[G.R. No. 4680. January 9, 1909.

ROBERTO MORENO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AGO CHI (alias Go CAY CHI), Defendant-Appellee.

Roberto Moreno, in his own behalf.

No appearance for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. ARREST; RIGHT OF OFFICER TO TAKE POSSESSION OF PROPERTY FOUND ON THE PERSON OF THE
DEFENDANT AT THE TIME OF ARREST. — An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested
any money or property found upon his person, which was used in the commission of the crime or was the
fruit of the crime or which may furnish the person arrested with the means of committing violence or of
escaping, or which may be used as evidence on the trial of the cause. Unless the property is of this
description, the officer is not justified in taking possession of the same.

2. PROPERTY TAKEN FROM THE PERSON OF ONE ARRESTED, HOW DISPOSED OF. — Property Consisting of
money or other things taken from the person of one arrested, which belongs to him, remains the property of
the arrested person and should be returned to him at the close of the trial, when it appears that such
property was in no way connected with the crime with which such person was charged, and it is the duty of
the court to make an order to that effect.

3. PROPERTY TAKEN FROM ONE ARRESTED, LIENS UPON. — Third persons, creditors, etc., can not acquire
any claim or lien upon property taken from the person of one arrested, charged with a crime, which property
was in no way connected with the commission of the crime, which he might not have acquired against such
property in the actual possession of the defendant. One can not use a criminal process ill this way to aid n
civil action for the collection of debts.

DECISION

JOHNSON, J. :

The facts presented in this case seem to be as follows: chanro b1es vi rtu al 1aw lib rary

In the month of May, 1904, a complaint was presented against the defendant charging him with the crime of
assassination. He was arrested and tried for said crime in the court of First Instance in the city of Manila.
The plaintiff and appellant was appointed by the court to defend the defendant de oficio during the progress
of the trial. The defendant at the close of the trial was found guilty of the crime charged and was sentenced
with the penalty of death. From that sentence the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. That court,
after a consideration of the case, on the 30th day of April, 1906, modified the finding of the lower court and
sentenced the defendant to be imprisoned for a period of twenty;years of reclusion temporal. 1 The
defendant was represented in the Supreme Court by another lawyer.

At the time the defendant was arrested under the complaint presented in the Court of First Instance, the
officer making the arrest found upon his person about P700, which said officer took possession of and
deposited the same with the clerk of the court.

On the 30th day of October, 1906, the plaintiff presented a petition in the Court of First Instance setting up
that his services in defending the defendant de oficio in said court were reasonably worth the sum of P600,
and prayed the court to make an order directing the clerk to turn over to him (the plaintiff and appellant), of
the money which had been taken from the defendant, the sum of P600. No action was taken upon this
petition of the plaintiff and appellant until the 3d day of January, 1907, when the plaintiff and appellant filed
with the Court of First Instance a copy of an execution which had been issued by Jose M. Quintero, justice of
the peace of Manila, from which copy of the writ of execution it appears that said justice had rendered a
judgment against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff, on the 27th day of December, 1906, for the
sum of P550 and costs. At the time of this judgment by the justice of the peace it is to be supposed, at
least, that the defendant was in Bilibid Prison, serving the sentence of the Supreme Court, and the record
does not disclose whether or not he was present during the trial or had received any notice of the action
pending against him in said court of the justice of the peace.

On the same day (the 3d day of January, 1907) the plaintiff and appellant presented another petition to the
Court of First Instance, praying that the court order the clerk to pay to him, out of the money in his hands,
the sum of P559.24, to apply on said judgment obtained before the justice of the peace. On the 4th day of
January, 1907, the judge of the said Court of First Instance fixed the 5th day of January for the hearing on
the said petition and ordered that the defendant be brought into court for the purpose of being heard upon
said motion. The record discloses that the defendant was brought into court on the day fixed for the hearing
and then and there stated to the court that he was willing that a portion of the money originally taken from
him by the officer making the arrest might be applied upon the execution, but that he wished some of it
reserved for his own use.

After hearing the respective parties, the judge of the lower court ordered that the clerk pay to the plaintiff
and appellant, out of said money, the sum of P50 and further ordered that the balance should be retained by
the clerk for the benefit of the defendant.

From this order of the lower court the plaintiff appealed.

The plaintiff and appellant makes two assignments of error as follows: cha nrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

First. That the court erred in arbitrarily fixing the value of the services rendered by him in the trial of said
cause at the sum of P50, and in not ordering the clerk to pay to him the sum of P550.

Second. That the lower court erred in not ordering the clerk of the court to pay to the plaintiff or to the
sheriff of the said court, a sum equal to the amount mentioned in said execution.

The fact is not denied that the money which the plaintiff and appellant is attempting to secure was taken
from the defendant at the time of his arrest and was by such officer turned over to the clerk of the court.

An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his
person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish
the prisoner with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the
trial of the cause; but there is very serious doubt whether an officer making an arrest has the right to take
from the defendant any property found upon his person, unless for some of the reasons just mentioned.
(Rex v. Burgis, 7 Carrington and Payne, English Reports, 488; Houghton v. Bachman, 47 Barber, N. Y., 388;
1st Bishop’s Criminal Procedure, secs. 210-212.)

Unless some of these special reasons exist the officer should not deprive the defendant of the possession of
his property. (Rex v. Johnson, 11 Modern Reports, English, 62; Rex v. Jones, 6 Carrington and Payne, 343.)

To deprive the defendant of his money or property under other circumstances than those mentioned above
is to deprive him, perhaps, of the lawful means of defense. (Rex v. Jones, supra; Clark s Criminal Procedure,
71; 1st Bishop’s Criminal Procedure, secs. 210-212.)

But what becomes of the property of the person arrested when the officer making the arrest has taken
possession of the same and after the termination of the trial it appears conclusively that such property was
in no way connected with the commission of the offense for which the defendant was arrested? If the
property was in no way connected with the commission of the offense, at the termination of the trial it is the
duty of the court to order the officer in possession of the same to return it to the defendant. The custody of
the officer of such property in no way deprives the defendant of his right therein and such custody should be
considered as the custody of the defendant under these circumstances.

But the question arises, may third persons, creditors for example of the defendant, obtain a lien or claim
upon such property while it is in the possession of such officer? We are of the opinion, and so hold, that
third persons, creditors, etc., can not acquire any claim or lien upon such property while thus in the hands of
the officer, which they might not acquire had the property remained in the custody of the defendant himself.
To hold otherwise would lead to unlawful and forcible searches of the person under cover of criminal process
as an aid to civil actions for the collection of debts. When it is fully shown that the property so taken was in
no way connected with the crime charged, the court should not permit any advantage to be taken of the
defendant, by reason of the fact that he had been deprived of his property by the officer and against his will.
(Commercial Exchange Bank v. Mc-Leod, 65 Iowa, 665; 54 American Reports, 36;1 Archibald Criminal
Pleading and Procedure, 34, 35; Wharton’s Criminal Pleading and Practice, sec. 61.)

It is therefore, the duty of the judge, under facts such as existed in this case, at the close of the trial to
order such property returned to the defendant.

The judgment of the lower court is therefore hereby reversed and it is hereby ordered that the cause be
remanded to the lower court with direction that an order be issued returning to the defendant the money or
property which was taken from his person at the time of his arrest. So ordered.

Facts of the case

Local police officers went to Chimel's home with a warrant authorizing his arrest for burglary. Upon
serving him with the arrest warrant, the officers conducted a comprehensive search of Chimel's
residence. The search uncovered a number of items that were later used to convict Chimel. State courts
upheld the conviction.

Question

Was the warrantless search of Chimel's home constitutionally justified under the Fourth Amendment as
"incident to that arrest?"

Conclusion

In a 6-2 decision, the Court held that the search of Chimel's house was unreasonable under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court reasoned that searches "incident to arrest" are limited to the
area within the immediate control of the suspect. While police could reasonably search and seize
evidence on or around the arrestee's person, they were prohibited from rummaging through the entire
house without a search warrant. The Court emphasized the importance of warrants and probable cause
as necessary bulwarks against government abuse.

Justice Abe Fortas participated in oral argument but retired before the Court rendered its decision.
NOLASCO V. PAÑO

FACTS:

The case at bar is for the motion for partial reconsideration of both petitioners and respondents
of the SC’s decision that the questioned search warrant by petitioners is null and void, that respondents
are enjoined from introducing evidence using such search warrant, but such personalities
obtained would still be retained, without prejudice to petitioner Aguilar-Roque. Respondents
contend that the search warrant is valid and that it
should be considered in the context of the crime of rebellion, where the warrant was
based. Petitioners on the other hand, on the part of petitioner Aguilar-
Roque, contend that a lawful search would be justified only by a
lawful arrest. And since there was illegal arrest of Aguilar-Roque, the
search was unlawful and that the personalities seized during the illegal search should be returned
to the petitioner. The respondents, in defense, concede that the search warrants were null and void but
the arrests were not.

HELD:

"Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible

for any purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]). This constitutional mandate expressly adopting the
exclusionary rule has proved by historical
experience to be the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures by outlawing all evidence illegally seized and
thereby removing the incentive on the part of
state and police officers to disregard such basic rights. What the plain language of the Constitution
mandates is beyond the power of the courts to
change or modify. All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and
unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any of the three petitioners.

People v. Sucro G.R. No. 93239 March 18, 1991 195 SCRA 388 (1991)

Facts: On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by
P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities of
appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. As
planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio Positioned himself under the house of a certain
Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a
chapel. Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned out
later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the
street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant went back to the
chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group of persons. It was at this instance
that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the activity going on. P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat.
Fulgencio to continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up
Seraspi to report that a third buyer later Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with
appellant. At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers
were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and
appellant. P/Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma
Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the
ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. When confronted, Macabante readily admitted
that he bought the same from appellant (Edison Sucro) in front of the chapel. The police team was able
to overtake and arrest appellant at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19
sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante,
The teabags of marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at Camp Delgado, Iloilo City
for analysis. The specimens were all found positive of marijuana.

Issue: Whether the police officer can arrest the accused without any arrest and search warrant when the
latter committed the crime in front of the former.

Held: Yes, Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where
arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states that arrest without warrant, when lawful. Is
when a peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person (a)When in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; When an offense is committed in the presence or
within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant,
when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and
proceeds at once to the scene thereof.

The records show that Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. Quimpo Street to monitor the
activities of the accused who was earlier reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel two (2) meters
away from Regalado’s house. Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his
nefarious activity. He saw Sucro talk to some persons, go inside the chapel, and return to them and
exchange some things. These, Sucro did three times during the time that he was being monitored.
Fulgencio would then relay the on-going transaction to P/Lt. Seraspi

PEOPLE V. DON RODRIGUEZA - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

FACTS:

l The police officers of Ibalon, Legaspi City, received a confidential information regarding an ongoing
illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay.

l The police officer (Taduran) acted as a poseur-buyer. He was told by the informant to look for a certain
Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs.
l Taduran went to Tagas alone and, while along the road, he met Samuel Segovia. He asked Segovia
where be could find Don and where he could buy marijuana. Segovia left for a while and when be
returned, he was accompanied by a man who was later on introduced to him as Don, herein appellant.

l After agreeing on the price (P200.00) for 100 grams of marijuana, Don left Taduran and Segovia and
when he came back, he’s already bringing with him a plastic containing Marijuana. Thereafter, Taduran
retirned to the headquarters and made a report regarding his said purchase of marijuana.

l Based on that information, they apprehended the accused without a warrant of arrest.

l Thereafter, NARCOM agents raided without a search warrant the house of the father(Jovencio
Rodrigueza) of herein accused-appellant. During the raid, they were able to confiscate dried marijuana
leaves and a plastic syringe, among others.

l The next 2 days, the father was released and Don and co-accused remained.

l The three accused (Don, Segovia, Lonceras) presented different versions of their alleged participation.

l RTC found Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425, as amended) while the two co-accused were
acquitted.

l Hence, this appeal raising the issue of the legality of his arrest.

ISSUE:

WON the warrantless arrest was in consonance to his constitutional right

HELD:

NO. The arrest and seizure were illegally conducted.

As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be authorized by a search
warrant duly issued by the proper government authority. True, in some instances, this Court has allowed
government authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without a search warrant.

l when the owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion;

l when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest;

l when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws;

l when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration
laws;

l when it involves prohibited articles in plain view;

l in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building
regulations,
In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio
Rodrigueza was not authorized by any search warrant.

It does not appear, either, that the situation falls under any of the aforementioned cases above.

Hence, appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM
agents could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under
surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should,
because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time.

The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the confiscated marijuana
leaves and other prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as evidence against appellant.

From the records of the case, Taduran (poseur-buyer) bought 100 grams of marijuana from Don but the
evidence presented were the prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called
follow-up raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza.

The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana leaves that became the basis of
appellant's conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic bag and
the dried marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime. As such, the
existence thereof must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal to
the cause of the prosecution.

Finally, the Court has repeatedly ruled that to sustain the conviction of the accused, the prosecution
must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. 31 As clearly
shown by the evidence, the prosecution has failed to establish its cause. It has not overcome the
presumption of innocence accorded to appellant. This being the case, appellant should not be allowed
to suffer for unwarranted and imaginary imputations against him

ESPANO V. CA G.R. No. 120431. April 1, 1998

FACTS:

l The accused was caught in flagrante by herein police officers selling Marijuana near Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, where they are conducting an investigation in the area reported being rampant of
drug pushing. The agents frisked the accused after he completed his transaction to a buyer and there
found with him 2 tea bags of Marijuana.

l Accused was asked by the police officers whether he has some more of the marijuana and told them he
got more at his house. They went to the accused house and found 10 more teabags of Marijuana.

l During the trial, accused denied all the allegations against him and made an alibi that he was in his
house sleeping when the police officer went to his house looking for his brother in law and instead
handcuffed him to take his part for allegedly having in his possession 10 teabags of Marijuana.

l The trial court did not believe his alibi and found him guilty of violation of Article II, Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
l Accused appealed and said that the arrest was illegally done and the search of his house is deemed a
violation of his constitutional right.

ISSUE:

WON the warrantless arrest is valid.

HELD:

YES. Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule (Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of
Court ). He was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the
basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing over something to an alleged buyer.
After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two pieces of cellophane of marijuana. His arrest
was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence,
being the fruits of the crime.

As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioners residence, however, the same are
inadmissible in evidence.

The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article III,
Section 2 which provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In this
case, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioners house after his arrest at Pandacan and
Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.

Petition denied with a modification that the 10 bags of marijuana seized from his house is inadmissible
in evidence since no search warrant was served to him.