CARROLL H. LAMB VS. W.H.

PHIPPS
G.R. No. 7806
July 12, 1912

FACTS: Carroll Lamb served as the Provincial Treasurer of Marinduque,

Mindoro and Laguna before he served as the superintendent of the Iwahig Penal
Colony. Intending to leave the Philippines, Lamb requested for a clearance
certificate from respondent, Auditor General Phipps stating that the former has
accounted for all the funds and property under his custody.
The respondent however, refused to issue said certificate despite records
showing that Lamb has settled his accounts, since a certain Fernandez may
bring a civil action against the government. Thus, Lamb filed a Petition for
Mandamus before the Supreme Court to compel the respondent to issue a
clearance certificate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mandamus may issue to compel the Auditor General
to issue the clearance certificate.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the legislature did not intend to
limit their jurisdiction in mandamus in cases where there was no other adequate
and speedy remedy in the ordinary courts of law. It is the duty of the Court to
give the statute a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative
intention and, if possible, avoid an injustice or an absurd conclusion. Clerical
errors or misprints, which, if uncorrected, would render the statute unmeaning
or nonsensical or would defeat or impair its intended operation, will not vitiate
the act; they will be corrected by the court and the statute read as amended,
provided the true meaning is obvious, and the real meaning of the legislature is
apparent on the face of the whole enactment.
Accordingly, the Auditor General is not obliged under the law to accept a mere
paper accounting as final and conclusive as to the real responsibility of
government employees and to issue a clearance upon that alone. He may, it is
true, if he is satisfied; but certainly, he may, if he so desires and if he has any
doubt about the correctness of such accounts, make an actual examination of
the funds and property represented by such paper accounts or balances.
 GOVERNOR RODOLFO C. FARINAS VS. MAYOR ANGELO BARBA
G.R. No. 116763
April 19, 1996

FACTS: The Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte recommended

the appointment of Edward Palafox to fill in the vacancy of a resigned member,
Carlito Domingo. A resolution, containing the recommendation, was then
submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan from Mayor Barba.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, however, disapproved said resolution for the
reason that the authority and power to appoint Sangguniang Bayan members
are lodged to the Governor. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan recommended the
appointment of Al Nacino to the Governor, instead, which was later on appointed
by the later. On the other hand, the respondent appointed Edward Palafox to the
same position.
Thus, a Petition for Quo Warranto and Prohibition filed by the petitioners before
the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proper procedure for appointment in case of

vacancy has been followed.

HELD: No. Under the Local Government Code, the person who has the
power to appoint under such circumstances is the Governor, upon the
recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned. In the case at bar, the
Sanggunian concerned is the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas since it is where
the vacancy occurs.
Thus, since neither the petitioner, Al Nacino nor the respondent, Edward Palafox
was appointed in the manner indicated under the law, neither is entitled to the
seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. This is despite the fact that while
the petitioner was appointed by the Provincial Governor, he was nonetheless,
recommended by the Mayor and not the Sangguniang Bayan, as required by law.
 IN RE: APPLICATION OF MARIO GUARINA FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR
G.R. No. 1179
January 8, 1913

FACTS: Relying upon Section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case
seeks admission to the Bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the
ground that he holds the office of Provincial Fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
Accordingly, the pertinent portion of Section 2, Act No. 1597 provides:
“any person who, prior to the passage of this Act, or at any time
thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States,
the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of
First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land
Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney-
General, Solicitor-General, Assistant Attorney-General, assistant
attorney in the office of the Attorney-General, prosecuting attorney
for the city of Manila, assistant prosecuting attorney for the city of
Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila,
provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant
attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in
the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon
motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the
satisfaction of said court."

ISSUE: Whether or not the applicant is entitled to be admitted to the

Bar as a matter of right, without taking the prescribed examination upon
motion before the Supreme Court.

HELD: No. The appointment to the office of Provincial Fiscal is not in

itself, satisfactory proof of possession of the necessary qualifications of
learning and ability.
Section 2, Act No. 1597 used the word, “may” in stating that persons
holding the enumerated positions in the Government may be licensed to
practice law in the Philippines without an examination, upon motion
before the Supreme Court.
To construe the word “may” as mandatory would bring it in direct conflict
with the Act of Congress. Thus, it must be concluded that it should be
given permissive and not mandatory effect, and that the true intention of
the legislator was to leave it within the discretion of the Court to admit to
the Bar without examination the officials mentioned in the Act in any case
wherein the Court is otherwise satisfied that they possess the necessary
qualifications.
 BERNADETTE ADASA VS. CECILLE ABALOS
G.R. No. 168617
February 19, 2007

FACTS: A resolution was issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of

Iligan City finding probable cause against petitioner, Adasa and ordered
the filing of two separate information for Estafa against the latter. The
petitioner, dissatisfied with the findings of the City Prosecutor, filed a
Petition for Review before the DOJ. The DOJ then reversed the resolution
of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City and directed the withdrawal of the
Information against the petitioner.
The respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said resolution of
the DOJ, arguing that under Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70, the DOJ
Secretary may no longer take cognizance of the petition once the accused
has been arraigned, but instead deny it outright.
On the other hand, the DOJ denied the Motion for Reconsideration,
arguing that under Section 12 of the same DOJ Circular, the DOJ
Secretary can entertain appeal even if the accused was already arraigned,
through the use of the word “may” in the provision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ Secretary shall take cognizance the
Petition for Review after the arraignment of the accused.

HELD: No. Where a statute or rule is clear and unambiguous,

interpretation need not be resorted to. In the case at bar, since Section 7
of DOJ Circular No. 70 clearly and categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss
outright an appeal or a petition for review filed after arraignment, no resort
to interpretation is necessary.
Moreover, the petitioner’s reliance on the Principle of Contemporaneous
Construction is unpersuasive. Accordingly, the courts may disregard
contemporaneous construction in instances where the law or rule
construed possesses no ambiguity, where the construction is clearly
erroneous, where strong reason to the construction exists and where the
court has previously given the statute a different interpretation.