Rule 1 - No.

12

Surigao Mine Exploration Co.Inc. vs. C. Harris, Surigao-Mainit Mining Syndicate, et.al.,
G.R. No. L-45543, May 17, 1939

Nature: Appeal from the order of the CFI of Surigao dismissing the complaint filed by Surigao Mining against Harris, et al

Legal Doctrine:
The cause of action must exist at the time the action was begun, and the plaintiff will not be allowed by an amendment to
introduce a cause of action which had no existence when the action was commenced

SC decision: Order appealed from is AFFIRMED.

Facts:
- On October 24, 1935, Surigao Mining filed a complaint claiming that it is the owner by purchase of 14 placer claims and
that lode claims were staked by the defendants Harris, Surigao-Mainit Mining Syndicate. Surigao Consolidated Mining Co.,
Inc., and Otto Weber on plaintiff's placer claims after the latter had been validly and duly staked and located by the
plaintiff or its grantors and predecessors in interest.
- On November 23, 1935, the defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground that the complaint was ambiguous
and unintelligible. On January 9, 1936 the CFI entered an order requiring Surigao Mining to amend its complaint so as to
contain a detailed description of its placer claims.
- On January 13, 1936 an amended complaint was filed to which another demurrer was interposed but was overruled. On
June 11, 1936, a third amended complaint in which thirty-two other individuals were included as parties-defendant. In this
third amended complaint the placer claims were reduced, to eleven, and the relief prayed for was about the same as that
asked in the original complaint, although the amount sought as damages was increased to P49,000.
- Exhibits O and O-1 to 0-9 were presented. With the exception of Exhibit O-7, all are deeds of sale in favor of Surigao
Mining covering the placer claims and bear dates posterior to (AFTER) October 24, 1935, the date of the filing of the
original complaint. Exhibit O-7 is a deed of sale executed by Pablo Atillo in favor of Maximo Borromeo on January 23,
1935. The mining claims conveyed by Maximo Borromeo, to Surigao Mining under Exhibit O-9 were the same claims
acquired by Maximo Borromeo, under Exhibit O-7.
- Before Surigao Mining could close its evidence, the defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that, when the action was commenced, plaintiff's right of action had not yet accrued, since the plaintiff did not become
the owner of the claims until after the original complaint was filed on October 24, 1935. The CFI granted the MTD.

ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint?

HELD
NO. Ratio Unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of action at the time his action is commenced, the defect
cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending, and a supplemental
complaint or an amendment setting up such later accrued cause of action is not permissible.
Reasoning Subject to certain qualifications and except as otherwise provided by law, an action commenced before the
cause of action has accrued is prematurely brought and should be dismissed, provided, an objection on this ground is
properly and seasonably interposed. The fact that the cause of action accrues after the action is commenced and while it
is pending is of no moment.
- In this case, timely objection was made by counsel for the appellees upon discovery of the immaturity of the action. The
date when a civil action is deemed commenced is determined by section 389 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under
section 389, which was taken from section 405 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California, the action is deemed
commenced upon the "filing of a complaint in the office of the clerk of the court in which the action is to be instituted."
The original complaint was filed on October 24, 1935.
- The right to amend a pleading is not an absolute and unconditional right. It is to be allowed in furtherance of justice
under a sound judicial discretion. This judicial discretion, upon the other hand, is of course not without any restriction.
The cause of action must exist at the time the action was begun, and the plaintiff will not be allowed by an amendment to
introduce a cause of action which had no existence when the action was commenced. As soon as an action is brought and
the complaint is filed, the proceedings thus initiated are not subject to the arbitrary control of the parties or of the court,
but must be dealt with in accordance with recognized rules of pleading and practice. Amendments must be such, and
only such, as are necessary to promote the completion of the action begun.
- It is true, that an amended complaint and the answer thereto take the place of the originals which are thereby regarded
as abandoned. That, however, which is no cause of action whatsoever cannot by amendment or supplemental pleading
be converted into a cause of action: Nihil do re accrescit ei qui nihil in re quando jua accresceret habet.

Disposition Order appealed from is AFFIRMED.

Rule 2 - No. 7

Film Development Council of the Phils. Vs. SM Prime Holdings, Inc.,

G.R. No. 197937, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA 175

Nature: Petitioner appeals the Orders (certiorari) from RTC dismissal due to litis pendentia.

Legal Doctrine:
The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once
regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the
same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting
judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons, and also to avoid the costs and
expenses incident to numerous suits

SC decision: Order appealed from is DENIED.

Facts:
Respondent SM Prime HOLDINGS, Inc. is the owner and operator of cinema houses at SM Cebu in Cebu City. The Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991 provides that owners, proprietors and lessees of theaters and cinema houses are subject
to amusement tax (not more than 30% of the gross receipts from admission fees) as provided in Section 140, Book II, Title
One.

R.A. No. 9167 created The Film Development Council of the Philippines, herein petitioner, has a mandate which includes
the development and implementation of “an incentive and reward system for the producers based on merit to encourage
the production of quality films.” Thus, the Cinema Evaluation Board (CEB) was established, its main function being to
review and grade films. According to Section 13 of R.A. No 9167, the producers of the films graded “A” or “B” shall be
entitled to an incentive equivalent to the amusement tax imposed and collected by highly urbanized and independent
component cities in the Philippines pursuant to Section 140 and 151 of the LGC, 100% of the amusement tax for films
graded “A” and 65% for films graded “B” (the remaining 35% shall accrue to the funds of the Council). On the other hand
Section 14 of the same law mandates the remittance of the proceeds of the tax collected by the LGUs to petitioner.

January 27, 2009, petitioner through the OSG sent a demand letter to respondent for the payment of amusement tax
rewards due to producers of 89 films graded “A” and “B” which were shown at SM cinemas from September 11, 20003 to
November 4, 2008.

The city of Cebu petitioned in the Cebu RTC against the petitioner as it sought to seek invalid and unconstitutional Section
14 of R.A. No. 9167 on grounds that: (1) it violates the basic policy on local autonomy; (2) it constitutes an undue
limitation of the taxing power of the LGUs; (3) it unduly deprives LGUs of the revenue from the amusement tax imposed
on theatre owners and operators; and (4) it amounts to technical malversation since revenue from the collection of
amusement taxes that would otherwise accrue to and form part of the general fund of the LGU concerned would now be
directly awarded to a private entity—the producers of the films-bypassing the budget process of the LGU and without the
proper appropriation ordinance from the sanggunian.

Several more petitions were raised in court yielding conflicting decisions. The last of these was about the petitioner filing
a comment praying for the dismissal of the case filed by the City of Cebu while respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss
arguing that petitioner’s complaint merits outright dismissal considering that its claim had already been extinguished by
respondent’s prior payment or remittance of the subject amusement taxes to the City of Cebu.

Issue:
WON Section 13 and 14 of R.A. No. 9167 is unconstitutional as it conflicts with the provisions of the LGC- was left to be
resolved at the lower court

Ratio:
This case had failed in its procedural aspect. The court held that there are issues involving litis pendentia which first had
to be resolved before the constitutionality issues may be raised. Since there were so many cases filed at the same time
regarding this subject, the Court looked on to the technicalities of procedure.

The ponencia states “It is evident that petitioner’s claim against the respondent hinges on the correct interpretation of
the conflicting provisions of the LGC of 1991 and R.A. No. 9167. There could be no doubt that a judgment in either case
would constitute res judicata to the other.”

The Court also used the criterion of the consideration of the interest of justice enunciated in Roa v. Magsaysay in
considering the predicament of the respondent. In applying this standard, what was asked was which court would be “in
a better position to serve the interests of justice,” taking into account (a) the nature of the controversy, (b) the
comparative accessibility of the court to the parties and (c) other similar factors.
Therefore, considering all the factors in this case, there can be no doubt Civil Case in Cebu is the appropriate vehicle to
determine the rights of petitioner and respondent.

WHEREFORE, petition DENIED.

Rule 3 - No. 5

SSS vs. Commission on Audit, 384 SCRA 548

G.R. No. 149240 July 11, 2002

Nature: Petitioner for certiorari

Legal Doctrine:
It is well settled that the legality of the representation of an unauthorized counsel may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings and that such illicit representation produces no legal effect.

SC decision: Order appealed from is DENIED.

Facts:
• The Social Security Commission (SSC) in behalf of SSS and the Concerned Emplyoees for Better SSS (ACCESS)
executed a collective negotiation agreement (CAN) that provides P5,000 contract signing bonus.
• Department of Budget and Management (DBM) declared the CAN as illegal.
• The SSS Corporate Auditor disallowed fund releases for the signing bonus since it was an allowance in the form of
additional compensation prohibited by the Constitution.
• ACCESS appealed the disallowance but COA affirmed the disallowance and ruled that the grant of the signing
bonus was improper because it has no legal basis since Sec. 16 of RA 7658 (1989) had repealed the authority of the SSC to
fix the compensation of its personnel.
• Hence the instant petition was filed in the name of the Social Security System and not by ACCESS through its legal
staff.
• Petitioner SSS argues that a signing bonus may be granted upon the conclusion of negotiations leading to the
execution of a CNA under Sec. 3, par. (c), of RA 1161 as, which allows the SSC to fix the compensation of its personnel.
• On the other hand, respondent COA asserts that the authority of the SSC to fix the compensation of its personnel
has been repealed by Sections 12 and 16 of RA 6758 and is therefore no longer effective.

Issue:
Whether or not ACESS has a power to file a case in the name of SSS?

HELD:

NO. There is no directive from the SSC that authorized the suit and only the officer-in-charge in behalf of petitioner
executed the purported directive. Clearly, this is irregular since under Sec. 4, par. 10, in relation to par. 7 RA 1161 as
amended by RA 8282 (The Social Security Act of 1997, which was already effective when the instant petition was filed), it
is the SSC as a collegiate body which has the power to approve, confirm, pass upon or review the action of the SSS to sue
in court. Moreover, the appearance of the internal legal staff of the SSS as counsel in the present proceedings is similarly
questionable because only DOJ can act as counsel of SSS under both RA 1161 and RA 8282. It is well settled that the
legality of the representation of an unauthorized counsel may be raised at any stage of the proceedings and that such
illicit representation produces no legal effect.

In the case at bar, there is no approval or ratification of the SSC has been undertaken in the manner prescribed
by law and DOJ has not delegated the authority to act as counsel, then this case must fail. These procedural deficiencies
are serious matters that cannot be ignored since the SSS is in reality confessing judgment to charge expenditure against
the trust fund under its custodianship. This reasoning is found in Premium Marble Resources v. Court of Appeals:
“no person, not even its officers, could validly sue in behalf of a corporation in the absence of any
resolution from the governing body authorizing the filing of such suit. Moreover, where the corporate officers power
as an agent of the corporation did not derive from such resolution, it would nonetheless be necessary to show a clear
source of authority from the charter, the by-laws or the implied acts of the governing body.”
Rule 3 - No. 12

St. Anne Medical Center vs. Parel, 176 SCRA 755

G.R. No. 78554 August 25, 1989

Nature: Petitioner for certiorari

Legal Doctrine:
Under the Rules likewise, "[p]arties may be . . added by order of the court . . . on its own initiative at any stage of the
action and on such terms as are just

SC decision: Order appealed from is GRANTED.

Facts:
A complaint was filed on February 1987 by Raquel Hit, et al against St. Anne Medical Center at Cadiz City for
underpayment of the basic minimum wage of P10/day, underpayment of ECOLA having paid only P170/month,
nonpayment of overtime pay in excess of 40 hours while working for 6 days a week, underpayment of regular holiday,
special holiday, rest day premium pay and underpayment of overtime pay and non-payment of ECOLA during sick leave
and maternity leave with pay. On February 1987, DOLE conducted inspection on Labor Standards Laws and Occupational
Safety and Health Standards. After inspection, violations were found. The management, thru Dr. Fernandez, was
instructed to effect restitution and/or correction within 10 days. However, the management failed to comply with the
instruction. A subpoena duces tecum was issued directing the management to submit to this Office all employment
records and payrolls to determine the extent of violations discovered which again the management failed to comply.
Incidentally, only xerox copies of the payrolls and daily time records for the months of April 1984, November 1985 and
December 1986 were submitted prompting this Office to determine the extent of violations based on available data and
complainants' interview. The extent of violations stood at P3, 059, 829. 57 representing differential pay of 127 employees
on their wages, ECOLA 13th month pay, holiday pay and overtime pay for work rendered in excess of 40 hours a week
excluding 6 employees who are holding managerial position and/or receiving salaries more than the minimum wage fixed
by law. Director Parel ordered respondent St. Anne Medical Center to restitute to its 127 employees through this Office
their differential wages, ECOLA, holiday pay, 13th month pay and overtime pay the amount of P3, 059, 829. 57 within 15
days from receipt of this order. Respondent is also ordered to effect correction of violations on Occupational Safety and
Health Standards. Respondent is also ordered to effect immediately and comply with the present minimum wage laws
applicable to hospitals. Dr. Fernandez, director of St. Anne Medical Center, sought reconsideration alleging that Director
Parel erred in imposing the money award because there's an absence of notice and hearing, the award is not supported
by evidence and there was an identical complaint already filed by the complaining employees pending with the NLRC. In
denying reconsideration, Director Parel held that the hospital had been given amole opportunity to effect restitution and
rectify the violations. He also ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Dr. Fernandez filed a petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition to SC. The petition was brought in the name of St. Anne Medical Center as petitioner although it does not
appear that it is a juridical entity. Petitioner also contended that they were denied due process. They also assailed the
jurisdiction of the Regional Director of DOLE to act on money claims.

Issue:
(1) Whether the petition for certiorari may be brought by St. Anne Medical Center
(2) Whether the Regional Director of DOLE, Director Parel, has jurisdiction to act on the money claims.

HELD:

(1) The Court granted it. (So technically, not a yes or no.) The petition for certiorari and prohibition was brought
in the name of St. Anne Medical Center as petitioner although it does not appear that it is a juridical entity.
Under the RoC, only natural or juridical persons or entities authorizes by law may be parties in a civil action. In
view of the serious questions involved though, the Court bypasses technical distinctions in this case and
impleads the planter’s association, the real owner of the hospital and hence, the real party in interest as the
petitioner. Under the Rules, “parties may be added by order of the court on its own initiative at any stage of the
action and on such terms as are just.

(2) No. The regional offices of the Department of Labor are charged alone with "mediation and conciliation"
and should the parties fail to agree, they must refer the case to the labor arbiters. The fact alone that at the
time Director Parel entered into the picture, respondents-workers had earlier commenced identical
proceedings in the NLRC, labor arbitrage section, is enough to warrant the grant of petition. The rule in Civil
cases is that the acquisition of jurisdiction by a court of concurrent jurisdiction divests another of its own
jurisdiction. The Court granted the petition and ordered
Rule 4 - No. 2

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION vs. TROY FRANCIS L. MONASTERIO

G.R. No. 151037 June 23, 2005

Nature: Petitioner for certiorari

Legal Doctrine:
Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a contract restricts or confines parties thereto when the suit relates to breach of
the said contract. But where the exclusivity clause does not make it necessarily all encompassing, such that even those
not related to the enforcement of the contract should be subject to the exclusive venue, the stipulation designating
exclusive venues should be strictly confined to the specific undertaking or agreement.

SC decision: REMANDED to RTC Naga

Facts:
On August 1, 1993, petitioner SMC entered into an Exclusive Warehouse Agreement (EWA) with SMB Warehousing Services (SMB),
represented by its manager, respondent Troy Francis L. Monasterio. SMB undertook to provide land, physical structures, equipment and
personnel for storage, warehousing and related services such as, but not limited to, segregation of empty bottles, stock handling, and
receiving SMC products for its route operations at Sorsogon, Sorsogon and Daet, Camarines Norte.

The agreement likewise contained a stipulation on venue of actions, to wit:

26. GENERAL PROVISIONS
. . . b. Should it be necessary that an action be brought in court to enforce the terms of this Agreement or the duties or rights of the
parties herein, it is agreed that the proper court should be in the courts of Makati or Pasig, Metro Manila, to the exclusion of the other
courts at the option of the COMPANY. . . .

On November 3, 1998, respondent Monasterio, a resident of Naga City, filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. RTC98-4150 for
collection of sum of money against petitioner SMC before the RTC of Naga City, Branch 20.

In his Complaint, Monasterio claimed P900,600 for unpaid cashiering fees. He alleged that from September 1993 to September 1997
and May 1995 to November 1997, aside from rendering service as warehouseman, he was given the additional task of cashiering in
SMC’s Sorsogon and Camarines Norte sales offices for which he was promised a separate fee. He claims that of approximately 290 million
pesos in cash and checks of the sales office and the risks of pilferage, theft, robbery and hold-up, he had assumed what amounted to
approximately 35 million pesos per annum for Sorsogon, Sorsogon, and 60 million pesos for Daet, Camarines Norte. He also said that
he hired personnel for the job. Monasterio added that it was only on December 1, 1997, that petitioner SMC started paying him P11,400
per month for his cashiering services.

Monasterio demanded P82,959.32 for warehousing fees, P11,400 for cashiering fees for the month of September, 1998, as well as
exemplary damages, and attorneys fees in the amount of P500,000 and P300,000, respectively.

On November 19, 1998, SMC filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. SMC contended that Monasterio’s money claim
for alleged unpaid cashiering services arose from his function as warehouse contractor thus the EWA should be followed and thus, the
exclusive venue of courts of Makati or Pasig, Metro Manila is the proper venue as provided under paragraph 26(b) of the EWA. SMC cites
in its favor Section 4(b) in relation to Section 2 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court allowing agreement of parties on exclusive venue of
actions.

Monasterio filed an Opposition contending that the cashiering service he rendered for SMC was separate and distinct from the services
under the EWA. Hence, the provision on venue in the EWA was not applicable to said services. Hence, he insists that in accordance with
Section 2 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court the venue should be in Naga City, his place of residence.

RTC RULING: On February 22, 1999, the RTC of Naga City, Branch 20 issued an Order denying petitioners motion to dismiss. The court
held that the services agreed upon in said contract is limited to warehousing services and the claim of Monasterio in his suit pertains to
the cashiering services rendered to SMC, a relationship which was not documented, and is certainly a contract separate and independent
from the exclusive warehousing agreements. SMC’s subsequent MR was likewise denied. While the motion was pending, Monasterio filed
an Amended Complaint deleting his claim for unpaid warehousing and cashiering fees but increasing the exemplary damages from
P500,000 to P1,500,000.

SMC elevated the controversy to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the RTC Naga City for denying
its motion to dismiss and subsequent MR.

On June 11, 1999, during the pendency of the certiorari petition SMC filed before the trial court an answer ex abundanti cautela with a
compulsory counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. SMC averred lack of cause of action, payment, waiver,
abandonment and extinguishment.

CA RULING: In its decision dated July 16, 2001, the Court of Appeals found respondents claim for cashiering services inseparable from
his claim for warehousing services, thus, the venue stipulated in the EWA is the proper venue. However, the Court of Appeals noted that
prior to the filing of SMC’s petition, Monasterio filed an amended complaint to which SMC filed an answer. Thus, the Court of Appeals
dismissed San Miguel’s petition for certiorari, stating that the case was already moot and academic.

SMC filed MR which was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: (1) Did the RTC of Naga City err in denying the motion to dismiss filed by SMC alleging improper venue?
(2) Did the CA gravely err in ruling that SMC’s petition for certiorari has become moot?

SC RULING: On disputes relating to the enforcement of the rights and duties of the contracting parties, the venue stipulation in the
EWA should be construed as mandatory. Nothing therein being contrary to law, morals, good custom or public policy, this provision is
binding upon the parties. The EWA stipulation on venue is clear and unequivocal, thus it ought to be respected.

However, SC notes that the cause of action in the complaint filed by Monasterio before the RTC of Naga was not based on the EWA, but
concern services not enumerated in the EWA. Records show also that previously, he received a separate consideration of P11,400 for
the cashiering service he rendered to SMC. Moreover, in the amended complaint, the Monasterio’s cause of action was specifically limited
to the collection of the sum owing to him for his cashiering service in favor of SMC. He already omitted SMC’s non-payment of
warehousing fees. As previously ruled, allegations in the complaint determines the cause of action or the nature of the case. Thus, given
the circumstances of this case, SC is constrained to hold that it would be erroneous to rule, as the CA did, that the collection suit of
Monasterio did not pertain solely to the unpaid cashiering services but pertain likewise to the warehousing services.

Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a contract restricts or confines parties thereto when the suit relates to breach of the said
contract. But where the exclusivity clause does not make it necessarily all encompassing, such that even those not related to the
enforcement of the contract should be subject to the exclusive venue, the stipulation designating exclusive venues should be strictly
confined to the specific undertaking or agreement. Otherwise, the basic principles of freedom to contract might work to the great
disadvantage of a weak party-suitor who ought to be allowed free access to courts of justice.

Restrictive stipulations are in derogation of the general policy of making it more convenient for the parties to institute actions arising
from or in relation to their agreements. Thus, the restriction should be strictly construed as relating solely to the agreement for which
the exclusive venue stipulation is embodied. Expanding the scope of such limitation on a contracting party will create unwarranted
restrictions which the parties might find unintended or worse, arbitrary and oppressive.

Moreover, since convenience is the raison detre of the rules on venue, venue stipulation should be deemed merely permissive, and that
interpretation should be adopted which most serves the parties convenience. Contrariwise, the rules mandated by the Rules of Court
should govern. Accordingly, since the present case for the collection of sum of money filed by Monasterio is a personal action, SC finds
no compelling reason why it could not be instituted in the RTC of Naga City, the place where he resides.

Having settled the issue on venue, SC needs not belabor the issue of whether SMC’s petition has become moot.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, it is hereby ruled that no reversible error was committed by the Regional Trial Court of Naga
City, Branch 20, in denying petitioners motion to dismiss. Said RTC is the proper venue of the amended complaint for a sum of money
filed by respondent against petitioner San Miguel Corporation, in connection with his cashiering services. The case is hereby REMANDED
to the RTC of Naga City, Branch 20, for further proceedings on respondents amended complaint, without further delay. Costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Rule 5 - No. 1

Rolex Rodriguez y Olares vs. People of the Philippines and Allied Domecq Spirit and Wines,
G.R. No. 192799, October 24, 2012

Nature: Petitioner for certiorari

Legal Doctrine:
If the Court has accorded litigants in civil cases greater leeway in filing an appeal through the “fresh period rule,” with
more reason that it should equally grant the same to criminal cases. The accused will have a fresh 15-day period
counted from receipt of such denial within which to file his or her notice of appeal.

SC decision: Order appealed from is GRANTED.

FACTS:
The RTC convicted petitioner Rolex Rodriguez y Olayres for Unfair Competition penalized under RA 8293. Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration before the RTC on the 15th or the last day of the reglementary period to appeal. Fourteen
(14) days after receipt of the RTC Order denying his motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal. Thus,
the denial of his Notice of Appeal on the ground of its being filed out of time under Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Before the RTC, the CA and the Supreme Court, petitioner was unwavering in his assertion of the
applicability of the “fresh period rule” as laid down in Neypes v. Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Is the “fresh period rule” applicable to appeals from conviction in criminal cases governed by Sec. 6, Rule 122 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure?

RULING:
YES. While Neypes was silent on the applicability of the “fresh period rule” to criminal cases, the issue was squarely
addressed in Yu v. Tatad,

“While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a ‘fresh period’ to appeal should
equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
x x x.”

The accused will have a fresh 15-day period counted from receipt of such denial within which to file his or her notice of
appeal… If the Court has accorded litigants in civil cases—under the spirit and rationale in Neypes—greater leeway in
filing an appeal through the “fresh period rule,” with more reason that it should equally grant the same to criminal cases
which involve the accused’s “sacrosanct right to liberty, which is protected by the Constitution, as no person should be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”
Rule 6 - No. 7

Maranan vs. Manila Banking Corporation

G.R. No. 164398 March 30, 2007
Nature: Petitioner for certiorari

Legal Doctrine:
A counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A
counterclaim need not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party, but may claim relief exceeding in
amount or different in kind from that sought by the opposing party’s claim.

SC decision: Petition Denied.

FACTS:
On January 11, 1979, Mandarin Development Corporation (Mandarin) obtained from respondent Manila Banking
Corporation a ten million peso loan as additional working capital. Petitioner Alicia C. Maranan, with Yu Kim Chuy, Sofio
Mo Gianan, Nestor Ignacio, and Roberto Posadas, signed a surety agreement binding themselves solidarily liable with
Mandarin for the said loan.

By June 30, 1990, Mandarin’s outstanding loan obligation inclusive of interest reached ₱30,500,000 prompting
respondent to file a complaint5 for a sum of money against Mandarin, as well as Pacific Enamel and Glass Manufacturing
Corporation (Pacific Enamel), S. Antonio Roxas Chua, Jr., and the aforementioned guarantors including herein petitioner.

Chua and Pacific Enamel filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action against
them. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and accordingly dropped them from the case. For her part, petitioner
filed an Answer alleging that the surety agreement did not express the true intent of the parties. She claimed that Chua
was the real borrower and actual recipient of the loan and that Mandarin was merely used as a conduit of Pacific Enamel.
Mandarin and Pacific Enamel were allegedly owned and controlled by Chua. She stated in the Answer that as a mere
employee of Chua, she was made to sign the surety agreement in compliance with the formalities required by the Central
Bank.
Respondent subsequently filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The trial court, however, denied the said motion.
About two years later, petitioner filed an Amended Answer10 impleading Chua and Pacific Enamel as defendants in her
counterclaim.
In its first assailed Order, the trial court denied the admission of petitioner’s Amended Answer and deemed the same
expunged from the records, thus:

Wherefore, defendants (sic) Amended Answer is hereby DENIED and considered expunged from the record.

ISSUE: WON petitioner correctly resorted in filing a counterclaim?

RULING:
NO. SEC. 6. Counterclaim. – A counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have
against an opposing party. A counterclaim need not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party, but
may claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought by the opposing party’s claim. (Emphasis
supplied)

SEC. 14. Bringing new parties. – When the presence of parties other than those to the original action is required for the
granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought
in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained.

Records show that at the time of the filing of the Amended Answer in which Chua and Pacific Enamel were impleaded in
the counterclaim, the two were no longer parties to the action. Note that the trial court had already dropped Chua and
Pacific Enamel from the case for lack of cause of action against them. Under the Rules, a counterclaim may be filed only
against an opposing party. The filing of a counterclaim against a third party is not allowed, but the court may order such
party to be brought in as defendant.

Corollarily, Section 12 of Rule 6 further provides:

SEC. 12. Third-party complaint. – A third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file
against a person not a party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or
any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim.

The purpose of the foregoing provision is to allow a defendant to assert an independent claim against a third party, which
would otherwise be asserted in another action, thus preventing multiplicity of suits. A prerequisite to the exercise of such
right is the existence of substantive basis for a third-party claim, such as indemnity, subrogation, contribution or other
substantive right. The bringing of a third-party defendant is proper if the latter would be liable to the plaintiff or to the
defendant or both for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant, although the third-party defendant’s
liability arises out of another transaction.15

In this case, petitioner’s allegations in the Amended Answer point to the existence of a substantive right against Chua and
Pacific Enamel, and impute liability to both for the sum of money respondent claims against petitioner. Clearly, under
Section 12 of Rule 6, the petitioner’s appropriate recourse is the filing, with proper leave of court, of a third-party
complaint against Chua and Pacific Enamel.

At any rate, as previously discussed, the Amended Answer could not have been admitted for lack of prior leave of court
and for having substantially altered the theory of the defense. Thus, at this stage, whether Chua and Pacific Enamel were
impleaded through a simple counterclaim or through a third-party complaint would not have mattered.