................................................................... 10
4.4 INPUT FOR EMC HAZARD ANALYSIS ................................................................................ 11

5 ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCES AND COUPLING MECHANISMS ......................................... 15


5.1 COUPLING MECHANISMS ................................................................................................ 15
5.2 ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFACES ................................................................................... 15
5.3 ELECTROMAGNETIC PHENOMENA ................................................................................... 16

6 EMC HAZARD ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................... 18


6.1 ASSESSMENT OF THE ELECTRIC/ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT IN STATION .............................. 18
6.2 TROUGH GOLF COURSE ELECTROMAGNETIC ZONING ..................................................... 18
6.3 SWITCHBOX ELECTROMAGNETIC ZONING ....................................................................... 20
6.4 EQUIPMENT INSTALLED IN RAILWAY ZONE OF THE STATION ............................................... 22
6.5 INTRA SYSTEM EMC (MEP SYSTEMS) ............................................................................ 23
6.6 INTER SYSTEM EMC WITH SYSTEM CONTRACTOR EQUIPMENT ......................................... 29
6.7 INTERFACE SYSTEM EMC FOR TUNNEL .......................................................................... 30
6.8 EXPOSURE OF PASSENGERS AND STAFF TO EM ENVIRONMENT ........................................ 32

7 CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................................... 33

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Table of SONO Clauses

Employer’s Requirements Clauses

M001.UND.VOL4.699

M001.UND.VOL4.2124

Table of Interfaces applicable to this package


Interface ID Title Status

IR.1874 Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) of structures Open


including related equipment

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1 INTRODUCTION
The operational railway environment requires careful consideration for the Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMC) of the Electrical and Mechanical equipment installed with the other
equipment and facilities, with themselves, workers and passengers.

1.1 PURPOSE
In compliance with the Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Plan: M001-ISG-SSA-PLN-
34015 [10] this document aim to identify the all sources of EMI likely to affect other systems
and the equipment that are sensitive to EMI disturbances. These hazards and the anticipated
consequences of the interference and proposed protective measures will be identified and
recorded in the EMC hazard log attached in 7Appendix A.
As a basis for the EMC Hazard Analysis will be also used the Preliminary EMC Hazard
analysis [17] which provides a preliminary high level assessment of the potential EMC issues.
In accordance with the Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Plan: M001-ISG-SSA-PLN-
34015 Ref. [10] this EMC Hazard Analysis covers the following electromagnetic coupling
mechanisms:
 Radiated (electric and magnetic radiation) in which the circuit structures act as
antennas transmitting and receiving energy;
 Inductive, in which a varying magnetic field produced by a current in a circuit, links
with a victim circuit, inducing a voltage via mutual inductance;
 Capacitive, in which the varying voltage in one circuit produces voltage changes in a
victim circuit via mutual capacitance;
 Electrostatic, in which a charged body is discharged to a victim circuit;
 Conductive, in which the source and the victim circuits share a common conduction
path;
This MEP EMC Hazard Analysis has been also developed considering the systems provided
by other (e.g. System Contractor) interfaced with the MEP systems.
The analyzed hazards include external events, hazards caused by the presence of people,
failures to subsystems or components of the transport system and failure of operating
procedures. All hazards have been identified taking into account the presence of passengers,
personnel assigned to operation and maintenance and third parties involved by the Red Line
North Underground.
This document is relevant for MEP (Mechanical-Electrical-Plumbing) System.
The process of the EMC hazard analysis has been developed starting with the Preliminary
EMC Hazard Analysis which constitute the DD1 analysis; the Preliminary EMC hazard
analysis had identified all the potential EMC interfaces while this EMC hazard analysis
constitute a more detailed analysis with the aim to identify only the real EMC interfaces.
Moreover this EMC hazard analysis is based on the DD2 M2 design thus constitute the DD2
EMC hazard analysis.

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2 SYSTEM DEFINITION
The system and the related boundary of works under the D&B Contractor and MEP/ARCH
Subcontractor (Civil and MEP works) is described as follows.
The Works comprise part of the Doha Metro Red Line North Underground and starts north of
Msheireb Switchbox (out of work scope) and continues northwards to Al Bidda Station. From
Al Bidda Station it continues to Corniche Station (starting built-up area). West Bay and Doha
Exhibition and Convention Centre Station. Doha Exhibition and Convention Centre Station will
also be the future terminal station of the Blue Line. To the north of Doha Exhibition and
Convention Centre Station the line continues to Al Qassar Station, Katara Station, Legtaifiya
Station and then ends at the start of the ramp of the Red Line North Elevated & At Grade.
It must be noted that all the names of the station have been changed. The table below shows
the previous and actual names.

PREVIOUS NAME NEW NAME


Al Diwan Al Bidda
Al Bidda Corniche
West Bay South West Bay
West Bay Central Doha Exhibition and Convention Centre
Al Wahda Al Qassar
Cultural Village Katara
Lusail Marina/The Pearl Legtaifiya

More details of System architecture and Mission profile are contained in the Contract
Document: “DESIGN & BUILD – RED LINE NORTH UNDERGROUND Volume 6 –
Employer’s Requirements, Design Specifications, RTC/038/2012”.

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2.1 PROJECT OVERVIEW


The Red Line North Underground works are schematically shown in the below figure
(Hatched Red Line within the marked area).

Figure 1 - Red Line North Underground Overview Plan

2.2 SYSTEM DEFINITION


The Red Line North Underground D&B and MEP Works (Civil and MEP works) package will
include the following:

1) civil and architectural works including: site clearance and establishment, utility
diversions, ground treatment, tunneling, station structures, subways, tunnel ventilation
shafts within stations, subway links, road bridges, pedestrian bridges, link ways,
parking and other commuter facilities, emergency escape shafts and staircases
(including related surface structures), station entrances and canopies, architectural fit
out and finishes, signage, landscaping, highway works and reinstatement;

2) underground and above ground ancillary structures including ventilation shafts, plant
rooms;

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3) auxiliary utilities systems for tunnels including lighting; emergency lighting and power
and connections to the station;

4) emergency and maintenance walkways and railings within tunnels and stations;

5) drainage channels, sumps, pipes and pumps within tunnels.

A brief description of the MEP systems/subsystems relevant for this report and within the
scope of work of ISG JV are shown in the table Table 2-1.

SYSTEMS SUBSYSTEM SUB-SUBSYSTEM


Earthing & Bonding System
Normal Lighting System
Emergency - Lighting System
ELECTRICAL Low Voltage Distribution
Lightning Protection System
Lift, Escalators and Moving Walks
BACS
VAC
MEP
Firefighting System for Station
MECHANICAL
Firefighting System for Tunnel, switchbox and
Escape Routes (cross passages/EE)
Special Ventilation
Drainage System for Stations
Drainage for Tunnel
PLUMBING
Domestic Water System
Irrigation water
Table 2-1 – MEP Systems and subsystems within the ISG JV scope of work

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3 ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

3.1 ACRONYMS
BACS Building Automation & Control System
EEC European Economic Community
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
EN European Standard (Europäische Norm)
EU European Union
FR Failure Rate
HA Hazard Analysis
EMC HL EMC Hazard Log
IEC International Electro technical Commission
MEP Mechanical, Electrical and Plumbing
RAMS Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Safety
RBD Reliability Block Diagram
RIO Remote I/O
SIL Safety Integrity Level
SCADA System Control and Data Acquisition
UPS Uninterrupted Power Supply
VAC Ventilation, Air Conditioning

3.2 DEFINITIONS
Corrective maintenance (EN 50126): The maintenance carried out after fault recognition
and intended to put a product into a state in which it can perform a required function.
Failure rate: Number of failures per time unit
Hazard: A physical situation with a potential for human injury and/or impacts on railway
service (according to EN 50126).
Hazard Log: the document in which safety management activities, hazard identified,
decisions made and solutions adopted are recorded or referenced.
Hazard Severity: estimate of the consequences associated with a particular dangerous
situation.
Preventive maintenance (EN 50126): The maintenance carried out at pre-determined
intervals or according to prescribed criteria and intended to reduce the probability of failure or
the degradation of the functioning of an item.
Reliability: The probability that an item can perform a required function under given
conditions for a given time interval.

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Risk: The probable rate of occurrence of a hazard (expressed in a time interval) causing
harm and the degree of severity (expressed in hazard severity levels) of the harm (according
to EN 50126).
Safety: Freedom from unacceptable risk of harm (according to EN 50126).
Safety Case: the documented demonstration that the product complies with the specified
safety requirements.
Safety integrity level: One of a number of defined discrete levels for specifying the safety
integrity requirements of the safety functions to be allocated to the safety related systems.
Safety Integrity Level with the highest figure has the highest level of safety integrity (EN
50126).
Safety Plan: A documented set of time scheduled activities, resources and events serving to
implement the organisational structure, responsibilities, procedures, activities, capabilities and
resources that together ensure that an item satisfies given safety-requirements relevant to a
given project or contract.

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4 REFERENCES

4.1 CONTRACT DOCUMENTS


[1] Contract Document, Contract No: RTC/038/2012, Design & Build Package 1- Red Line
North Underground, Volume 4 - Employer’s Requirements – General
[2] Contract Document, Contract No: RTC/038/2012, Design & Build Package 1- Red Line
North Underground, Volume 5 - Employer’s Requirements – Particular
[3] Contract Document, Contract No: RTC/038/2012, Design & Build Package 1- Red Line
North Underground, Volume 6 – Employer’s Requirements – Design Specifications
[4] Contract Document: DESIGN & BUILD PACKAGE 1 – RED LINE NORTH
UNDERGROUND - Volume 10 – Employer’s Program Plans, RTC/038/2012
[5] Qatar Rail, Alignment, Red Line Nort U/G, Coordinates Lists, Doc. No.: M001-QRC-ALI-
DAT-00001 Rev. 1.00, 04/06/13
[6] System Reliability, Availability, Maintainability (RAM) Plan, Doc . No.: QR-PBII-181247-
TEM-PLAN-001288 Rev. 2.0, 03/02/13
[7] Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Assurance Plan - M000-QRC-SSA-PLN-00001

4.2 ISG J.V. DOCUMENTS


[8] System Assurance Plan: M001-ISG-SSA-PLN-00001
[9] System Safety Plan: M001-ISG-SSA-PLN-00002
[10] Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Plan: M001-ISG-SSA-PLN-34015
[11] Earthing and Bonding Plan: M001-ISG-SSA-PLN-34028
[12] Fire Life & Safety Strategy: M001-ISG-SSA-RPT-34012
[13] Preliminary Hazard Analysis report (DD1): M001-ISG-HAZ-RPT-00001
[14] System and Subsystem Hazard Analysis (DD1): M001-ISG-SSA-RPT-34001
[15] Interface Hazard Analysis (DD1): M001-ISG-SSA-RPT-34002
[16] Procedure – Potential Hazard Management identified outside of HAZOP/HAZID
Workshop: M001-ISG-SSA-PRO-00001
[17] Preliminary EMC Hazard Analysis: M001-ISG-SSA-RPT-34025
[18] Equipped Tunnel Cross Section Straight Track: M001-ISG-MEP-DWG-RNBBAAA-ZZ-
79315

4.3 OTHER STANDARDS


[19] EN 50126 “Railway applications – The specification and demonstration of Reliability,
Availability, Maintainability and Safety”
[20] EN 50129 “Railway applications – Safety related systems for signalling”
[21] EN 50121 Railway Applications – EMC
[22] IEC 61000-3-2: Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) – Part 3-2 Limits – Limits for
harmonic current emissions (equipment input current <= 16 A per phase)

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[23] IEC TS 61000-3-4: Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - Part 3-4: Limits - Limitation of
emission of harmonic currents in low-voltage power supply systems for equipment
with rated current greater than 16 A
[24] IEC 61000-4 Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 4: Testing and Measurement
Techniques
[25] IEC TR/TS 61000-5 Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 5: Installation and
mitigation guidelines
[26] 2004/108/EC EU Directive on EMC
[27] IEC 62305: Protection against lightning
[28] IEC 62040-2 Uninterruptible power systems (UPS) - Part 2: Electromagnetic compatibility
(EMC) requirements;
[29] EN 12015 Electromagnetic compatibility. Product family standard for lifts, escalators and
moving walks. Emission
[30] EN 12016 Electromagnetic compatibility. Product family standard for lifts, escalators and
moving walks. Immunity
[31] ITU-T K 27 Protection against interference – Bonding configurations and earthing inside a
telecommunication building
[32] IEC TR 61000-5-2 Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 5: Installation and
mitigation guidelines – section 2: Earthing and cabling

4.4 INPUT FOR EMC HAZARD ANALYSIS

This EMC hazard analysis has been carried out taking as a basis the most updated MEP
packages available at the date of April 2016.
In particular rev. 1 of Corniche (ex Al Bidda station) MEP DD2.M2 has been used as a basis
for this analysis for the stations.
For the Trough Golf Course please refer to relatives design package.

Following the list of the packages taken into account is reported:

Package Title Revision

7.22.1.3.2 Al Bidda Station, DD2.M1+M2, Earthing Distribution (station levels) 1


7.22.1.3.3 Al Bidda Station, DD2.M1+M2, Lighting System 1
7.22.1.3.4 Al Bidda Station, DD2.M1+M2, LV Distribution 1
7.22.1.3.5 Al Bidda Station, DD2.M1+M2, Lightning Protection System 1
7.22.1.3.6 Al Bidda Station, DD2.M1+M2, Cable Routing 1
7.22.1.3.7 Al Bidda Station, DD2.M1+M2, General Electrical Design 1
7.22.1.2.2 DIW, Earthing Distribution (station levels) 1,0
7.22.1.2.3 DIW, Lighting System 1,0

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7.22.1.2.4 DIW, LV Distribution 1,0


7.22.1.2.5 DIW, Lighting Protection System 1,0
7.22.1.2.6 DIW, Cable Routing 1,0
7.22.1.2.7 DIW, General Technical Design 1,0
7.22.1.4.2 WBS, Earthing Distribution (Station Levels) 1,0
7.22.1.4.3 WBS, Lighting System 1,0
7.22.1.4.4 WBS, LV Distribution 1,0
7.22.1.4.5 WBS, Lighting Protection System 1,0
7.22.1.4.6 WBS, Cable Routing 1,0
7.22.1.4.7 WBS, General Electrical Design 1,0
7.22.1.5.2 WBC, Earthing Distribution (station levels) 1,0
7.22.1.5.3 WBC, Lighting System 1,0
7.22.1.5.4 WBC, LV Distribution 1,0
7.22.1.5.5 WBC, Lighting Protection System 1,0
7.22.1.5.6 WBC, Cable Routing 1,0
7.22.1.5.7 WBC, General Technical Design 2,0
7.22.1.6.2 WHD, Earthing System (Station Levels) 1,0
7.22.1.6.3 WHD, Lighting System 1,0
7.22.1.6.4 WHD, LV Distribution 2,0
7.22.1.6.5 WHD, Lightning Protection System 1,0
7.22.1.6.6 WHD, Cable Routing 1,0
7.22.1.6.7 WHD, General Technical Design 1,0
7.22.1.7.2 CUV, Earthing Distribution (station levels) 1,0
7.22.1.7.3 CUV, Lighting System 1,0
7.22.1.7.4 CUV, LV Distribution 1,0
7.22.1.7.5 CUV, Lightning Protection System 1,0
7.22.1.7.6 CUV, Cable Routing 1,0
7.22.1.7.7 CUV, General Technical Design LV and ES 1,0
7.22.2.3 DIW, Lifts, Escalators, Moving walks 1,0
7.22.2.4 BID, Lifts, Escalators, Moving walks 1,0
7.22.2.5 WBS, Lifts, Escalators, Moving walks 1,0
7.22.2.6 WBC, Lifts, Escalators, Moving walks 1,0
7.22.2.7 WHD, Lifts, Escalators, Moving walks 1,0
7.22.2.8 CUV, Lifts, Escalators, Moving walks 1,0
7.22.3.11 DIW, BACS for BACS Subcontractor 1,0
7.22.3.12 BID, BACS for BACS Subcontractor 1,1

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7.22.3.13 WBS, BACS for BACS Subcontractor 0,1


7.22.3.14 WBC, BACS for BACS Subcontractor 0,1
7.22.3.15 WHD, BACS for BACS Subcontractor 0,1
7.23.1.1 DIW, VAC 1,0
7.23.1.2 BID, VAC 1,0
7.23.1.3 WBS, VAC System 1,0
7.23.1.4 WBC, VAC System 1,0
7.23.1.5 WHD, VAC System 1,0
7.23.1.6 CUV, VAC System 1,0
7.22.3.16 CUV, BACS for BACS Subcontractor 0,1
7.23.2.2.1 DIW, Standpipe and Sprinkler 1,0
7.23.2.2.2 DIW, Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing System 1,0
7.23.2.2.3 DIW, Special Ventilation 1,0
7.23.2.2.4 DIW, Smoke - Fire Detection System 1,0
7.23.2.3.1 BID, Fire Design, Firefighting System 1,0
7.23.2.3.2 BID, Firefighting System, Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing System 1,0
7.23.2.3.3 BID, Special Ventilation 1,0
7.23.2.3.4 BID, Smoke - Fire Detection System 1,0
7.23.2.4.1 WBS, Standpipe and Sprinkler 1,0
7.23.2.4.2 WBS, Clean Agent 1,0
7.23.2.4.3 WBS, Special Ventilation System 1,0
7.23.2.4.4 WBS, Smoke - Fire Detection System 1,0
7.23.2.5.1 WBC, Standpipe and Sprinkler 1,0
7.23.2.5.2 WBC, Clean Agent System 1,0
7.23.2.5.3 WBC, Special Ventilation 1,0
7.23.2.5.4 WBC, Smoke - Fire Detection System 1,0
7.23.2.6.1 WHD, Fire Design, Standpipe and Sprinkler System 1,0
7.23.2.6.2 WHD, Fire System, Clean Agent System 1,0
7.23.2.6.3 WHD, Fire System, Special Ventilation 1,0
7.23.2.6.4 WHD, Smoke - Fire Detection System 1,0
7.23.2.7.1 CUV, Fire Design, Standpipe and Sprinkler System 1,0
7.23.2.7.2 CUV, Fire System, Clean Agent System 1,0
7.23.2.7.3 CUV, Fire System, Special Ventilation 1,0
7.23.2.7.4 CUV, Smoke - Fire Detection System 1,0
7.24.2 DIW, Plumbing (7.24.2.1/7.24.2.3) 1,0
7.24.3 BID, Plumbing (7.24.3.1/7.24.3.3) 1,0

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7.24.4 WBS, Plumbing (7.24.4.1/7.24.4.3) 1,0


7.24.5 WBC, Plumbing (7.24.5.1/7.24.5.3) 1,0
7.24.6 WHD, Plumbing (7.24.6.1/7.24.3) 1,0
7.24.7 CUV, Plumbing (7.24.7.1/7.24.7.3) 1,0

7.25.1.1 Tunnel - DD2.M1+M2, Cross passage, CSD 1

7.25.1.2 Tunnel - DD2.M1+M2, Equipped Tunnel Cross Section, CSD 1

7.22.1.9 Trough Golf Course, DD2.M1+M2, LV and ES 1

7.22.1.9.2 Trough Golf Course, DD2.M1+M2, Earthing Distribution (station levels) 1

7.22.1.9.3 Trough Golf Course, DD2.M1+M2, Lighting System 1

7.22.1.9.4 Trough Golf Course, DD2.M1+M2, LV Distribution 1

7.22.1.9.5 Trough Golf Course, DD2.M1+M2, Lightning Protection System 1

7.22.1.9.6 Trough Golf Course, DD2.M1+M2, Cable Routing 1

7.22.1.9.7 Trough Golf Course, DD2.M1+M2, General Electrical Design 1

7.22.2.10 Trough Golf Course, DD2.M1+M2, Lifts, Escalators, Moving walks 1

7.22.3.18 Trough Golf Course, BACS for BACS Subcontractor 1

7.23.1.8 Trough Golf Course, DD2.M1+M2, VAC 1

7.23.2.9 Trough Golf Course, DD2.M1+M2, Fire Design 1

7.24.9.1 Trough Golf Course, DD2.M1+M2, Plumbing, General Reports 1


8.10.5.3
WHD Switchbox, DD1, Architectural, BOH 0,3
8.10.2.3
BID, Switchbox, DD1, Architectural, BOH 0,2
8.2.8
DD1 - Golf Trough, Architectural Layouts 1,0
Table 2 – Design packages taken into account for the EMC Hazard analysis

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5 ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCES AND COUPLING MECHANISMS


The first task of the Electromagnetic Compatibility Management is the identification of the
potential interferences between the various systems included in the Red Line North
Underground project.
The interfaces are identified to later assess if any kind of coupling mechanism can transfer
disturbancies generated from a source to another equipment/system which represent the
victim of the interference.

5.1 COUPLING MECHANISMS


The interferences can be transferred by five different coupling mechanism:
 Conductive: in which the source and victim circuits share a common conduction path;
 Electric and Magnetic radiation, in which the circuit structures act as antennas
transmitting and receiving energy;
 Capacitive, in which the varying voltage in one circuit produces voltage changes in a
victim circuit via mutual capacitance;
 Inductive, in which a varying magnetic field produced by a current in one circuit, links
with a victim circuit, inducing a voltage via mutual inductance;
 electrostatic, in which a charged body is discharged to a victim circuit.
Considering the different nature and source of the conducted interferences a further
explanation of the phenomena and the potential source of conductive interferences is given in
the section below.

5.1.1 Conducted interferences


Given the MEP equipment installed in the station the following conducted interferences will be
analyzed:
 Voltage variations: Sudden reduction or increase of the nominal voltage at a node of
the electrical system lasting more than one period up to few seconds. In the analyzed
systems a voltage variations can be caused either by a voltage variation on the
primary source, by excessive power loading on some circuit or the inrush current due
to switching of big motors.
 Voltage unbalances: voltage unbalances in the three phase voltage; voltage
unbalances can be caused by single-phase loads, phase to phase loads and
unbalanced three-phase loads. This conditions is normally controlled by a proper
balancing of the single phase loads.
 Transient: rapid change in the sine wave that occurs in both voltage and current
waveform. They are caused by switching devices, start-stop of high power equipment.
 Harmonics: Component of the voltage and current with frequency multiple of the
supply frequency. They are mainly caused by power electronic loads such as VFD,
inverter, UPS as well as electronic ballast for lighting systems.
 Reactive power: strong reactive load (capacitive and inductive) can lead to an
increase of the phase angle between the current and voltage waveform. They lead to
small power factor and can cause voltage reduction.

5.2 ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFACES


As stated in the EMC Plan [10] the interfaces considered in the EMC hazard analysis will be
the intra and inter interfaces.

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Interfaces with the external/Existing EMC environment will be at the present stage not
analyzed. In fact considering the systems provided by ISG JV and the fact that the most
relevant systems are installed in the underground station, the interface with the external
environment is negligible for both conducted and radiated interferences. The assessment of
the external sources of disturbances might be done by the System Contractor who provide
the most critical system for the metro operation and considering that:
 regarding the radiated interferences the System Contractor provides several radio
and telecommunication system for which a deeper assessment of the EMC with the
external environment would be required. Furthermore it has to be considered that the
equipment are installed in an underground station with a structure composed by
concrete reinforced with an electrically continuous rebar cage.
 regarding the conducted interferences System Contractor will connect several system
to external systems (e.g. electrical network, telecommunication network).
However System Contractor will interface with Civil and MEP Contractor to highlight if any
criticism will be found with the external Electromagnetic environment.

Figure 2 - EMC Interfaces

5.3 ELECTROMAGNETIC PHENOMENA


The Standard EN 50121 [21] defines the following electromagnetic phenomena to be
considered in an EMC management:
 Conducted Low Frequency phenomena
 Low Frequency field phenomena
 Conducted High Frequency phenomena
 Radiated high frequency phenomena
The EN 50121 is more concerned about the railway system rather than MEP low voltage and
extra low voltage systems which are the scope of the ISG JV supply. The EN 50121 is applied
to the railway environment which, following the principle of the zoning defined in the EMC
Plan [10], is applicable only to the equipment installed in the zone A.

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Considering the above a description of the electromagnetic disturbancies which will be taken
into account in the hazard analysis is provided.

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6 EMC HAZARD ANALYSIS


In this chapter the EMC hazard analysis carried out is described. Electromagnetic zoning is
shown for Golf Trough and Switchbox while for station the EMC zoning is shown in the EMC
Plan [10]. Electromagnetic zoning for mid-tunnel Emergency Exit is not shown as they are
similar to normal cross passages already analyzed in the EMC Plan.

6.1 ASSESSMENT OF THE ELECTRIC/ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT IN STATION


The first step of the hazard analysis is a more detailed assessment of the electric and
electronic equipment inside the station. Due to the fact that several systems and equipment
(also high power equipment) are installed within the station and most of them are connected
to each other or installed in vicinity, the station represent the most complex EMC environment
for intra, inter and extra interfaces.
In order to better identify the potential hazardous coupling mechanism inside the station a
table of the electric and electronic equipment has been carried out. The table identify the
system/sub-system, the electric/electronic component and provide a preliminary EMC
assessment of the potential known issues. The column physical interaction gives information
regarding the location of the component and the electrical connection with MEP system (intra)
and with other system (inter). The location will help to understand the potential interaction for
radiated EMI while the electrical connection will help to understand the potential interaction for
conducted EMI.
Moreover the table provides information regarding potential EMC issues related to emission
and susceptibility to EMI.

6.2 TROUGH GOLF COURSE ELECTROMAGNETIC ZONING


As defined in the EMC plan the zoning principle is based on reduction in EM level of radiated
and conducted emissions.
The Following figure shown the zoning for the Golf Trough.

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Center Track

Center Track

 Zone A
 Zone B

Figure 3 - EMC zoning – Track level


It is possible to show that there are not safety-critical equipment installed in zone A at the
track level of the Golf Trough; the equipment for control of the firefighting escalator are
installed at the upper level.
The distance between the track and other equipment is more than 3 meter, so they are inside
Zone B. As requested from EMC plan the equipment shall be compliant with the Standard EN
61000 for emissions and immunity.
The following figure shown the analysis for the distance in the TPS floor:

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TPS

TPS

Figure 4 - EMC zoning - TPS

 Zone A
 Zone B

All equipment inside the yellow zone shall be compliant with the standard EN 50121, this
zone is defined as railway zone. However there are not safety-critical equipment installed in
the zone A at the TPS level of the Golf Trough. The equipment installed by the MSI in the
zone A are not considered in this document as will be part of the hazard analysis developed
by the MSI.
The equipment and name of the room are the same of the station.
The main difference is that in the Torugh Golf Course and Emergency Exit there are not the
following systems:
 Fire Standpipe and sprinkler
 Domestic Water System
 Irrigation Water
 Control Lighting System,
So they are not considered in the Analysis.
At this moment the Layout for the Emergency Exit is under review from ISG.

6.3 SWITCHBOX ELECTROMAGNETIC ZONING


EMC Zoning for the switchbox is shown in Figure 5. The area with yellow hatch
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All the safety-critical equipment in the switchbox are installed inside the technical room which
is in Zone B. There are not safety-critical equipment in Zone A.

Figure 5 - EMC Zoning switchbox Track Level

Figure 6 - Room's description in switchbox

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6.4 EQUIPMENT INSTALLED IN RAILWAY ZONE OF THE STATION


Following the principle of the zoning as specified in the EMC Plan [10] the railway zone is
defined as the zone A.
Using the table provided in 7Appendix B it is possible to identify the equipment which may be
within zone A and zone B.
The zone A includes the following rooms indicated in

ROOM IN ZONE A
Room Code Room Name
UL18 TPS DC Room
UL04 Clean Agent Room
UL21 Corridor
Firefighting Elevator
SO01 opening
UL24 Lobby EE02
UL03 Clean Agent Room
UL20 Corridor

Table 6-1 - List of rooms in zone A

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MEP Station System Analysis


Emission Susceptibility
System/Subsystem Component ID Conducte Radiate Conducte Radiate
d d d d
CRAC
(internal CRACINT X X X X
Mechanical

VAC Unit)
Fan Coil
FCU
Unit
Clean Agent
GSPA X X
panel
Clean Agent
Distribution
GSDW
valves
Electrical

Lift/Escalator/Movin Firefighting
X X X X
FFELE
g Walk elevator

Table 6-2 - List of equipment in Zone A


As stated in the EMC Plan [10] the safety-critical equipment installed in zone A will have to be
compliant with the EN 50121-3, EN 50121-4 and EN 50121-5 and with the test level specified
in the standard unless an assessment is provided to show the Electromagnetic Compatibility
with the zone of installation (see section 6.4 of the EMC Plan [10]).
All the equipment listed in Table 6-2 are to be considered safety critical.
Regarding the clean agent room it is located close to the TPS room and it may contain the
central panel for the command of the Distribution Valves; considering the safety function
carried out by this clean agent panel EMC has to be ensured. The clean agent panel will be
located as far as possible from the TPS and shielding of the panel and the control cables to
the distribution valves will be provided.

6.5 INTRA SYSTEM EMC (MEP SYSTEMS)


In this section will be analyzed the EM coupling, both radiated and conducted, between
different component of the MEP systems.

6.5.1 Low Voltage Distribution - Station Normal Power


The items considered for the Normal Power Distribution system are the following:
 Sub-Main Distribution Board;
 Distribution Board;
 Normal Motor Control Center;
 Inverter;
The Sub-Main Distribution Board is directly supplied from the Main Switchboard of the SPS
installed by the System Contractor while the Distribution Board and the MCC are supplied
from the Sub-Main Distribution Board. The SMDB, DB and MCC can be susceptible to
conducted and radiated EMI that can cause unwanted tripping of the circuit breaker or of the
RCD (Residual Current Devices).
Some of the known cause for unwanted tripping of the RCD are:
 Leakage currents generated by installation of EMI filters;

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 Leakage currents (high frequency and low frequency) caused by inverter/frequency


converter/variable speed drive;
 Transient leakage current caused by common-mode overvoltage on the downstream
circuits;
 Surge leakage current caused by installation of SPD (Surge Protective Devices) on
downstream circuits;
Considering the above a careful choice of the type of RCD installed has to be done.
The Distribution Board are connected to some single-phase loads represented by the Ticket
Vending Machine (TVM), the Hand Dryer and the socket; Although these loads are often
intermittent and, especially for the socket, not well known, a correct balance of the single-
phase load on the three phase circuit will help to avoid unbalances in the system.
Regarding the inverter installed inside the MCC they are potential source of both radiated and
conducted disturbances.
Radiated emission can be found on the cables connecting the inverter with the supplied
motor. These cables bring variable frequency currents and, if running in parallel with other
control cables (e.g. control cables for BACS) may induce voltages on the victim cables.
Separation of source and victim cables will be ensured following the guidelines of the IEC TR
61000-5-2 and EN 50174-2 standard.
Conducted interference from the inverter are caused mainly by the amount of harmonics
generated. The compliance with the IEC 61000 and EN 61800-3 standards is considered
sufficient to ensure compatibility. If additional protection against harmonics is needed it may
be considered installation of harmonics filters for VFD and inverter.

6.5.2 Low Voltage Distribution - Station Emergency Power


The items considered for the Emergency Power distribution system are the following:
 Emergency Main Switchboard
 Emergency Sub-Main Distribution Board;
 Emergency Distribution Board;
 UPS Sub-Main Distribution Board;
 UPS Distribution Board;
 Automatic Transfer Switch (ATS)
 Emergency Motor Control Center;
 Inverter;
The items considered are similar to the ones considered in the normal power distribution
except the ATS the automatic transfer switch installed to ensure a double power supply to the
fire pump from the SPS Main Switchboard and from the Emergency Motor Control Center
(EMCC). Since the ATS carry out a very critical function for safety it has to be very reliable.
The ATS and its controller, in addition to the basic standards, shall be tested following
standard for EMC immunity such as:
 IEC 61000-4-2 - EMC Testing and Measurement Techniques - Electrostatic
Discharge Immunity Test
 IEC 61000-4-3 - EMC Testing and Measurement Techniques - Radio-frequency,
Electromagnetic Field Immunity Test
 IEC 61000-4-4 - EMC Testing and Measurement Techniques - Electrical Fast
Transient/Burst Immunity Test
 IEC 61000-4-5 - EMC Testing and Measurement Techniques - Surge Immunity Test
 IEC 61000-4-6 - EMC Testing and Measurement Techniques - Immunity to
Conducted Disturbances, Induced by Radio-frequency Fields
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 IEC 61000-4-11 - EMC Testing and Measurement Techniques - Voltage Dips, Short
Interrupts and Voltage Variations Immunity Tests
Compliance with the above standards will cover the hazard of malfunctioning of the ATS
during emergency for both radiated and conducted interferences.
Regarding the Distribution Board and the inverter can be considered the same hazards
already analyzed for the normal power distribution with particular attention to the USMDB and
the UDB which supply safety critical loads where unwanted tripping of a circuit breaker can
also lead to loss of operation for the metro (signaling system).

6.5.3 Earthing and Bonding System


Earthing and Bonding System does not constitute a source of interference nor can be
considered susceptible to EMI.
Earthing and bonding system constitute a means for some conducted disturbances that can
propagate to the MEP system.
For the Earthing and Bonding concept refer to the Earthing and Bonding Plan: M001-ISG-
SSA-PLN-34028 [11] which shows that the total earthing concept is used.

6.5.4 Normal Lighting System


The items considered for the normal lighting system are:
 Lighting Control System;
 Luminaries
Lighting Control System is supplied by the UPS system and the quality of the power supply is
ensured.
Lighting for both front-of-house and Back-Of-House will be done with LED luminaries which
are supplied by specific electronic driver.
The electronic driver for the LED luminaries are sensitive to surge overvoltage hence they
have to be properly protected with external or internal (inside the electronic driver) SPD
(Surge Protective device).
LED driver for supply and dimming are a potential source of conducted EMI in terms of
harmonics and power factor. The driver for LED application shall be compliant with the
standard IEC 61000-3-2 or IEC 61000-3-4 depending on the applicability to the installed
equipment.

6.5.5 Emergency Lighting System (escape route lighting)


The following items have been analyzed for the Emergency Lighting system:
 Central Battery;
 Central Battery Lighting Switchboard;
 Controllers;
 Escape route luminaries.
As the Central Battery contains electronic component for the control system it is susceptible
to conducted EMI such as voltage variation and transient; installation of SPD to protect
against surge overvoltage shall be evaluated.

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Central battery contains rectifier and other non-linear component which may generate
harmonics in the distribution system thus system has to be compliant with the standard for the
UPS system IEC 62040-2. Installation of additional EMI filter can be evaluated.
The switchboard of the central battery system are susceptible to radiated and conducted EMI
as already analyzed for the normal and emergency switchboard (see section 6.5.1).
Escape route luminaries are equipped with electronic ballast which may generate harmonics;
compliance with standard IEC 61000-3-2 or IEC 61000-3-4 (depending on the applicability)
shall be ensured unless central battery isolate the load from the power supply.

6.5.6 Lightning Protection System


Lightning protection system is installed to protect the structures against direct and indirect
lightning strikes. However, as the system is built to catch a lightning strike, the conductors
part of the protection system may carry the lightning strike current which is characterized by
high peak value and steep transient.
Lightning currents carried by the LPS system may lead to the following EMI:
 Radiated, especially inducted, interferences with the consequence of inducted
voltages in the victim circuits;
 Conducted interferences caused by the rise of potential in the earthing system.
These two phenomena may cause hazardous potential within all the distribution system and
can lead to failure of isolation in cables and apparatus with potential consequence of fire
ignition and electrocution.
The Lightning Protection System will be installed in compliance with the standard IEC 62305.
Dedicated down-conductors will be installed such as to avoid the lightning current to flow
through the earthing and bonding system inside the station. It will be evaluated the separation
between the station earthing system and the External Lightning Protection System.
A coordinated system of SPD will be installed in compliance with the IEC 62305 to avoid
failure of isolation in the MEP equipment. SPD will be considered by the system contractor in
the SPS to protect the entire system against surge overvoltage coming from the 33 kV
network.

6.5.7 Lift/Escalator/Moving Walk


Lift, Escalator and Moving Walk are operated with inverter driven motors hence all the
precautions regarding the inverter as explained in section 6.5.1 have to be taken against
conducted interferences caused by the inverter.
Moreover the control panels contain micro-processor which may be affected by EMI picked up
via connecting cables and/or generated by other equipment in the vicinity.
However, considering the installation of the main equipment outside of the railway zone,
compliance with the standard for EMC of Lifting, Escalator and Moving Walks will ensure
compatibility. The standards are:
 EN 12015 - Electromagnetic compatibility. Product family standard for lifts, escalators
and moving walks. Emission;
 EN 12016 - Electromagnetic compatibility. Product family standard for lifts, escalators
and moving walks. Immunity;
Considering that certain immunity levels given by the above standards for EMC of lift,
escalators and moving walks do not respect industrial level defined for Zone B the suppliers

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will have to prove the compliance of the installation in the respective EMC environment also
by mean of compensatory measures.

6.5.8 BACS
The items analyzed for the BACS system are the following:
 Telecommunication network;
 BACS peripheral component;
 BACS server/Main PLC;
Although the telecommunication network is done with fiber optic cables, several other
apparatus may be susceptible to both radiated and conducted EMI; in particular the network
switch to ensure interconnection of the network are considered susceptible to EMI.
Switch shall be supplied by the UPS system and installed in electromagnetically shielded rack
or cabinet in order to ensure full electromagnetic compatibility in the point of installation.
BACS peripheral component comprise the remote I/O and all those component and apparatus
installed inside the technical room and electrical room. The peripheral component are
electrically connected with field sensors and actuators which are installed in close proximity to
motors, fans, inverter and other electrical apparatus; field connection cables are exposed to
radiated and conducted interferences. To avoid interference to be conducted to the BACS
system the remote I/O will be installed in dedicated metallic EMC-shielded cabinet to ensure
compatibility with the electromagnetic environment.
Moreover cable connecting the remote I/O will be enclosed and shielded and the I/O modules
will have opto-isolated input/output.

6.5.9 VAC
Most of the VAC equipment, included the inverter driven, are supplied from the EMCC and
the interference arising from the inverter have already been considered in the EMCC.
However some VAC equipment such as the CRAC and the VRV external unit, are installed at
surface level and are more exposed to direct and indirect lightning strikes. To protect this
component and to avoid lightning disturbances to be picked up and carried into the low
voltage distribution system, installation of SPD shall be considered to protect the final circuit
of the VAC external unit.
Susceptibility and emission of the CRAC internal unit will be considered in section 6.6.

6.5.10 Smoke and Fire Detection


Main Fire Alarm Control Panel contain micro-processor based electronic systems which are
susceptible to conducted and radiated EMI. The MFACP will be installed inside a dedicated
cabinet in the SCR and EMC shielding will be evaluated. MFACP will be supplied from the
UPS system which will ensure the quality of the power supply.
Cables of the fire detection loop run within the station and no additional protection is needed
against external EMI such as direct and indirect lightning surge.
Cables of the fire detection loop will be separated from the power cables and will be installed
inside dedicated steel conduit which constitute a shield against EMI; installation of shielded
cables for fire detection loop will be evaluated if deemed necessary.
No particular EMC issues are identified for the Smoke and Fire Detection system thus no
hazards will be raised for the system.

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6.5.11 Fire Standpipe and sprinkler


Items considered for the fire standpipe and sprinkler system are:
 Sensor and actuator;
 Command Panel;
 Fire pump.
Command Panel contains electronic micro-processor based control system and EMC has to
be ensured with the installation environment. The command panel is installed in the
underplatform level in a dedicated room where only the firefighting pump is also installed thus
there is not any particular EMC issue to consider.
Inrush current due to the switching of the firefighting pump may lead to voltage variation and
transient on the busbar; these loads are connected to the Main Switchboards inside the SPS
which are connected to the Main MV/LV transformer and have high short circuit rating hence
the risk of voltage transient is reduced at the minimum.

6.5.12 Gas Suppression System


Gas suppression system items are:
 Clean Agent panel;
 Distribution valves.
Clean agent panel include the panel located in each rooms protected by the clean agent
system to detect the fire and manage the functions of the clean agent suppression system.
Clean agent panel are also connected to the station Smoke and Fire Detection System.
Clean agent panel may be connected to each other and to the centralized panel located in the
Clean Agent room by means of signal cables; these signal cables, if running in parallel with
other MEP power cables may pick up interferences hence optic fiber, shielded, twisted or
coaxial cable will be preferred; segregation of the cables have to be considered to ensure
EMC.

6.5.13 Special Ventilation


The special ventilation system comprised extraction and pressurization fans; the fans are
supplied from the EMCC where the inverter is installed. EMC for the inverter is already
considered for the inverter inside the EMCC (see section 6.5.2).

6.5.14 Domestic Water System


No EMC issues have been identified for the Domestic Water System considering that the
electric equipment are installed inside dedicated rooms in the underplatform and the power of
the apparatus is low. The water heater are installed inside the toilet and can be considered
inherently benign equipment. However they represent single-phase loads that have to be
balanced as much as possible with other single phase loads on the busbar of the
switchboard.

6.5.15 Irrigation Water


No EMC issues have been identified for the Irrigation Water System considering that the
electric equipment are installed inside dedicated rooms in the underplatform and the power of
the apparatus is low.

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6.5.16 Station Plumbing System


Plumbing system is considered a source of conducted disturbances for the electric motors
with direct online connection which can cause voltage variations and transient due to the
inrush current; considering that these loads are intermittent and will start often, effects of the
inrush currents shall be accounted considering installation of soft-starter or VFD (Variable
Frequency Drive).

6.6 INTER SYSTEM EMC WITH SYSTEM CONTRACTOR EQUIPMENT


The principle of the zoning covers most of the Electromagnetic interaction for the equipment
installed in vicinity to the railway track and to the TPS; the principle is based upon the
distance to the railway equipment thus covers mainly radiated EMI.
As other apparatus, vital for the operation of the metro, will be installed by the system
contractor within the station and the power supply will be in common with the MEP systems
an assessment of other interfaces with the system contractor equipment inside the station is
needed to identify potential coupling mechanism (radiated and conducted).
This analysis is mainly focused to identify potential source of interference in the MEP systems
which may affect the correct and safe operation of the metro system.
As a first step it has been identified a list of rooms within the station where, potentially EM
sensitive equipment will be installed by the system contractor (see Table 6-3).

SENSITIVE ROOM
Room Code Room Name
CL12 Main Tel/IT Room
CL14 Tel/IT Room
CL27 SCR
UL02 Signalling Room
UL10 AC/DC Scada Room
UL11 AC/DC Scada Room
UL14 Tel/IT Room
UL15 Tel/IT Room
UL19 PSD Room

Table 6-3 - List of rooms with EM sensitive equipment

Using the table given in 7Appendix B it has been extracted the list of MEP equipment installed
within the sensitive rooms.

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MEP Station System Analysis


Emission Susceptibility
System/Subsystem Component ID Electrical Electrical
connection connection Conducted Radiated Conducted Radiated
(Intra) (inter)
BACS BACTLC
Electrical BACS server - BACSCR USMDB X X
Main PLC EAB

CRAC EMCC
(internal CRACINT BACS X X X X
Unit) EAB

VAC VRV EMCC


(internal VRVINT BACS
unit) EAB
Mechanical
EMCC
Fan Coil
FCU BACS
Unit
EAB
Main Fire
Smoke and Alarm UDB
Fire Control MFACP BACSCR X X
Detection Panel EAB
(MFACP)

Table 6-4 - MEP apparatus installed inside sensitive rooms

6.6.1.1 Interface CRAC internal unit with SCADA/Signalling/TLC

Table 6-4 clearly shows that the CRAC internal unit can constitute a potential source of EMI in
the rooms identified.
CRAC internal unit contain inverter driven compressor which may, under certain conditions,
emit radiated interferences. The CRAC unit are installed also inside SCADA and
telecommunication room where sensitive equipment are installed.
The hazard will be recorded in the EMC hazard log in order to ensure the implementation of
the control measures. The control measure will include compliance with the IEC 61000-6-4.
As the CRAC unit are also installed inside the TPS room immunity has to be ensured for the
control system which contains micro-processor and others EMC sensitive component.
CRAC internal unit are supplied from the EMCC which is not supplying the equipment
installed in those EMC sensitive rooms; however attention will be paid with the earthing and
bonding connection which will be kept separated between the MEP equipment and the
signalling, telecommunication and SCADA earthing.

6.7 INTERFACE SYSTEM EMC FOR TUNNEL


In this section will be analyzed the EM coupling within the Tunnel Systems, both radiated and
conducted, between different component of the MEP system and Rail System.
The MEP System includes: Electrical, Mechanical and Plumbing.
The Rail System means all system which are inside of the tunnel and that are Scope of work
of the System Contractor :
 Power System;
o Traction Power System;
o Medium Voltage;

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 TVS (Tunnel Ventilation System):


 Signalling System:
o Train Control;
o Platform Screen Door;
o Wayside equipment;
 Safety System:
o Tunnel Fire Detection System;
o Tunnel dynamic signage.
 SCADA;
 Telecom System:
o Wayside equipment;
o Emergency Call System;
o PA System;
o Radio System;
o CCTV;
o Security and Access control system;
o Ethernet Backbone Networks
 Trackwork:
o Switch;
o Stray Current protection System
 Rolling Stock.
The study inside the Tunnel includes only the intra-interfaces between MEP Systems and the
inter-interfaces between MEP and MSI’s systems. All interfaces within the Rail System
contractor scope are out of Scope of this document and shall be studied by the MSI.
The EMC study is based on the following Cross Section Ref. M001-ISG-MEP-DWG-
RNBBAAA-ZZ-79315:

Figure 7 – Tunnel Cross Section

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The Fig.3 shows potential source of EMC coming from MV cables to MEP Electrical System.
This issue has been mitigated with the distance (around 5 meter minimum) and any mutual
effect at this distance can be considered negligible.
At the top of the tunnel inside the cable tray will run the BACS System, near the space
provision for WI-FI Railway System. The BACS allows local and centralized control and
monitoring of the Tunnel system, included the emergency lighting which is considered the
most critical for safety reasons. The main BACS network running in the tunnel is made in
Optical Fibre cables thus there is not any risk for electromagnetic coupling.
However copper cables for BACS system will be installed to connect the BACS RIO (Remote
Input/Output) and the field equipment (distribution board, valve sensor, etc.) and this cables
will run inside the tunnel where they can be exposed to radiated fields.

MEP Station System Analysis

Emission Susceptibility
System/Subsystem
Conducted Radiated Conducted Radiated

Electrical BACS X

Pressurization
System

Mechanical

Fire Stand
pipe

Drainage for
Plumbing
tunnel

Table 6-5 - MEP apparatus installed inside of the Tunnel

6.8 EXPOSURE OF PASSENGERS AND STAFF TO EM ENVIRONMENT


Another interface to be considered in the EMC analysis is the interaction between the EM
environment and the people occupying the station such as passengers and staff.
Considering the MEP equipment installed by ISG JV and the fact that the most of the
equipment are installed inside dedicated technical room where staff is present only during
maintenance operation, the generated electromagnetic field does not constitute a risk for
people.
Precaution will be evaluated by the Operator to avoid for staff with implantable medical
devices such as pacemaker who may access inside the MEP technical room.

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7 CONCLUSIONS

This document represents the EMC Hazard analysis for the MEP system. The Analysis also
identify potential EMC issues with the Rail System Contractor scope.
The results of this activity are reported in Appendix A where the EMC Hazard Log is provided.
The template for the EMC hazard log is compliant with the template provided in the
Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Assurance Plan - M000-QRC-SSA-PLN-00001 [7].
It is underlined that this is a live document that can be updated during the next phase of the
project if additional hazards are identified. It will be a target of the whole risk management
process of the MEP system demonstrating that the EMC mitigating actions have been
effectively taken into account during design and construction phases.

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Appendix A EMC HAZARD LOG

Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner
Compliance with the IEC 61000-
EMC-CM-1 M001
6-4 for emission
Radiated emission Hazard has a safety Interface with the System
Signalling equipment, Radiated EMI from the Potential M001
during normal and impact if the EMC-CM-2 Contractor to ensure EMC with
Telecommunication/IT, CRAC unit to EMC malfunctioning of M010
EMC-HZ-1 CRACINT fault operation of malfunctioning in the MEP equipment
PSD room, AC/DC sensitive equipment for the signalling EMC bonding for sensitive
the CRAC internal signalling system is not
SCADA metro operation system equipment (e.g. signaling,
unit detected M001
EMC-CM-3 SCADA, BACS) in compliance
M010
with the ITU-T K27; IBN
configurations will be evaluated.

Clean agent panel will be


EMC-CM-4 located as far as possible from M001
the TPS room.

Unwanted discharge Safety impact if the


Radiated of the clean agent clean agent discharge
Clean Agent central malfunctioning of the
EMC-HZ-2 TPS equipment disturbance from system if the control occur when staff is
panel clean agent central panel
the TPS room panel activate the inside the technical
distribution valves room Segregation of command cable
of the clean agent system will
EMC-CM-41 M001
be ensured following the
standard EN 50174-2

Clean agent panel will have


metallic EMC-shielded
EMC-CM-5 enclosure for the M001
electromagnetic environment in
which is installed

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Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner
Command cables from the clean
agent panel to the distribution
EMC-CM-6 valves will be shielded, twisted M001
or coaxial to avoid
electromagnetic interference

EMI filters installed will be with


EMC-CM-7 M001
low leakage current

Excessive
Safety impact if failure
leakage current
EMI filters Residual Current Failure of power of power supply occurs
on the
EMC-HZ-3 installed on Device (RCD) inside Nuisance tripping of RCD supply to loads in on lighting system,
downstream If EMI filters are installed
apparatus the switchboard the station BACS and other safety-
circuit where EMI downstream of RCD verification
related loads EMC-CM-8 M001
filters are installed on the limit of the leakage
current will be carried out
RCD with reinforced continuity
will be installed to avoid
EMC-CM-11 nuisance tripping caused by M001
various disturbances on the
network

Safety impact if the


High Frequency
Residual Current Failure of power failure of power supply RCD will not be installed on the
leakage current
EMC-HZ-4 Inverter Device (RCD) inside Nuisance tripping of RCD supply to loads in occurs to special EMC-CM-9 circuit supplying inverter for M001
caused by the
the switchboard the station ventilation and other safety loads
inverter
safety system

Transient leakage
Safety impact if failure
current caused by
External - Residual Current Failure of power of power supply occurs It will be evaluated installation of
overvoltage and
EMC-HZ-5 Common Mode Device (RCD) inside Nuisance tripping of RCD supply to loads in on lighting system, EMC-CM-10 RCD with non-actuating time M001
capacitance of the
Overvoltage the switchboard the station BACS and other safety- (delay time)
downstream
related loads
circuit

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Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner
RCD with reinforced continuity
will be installed to avoid
EMC-CM-11 nuisance tripping caused by M001
various disturbances on the
network

It will be evaluated installation of


EMC-CM-10 RCD with non-actuating time M001
(delay time)
Transient leakage
Safety impact if failure
current caused by
Residual Current Failure of power of power supply occurs
surge current
EMC-HZ-6 SPD Device (RCD) inside Nuisance tripping of RCD supply to loads in on lighting system,
flowing in the SPD
the switchboard the station BACS and other safety- RCD with reinforced continuity
installed
related loads will be installed to avoid
dowstream
EMC-CM-11 nuisance tripping caused by M001
various disturbances on the
network
The SPD will be installed
EMC-CM-12 upstream of the RCD, where M001
possible

The impact of the Single phase loads will be


voltage unbalances is EMC-CM-13 balanced on the three phase of M001
not relevant for the distribution board
functioning of the main
Single-phase Single phase Potential for safety system (e.g.
loads (Hand Distribution board and loads are not malfunctioning on special ventilation and
EMC-HZ-7 Voltage unbalances
Dryer, Socket, loads connected balanced on the some equipment firefighting). Safety load
TVM) three phase and motor sensitive to voltage
unbalances are Main and Sub-Main distribution
supplied by the UPS boards will be equipped with
system which ensure EMC-CM-14 current analyzer to detect M001
power quality. unbalances in the current and
voltage of the busbar

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Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner

Impact of the
harmonics is not VFD and inverter compliant with
EMC-CM-15 M001
relevant for functioning EN 61800-3
Harmonics Potential for of the main safety
caused by inverter malfunctioning on system (e.g. special
Inverter inside
Distribution board and for variable some equipment. ventilation and
EMC-HZ-8 the MCC and Harmonics
loads connected frequency drive Loose of firefighting). Safety load
EMCC
(VFD) for motors performance for sensitive to voltage
and fans motors. unbalances are
supplied by the UPS It will be considered installation
system which ensure EMC-CM-16 of harmonics filter for the VFD M001
power quality. and inverter

Use of screened, twisted,


coaxial and optical fiber will be
EMC-CM-17 M001
considered for the signal/control
cable at field level

Separation of source and victim


BACS cables following the guidelines
As BACS carry out EMC-CM-18 M001
Connection Induced voltage on the signal/control of the IEC TR 61000-5-2 and
BACS signal/control Malfunction of safety functions its EN 50174-2
EMC-HZ-9 between inverter BACS signal/control cables and power
cables at field level BACS malfunctioning may
and motor/fan cables at field level cables running in The ATS and its controller will
have a safety impact
parallel be compliant with the following
standard for immunity from
radiated and conducted EMI:
IEC 61000-4-2
EMC-CM-20 M001
IEC 61000-4-3
IEC 61000-4-4
IEC 61000-4-5
IEC 61000-4-6
IEC 61000-4-11

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Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner

Cables for lighting control


system bus will be shielded,
Induced voltage
Safety hazard if the EMC-CM-21 twisted, coaxial or fiber optic to M001
on the lighting
Low Voltage malfunctioning lead to avoid EM coupling with power
Lighting Control Malfunctioning of the control system Failure of control of
EMC-HZ-11 distribution an unwanted switching cables
System lighting control system bus running in the lighting system
network off of the lighting in
parallel with
some public area Separation of source and victim
power cables
cables following the guidelines
EMC-CM-18 M001
of the IEC 61000-5-2 and EN
50174-2

Surge overvoltage
on the power Degradation of the External or internal Surge
External - Electronic LED driver Failure of the LED
EMC-HZ-12 supply line leading Failure of lighting illuminance level can EMC-CM-22 Protective Device (SPD) to M001
overvoltage for lighting lighting in public areas
to failure of LED have a safety impact protect the electronic driver f
driver

Potential for
malfunctioning on Driver for LED application
some equipment. compliant with IEC 61000-3-2
EMC-CM-23 M001
Electronic LED Loose of and IEC 61000-3-4 depending
Electronic LED Low Voltage Harmonics on the low
EMC-HZ-13 driver used for performance for on the applicability.
driver for lighting distribution network voltage power network
lighting system motors if the
disturbance
propagates in upper Installation of additional
level of the network EMC-CM-24 harmonics filters will be M001
considered if needed

Surge overvoltage It will be considered installation


Failure of the
External - Central Battery Malfunctioning of the on the power Failure of the escape of Surge Protective Device
EMC-HZ-14 escape route EMC-CM-25
overvoltage System (CBS) Central Battery System supply line leading route lighting (SPD) to protect the Central
lighting
to failure of CBS Battery System

Potential for
malfunctioning on
Central Battery System to be
Central Battery some equipment.
Central Battery Low Voltage Harmonics on the low compliant with the standard for
EMC-HZ-15 system emits Loose of EMC-CM-26 M001
System (CBS) distribution network voltage power network the EMC of the UPS systems
harmonics performance for
IEC 62040-2
motors if the
disturbance

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Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner
propagates in upper Installation of additional
level of the network EMC-CM-24 harmonics filters will be M001
considered if needed

Down-conductor will be installed


EMC-CM-27 M001
far from the MEP cables

Induced voltage on the Down-conductor


Failure of isolation with Lightning current to be splitted
Lightning low voltage system from of the LPS system Overvoltage on the
Low Voltage the consequence of on several down-conductor to
EMC-HZ-16 Protection the conductors of the running in Low Voltage power
distribution network malfunctioning of safety EMC-CM-28 decrease the value of the M001
System (LPS) LPS during a lightning proximity to the network
systems carried current on each
event power cables
conductor
It will be analyzed the
installation of a coordinated
system of SPD in order to M001
EMC-CM-29
protect the low voltage M010
equipment against overvoltage
from lightning event

Lightning protection system


EMC-CM-30 designed in compliance with M001
IEC 62305

Dedicated down-conductors will


Lightning be installed such as to avoid the
Protection System Failure of isolation with lightning current to flow through
Lightning Overvoltage on the
Earthing and Bonding connected with the consequence of the earthing and bonding
EMC-HZ-17 Protection Earth Potential Rise Low Voltage power
System the Earthing and malfunctioning of safety EMC-CM-31 system inside the station. It will M001
System (LPS) network
Bonding System systems be evaluated the separation
within the station between the station earthing
system and the External
Lightning Protection System
It will be analyzed the
installation of a coordinated
system of SPD in order to M001
EMC-CM-29
protect the low voltage M010
equipment against overvoltage
from lightning event

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Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner

Lift, Escalator and moving walk


Power cable and compliant with EMC product
Malfunction of EMC-CM-32 M001
signal/control Safety impact if the family standard such as EN
Low Voltage Inductive interference Elevators,
Elevator, Escalator, cable run in interference occurs on 12015 and EN 12016
EMC-HZ-18 distribution coupled to signal/control Escalators and
Moving Walk parallel and in the Firefighter elevator
network cables Moving Walks
proximity during an emergency
Control Panel Control system for lift, escalator
to each other
and moving walk compliant with
EMC-CM-33 M001
IEC 61000-6-2 for EMC
immunity

Installation of the switch for


BACS telecommunication
EMC-CM-34 M001
system in dedicated rack or
Low Voltage
Malfunctioning of the As BACS carry out enclosure EMC-shielded
distribution BACS - Switch for Proximity to power
switch of the Malfunctioning of safety functions its
EMC-HZ-19 network and telecommunication cables or radio
telecommunication the BACS system malfunctioning may
external network emitting devices Installation of the switch for
network have a safety impact
environment BACS telecommunication M001
system will take into account M010
EMC-CM-35
vicinity of radio emitting devices Third
installed by system contractor or party
third parties

Field connection to Remote I/O


Field component will be done with shielded,
Low Voltage EMC-CM-36 M001
in close proximity As BACS carry out twisted, coaxial or optic fiber
distribution BACS - Peripheral Remote I/O affected by cables
to the power Malfunctioning of safety functions its
EMC-HZ-20 network and component - Remote Interferences pickep up
component, the BACS system malfunctioning may
other MEP I/O by field component
motors, fans and have a safety impact
equipment
inverter Remote I/O modules to have
EMC-CM-37 immunity to overvoltage or opto- M001
isolated input/output

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Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner

It will be analyzed the


Malfunctioning of installation of a coordinated
CRAC and VRV the VAC system and system of SPD in order to M001
Malfunctioning of VAC external unit potential disruption EMC-CM-29
External - Direct protect the low voltage M010
CRAC and VRV system caused by failure exposed to direct for the metro if the equipment against overvoltage
EMC-HZ-21 or indirect
external unit of CRAC and VRV or indirect failure involves VAC from lightning event
lightning
external unit lightning causing of critical rooms
overvoltage (TPS, SCADA,
Signalling etc.) Lightning protection system
EMC-CM-30 designed in compliance with M001
IEC 62305

Signal/control cables to connect


local fire detection panel and
Safety hazard if a
Inductive interference centralized clean agent panel
Signal/control discharge occurs EMC-CM-38 M001
coupled to signal/control will be shielded, twisted or
Low Voltage cables running in Malfunctioning of during maintenance
Gas Suppression cables connecting the coaxial to avoid electromagnetic
EMC-HZ-22 distribution parallel and/or in the Gas operation or if the
System central Gas Suppression interference
network proximity with Suppression system malfunctioning cause
panel to the local fire
power cables the fail of the system
detection system Separation of source and victim
during a fire event
cables following the guidelines
EMC-CM-18 M001
of the IEC 61000-5-2 and EN
50174-2

Voltage variations
Inrush current of
Conductive interference - and transient may
the plumbing Considering installation of
Pumps of the voltage variations and propagate on the
Low Voltage pumps which is Softstarter or Variable
EMC-HZ-23 Station Plumbing transient on the low power network with EMC-CM-39 M001
distribution network caused by a Frequency Drives to supply the
system voltage distribution the consequence of
Direct Online plumbing pumps.
network loss of performance
starting system
of some loads

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Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner

Voltage variations Voltage variations,


Conductive interference - Inrush current of and transient may transient and
System Contractor to ensure
Tunnel Emergency Low voltage variations, the Tunnel propagate on the harmonics may
conducted disturbances from
EMC-HZ-24 Ventilation Voltage distribution transient, harmonics on Ventilation load or power network with considerably affect EMC-CM-40 M010
the TVS do not affect operation
System network the low voltage harmonics caused the consequence of functioning of the
of the other MEP systems
distribution network by VFD loss of performance electrical load supplied
of some loads by the EMSB

As BACS carry out


BACS backbone safety functions
Radiated interference –
WI-FI Railway cables run near (switching of The main BACS network
Signal variations on the Malfunctioning of
EMC-HZ-25 System inside BACS WI-FI Railway emergency lighting in EMC-CM-41 running in the tunnel is made in M001
remote and control of the the BACS system
Tunnel System or other tunnel) its Optical Fibre cables
Tunnel system.
power cables malfunctioning may
have a safety impact

Field connection to Remote I/O


will be done with shielded,
EMC-CM-36 M001
twisted, coaxial or optic fiber
cables
BACS cables from As BACS carry out
RIO to field safety functions
Radiated interference –
WI-FI Railway equipment run (switching of
Signal variations on the Malfunctioning of
EMC-HZ-26 System inside BACS near WI-FI emergency lighting in
remote and control of the the BACS system
Tunnel Railway System tunnel) its
Tunnel system.
or other power malfunctioning may
cables have a safety impact
Remote I/O modules to have
EMC-CM-37 immunity to overvoltage or opto- M001
isolated input/output

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Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner

Appropriate segregation of
EMC-CM-42 BACS cables will be ensured in M001
accordance with EN 50174-2

Field connection to Remote I/O


will be done with shielded,
EMC-CM-36 M001
twisted, coaxial or optic fiber
cables

BACS cables from As BACS carry out


RIO to field safety functions
Medium Voltage Radiated interference –
equipment run (switching of Remote I/O modules to have
Distribution Signal variations on the Malfunctioning of
EMC-HZ-27 BACS inside the tunnel emergency lighting in EMC-CM-37 immunity to overvoltage or opto- M001
System inside remote and control of the the BACS system
and close to the tunnel) its isolated input/output
the tunnel Tunnel system.
Medium Voltage malfunctioning may
Cable have a safety impact

Appropriate segregation of
EMC-CM-42 BACS cables will be ensured in M001
accordance with EN 50174-2

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Control
Hazard Functional Mitigation
Source of EMI Victim of EMI Hazard Description Cause Safety impact Control Measure Measure
Id/ComplyPro ID consequences Measure Id.
Owner

Radiated
interference from
Radiated fields can
the MEP Malfunctioning of Operator to address the issue
MEP Equipment interfere with implantable
Staff with implantable equipment in No functional implantable devices on and avoid staff with implantable M017-
EMC-HZ-28 inside technical medical devices of staff EMC-CM-43
devices normal conditions consequences staff people can lead to medical devices to access Operator
room operating in the technical
and abnormal safety issues inside technical room
room
functioning (short
circuit)

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Appendix B MEP ELECTRIC/ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT WITHIN THE STATION

MEP Station System Analysis


Physical interaction Emission Susceptibility
System/Subsystem Component ID EMC assessment Electrical Electrical
connectio connection Conducte Radiate Conducte Radiate
Location n (Intra) (inter) d d d d
CL08
Radiated and conducted susceptibility is CL09
DB
related only to the circuit breaker installed CL16
PAELE MAIN
Sub-Main Distribution inside the switchboard. Conducted CL51
SMDB ESCA SWITCHBOARD X X
Board interference may trig the circuit breaker CL52
BACPC RETAIL
tripping and EMI filters can increase CL58
EAB
sensibility of RCD PL04
PL06

CL08
CL09
NLUM
Radiated and conducted susceptibility is CL16
WH
related only to the circuit breaker installed CL51
HAND
inside the switchboard. Conducted CL52
Distribution Board DB DRYER X X
interference may trig the circuit breaker CL58
SOCKET
Low Voltage tripping and EMI filters can increase PL04
BACPC
Distribution - Station sensibility of RCD PL05
EAB
Normal Power UL07
ELE-LV-NP UL09

BACPC
EAB
Radiated and conducted susceptibility is
AHU
related only to the circuit breaker installed
VRVINT
Normal Motor Control inside the switchboard. Conducted CL02 MAIN
MCC FCU X X
Center interference may trig the circuit breaker CL03 SWITCHBOARD
DWPUMP
tripping and EMI filters can increase
IRPUMP
sensibility of RCD
GWPUMP
BWPUMP
To be noted that inverter are installed
Electrical

inside an electrical room but the supplied MCC


CL02
Inverter INV motors are often located in other rooms BACPC X X
CL03
thus careful consideration has to be given EAB
to this electrical connection.

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MEP Station System Analysis


Physical interaction Emission Susceptibility
System/Subsystem Component ID EMC assessment Electrical Electrical
connectio connection Conducte Radiate Conducte Radiate
Location n (Intra) (inter) d d d d
CL08
Radiated and conducted susceptibility is
CL09
related only to the circuit breaker installed EDB
CL51
Emergency Sub-Main inside the switchboard. Conducted EAB
ESMDB CL52 X X
Distribution Board interference may trig the circuit breaker BACPC
PL04
tripping and EMI filters can increase PRFAN
PL05
sensibility of RCD
SWITCH

CL08
Radiated and conducted susceptibility is CL09
related only to the circuit breaker installed CL51
Emergency inside the switchboard. Conducted CL52 BACPC
EDB X X
Distribution Board interference may trig the circuit breaker PL04 EAB
tripping and EMI filters can increase PL05
sensibility of RCD UL07
UL08
Radiated and conducted susceptibility is UDB
PSD
related only to the circuit breaker installed CL08 TUNNEL
SIGNALLING
UPS Sub-Main inside the switchboard. Conducted CL09 MEP
USMDB SCADA X X
Distribution Board interference may trig the circuit breaker UL07 BACPC
TLC
tripping and EMI filters can increase UL08 BACSCR
SECURITY GATE
sensibility of RCD BACTLC
Radiated and conducted susceptibility is
related only to the circuit breaker installed
CL09
UPS Distribution inside the switchboard. Conducted KNX
UDB PL05 X X
Board interference may trig the circuit breaker BACTLC
UL08
tripping and EMI filters can increase
sensibility of RCD
EMCC
ATS (Automatic ESMDB MAIN
ATS UL01 X X
Transfer Switch) BACPC SWITCHBOARD
EAB

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MEP Station System Analysis


Physical interaction Emission Susceptibility
System/Subsystem Component ID EMC assessment Electrical Electrical
connectio connection Conducte Radiate Conducte Radiate
Location n (Intra) (inter) d d d d
ATS
Radiated and conducted susceptibility is CRACEXT
related only to the circuit breaker installed CRACINT
Emergency Motor inside the switchboard. Conducted UL07 SEFAN
EMCC X X
Control Center interference may trig the circuit breaker UL17 PSFAN
tripping and EMI filters can increase PRFAN
sensibility of RCD BACPC
FFELE
To be noted that inverter are installed
inside an electrical room but the supplied EMCC
Inside the
Inverter EINV motors are often located in other rooms BACPC X X X
EMCC
thus careful consideration has to be given EAB
to this electrical connection.
Earthing system represent only a means
which can carry conducted disturbances.
Earthing and Bonding Station Earthing and all MEP
EAB Radiated emission from the earthing other
System bonding system system
system are negligible expect that in case
of short circuit
BACS
Conducted disturbancies can be EAB
Lighting control
KNX generated by dimming devices used for other DB X X
system (KNX)
lighting control system EDB
UDB
Normal Lighting System
KNX
EAB
If luminaries are equipped with ballast
Luminaries NLUM other DB X
they can generate conducted interference
EDB
UDB
Central battery can generate conducted
Emergency Lighting CSMDB
interference caused by the internal CL08 MAIN
System (escape route Central Battery (CBS) CBS EAB X X
rectifier. Compliance with IEC 62040-2 CL09 SWITCHBOARD
lighting) BACS
can be evaluated

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MEP Station System Analysis


Physical interaction Emission Susceptibility
System/Subsystem Component ID EMC assessment Electrical Electrical
connectio connection Conducte Radiate Conducte Radiate
Location n (Intra) (inter) d d d d

Radiated and conducted susceptibility is CL08


related only to the circuit breaker installed CL09
Central Battery CBS
inside the switchboard. Conducted PL04
Lighting Sub Main CSMDB CBCC X X
interference may trig the circuit breaker PL05
Distribution Board CBLUM
tripping and EMI filters can increase UL07
sensibility of RCD UL08

CL08
Radiated and conducted susceptibility is
CL09
related only to the circuit breaker installed
PL04 CBS
Central Battery inside the switchboard. Conducted
CDB PL05 CBCC X X
Lighting switchboard interference may trig the circuit breaker
UL07 CBLUM
tripping and EMI filters can increase
UL08
sensibility of RCD
SWITCH
EMC assessment will be carried out in a
CBS
later stage when the product will be CL08
Controller CBCC CBLUM
chosen. However the EMI interaction other
CDB
should be negligible for standard product
Escape route If luminaries are equipped with ballast CBCC
CBLUM other X
luminaries they can generate conducted interference CDB
LPS represent a source of conducted and
Lightning Protection Lightning Protection
LPS radiated EMI. The design will comply with other EAB X X
System System
the relavant standard (IEC 62305)
Elevators are operated by inverter. The
main electrical equipment (included the
ESMDB
inverter) will be located in the upper part Emergenc
Firefighting elevator FFELE BACPC X X X
of the elevator (Surface level). y Exit
EAB
Compliance with the standard EN 12015
and EN 12016 to ensure EMC.
Lift/Escalators/Moving
Elevators are operated by inverter. The
Walks
main electrical equipment (included the
inverter) will be located in the upper part SMDB
Station
Passengers elevator PAELE of the elevator (Surface level or BACPC X X X
public area
Concourse level). Compliance with the EAB
standard EN 12015 and EN 12016 to
ensure EMC.

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MEP Station System Analysis


Physical interaction Emission Susceptibility
System/Subsystem Component ID EMC assessment Electrical Electrical
connectio connection Conducte Radiate Conducte Radiate
Location n (Intra) (inter) d d d d
Escalators are operated by inverter. The
main electrical equipment (included the
inverter) will be located in the upper part SMDB
Station
Escalator ESCA of the escalator (Surface level or BACPC X X X
public area
concourse level). Compliance with the EAB
standard EN 12015 and EN 12016 to
ensure EMC.
Telecommunication network will be Fiber
USMDB
Telecommunication Optic but the switch and other electronic
BACTLC other UDB X X
network equipment are susceptible to both
BACPC
conducted and radiated EMI
The room where the peripheral
equipment are installed may have a very
noise EMC environment for the
contemporary presence of
inverter/motors/pump/electrical
BACS BACS peripheral equipment. A correct shielding of the Electrical EAB
BACPC X X
component peripheral component has to be studied. room ALL
Connection with sensors, switchboard will
be studied to avoid conducted EMI.
Proper power supply to the BACS
equipment (EMI filters and SPD if
needed).
BACTLC
BACS server - Main
BACSCR CL27 USMDB X X
PLC
EAB
CL02
Inverter of the AHU are installed in the MCC
Air Handling Unit CL03
AHU MCC thus the majoority of the EMC BACPC
(AHU) CL04
issues will be on the inverter of the MCC EAB
CL05
Mechanical

Inverter driven unit. The radiated MCC


Surface
VAC VRV (external unit) VRVEXT susceptibility is mainly related to direct BACS X X
level
and indirect lightning discharge EAB
The external unit contain a low power fan
EMCC
CRACEX with negligible EMI emission. The Surface
CRAC (External Unit) BACS X
T radiated susceptibility is mainly related to level
EAB
direct and indirect lightning discharge

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MEP Station System Analysis


Physical interaction Emission Susceptibility
System/Subsystem Component ID EMC assessment Electrical Electrical
connectio connection Conducte Radiate Conducte Radiate
Location n (Intra) (inter) d d d d
CL13
CL14
CL15
The VRV internal unit contain a low CL27
MCC
power fan which does not represent a UL10
VRV (internal unit) VRVINT BACS
source of EMI. Susceptibility to EMI is UL11
EAB
negligible. UL12
UL13
UL14
UL15

CL12
CRAC internal unit may contain inverter CL16
driven compressor with considerable PL02
EMCC
power consumption. A deeper PL03
CRAC (internal Unit) CRACINT BACS X X X X
assessment has to be carried out if the PL06
EAB
unit is installed in room with sensitive PL07
equipment. UL02
UL18
Pumps for chilled Inverter driven pumps with considerable
CWPUMP AG06
water power consumption.

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MEP Station System Analysis


Physical interaction Emission Susceptibility
System/Subsystem Component ID EMC assessment Electrical Electrical
connectio connection Conducte Radiate Conducte Radiate
Location n (Intra) (inter) d d d d

AG04
AG05
AG06
AG08
AG09
AG11
RL02
CL02
CL03
CL06
CL08
CL13
CL14
CL15
CL27
CL28
CL29
CL30
CL34
CL35
The AHU contain a low power fan which CL36 MCC
Fan Coil Unit FCU does not represent a source of EMI. CL38 BACS
Susceptibility to EMI is negligible. CL39 EAB
CL40
CL42
CL48
CL55
PL04
UL01
UL03
UL04
UL05
UL06
UL07
UL08
UL09
UL11
UL12
UL13
UL14
UL15
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UL16
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MEP Station System Analysis


Physical interaction Emission Susceptibility
System/Subsystem Component ID EMC assessment Electrical Electrical
connectio connection Conducte Radiate Conducte Radiate
Location n (Intra) (inter) d d d d
Main Fire Alarm UDB
Control Panel MFACP CL27 BACSCR X X
(MFACP) EAB
Satellite Fire Alarm
Conducted disturbancies to be MFACP
Control Panel SFACP other X X
considered only if supplied locally UDB
(SFACP)
Fire Alarm Repeater Conducted disturbancies to be MFACP
FARP other X X
Smoke and Fire Panel (FARP) considered only if supplied locally UDB
Detection Only connected with MFACP which
provides stable supply. Considering the
Fire alarm sounder-
FAS low complexity of the on-board electronic other MFACP
strobe light
no EMI susceptibility will be taken into
account
Only radiated susceptibility will be
accounted as the detectors are only
Smoke detector SMD other MFACP X
connected to the MFACP which provides
stable supply.
Sensors and Only connected with the FFCP which UL01
FFSA FFCP
actuators provides stable supply other
Fire Standpipe and BACPC MAIN
Command panel FFCP UL01 X
sprinkler EAB SWITCHBOARD
FFCP
Firefighting Pumps FFPUMP High Power pump with Wye delta start UL01 X
EAB
UDB
UL03
Clean Agent panel GSPA MFACP X
Gas Suppression UL04
EAB
System
UL03
Distribution valves GSDW GSPA X
UL04
Inverter driven fan with considerable EMCC
Pressurization fan PRFAN RL02
power consumption. BACS
Extraction fan (purge Inverter driven fan with low power EMCC
Special Ventilation PSFAN RL01
system) consumption BACS
Inverter driven fan with considerable EMCC
Smoke Extraction fan SEFAN RL01
power consumption. BACS
Plumbi

Domestic Water Water Heater can be considered CL42


ng

System Water Heater WH inherently benign equipment (see EMC CL29 DB


PLU-DO Plan) CL38

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MEP Station System Analysis


Physical interaction Emission Susceptibility
System/Subsystem Component ID EMC assessment Electrical Electrical
connectio connection Conducte Radiate Conducte Radiate
Location n (Intra) (inter) d d d d
MCC
Domestic water pump DWPUMP Direct driven with low power consumption UL17
BACS
Iirrigation Water MCC
Irrigation pump IRPUMP Direct driven with low power consumption UL16
PLU-IR BACS
Direct driven with high power UL05 MCC
Station Plumbing Grey water pump GWPUMP X
consumption UL06 BACS
System
PLU-DS Direct driven with high power UL05 MCC
Black water pump BWPUMP X
consumption UL06 BACS

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Appendix C MEP ELECTRICAL/ELECTRONICS AND RAILWAY SYSTEM EQUIPMENT WITHIN THE


TUNNEL
SYSTEM/SUBSYSTEM SOURCE OF DISTURBANCIES

MEP Contractor Scope Rail System Contractor Scope


Rolling
Electrical Mechanical Plum bing Pow er TVS Safety System Signalling SCADA Telecom System Trackw ork stock

Low Voltage Distribution System

Stray current protection system


Tunnel Fire Detection System
Earthing and Bonding System

switchbox emergency exit) -

Security and Access control

Ethernet Backbone Network


Emergency Lighting System

Medium Voltage distribution

Tunnel Ventilation (included


Escape routes (tunnel and

Tunnel dynamic signage

Emergency Call System


Traction Power System
Pressurization system
Fire Standpipe Tunnel

Platform Screen Door

Wayside equipment

Wayside equipment
Drainage for tunnel
System /Subsystem

Radio system
Train Control

Rolling stock
PA system
OTE/UPE)
(Tunnel)

(Tunnel)

SCADA
system

system

Switch
CCTV
Low Voltage Distribution System (Tunnel)
MEP Contractor Scope

Earthing and Bonding System


Electrical
BACS R R
Emergency Lighting System (Tunnel)
Fire Standpipe Tunnel
Mechanical
Escape routes (tunnel and sw itchbox emergency exit) -
Pressurization system
VICTIM SYSTEM/SUBSYSTEM (POTENTIAL HAZARDS)

Plum bing Drainage for tunnel


Traction Pow er System
Pow er
Medium Voltage distribution system
TVS Tunnel Ventilation (included OTE/UPE)
Tunnel Fire Detection System
Safety System
Tunnel dynamic signage
Train Control
Rail System Contractor scope

Signalling Platform Screen Door


Wayside equipment
SCADA SCADA
Wayside equipment SYSTEM CONTRACTOR SCOPE

Emergency Call System


PA system
Telecom System Radio system

CCTV
Security and Access control system
Ethernet Backbone Netw ork
Sw itch
Trackw ork
Stray current protection system
Rolling Stock Rolling stock

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