CRIMINAL LAW 1

Case Digests

I. General Principles of Criminal Law

A. Nature and definition

Ient v. Tullett Prebon, G.R. No. 189158, 11 January 2017

FACTS: Tradition Group, where petitoners herein are employed, and Tullett are competitors in the inter-
dealer broking business. On the Tradition Group's motive of expansion and diversification in Asia,
petitioners lent and Schulze were tasked with the establishment Tradition Financial Services Philippines,
Inc. However, Tullett, filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the City Prosecution Office of Makati City against the
officers/employees of the Tradition Group for violation of Sections 31 and 34 of the Corporation Code
which made them criminally liable under Section 144.

Impleaded as respondents in the Complaint-Affidavit were petitioners lent and Schulze, Jaime Villalon
,who was formerly President and Managing Director of Tullett, Chuidian who was formerly a member of
Tullett's Board of Directors. Villalon and Chuidian were charged with using their former positions in Tullett
to sabotage said company by orchestrating the mass resignation of its entire brokering staff in order for
them to join Tradition Philippines which was evident on their conduct of several meetings with the
employees.

According to Tullett, petitioners lent and Schulze have conspired with Villalon and Chuidian in the latter's
acts of disloyalty against the company. According to Tullett, respondents Villalon and Chuidian, violated
Sections 31 and 34 of the Corporation Code which made them criminally liable under Section 144. As for
petitioners Ient and Schulze, Tullett asserted that they conspired with Villalon and Chuidian in the latter's
acts of disloyalty against the company.Petitioners argued that there could be no violation of Sections 31
and 34 of the Corporation as these sections refer to corporate acts or corporate opportunity, that Section
144 of the same Code cannot be applied to Sections 31 and 34 which already contains the penalties or
remedies for their violation; and conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code cannot be applied to the
Sections 31 and 34 of the Corporation Code. The city prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint
however, on respondent’s appeal to the Department of Justice, the dismissal was reversed finding the
arguments of the respondent proper.

ISSUE: W/N Section 144 of the Corporation Code applies to Sections 31 and 34 of the same code, thus,
making it a penal offense so that conspiracy can be appreciated and the petitioners can be impleaded?

HELD: No
The provision of Section 144 of the Corporation Code is also applicable in the case at bar as the penal
provision provided therein is made applicable to all violations of the Corporation Code, not otherwise
specifically penalized.

After a meticulous consideration of the arguments presented by both sides, the Court comes to the
conclusion that there is textual ambiguity in Section 144; moreover, such ambiguity remains even after an

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examination of its legislativ... e history and the use of other aids to statutory construction, necessitating
the application of the rule of lenity in the case at bar.

There is no provision in the Corporation Code using similarly emphatic language that evinces a categorical
legislative intent to treat as a criminal offense each and every violation of that law. Consequently, there is
no compelling reason for the Court to construe Section 144 as similarly employing the term "penalized" or
"penalty" solely in terms of criminal liability.

The Corporation Code was intended as a regulatory measure, not primarily as a penal statute. Sections 31
to 34 in particular were intended to impose exacting standards of fidelity on corporate officers and
directors but without unduly impeding them in the discharge of their work with concerns of litigation.

B. Characteristics of Criminal Law

i. General (Art. 2, RPC)
Minucher v. Scalzo, G.R. No. 142396, 11 February 2003

FACTS:
An Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise also known as the "Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972," was filed against petitioner Minucher and Torabian.

A buy bust operation was conducted wherein a heroin was seized. Plaintiff testimony is that Scalzo showed
his interest in buying caviar and later on made a transaction of buying caviar and carpet. They met a law
office of of Atty. Saruca. plaintiff expressed his desire to obtain a US Visa for his wife. At the date of buy
bust operation, the defendant came back again to plaintiff's house and directly proceeded to the latter's
bedroom, where they were playing chess. Plaintiff opened his safe in the bedroom and obtained $2,000.00
from it, gave it to the defendant for the latter's fee in obtaining a visa for plaintiff's wife. The defendant
told him that he would be leaving the Philippines very soon and requested him to come out of the house
for a while so that he can introduce him to his cousin waiting in a cab. Without much ado, and without
putting on his shirt as he was only in his pajama pants, he followed the defendant where he saw a parked
cab opposite the street. To his complete surprise, an American jumped out of the cab with a drawn high-
powered gun. He was in the company of about 30 to 40 Filipino soldiers with 6 Americans, all armed. He
was handcuffed and after about 20 minutes in the street, he was brought inside the house by the
defendant. The defendant came out of the bedroom and out from defendant's attaché case, he took
something and placed it on the table in front of the plaintiff. Plaintiff was not told why he was being
handcuffed and why the privacy of his house.

That his arrest as a heroin trafficker x x x had been well publicized throughout the world, in various
newspapers and television. He was identified in the papers as an international drug trafficker. x x x

During the trial, Scalzo filed another special appearance to quash the summons on the ground that he, not
being a resident of the Philippines and the action being one in personam, was beyond the processes of the
court.

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After almost two years since the institution of the civil case, Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was
entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note No. 414 of the United States
Embassy.

While the trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the evidence presented by him that he was
a diplomatic agent entitled to immunity as such, it ruled that he, nevertheless, should be held accountable
for the acts complained of committed outside his official duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the trial court and sustained the defense of Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with
diplomatic immunity during his term of duty and thereby immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction
of the "Receiving State" pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention.

Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the Philippines is a
signatory, grants him absolute immunity from suit, describing his functions as an agent of the United States
Drugs Enforcement Agency as "conducting surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the
Philippines believed to be the source of prohibited drugs being shipped to the U.S., (and) having
ascertained the target, (he then) would inform the Philippine narcotic agents (to) make the actual arrest."

The documents, according to Scalzo, would show that: (1) the United States Embassy accordingly advised
the Executive Department of the Philippine Government that Scalzo was a member of the diplomatic staff
of the United States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his
departure on 10 August 1988; (2) that the United States Government was firm from the very beginning in
asserting the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo with respect to the case pursuant to the provisions of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and (3) that the United States Embassy repeatedly urged the
Department of Foreign Affairs to take appropriate action to inform the trial court of Scalzo’s diplomatic
immunity. Other documentary exhibit showed that: 1) the Philippine government itself, through its
Executive Department, recognizing and respecting the diplomatic status of Scalzo, formally advised the
"Judicial Department" of his diplomatic status and his entitlement to all diplomatic privileges and
immunities under the Vienna Convention; and (2) the Department of Foreign Affairs itself authenticated
Diplomatic Note No. 414. Scalzo additionally presented Exhibits "9" to "13" consisting of his reports of
investigation on the surveillance and subsequent arrest of Minucher.

and the special power of attorney executed by him in favor of his previous counsel6 to show (a) that the
United States Embassy, affirmed by its Vice Consul, acknowledged Scalzo to be a member of the diplomatic
staff of the United States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until
his departure on 10 August 1988, (b) that he investigated Minucher for alleged trafficking in a prohibited
drug with the cooperation of the Philippine law enforcement officials and in the exercise of his functions
as member of the mission, and (c) that the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs itself Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs itself recognized that Scalzo during his tour of duty in the Philippines (14
October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as being an Assistant Attaché of the United States
diplomatic mission and accredited with diplomatic status by the Government of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Wether or not Scalzo is immune from suit

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RULING:
The Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help
contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.

The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a) ambassadors or nuncios
accredited to the heads of state, (b) envoys, ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads of states;
and (c) charges d' affairs accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs. Comprising the "staff of the
(diplomatic) mission" are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and service staff.
Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the
administrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank.

Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for immunity to the members of
diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an understanding that the same be restrictively applied.
Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity
from civil and criminal suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of missions or
members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same privileges from all others. It might
bear stressing that even consuls, who represent their respective states in concerns of commerce and
navigation and perform certain administrative and notarial duties, such as the issuance of passports and
visas, authentication of documents, and administration of oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional
diplomatic immunities and privileges accorded diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not charged
with the duty of representing their states in political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining
whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs
duties of diplomatic nature.

Scalzo asserted that he was an Assistant Attaché of the United States diplomatic mission and was
accredited as such by the Philippine Government. An attaché belongs to a category of officers in the
diplomatic establishment who may be in charge of its cultural, press, administrative or financial affairs.
Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are administratively under him, but their main function
is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country
and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government. These officials are
not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally designated as having
diplomatic rank.

Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive branch of the
government. It might be recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of
the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of
territorial jurisdiction. The government of the United States itself, which Scalzo claims to be acting for, has
formulated its standards for recognition of a diplomatic agent. The State Department policy is to only
concede diplomatic status to a person who possesses an acknowledged diplomatic title and "performs
duties of diplomatic nature."

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But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was sufficiently established
that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct
surveillance of suspected drug activities within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should
be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the
acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine
of State Immunity from Suit.

The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary
international law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign
agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint
could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a
representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded
for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim - par in parem,
non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.

The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries,
certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States
Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust
operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support
the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has
given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United
States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on
suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would
then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the
poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case
against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or
duties.

Liang v. People, G.R. No. 125865, 28 January 2000

FACTS:

The Petitioner who was an economist working in ADB was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory
words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal.

MTC released him after bail. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from DFA
stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter
Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from
suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit

RULING:
No.
First. The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has
no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice and in motu propio dismissing the two
criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to due process was violated. At any rate,
it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping
of the charges.

Second. The immunity mentioned in the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the
acts was done in "official capacity."

Third. slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do
not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. The imputation of
theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public
official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act
done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

Fourth. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is
such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action
relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state
outside his official functions.

ii. Territorial (Art. 2, RPC)

People v. Tulin, G.R. No. 111709, 30 August 2001, 364 SCRA 10

FACTS:
A cargo vessel “M/T Tabango” was sailing in Mindoro when manned by all armed 21 crew members. They
detained the crew and took complete control of the vessel. They change the name of the vessel with the
name "Galilee”. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages
to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.

PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel to the Philippine
Coast Guard. The vessel were forced to return to Philippines (they remained at the sea) when another
vessel failed to arrive upon their arrival in Singapore. On March 28, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to
and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi
Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered to transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride"
which were supervised by Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after
an interruption, with both vessels leaving the area, was completed on March 30, 1991.

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On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in three batches with the stern warning not to
report the incident to government authorities for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise
they would be killed. The first batch were fetched bu Cecilio Changco and brought them in Imus Cavite
while the second batch were brought to Manila.

The appellants were arrested and charged of Qualified Piracy. Changco also categorically denied the
charge, averring that he was at home sleeping. As it turns out, Navi Pride captain, Hiong, was employed
with Navi Marine Services ( a Singaporean firm, I think). Before the seizure of the MT Tabangon,
Navi Marine was dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker who offered to sell
bunker oil to the former. When the transaction pushed through, Hiong was assigned to supervise a
ship to ship transfer. He was told that the Galilee would be making the transfer, so Navi Pride
ship-sided with Galilee and the transfer was effected. Paul Gan received the payment. Upon arrival
in Singapore, Hiong was asked again to transact another transfer of oil. The same procedure was
followed. Hiong then went to the Philippines to arrange another transfer with Changco – the pirates
head. This was how Hiong was arrested by the NBI agents.

Cheong argues that the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts
allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping
the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as such and the acts
allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters and territory

HELD: Yes.

The attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were
committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore
where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under Hiong's direct
supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and
its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still
deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.

Art. 122 of the RPC (piracy in general and mutiny in the high seas) provided that piracy must be
committed in the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger
thereof. It was amended by RA 7659, which broadened the law to include offenses committed in
Philippine waters. PD 532 on the other hand, embraces any person, including a passenger or
member of the complement of said vessel in the Philippine waters. Passenger or not, member of
the complement or not, any person is covered by the law. No conflict exists among the mentioned
laws, they exist harmoniously as separate laws.

Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the RPC. As such, it is an exception to the rule on
territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged,

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not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree
No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied
with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters
(People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing
the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).

iii. Prospective (Article 21 and 22, RPC)

a. Effects of repeal

C. Sources of Criminal Law

A. Revised Penal Code
B. Special Penal Laws

D. Constitutional Limitations on Criminal Law

A. Due process and Equal protection (Art. 3, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution)
White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, 20 January 2009

FACTS:
Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance prohibiting short time admission, wash-
up rate (admittance and charging of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the
renting out of rooms more than twice a day) or other similarly concocted terms in hotels, motels, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila to protect the best interest, health
and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth in particular.

Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint and alleged that ordinance is
invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate,
Manila it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as
well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.

White Light Corporation filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on
the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and
motels in Manila.

The RTC issued a TRO on, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. The City
alleged that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power and its constitutional.

The RTC noted that the ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously
guarded by the Constitution.

Before the CA, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section
458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities, among other local government units,
the power:

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“To regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides
and transports.”

The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III, Section 18(kk)
of the Revised Manila Charter, thus:

“to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance
of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry into effect and discharge
the powers and duties conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which
shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment
for a single offense”

Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and
the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and
oppressive interference in their business. They also allege that the equal protection rights of their clients
are also being interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether or not these establishments have
the requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal protection rights.

CA reversed the decision of RTC and ruled that: First, Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the
freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit
individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by
having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied
since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed
to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents
in general.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is constitutional and a valid exercise of police power.

HELD: No

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government
unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair
or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and
renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as

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conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the
general welfare clause.

Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and
flexible response as the conditions warrant. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not
eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals,
by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet
the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must
align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people.

Due process evades a precise definition. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental
encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by
the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.

The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct
restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due
process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life,
liberty, or property. It concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it
makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of
formality of a hearing.

If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of
arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process
completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has
sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.

Two standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the
mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender and legitimacy.

We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges.
Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate
governmental interest. Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the
availability of less restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence
of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means
for achieving that interest.

In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining
the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental
freedoms.Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech,

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gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal
protection.

The Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners
of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a
police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also
be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights
can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and
the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion
into private rights.

The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be
diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of
prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation.
So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.
These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate
merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the
whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and
prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the
rent for motel rooms and even apartments.

The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of
the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect.

Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013

FACTS:
Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified
petition for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia
(petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological,
and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation
of custody of her children and of financial support.

Private respondent married to the petitioner. She described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose
life revolved around her husband and that the petitioner is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute
obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated

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her from her friends. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of some
men, at one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed.

Things turned for the worse when Garcia took up an affair with a bank manager. He admitted to the affair
when private respondent confronted him about it. Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that
left private respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed
private respondent on both arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At
another time, petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner
sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to his
paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many
times. When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear
that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware of private
respondent's sufferings.

All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. She
attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply
fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven
(7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Private
respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her children
from her and deprive her of financial support.

Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. In contrast to
the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly
salary of ₱20,000.00 from one corporation only. After the confrontation if petitioner’s affair, petitioner
has not given private respondent an accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise
to millions of pesos.

RTC issued a TPO but petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply
with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their children. The trial court issued
a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be
modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required
comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”

Petitioner challenged (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the
equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an
unwanted product of an invalid law."

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of Due Process and Equal Protection of law.

HELD: No

Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.

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Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which
could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough basis to
deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.

If we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by the women or
their spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.

By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy,
wisdom and expediency of any law.68 We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution.
However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.

R. A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a
guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman
and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that
things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection
clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. All that is required of a
valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member
of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on
a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate
the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the
State extends its protection.

(1) R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

A. The unequal power relationship between women and men. Traditions subordinating women have a
long history rooted in patriarchy – the institutional rule of men. Women were seen in virtually all societies
to be naturally inferior both physically and intellectually. Thefact that women are more likely than men to
be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real
differences justifying the classification under the law.

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B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely" victims of violence. While there are, indeed, relatively few
cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262
invalid.

C. Gender bias and prejudices. Crimes against women are often treated differently and less seriously than
other crimes. whenever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the
parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter
is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance
to be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating, recurring and often serious nature
of domestic violence

(2.) The classification is germane to the purpose of the law

A Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law87 and
shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to
marriage and family relations on the basis of equality of men and women.88 The Philippines likewise
ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said
Conventions and their respective protocols.

(3.) The classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and apply equally to all members

The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to
future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened
by violence and abuse. It applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse.

Petitioner insists that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal
right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing
mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However,
we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute
are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in
its wordings or detailed in its provision.

R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children,
their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the
offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the
opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.

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The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is
afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to
safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts
that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim.

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised
of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner
of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all
in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of an overactive
imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.

ii. Freedom of expression (Art. 3, Sec. 4, 1987 Constitution)

US v. Bustos, L-12592, 8 March 1918

FACTS:
Five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Peace in Pampanga
with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. Specific allegations against him included bribery
charges, involuntary servitude, and theft. However, Justice denied the charges.

Punsalan filed a motion for new trial and assert that the he was the victim of prosecution, and that one
Agustin Jaime, the auxiliary justice of the peace, had instituted the charges for personal reasons; and the
judge of first instance ordered a suppression of the charges against Punsalan and acquitted him the same.

A criminal action was charged against petitioner for voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and with malicious
intent to prejudice and defame Mr. Roman Punsalan by having wrote, signed, and published a writing
which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against Punsalan stating that he is found
to be a public functionary who is absolutely unfair, eminently immoral and dangerous to the community,
and consequently unworthy of the office.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitutional provision on Freedom of Expression was violated

HELD:
No

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
Completely liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The
sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a
hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public

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officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the
intelligence and the dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize
defamation.

The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The
administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced
is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a
judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. On the contrary, it is
a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged
misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or
the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire
into and punish them.

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably
for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply,
without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances.
The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made.

Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded
protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and
adoption of the doctrine of privilege.

Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a
prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice.

A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint made in good faith and
without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a
board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the statements are found to be false, if there
is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of
privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be made under an honest
sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All persons have an
interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a
party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he
is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere
fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of the law of privilege
concerns the person to whom the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the
wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials
such unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege.

In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroy that presumption.
The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the

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existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will
amount to proof of malice.

A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of

malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged
communications.

As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity
or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not have
present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges predicated
on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged.

Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not
true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded
their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is
apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person
thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens
did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a grave
character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to convince him of their
seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition.

We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified
privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an
honest endeavor to improve the public service, we should rather commend them for their good
citizenship.

Guingguing v. People, G.R. No. 128959, 30 September 2005

FACTS:
A criminal complaint for libel filed by Torralba (complainant) against Lim and petitioner. Complainant was
a broadcast journalist who handled two programs for radio stations.

Lim caused the publication of records of criminal cases filed against complainant as well as photographs
of the latter being arrested. These were published by means of a one-page advertisement in the Sunday
Post, a weekly publication edited and published by petitioner.

Asserting inter alia that he had been acquitted and the case/s referred to had already been settled,
complainant sought Lim and petitioners conviction for libel. It was claimed that the publication was also
designed to degrade and malign his person and destroy him as a broadcast journalist.

Lim, in his defense, claimed that complainant was allegedly making scurrilous attacks against him and his
family over the airwaves. Since Lim had no access to radio time, he opted for paid advertisements via
newspaper to answer the attacks, as a measure of self-defense. Lim also argued that complainant, as a

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media man and member of the fourth estate, occupied a position almost similar to a public functionary
and should not be onion-skinned and be able to absorb the thrust of public scrutiny.

RTC ruled that publication is indeed libelous. The publication of a calumny even against public officers or
candidates for public office, according to the trial court, is an offense most dangerous to the people.

CA likewise held that self-defense was unavailing as a justification since the defendant should not go
beyond explaining what was previously said of him. The appellate court asserted that the purpose of self-
defense in libel is to repair, minimize or remove the effect of the damage caused to him but it does not
license the defendant to utter blow-for-blow scurrilous language in return for what he received.

ISSUE: whether or not the publication was libelous.

HELD:
No
Under our law, criminal libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead. Thus, the elements of libel are: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b)
publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice.

There are two major propositions in the prosecution of defamatory remarks were established: first, that
libel against a public person is a greater offense than one directed against an ordinary man, and second,
that it is immaterial that the libel be true.

In any event, where the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in
private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the
dissemination of truth.

In the highest, most-speech protective tier is libelous speech directed against a public figure. Government
can allow libel plaintiffs to recover damages as a result of such speech if and only if the speaker had actual
malicethat is, the speaker must have known that the speech was false, or he must have been recklessly
indifferent to its truth or falsity. This standard means that the speaker is protected against libel suits unless
he knew that he was lying or he was truly foolish to think that he was telling the truth. A person counts as
a public figure (1) if he is a public official in the sense that he works for the government, (2) if, while not
employed by government, he otherwise has pervasive fame or notoriety in the community, or (3) if he has
thrust himself into some particular controversy in order to influence its resolution. Thus, for example, Jerry
Falwell is a public figure and, as a famous case holds, he is barred from recovering against a magazine that
portrays him as having had sex with his mother. Movie stars and famous athletes also qualify as public
figures. False speech directed against public figures is thus protected from libel actions except in quite
extreme circumstances.

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even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the
public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. (New york times vs sullivan)

public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by
adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and
his character, has become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be included
in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public,
as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer. The list is,
however, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and
even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge.
It includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention is focused upon him as a
person.

In the issue whether complainant is a public figure, Complainants standing as a public figure is further
militated by the contextual circumstances of the case. The newspaper in question, the Sunday Post, is
particularly in circulation in the areas where complainants broadcasts were aired. Certainly, it cannot be
denied that the target audience of the newspaper were the same persons who may have listened regularly
to the complainants broadcast. Even if the sphere of complainants renown is limited in geography, it is in
the same plane as the circulation of the offending newspaper. The extent of complainants ability to
influence hearts and minds through his broadcasts need not be established, only that he has such capacity
and willingness to exert an influence. Complainants volition to practice the radio broadcasting profession
necessarily thrusts him in the public sphere.

With respect to Actual Malice, As it has been established that complainant was a public figure, it was
incumbent upon the prosecution to prove actual malice on the part of Lim and petitioner when the latter
published the article subject matter of the complaint. Set otherwise, the prosecution must have
established beyond reasonable doubt that the defendants knew the statements in the advertisement was
false or nonetheless proceeded with reckless disregard as to publish it whether or not it was true.

It should thus proceed that if the statements made against the public figure are essentially true, then no
conviction for libel can be had. Any statement that does not contain a provably false factual connotation
will receive full constitutional protection.

In the case at bar, it is clear that there was nothing untruthful about what was published in the Sunday
Post. The criminal cases listed in the advertisement as pending against the complainant had indeed been
filed. It may have been inconvenient for the complainant that these matters may have been divulged, yet
such information hardly falls within any realm of privacy complainant could invoke, since the pendency of
these criminal charges are actually matters of public record.

The information, moreover, went into the very character and integrity of complainant to which his
listening public has a very legitimate interest. Complainant hosts a public affairs program, one which he
himself claimed was imbued with public character since it deals with corruptions in government,

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corruptions by public officials, irregularities in government in comrades. By entering into this line of work,
complainant in effect gave the public a legitimate interest in his life. He likewise gave them a stake in
finding out if he himself had the integrity and character to have the right to criticize others for their
conduct.

As adverted earlier, the guarantee of free speech was enacted to protect not only polite speech, but even
expression in its most unsophisticated form. Criminal libel stands as a necessary qualification to any
absolutist interpretation of the free speech clause, if only because it prevents the proliferation of untruths
which if unrefuted, would gain an undue influence in the public discourse.

Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does
not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and
debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point
of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room
for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can
they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy.

To this end, the publication of the subject advertisement by petitioner and Lim cannot be deemed by this
Court to have been done with actual malice. Aside from the fact that the information contained in said
publication was true, the intention to let the public know the character of their radio commentator can at
best be subsumed under the mantle of having been done with good motives and for justifiable ends. The
advertisement in question falls squarely within the bounds of constitutionality.

III. Freedom of religion (Art. 3, Sec. 5, 1987 Constitution)

Estrada v. Escritor, AM No. P-02-1651, 22 June 2006, 492 SCRA I
FACTS:
● Complainant Alejandro Estrada filed with Judge Jose F. Caoibes Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253 of the
Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, a sworn Letter-Complaint dated July 27, 2000.
● Estrada requested an investigation of Respondent Soledad Escritor, the court interpreter, for living in with
a man not her husband, with whom she had a child
● Complainant (Estrada) believed that she was committing an immoral act that tarnished the image of the
court, and contended that she should not be allowed to remain as an employee of the court, as it might
appear to be condoning her act
● Consequently, respondent (Escritor) was charged with committing “disgraceful and immoral conduct”
under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Section 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code
● Respondent (Escritor) testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow; her
husband had died in 1998. More than twenty years ago, she started to have a live-in arrangement with
Luciano Quilapio Jr., with whom she had a son. At the time, she alleged, her husband who was then still
alive was himself living with another woman.
● Escritor, as a member of the religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible
Tract Society, however, asserted that her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio was in conformity with their

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religious beliefs and had the approval of their congregation. After ten years of living with Quilapio, she
executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” on July 28, 1991
● Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness – the Declaration allows members of the congregation who have been
abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union
moral and binding within the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed.
As laid out by the tenets of their faith, the Jehovahs congregation requires that at the time the declarations
are executed, the couple cannot secure the civil authorities approval of the marital relationship because
of legal impediments. Only couples who have been baptized and in good standing may execute the
Declaration, which requires the approval of the elders of the congregation. As a matter of practice, the
marital status of the declarants and their respective spouses commission of adultery are investigated
before the declarations are executed.
● Escritor and Quilapio made their declarations in the usual and approved form prescribed by Jehovah’s
Witnesses, approved by the elders of the congregation where the declarations were executed, and
recorded in the Watch Tower Central Office.
● Moreover, the congregation believed that once all legal impediments for the couple were lifted, the
validity of the declarations ceased, and the couple were obliged to legalize their union. In this case,
although Escritor was widowed in 1998 -- a fact that, on her part, lifted the legal impediment to marry --
her mate was still not capacitated to remarry. Thus, their declarations remained valid.
● In sum, therefore, insofar as the congregation was concerned, there was nothing immoral about the
conjugal arrangement between the couple, and they remained members in good standing in the
congregation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Soledad Escritor could be held administratively liable for committing an act that
was within the ambit of her right under the religion clauses (Article III, Section 5) of the Constitution.

RULING:The instant administrative complaint is DISMISSED.

The state has the burden of satisfying the “compelling state interest” test to justify any possible
sanction to be imposed upon Escritor. This test involves three steps:

1) The courts should look into the sincerity of the religious belief without inquiring into the truth of the
belief.
2) The state has to establish that its purposes are legitimate and compelling.
3) The state used the least intrusive means possible.

The case was remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator so that the government would
have the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing Escritor’s
position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free
exercise protection.

Since neither Estrada, Escritor nor the government has filed a motion for reconsideration assailing
the August 4, 2003 ruling, the 2003 decision has attained finality and constitutes the law of the case. Any
attempt to reopen this ruling constitutes a contravention of elementary rules of procedure. Worse, insofar

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as it would overturn the parties’ right to rely upon the Supreme Court’s interpretation which has long
attained finality, it also runs counter to substantive due process.

In its June 20, 2006 ruling, the Supreme Court held that, Escritor’s sincerity is beyond serious doubt.
She procured the certificate 10 years after their union began and not merely after being implicated. The
free exercise of religion is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights.
The state’s broad interest in protecting the institutions of marriage and the family is not a compelling
interest enforcing the concubinage charges against Escritor. The Constitution adheres to the benevolent
neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause. Even assuming that there was a compelling state interest, the state failed to show
evidence that the means the state adopted in pursuing this compelling interest is the least restrictive to
Escritor’s religious freedom.

Hence, Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for
exemption from the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

IV. No excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment (Art. 3, Sec. 19, 1987 Constitution)
People v. Echagaray, G.R. No. 117472, 7 February 1997, 267 SCRA 682

Facts:
Leo Echegaray was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape for raping his 10 years-old
daughter. The crime was commited in April 1994, during which time RA No 7695 “Death Penalty Law” was
in effect, and therefore sentenced to penalty of death.

Raped his daughter five times, when the mother was pregnant and was outside gambling. After the fifth
time she sought for the help of her grandmother who then told her mother, and the two went to the
barangay captain and afterwards to PNP to execute an affidavit. She was also accompanied to the Police
Crime Laboratory for medical examination. Which found lacerations in her vagina which are consistent
with the dates when the rape occurred.]

In appealing his conviction, it raised the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law as being severe and
excessive, cruel and unusual penalty, in violation of the Constitution. He invokes the ruling in Furman vs.
Georgia wherein US SC categorically ruled that death penalty is cruel and degrading. He also argued that
death is an excessive and cruel punishment for crime of rape because there is no taking of life in rape. He
invokes the ruling in Coker vs. Georgia which said that while rape deserves serious punishment, it should
not involve taking of human life. In rape, life is not over for the victim. Death penalty should only be
imposed where the crime was murder.

Issue: Whether or not Death Penalty is cruel and unusual punishment

Held: NO

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The penalty is neither cruel, unjust or excessive. It was held that punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death. It implies something inhuman, barbarous, something more than
extinguishment of life. It is degrading if it involves public humiliation. The severity is not sufficient, but
must be disproportionate to the crime committed. Excessive is measured by: (a) seriousness of the
crime, (b) policy of legislature, and (c) perversity to the accused.

In re-enactment of Death Penalty, the power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of
Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1) that Congress
define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only
crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty
bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can
only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime
to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that
Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes."

The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness pervading the procedures
by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense
theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on
the discrimination against the black accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is
given the unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty. Furman,
thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per se.

Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence with the
enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with
homicide or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with
homicide, and arson resulting in death.

Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-
parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of
that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something
more than the mere extinguishment of life.

People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme
penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the
statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of
judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions,".

R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the
need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to
impose the death penalty for said crimes.

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Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in which the same was
committed or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the
law, public peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential and inherent viciousness
and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a
people.

SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because:

the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply
dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the
masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and
honest citizenry. They have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the
society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival
of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so.

People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury
to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to
which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an
intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the
society itself.

Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, 29 April 2014

Facts:

FACTS:
Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at Casino and ordered pieces of jewelry on commission basis, upon
knowing that Tangcoy was lending money for casino players and have some pieces of jewelry for sale,
petitioner approached him and offered to sell said jewelries. Tangcoy accepted the offer and They both
agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items,
within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or
returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter
promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.

Thus, an information for Estafa was filed agaist the petitioner.

DEFENSE’S TESTIMONY: Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia,
who is engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. Petitioner denied having
transacted any business with private complainant. He admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia for which
he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then used as evidence against
him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.

ISSUE:

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HELD:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue
to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the
value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties
because that would constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the
penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would
be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government. This, however, does not render the
whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5.

Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on the ground
that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that
the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a
recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh.20

There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on the current
inflation rate or at the ratio of ₱1.00 is equal to ₱100.00 . However, it would be dangerous as this would
result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered that
the economy fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes against property be
adopted, the penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the
framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have provided the same, instead, it included the earlier
cited Article 5 as a remedy.

It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not seem to be
excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding penalties.

In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as tantamount to cruel
punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being punitive in nature. Whether or not they are
excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative
of the courts to apply the law, especially when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation
than that which is plainly written.

Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision of the
law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it violative
of due process, considering that the State and the concerned parties were not given the opportunity to
comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked
collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally.

Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at
the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and
applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those

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inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling,
and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious
to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it
cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment
must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to
shock the moral sense of the community."

V. Non-imprisonment for debt or non-payment of poll tax (Art. 3, Sec. 19, 1987 Constitution)

VI. Bill of attainder (Art. 3, Sec. 22, 1987 Constitution)

People v. Ferrer, L-32613-14, 27 December 1972, 48 SCRA 382

FACTS:
a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the respondent
Feliciano Co.

Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder;
(2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied
him the equal protection of the laws.

The trial court, in its resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is
a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the informations against the two
accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is a bill of attainder

HELD: No, bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial.

Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban
against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining
legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. The
singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to
stigmatizea statute as a bill of attainder.

In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of attainder because
it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and
security of the country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.'"
By means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed
"judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial
trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the

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accused is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it has expressly
created a presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow."

When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party
of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare
the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the
prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist
Party of the Philippines" issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the
Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and their
successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.

Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge
Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the
undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at
the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the
Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to
overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under
the control and domination of a foreign power.

As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the requirement
of proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is precisely the nature of conspiracy,
which has been referred to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who participate in the criminal covenant
are liable. The contention would be correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere membership
devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the Party. But the statute specifically required
that membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the
Party. That is what section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to
have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the
unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." This constitutes an element of "membership"
distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the
organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's
illegal objectives.

Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to
render it a bill of attainder. Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial
does it become a bill of attainder.

Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of the
prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past
conduct. This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt.

This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof expressly
states that the prohibition therein applies only to acts committed"After the approval of this Act." Only

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those who "knowingly,willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,become or remain members of
the Communist Party of thePhilippines and/or its successors or of any subversive association"after June
20, 1957, are punished. Those whowere members of the Party or of any other subversive associationat
the time of the enactment of the law, weregiven the opportunity of purging themselves of liability
byrenouncing in writing and under oath their membershipin the Party. The law expressly provides that
such renunciationshall operate to exempt such persons from penalliability. The penalties prescribed by
the Act are thereforenot inescapable.

VII. Ex-post facto laws (Art. 3, Sec. 22, 1987 Constitution)

US v. Diaz Conde, L-18208, 14 February 1922

FACTS:
The defendants were charges of usury law and later found guilty thereof.

The essential facts constituting the basis of the criminal action are not in dispute, and may be stated as
follows: (1) That on the 30th day of December, 1915, the alleged offended persons Bartolome Oliveros
and Engracia Lianco executed and delivered to the defendants a contract (Exhibit 😎 evidencing the fact
that the former had borrowed from the latter the sum of P300, and (2) that, by virtue of the terms of said
contract, the said Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco obligated themselves to pay to the defendants
interest at the rate of five per cent (5%) per month, payable within the first ten days of each and every
month, the first payment to be made on the 10th day of January, 1916.

The appellants now contend: (a) That the contract upon which the alleged usurious interest was collected
was executed before Act No. 2655 was adopted; (b) that at the time said contract was made (December
30, 1915), there was no usury law in force in the Philippine Islands; (c) that said Act No. 2655 did not
become effective until the 1st day of May, 1916, or four months and a half after the contract in question
was executed; (d) that said law could have no retroactive effect or operation, and (e) that said law impairs
the obligation of a contract, and that for all of said reasons the judgment imposed by the lower court
should be revoked; that the complaint should be dismissed, and that they should each be discharged from
the custody of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is an ex post facto

HELD: Yes

The law, we think, is well established that when a contract contains an obligation to pay interest upon the
principal, the interest thereby becomes part of the principal and is included within the promise to pay. In
other words, the obligation to pay interest on money due under a contract, be it express or implied, is a
part of the obligation of the contract. Laws adopted after the execution of a contract, changing or altering
the rate of interest, cannot be made to apply to such contract without violating the provisions of the
constitution which prohibit the adoption of a law "impairing the obligation of contract."

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A law imposing a new penalty, or a new liability or disability, or giving a new right of action, must not be
construed as having a retroactive effect. It is an elementary rule of contract that the laws in force at the
time the contract was made must govern its interpretation and application. Laws must be construed
prospectively and not retrospectively. If a contract is legal at its inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by
any subsequent legislation. If that were permitted then the obligations of a contract might be impaired,
which is prohibited by the organic law of the Philippine Islands.

Ex post facto laws, unless they are favorable to the defendant, are prohibited in this jurisdiction. Every law
that makes an action, done before the passage of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal,
and punishes such action, is an ex post facto law.

In the present case Act No. 2655 made an act which had been done before the law was adopted, a criminal
act, and to make said Act applicable to the act complained of would be to give it an ex post facto operation.
The Legislature is prohibited from adopting a law which will make an act done before its adoption a crime.
A law may be given a retroactive effect in civil action, providing it is curative in character, but ex post facto
laws are absolutely prohibited unless its retroactive effect is favorable to the defendant.

For the reason, therefore, that the acts complained of in the present case were legal at the time of their
occurrence, they cannot be made criminal by any subsequent or ex post facto legislation. What the courts
may say, considering the provisions of article 1255 of the Civil Code, when a civil action is brought upon
said contract, cannot now be determined. A contract may be annulled by the courts when it is shown that
it is against morals or public order.

Therefore, that the acts complained of by the defendants did not constitute a crime at the time they were
committed, and therefore the sentence of the lower court should be, and is hereby, revoke.

E. Construction and interpretation

B. Liberally in favour of the accused

C. Spanish text of the RPC prevails over the English text

People v. Abilong, L-1960, 26 November 1948
The accused, being then a convict sentenced and ordered to serve destierro during which he should not
enter any place within the radius of 100 km from the City of Manila, by virtue of final judgment for
attempted robbery, did then evade the service of said sentence by going beyond the limits made against
him and commit vagrancy.

Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional.

Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused evading a sentence of destierro is not
criminally liable under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly article 157 of the said Code
for the reason that said article 157 refers only to persons who are imprisoned in a penal institution and

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completely deprived of their liberty. He bases his contention on the word "imprisonment" used in the
English text of said article which in part reads as follows:

Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of
his imprisonment by reason of final judgment.

RATIO: Inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish
text governs.

It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the
phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the
Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty,
though partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of destierro was
deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila.

It is clear that a person under sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of his liberty and escapes from
the restrictions of the penalty when he enters the prohibited area.

Hence, appellant is guilty of evasion of service of sentence under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code
(Spanish text), in that during the period of his sentence of destierro.

iii. Retroactive application when favourable to the accused

iv. Prescribed but undeserved penalties (Art. 5, RPC)

People v. Formigones, L-3246, 29 November 1950

FACTS:
CFI found the appellant guilty of parricide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased in the amount of P2,000.

While defendant’s wife, Julia, was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The accused, without any
previous quarrel or provocation, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed her in the back,
which caused her death. The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately followed
by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of
the living room and then lay down beside her.

Upon investigation, he admitted that he killed his wife because of jealousy to his brother and that he
suspected that the two were maintaining illicit relations.

His counsel presented the testimony of two guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to
the effect that his conduct there was rather strange and that he behaved like an insane person; that
sometimes he would remove his clothes and go stark naked in the presence of his fellow prisoners; that

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at times he would remain silent and indifferent to his surroundings; that he would refused to take a bath
and wash his clothes until forced by the prison authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in chorus
with his fellow prisoners, or even alone by himself without being asked; and that once when the door of
his cell was opened, he suddenly darted from inside into the prison compound apparently in an attempt
to regain his liberty.

The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from
criminal liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code.

After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According to
the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in
anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his
farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his children of school
age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man who could feel the
pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of being
unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as
an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he
believed her faithless.

RATIO:

In this case, the appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of those unfortunate
beings, simple, and even feebleminded, whose faculties have not been fully developed. His action in
picking up the body of his wife after she fell down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on
the floor, and lying beside her for hours, shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his loved one though
he thought that she has betrayed him. Although he did not exactly surrender to the authorities, still he
made no effort to flee and compel the police to hunt him down and arrest him. In his written statement
he readily admitted that he killed his wife, and at the trial he made no effort to deny or repudiate said
written statement, thus saving the government all the trouble and expense of catching him, and insuring
his conviction.

Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the commission of the act is attended by some
mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

And even though the court should take into consideration the presence of two mitigating circumstances
of a qualifying nature, which it can not afford to overlook, without any aggravating one, the penalty could
not be reduced to the next lower to that imposed by law, because, according to a ruling of the court of
Spain, article 80 above-mentioned does not contain a precept similar to that contained in Rule 5 of article
81 (now Rule 5, art. 64 of the Rev. Penal Code.) (Decision of September 30, 1879.)

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In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby affirm the judgment of the lower
court with the modification that the appellant will be credited with one-half of any preventive
imprisonment he has undergone. Appellant will pay costs.

Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same court in the two cases above cited, and
believing that the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty, this case should be brought to the attention of
the Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusion perpetua
to death or otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he sees fit.

v. Suppletory application of RPC to Special Penal Laws (Art. 10, RPC)

Ladonga v. People, G.R. No. 141066, 17 February 2005

Facts:
Petitioner seeks a review of the Decision convicting her of violation of The Bouncing Checks Law.

In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga, petitioner, becamethe regular customer of Alfredo
Oculam in his pawnshop. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a loan from him,
guaranteed by check of United Coconut Planters Bank, issued by Adronico. On last week of April 1990and
during the first week of May 1990 the spouses obtained additional loanguaranteed by UCPD. And between
May and June 1990, the spouses obtainedthe third loan guaranteed by UCPD. The three checks bounced
uponpresentment for the reason that the account was closed. When the spousesfailed to redeem the
check, despite repeated demands, Oculam filed a criminalcomplaint against them.While admitting that
the checks issued by Adronico bounced becausethere was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed,
the spouses claimthat the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with anagreement that
Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature, and,that petitioner is not a signatory of the
checks and had no participation in theissuance thereof.

Issues:
Whether or not the petitioner, who was not the issuer of the three checksthat bounced, could be held
liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator.

Held: No

The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and echoes the declaration of the Court of
Appeals that some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition of the second
sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any
prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
to it.

Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:

“ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the future may
be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.”

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The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future are made
punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the
RPC supplementary to such laws. While it seems that the two clauses are contradictory, a sensible
interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled.

The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are controlling with regard
to offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule of statutory
construction that special legal provisions prevail over general ones- Lex specialis derogant generali. In fact,
the clause can be considered as a superfluity, and could have been eliminated altogether. The second
clause contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision
that the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the
contrary.

Article 8 of the RPC provides that a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason
of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of
the complicity. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them
to execute or implement the criminal plan.

In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance
of the alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the lone prosecution witness, complainant Alfredo Oculam,
petitioner was merely present when her husband, Adronico, signed the check subject of Criminal Case No.
7068. With respect to Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070, Oculam also did not describe the details of petitioners
participation. He did not specify the nature of petitioners involvement in the commission of the crime,
either by a direct act of participation, a direct inducement of her co-conspirator, or cooperating in the
commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Apparently,
the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first
check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal
design.

Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy
transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount
to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute
one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view
to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

Criminal liability cannot be incurred based on general allegation of conspiracy. In criminal cases, moral
certainty -- not mere possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even when the
evidence for the defense is weak, the accused must be acquitted when the prosecution has not proven
guilt with the requisite quantum of proof required in all criminal cases.

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People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994

Facts:
Appellant Martin Simon was charged with violation of Sec. 4 Article II of the Republic Act No. 6425
“Dangerous Drugs Act of 1974” under the indictment alleging that he sold 4 tea bags of marijuana to
poseur-buyers of Narcotics Command. With a penalty of life imprisonment, a fine of 20,000 and pay the
costs.

Evidence show that a confidential informant, a NARCOM operative informed the police unit at Camp
Olivas, San Fernando Pampanga, of the illegal drug activities of the Appellant. Capt. Bustamante,
commanding officer of the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit, formed a buy-bust team, consisting of Sgt. Lopez,
Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz and Sgt. Pejoro. After securing the marked money, they proceeded to Sto. Cristo
Guagua Pampanga and coordinated with the police authorities and barangay officials thereof. When they
reached the place, the informant pointed out the Appellant to Lopez and Lopez approached, asking
Appellant if he had Marijuana. The appellant answered to the affirmative and Lopez offered to buy two
bags. The appellant left and returned shortly, giving the two teabags to Lopez, after receiving the marked
money amounting to P40.00, Lopez scratched his head to alert companions and they proceeded to arrest
the Appellant. He was brought to the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Olivas and was placed under
Custodial Investigation under Sgt. Pejoro.

Appellant’s side of the story: He was told that he was a pusher on a jeep ride with theofficers and forced
to sign papers. He was punched in thestomach when he refused to do so. He dmitted that he escaped from
the NARCOM office BUT itwas because of the maltreatment and went to his uncle’s house (Bienvenido
Sunga) and thereafter Confined in the hospital for 3 days

The trial court convicted the appellant for aviolation of the Dangerous Drug Act and imposed a Penalty of
Life imprisonment, fine of PHP20,000, and pay thecosts and 4 tea bags of marijuana were confiscated by
the Government.

Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal saleof prohibited drugs. Thus, it is unlikely
that he was set-up and morelikely that he committed the crime.

Issue: Should RA 7659 be given a retroactive effect to provide him a lesser penalty, as provided in Article
22 of the RPC?

Held:
Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the sale of four tea bags of marijuana with a total
weight of only 3.8 grams and, in fact, stands to be convicted for the sale of only two of those tea bags, the
initial inquiry would be whether the patently favorable provisions of Republic Act
No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the lesser penalty provided thereunder,
pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.

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Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit originally amendatory and in
substitution of the previous Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code, it has long been settled that by
force of Article 10 of said Code the beneficient provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be given
retrospective effect to crimes punished by special laws. The execution in said article would not apply to
those convicted of drug offenses since habitual delinquency refers to convictions for the third time or more
of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification.

Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 could neither have then been involved
nor invoked in the present case, a corollary question would be whether this court, at the present stage,
can sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be imposed on appellant.
That issue has likewise been resolved in the cited case of People vs. Moran, et al., ante., thus:

. . . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of penal laws
in so far as they are favorable to persons accused of a felony, would be useless and nugatory if the courts
of justice were not under obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not the accused has
applied for it, just as would also all provisions relating to the prescription of the crime and the penalty.

If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced penalties provided in Republic Act
No. 7659 has already become final and executory or the accused is serving sentence thereunder, then
practice, procedure and pragmatic considerations would warrant and necessitate the matter being
brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ of habeas corpus.

By the force of Article 10, provisions of Article 22 applies to and shall be given retroactive effect for crimes
punished by special penal laws (except habitual delinquents). The penalty, prison correccional, although
defined in the special penal law, was taken from the RPC in its technical nomenclature, with its duration,
correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties native to the code.

*If the penalties under special laws are without reference or relation to those under RPC, there can be no
suppletory effects of the rules of application of penalties under said code, or by other relevant provisions
based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the code. The special penal law legal intent was
clear.

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II. General Principles of Criminal Liability

A. Felony, defined (Art. 3, RPC)

B. Elements of criminal liability
i. Physical element (Actus reus)
1. Act
2. Omission
People v. Sylvestre and Atienza, G.R. No. 35748, 14 December 1931, 56 Phil. 353
FACTS:
Romana Silvestre, wife of Joaquin, cohabitated with her co-defendant Atienza. Joaquin filed a complaint
for adultery. The said accused were arrested and later released on bail. The two accused begged to talk to
Joaquin to withdraw the complaint and promised to discontinue their cohabitation. The case was
withdrawn and dismissed.

Later, Romana Silvestre met her son, Nicolas de, in the barrio of Santo Niño, and under pretext of asking
him for some nipa leaves, followed him home to the village of Masocol, and remained there. The accused,
Martin Atienza, who had continued to cohabit with said Romana Silvestre, followed her and lived in the
home of Nicolas de la Cruz.

On the night the crime was committed, while Nicolas and his wife were gathered together with the
appellants herein after supper, Martin Atienza told said coupled to take their furniture out of the house
because he was going to set fire to it because according to him, that was the only way he could be revenged
upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery against him and his
codefendant, Romana Silvestre. As Martin Atienza was at that time armed with a pistol, no one dared say
anything to him. The couple left the house, and as they tried to communicate with the barrio lieutenant,
they heard cries of "Fire! Fire!" and saw their home in flames, and ran back to it. The fire destroyed about
48 houses.

The court found Romana Silvestre, guilty as an accomplice, for being listening to her codefendant's threat
without raising a protest, and did not give the alarm when the latter set fire to the house.

ISSUE: Whether or not Romana is guilty as an accomplice.

HELD: No

Article 14 of the Penal Code, considered in connection with article 13, defines an accomplice to be one
who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to commit
it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions.

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The complicity which is penalized requires a certain degree of cooperation, whether moral, through advice,
encouragement, or agreement, or material, through external acts. In the case of the accused-appellant
Romana Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation, and none of an agreement to
commit the crime in question. Here mere presence and silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not
constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit
the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not make
her liable as an accomplice.

For all the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold, that:

(1) Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm,
without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by article
14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with
regard to which one has kept silent; and

(2) he who desiring to burn the houses in a barrio, without knowing whether there are people in
them or not, sets fire to one known to be vacant at the time, which results in destroying the rest,
commits the crime of arson, defined and penalized in article 550, paragraph 2, Penal Code.

Hence, accused-appellant Martin Atienza, was found guilty and reversed with reference to the accused-
appellant Romana Silvestre, who is hereby acquitted.

People v. Talingdan, L-32126, 6 July 1978, 84 SCRA 19

FACTS:
Teresa and Bernardo (victim) and their children (Corazon, 12 yrs old) live near municipal building. Prior to
the death of Bernardo, on 2 different occasions, appellant Talingdan had visited Teresa in their house while
Bernardo was out at work, and during every visit, they make Corazon leave the house. About a month
before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did not come back for a period of more
than 3 weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan were seen together in the town
during that time;

2 days before he was gunned down, Bernardo and Teresa had a violent quarrel; Heslapped Teresa several
times; and the latter sought the help of the police. Talingdan, who was a police man, came to the vicinity
of Bernardo's house and called him to come down but Bernardo ignored him, so the latter left the place
with a warning that someday he would kill Bernardo.

A day before commission of a crime, Corazon, who was then in a creek to wash clothes saw her mother,
Teresa, meeting with Talingdan and their co-appellants Tobias, Berras and Bides in a small hut owned by
Bernardo, some 300 to 400 meters away from the latter's house; as she approached them, she heard one
of them say "Could he elude a bullet"; and when accused Teresa Domogma noticed the presence of her
daughter, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill him".

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Saturday, June 24, 1967, while the Corazon was cooking food for supper in the kitchen of their house
“batalan”, she saw her mother go down the house and go to the yard where she again met with the other
appellants. She noted that the appellants had long guns at the time. After the meeting for about 2 minutes,
Teresa came up the house, while the other appellants went under an avocado tree nearby. As supper was
then ready, the child called her parents to eat; Bernardo who was in the room adjoining the kitchen did
not heed his daughter's call to supper but continued working on a plow, while Teresa also excused herself
by saying she would first put her small baby to sleep. So Corazon ate supper alone, and thereafter, she
informed her father about the presence of persons downstairs, but Bernardo paid no heed to what she
said. He proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the floor near the door. Corazon stayed nearby
watching him. At that moment, he was suddenly fired upon from below the stairs of the "batalan". The
four accused then climbed the stairs of the "batalan" carrying their long guns and seeing that Bernardo
was still alive, Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again. Bides and Berras did not fire their guns at that
precise time, but when Corazon tried to call for help, Bides warned her, saying "You call for help and I will
kill you", so she kept silent. The assailants then fled from the scene, going towards the east.

Teresa pulled Corazon aside and questioned her, and when the latter informed her that she recognized
the killers of her father to be her co-appellants herein, she warned her not to reveal the matter to anyone,
threatening to kill her if she ever did so.

TERESA’S DEFENSE: Teresa knew Talingdan well because they are neighbors but illicit relationship had
never existed between them. As they go to the kitchen, they heard more than five (5) or six (6) successive
gun shots coming from near their "batalan". She did not see the killers of her husband, as the night was
then very dark and it
was raining.

TALINGDAN’S DEFENSE: Talingdan was not in that area at the time of the killing of Bernardo. Being a
policeman of the place at the time, he was one of the two (2) policemen who escorted and acted as
bodyguard of the Mayor.

The court, find the accused guilty of murder qualified by treachery and that they committed the said
offense in conspiracy with each other.

ISSUE: Whether or not Teresa was innocent

HELD: No

It is contended that there is no evidence proving that she actually joined in the conspiracy to kill her
husband because there is no showing of "actual cooperation" on her part with her co-appellants in their
culpable acts that led to his death. If at all, what is apparent, it is claimed, is "mere cognizance,
acquiescence or approval" thereof on her part, which it is argued is than what is required for her conviction
as a co-conspirator.

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The active cooperation of the wife in the conspiracy against the life of the her husband is clearly
demonstrated in the categorical testimony of her 13-year old daughter who declared that she saw her
mother meeting with her other co-accused in a hut on which occasion she overheard one of them ask
"Could he elude a bullet?"; that when her mother noticed her presence, she shoved her away saying, "You
tell your father that we will kill him"; that in the evening of her father's death while she was cooking supper
she saw her mother go down the stairs and meet the other accused who were armed with long guns in
their yard about 3 to 4 meters away from where she was and that she heard them conversing in subdued
tones; and, that after her father was shot and her mother knew that she recognized and could identify her
father's assailants her mother warned her not to tell anyone threatening to kill her if she did.

True it is that the proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt, for
which reason, she cannot have the same liability as her coappellants. Indeed, she had no hand at all in the
actual shooting of her husband. Neither is it clear that she helped directly in the planning and preparation
thereof, albeit We are convinced that she knew it was going to be done and did not object.

But this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is in the record morally convincing
proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the offense committed by her co-accused. She was inside
the room when her husband was shot. As she came out after the shooting, she inquired from Corazon if
she was able to recognize the assailants of her father. When Corazon identified appellants Talingdan,
Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she
knew to anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, "Don't tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this
to somebody." Later, when the peace officers who repaired to their house to investigate what happened,
instead of helping them with the information given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no suspects in
mind. In other words, whereas, before the actual shooting of her husband, she was more or less passive
in her attitude regarding her co-appellants' conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him, after Bernardo
was killed, she became active in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute
"concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an accessory
after the fact under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.

ii. Mental element (Mens rea)

1. Deliberate intent (Dolo)
Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, 29 November 2005

FACTS: Eduardo, 39 years old, was married to Rubylus Gaña.He met the private complainant Tina B.
Gandalera who was then 21 years old. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually,
they went to a motel where, despite Tina's resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her.
Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. When they finally get
married, the couple was happy during first 3 years. However, Manuel started making himself scarce and
went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from
Eduardo, he would slap her. Later, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return and he stopped
giving financial support. Tina became curious and made inquires to NSO and learned that Eduardo had
been was previously married.

EDUARDO’S TESTIMONY: He and tina met in a bar, where the latter worked as a GRO. He informed Tina

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of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaña, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital
relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed that she had a "love-bite" on her neck. He
then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was "single" in his marriage contract
with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid.

Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit
suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited
her in jail after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his
first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years. He did
not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying
Tina.

The trial court convict Eduardo for Bigamy under Article 349.

Eduardo appealed to CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married
the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He insisted that
conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable
for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only
out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage.

The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the felony, i.e., that
the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaña
had been "absent" for 21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead
as a matter of law. He points out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who
has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all
purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of
death with respect to succession.

The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by operation of law upon
the satisfaction of two requirements: the specified period and the present spouse's reasonable belief that
the absentee is dead. He insists that he was able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since
1975 and that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or whether she was still alive; hence, under
Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive death of Gaña had arisen by operation of law, as the two
requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The petitioner concludes that he should thus be
acquitted of the crime of bigamy.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty under Article 3 of RPC

HELD: Yes

Petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent.

Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classi ed as an intentional felony, it
is deemed voluntary. Although the words "with malice" do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal
Code, such phrase is included in the word "voluntary." Malice is a mental state or condition prompting
the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or justi cation from which another suffers injury. When the
act or omission de ned by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the
law presumes it to have been intentional. Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends
the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and such
presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence.
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an
evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.

In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in 1975, and such
marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. The prosecution
also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the
Family Code. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the
private complainant.

As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a
felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an
excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. It was the
burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he
was of the well-grounded belief that his rst wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more
than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring
the presumptive death of his rst wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in
good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and,
as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to
discharge his burden.

a. Elements of dolo
b. General and specific intent
People v. Puno, G.R. No. 97471, 17 February 1993, 219 SCRA 85

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FACTS: Maria Socorro owns a bakeshop. the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of her
husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at the
bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro that her driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency (something
bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary take his place.

Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the Mercedes Benz of her
husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After the car turned right in (sic) a corner of Araneta Avenue, it
stopped. A young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver. Isabelo, who had
earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, 'ma'm, you know, I want to get money from you.'
She said she has money inside her bag and they may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained
P7,000 00 and was taken. Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more Ma. Socorro agreed
to give them that but would they drop her at her gas station. The car sped off north towards the North
superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he is called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00.
Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for P40
thousand. Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and turned the
car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other
side of the superhighway and, after some vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish
vendor's van. Her dress had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on the ground and was
injured when she jumped out of the car.

PUNO’S TESTIMONY: he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed complainant to step out
of the car. He even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride,
and he claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway.

ISSUE: Whether Isabelo Puno and Enrique Amurao committed the felony of kidnapping for ransom or mere
robbery.

HELD: The accused committed the crime of Robbery.

It is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of the crime for which the
accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant offenses, and
the same holds true with regards to the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and
specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation
and accurate conclusion thereon.

In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the
time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her
under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both appellants, without any
other esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as already stated, candidly laid the
blame for his predicament on his need for funds for, in his own testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way
`Mam (sic) Corina was telling me 'Beloy, I know your family very well and I know that your (sic) not (a)

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bad person, why are you doing this?' I told her `Mam (sic), because I need money and I had an ulcer and
that I have been getting an (sic) advances from our office but they refused to give me any bale (sic) ."

With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had kidnapped the victim, we
can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there must be indubitable
proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty, and not where
such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the offenders.

It has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even for an
appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders
liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental
deprivation of the victims liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention. That appellants
in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her personal liberty is
clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional testimony of appellant Puno.

Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the nature of ransom,
considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the complainant personally. Ransom, in
municipal criminal law, is the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured
person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. It can hardly be assumed that when complainant
readily gave the cash and checks demanded from her at gunpoint, what she gave under the circumstances
of this case can be equated with or was in the concept of ransom in the law of kidnappings. These were
merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of a robbery or of which she
was summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that the crime committed is robbery as
defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however, reject the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes
the highway robbery contemplated in and punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.LexLib

People v. Delim, G.R. No. 142773, 28 January 2003

FACTS:

in the evening, Modesto, Rita and Randy were preparing to have their supper in their home. Joining them
were Modesto and Rita's two young grandchildren, aged 5 and 7 years old. They were about to eat their
dinner when Marlon, Robert and Ronald, his stepped brothers, suddenly barged into the house and closed
the door. Each of the three intruders was armed with a short handgun. Marlon poked his gun at Modesto
while Robert and Ronald simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A piece of cloth was placed in
the mouth of Modesto. The accused herded Modesto out of the house on whle Rita and Randy were
warned by the intruders not to leave the house. Leon and Manuel, who were also armed with short
handguns, stayed put by the door to the house of Modesto and ordered Rita and Randy to stay where
they were. Leon and Manuel left the house of Modesto only at around 7:00 a.m. the following day.

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They found Modesto under thick bushes in a grassy area. He was already dead. The cadaver was bloated
and in the state of decomposition. It exuded a bad odor. Tiny white worms swarmed over and feasted on
the cadaver. Randy and his relatives immediately rushed to the police station to report the incident and
to seek assistance. Rita and Randy divulged to the police investigators the names and addresses of Marlon,
Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel, whom they claimed were responsible for the death of Modesto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty of murder or kidnapping

HELD: Murder

It bears stressing that in determining what crime is charged in an information, the material inculpatory
facts recited therein describing the crime charged in relation to the penal law violated are controlling.
Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged such specific intent must
be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution.

The Court held in People v. Isabelo Puno, et al., that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable
proof that the actual specific intent of the malefactor is to deprive the offended party of his liberty and
not where such restraint of his freedom of action is merely an incident in the commission of another
offense primarily intended by the malefactor. If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill
the victim, the incidental deprivation of the victim's liberty does not constitute the felony of kidnapping
but is merely a preparatory act to the killing, and hence, is merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the
victim. The crime committed would either be homicide or murder. What is primordial then is the specific
intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the information or criminal complaint that is determinative of
what crime the accused is charged with — that of murder or kidnapping.

Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances indicate that an
offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively desired a specific result to follow
his act or failure to act. Specific intent involves a state of the mind. It is the particular purpose or specific
intention in doing the prohibited act. Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the
state in a prosecution for a crime requiring specific intent. Kidnapping and murder are specific intent
crimes.

It is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason which prompts the accused
to engage in a particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the
prosecution need not prove the same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense
charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of
accused for the crime charged such as murder. The history of crimes shows that murders are generally
committed from motives comparatively trivial. Crime is rarely rational.

In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the victim
of his/her liberty. If there is no motive for the crime, the accused cannot be convicted for kidnapping. In

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kidnapping for ransom, the motive is ransom. Where accused kills the victim to avenge the death of a
loved one, the motive is revenge.

Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred from
the circumstances of the actions of the accused as established by the evidence on record.

In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the specific intent of the malefactors in barging
into the house of Modesto was to kill him and that he was seized precisely to kill him with the attendant
modifying circumstances. The act of the malefactors of abducting Modesto was merely incidental to their
primary purpose of killing him. Moreover, there is no specific allegation in the information that the
primary intent of the malefactors was to deprive Modesto of his freedom or liberty and that killing him
was merely incidental to kidnapping. Irrefragably then, the crime charged in the Information is Murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof.

In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two things:
first, the criminal act and second, defendant's agency in the commission of the act. Wharton says that
corpus delicti includes two things: first, the objective; second, the subjective element of crimes.

In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the
party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the
deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed
the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the death. To prove
the felony of homicide or murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that
the victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence
may consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of
wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or
immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor,
intent to kill is conclusively presumed. The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond
reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence.

c. Mistake of fact
US v. Ah Chong, G.R. No. 5272, 19 March 1910, 15 Phil. 488

FACTS:
Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort McKinley, Rizal Province, and at
the same place, deceased, was employed as a house boy.

On the night at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, was suddenly awakened by someone trying to force open
the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was
convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way
into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark,

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and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If
you enter the room, I will kill you." At the moment he was struck just above the knew by the edge of the
chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that
the blow had been in icted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a
burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the
room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which
he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out,
was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately
wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight.
Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran
back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described,
one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant
alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal
protection.

The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have been or friendly and
amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he
should knock at the door and acquaint his companion with his identity.

he defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under
the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room,
despite defendant's warnings.

No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascual suggests itself, unless it be
that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frighten
him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah
Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.

ISSUE: Whether or not, there was a mistake of fact,

HELD: Yes

Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitled to complete
exemption from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced
open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him
to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such
an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice- repeated

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warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be
questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a
small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warning, defendant
would have been wholly justi ed in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault,
and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first
blow.

But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the
defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time when
he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron"
as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of
knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his charge.

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at the bar convinces us that the defendant
Chinaman struck the fatal below alleged in the information in the belief that the intruder who forced open
the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was an imminent peril, both of his life
and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as
they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice,
or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising hid legitimate right of self-
defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from
criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or
recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by
him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believed threatened his person and his
property and the property under his charge. åå

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative
a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e. g., in larceny,
animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes and misdemeanors generally some degree of criminal intent)
"cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the
circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases
where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdemeanor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different
from that which he intended to commit.

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the
act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from
criminal liability, provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; hat is to say, the question as
to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and
the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in
forming the intent, criminal or otherwise upon which he acted.

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People v. Oanis, G.R. No. 47722, 27 July 1943, 74 Phil. 257

FACTS:
● Police received information on escape`d convict named Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in
Cabanatuan. They were tasked to arrest Balagtas and to get him dead or alive only if he resists or acts in
aggression.
● Oanis and Galanta with private Fernandez followed a lead to the house where Irene was supposedly living.
Upon arrival, the group approached Bigida Mallare who indicated where Irene was sleeping in with her
paramour. Mallare then returned to her own room out of fright of what might happen. Oanis and Galanta
then went to the room of Irene and seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door, the police
immediately started to shoot. Irene was awakened by the shooting and tuhen fainted after seeing her
paramour wounded. After the shooting, the man was apparently Serapio Tecson who was mistaken to be
Balagtas because of his association with Irene.
● Oanis claimed that after opening the curtain and after him saying “If you are Balagtas, stand up”, Galanta
fired Tecson while he was lying on the bed. When Oanis saw that Tecson was seemingly picking up
something from the floor, Oanis fired at Tecson.
● Galanta, on the other hand, claimed that Oanis shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit up in bed
after being awakened by the noise.
ISSUE:
● Whether Oanis and Galanta were guilty of reckless imprudence.
RULING:
● Oanis and Galanta were found guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence and were each sentenced
from 1 year and 6 months to 2 years and 2 months of prison correccional and to jointly and severally pay
the heirs of the deceased 1,000 pesos.
● The judge then modifies the sentence upon separate appeals by the defendants to 5 years imprisonment
to 15 years of reclusion temporal and pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally
an indemnity of 2,000 pesos with costs.

d. Malum prohibitum as exception to the requirement of mens rea

Padilla v. Dizon, AC No. 3086, 23 February 1988, 158 SCRA 127

FACTS:
Then Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, filed an administrative complaint against respondent Baltazar R.
Dizon, RTC Judge of Branch 115, Pasay City, on August 6, 1987 for rendering a manifestly erroneous decision in
Criminal Case No. 86-10126-P, entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Lo Chi Fai”, due to gross incompetence and
gross ignorance of the law. Respondent Judge filed an Answer to the Complaint wherein he recited his
“commendable record as a fearless prosecutor”; that his length in service as a prosecutor and a judge is “tangible
proof that would negate the allegations of the petitioner. He added that the decision in the complaint that was
promulgated by respondent on September 29, 1986, although the complaint was only filed against him on August
6, 1987, is a clear indication of malice and ill-will of the complainant to subject him to harassment, humiliation and
vindictiveness. Also, he stated that his decision on the case in question is based on “fundamental principles and the
foundation of rights and justice” and if there are mistakes or errors in the questioned decision, they are committed
in good faith.

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The case in question, in which the respondent rendered a decision of acquittal, involved a tourist, Lo Chi Fai, who
was caught by a Customs guard at Manila International Airport while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and
foreign exchange instrument out of the country. He was apprehended by a custom guard and two PAFSECOM
officers while on board Flight PR 300 of Philippines Airlines bound for Hongkong. He was found carrying foreign
currency and foreign exchange instruments (380 pisces) without any authority as provided by law and was able to
show two currency declarations which he supposed have accomplished upon his arrival in Manila.

The accused tried to establish that he was a businessman, engaged in the garment business, from Kowloon,
Hongkong and that he come to Philippines 9 to 10 times, although he can only remember four dates, to invest in
business in the Philippines and also to play casino. That he had a group of business associates who had their own
businesses in Japan and Hongkong who decided to invest in business with him. That he tried to declare the money
he brought from Japan and China but the Central Bank representative refused to accept his declaration, until he
could get a confirmation as to the source of the money. He stated that as per agreement with his business associates
to invest in some business in the Philippines, each one of them started money for this purpose in a common fund
when they came to the Philippines and that they would declare all the money they were bringing in and the accused
is the one who kept all the declarations. These said currency declarations were presented in court as exhibits for
the defense and when he was asked why he did not present the said declarations when he was apprehended, he
answered that he was not asked to present the declarations of his business associates, that he does not understand
English and he was not told to do so. He also testified that the reason that he was going back to Hongkong and
bringing all the money was because of the fear of his group that the revolution taking place in Manila might become
widespread.

The respondent judge accepted the explanation and acquitted the accused in his decision. Also, the respondent
judge directed in his decision the release to the accused of at least the amount of $3,000.00.

ISSUE: WON respondent Judge Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in
rendering the decision in question.

RULING:
The respondent judge has shown gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law in holding that to
convict the accused for violation of CB Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the accused had
the criminal intent to violate the law. The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent
(mens rea) is not essential in offenses to be punished by special laws, which are mala prohibita. In requiring
proof of malice, the respondent has by his gross ignorance allowed the accused to go scot free. The accused
at the time of his apprehension at the Manila International Airport had in his possession the amount of
US$355,349.57 in assorted foreign currencies and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces), without any
specific authority from the Central Bank as required by law.

He not only acquitted the accused Lo Chi Fai, but directed in his decision the release to the accused of at least

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the amount of US$3,000.00, allowed, according to respondent, under Central Bank Circular No. 960. This, in
spite of the fact that forfeiture proceedings had already been instituted by the Bureau of Customs over the
currency listed in the information, which according to the respondent should be respected since the Bureau
of Customs "has the exclusive jurisdiction in the matter of seizure and forfeiture of the property involved in
the alleged infringements of the aforesaid Central Bank Circular." In invoking the provisions of CB Circular
No. 960 to justify the release of US$3,000.00 to the accused, the respondent judge again displayed gross
incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. There is nothing in the said CB Circular which could be taken
as authority for the trial court to release the said amount of U.S. Currency to the accused. According to the
above-cited CB Circular, tourists may take out or send out from the Philippines foreign exchange in amounts
not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them; for the purpose of establishing such
amount, tourists or non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its
equivalent in other foreign currencies must declare their foreign exchange at points of entries upon arrival
in the Philippines.

The Court finds the respondent RTC Judge Baltazar R. Dizon guilty of gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law
and grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity. The Court also ordered that the Respondent Judge Baltazar
R. Dizon be dismissed from the service and all leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which he may be
entitled are hereby forfeited with prejudice to his being reinstated in any branch of government service, including
government -owned and/or controlled agencies or corporations.

Magno v. CA, G.R. No. 96132, 26 June 1992, 210 SCRA 475
Facts:
● Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair shop operational,
approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries.
● VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice President, Joey
Gomez, that Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could
accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities.
● The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as warranty
deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP Gomez to look for third party who could lend
him that amount.
● Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided that amount.
● As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and the rest had no
sufficient fund.
● Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled out the equipment.
● Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty.

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Issue:
Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.

Held:
No. To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it was not his own
account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust debt since he did not
receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing
company which is managed by the officials and employees of LS Finance

Garcia v. CA, G.R. No. 157171, 14 March 2006, 484 SCRA 617

FACTS:
Aquilino Pimintel, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit against Electio Officer Arsenia Garcia (Arsenia), along with her co-
conspirators, for willfully and unlawfully decreasing the number of votes he received from 6,998 to 1921 votes.

All the accused was acquitted due to lack of evidence except for Arsenia who was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel in
the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881.

She was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of 6 years as maximum, but applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum penalty is the next lower degree which is 6 mos. She was not entitled to probation and was
sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office. Moreover, she was also deprived of her right of suffrage.
Petitioner appealed to CA which also affirmed the decision of the RTC and increased the minimum penalty to 1 year.

Arsenia appealed to SC, contending that the judgment of CA is erroneous and there was no motive on her part to
reduce the votes of private complainant. Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense
in the violation of an election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.

ISSUES:
1. WON a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se or mala prohibita.
2. WON good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?

RULING:

1. Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts
complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special
law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime;
otherwise, no crime is committed.

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On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but
become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is
whether the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for
reasons of public policy.

Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 provides:

SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and election
offenses enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended,
the following shall be guilty of an election offense:
xxx
(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who
tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any
member of the board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the
correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.
xxx

Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and mistakes
committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted
and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it
could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally
increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is
done with malice and intent to injure another.

Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes,
unless the contrary shall appear. Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the burden of proving
its existence.

During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who announced the figure of
1,921, which was subsequently entered by then accused Viray in his capacity as secretary of the board.
Petitioner likewise admitted that she was the one who prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7), though it was not
her duty.To our mind, preparing the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an intention to perpetuate
the erroneous entry in the COC[

Neither can this Court accept petitioners explanation that the Board of Canvassers had no idea how the
SOV (Exhibit 6) and the COC reflected that private complainant had only 1,921 votes instead of 6,921
votes. As chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioners concern was to assure accurate,
correct and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency and fidelity to her

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trust deserves not only censure but also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal responsibility
pursuant to the dictates of the law.

2.YES. what is being punished is the intentional decreasing of a candidate’s votes and not those arising from errors
and mistakes. Since a violation of this special law is a malum in se, good faith can be raised as a defense. The
person invoking the said defense has the burden of proving its existence.

Garcia’s defense of good faith was not proven. Facts show that the decreasing of Pimentel’s vote was not due to
error or mistake. It was shown that she willingly handled certain duties which were not supposed to be hers to
perform. That’s a clear sign that she facilitated the erroneous entry.

e. Intent distinguished from motive

2. Constructive intent (Culpa) Art. 3 and 365
i. Elements
ii. Imprudence or lack of skill
iii. Negligence or lack of foresight

People v. Pugay, L-74324, 17 November 1988, 167 SCRA 439

FACTS:

The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Sometime after
midnight at the town fieta, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book with
his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived. These persons
appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby,
they started making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.

Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of
gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former.
Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process of pouring the gasoline. Then,
the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.

The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the police officers
brought Gabion, the two accused and five other persons to the Rosario municipal building for interrogation.
Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the written statements of Gabion and the two accused, after which
Gabion was released. The two accused remained in custody.

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ISSUE: WON Pugay and Samson are guilty of the crime murder.

RULING: No.

However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal
purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the commission of the
crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at
the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted
to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising
from different acts directed against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable
only for the act committed by him.

A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious,
careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for
such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through
culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever
be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.

There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the
deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting the
latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their
fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him
of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind of
physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver
offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the
aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

Criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson are counted as individual acts and they are held liable only for the acts
they committed individually.

1.Pugay – guilty reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.

He should have known that what he was pouring on Miranda was gasoline because of its smell. He failed to
exercise diligence necessary to avoid the consequences of his actions and exposed Miranda to danger and injury.

2.Samson – guilty of homicide credited with ordinary circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong.
Samson merely wanted to set Miranda’s clothes on fire but this not relieves him of criminal liability.

As Article 4 of the RPC provides: Criminal liability shall be incurred:

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1. By any person committing a felony (delito, although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means.

Ivler v. San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, 17 November 2010

FACTS:
Following a vehicular collision, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged with two separate offenses:
(1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce ; and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the
death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.

Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on
the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved
to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the
same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the
two cases.

The petitioner elevated the matter to RTC, in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MeTC the
suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial
question.

Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of
petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued a
resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after
his arrest.Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained
unresolved.

ISSUES:
1. WON petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in SCA 2803 when the MeTC ordered his
arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366
2. WON petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings
in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent
Ponce’s husband.

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RULING:
1. Petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him
of standing to maintain the petition in SCA 2803.

The Court explained that, under Sec. 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
defendant’s absence only makes it bondsman potentially liable on its bond, and that it could be revoked
in the event the bondman fails to present the accused within 30 days. The accused retained in standing
and, in case of non-attendance without explanation, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or
acquitted. On the RTC’s observation that the petitioner provided “no explanation why he failed to attend
the scheduled proceeding”, the Court ruled that the RTC failed to appreciate that there is a pending motion
for reconsideration filed by the petitioner which was left unresolved by the lower court.

2. The protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him
in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366.

According to the Court, the MeTC is mistaken in finding the two cases of reckless imprudence
entirely separate offenses using the basis that the Second Criminal Case required proof of an additional
fact which the First Criminal Case does not.

Reckless imprudence is a single crime; its consequences on persons and property are material
only to determine the penalty. The two charges against the petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the Article 365 of the RPC. The reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC is a
single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or
acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its
various resulting acts.

3. Article 48 does not apply to Acts Penalized under Article 365 of the RPC
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems
from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and
procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48
on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code.

Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under
either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus
excluding from its operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other. This procedural tool is crafted to benefit the accused who, have multiple sentences, will serve
the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.

Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony “but the mental attitude
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight”, a single mental attitude regardless
of the resulting consequences. This was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.

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The contention of MeTC to invoke the Art. 48, where light offenses such as slight physical injuries
cannot be complexed with grave or less grave felony such as murder that the court is compelled to
separate both charges is untenable in this case. The principle of prosecuting quasi-offenses remains intact
in the case thus the petitioner cannot be prosecuted for 2 offenses of similar charges of reckless
imprudence. His prosecution on the first offense thus bars another prosecution for the second offense by
virtue of the principle of double jeopardy.

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c. Transferred intent (Art. 4, par. 1)

i. Aberratio ictus

People v. Guillen, L-1477, 18 January 1950, 85 Phil. 307

FACTS:
● By the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Case No. 2746, Julio Guillen y Corpuz,
or Julio C. Guillen, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated
murder and is sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify the deceased of Simeon Valera (Barrela)
in the sum of P2,000.00 and to pay the costs.
● On arraignment, the accused plead not guilty to the said charges. He was tried in one of the branches of
the Court of First Instance in Manila presided over by honorable Buenaventura Ocampo who rendered the
above judgment after the submission of the evidence. The counsel de oficio for the accused, at the
beginning of the trial and before arraignment, moved that the mental health of the accused to examine.
The court ordered that the accused be confined for Hospital, National Psychopathic Hospital, to be
examined by medical experts who should report accordingly. The diagnosis is that the accused is not insane
but is an individual with a personality disorder, Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority. Hence, the court
ruled that Julio Guillen is not insane and could be tried for the offenses he committed.
● In the 1946 Presidential election, the accused voted for the defeated candidate. The successful candidate,
Manuel A. Roxas, assumed the Office of the President of the Commonwealth and subsequently President
of the Philippine Republic. When President Roxas, according to the accused, failed to redeem pledges and
fulfill the promised he made during the campaign, he became disappointed and his disappointment
worsen when President Roxas sponsored and campaigned for the parity measure instead of looking after
the interest of the country. Hence, he decided to assassinate the President. When the opportunity
presented itself at a popular meeting held by the Liberal Party at Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, Manila on the
night of March 10, 1947, which was attended by a big crowd , he decided to carry out his plan.
● On the night of the meeting, Guillen went to Plaza Miranda carrying two hand grenades concealed in a
paper bag which also contained peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades in a pot near the platform
where the President and his wife and daughter along with prominent names in government and politics
were located. To carry out his plan, he stood on a chair on which he had been sitting and he threw the
grenade at the President who just finished his speech and was being congratulated and was about to leave
the platform. General Castaneda, who was in the same platform and who saw the grenade, kicked it away
from the platform towards the open space where he thought the grenade was likely to less harm; covered
the President with his body and shouted to the crowd to lie down. The grenade exploded in the middle of
the group of people near the platform. The explosion caused panic and it was found that the grenade
severely injured Simeon Valera, who died on the following day, and several other people.
● Guillen was arrested two hours later and was identified by the witness, Angel Garcia, as the one who threw
the grenade at the platform. The accused admitted his responsibility and at the same time justified his
action in throwing the grenade at President Roxas. He indicated to his captors the location of his last will
which contained the reasons for his action and the location of the second grenade.

ISSUES:
● WON the appellant is guilty of the complex crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder.

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● WON the sentence of death penalty was correct and should be aggravating circumstances be considered.

RULING:
The Court affirmed the decision of the CFI by unanimous vote and death sentence shall be executed,
stating that the facts do not support the contention of the counsel that the appellant is guilty only of
homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Valera and of less physical injuries
in regard to other said victims.
In throwing the hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the Court stated
that the appellant acted with malice, and was therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act,
for in accordance. With Article 4 of the RPC, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing felony
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
The act cannot be classified as criminal negligence because such requires that the injury incurred
be unintentional as the incident of act performed without malice. The Court finds that a deliberate intent
to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence.

ii. Error in personae

People v. Sabalones, G.R. No. 123485, 31 August 1998, 294 SCRA 751
Facts:
On June 1, 1985, Edwin Santos went to the house of Maj. Tiempo where a small gathering was
taking place. Arriving thereat, he saw Nelson and Glenn Tiempo, Rogelio Presores, Regelio Oliveros, Junior
Villoria, Rey Bolo and Alfredo Nardo. At 11pm, Stephen Lim, who was also at the party, called their group
and asked them to drive his car home. Nelson, accompanied by Rogelio Presores, Rogelio Oliveros and
Junior, drove Stephen Lim’s car. They followed Glenn, Rey and Alfredo who were riding in an owner-type
jeep.
When they arrived at the gate of the house of Stephen, Glenn, Rey and Alfredo were fired at by
Teodulo Alegarbes, Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo Beronga. Glenn, Rey and Alfredo fell to the ground;
Rey, although injured by the gunshots, was able to escape. Thereafter, the gunmen fired at the car driven
by Nelson. Nelson and other passengers were injured; despite Nelson’s injuries, he was able to drive back
to their residence.
In the defense’s version of the facts, Rolusape Sabalones remembered that a month prior to the
death of Nabing Velez, his father, Federico Sabalones Sr. and Nabing Velez, while matching their fighting
cocks, had an altercation and the latter slapped his father and challenged his father to ask one of his sons
to avenge what he had done to him.
Furthermore, Timoteo Beronga mentioned in his extrajudicial statement that:
“It did not take long after we knew that Nabing was killed, somebody called up by telephone
looking for Roling, and this was answered by Roling but we did not know what they were conversing about
and then Roling went back to the house of Junior (Roling’s deceased brother; all of this happened during
the wake of Junior) after answering the phone. And after more than two hours, we heard the sound of
engines of vehicles arriving, and then Meo, the man who was told by Roling to guard, shouted saying:
"They are already here[;]" after that, Roling came out carrying a carbine accompanied by Tsupe, and not
long after we heard gunshots and because of that we ran towards the house where the wake was. But
before the gun-shots, I heard Pedring Sabalones father of Roling saying: "You clarify, [t]hat you watch out
for mistake[n] in identity," and after that shout, gunshots followed. [sic] Then after the gun-shots Roling

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went back inside still carrying the carbine and shouted: 'GATHER THE EMPTY SHELLS AND MEO[,] YOU
BRING A FLASHLIGHT,' and then I was called by Meo to help him gather the empty shells of the carbine
and also our third companion to gather the empty shell.”

Beronga’s extrajudicial statement was corroborated by the testimony of Prosecution Witness

Jennifer Binghoy. Binghoy’s testimony is as follows:
“They gathered in one table and they were conversing with each other. … I heard over the radio at
the Sabalones Family that a certain Nabing Velez was shot. … I observed that their reactions were so queer,
– as if they were running. … When the shots were fired, I did not proceed to look through the window
because I stooped down. … After the burst of gunfire, I again opened the window and saw two persons
going towards the jeep and went back to Sabalones’ house. … 5 to 6 people coming from the highway and
looking to the jeep, and before they reached the jeep someone shouted that “it’s ours”. The person who
shouted was Roling Sabalones. … the Sabalones’ house was in chaos because the wives were advising their
husbands to go home.”

The RTC found the accused guilty of murder of Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo and of frustrated murder
of Rey Bolo, Rogelio Presores and Nelson Tiempo. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the case is one of aberratio ictus. (or Whether or not the accused are guilty of murder
and frustrated murder although there was a mistake in the identity of the victim)
Held:
No, the case is not one of aberratio ictus.
The trial court relied on the concept of aberratio ictus to explain why the appellants staged the ambush,
not to prove that appellants did in fact commit the crimes. Even assuming that the trial court did err in
explaining the motive of the appellants, this does not detract from its findings, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals and sustained by this Court in the discussion above, that the guilt of the appellants was proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
The conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the appellants killed the wrong
persons was based on the extrajudicial statement of Appellant Beronga and the testimony of Jennifer
Binghoy. These pieces of evidence sufficiently show that appellants believed that they were suspected of
having killed the recently slain Nabing Velez, and that they expected his group to retaliate against them.
Hence, upon the arrival of the victims' vehicles which they mistook to be carrying the avenging men of
Nabing Velez, appellants opened fire. Nonetheless, the fact that they were mistaken does not diminish
their culpability. The Court has held that "mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as
when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim.”
The case is better characterized as error in personae or mistake in the identity of the victims, rather
than aberratio ictus which means mistake in the blow, characterized by aiming at one but hitting the other
due to imprecision in the blow. In the case at bar, the appellants opened fire because they they mistook
the vehicles to be carrying the avenging men of Nabing Velez. The fact that they were mistaken does not
diminish their culpability.

Additional information with regard to transferred intent (not mentioned in the the ruling tho hehe):
Transferred intent is used when a defendant intends to harm one victim, but then unintentionally harms
a second victim instead. In this case, the defendant’s intent transfers from the intended victim to the actual

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victim and can be used to satisfy the mens rea element of the crime that the defendant is being charged
with. The transferred intent doctrine is only used for completed crimes, and is not used for attempted
crimes.

iii. Praeter intentionem

People vs. Albuquerque, G.R. No. 38773, 19 December 1933, 59 Phil. 150
FACTS:
● Gines Alburquerque was found guilty of the crime of homicide committed on Manuel Osma and was
sentenced to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor and indemnify the heirs the deceased in the sum of
P1,000.00 with costs.
● The accused, a widower of 55 years old and a father of 9 children, has been suffering from a partial
paralysis, walks with one leg and lost control of his right arm. He was an able to walk and is living with his
daughter Maria, married, along with his other children, except for the nun and the other married daughter.
● Pilar, one of his daughter living with Maria, became acquainted and intimate with the deceased Manuel
Osma on the late 1928, which is when the appellant became acquainted with the victim who frequently
visited his daughter. The relationship and Osma resulted to a birth of a child which was hidden to the
appellant and was only became known when Pilar went home with the child. The appellant appeared sad
and worried because of the dishonor it brought to his family and the burden that it will add to Maria. He
then started to write letters to the victim, which were sometimes hostile and threatening and sometimes
entreating the deceased to marry his daughter or, at least, to support her and the child. The deceased
agreed to send support, but he never complied with his word.
● The appellant was in a mood when he went to the office where the deceased work to talk. They both went
downstairs where, according to the appellant, he proposed to the deceased to marry his daughter and
when the victim refused, he whipped out his penknife. When the deceased saw the knife, he tried to seize
the appellant by the neck and where he intended to stabbed him on the face, but, due to his lack of control
in his right arm, inflicted a wound on the base of the neck of the victim, which resulted to his death.

ISSUES:
● WON the appellant acted on legitimate self-defense

RULING:
● The trial court found that the appellant did not intend to cause grave an injury as death of the deceased.
According to the appellant, he only intended to inflict a wound that would live a permanent scar on the
face of the deceased or one that would compel him to stay at the hospital.
● The court cannot entertain the claim that he acted in legitimate self-defense because he was the one who
provoked when he whipped out his penknife.
● In review of the circumstances, the court imposed that the appellant be charged of the penalty next lower
to reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor. The appellant was sentenced to suffer indeterminate
penalty of from 1 year of prison correccional to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor.

3. Concurrences
4. Resulting harm

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5. Causation

Bataclan v. Medina, L-10126, 22 October 1957, 102 Phil. 181

FACTS:
● Bus No. 30 of the Medina Transport left the town of Amadeo, Cavite with about eighteen passenger,
including the driver and conductor, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado
Saylon, about after midnight on September 13, 1952. At about 2 o’clock that same day, while the bus was
running in Imus, Cavite, one of the tires burst which caused the vehicle to zigzag and eventually fell into a
canal or ditch and turned turtle. Some passengers managed to leave the bus, others have to be pulled out
or to be helped, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Juan Bataclan, Felipe Lara
and one from Visayan Island, could not get out but heard by some passengers asking for help, especially
Lara and Bataclan. There was no evidence showing that the passengers, who are free from the bus,
including the driver and conductor, made any effort to rescue the trapped passengers, but calls for help
were made for the houses in the neighborhood. Half an hour later, about ten men, one of them carrying
a bamboo torch, came to the rescue but as soon as the men approached the bus, the fire started, spreading
over and consuming the bus and the ground under it. That same day, the charred bodies of the four
deemed passengers inside the bus were removed and identified.
● By the reason of the death of Juan Bataclan, his widow, Salud Villanueva, filed a case to recover from the
Mariano Medina, owner of Medina Transport, compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fee in the total of P87,150. The Trial Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the
plaintiffs, plus P600 as attorney’s fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise lost in fire. The plaintiffs
and the defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
● WON the defendant carrier is liable to the death of Juan Bataclan.

RULING:
● In accordance to Articles 1755 and 1756, the Court of Appeals agree with the trial court that the case
involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire. The Court of Appeals also agree that there was a
negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, Saylon. There is evidence to show that the bus
was speeding. There is no question that under circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only
question is the degree.
● The Court of Appeals disagree with the trial court on their opinion about the proximate cause of death of
Bataclan, along with other passenger, was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned
the bus; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan was still alive, and so the damages were awarded, not
for his death, but for the physical injuries.
● The Court of Appeals increased the damages awarded by the trial court from P1,000 to P6,000, and from
P600 to P800, for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney’s fee, respectively.

People v. Iligan, G.R. No. 75369, 26 November 1990

FACTS:
At around 2 in the morning Esmeraldo Quinones Jr. and his companions Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban
were walking home from barangay Sto. Domingo after attending a barrio fiesta. On the way they met the

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accused Fernando Iligan and his nephew Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed them
aside prompting Zaldy Asis to box him. Felix quickly said that they had no desire to fight. Upon seeing his
nephew fall, Fernando Iligan drew from his back a bolo and hacked Zaldy but missed. Terrified the trio ran,
pursued by the three accused. They ran for a good while and even passed the house of Quinones, when
they noticed that they were no longer being chased the three decided to head back to Quinones house.
On the way back the threeaccused suddenly emerged from the roadside, Fernando Iligan then
hacked Quinones Jr.on the forehead with his bolo causing him to fall down. Felix and Zaldy ran.
Uponreturning they saw that Quinones Jr. was already dead with his head busted.
The postmortem examination report and the death certificate indicates that the victim died of
“shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to vehicular accident.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are liable for the victim’s death given that it was due to a vehicular
accident and not the hacking.

RULING:
YES.
The Court was convinced beyond peradventure that indeed after Quinones, Jr. had fallen from the
bolo hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. This finding, however, does not in any
way exonerate Iligan from liability for the death of Quinones Jr. This being under ART 4 of the RPC which
states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended.
The essential requisites of Art 4 are: that an intentional felony has been committed and that the
wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct natural and logical consequence of the felony committed
by the offender.
It is held that the essential elements are present in this case. The intentional felony committed was
the hacking of the head of Quinones the fact that it was considered superficial by the physician is
immaterial. The location of the wound intended to do away with him. The hacking incident happened on
the national highway where vehicles pass any moment; the hacking blow received by Quinones weakened
him and was run over by a vehicle. The hacking by Iligan is thus deemed as the proximate cause of the
victim’s death. Iligan is held liable for homicide absent any qualifying circumstances.

Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, 7 January 1988

FACTS:
Filomeno Urbano’s rice field was located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo
Javier. On October 23, 1980, he found the place where he stored his palay flooded with the water coming
from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed because Javier opened it. Urbano got angry and
demanded payment from Javier for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano hit the palm
of Javier’s right hand and left leg with his bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable
settlement formalized in San Fabian Police Station and Javier was paid P700 for the medical expenses. On
November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the hospital because of lockjaw and convulsions caused by
tetanus toxin. Dr. Edmundo Exconde claimed that Javier’s palm was infected by tetanus. Javier died the

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following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain
Menardo Soliven who stated that he saw Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November
5, 1980. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the wound inflicted by Urbano was the proximate cause of Javier’s death.

HELD:
No, the wound inflicted by Urbano was not the proximate cause of Javier’s death.
A proximate cause is defined as “that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more
than 6 days. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time. Severe
tetanus has a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hours or less. If Javier’s wound was already
infected by tetanus during the time it was inflicted, it is medically probable that Javier should have been
infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day
after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time
should have been more than six days. Javier died on the second day from the onset time. Considering the
circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus in 2 or 3 or a few
days but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof
that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The
medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was
an efficient intervening cause later or between the times Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for
failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death
with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action
if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the
injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened
but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent
cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition,
such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

C. Impossible Crimes (Art. 4, Par. 2)

Intod v. CA, G.R. No. 103119, 21 October 1992, 215 SCRA 52
FACTS:

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On February 4, 1979, Aniceto Dumalagan ordered Salvador Manyada to accompany Sulpicio Intod,
Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio, and Avelino Daligdig and to kill Bernardina Palangpangan. If Mandaya
does not follow Dumalagan, Mandaya will also be killed. In the evening of the same day, the five men fired
at Palangpangan’s bedroom. However, it turned out that Palangpangan was in another City and her home
was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room during that time so no one got
hit. However, petitioner and his companions were identified by witnesses.
Intod was convicted of attempted murder by the Regional Trial Court, which the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Hence, petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an
impossible crime.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Intod is guilty of attempted murder.

HELD:
No, Intod is not guilty of attempted murder.
Under Art. 4 (2) of the RPC, “Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for
the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.”
Petitioner contends that Palangpangan’s absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
There must be either legal impossibility or physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act
in order to qualify the act an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if
completed, would not amount to a crime. On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous
circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended
crime. The case at bar belongs to the latter category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his
victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed
to accomplish his end. Thus, the petitioner is guilty of an impossible crime, not attempted murder.

People v. Saladino, L-3634, 30 May 1951, 89 Phil. 807

FACTS:
The following is the testimony of five witnesses (Januaria Corpus, Dr. Juan Pedro Blanco, Melchor
Quevedo, Wilfredo Osman and Jesus Menor):
On June 23, 1948, Corporal Bartolo Saladino and Private Anastacio Alejo were resting in the house
of Celso Abucay with policemen Melchor Quevedo, Wilfredo Osman and George Plan. They were
approached by Felix Pasion who said that he had been robbed, one of the robbers being Luis Bernabe. The
next day, they brought the suspect in Pasion’s house to investigate him. Bernabe denied the accusation. To
extract a confession, Saladino tortured him. Insisting his innocence, Bernabe eventually died due to the
injuries he sustained. Suddenly realizing his predicament, Salandino ordered Alejo to shoot Bernabe four
times using Alejo’s gun to make it appear that Bernabe ran away.
The following is the testimony of Bartolo Salandino:

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On June 24, 1948, while he was conversing with Pasion inside the house, Luis Bernabe was
downstairs under the vigilance of Anastacio Alejo; that four shots were suddenly heard; and that Alejo, had
fired at Bernabe because the latter had attempted to escape.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Saladino and Alejo are guilty of murder.

HELD:
Yes, Saladino is guilty of murder. Saladino’s testimony was contradicted (1) bythe three policemen
who had no reason to falsify, (2) by the nature and direction of the wounds described by the doctor who
saw them wounds which could not have been inflicted while Bernabe was running away, and (3) by the
discovery of the one of the bullets embedded in the ground underneath the corpse of Bernabe. Without
doubt, Saladino is guilty of having cruelly tortured and caused the death of Luis Bernabe.
No, Alejo is not guilty of murder. Alejo does not appear to have conspired with Saladino, and is not
liable either as principal or accomplice of the murder. However, he is guilty as accessory after the fact for
having performed acts tending to conceal Saladino’s crime by making it appear that Bernabe had run away.
Such acts must be characterized as concealment, and since they are not only wrong but also unlawful, the
defendant is not exempt from liability, even though he acted in obedience to command from his superior,
because such command was illegal and in conflict with law and justice. Obedience to the order of a superior
official is not an excuse where the order was not for a lawful purpose.

Jacinto v. People, G.R. No.162540, 13 July 2009

FACTS:
Baby Aquino handed petitioner Gemma Jacinto a Banco De Oro (BDO) check in the amount of
P10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and
petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank
account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the
former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Later, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an
employee of Land Bank, who was looking for Generoso Capitle to inform Capitle that the BDO check
deposited in his account had been dishonored. Ricablanca then called and relayed the message through
accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, because the Capitles did not have a
phone; but they could be reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline
Capitle at Mega Foam.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to
ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash
and divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca,
upon the advice of Mega Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph
Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed
handed petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 as payment for her purchases from Mega Foam. Baby
Aquino further testified that petitioner Jacinto also called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check
bounced. Verification from company records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to

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Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash as
replacement for the dishonored check.
Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an
entrapment operation with its agents. P10,000.00 by Dyhengco were marked were given to Ricablanca,
who was tasked to pretend that she was going along with Valencia's plan.
Ricablanca, petitioner, her husband, and Valencia then boarded petitioner's jeep and went on to
Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino,
pretending that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually brought out from
the premises was the P10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided
the money and upon returning to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter,
petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole time.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Jacinto is guilty of qualified theft.

HELD:
No, Jacinto is not guilty of qualified theft.
Under Art. 308, qualified theft is defined as (1) the taking of personal property - as shown by the fact that
petitioner, as collector for Mega Foam, did not remit the customer's check payment to her employer and,
instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) said property belonged to another − the check belonged to Baby
Aquino, as it was her payment for purchases she made; (3) the taking was done with intent to gain this is
presumed from the act of unlawful taking and further shown by the fact that the check was deposited to
the bank account of petitioner's brother-in-law; (4) it was done without the owner’s consent petitioner hid
the fact that she had received the check payment from her employer's customer by not remitting the check
to the company; (5) it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor
of force upon things the check was voluntarily handed to petitioner by the customer, as she was known to
be a collector for the company; and (6) it was done with grave abuse of confidence petitioner is admittedly
entrusted with the collection of payments from customers. The personal property subject of the theft must
have some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen. In the case at bar,
petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently
without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense,
petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the theft.
The fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced with cash by its issuer is a
different and separate fraudulent scheme. Therefore, qualified theft was not produced.
Instead, Jacinto committed an impossible crime because it was only due to the extraneous circumstance
of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to the petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from
being produced. As of the time that petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had
performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in
this case.

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III. Stages of execution

A. Attempted Stagexf
B. Frustrated Stage
C. Consummated crimes

US v. Eduave, G.R. No. 12155, 2 February 1917, 36 Phil. 209

FACTS:

Protasio Eduave, the querido of the victim’s mother suddenly and struck her from behind, in part at least,
with a sharp bolo, producing a frightful gash in the lumbar region and slightly to the side eight and one-
half inches long and two inches deep, severing all of the muscles and tissues of that part.

Knowing that the victim is already dead, he threw the body into the bushes, then gave himself up and
declared that he had killed the complainant

The crime’s motive was when the victim charged him criminally before the local officials with having raped
her and with being the cause of her pregnancy.

ISSUE:
What stage of crime of murder did Eduave committed?

HELD:

Guilty of frustrated murder. From the moment Eduave attacked the victim from behind in one of the vital
portions of her body, shows that there is a treachery qualifying it as murder.

The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is
no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of
the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been performed which should result in the
consummated crime; while in the former there is such intervention and the offender does not arrive at
the point of performing all of the acts which should produce the crime.

On frustrated crimes like this, the subjective phase has completely passed. Subjectively the crime is
complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he was passing through the subjective phase.

The crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will
of the offender. He did all that was necessary to commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a
consequence it was due to something beyond his control.

Consequently, the victim did not die because of an external element has prevented such death after the
accused has performed all the necessary acts of execution that would have caused the death of the victim

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Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326, 25 January 2006, 480 SCRA 188
FACTS:
At noon of May2, 1998, as Ruben Rodil went to a nearby store to buy food , Edgardo Rivera mocked him
for being jobless and dependent on his wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and thereafter, a
heated exchange of words ensued. In the following day about 7:30 pm, when Ruben and his three year old
daughter went to the store to buy food and to look for his wife, Edgardo together with his brother
Esmeraldo and Ismael Rivera emerged from their house and ganged up on him. Esmeraldo and Ismael
mauled Ruben with fist blows. And as he fell to the ground, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow
block on the parietal area. The Rivera brothers fled when policemen came. The doctor declared that the
wounds were slight and superficial, though the victim could have been killed had the police not promptly
intervened. Trial court rendered judgment finding all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated murder. The accused appealed to the CA, rendering modification in trial court’s decision, in
that the appellants are convicted of attempted murder.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was intent to kill.

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in modifying the crime from frustrated to attempted
murder.

3. Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of treachery was properly applied.

RULING:
1. Yes. The Court held that there was intent to kill as Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with
fist blows, while Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Even though the wounds sustained by
the victim were merely superficial and could not have produced his death, intent to kill is presumed.

2. Yes. The Court of Appeals was correct since based on Art. 6 of the RPC, there is an attempt when the
offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.

3. Yes. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, which gives no opportunity for
the victim to repel it or defend himself. In the present case, the sudden attack to the victim caused him to
be overwhelmed and had no chance to defend himself and retaliate. Thus, there was treachery.

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Baleros v. People, G.R. No. 138033, 22 February 2006, 483 SCRA 10

Facts:
● December 13, 1991 in the Celestial Marie Building, Martina Lourdes Albano, a UST medical student,
occupied room 307 with her maid Bebania. Albano was awakened by the smell of chemicals on a piece of
cloth being pressed on her face. She struggled, but couldn’t move because someone was pinning her down
in her bed. During the attack, she felt her attacker’s clothes and weight, and stated that he was wearing a
t-shirt and shorts. She managed to get help from Bebania, the guard S/G Ferolin, and her classmates in
room 310– Alcala, Baptista, Acosta, and Montes – while her attacker fled from her room through the
bedroom window. Nightdress was stained with blue, which was chloroform.
● According to S/G Ferolin, Baleros wanted to go to room 306, which was owned by Co while Africa was
staying inside the unit. Baleros didn’t have a written authorization, but Ferolin let him in. Africa testified
that Baleros was wearing a dark-colored shorts and a white T-shirt, which Ferolin also acknowledged.
● The following day, Montes found a gray bag inside their unit which did not belong to them, but Alcala
stated that it belonged to Baleros. Inside the bag was a white fraternity shirt, a black adidas shorts, a
handkerchief, and three white shirts, underwear, and socks. In the toxicological exam, the Albano’s night
dress and Baleros’s handkerchief tested positive for chloroform.
○ Albano testified that Baleros was her classmate and he confided his feelings for her but she rejected him.
● RTC – convicted petitioner of attempted rape. CA – Affirmed.

Issue: WON Baleros is guilty of attempted rape

Held: No. Guilty of light coercion.

● Circumstantial evidence is sufficient when: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; (3) combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt
○ SC approves CA’s finding of circumstantial evidence that led to identity of Baleros: (1) he was in the building
when the attack took place; (2) access to Albano’s room due to the window which allowed ingress and
engress; (3) S/G Ferolin and Africa confirmed that he wore a black adidas shorts and a white fraternity shirt
when he arrived in the building and room 307; (4) Albano felt her intruder’s apparel which was cotton and
satin-smooth. Further, found Baleros’s bag which he left in room 307 that contained the handkerchief
stained with blue and wet with chloroform, black adidas shorts, and the white fraternity shirt.
● Article 335 of RPC, rape is committed under the following circumstances: (1) using force or intimidation;
(2) woman is deprived of reason or unconscious; and (3) under 12 years of age or demented
● Article 6 of RPC: “rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of the rape directly
by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
● Overt or external act – some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime,
more than a mere planning or preparation. Petitioner did not commence all the performance of an act
indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Albano … petitioner was fully clothed and there was no attempt
on his part to undress Albano, and to touch her private part.

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○ Appellate court indulges in plain speculation … mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for
proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.

D. Stages of execution in relation to specific felonies

1. Theft

Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 160188, 21 June 2007

FACTS
Petitioner (Valenzuela) concedes having performed the felonious acts imputed against him, but instead
he insist that he should only be adjudged guilty of frustrated theft only, not the felony in its consummated
stage of which he was convicted.

Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon on May 19, 1994 at around 4:30 pm were sighted outside the Super
Sale Club, a supermarket inside SM North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (security guard) who was then manning
in his post at the open parking of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner who was wearing an ID with the
mark Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU), hauling a push cart with cases of detergent “Tide” brand.
Petitioner unloaded the boxes of Tide in an open parking where Calderon is waiting. Petitioner then goes
back inside to get some boxes of detergent then go back after 5 minutes. After that, petitioner left the
open parking then hailed a taxi, boarded the cab, and then directed to Calderon in the open parking to
load the boxes of detergent. All these acts were witnessed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it
was leaving the parking. Lago asked for a receipt of the merchandise, Valenzuela and Calderon reacted by
fleeing on a foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioners
were apprehended and the stolen merchandise recovered. The filched items seized from the two has a
cost of P12, 090.00.

Petitioner were first brought to the SM security office before they were transferred on the same day to
Baler station II of the PNP, QC for investigation. Aside from the petitioner and Calderon, four others were
apprehended at the scene and delivered to PNP QC in connection with the incident. However, on May 20,
1994 only petitioner and Calderon were charged by theft by the Asst. City Prosecutor. They plead not guilty
on arraignment and had different story and claimed innocent bystanders within the vicinity of the grocery.

ISSUE
Whether or not under the given facts, the theft should be deemed as consummated or merely frustrated

HELD
YES, petition is DENIED.
Basic rules on the 3 stages of crimes under RPC (Art. 6 defined)
1. Consummated - when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present.
2. Frustrated - when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will
of the perpetrator.

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3. Attempted - when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts,
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

·Subjective phase - or that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which
begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior acts,
should result in the consummated crime.
·If the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense, the crime is merely attempted. On the
other hand, the subjective phase is completely passed in case of frustrated crimes, for in such instances,
subjectively the crime is complete.
·After that point has been breached, the subjective phase ends and the objective phase begin.

Distinction of consummated, frustrated and attempted

üOffender fails to complete all the acts of execution despite commencing the commission of a felony, the
crime is undoubtedly in the attempted stage.

üThe determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial concession

that all of the acts of execution have been performed by the offender. The critical distinction instead is
whether the felony itself was actually produced by the acts of execution. The determination of whether
the felony was "produced" after all the acts of execution had been performed hinges on the particular
statutory definition of the felony.
Statutory definition of theft (Article 308 of the RPC)

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. — Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latter's consent.

Elements of theft
1. that there be taking of personal property
2. that said property belongs to another
3. that the taking be done with intent to gain
4. that the taking be done without the consent of the owner
5. that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things.

·Applied to the present case, the moment petitioner obtained physical possession of the cases of detergent
and loaded them in the pushcart, such seizure motivated by intent to gain, completed without need to
inflict violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things, and accomplished without the
consent of the SM Super Sales Club, petitioner forfeited the extenuating benefit a conviction for only
attempted theft would have afforded him.
·Following that provision, the theft would have been frustrated only, once the acts committed by
petitioner, if ordinarily sufficient to produce theft as a consequence, "do not produce [such theft] by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator."

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Two determinative factors to consider (1) that the felony is not "produced," and that such failure is due
to causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. (2) ultimately depends on the evidence at hand in
each particular case.

Cases supporting the notion:

·US vs Adiao – get the merchandise out of the custom house and appears that he was observed during the
entire transaction (Frustrated rather than consummated theft)
·People vs Sobrevilla – caught hold of the accused’s shirt-front, at the same time shouting for a policeman;
after a struggle, he recovered his pocket-book and let go of the defendant, who was afterwards caught by
a policeman (Frustrated theft)
·Dino – accused was a driver employed by the United States Army, had driven his truck into the port area
of the South Harbor, to unload a truckload of materials. Pass through the checkpoint, perhaps in the belief
that as the truck had already unloaded its cargo inside the depot, it would be allowed to pass through the
checkpoint without further investigation or checking (Frustrated theft)
·Flores - The accused therein, a checker employed by the Luzon Stevedoring Company, issued a delivery
receipt for one empty sea van to the truck driver who had loaded the purportedly empty sea van onto his
truck at the terminal of the stevedoring company. The truck driver proceeded to show the delivery receipt
to the guard on duty at the gate of the terminal. However, the guards insisted on inspecting the van, and
discovered that the "empty" sea van had actually contained other merchandise as well (Frustrated theft)

DETERMINATIVE FACT OF CONSUMMATION is the ability of the actor to freely dispose of the items stolen
at the time of apprehension is determinative as to whether the theft is consummated or frustrated.

There is no language in Article 308 that expressly or impliedly allows that the "free disposition of the items
stolen" is in any way determinative of whether the crime of theft has been produced. Diño itself did not
rely on Philippine laws or jurisprudence to bolster its conclusion, and the later Flores was ultimately
content in relying on Diño alone for legal support. These cases do not enjoy the weight of stare decisis,
and even if they did, their erroneous appreciation of our law on theft leaves them susceptible to reversal.

Under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft. As petitioner has latched the success
of his appeal on our acceptance of the Diño and Flores rulings, his petition must be denied, for the court
decline to adopt said rulings in our jurisdiction. That it has taken all these years for us to recognize that
there can be no frustrated theft under the RPC does not detract from the correctness of this conclusion. It
will take considerable amendments to our Revised Penal Code in order that frustrated theft may be
recognized.

2. Illegal Trespass
People v. Lamahang, L-43530, 3 August 1935, 61 Phil. 703
FACTS:
Defendant Aurelio Lamahang is before this court on appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo, finding him guilty of attempted robbery and sentencing him to suffer two years and four months
of prision correccional and to an additional penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor for being an
habitual delinquent, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs of the proceeding.

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At early dawn on March 2, 1935 – policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on Delgado
and C. R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused (Lamahang) in the act of making an
opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named street.
- At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman.
- The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when
the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of attempted robbery

RULING:
The sentence appealed from is REVOKED and the accused is hereby held GUILTY OF ATTEMPTED TRESPASS
TO DWELLING, committed by means of force, with the aforesaid aggravating and mitigating circumstances
and sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties thereof and
to pay the costs.

In case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence another person's
dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly
intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to another. In
the instant case, there is nothing in the record from which such purpose of the accused may reasonably
be inferred.
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold that the fact under consideration does not
constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling. (People vs. Tayag and Morales) Under
article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, this offense is committed when a private person shall enter the
dwelling of another against the latter's will. The accused may be convicted and sentenced for an attempt
to commit this offense in accordance with the evidence and the following allegation contained in the
information: ". . . the accused armed with an iron bar forced the wall of said store by breaking a board and
unfastening another for the purpose of entering said store . . . and that the accused did not succeed in
entering the store due to the presence of the policeman on beat Jose Tomambing, who upon hearing the
noise produced by the breaking of the wall, promptly approached the accused ***." Under the
circumstances of this case the prohibition of the owner or inmate is presumed. Against the accused must
be taken into consideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and former convictions, —
inasmuch as the record shows that several final judgments for robbery and theft have been rendered
against him — and in his favor, the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. The breaking of the wall
should not be taken into consideration as an aggravating circumstance inasmuch as this is the very fact
which in this case constitutes the offense of attempted trespass to dwelling.

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3. Physical Injuries, Homicide, and Murder

People v. Borinaga, G.R. No. 33463, 18 December 1930, 55 Phil. 433
FACTS:
Prior to March 4, 1929 – Harry H. Mooney, an American resident of the municipality of Calubian, Leyte,
contracted with one Juan Lawaan for the construction of a fish corral.
- Basilio Borinaga was associated with Lawaan in the construction of the corral.
Morning of March 4, 1929 - Lawaan, with some of his men, went to Mooney's shop and tried to collect
from him the whole amount fixed by the contract, notwithstanding that only about two-thirds of the fish
corral had been finished.
- Mooney refused to pay the price agreed upon that time. Lawaan warned him that if he did not pay,
something would happen to him, to which Mooney answered that if they wanted to do something to him
they should wait until after breakfast, inasmuch as he had not yet taken his breakfast.

- Lawaan then left with his men, and Mooney, after partaking of his morning meal, returned to his shop.
Evening of March 4, 1929 - Mooney was in the store of a neighbor (Perpetua Najarro). He had taken a seat
on a chair in front of Perpetua, his back being to the window.
- Mooney had not been there long when Perpetua saw Basilio Borinaga from the window strike with a knife
at Mooney, but fortunately for the latter, the knife lodged in the back of the chair on which Mooney was
seated. Mooney fell from the chair as a result of the force of the blow, but was not injured. Borinaga ran
away towards the market place.

- Before this occurred, Borinaga had been heard to tell a companion: "I will stab this Mooney, who is an
American brute." After the attack, Borinaga was also heard to say that he did not hit the back of Mooney
but only the back of the chair.

- Borinaga was persistent in his endeavor, and hardly ten minutes after the first attack, he returned, knife
in hand, to renew it, but was unable to do so because Mooney and Perpetua were then on their guard and
turned a flashlight on Borinaga, frightening him away. Again that same night, Borinaga was overheard
stating that he had missed his mark and was unable to give another blow because of the flashlight. The
paint of the knife was subsequent, on examination of the chair, found imbedded in it.
-
The foregoing occurrences gave rise to the prosecution of Basilio Borinaga in the Court of First Instance of
Leyte for the crime of frustrated murder. The defense was alibi, which was not given credence. The accused
was convicted as charged, by Judge Ortiz, who sentenced him to fourteen years, eight months, and one
day of imprisonment, reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties and the costs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the facts constitute frustrated murder or attempted murder within the meaning of article
3 of the Penal Code

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RULING:
The judgment appealed from will be AFFIRMED, WITH THE COSTS of this instance against the appellant.

That within the meaning of article 3 of the Penal Code, the crime committed was frustrated murder and
not attempted murder.
The essential condition of a frustrated crime, that the author performs all the acts of execution, attended
the attack. Nothing remained to be done to accomplish the work of the assailant completely. The cause
resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason of forces independent of the will of the perpetrator.
The assailant voluntarily desisted from further acts. What is known as the subjective phase of the criminal
act was passed.
** The homicidal intent of the accused was plainly evidenced. The attendant circumstances conclusively
establish that murder was in the heart and mind of the accused. More than mere menaces took place. The
aggressor stated his purpose, which was to kill, and apologized to his friends for not accomplishing that
purpose. A deadly weapon was used. The blow was directed treacherously toward vital organs of the
victim. The means used were entirely suitable for accomplishment. The crime should, therefore, be
qualified as murder because of the presence of the circumstance of treachery.

People v. Kalalo, G.R. No. 39303-05, 17 March 1934, 59 Phil. 715

Facts:
Prior to 10 Oct 1932 (date of commission of crime) appellant Marcelo Kalala and Isabela Hogaldo (sister of
deceased Hogaldo and cousin of Panaligan) had a litigation over a parcel of land in Barrio of Calumpang,
Municipality of San Luis, Batangas. Kalalo filed complaints against her in the Court of First Instance but
both were dismissed. Kalalo cultivated the land during the agricultural years 1931-1932 but when harvest
time came Isabela Hogaldo reaped all that were planted.

Isabela and Arcadio decided to order the land plowed and employed laborers for the purpose. The men
went to the land early that day, and Marcelo Kalalo who had known about it proceeded to the place with
his brother Felipe and Juan, Gregorio Ramos and Alejandro Garcia, followed by Fausta and Alipia Abrenica,
mother and aunt of the first three. The were armed with bolos and ordered those who were plowing to
stop, with the men conceding due to threatening attitude.

Isabela, Maria Gutierrez and Hilarion Hogaldo arrived at the place with food for the laborers. Afterwards,
Panaligan arrived. Upon being informed of the cause of suspension of work, Panaligan ordered them to
continue the work they began.

Marcelo approached Arcadio, while Felipe, Juan, and Gregorio approached Panaligan. After Fausta said
“what is detaining you?” they all simultaneously struck with their bolos, with the victims dying instantly.
After Arcadio and Panaligan died, Marcelo Kalalo retrieved the revolver on Panaligan’s belt and fired four
shots at Hilarion Hogaldo who was fleeing.

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The wounds in the autopsy report shows that the deaths were caused by sharp instruments.

Appellants claim that Panaligan provoked them through firing shots at them upon seeing the latter's
determination to prevent Arcadio Holgado and his men from plowing the land in question, and it was on
self-defense. However, this was contradicted by the testimony of Maria Guttierez, which corroborates
with that of Isabela Hogaldo, (1) showing that the said deceased was already lying prostrate and lifeless
on the ground when the appellant Marcelo Kalalo approached him to take his revolver for the purpose of
using it, as he in fact did, against Hilarion Holgado; (2) in the second place, because the assault and
aggression of the said appellant were not directed against said Marcelino Panaligan but exclusively against
Arcadio Holgado, the evidence of record on this point being overwhelming, and if his claim were true, he
naturally should have directed his attack at the person who openly made an attempt against his life; in the
third place, because the evidence shows without question that Panaligan was an expert shot with a
revolver, and among the eight wounds that the appellant Marcelo Kalalo received (Exhibit 3), not one
appears to have been caused by bullet, and similarly, none of the other appellants received any wound
that might, in any way, suggest the possibility of having been caused by bullet; and (3) finally, because the
fact that he and his co-appellants, together with those who had been charged jointly with them, had gone
to the place of the crime armed with bolos, determined at any cost to prevent the Holgados from plowing
the land in dispute, cannot but disclose not only their determination to resort to violence or something
worse, but that they did not need any provocation in order to carry out their intent.

On the contention that Marcelo alone fought agaist deceased, as a defense of his own life, it cannot give
credence, One man alone could not have in icted on the two deceased their multiple wounds, particularly
when it is borne in mind that one of them was better armed, because he carried a revolver, and that he
was furthermore an expert shot and scarcely two arm-lengths from Kalalo, according to the latter's own
testimony.

Appellants Felipe Kalalo, Marcelo Kalalo, Juan Kalalo and Gregorio Ramos (Appellants) were tried in the
Court of First Instance of Batangas jointly with Alejandro Garcia, Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica in
criminal cases # 6858, 6859 and 6860, the first two for murder and the last for frustrated murder.

Issue:
WON the appellants were guilty of simple homicide or murder
WON appellant Marcelo is guilty of attempted homicide or discharge of firearms

Ruling:

On the question of Murder or Homicide:

The Attorney-General maintain that they are guilty of murder due to the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, while Trial Court, that they were guilty of simple homicide
with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

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While it is true that under Art 248, which defines murder, that if there is a presence of abuse of
circumstances, the crime would be raised from homicide to murder. HOWEVER, it cannot be applied to
the cases at bar that the victims were also armed with bolo and revolver. Strength was almost balanced,
and the risk is on the contending parties for a revolver is as effective if not more than 3 bolos. Also,
Panaligan was skilled in using it. For this reason, the acts merely constitute two homicides with no
modifying circumstances.

On the question of attempted homicide or discharge of firearms:

The evidence shows that Marcelo Kalalo fired four successive shots at Hilarion Holgado while the
latter was fleeing from the scene of the crime in order to be out of reach of the appellants and
their companions and save his own life. The fact that the said appellant, not having contented
himself with firing only once, fired said successive shots at Hilarion Holgado, added to the
circumstances that immediately before doing so he and his co-appellants had already killed
Arcadio Holgado and Marcelino Panaligan, cousin and brother-in-law, respectively, of the former,
shows that he was then bent on killing said Hilarion Holgado. He performed everything necessary
on his part to commit the crime that he determined to commit but he failed by reason of causes
independent of his will, either because of his poor aim or because his intended victim succeeded
in dodging the shots, none of which found its mark. The acts thus committed by the said
appellant Marcelo Kalalo constitute attempted homicide with no modifying circumstance to be
taken into consideration, because none has been established.

In case # 6858 and 6859 the courts find that the appellants committed the crime of homicide (14 years, 8
months, 1 day of reclusion temporal, P1,000 indemnity and costs of proceedings; in virtue of Act 4103, the
minimum penalty is fixed at nine years).

In case 6860, Marcelo Kalalo is convicted of attempted homicide (2 years 4 months and 1 day of prision
correccional; in virtue of Act 4103, the minimum penalty is 6 months + pay the costs of appeal).

People v. Trinidad, G.R. No. 79123-25, 9 January 1989, 169 SCRA 51

Facts:
Lolito Soriano, a fish dealer based in Davao City, Ricardo Tan, his driver, and Marcial Laroa arrived
to Butuan City to sell fish. Tan was left behind to dispose of the fish left; he later followed Soriano and
Laroa to Buenavista, Agusan del Norte. While at Buenavista, Emeliano Trinidad, a member of the
Integrated National Police, asked for a ride to Baguyan, Agusan del Sur, which is on the way to Davao City.
Trinidad was in uniform and had 2 firearms. Tan was driving the truck; seated beside him were Soriano,
Larao and Trinidad, respectively. When they reached the stretch between El Rio and Afga, Tan heard two
gunshots. SORIANO and LAROA slumped dead. Tan did not actually see the shooting of Larao but he
witnessed the shooting of Soriano having been alerted by the first gunfire. Both were hit on the head.

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Tan hurriedly got off the truck while it was still slowly running and hid himself in the bushes. AN
heard a shot emanating from the Fiera while he was hiding in the bushes. After 20-30 mins, a jeep passed
by and he then rode on the front seat of a passenger. Shortly after, he noticed that Trinidad was seated at
the back. Trinidad ordered him to approach him. Tan got out and ran around the jeep, but Trinidad
followed him. When the jeep started to drive away, Tan clung to its side. Trinidad fired two shots, one of
which hit Tan on his right thigh. As another passenger jeep passed by, TAN jumped from the first jeep and
ran to the second. However, the passengers in the latter jeep told him to get out not wanting to get
involved in the affray. Pushed out, TAN crawled until a member of the P.C. chanced upon him and helped
him board a bus for Butuan City.

Felimon Comendador, also a fish vendor, testified that he saw Trinidad riding in the truck on the
front seat in the company of Tan, Soriano and Laroa.
Emeliano Trinidad was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Murder and
Frustrated Murder.

Issue:
Whether or not Trinidad is guilty of frustrated murder.

Held:
The defense is correct in contending that in the Frustrated Murder case, Trinidad con only be convicted
of Attempted Murder. Trinidad had commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt acts but
was unable to perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of causes other
than his spontaneous desistance, such as, that the jeep to which Tan was clinging was in motion, and there
was a spare tire which shielded the other parts of his body. Moreover, the wound on his thigh was not
fatal and the doctrinal rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his
death, the crime is only Attempted Murder, the accused no having performed all the acts of execution that
would have brought about death. (People vs. Pilones; People vs Garcia).

Wherefore, the guilt of the accused Emeliano Trinidad for the crimes of Murder (on two counts) and
Attempted Murder, having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, his conviction is hereby AFFIRMED.

Martinez v. CA, G.R. No. 168827, 13 April 2007. (ANNA)

FACTS:
Dean Dongui-is was a teacher at Tubao National Highschool with Lilibeth Martinez, wife of the petitioner
Benjamin Martinez who was a tricycle driver. Dean and his wife Freda filed a complaint asking for damages
against Martinez’ spouse for spreading false reports. It was alleged that Dean and Elvisa has an illicit
relationship, which led to a fight between Dean and his wife. The fight resulted to the hospitalization of
Freda due to a heart condition. Dean then requested to Lilibeth to ask his husband to stop spreading the
rumors; however, Lilibeth responded by saying Elvisa had been her husband's mistress. Dean and Freda
filed for damages of 100,000 pesos against Martinez spouses.

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Elvisa was working in a pawnshop and pharmacy.it was said that one day Benjamin Martinez showed up
in one of Elvisa’s workplace and accused her of having an affair with Dean. This resulted to B. Martinez
forcibly pulling Elvisa outside her work which caused her to scratch him to get away; however, he then ran
after her with a knife. Also, B. Martinez told Elvisa’s husband’s cousin the alleged affair between her and
Dean. This resulted to the spread of rumors in the municipality. Elvisa pleads for moral damages in the
amount of 100,000 pesos against B. Martinez.

One day, while Dean was leaving Tubao Credit Cooperative after getting his and his wife's dividend
certificate. He left the building and walked to his car. Dean was about a step away from an L-300 van which
was parked in front of the building when Martinez suddenly appeared with a bolo and stabbed Dean. He
was hit on his left breast. He instatntly moved backward and tried to gain cover by entering a bank;
however, B. Martinez caught up with him stabbing him again he was able to parry the blow with his right
hand, and bolo hit him on the right elbow. He was then again hit on his left breast after falling down from
the previous attacks. Dean managed to run to the counter which was partitioned by a glass. Unable to get
inside the counter, petitioner shouted at Dean: You kneel down because I will really kill you now this day.
Petitioner was subdued by Barangay officials and was then arrested by SP01 Henry Sulatre. While going to
the police station, they passed a tricycle terminal when petitioner shouted “I stabbed him! He's just a
visitor so he shouldn't act like a King” among the tricycle drivers. Also when petitioners was put in jail, he
kept on shouting “I killed him, I killed him.”

Dean was given medical attention and the attending physician gave findings that Dean sustained two stab
wounds in the anterior chest, left, and a lacerated wound in the right elbow, forearm. Had it not been for
the blood clot that formed in the stab wound on the left ventricle that prevented the heart from bleeding
excessively, Dean would have died from profuse bleeding. He would need more than 30 days of medical
attendance to bar complications.

The petitioner claimed that Dean assaulted him because he was so jealous that Elvisa was also petitioner’s
mistress. He claimed Dean spat on his face, punched him and kept on attacking him, but Martinez used his
bolo to par Dean’s attacks. He also said that Godofredo Sarmiento, Martinez’ uncle, was a witness to the
aggression of Dean; however, Godofredo only testified to have witnessed the spitting and he did not know
the rest of what happened because he left the scene to avoid being involved.

RTC- guilty of crime frustrated homicide

CA-affirm RTC’s decision and that it is more of retaliation than self defense.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the crime committed was frustrated homicide or mere serious physical injury

RULING:

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If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is either
consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim or frustrated or
attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim.
Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of the following: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons
used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds in icted on the victim; (d) the
manner the crime was committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are
inflicted by him on the victim.

Petitioner insists that he had no intent to kill Dean. However, the physical evidence belies petitioner's
pose.

To begin with, as between petitioner and the victim, the former had more hatred to harbor arising from
the fact that the victim filed a lawsuit against him and his wife. Petitioner thus had more motive to do
harm than the victim. By his own account, he and Dean had a history of personal animosity. IaSAHC
Secondly, petitioner was armed with a deadly 14 1/2-inch bolo.

Thirdly, if it were true that petitioner stabbed Dean merely to defend himself, it defies reason why he had
to stab the victim three times. Petitioner's claim that Dean suffered only a single non-life threatening
wound is misleading. Dr. Rimando, who attended to and operated on Dean, testified that the victim
sustained three (3) stab wounds, two (2) of which penetrated his heart and lung, causing massive blood
clotting necessitating operation; the other lacerated Dean's his right elbow. The presence of these wounds,
their ocation and their seriousness would not only negate self-defense; they likewise indicate a
determined effort to kill. Moreover, physical evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more
eloquently than a hundred witnesses.

Neither does the non-presentation of Dr. Darius R. Pariñas, the doctor who signed the medical certi cate,
would dent a bit the evidence for the prosecution. This is so because Dr. Pariñas, who assisted Dr. Rimaldo
during the operation of Dean, would merely corroborate Dr. Rimaldo's testimony. As such, his testimony
is not indispensable.

Fourthly, from the manner the crime was committed, there can hardly be any doubt that intent to kill was
present. It has been clearly established that petitioner ambushed Dean and struck him with a bolo. Dean
was defenseless and unarmed, while petitioner was deadly armed.

It cannot be denied that petitioner had the intention to kill Dean. Petitioner performed all the acts of
execution but the crime was not consummated because of the timely medical intervention applied on the
victim.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might take.

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In the present case, the prosecution had met the requisites for alevosia to be appreciated: (1) at the time
of the attack the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) that the offender consciously
adopted the particular means, method, or form of the attack employed by him.

Petitioner is guilty of frustrated murder under Article 248 in relation to Article 6, rst paragraph of the
Revised Penal Code which reads:

“A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent
of the will of the perpetrator.”

The essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows:

1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;
2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence;
3. But the felony is not produced;
4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

A crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should result in the
consummation of the crime. The offender has passed the subjective phase in the commission of the crime.
Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while passing through the subjective
phase. He did all that is necessary to consummate the crime. However, the crime was not consummated
by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. In homicide cases, the
offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal
and could cause the death of the victim barring medical intervention or attendance.

Mondragon v. People, L-17666, 30 June 1966, 17 SCRA 476

FACTS:
At about 5:00 in the afternoon, while complainant Serapion Nacionales was opening the dike of his ricefield
situated to drain the water therein and prepare the ground for planting the next day, he heard a shout
from afar telling him not to open the dike, Nacionales continued opening the dike, and the same voice
shouted again, 'Don't you dare open the dike.' When he looked up, he saw Isidoro Mondragon coming
towards him. Nacionales informed appellant that he was opening the dike because he would plant the
next morning. Without much ado, Mondragon tried to hit the complainant who dodged the blow.
Thereupon, appellant drew his bolo and struck complainant on different parts of his body. Complainant
backed out, unsheathed his own bolo, and hacked appellant on the hand and forearm and between the
middle and ring fingers in order to defend himself. The appellant retreated, and the complainant did not
pursue him but went home instead.

Also upon the evidence, the offense committed is attempted homicide. Appellant's intention to kill may
be inferred from his admission made in court that he would do everything he could to stop Nacionales

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from digging the canal because he needed the water. However, it was established that the injuries received
by the complainant were not necessarily fatal as to cause the death of said complainant.

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals also show that the offended party drew his bolo and hit the
petitioner on different parts of his body, and that the petitioner retreated and did not insist on hitting the
offended party with his bolo. It may be assumed that the petitioner drew his bolo and hit the offended
party with it only when the offended party had shown a defiant attitude, considering that the offended
party himself had a bolo, as in fact the offended party had also drawn his bolo and hit the petitioner with
it. We consider that under the circumstances surrounding the fight between the petitioner and the
offended party the intention of the petitioner to kill the offended party was not manifest.

ISSUE: WON accused is guilty of the crime of attempted homicide or less serious physical injuries.

RULING:
The statement made by the petitioner almost five years after the occurrence of the incident should not,
in our opinion, be considered as an accurate indication of what he had in his mind at the time of the
incident. Besides, that answer of the petitioner is not a categorical statement of an intention on his part
to kill the offended party. The term "will do everything" has a broad meaning and it should be construed
in a manner as to give the petitioner the benefit of the doubt as to what he really meant to do. At least it
cannot be said that when the petitioner answered "yes", when he was asked whether he would do
everything to stop Nacionales from digging the canal, the only way he had in mind to stop Nacionales was
to kill him. It must be noted that this answer of the petitioner was made to a qualifying question
propounded to him by the private prosecutor over the objection of his counsel on the ground that the
question was misleading. At most, that answer of the petitioner may only be considered as an expression
of opinion of what he would do under a given circumstance.

The intent to kill being an essential element of the offense of frustrated or attempted homicide, said
element must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. That element must be proved with the same
degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should
not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt.

We hold that the facts brought out in the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case do not justify
a finding that the petitioner had the intention to kill the offended party. On the contrary, there are facts
brought out by the decision appealed from which indicate that the petitioner had no intention to kill,
namely: the petitioner started the assault on the offended party by just giving him fist blows; the wounds
inflicted on the offended party were of slight nature, indicating no homicidal urge on the part of the
petitioner; the petitioner retreated and went away when the offended party started hitting him with a
bolo, thereby indicating that if the petitioner had intended to kill the offended party he would have held
his ground and kept on hitting the offended party with his bolo to kill him.

The element of intent to kill not having been duly established, and considering that the injuries suffered
by the offended party were not necessarily fatal and could be healed in less than 30 days, we hold that the
offense that was committed by the petitioner is only that of less serious physical injuries.

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People v. Sy Pio, L-5848, 30 April 1954, 94 Phil. 885 (ANNA)

FACTS:
On Sept 3, 1949 Sy Pio, alias Policarpio de la Cruz, entered the store at 511 Misericordia, Sta Cruz Manila
and once inside fired a .45 caliber pistol at Jose Sy. Tan Siong Kiap who was at the store that time asked
“What is the idea?” was shot next. The bullet entered the shoulder of Kiap and passed through his back,
upon being hit he ran to a room behind the store and hid. From there, Kiap heard gunshots, but afterwards
Sy Pio fled the scene. The wound of Kiap healed in 20 days, he spent 300 pesos for hospital and doctor’s
fees. Sy Pio shot one Ong Pian and Jose Sy prior to Kiap.

According to defendant, he was employed as an attendant in Ong Pian’s restaurant, while his wife, Vicenta,
was employed in Ong Pian’s partner, Eng Cheng Suy. Sy Pio claimed that his wife’s relatives were asking
for help becuase his wife’s father was sick. Defendant asked Ong Pian for money, but the latter can only
give P1. His wife was able to borrow P20 from her employer and sent the money to her parents in Cebu.
Afterwards, defendant was dismissed from his work at the restaurant, and he became a peddler. As to Tan
Siong Kiap, defendant earned 70php from the sales of peddling medicine which he placed in his room, but
the following morning the money disappeared. Kiap and Jose Sy said that he must have given it to his wife
and that nobody had stolen it. After the incident, Sy Pio heard the other Chinamen talking that the money
was not actually stolen, and that Sy Pio actually lost it in gambling. Because of these accusations against
him, he nurtured resentment against both Tan Siong Kiap and Jose Sy.

Early in the morning of the incident, while a Chinaman by the name of Ngo Cho, who was the possessor of
a caliber .45 pistol, was away from his room, defendant-appellant got his pistol and tucked it in his belt.
With this pistol he went to the restaurant at 822 Ongpin, and there shot Ong Pian. After shooting him, he
proceeded to 511 Misericordia, in the store where Jose Sy and Tan Siong Kiap were, and there he fired at
them. Then he escaped to Legarda street, in Sampaloc, where he borrowed P1 from his relatives. From
there he went to Malabon, to the house of his mother, to whom he told he had killed two. persons and
from whom he asked money.

Sy Pio disowned the confession and claimed that he signed the testimony without reading it. He declared
that it was not him who shot the victims, but one Chua Tone, with one whom he had previously connived
to kill the 3 vicitims. There were no evidence to support his claims. The court refused to believe his
testimony, and found him guilty as charged,

ISSUE: Whether or not Sy Pio is guilty of frustrated or attempted murder or less serious physical injuries

HELD:
He is guilty of attempted murder.

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It is lastly contended that the defendant-appellant should be found guilty only of less serious physical
injuries instead of the crime of frustrated murder as defendant- appellant admitted in his confession in
the open court that he had a grudge against the offended party, and that he connived with another to kill
the latter. The intent to kill is also evident from his conduct in firing the shot directly at the body of the
offended party.

But while the intent to kill is conclusively proved the wound in icted was not necessarily fatal, because it
did not touch any of the vital organs of the body. As a matter of fact, the medical certification issued by
the physician who examined the wound of the offended party at the time he went to the hospital, states
that the wound was to heal within a period of 14 days, while the offended party actually stayed in the
hospital for 9 days and continued receiving treatment thereafter 5 times for a period of more than 10 days,
or a total of not more than 30 days. The question that needs to be determined, therefore, is: Did the
defendant-appellant perform all the acts of execution necessary to produce the death of his victim?

This Court has held that it is not necessary that the accused actually commit all the acts of execution
necessary to produce the death of his victim, but that it is su cient that he believes that he has committed
all said acts.

In the case at bar, however, the defendant-appellant fired at his victim, and the latter was hit, but he was
able to escape and hide in another room. The fact that he was able to escape, which appellant must have
seen, must have produced in the mind of the defendant- appellant that he was not able to hit his victim at
a vital part of the body. In other words, the defendant-appellant knew that he had not actually performed
all the acts of execution necessary to kill his victim. Under these circumstances, it can not be said that the
subjective phase of the acts of execution had been completed. And as it does not appear that the
defendant-appellant continued in the pursuit, and, as a matter of fact, he ran away afterwards a
reasonable doubt exists in our mind that the defendant-appellant had actually believed that he had
committed all the acts of execution or passed the subjective phase of the said acts. This doubt must be
resolved in favor of the defendant-appellant.

4. Robbery
People v. Dio, L-36461, 29 June 1984, 130 SCRA 151

Facts:
Crispulo Alega, a civil engineer by profession working at the Sugar Construction Company, went to the
Southeastern College, to fetch his girlfriend, Remedios Maniti, a third year high school student thereat
They proceeded to the Pasay City Public Market. As they were going up the stairs leading to the Teresa
and Sons Restaurant, Remedios, who was walking about an arms-length ahead of Crispulo suddenly heard
the dropping of her folders and other things, being carried by Crispulo. When she looked back, she saw a
man — later identified as Danilo Tobias but still at large — twisting the neck of Crispulo, while the appellant
was holding his (Crispulo's) two hands. The appellant and his companion tried to divest Crispulo of his
'Seiko' wrist watch, but Crispulo resisted their attempt and fought the robbers. At this juncture, the man
who was twisting the neck of Crispulo stabbed the latter on the left side of his chest. Crispulo ran down

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the stairs followed by Remedios who shouted for help. When he reached the front of the Pasay
Commercial Bank he fell down and expired. At the time of his death, the 'Seiko' watch was still strapped
to his wrist.

Autopsy shows that victim died of stab wound at the region of his left breast which penetrated his heart
and that it must have been caused by a single-bladed pointed instrument.

Hernando Dio was convicted of Robbery with Homicide with under Art 294 of RPC, to suffer the penalty of
death and to indemnify the heirs of the victim.

The appellant claims in his first assignment of error that he should not have been convicted of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide because the robbery was not consummated. He states that there
was only an attempted robbery.

Issue: WON the accused is guilty of Robbery with Homicide

Ruling:
Crime committed is Attempted Robbery with Homicide
The evidence adduced show that the appellant and his companion were unsuccessful in their criminal
venture of divesting the victim of his wrist watch so as to constitute the consummated crime of robbery.
Indeed, as adverted to earlier, when the victim expired, the 'Seiko' watch was still securely strapped to his
wrist. The killing of Crispulo Alega may be considered as merely incidental to and an offshoot of the plan
to carry out the robbery, which however was not consummated because of the resistance offered by the
deceased.This comes under Art 297 of RPC: “When by reason or occasion of an attempted or frustrated
robbery a homicide is committed , the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, unless the homicide committed shall deserve a
higher penalty under the provisions of this Code.”

The appellant also contends that the Trial Court erred in sentencing him to suffer the Death Penalty, that
the information does not allege any aggravating circumstance nor any proved in trial. The Solicitor General
also agrees.

Judgment of Trial Court is modified. Appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of attempted robbery with homicide.

**Since there are no aggravating/mitigating circumstances, the penalty is applied in its medium period,
the Indeterminate Sentence Law to be applied.

People v. Salvilla, G.R. No. 86163, 26 April 1990.

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FACTS:
On April 12, a robbery was staged by the 4 accused (Bienvenido Salvilla, Reynaldo Canasares,
Ronaldo Canasares, Simplicio Canasares) at the New Iloilo Lumber Yard at noon time. They wer armed with
homemade guns and a hand grenade. Upon entering, they met with Rodita Habiero, an employee on her
way out for her meal break. They made her go back to the office and then Salvilla pointed his gun at the
owner, Severino Choco, who was with his 2 daughters, Mary and 15y/o Mimmie. Severino asked Mary to
get a paper bag and placed phph20,000 in it and handed it over. Severino pleaded for them to leave the
premises. Simplicio Casanares instead took his wallet and wristwatch of Severino and his 2 daughters and
Rodilla were herded to the office and kept there as hostages.

At 2:00 hostages were allowed to eat. Then Severino was told to produce php 100,000 so they
could be released. Severino told them that the banks were closed because it was a Saturday. Police and
Military authorities surrounded the place. Major Sequio negotiated with the accused but they refused to
surrender. OIC Mayor, Rosa Caram, joined the negotiations. Dialogue lasted for 4 hrs. Appellant demanded
php100,000, a coaster, and raincoats. Offered them php50,000 instead. Accused agrees to receive, release
Rodita to be accompanied by Mary. When they were out of the door, one of the accused gave a key to
Mayor. Mayor unlocks padlocked door and hands php50,000. Rodita was set free but Mary was herded
back.

Mayor, Major, and volunteer radio newscasters continued to appeal to the accused to surrender
peacefully but they refused. Police and military decides to launch an offensive, resulting to injuries of the
2 daughters, as well as the accused Ronaldo and Reynato Canasares. Mary’s right leg was amputated.

For his part, Appellant Salvilla confirmed that at about noon time of 12 April 1986 he and his co-
accused entered the lumber yard and demanded money from the owner Severino Choco. He demanded
P100,000.00 but was given only P5,000.00, which he placed on the counter of the office of the lumber
yard. He admitted that he and his co-accused kept Severino, his daughters, and Rodita inside the office.
He maintained, however, that he stopped his co-accused from getting the wallet and wristwatch of
Severino and, like the P5,000.00 were all left on the counter, and were never touched by them. He claimed
further that they had never fired on the military because they intended to surrender. Appellant's version
also was that during the gunfire, Severino's daughter stood up and went outside; he wanted to stop her
but he himself was hit by a bullet and could not prevent her. Appellant also admitted the appeals directed
to them to surrender but that they gave themselves up only much later.

The defense contends that "The complete crime of larceny (theft/robbery) as distinguished from
an attempt requires asportation or carrying away, in addition to the taking. In other words, the crime of
robbery/theft has three consecutive stages: 1) the giving 2) the taking and 3) the carrying away or
asportation. And without asportation the crime committed is only attempted"

ISSUE: Whether the crime is attempted or consummated.

HELD: Consummated

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There is no question that in robbery, it is required that there be a taking of personal property belonging to
another. This is known as the element of asportation, the essence of which is the taking of a thing out of
the possession of the owner without his privity and consent and without the animus revertendi. In fact, if
there is no actual taking, there can be no robbery. Unlawful taking of personal property of another is an
essential part of the crime of robbery.

Appellant insists that while the "giving" has been proven, the "taking" has not. And this is because neither
he nor his three co-accused touched the P5,000.00 given by Severino nor the latter's wallet or watch during
the entire incident; proof of which is that none of those items were recovered from their persons.

Those factual allegations are contradicted by the evidence. Rodita, the lumberyard employee, testified
that upon demand by Appellant, Severino put P20,000.00 inside a paper bag and subsequently handed it
to Appellant. In turn, accused Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino. In respect of the
P50,000.00 from Mayor Caram, Rodita declared that the Mayor handed the amount to her after she (the
Mayor) had opened the padlocked door and that she thereafter gave the amount to one of the holduppers.
The "taking" was, therefore, sufficiently proved. The money demanded, and the wallet and wristwatch
were within the dominion and control of the Appellant and his co-accused and completed the taking.

It is no defense either that Appellant and his co-accused had no opportunity to dispose of the personalities
taken. That fact does not affect the nature of the crime. From the moment the offender gained possession
of the thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete.

"The crime is consummated when the robber acquires possession of the property, even if for a short time,
and it is not necessary that the property be taken into the hands of the robber, or that he should have
actually carried the property away, out of the physical presence of the lawful possessor, or that he should
have made his escape with it"

5. Rape
People v. Orita, G.R. No. 88724, 3 April 1990, 184 SCRA 105

Facts:
● March 20, 1983, 1:30 am in Eastern Samar, Abayan, a 19-year old freshman in St. Joseph’s College student,
arrived in her boarding house after a party.

● She knocked at the door, but no one answered. Someone held her and poked a knife to her neck, and she
recognized Orita, a Philippine Constabulary soldier, who was a frequent visitor of another boarder. He
ordered her to go upstairs with him to her room.

● Using one hand to hold the knife, he undressed himself and ordered Abayan to undress herself. He pulled
off her clothes, and ordered her to lie down as he mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert it

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in her vagina … but Orita could not fully penetrate her, and only a portion of his penis entered. Orita
commanded her to mount him, but only a small part of his penis was inserted into her vagina.

● Seizing her opportunity, "She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. Appellant pursued her
and climbed the partition. When she saw him inside the room, she ran to another room. Appellant again
chased her. She fled to another room and jumped out through a window

● She darted to the municipal building while she was still naked. Pat. Donceras found her naked and gave
her his jacket to cover herself with, and when they discovered what happened – Donceras and two
policemen rushed to the boarding house, and they saw someone running away.

● RTC - Frustrated rape

Issue: WON rape was attempted or consummated.

Held: Rape was consummated

● The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes
independent of the perpetrator's will.

● A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the commission of
the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from performing all
of the acts which should produce the crime. In other words, to be an attempted crime the purpose
of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him
to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which should produce the crime
as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform. If he has performed all of the acts which
should result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it
can not be an attempt.

● The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter,
there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the
commission of the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been performed which should
result in the consummated crime; while in the former there is such intervention and the offender
does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. He is
stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.

● When a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that rape was committed provided her testimony is clear and free from contradiction and her
sincerity and candor, free from suspicion

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● The victim in this case did not only state that she was raped but she testified convincingly on how
the rape was committed. The victim's testimony from the time she knocked on the door of the
municipal building up to the time she was brought to the hospital was corroborated by Pat.
Donceras. Interpreting the findings as indicated in the medical certificate, Dr. Reinerio Zamora
(who was presented in view of the unavailability of Dr. Abude) declared that the abrasions in the
left and right knees, linear abrasions below the left breast, multiple pinpoint marks, circumscribed
hematoma at the anterior neck, erythematous area surrounding the vaginal orifice and tender
vulva, are conclusive proof of struggle against force and violence exerted on the victim. The trial
court even inspected the boarding house and was fully satisfied that the narration of the scene of
the incident and the conditions therein is true.

● Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he
actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense
have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has
performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In a long
line of cases, we have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration
is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient.

● Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the
vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration
of the female organ because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely
commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature,
elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is
hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.

● Article 335, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. The
trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime. Thus, the proper
imposable penalty is death.

People v. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433, 30 March 2000

FACTS:

25 April 1996, at around 4PM, Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went
down from the second floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her two (2) children. At
the ground floor she met Primo Campuhan who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be
frozen into ice in the freeze. He’s also a helper of Conrado brother of Corazon.

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As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!"
prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside her children's room
kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his
short pants were down to his knees.

As per Corazon’s statement, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina. Horrified, she cursed the
accused "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times, resulting to evading her blows and
pulled up his pants. Later, was apprehended by those who answered Corazon’s call for help.

Physical examination of the victim yielded negative results and no evident sign of extra-genital physical
injury was noted by the medico-legal officer on Crysthel's body as her hymen was intact and its orifice was
only 0.5 cm. in diameter.

Primo Campuhan had only himself for a witness in his defense. He maintained his innocence and assailed
the charge as a mere scheme of Crysthel's mother who allegedly harbored ill will against him for his refusal
to run an errand for her. 9 He asserted that in truth Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on
his back when she suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to fall down on the floor. It was in this
fallen position that Corazon chanced upon them and became hysterical. Corazon slapped him and accused
him of raping her child. He got mad but restrained himself from hitting back when he realized she was a
woman. Corazon called for help from her brothers to stop him as he ran down from the second floor.

ISSUE: W/N the crime of the accused constitute attempted or consummated rape?

HELD:

ATTEMPTED RAPE. A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge
its onus of proving that Primo's penis was able to penetrate Crysthel's vagina.

The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12), as
provided in Art. 335, par. (3), of the Revised Penal Code. Crysthel was only four (4) years old when sexually
molested, thus raising the penalty, from reclusion perpetua to death, to the single indivisible penalty of
death under RA 7659, Sec. 11, the offended party being below seven (7) years old. We have said often
enough that in concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not
an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere touching of the external
genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge.
But the act of touching should be understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the
labias of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum.

Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted "touching of the female
organ," but has also progressed into being described as "the introduction of the male organ into the labia
of the pudendum," or "the bombardment of the drawbridge." But, to our mind, the case at bar merely
constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or as earlier stated, a "strafing of the citadel of
passion." A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge its onus

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of proving that Primo's penis was able to penetrate Crysthel's vagina however slight. Even if we grant
arguendo that Corazon witnessed Primo in the act of sexually molesting her daughter, we seriously doubt
the veracity of her claim that she saw the inter-genital contact between Primo and Crysthel. When asked
what she saw upon entering her children's room Corazon plunged into saying that she saw Primo poking
his penis on the vagina of Crysthel without explaining her relative position to them as to enable her to see
clearly and su ciently, in automotive lingo, the contact point.

The possibility of accused-appellant's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is belied by the child's own
assertion that she resisted Primo's advances by putting her legs close together; consequently, she did not
feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to her. Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko,
ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!" In cases where penetration was not fully established, the Court had
anchored its conclusion that rape nevertheless was consummated on the victim's testimony that she felt
pain, or the medico-legal finding of discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or the labia minora was
already gaping with redness, or the hymenal tags were no longer visible. None was shown in this case.
Although a child's testimony must be received with due consideration on account of her tender age, the
Court endeavors at the same time to harness only what in her story appears to be true, acutely aware of
the equally guaranteed rights of the accused. Thus, we have to conclude that even on the basis of the
testimony of Crysthel alone the accused cannot be held liable for consummated rape; worse, be sentenced
to death.

In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all respects
complement each other; otherwise, to rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter disregard of the
manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of unwarranted or even mischievous
results. It is necessary to carefully ascertain whether the penis of the accused in reality entered the labial
threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude that rape was consummated.

Also, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal officer's finding in this case that there were no external
signs of physical injuries on complaining witness' body to conclude from a medical perspective that
penetration had taken place. As Dr.Villena explained, although the absence of complete penetration of
the hymen does not negate the possibility of contact, she clarified that there was no medical basis to hold
that there was sexual contact between the accused and the victim

Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the RPC, rape is attempted when the offender commences the
commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. All the elements of attempted rape — and only of attempted rape — are present in the instant
case, hence, the accused should be punished only for it.

6. Arson
US v. Valdes, L-14128, 10 December 1918.

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FACTS:
Between 8-9am, when M.D Lewin is absent from the house in which he and his family are living at San
Miguel, Mrs. Auckback (neighbor) noticed a smoke coming from the lower floor of the house of Lewin’s.
She told Mrs. Lewin about the smoke and when her attention was brought to the fact she ordered her
servant Paulino Banal to look for the fire, as he did, he found, soaked with kerosene oil and place between
a post of the house and a partition of the entresol, a piece of a jute sack and a rag which were burning.

On the same morning, the defendants Severino Valdes and Hugo Navarro were arrested. Valdes admitted
that he was the one who set the fire to the sack and rag on the date mentioned and aside from that he’s
also responsible for the other fires which had occurred in the said house on previous days. But he denied
in his affidavit that he placed the rag and piece of jute sack, soaked with kerosene, in the place where they
were found and stated that it was Paulino (same person as the driver Hugo) who had done so. He also
confessed that he had performed such acts through the inducement of Hugo, for they felt resentment
toward their masters and that he and his co-accused were friends, he had acted as he did due to the
promise of Hugo to give him a peso for each fire that he should start.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of consummated arson?

HELD:
The fact of setting fire to a jute sack and a rag, soaked with kerosene oil and placed beside an upright of
the house and a partition of the entresol of the building, thus endangering the burning of the latter,
constitutes the crime of frustrated arson of an inhabited house, on an occasion when some of its inmates
were inside of it. This crime of provided for and punished by article 549, in connection with articles 3,
paragraph 2, and 65 of the Penal Code, and the sole proven perpetrator of the same by direct participation
is the defendant Severino Valdes, for, notwithstanding his denial and unsubstantiated exculpations, the
record discloses conclusive proof that it was he who committed the said unlawful act, as it was also he
who was guilty of having set the other fires that occurred in said house. In an affidavit the defendant
admitted having made declarations in the police station, and though at the trial he denied that he set fire
to the sacks and the rag which were found soaked in kerosene and burning, and, without proof whatever,
laid the blame unto his codefendant, the fact is that confessed to having set fire to a pile of dry leaves
whereby much smoke arose from the lower part of the house, but which, however, did not forewarn his
mistress, Mrs. Lewin, though she should have noticed it, and he allowed the sack and the rag to continue
burning until Mrs. Auckback noticing a large volume of smoke in the house, gave the alarm. No proof was
submitted to substantiate the accusation he made against the servant Paulino, who apparently is the same
persons as the driver Hugo Labarro.

The crime is classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch as the defendant performed all the acts
conducive to the burning of said house, but nevertheless, owing to causes independent of his will, the
criminal act which he intended was not produced. The offense committed cannot be classified as
consummated arson by the burning of said inhabited house, for the reason that no part of the building
had yet commenced to burn, although, as the piece of sack and the rag, soaked in kerosene oil, had been

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placed near the partition of the entresol, the partition might have started to burn, had the fire not been
put out on time.

There is no extenuating or aggravating circumstance to be considered in connection with the commission

of the crime, and therefore the penalty of presidio mayor immediately inferior in degree to that specified
in Article 549 of the Penal Code, should be imposed in its medium degree and shall also pay the costs of
both instances.

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E. Conspiracy and proposals to commit a felony (Art. 8)

1. Conspiracy and proposal, when punished?
2. As a manner of incurring criminal liability.

People v. Aguilos, G.R. No. 121828, 27 June 2003

Facts:
On June 7, 1998, Edmar Aguilos, Odilon Lagliba and appellant Rene Gayot Pilola were charged with murder.
Odilon Lagliba, who was the first to be arrested and tried, was convicted of murder. The decision of the
trial court became final and executory. Accused Edmar Aguilos remains at large while accused Ronnie
Diamante reportedly died a month after the incident. Meanwhile, the appellant was arrested and arraigned
on March 9, 1994, assisted by counsel, and pleaded not guilty to the charge.

On February 5, 1988, Elisa Rolan was inside their store waiting for her husband to arrive. Joselito Capa and
Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking beer. Although already drunk, Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba obliged to
join them. Edmar had a heated argument with Julian. Elisa pacified Edmar and advised them to go home
as she was already going to close up. Edmar and Odilon left. When Joselito and Julian were about to leave,
Edmar and Odilon returned and blocked their way. Edmar punched Julian in the face. Elisa shouted to
stop them, but they continued until they reached the end of the street. Odilon positioned himself on top
of a pile of hollow blocks and watched as Edmar and Julian swapped punches.

As Joselito tried to stop the fight, Odilon pulled out his knife with his right hand and stepped down from
his perch. He placed his left arm around Joselito’s neck, and stabbed him.

Ronnie and Rene Gayot Pilola, who were across the street, saw their gang mate Odilon stabbing the victim
and decided to join the fray. As Joselito was stabbed 11 times (6 of which were fatal stab wounds), he fell
in the canal. Odilon and Pilola fled while Ronnie went after Julian who ran to stab him.

When Julian noticed that Ronnie was no longer running after him, he looked back and saw Ronnie pick up
a piece of hollow block and bashed Joselito’s head. Then, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck
Joselito once more before fleeing from the scene.

Joselito died on the spot. Elisa rushed to Joselito’s house and informed his wife and brother of the incident.

The appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with Ronnie and Odilon in
stabbing the victim to death. He contends that for one to be a conspirator, his participation in the criminal
resolution of another must either precede or be concurrent with the criminal acts. He asserts that even if
it were true that he was present at the situs criminis and that he stabbed the victim; it was Odilon who
had already decided, and in fact fatally stabbed the victim. He could not have conspired with Odilon as the

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incident was only a chance encounter between the victim, the appellant and his co-accused. He asserted
that he is merely an accomplice and not a principal by direct participation.

Issue:
WON the appellant should be considered as a co-principal in the commission of the crime and not merely
an accomplice.

Ruling: Principal
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved separately from and with the same
quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After all, secrecy
and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. It may be inferred from the conduct of
the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a
common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed
by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. There may be conspiracy
even if an offender does not know the identities of the other offenders and even though he is not aware of
all the details of the plan of operation or was not in on the scheme from the beginning. One need only to
knowingly contribute his efforts in furtherance of it. One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts
as his own the criminal designs of his co-conspirators. If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are
liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since in contemplation of
law, the act of one would be the act of all. Each of the conspirators is the agent of all the others.

Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may be held criminally
liable as principals by direct participation if they perform overt acts which immediately or immediately
cause or accelerate the death of the victim, applying Article 4 of the RPC:

Art. 4.Criminal liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1.By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended.
In this case, it is not necessary that each of the separate injuries is fatal. It is sufficient if the injuries
cooperated in bringing about the victim’s death. If conspiracy is absent between two or more offenders,
they may be guilty of homicide or murder, one as a principal by direct participation and the other as an
accomplice.

Article 17. Principals – The following are considered principals:

(1)Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
(2)Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
(3)Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have
been accomplished.

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Article 18. Accomplices. – Accomplices are the persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate
in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur:
1. the community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
2. the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission
of the crime.

In this case, Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim. The appellant and Ronnie were on the
side of the street. However, while Odilon was stabbing the victim, the appellant and Ronnie agreed to join
in; they rushed to the scene and also stabbed the victim with their respective knives. The three men
simultaneously stabbed the hapless victim. Odilon and the appellant fled from the scene together, while
Ronnie went after Julian. When he failed to overtake and collar Julian, Ronnie returned to where Joselito
fell and hit him with a hollow block and a broken bottle. Ronnie then hurriedly left. All the overt acts of
Odilon, Ronnie and the appellant before, during, and after the stabbing incident indubitably show that
they conspired to kill the victim.

The victim died because of multiple stab wounds inflicted by two or more persons. There is no evidence
that before the arrival of Ronnie and the appellant at the situs criminis, the victim was already dead. It
cannot thus be argued that by the time the appellant and Ronnie joined Odilon in stabbing the victim, the
crime was already consummated.

All things considered, we rule that Ronnie and the appellant conspired with Odilon to kill the victim; hence,
all of them are criminally liable for the latters death. The appellant is not merely an accomplice but is a
principal by direct participation.

Even assuming that the appellant did not conspire with Ronnie and Odilon to kill the victim, the appellant
is nevertheless criminally liable as a principal by direct participation. The stab wounds inflicted by him
cooperated in bringing about and accelerated the death of the victim or contributed materially thereto.

Accomplices come to know about the criminal resolution of the principal by direct participation after the
principal has reached the decision to commit the felony and only then does the accomplice agree to
cooperate in its execution. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they
merely assent to the plan of the principal by direct participation and cooperate in its accomplishment.
However, where one cooperates in the commission of the crime by performing overt acts which by
themselves are acts of execution, he is a principal by direct participation, and not merely an accomplice.

All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and Pilola before, during, and after the stabbing incident show that
they conspired to kill the victim. It cannot be argued that the crime was already consummated when
Ronnie and Pilola joined Odilon on stabbing the victim because there was no evidence that before the
arrival of the two, the victim was already dead, hence all of them are liable to the death of the victim. The
appellant is a principal by direct participation not merely an accomplice.

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IV. Circumstances that affect criminal liability

A. Justifying circumstances
1. Defense of self, relatives, and strangers

Manaban v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150723, 11 July 2006.

FACTS:
Joselito Bautista went to BPI Kalayaan Branch to withdraw money for the hospital medication of her Child,
Frinzi. Due to alcoholic drinks taken by Bautista earlier, he started kicking the Automated Teller’s Machine
(ATM) because of its failure to dispose money intended to be withdrawn. Manaban, a security guard, walk
to Baustista to assist him. Upon checking the receipt of ATM, the Mabanan told baustista that the PIN
inserted was wrong. He persuade the latter to come back next morning which angered Bautista more,
Manaban calm down Bautista and refer him to customer service over phone. The latter continue raging
and kicking the machine which make Manaban fire his gun as a warning shot. That diverted the attention
of Bautista. Instead of venting his anger against the machine, he confronted Manaban. After some
exchange of words, a shot rang out fatally hitting Bautista. Mabanan admitted shooting the victim. RTC
found Mabanan guilty of Homicide for failure to prove a justifying circumstance of Self defense.T he trial
court also held that the requisites for the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear under paragraph
6, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code are not present in this case. However, the trial court credited
Manaban with two mitigating circumstances: voluntary surrender and obfuscation. Upon appeal, Court of
Appeals affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Respondent Court gravely erred in affirming the erroneous factual appreciation and
interpretation by the trial court a quo in practically affirming the decision of the latter court which are
based on a clear misappreciation of facts and findings grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court.

2. Whether or not the Respondent Court gravely erred in ignoring petitioners self-defense on the sole fact
that the entrance of the deceased victims wound was from the back.

3. Whether or not the Respondent Court gravely erred in concluding that petitioner failed to establish
unlawful aggression just because the holster of the victim was still in a lock position.

4. Whether or not that mistake of fact is deemed justified when petitioner made a mistake in his
appreciation that there was an attempt on the part of the deceased victim to draw his gun who turned
back.

5. Whether or not the Respondent Court gravely erred in awarding exorbitant and baseless award of
damages to the heirs of deceased victim

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RULING:

Ramonito Manaban found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,
Ramonito Manaban is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from six years and one
day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Ramonito
Manaban is ordered to pay the heirs of Joselito Bautista: P892,570.56 as indemnity for loss of earning
capacity; P69,500 as actual damages; and P50,000 as indemnity for death.

1. Unlawful Aggression is an Indispensable Requisite of Self-Defense

When the accused invokes self-defense, he in effect admits killing the victim and the burden is shifted to
him to prove that he killed the victim to save his life. The accused must establish by clear and convincing
evidence that all the requisites of self-defense are present. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is
not considered unlawful aggression, unless the threat is offensive and menacing, manifestly showing the
wrongful intent to cause injury. There must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof, which puts the defendants life in real peril.

In this case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. First, Bautista was shot at the back
as evidenced by the point of entry of the bullet. Second, when Bautista was shot, his gun was still inside a
locked holster and tucked in his right waist. Third, when Bautista turned his back at Manaban, Manaban
was already pointing his service firearm at Bautista. Aggression presupposes that the person attacked must
face a real threat to his life and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not imaginary.
Absent such actual or imminent peril to ones life or limb, there is nothing to repel and there is no
justification for taking the life or inflicting injuries on another.

Requisite of Self defense

a. unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
b. reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression
c. lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused or the person defending himself.

2. Voluntary Surrender and Obfuscation

On obfuscation, we find that the facts of the case do not entitle Manaban to such mitigating circumstance.

Manaban admitted shooting Bautista because Bautista turned around and was allegedly about to draw his
gun to shoot Manaban. The act of Bautista in turning around is not unlawful and sufficient cause for
Manaban to lose his reason and shoot Bautista. That Manaban interpreted such act of Bautista as
preparatory to drawing his gun to shoot Manaban does not make Bautistas act unlawful. The threat was
only in the mind of Manaban and is mere speculation which is not sufficient to produce obfuscation which
is mitigating. Besides, the threat or danger was not grave or serious considering that Manaban had the
advantage over Bautista because Manaban was already pointing his firearm at Bautista when the latter
turned his back. The defense failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence the cause that allegedly
produced obfuscation.

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Requisites of the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation:

a. that there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind;
the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.

Senoja v. People, G.R. No. 160341, 19 October 2004.

PETITION for REVIEW on certiorari of the decision of the CA, affirming with modification the decision of
the RTC, Baler, Aurora, finding Senoja guilty of homicide.

FACTS:
On April 16, 1997, 11am, petitioner Senoja, with Fidel Senoja, Jose Calica, and Miguel Lumasac, were
drinking gin in the hut of Reguyal. Leon Lumasac, the victim, suddenly arrived with a bolo, looking for his
brother Miguel. Petitioner and Jose pacified Leon and took his bolo. Leon walked out of the hut. Petitioner
followed, and about 10 meters away from the hut, stabbed Leon until he fell to the ground.

Petitioner admits killing but invokes self-defense: Leon Lumasac left but returned and angrily demanded
for his bolo. Calica gave his own bolo to replace the bolo of Leon which he threw away. Leon left but after
leaving a threat that something will happen to Exequiel Senoja for siding with his brother. After walking
10 meters away from the hut, Leon turned around and saw Senoja on his way home following him. Leon
walked back to meet Senoja and suddenly hacked the latter at the left side of his head and right thigh.
Senoja drew his "colonial" knife and stabbed Leon in self-defense, inflicting upon him multiple wounds
which caused his death.

ISSUE:
Whether or not act is done in self-defense

HELD:
No. It is the well-considered finding of this Court that while Leon Lumasac had ceased being the aggressor
after he left the hut to go home, accused Exequiel Senoja was now the unlawful aggressor in this second
phase (when Leon already left) of their confrontation.

Paragraph 1, Article 11, of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability: 1. Anyone who acts
in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur; First. Unlawful
aggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
It bears stressing that the petitioner resolutely denied stabbing the victim at the buttock and insisted that
he stabbed the victim frontally. Testimony of petitioner is belied by physical evidence on record. Physical
evidence is evidence of the highest order; it speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.

RULING:
Petition DENIED.

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People v. Decena, G.R. No. 107874, 4 August 1994, 235 SCRA 67

Facts:
On Christmas day, Luzviminda Ballesteros met her father, Jaime Ballesteros, walking home in an
intoxicated state. She saw George Decena rushing towards her father with a long bladed weapon,
prompting her to warn her father to run for safety. However. Jaime just raised his hand, thus allowing
Decena to stab him on the right chest. Decena then fled from the scene, while the victim also managed to
run but stumbled and fell to the ground. Luzviminda called for her mother at their house, saying “Mother,
come! My father has been stabbed by George Decena!” Victim was declared dead on arrival.
On the other hand, Decena claimed that Jaime Ballesteros was walking around the basketball court in a
wobbly manner due to drunkenness. While he was watching a basketball game, Jaime Ballesteros held him
by the neck with one arm and poked him using a fork with the other arm. Barangay Tanod Romeo Decena
intervened and advised George Decena to go home.

Issue:
Whether or not Decena acted in complete self-defense in killing Jaime Ballesteros.

Held:
The basic requirement for self-defense, as a justifying circumstance, is that there was an unlawful
aggression against the person defending himself. It must be positively shown that there was a previous
unlawful and unprovoked attack that placed the life of the accused in danger and forced him to inflict
more or less severe wounds upon his assailant, employing therefore reasonable means to resist said
attack.
For the right of defense to exist, it is necessary that one be assaulted or that he be attacked, or at
least that he be threatened with an attack in an immediate manner. The defense asserted that the
unlawful aggression started in the basketball court, when the victim tried to poke a fork on the neck of
appellant, and continued thereafter. It is a rule that when the aggressor leaves, the unlawful aggression
creases. So when the appellant and Jaime heeded the advice of the barangay tanod for them to go home,
the unlawful aggression no longer existed. Thus, appellant had no right whatsoever to kill or even wound
the former aggressor.
Also, the courts must determine by a balance of probabilities who of the participants in a fight had,
in the natural order of things, the reason to commence the aggression. When the appellant claimed that
Jaime suddenly and without any provocation tried to strangle him and poked a fork against his neck, in
front of so many people in the basketball court, then he must necessarily have been deeply offended, if
not insulted and this fact undoubtedly fired him with a desire to get even with the deceased.
The case at bar calls to mind the scenario and logical view that when a person had inflicted slight
physical injuries on another, without any intention to inflict other injuries, and the latter attacked the
former, the one making the attack was an unlawful aggressor. The attack made was evidently retaliation.
And, we find this an opportune occasion to emphasize that retaliation is different from an act of self-
defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased to exist when
the accused attacked him. In self-defense, the aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured or

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disabled by the person making a defense. We find these observations apropos to the situation presented
by the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo is hereby MODIFIED by finding accused-
George Decena guilty of the crime of homicide, and imposing upon him an indeterminate sentence of eight
(8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. In all other respects, the said judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.

People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 128359, 6 December 2000, 347 SCRA 100
For automatic review is the decision, dated 27 November 1996, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, of
Cabanatuan City, which has sentenced to death Roberto E. de la Cruz for "Qualified Illegal Possession of
Firearm and Ammunition with Homicide."

FACTS:
Roberto E. de la Cruz was sentenced to death for “Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition
with Homicide under Presidential Decree 186, Sec. 1 and was ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased victim in the sum of P50,000, burial and interment expenses of P65,000, and P2,865,600
representing the loss of income.
On or about May 27, 1996, the appellant, with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault and use personal violence upon Daniel Macapagal by shooting him with an unlicensed Caliber .38
snub nose firearm, with SN. 120958, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds on different part of his body, which
caused his death.
Roberto de la Cruz and Ma. Luz Perla San Antonio were currently living together when Macapagal (San
Antonio’s ex-live-in-partner) went to their house, holding a gun (9mm caliber pistol). Despite San Antonio’s
refusal to let him in, Macapagal made his way inside the house and banged the door of the bedroom where
the appellant was demanding him to go out.
The appellant opened the door, and upon seeing that the victim was pointing the gun at him, he
immediately went back to the room and closed the door. The next time he went out, he too was holding
a gun.
The two of them grappled each other and not long after that, shots were heard and Macapagal fell dead
on the floor. Appellant told San Antonio to call the police and when they arrived, he surrendered the gun
he used and told the police that he shot Macapagal in self-defense.
According to the autopsy, Macapagal sustained 4 gunshot wounds, 3 of which were non-penetrating and
the other 1, which was the cause of death, penetrated the heart. It was also found by the police that the
firearm used by Macapagal was not loaded. Macapagal had a license to carry said firearm while the
appellant had no license.

ISSUE:
WON the appellant is able to prove to the Court the elements of self-defense in order to extenuate him
from the crime.

RULING:

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NO.
Self-defense requires that there be:
(1) an unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed by the offender;
Unlawful aggression would presuppose an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on
the life and limb of a person – not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude – but, most importantly, at
the time of the defensive action was taken against the aggressor.
In this case, the victim banged at the bedroom door with his gun but the appellant, upon seeing the
victim pointing a gun at him was able to prevent at this stage harm to himself by promptly closing the
door. He could have stopped there; instead, he confronted the victim.
At this encounter, accused-appellant would be quite hard put to still claim self-defense.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful aggression;
The number of wounds sustained by the victim in this case would negate the existence of this
indispensable component of self-defense. The autopsy report would show that the victim sustained four
gunshot wounds that would indicate a determined effort to kill.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
When the appellant, confronted the victim with his own gun, he can no longer argue that there was no
provocation on his part.
The appellant claim of self-defense was rejected.
The elements of illegal possession of firearm are (1) the existence of the subject firearm, (2) the ownership
or possession of the firearm, and (3) the absence of the corresponding license therefor. Accused-appellant
claims that he did not have animus possidendi in the use and possession of the .38 caliber revolver since
he has used it for just a "fleeting moment" to defend himself. This assertion is not supported by the
evidence. Apparently, the subject revolver has all the while been kept in the house of accused-appellant
and his live-in partner.
In imposing the death penalty on the appellant, PD No. 1866 was already amended by RA No. 8294, Sec. 1
(3) which provides that “if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such
use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance”.
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered in favor of appellant.
Immediately following the shooting incident, he instructed his live-in partner to call the police and report
the incident. He waited for the arrival of the authorities and readily acknowledged before them his having
been responsible for the shooting of the victim. The aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed
firearm being effectively offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty
prescribed by law for the offense should be imposed in its medium period.
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal in the crime of
homicide, the range of which is 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the maximum of the penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, i.e., from 14
years, 8 months, and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, anywhere in its range of from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years.
The decision appealed from is modified. Appellant was held guilty of homicide with the use of an
unlicensed firearm an aggravating circumstance that is offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, and he is accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 9 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as minimum to 16 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. The award of P2,865,600.00

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for loss of earning is reduced to P1,432,800.00

People v. Jaurigue, G.R. No. 384, 21 February 1946, 76 Phil. 174

Facts:
● Nicolas and Avelina Jaurigue - prosecuted in Court of First Instance of Tayabas for crime of murder, but
Nicolas, Avelina’s father, was acquitted, while Avelina was found guilty of homicide
● 1942, Laguna, Amado Capiña, the deceased, had been courting Avelina to no avail.
○ One month before, Capiña snatched a handkerchief that belonged to Avelina.
○ September 13, Capiña approached Avelina while she was feeding a dog, and spoke of his love for her, but
she flatly refused. He suddenly embraced her, kissed her, and touched her breast. She slapped him, gave
him fist blows, and kicked him. After that incident, decided to arm herself with a long fan knife for self-
protection.
○ September 15, at around midnight, Capiña climbed and entered the room where she was sleeping. Felt
her forehead, evidently with the intention of abusing her, and she immediately screamed for help, which
awakened her parents. Capiña came out from where be bad hidden and kissed the hand of Nicolas, asking
for forgiveness. Lozada, the barrio lieutenant, and Capiña’s parents came to house and apologized for
misconduct of Capiña.
○ September 20, Avelina received information that Capiña had falsely boasted about having taken liberties
with her person, that she asked him to elope with her, and if he didn't marry her - she would take poison.
■ That night, in the chapel, Avelina, sitting next to the door, was approached by Capiña, and with the greatest
imprudence, placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh. Avelina, conscious of her personal dignity
and honor, pulled out the knife with the intention of punishing Capiña’s offending hand. He seized her
right hand, but she quickly grabbed the knife with her left hand and stabbed Capiña at the base of the left
side of the neck - which was necessarily mortal.

Issue: WON Avelina can invoke defense of honor

Held:
● No; As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in killing her aggressor, in the
defense of her honor; However, the means employed by Avelina Jaurigue in the defense of her honor was
evidently excessive, and due to the facts and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared
completely exempt from criminal liability.
○ Mitigating circumstances: (1) immediately and voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered to the barrio
lieutenant; (2) acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against her a few moments
before; (3) provocation to produce passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and self-control;
and (4) claims that she had not intended to kill the deceased but merely wanted to punish his offending
hand with her knife.
○ No evidence to show that defendant and appellant had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel
that night … she is not a criminal by nature, and happened to jill under the greatest provocation.
● In the case at bar, defendant and appellant committed the crime of homicide, but with at least 3 mitigating
circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in her favor. Entitled to a reduction by one or two
degrees in the penalty to be imposed upon her. Sentenced to indeterminate penalty ranging from two
months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months, and one day of prision

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correccional, as maximum, with accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to indemnify heirs of deceased
Capiña in sum of P2,000.

People v. Narvaez, L-33466-67, 20 April 1983, 121 SCRA 389 (see also dissents of J. Abad Santos and J.
Gutierrez, Jr.)

FACTS:
Mamerto Narvaez is guilty of two counts of homicide qualified by treachery with aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. At
about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano Juan, Jesus Verano and Cesar Ibanez together
with the two deceased Davis Fleisher (secretary-treasurer of Fleisher and Co., Inc.) and Flavino Rubia (asst.
manager of FCI) were fencing the land of George Fleisher the father of the deceased. The place is the
boundary of highway and hacienda of the Fleishers in Maitum, South Cotabato. Narvaez was awaken by
the sound of his house being chiseled and he saw the fencing going on that if the fencing will go on
appellant would be prevented from going into his house and ricemill bodega. He addressed the group
saying -'Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk it over - what is good,'
addressing the deceased Rubia, who is appellant's compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however, answered:
'No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.' Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot
Fleischer, hitting him. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing there is a gun on
the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him.
Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal
battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time
of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to
Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleisher
(though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter
terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove his house
from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after receiving the letter. Defendant claims he killed in
defense of his person and property. Court ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders,
Court sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted
in defense of his person
2. Whether or not the court a quo also erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in
defense of his rights

HELD
NO. There is no question that there was aggression on the part of the victims: Fleiseher was ordering, and
Rubia was actually participating in the fencing. This was indeed aggression, not on the person of appellant,
but on his property rights.

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YES. The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying circumstance of self
defense or defense of one's rights under paragraph I of Article 11, Revised Penal Code. When the appellant
fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
The third element of defense of property is present, i.e., lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
appellant who was defending his property. As a matter of fact, there was no provocation at all on his part,
since he was asleep at first and was only awakened by the noise produced by the victims and their laborers.
His plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk things over with him was no provocation at all.

Since not all requisites are present defendant is credited of special mitigating circumstance of incomplete
defense. The appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since not all the elements for
justification are present. He should therefore be held responsible for the death of his victims, but he could
be credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to paragraph 6,
Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

The court ruled that Narvaez is guilty of homicide beyond reasonable doubt of only two, mitigated by the
privileged extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense as well as two generic mitigating
circumstance (1) voluntary surrender (2) obfuscation without any aggravating circumstance. Narvaez is
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of arresto mayor and indemnify each group of 4,000 pesos but due to
the under detention of 14 years since he surrender on august 22, 1968 his immediate release is hereby
ordered with no cost.

Sabang v. People, G.R. No. 168818, 9 March 2007, 518 SCRA 35

FACTS:
On January 17, 1997, around 6:30 p.m, petitioner (Nilo Sabang) and Butad were having drinks together
with spouses Cruz and Andresa Villamor outside the store of Melania Sombilon in Ormoc City. Butad, a
civilian agent with PNP was then armed with a .38-caliber revolver which was tucked in his holster. Randy
Sabang (son of Nilo Sabang) suddenly and unexpectedly appeared before the group. His appearance
triggered a negative reaction from Butad, who then uttered the words "I will shoot you" to Randy Sabang.

Version of the defendant: Within moments, Butad himself lay dead from four gunshot wounds on his body.
Nilo Sabang, petitioner herein, who was charged with and later convicted for the homicide, admits to the
killing of Butad, but claims that the shooting was accidental and done as a means of defending his son.

Petitioner pleaded innocence and four (4) other witnesses testified for the defense. Sombilon testified that
when Butad told Randy Sabang, "I will shoot you," the deceased already had his revolver aimed at Randy.
Petitioner’s account is substantially corroborated as well by Caparoso.

Prosecution’s version: Payud, an eyewitness to the incident, testified that while the group of the deceased
Butad, petitioner, and the spouses Cruz and Andresa Villamor was having a drinking spree, Randy suddenly
entered the scene. Butad, appearing surprised, thrust a glass of Tanduay near Randy’s mouth and uttered
the words, "I will shoot you.” Also stated that Butad was not holding any gun at that time.

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Unexpectedly, a person appeared on the scene and punched Butad causing the latter to fall down lying
partially on his back. Petitioner, who was then sitting across Butad, stood up and pulled the gun tucked in
Butad’s waist. He pointed the gun at Butad and fired a shot at the latter’s chest.Payud and Andresa
Villamor both saw petitioner fire two (2) more shots near Butad’s chest.

ISSUE: W/N THE PETITIONER IS STILL LIABLE FOR THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE AS CHARGED?

HELD: YES. Initially on this case, there’s the petitioner’s insistence on the justifying circumstance of defense.

In order to successfully claim that he acted in defense of a relative, the accused must prove the concurrence
of the following requisites:

(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed or injured;

(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and
(3) the person defending the relative had no part in provoking the assailant, should any provocation been
given by the relative attacked.

Unlawful aggression must be clearly established by the evidence. In this case, there is a divergence in the
testimonies of the prosecution and defense witnesses as to whether Butad aimed a gun at petitioner’s son
as he uttered the words "I will shoot you.

With this conflict emerges the question of whether petitioner sensed an imminent threat to his son’s life.
Payud unequivocally testified that petitioner even dismissed Butad’s utterance saying, "Just try to shoot
my child because I’ll never fight for him because he is a spoiled brat.” - - which indicates to us that petitioner
did not consider Butad’s words a threat at all.

These circumstances led the trial court to conclude that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of
Butad which could have precipitated petitioner’s actions which is affirmed by Court of Appeals.

Furthermore, the presence of four (4) gunshot wounds on Butad’s body negates the claim that the killing
was justified but instead indicates a determined effort to kill him. Even assuming that it was Butad who
initiated the attack, the fact that petitioner was able to wrest the gun from him signifies that the aggression
which Butad had started already ceased. Petitioner became the unlawful aggressor when he continued to
shoot Butad even as he already lay defenseless on the ground.

Also, the Prosecution’s theory is consistent with the physical evidence they presented.

Therefore, PETITION DENIED

People v. Dagani, G.R. No. 153875, 16 August 2006, 499 SCRA 64

APPEAL from a decision of the CA, finding appellants Santiano and Dagani guilty for the crime of murder.

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FACTS:
In September 11, 1989 at 4:45PM, Javier, Miran, and 2 others had been drinking at the canteen in the
compound of the Philippine National Railways (PNR) along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila. All of a sudden,
appellants, who were security officers of the PNR and covered by the Civil Service Rules and Regulations,
entered the canteen and approached the group. Dagani shoved Miran, who fell from his chair. Dagani held
Javier while Santiano shot Javier twice at his left side, killing the latter.
Defense’s version of the facts:
Appellants were ordered by desk officer to investigate a commotion at the canteen. Upon reaching the
place, Santiano ordered his co-accused, Dagani, to enter, while the former waited outside.
Dagani approached Javier who had been striking a bottle of beer on the table. Javier pulled out .22 caliber
revolver and attempted to fire at him, but the gun failed to go off. While outside the canteen, Santiano
heard gunfire and, saw Javier and Dagani grappling for a .22 caliber gun which belonged to Javier. During
the course of the struggle, the gun went off, forcing Santiano to fire a warning shot. Javier’s gun fires again,
he rushed into the canteen. Santiano shoots Javier from a distance of less than four meters.
Appellants invoked self-defense and lawful performance of official duty. Argues that prosecution failed to
establish treachery and conspiracy.

ISSUES:
1. If the act was self-defense
2. If it was performed for duty
3. If prosecution failed to establish treachery and conspiracy

HELD:
1. NOPE.

ELEMENTS OF SELF DEFENSE:

a.Unlawful aggression by person injured or killed
i. Dagani held down the victim and the victim was already thrown off-balance. When an unlawful
aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or
wound the former aggressor.
b. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful aggression
i. Circumstance which surrounded the grappling of firearm. Dagani was able to restrain hands of Javier.
Dagani was larger and had finished Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) hand-to-hand combat training.
Javier was drunk. Circumstances do not justify Santiano’s act of shooting the victim twice.
c. Lack of sufficient provocation on part of the person defending himself

2. NOPE.
PERFORMANCE OF DUTY
a.Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office does not incur any criminal liability. Two requisites must concur before
this defense can prosper: 1) the accused must have acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed should have been the
necessary consequence of such lawful exercise.

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i. Requisites are absent in the instant case.

3. YEP.
a.Conspiracy
i. Neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of conspiracy. Conspiracy must be shown
to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself. Thus, even assuming that Javier
was simultaneously attacked, this does not prove conspiracy. No evidence was presented to show that the
appellants planned to kill Javier or that Dagani’s overt acts facilitated that alleged plan.
b. Treachery
i. Treachery under par.16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the deliberate employment
of means, methods or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the intended victim
might raise. Treachery is present when two conditions concur, namely: (1) that the means, methods and
forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate;
and (2) that such means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by
the accused without danger to his person.
1. Court is inclined to look uon helpless position of Javier as merely incidental to the attack, and the
decision to shoot Javier was made in an instant.

RULING:
Santiano is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE. Dagani ACQUITTED.

Palaganas v. People, G.R. No. 165483, 12 September 2006, 501 SCRA 533
FACTS:

On January 1998 at 8 in the evening, brothers Servillano Jr., Melton alias “Tony” and Michael alias
“Boying” were having a drinking spree in their house because Melton, who now lived in San Fernando La
Union, visited his brothers and mother in Poblacion, Manaoag. At 9:45 pm, the brothers decided to go to
Tidbits videoke bar to continue their drinking spree. At 10:30 pm Jaime Palaganas arrived with his nephew
Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista at Tidbits karaoke bar. By this time, Ferrer brothers were the
only customers in the bar. After the Ferrer’s turn in singing, they turned over the mic to the Palaganases,
which were in a separate table.
Later when Jaime Palaganas was singing “My Way”, Melton Ferrer sang along which Jaime did not
like. Jaime went near the table of the Ferrers and said “As if you are tough guys” he also added that “You
are already insulting me in that way”. Jaime then struck Servillano with the microphone, hitting the back
of his head. A rumble has ensued between the Ferrer brothers and the Palaganases, of which Virgilio
Bautista did not take part of for he left the place. During the rumble, Ferdinand went out of the bar who
was pursued by Michael. When Servillano saw that Michael was following Ferdinand outside, Servillano
immediately approached Michael and told him not to do so. The two went back inside the bar and
continued their fight with Jaime.
Meanwhile, Edith Palaganas, owner of the bar and sister of Jaime, arrived at the scene and pacified
them. Servillano, however, noticed that his watch was missing. Since he could not find it inside the bar,
him and his brothers went outside. It was when they saw, about 8 meters away, Ferdinand pointing at
them and said to his companion, Rujjeric his brother, “They are the ones, shoot them”. Rujjeric then shot

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the Ferrers hitting Servillano first at the left side of his abdomen causing his fall. He thn hits Melton who
also fell to the ground. When Servillano noticed that Melton was not moving, he instructed Michael “Bato
bato”. Michael then threw rocks at the petitioner and Ferdiand, whom eventually left the place.
Thereafter, the police arrived and the Ferrer brothers were brought to Manaoag Hospital and later
transferred to Villaflor Hospital in Dagupan. Servillano discovered that Melton was hit in the head, while
Micahel was hit on his right shoulder.
On the other hand, the Palaganans defense was that while Jaime was singing Tony Ferrer sang loudly as a
form of insult to the former; which then started the brawl. Jaime was said to be mauled and Ferdinand
was hit on the face and was chased outside by Junior and Boying Ferrer. Ferdinand allegedly ran to the
house of Petitioner Rujjeric Palaganas, his brother, and sought for help. Rujjeric was awakened from his
sleep went outside his house. Upon seeing that his Uncle’s van was outside the bar, he proceeded to that
place; however, he was stopped by the throwing of rocks by the Ferrers. Rujjeric then ran towards his
house and came across Ferdinand, whom he tugged towards the other direction to seek cover from the
stones. Noticing that Ferdinand carried a gun, Rujjeric grabbed it from the former and shot in the air to
force the brothers to retreat. The Ferrer brothers, however, continued to throw stones so Rujjeric closed
his eyes and pulled the trigger.

The Petitioner was thereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the following crimes: 1 count
of murder (for the murder of Melton Ferrer) and 2 counts of Frustrated Murder (for Servillano Ferrer Jr
and Michael Ferrer) and 1 count for Violation of COMELEC Resloution No. 2958 of the Omnibus Election
Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the actions by the Petitioner be classified as self-defense therefore absolving him of
criminal liability

RULING:
No. The petitioner contends that the warning shot proved that the Ferrer brothers were unlawful
aggressors since there would have been no occasion for the petitioner to fire a warning shot if the Ferrer
brothers did not stone him; and that the testimony of Michael Ferrer in the trial court proved that it was
the Ferrer brothers who provoked petitioner to shoot them; and that Ferrer brothers pelted with stones
even after the warning shot. He claims that it was a form of self-defense against the aggressors.

Art 11 par 1 of the RPC provides for the elements or requisites of self-defense absolving the person of
criminal liability as the following:

ART 11. Justifying circumstances – The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur;
First, Unlawful aggression;
Second, Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it’
Third, Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

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As an element of self-defense, unlawful aggression refers to an assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an

imminent and immediate manner, which places the defendant’s life in actual peril. It is an act positively
strong showing the wrongful intent of the aggressor and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.
It is also described as a sudden unprovoked attack of immediate and imminent kind to the life, safety or
rights of the person attacked.

In the case at bar, it was clear that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers
that justifies the act of petitioner in shooting them. There was no actual imminent danger to the lives of
the petitioner and Ferdinand when they proceeded and arrived at the videoke bar and saw threat the
Ferrer brothers. It appears that the Ferrer brothers were merely standing outside the videoke bar and
were not carrying any weapon when the petitioner arrived with his brother Ferdinand and started firing
his gun.

Reasonableness of the means employed may take into account the weapons, physical condition of the
parties and other circumstances showing that there is a rational equivalence between the means of attack
and the defense.
The accused invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability after admittedly killing the victim. The accused
in burdened to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense. The burden of
evidence is shifted on the accused to prove all the elements of self-defense, he must rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not the weakness of the prosecution.

The decision is hereby affirmed with the following modifications:

1. Petitioner is guilty of Attempted Homicide for Michael Ferrer and is sentenced to prision
correctional there being aggravating circumstances of the use of unlicensed firearm penalty becomes 4
years and 2 months of arresto mayor as minimum to 6 years prision correctional as maximum plus
exemplary damages in the amount of 25,000 php in addition to actual damages and moral damages.
2. Petitioner is guilty of Frustrated Homicide for Servillano Ferrer Jr and is sentenced to prision
mayor there being aggravating circumstances of the use of unlicensed firearm and applying Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty becomes 6 years of prision correcional as minimum to 12 years prision mayor
as maximum plus exemplary damages in the amount of 25,000 php in addition to actual damages and
moral damages.
3. Petitioner is guilty of Homicide of Melton Ferrer. There being a special aggravating circumstance
of the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty is now 12
years of prision mayor as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as a maximum. He is to pay exemplary
damages of 25,000 php in addition to actual and moral damages. Actual damages is reduced to 42,374.18
php.

2. Avoidance of greater evil

People v. Ricohermoso, L-30527-28, 29 March 1974, 56 SCRA 431
Facts:
Geminiano de Leon, together with his wife Fabiana Rosales, son Marianito de Leon, and one Rizal
Rosales, encountered Pio Ricohermoso. Geminiano owned a parcel of land which Ricohermoso cultivated

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as kaingin. Geminiano asked Ricohermoso about his share of the palay harvest. He added that he should
at least be allowed to taste the palay harvested from his land. Ricohermoso answered that Geminiano
could go to his house anytime and he would give the latter palay. Geminiano and company went
somewhere first. They then went to Ricohermoso’s house to get the palay. Ricohermoso, who was no
longer conciliatory and evidently hostile, said “Whatever happens, I will not give you palay.” Geminiano
replied “Why did you tell us to pass by your house, if you were not willing to give the palay?”
Thereafter, Ricohermoso unsheathed his bolo and approached Geminiano from the left while
Severo Padernal (Ricohermoso’s father-in-law) got an axe and approached Germiniano from the right.
Geminiano looked up to Severo Padernal, with both hands raised and pleaded: “Mamay (Grandpa), why
will you do this to us. We will not fight you.” While Geminiano was still looking up to Severo Padernal on
his right, Ricohermoso walked to Geminiano’s left, and stabbed him on the neck with his bolo. Geminiano
fell face downward on the ground. While in that helpless position, he was hacked on the back with an axe
by Severo Padernal.
During the time of Geminiano’s assault, Juan Padernal (Ricohermoso’s brother-in-law and son of
Severo) suddenly embraced Marianito de Leon from behind, with his right arm locked around Marianito’s
neck and his left hand pressing Marianito’s left forearm. They grappled and rolled downhill towards a
camote patch. Marianito passed out. When he regained consciousness, his rifle was gone. He saw his
mortally wounded father Geminiano already dead.
The Circuit Criminal Court convicted Severo Padernal and Juan Padernal of murder.
Issue:
Whether or not Juan Padernal conspired with Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal to Kill Geminiano de
Leon.
Held:
The trial court rationalized its conclusion that there was conspiracy by stating that their conduct revealed
unity of purpose and a concerted effort to encompass Geminiano’s death.
The act of Juan Padernal in preventing Marianito de Leon from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal,
who were the aggressors, was designed to insure the killing of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to his
assailants. Juan Padernal was not avoiding any evil when he sought to disable Marianito. Padernal’s
malicious intention was to forestall any interference in the felonious assault made by his father and
brother-in-law on Geminiano.
Juan Padernal contends that he was not a co-principal because he did not take any direct part in
the killing of Geminiano, that he did not force or induce Ricohermoso to stab Geminiano, and that he
allegedly did not cooperate in its commission. Considering the trio’s behavior and appellant Juan
Padernal’s close relationship to Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, the ineluctable conclusion is that he
acted in conspiracy with them. It is doubtful if the assailants could have consummated the killing
Geminiano, without their suffering any injury, if Marianito had not been rendered helpless by appellant
Juan Padernal.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court as to appellant Juan Padernal is affirmed.

People v. Norma Hernandez, CA-G.R. No. 22553-R, 14 April 1959, 55 OG 8465

APPEAL from a judgment of the CIF, Batangas, finding Norma Hernandez guilty of serious slander by deed.
(Appellant and her parents were all charged. Only Appellant was found guilty.)

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FACTS:
Complainant Lascano courted appellant in August 1954. After months of courtship, appellant accepted
and told Lascano to bring his parents to her home so they can talk about their marriage. Complainants’
parents, together with 12 aunts, came to their house on Feb 1955 to ask for her hand in marriage. Both
parents agreed to the marriage. March 19, 1995 wedding date. Lascanos will provide the wedding dress,
shoes. March 5, wedding license was issued. After issuance, all 6 went to parish priest of Taal, Batangas to
arrange proclamation of the coming marriage of the 2. On the morning of March 19 parents served the
appellant’s friends and relatives. She never showed up.
Appellant says that she was never in love with Lascano (ooooow L) and that she was only convinced by
both set of parents and one of her uncles to marry him. She accepted but as the wedding day approached
she felt tortured. She left without telling her parents. She denies having received a wedding gown.
Hernandez parents denies that Lascano’s parents came to their house on March 17 and 18 to prepare for
food, now wedding dress was brought to their house.

ISSUE:
Whether or not she broke the guy’s heart. CHAROT
Whether or not the steps taken by her in order to prevent marriage constitute the serious crime of slander.

HELD:
Solicitor General denies that there was malice, which is one of the requisites of slander. That when
appellant changed her mind, she was only exercising her right not to give her consent to marriage, such
consent being her prerogative as one of the contracting parties.
No marriage shall be solemnized unless the consent of the parties are freely given. To penalize appellant
for not continuing would make the State practically instrumental in compelling an unwilling party to enter
into marriage.

RULING:
Appealed judgment is REVERSED and appellant is ACQUITTED.
LESSON:
Hindi napipilit ang pag-ibig. Kung ayaw saýo, ayaw.

3. Fulfillment of duty
People v. Delima, L-18660, 22 December 1922, 46 Phil. 738
FACTS:
Lorenzo Napilon escaped from the jail. Policeman Felipe Delima found him in the house of Jorge Alegria,
armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance. Delima ordered his surrender but Napilon
answered with a stroke oh his lance. Delima was able to dodged it and to impose his authority fired his
revolver, but it did not hit Napilon. The criminal ran away, without parting with his weapon. The police
went after him and fired his revolver again, this time hitting and killing Napilon.
Delima was tried and convicted for homicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal and the accessory
penalties.
Delima appeals the judgment.

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RULING:
The killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under the obligation to surrender,
and had no right, after evading service of his sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a weapon
in the hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to such an extreme means, which although it prove
to be fatal, was justified by the circumstances.
Article 8, No. 11, of the Penal code being considered, Felipe Delima committed no crime, and he is hereby
acquitted with the costs de oficio.

People v. Lagata, L-1940-42, 24 March 1949, 83 Phil. 150

FACTS:

Eusebio Abria was a 20 year old farmer from Samar. He was detained in the provincial jail for illegal
possession of firearms, but his case was dismissed. Ignacio Lagata was a provincial guard. 6 prisoners were
assigned to work at the capitol’s plaza namely Jesus, Tipace, Eusebio, Mariano, the witness and Epifanio
Labong. Lagata, who was their guard, ordered them to go to the nursery to pick up gabi. The nursery was
near the provincial hospital in Catbalogan, which was grassy. Not long after, Epifanio Labong was missing.
Lagata ordered the 5 prisoners to call for him, and when he did not respond they were ordered to look for
him. The five prisoners then proceeded to the mountains where there was a camote plantation. Eusebio
Abria said that while they were gathering gabi, he heard 3 shots. He was wounded by the 2nd one. They
were already assembled by the 1st shot and that he did not see Tipace being shot. He said he ran away
because he was afraid that he might be shot again and that his companions were also probably scared and
that is why they ran.
Another prisoner, Mariano Ibañez stated that Epifanio Labong did not answer their call so Ignacio
Lagata ordered to go look for him in the mountain. He said that Abria went to the camote plantation and
found footprints and called on Lagata to inform him about the footprints. When Abria told Lagata of the
flattened grass and that he was unable to look for Labong, Ignacio Lagata fired at him and he was hit on
his left arm. Abria told Lagata he was wounded and in turn, Lagata told them to assemble. Once they
were assembled, Lagata cocked his gun and shot Ceferino Tipace.
Mariano said that when he saw Tipace was shot, he ran away because he also could have been
shot.
Eustaquio Galet, another detainee, received good treatment from Lagata though his testimony
corroborated those of the other prisoners.
Pedro Mayuga, chief of Samar Provincial Hospital & Gilberto Rosales, Sanitary Division president,
verified the gunshot wound and that the death of Tipace resulted therein. Ignacio Lagata, however, said
that he fired his gun because the prisoners were running far from him when he already ordered them to
stop. He said that he would be the one in jail if a prisoner escaped under his custody. Furthermore, he
would be discharged from duty like the others. He was hopeless already. Moreover, the picking up of gabi
was not part of the prisoner’s work.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Lagata should be criminally liable for homicide and serious physical injuries (Yes)

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Whether or not the appellant is entitled to the benefit of mitigating circumstance of incomplete justifying
circumstance (Yes)

RULING:

It was clear that Lagata had absolutely no reason to fire at Tipace. The record does not show that Tipace
was bent on committing any act of aggression or that he attempted to escape. According to Lagata himself,
Tipace was running towards and around him. Even if Lagata sincerely believed that he acted in the
performance of his duties, the circumstances show that there was no necessity for him to fire directly
against the prisoners as to wound them seriously and even kill one of them. While custodians should take
care for prisoners not to escape, only ABSOLUTE NECESSITY would authorize them to fire against them.

Appellant is entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete justifying circumstance
defined in Art 11 par 5 of the RPC. Therefore, appellant should be sentenced for homicide to an
indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day prision mayor to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal. In
the case of physical injuries to an indeterminate penalty of 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor to 2 years,
4 months and 1 day of prision correctional.

Mamangun v. People, G.R. No. 149152, 2 February 2007

Facts:
● 1994, Bulacan, at around 8:00 pm Liberty Contreras was heard shouting, “Magnanakaw … Magnanakaw,”
and several residents responded and chased after the suspect, who entered the yard and then rooftop of
Abacan. By 9:00 pm, desk officer of Meycauayan PNP dispatched two patrol cars to the scene.
○ Mamangun, Diaz, and Cruz, each armed with a drawn handgun, searched the rooftop. Saw a man whom
they thought was the robbery suspect. Mamangun, walking ahead of the group, fired his gun once, hitting
the man. Man turned out to be Gener Contreras, who was not the robbery suspect - died from the gunshot
wound.
○ Prosecution’s version: According Ayson, he accompanied the three policemen to the rooftop, which was
lit from an adjacent house. They saw a man, who he recognized as Contreras, but Mamangun pointed his
.45 caliber pistol at the man. The man said, “Hindi ako, hindi ako!,” and Mamangun replied, “Anong hindi
ako?”. Before Ayson could say anything, Mamangun already fired his gun.
○ Defense’s version: Mamangun, Cruz, and Diaz denied the presence of Ayson. Testified that they were the
only ones at the scene of the shooting, and that it was dark. Cruz pointed to a person crouching at the
edge of the roof, and Mamangun chased the person. Announced that they were police officers, but person
continued running. Eventually attacked Mamangun with a stainless steel pipe, which prompted
Mamangun to shoot the person.
○ After shooting, Investigator Banez went to the place where the shooting happened, and allegedly found a
steel pipe about 3 feet long on the roof.
● Sndiganbayan - finding petitioner guilty of Homicide beyond a reasonable doubt.

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Issue: WON performance of duty or lawful exercise of a right or office absolves Mamangun of criminal
liability in the shooting
Held:
● No; Justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under paragraph 5, Article iI of RPC may be invoked after
defense successfully proves that: (1) accused acted in the performance of a duty; and (2) injury inflicted
or offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such
duty.
○ First requisite is present; however, proof that the shooting and ultimate death of Contreras was a
necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty as a policeman is essential to exempt him from
criminal liability.
○ Sandiganbayan and SC found no reason for petitioner to shoot Contreras. The latter was unarmed and had
already uttered, “Hindi po ako, Hindi po ako,” before Mamangun fatally shot him. Further, Mamangun did
not report Contreras’s attack to Banez when he reported back to the police station after the shooting
incident. Only when the lead pipe was recovered from the scene and brought to the police station that
petitioner conveniently remembered that Contreras tried to hit him with the pipe.
● Most important element of unlawful aggression on part of the victim to justify the claim of self-defense
was absent. Lacking this essential and primary element of unlawful aggression, petitioner’s plea of self-
defense, complete or incomplete, must have to fail. Acts in the fulfillment of a duty, without more, do not
completely justify the petitioner’s firing the fatal gunshot at the victim … No rational necessity for the
killing of Contreras. Petitioner could have first fired a warning shot before pulling the trigger against
Contreras who was one of the residents chasing the suspected robber.

People v. Dagani, G.R. No. 153875, 16 August 2006, 499 SCRA 64

4. Obedience to a lawful order of a superior

People v. Beronilla, L-4445, 28 February 1955, 96 Phil. 566
Facts:
This is an appeal by accused Manuel Beronilla, Policarpo Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico
from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Abra (Criminal Case No. 70) convicting them of murder
for the execution of Arsenio Borjal in the evening of April 18, 1945, in the town of La Paz, Province of Abra.
● Arsenio Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the outbreak of war, and continued to serve as
Mayor during the Japanese occupation, until March 10, 1943, when he moved to Bangued because of an
attempt upon his life by unknown persons.
● Appellant Manuel Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by Lt. Col. R. H. Arnold, regimental
commander of the 15th Infantry, Philippine Army, operating as a guerrilla unit in the province of Abra.
● Beronilla received copy of a memorandum issued By Lt. Col. Arnold to all Military Mayors in Northern
Luzon, authorizing them "to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons accused of treason, espionage, or
the aiding and abetting (of) the enemy"
● Beronilla also received from the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry a list of all puppet government officials
of the province of Abra (which included Arsenio Borjal, puppet mayor of La Paz), with a memorandum
instructing all Military Mayors to investigate said persons and gather against them complaints from people
of the municipality for collaboration with the enemy.

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● Beronilla, upon the return of Borjal who left La Paz because of an attempt on his life, placed Borjal under
custody.
● Pursuant to his (Beronilla) instructions, complaints were gathered, a 12-man jury was appointed,
prosecutors and a clerk of the jury were assigned.
● Trial lasted for 19 days and the jury found Borjal guilty on all counts (espionage, aiding the enemy, abuse
of authority). Death penalty was imposed.
● Beronilla forwarded the records of the case to the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry for review.
● The records were returned by Lt. Col. Arnold adding that the matter was best handled by the La Paz
Government and whatever disposition taken was approved.
● Upon receipt of the letter, Beronilla then ordered the execution of Borjal. The execution was reported to
Col. Arnold and Beronilla received compliments based on the reply of his superior.
● Two years after, those who were involved were indicted in the CFI of Abra for murder for allegedly
conspiring and confederating in the execution of Borjal.
● The defendants were convicted, thus this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants are guilty of murder

Ruling:
Appellants ACQUITTED, with costs.

No.
● The records are ample to sustain the claim of the defense that the arrest, prosecution and trial of Borjal
were done pursuant to express orders of the 15th Infantry HQ.
● The state however contends that there was a radiogram from Col. Volckmann to Lt. Col. Arnold, specifically
noting the illegality of Borjal’s conviction and sentence, which the prosecution claims that Beronilla was
informed about this but still pursued with the execution.
● A witness, a relative of Borjal, asserts that he was present when Beronilla received the message and was
able to read it over Beronilla’s shoulder. But basing on his affidavit, it can be imported that witness was
not with Beronilla the message alleged to have arrived.
● Moreover, Beronilla would not have informed Lt. Col. Arnold about the execution if he did it after the
receipt of the message since this would be in violation of superior orders. And more importantly, Arnold
complimented him in his reply.
● The Court concludes that Lt. Col. Arnold failed to transmit the Volckmann message to Beronilla. The charge
of criminal conspiracy to do away with Borjal must be rejected because the accused had no need to
conspire against a man who was, to their knowledge, duly sentenced to death.
● The lower Court, after finding that the late Arsenio Borjal had really committed treasonable acts, (causing
soldiers and civilians to be tortured, and hidden American officers to be captured by the Japanese)
expressly declared that "the Court is convinced that it was not for political or personal reason that the
accused decided to kill Arsenio Borjal". It appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and
that the accused-appellants acted upon orders, of a superior officers that they, as military subordinates,
could not question, and obeyed in good faith, without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or
negligence on their part, we can not say that criminal intent has been established.

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“To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a
criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences, as, in law, is equivalent
to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea-a is not committed if the mind of the
person performing the act complained of be innocent."||

Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 103501-03, 17 February 1997, 268 SCRA 332
Facts:
Louis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta appeal the Sandiganbayan decision, as well as Resolution denying
reconsideration, convicting them of malversation under Art. 217 of the RPC. They were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of having malversed the total amount of P55M of the Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) funds during their incumbency as General Manager and Acting Finance Services
Manager. A co-accused of the two, Gerardo Dabao, then Assistant General Manager of MIAA, has
remained at large.

Documentary and Testimonial evidence:

Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly through the president’s office
and in cash what the MIAA owes to Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) to which Tabuena
obliged. He then received from the Marcos’ private secretary a Presidential Memorandum dated 9 January
1986 reiterating in black and white the instruction:

“You are hereby directed to pay immediately the PNCC, thru this Office, the sum of 55M in case as partial
payment of MIAA’s account with Company mentioned in a Memorandum of Minister Roberto Ongpin..”

The 7 January memorandum of then Minister of Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin referred in Marcos
Memorandum reads:

“... to pay the PNCC the amount of P34.5M out of existing MIA Project Funds.”

In obedience to Marcos’ verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena with the help of Dabao and Peralta
caused the release of P55M of MIAA funds by means of 3 withdrawals [MIAA Savings Acct in the PNB
Extension Office at MIAA purportedly as partial payment to the Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC)]:
1. 10 January 1986, Tabuena and Dabao - 25M
2. 16 January 1986, Tabuena and Dabao - 25M
3. 29 January 1986, Tabuena and Peralta - 5M

The first two were done following a letter signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB Extension
Office at the MIAA (depository branch of MIAA funds) to issue a manager’s check for said amount payable
to Tabuena) and were encashed in PNB Villamor Branch after which Tabuena delivered, the case placed in
peerless boxes and duffle bags and loaded on PNB armored car, delivered to the office of Mrs. Gimenez,
private secretary of the President. She did not issue any receipt for the money received.

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In the last withdrawal, Peralta was co-signatory of the letter and he accompanied Tabuena to PNB Villamor
and counted the 5M himself (Peralta). The money was placed in two peerless boxes and loaded in the
trunk of Tabuena’s car. Only Tabuena went to deliver the money, and only then was a receipt issued by
the secretary.

The position of the prosecution was that there were no outstanding obligations in favor of PNCC at the
time of the disbursement. Tabuena and Peralta claims to have acted in good faith, that Tabuena was
merely complying with the Marcos Memorandum and that he was of the belief that MIAA had liabilities
to PNCC. Peralta shared the same belief and had acted on the request of his superior, Tabuena.

Sandiganbayan rejected their claim of good faith which lead to their conviction.

Issue:
WON acting in good faith, through obedience to lawful superior can be made basis of acquittal

Ruling:
Tabuena and Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation. The Sandiganbayan Decision and
Resolution are reversed and set aside.

Defense of Good Faith due to Obedience to Lawful Superior:

It is a valid defense in a prosecution of malversation for it would negate the criminal intent.

With the presentation of the Marcos Memorandum, the court is swayed to give credit to his claim that he
he acted by reason of the memorandum. The following reasons and considerations would support his
innocence:

First, Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawal, as was required by the Marcos
Memorandum. Marcos is his superior being the President, who had unquestionably exercised control over
government agencies such as MIAA and PNCC. He had a say in the affairs and transactions of agencies,
including directing payment of liability of one entity to another and the manner it is to be carried out.
Good faith can be deduced in his compliance to the orders of the highest official of the land. He is entitled
to the justifying circumstance of “Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for
some lawful purpose. Subordinate-superior relationship is clear as well as the lawfulness of the order in
the Marcos Memorandum, as it has for its purpose partial payment of liability of one government agency
to another.

As for the question of unlawfulness of the directive (Ongpin memorandum - 34.5M liability while Marcos
Memorandum - 55M was ordered) it still does not negate Tabuena’s good faith for it is patently legal (for
on its face it directs payment of an outstanding liability) and he had only acted in honest belief that 55M
was a due and demandable debt and that it was just a portion of a bigger liability to PNCC. If order is illegal
and yet patently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its illegality, he is not liable, for then there would
only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith.

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Second, his noncompliance to certain auditing rules and regulations (no vouchers to authorize the
disbursement in question, no bills to support disbursement and no certifications as to the availability of
funds), he was pressed by the order “immediate compliance”. Since he acted in good faith, he’s only liable
administratively and civilly.

Third, as for the Sandiganbayan finding that Tabuena converted and misappropriated the 55M when he
delivered it to Mrs. Gimenez. Again, it must be stressed that it was directed by the Marcos Memorandum
“to pay immediately the PNCC, thru this office, the sum of 55M”, and that was what he did. He had
reasonable ground to believe Marcos’ entitlement to receive the 55M since he was the chief executive,
having control and supervision over gov’t agencies. He did this out of strict compliance to the
memorandum. Good faith in payment of public funds relieves officer from crime of malversation.

**Conversion - appropriation to one’s own use of another’s property; the attempt by one person to
dispose of the goods of another without right as if they were his own is ‘conversion to his own use’

Fourth, even if the purpose behind the memorandum was ill and for the benefit of those in power, no
liability can be attributed to Tabuena. There is no showing that he had anything to do with the execution
of the Memorandum, nor proof that he had profitwd from the scheme. No conspiracy was established.

These principles also apply to Peralta as he only acted in good faith upon directive of Tabuena.

B. Exempting Circumstances
1. Insanity
People v. Taneo, L-37673, 31 March 1933, 58 Phil. 255
Facts:
● 1392, Leyte, Potenciano Taneo lived with his wife in his parents’ house, and a day before the commission
of the crime – had a quarrel over a glass of “tuba” with Enrique Collantes and Valentin Abadilla, who invited
him to fight, but was stopped by his wife and mother.
● The next day, a fiesta was being celebrated in their barrio (Dolores), and entertained guests Fred Tanner
and Luis Malinao in Taneo’s house. Taneo went to sleep early in the afternoon, but he suddenly got up,
bolo in hand – wounded his wife, who tried to stop him, in the abdomen (wife and 7-month old baby died),
attacked Tanner and Malinao, tried to attack his father, and eventually wounded himself.
● It was noted that defendant was sad, weak, and had a stomach-ache, so he went to bed in the afternoon.
When he fell asleep, he dreamt that Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo, while Abadilla held his
feet. He got up and armed himself with a bolo, when it seemed like his enemies were trying to invite him
to come down. He met his wife who seemed to say that she was wounded, and in desperation he wounded
himself. Then, his enemies seemed to multiply around him, so he attacked everybody that came his way.
● Trial Court - convicted Taneo of Parricide

Issue: WON Taneo committed Parricide

Held:

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● No; SC: defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, which he was charged, were not voluntary – in the
sense of entailing criminal liability. Dr. Serafica, an expert witness in the case, stated that the defendant
acted while in a dream, under the influence of a hallucination and not in his right mind.
○ Defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his wife, but that he was defending himself from his
enemies – and in believing that his wife was really wounded, in desperation, he stabbed himself.
● There were also special circumstances present: victim was defendant’s own wife whom he loved dearly;
tried to attack his father, in whose house and under whose protection he lived; and, attacking Tanner and
Malinao, who he himself invited - along with lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the
acts in the information.

People v. Bonoan, L-45130, 17 February 1937, 64 Phil. 87

FACTS
Celestino Bonoan was charged of murder, on the 12th day of December 1934 in the City of Manila he
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously without justifiable motive to kill Carlos Guison. He was attack, assault
and stab on the different parts of the body, inflicting one stab wound at the right epigastric region
penetrating 1 cm into the superior surface of the right liver and three non penetrating stab wound located
at the posterior and lateral lumbar region and left elbow which directly caused death after 3 days.

January 16, 1935 the case was called for arraignment but the counsel of the accused objected on the
ground that his client was mentally deranged and was at that time confined in the Psychopathic Hospital.
The court issued an order requiring the Director of the Hospital to render a report regarding the mental
condition of the accused. Dr. Toribio Joson, asst. alienist rendered a report on the court. After that, the
trial court issued an order directing that the accused be placed under t5he chief alienist or an asst. alienist
of the Psychopathic Hospital for his personal observation and subsequent submission of his mental
condition. Dr. Jose Fernandez the assigned asst. alienist rendered a report on June 11, 1935 stating that
the accused was not in a condition to defend himself so, the case was suspended indefinitely.

On January 21, 1936 Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the accused could be discharged from the
hospital and appears for trial and he was considered a recovered case / recovered from the disease. On
February 27, 1936 the accused pleaded not guilty. After the trial, the lower court found the defendant
guilty of the offense charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment and indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P1,000 and pay cost.
The defendant claims that the lower court made errors in finding him suffering dementia only occasionally
and intermittently, did not show any kind of abnormality, that the defense did not establish the
defendant’s insanity and finding accused guilty.

ISSUE
Whether or not the defendant-appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime / the court
erred in finding the accused guilty

HELD

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YES. The following considerations have weighed heavily in arriving at a conclusion differ from the early
decision of the court.
1. Uncontradicted evidence that the defendant during the periods from April 11 to 26, 1922 and from
January 6 to 10, 1926 was confined in the insane department of the San Lazaro Hospital suffering from a
disease diagnosed as dementia praecox, long before the commission of the offense and recurrence of
ailments were not entirely lacking of scientific foundation.
2. Dementia praecox is clearly regarded as having mental disease to the degree that disqualifies them for
legal responsibilities for their actions and considered he has no control whatever of his acts.
3. According to the statement of Dr. Francisco 4 days prior to the attack the defendant had an insomnia
attack, a symptom leading to dementia praecox.
4. The accused was taken to the police station on the same day of the perpetration of the crime and on
the following day he was sent by the Police department to the Psychopathic Hospital, this is an indication
that the police doubted the mental normalcy of the accused.
5. According to the findings of Dr. Toribio Joson on the first month of treatment , the defendant was
suffering from a form of psychosis called manic depression psychosis.

The court acquits Boroan, with costs de oficio in both instances. In conformity to Art 12 of the RPC,the
defendant shall be kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or other mental institution designated
by the Director of the Philippine Health Service and shall remain confined unless the court order or decree.

People v. Dungo, G.R. No. 89420, 31 July 1991, 199 SCRA 860

FACTS:
Prosecution’s side: That on March 16, 1987 between the hours of 2:00 and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
a male person, identified as the accused, went to the place where Mrs. Sigua was holding office at the
Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the
envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. Accomplishing the morbid act, he went
down the staircase and out of the DAR's office with blood stained clothes, carrying along a bloodied bladed
weapon.

Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified that the accused inquired from him concerning the
actuations of his wife (the victim) in requiring so many documents from the accused. Rodolfo Sigua
explained to the accused the procedure in the Department of Agrarian Reform but the latter just said "never
mind, I could do it my own way.”

Defense: Dungo said he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense.

According to Andrea Dungo (wife), her husband had been engaged in farming up to 1982 when he went to
Lebanon for six (6) months. Later, in December 1983, her husband again left for Saudi Arabia and worked
as welder. Her husband did not finish his two-year contract because he got sick. Upon his arrival, he
underwent medical treatment, and because he was sick, he wasn’t able to resume farming. She also stated
different unusual behavior of her husband such as:

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1. She noticed her husband to be in deep thought always; maltreating their children when he was not used to
it before
2. Her husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they were not.
3. On the fateful day of March 16, 1987, at around noon time, her husband complained to her of stomach
ache; however, they did not bother to buy medicine as he was immediately relieved of the pain therein.

Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that the
accused was confined in the mental hospital and concluded that Rosalino Dungo was psychotic or insane
long before, during and after the commission of the alleged crime and that his insanity was classified under
organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke.

ISSUE: W/N the accused was insane during the commission of the crime

HELD:

NO. One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged cannot in a legal
sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for his acts. His unlawful act is
the product of a mental disease or a mental defect.

In order that insanity may relieve a person from criminal responsibility, it is necessary that there be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of
cognition; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be complete absence or deprivation of the
freedom of the will.

Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such as
evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct
inconsistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his improvident
bargains.

The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he perpetrated the act was sane.

The evidence shows that the accused, at the time he perpetrated the act was carrying an envelope where
the fatal weapon was hidden. This is an evidence that the accused consciously adopted a pattern to kill the
victim. The suddenness of the attack classified the killing as treacherous and therefore murder.

After the accused ran away from the scene of the incident after he stabbed the victim several times, he was
apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila, an indication that he took flight in order to evade arrest. This
to the mind of the Court is another indicia that he was conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in
stabbing the victim.

Court also stated that it is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person who may have
wronged him. Be it noted that the accused was supposed to be suffering from impairment of the memory,

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We infer from this confrontation that the accused was aware of his acts. This event proves that the accused
was not insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of lucid intervals.

The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez is to the effect that the appellant could have been
aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed it.

People v. Rafanan, L-54135, 21 November 1991, 204 SCRA 65

FACTS:
Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. appeals from a decision of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan convicting
him of the crime of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify complainant Estelita
Ronaya in the amount of P10,000.00 by way of moral damages, and to pay the costs.
Complainant Estelita Ronaya who was then only fourteen years old was hired as a househelper by the
mother of the accused, Ines Rafanan alias 'Baket Ines' with a salary of P30.00 a month.
The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the same house at Barangay San
Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was then married and had two children.
On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the mother of the accused to
help in their store which was located in front of their house about six (6) meters away. At 11:00 o'clock in
the evening, the accused called the complainant to help him close the door of the store and as the latter
complied and went near him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside the store and said, 'Come, let us
have sexual intercourse,' to which Estelita replied, 'I do not like,' and struggled to free herself and cried.
The accused held a bolo measuring 1-1/2 feet including the handle which he pointed to the throat of the
complainant threatening her with said bolo should she resist. Then, he forced her to lie down on a bamboo
bed, removed her pants and after unfastening the zipper of his own pants, went on top of the complainant
and succeeded having carnal knowledge of her inspite of her resistance and struggle. After the sexual
intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to report the matter to her mother or to anybody
in the house, otherwise he would kill her. LexLib
Because of fear, the complainant did not immediately report the matter and did not leave the house of
the accused that same evening. In fact, she slept in the house of the accused that evening and the following
morning she scrubbed the floor and did her daily routine work in the house. She only left the house in the
evening of March 17, 1976.
Somehow, in the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the accused learned what happened the night
before in the store between Policarpio and Estelita and a quarrel ensued among them prompting Estelita
Ronaya to go back to her house. When Estelita's mother confronted her and asked her why she went home
that evening, the complainant could not answer but cried and cried. It was only the following morning on
March 18, 1976 that the complainant told her mother that she was raped by the accused. Upon knowing
what happened to her daughter, the mother Alejandra Ronaya, immediately accompanied her to the
house of Patrolman Bernardo Mairina of the Villasis Police Force who lives in Barrio San Nicolas, Villasis,
Pangasinan. Patrolman Mairina is a cousin of the father of the complainant. He advised them to proceed
to the municipal building while he went to fetch the accused. The accused was later brought to the police
headquarter with the bolo, Exhibit 'E', which the accused allegedly used in threatening the complainant.

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At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial and in due course
of time, the trial court, as already noted, convicted the appellant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Policarpio Rafanan Jr. was suffering from a metal aberration characterized as
schizophrenia when he committed the crime of rape

RULING:
The Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the amount of moral damages is increased
to P30,000.00. Costs against appellant.

The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a metal aberration characterized as
schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent intentions upon Estelita. At the urging of his counsel, the trial
court suspended the trial and ordered appellant confined at the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong
for observation and treatment.

During his confinement, the hospital prepared four (4) clinical reports on the mental and physical condition
of the appellant, all signed by Dr. Simplicio N. Masikip and Dr. Arturo E. Nerit, physician-in-charge and
chief, Forensic Psychiatry Service, respectively.

First report:
"In view of the foregoing examinations and observations, Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is found
suffering from a mental disorder called schizophrenia, manifested by carelessness in grooming,
sluggishness in movements, staring vacuously, indifferen[ce], smiling inappropriately, refusal to verbalize,
emotional dullness, mental inaccessibility, seclusiveness, preoccupation, disorientation, and perceptual
aberrations of hearing strange sounds. He is psychotic or insane, hence cannot stand court trial. He needs
further hospitalization and treatment."

Second report:
"In view of the foregoing examinations and observations Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is at present
time still psychotic or insane, manifested by periods of irritability cursing nobody in particular, seclusive,
underactive, undertalkative, retarded in his responses, dullness of his affect, mumbles alone by himself,
preoccupied and lack of insight.
He is not yet in a condition to stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and treatment."

Third report:
Appellant was described as having become "better behaved, responsive" and "neat in person," and
"adequate in his emotional tone, in touch with his surroundings and . . . free from hallucinatory
experiences." During the preceding period, appellant had been allowed to leave the hospital temporarily;
he stayed with a relative in Manila while coming periodically to the hospital for check-ups. During this
period, he was said to have been helpful in the doing of household chores, conversed and associated freely
with other members of the household and slept well, although, occasionally, appellant smiled while alone.

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Appellant complained that at times he heard voices of small children, talking in a language he could not
understand. The report concluded by saying that while appellant had improved in his mental condition, he
was not yet in a position to stand trial since he needed further treatment, medication and check-ups.

Fourth report:
Appellant was described as behaved, helpful in household chores and no longer talking while alone. He
was said to be "fairly groomed" and "oriented" and as denying having hallucinations. The report concluded
that he was in a "much improved condition" and "in a mental condition to stand court trial."

Appellant's plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
"ARTICLE 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — The following are exempt from
criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
Where the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito),
the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus
afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder characterized by
inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and
delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is said to be the most common form of psychosis and
usually develops between the ages 15 and 30.

Q Now, is this insane person also capable of knowing what is right and what is wrong?
A Well, there is no weakness on that part of the individual. They may know what is wrong but yet there is
no inhibition on the individual.
Q Yes, but actually, they are mentally equipped with knowledge that an act they are going to commit is
wrong?
A Yeah, they are equipped but the difference is, there is what we call they lost the inhibition. The reasoning
is weak and yet they understand but the volition is [not] there, the drive is [not] there.
The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita with death should she reveal she had
been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the
reprehensible moral quality of that assault. The defense sought to suggest, through Dr. Jovellano's last
two (2) answers above, that a person suffering from schizophrenia sustains not only impairment of the
mental faculties but also deprivation of the power of self-control. We do not believe that Dr. Jovellano's
testimony, by itself, sufficiently demonstrated the truth of that proposition. In any case, as already pointed
out, it is complete loss of intelligence which must be shown if the exempting circumstance of insanity is to
be found.

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The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his
affirmative allegation of insanity. Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding
his state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry
into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment
the act is committed. Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of the two (2) physicians (Dr. Jovellano
and Dr. Nerit) which, however, did not purport to characterize his mental condition during that critical
period of time. They did not specifically relate to circumstances occurring on or immediately before the
day of the rape. Their testimonies consisted of broad statements based on general behavioral patterns of
people afflicted with schizophrenia. Curiously, while it was Dr. Masikip who had actually observed and
examined appellant during his confinement at the National Mental Hospital, the defense chose to present
Dr. Nerit.
Accordingly, we must reject the insanity defense of appellant Rafanan.

People v. Madarang, G.R. No. 132319, 12 May 2000, 332 SCRA 99

Facts:
Fernando Madarang worked as a seaman for 16 years. After working as a seaman, he started a hardware
store business. However, his venture failed. Worse, he lost his entire fortune due to cockfighting.
Fernando, his wife Lilia and their children were forced to stay in the house of Avelina Mirador, Lilia’s
mother, as he could no longer support his family. Moreover, Lilia was then already heavy with their eight
child and was about to give birth.
Fernando and Lilia had a squabble. The accused was jealous of another man and was accusing Lilia of
infidelity. In the heat of the fight and in the presence of their children, the accused stabbed Lilia, resulting
in her untimely demise. Avelina Mirador was then in the pigpen when she heard the children of the
accused shouting and crying inside her house. Her nephew barged into the house and brought out the
children one at a time, leaving the accused with Lilia. Avelina then saw the accused emerge from the house
holding a bolo. She scampered for safety.
Fernando Madarang was charged with parricide for killing his wife Lilia Madarang.
At the initial hearing of the case, the accused’s counsel manifested that his client had been
observed behaving in an abnormal manner inside the provincial jail. So he was transferred to the National
Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for psychiatric evaluation to determine his fitness to stand trial. The
initial examination of the accused at the NCMH revealed that he was suffering from a form of psychosis
known as schizophrenia. The accused was detained at the hospital and was administered medication for
his illness. After more than two years of confinement, the accused was discharged from the NCMH and
recommitted to the provincial jail as he was already found fit to face the charges against him.

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Avelina declared that during the period that the accused and his family stayed in her house, she
did not notice anything peculiar in accused's behavior that would suggest that he was suffering from any
mental illness. Neither did she know of any reason why the accused killed his wife as she never saw the
two engage in any argument while they were living with her.
The accused declared that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident. He could not
remember where he was on that fateful day. He did not know the whereabouts of his wife. It was only
during one of the hearings when his mother-in-law showed him a picture of his wife in a coffin that he
learned about her death. He, however, was not aware of the cause of her demise. He claimed that he did
not know whether he suffered from any mental illness and did not remember being confined at the NCMH
for treatment.
The trial court convicted the accused as his evidence failed to refute the presumption of sanity at
the time he committed the offense. The court held that accused Fernando Madarang is of sound mind at
the time of the commission of the offense and that he failed to rebut by convincing proof the evidence on
record against him to exempt him from criminal liability.
The accused appealed that (1) he had no recollection of the stabbing incident; (2) his behavior at
the time of the stabbing proved he was then afflicted with schizophrenia; (3) there was high possibility
that he was already suffering from insanity prior to his commission of the crime; (4) that his mental illness
may have been caused by his loss of fortune and being dependent on his mother-in-law for his family’s
support; (5) he and his wife never engaged in a fight prior to commission of crime; and (6) he had no
motive to kill Lilia who was scheduled to give birth 3 days prior to the killing.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused, invoking insanity, can claim exemption from liability for the crime he
committed.
Held:
No, the accused cannot invoke insanity to exempt him from liability.
Dr. Tibayan of National Center for Mental Health stated that schizophrenia is a mental abnormality
characterized by impaired fundamental reasoning, delusions, hallucinations, preoccupation with one's
thoughts, poor self-care, insight and judgment, and impaired cognitive, social and occupational functions.
A schizophrenic, however, may have lucid intervals during which he may be able to distinguish right from
wrong. Dr. Tibayan opined that the accused's mental illness may have begun even prior to his admission
to the NCMH and it was highly possible that he was already suffering from schizophrenia prior to his
commission of the crime.
The courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required
that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived
of reason; heacted without the least discernmentbecause there is a complete absence of the power to
discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability.
The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of
the usual means of proof. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may
be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused, by a witness who has rational basis
to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own perception of the accused, or by a
witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. The testimony or proof of the accused's insanity

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must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is
charged.
The accused was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia after he killed his wife.
Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and bizarre behavior apparent in
aloofness or periods of impulsive destructiveness and immature and exaggerated emotionality. None of
the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he exhibited any of the myriad symptoms
associated with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing incident. Although
Dr. Tibayan opined that there is a high possibility that the appellant was already suffering from
schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, he also declared that schizophrenics have lucid intervals during
which they are capable of distinguishing right from wrong. Evidence of insanity after the fact of
commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of abnormal behavior
immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime.
The Court finds the evidence adduced by the defense insufficient to establish his claim of insanity
at the time he killed his wife. There is a dearth of evidence on record to show that the appellant was
completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime. His claim that he
has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident amounts to a mere general denial that can be made
with facility. Neither is the appellant's seemingly non-repentant attitude immediately after he stabbed
his wife an indicium of his alleged insanity. Similarly, that the appellant and his wife were never seen
quarreling prior to that fateful day does not by itself prove the appellant's unstable mental condition.
Neither can it be said that jealousy is not a sufficient reason to kill a pregnant spouse. The Court also finds
his contention that his loss of sanity is due to the fact that he lost his business and became totally
dependent on his mother-in-law for support is purely speculative and unsupported by record. There was
no showing of any odd or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant after he lost his fortune and prior
to his commission of the crime that may be symptomatic of his mental illness. In fact, the appellant's
mother-in-law declared that during the time that she knew the appellant and while he lived in her house,
she did not notice anything irregular or abnormal in the appellant's behavior that could have suggested
that he was suffering from any mental illness.
As the appellant failed to establish by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed
his wife, the decision of the trial court convicting him of the crime of parricide is AFFIRMED.

People v. Robiños, G.R. No. 138453, 29 May 2002, 382 SCRA 581
Facts:
For automatic review is the RTC Decision of Camiling, Tarlac finding Melecio Robiños (Appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion and sentencing
him to death.

On 25 March 1995, fifteen year-old Lorenzo Robiños, while cooking, heard his parents, the appellant and
Lorenza quarrelling. After the victim said “Why did you come home, why don’t you just leave?”, he saw
appellant stab her with double-bladed knife on her right shoulder, and she fell down on the floor. Upon
witnessing the attack, he left to go to his grandmother’s house and reported what happened.

On the same day, Benjamin Bueno, brother of the victim was at his mother’s house, and received the news
that his own sister had been killed. He did not go to her house though, because he was afraid of what

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appellant might do. But from his mother’s house which was 150m away from his sister’s home, he saw the
appellant who shouted “It’s good you would see how your sister died.” He then sought help, and with the
help of the Barangay Captain and some members of the PNP Alert Team at Camiling Tarlac, with other
barangay officials and barangay folk, went to the scene of the crime. They saw blood dripping from the
house of the appellant. The police told him to come out and when he did not, they detached the bamboo
wall from the part of the house where blood was dripping. And they saw appellant embracing his wife. He
was uttering the words “I will kill myself, I will kill myself”. They pulled him away from the victim and tied
his hands and feet. But before he was pulled away from his wife and restrained, he told his neighbor
Rolando Valdes that he had killed his wife and showed the bloodstained knife. Victim’s body was already
dead and was sent to the funeral parlor for autopsy. Appellant on the other hand was brought to the police
station, but he had to be taken to the hospital for the treatment of stab wounds.

Reports show that victim was killed by 41 wounds on her body and apparently was 6-months pregnant.

Appellant does not refute the allegations but seeks exoneration from criminal liability by using the defense
of insanity.

Issue:
WON the defense Insanity is an Exempting Circumstance

Ruling:

Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of
will at the the time of the commission of the crime. Only when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be
considered. Presumption of law always lies in favor of sanity, and one who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving it. In the absence of this, he is presumed sane.

Looking at the records of the case shows that appellant's claim is unsubstantiated and wanting in material
proof. Testimonies from prosecution and defense witnesses shows no substantive evidence of his insanity
during the perpetration of the crime.

According to testimonies, a domestic altercation preceded the fatal stabbing. His stabbing was a deliberate
and conscious reaction to her remarks and thus it cannot be claimed that he attacked her for no reason at
all and without knowledge of the nature of his act. Also, he even boasted to victim’s husband of having
killed her. There is also the fact that he admitted to law enforcers that he killed his wife, showing remorse
-- upon realization of the wrongfulness of his act.

It is also worth noting that the bulk of evidence showing his unsound mental condition refer to the
condition after the commission of the crime. Testimonies of a nurse and his fellow prisoners show of his
unusual action in the Tarlac Penal Colony.

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In the exempting circumstance of insanity, the accused must be deranged during the commission or even
prior to it. His alleged insanity should have pertained to the period prior to or at the precise moment of
the crime, not thereafter. If the evidence points to insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime,
he cannot be acquitted. The testimony of Dr. Maria Mendoza, the psychiatrist who examined the appellant
does not provide help either. She only got to examine him 6 months after the crime and she was not able
to make a background study on the history of his mental condition prior to the killing because of the failure
of a social worker to gather data. She did testify that it was possible he had been insane during the
commission of the crime but it was merely an opinion and is inconclusive to support a positive finding of
insanity.

As for the penalty, the court erred in imposing the penalty of death. It imposed the maximum penalty
without considering the absence or presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. In all cases in
which the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, the court is mandated to impose
one or the other depending on the absence or presence of mitigating circumstances. The penalty provided
by law for the crime of Parricide is Reclusion Perpetua to Death, both indivisible penalties. And in
accordance with Art. 63 of the RPC “When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in
the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.” Hence, in this case, since there are neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, Reclusion Perpetua and not Death.

The Decision of the RTC is affirmed with modifications as to the penalty.

People v. Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, 17 March 2004, 425 SCRA 654
FACTS:
Appellant Anacito Opuran was charged with two counts of murder before the Regional Trial Court of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, for the death of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., and Allan Dacles under separate
informations, the accusatory portions of which respectively read:

Criminal Case No. 4693

That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Km. 1, South Road, Municipality of Catbalogan,
Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with
deliberate intent to kill and treachery, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault and stab Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., with the use of a bladed weapon (5" long from tip to handle
with scabbard), thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds on the back of his body, which wounds
resulted to his instantaneous death.
All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Criminal Case No. 4703

That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Purok 3, Barangay 7, Municipality of Catbalogan,
Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with
deliberate intent to kill, with treachery, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,

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assault and stab one Allan Dacles, who was lying on the bench, with the use of a bladed weapon, locally
known as 'pisao,' thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds on the different parts of his body,
which wounds resulted to his instantaneous death.
All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery.

After Anacito entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment, trial ensued.

Evidence for the prosecution:

[Allan Dacles’ case]

On 19 November 1998, at about 6:30 p.m., witness Bambi Herrera was studying his lessons inside his
house. His brother and a certain Jason Masbang were outside sitting side by side with each other on a
plastic chair; opposite them was Allan Dacles, who was lying on a bench.
Moments later, Jason barged into Bambi's house, shouting: "There's a long-haired man!" Bambi stood up
and looked through the open door. He saw appellant Anacito Opuran stab Allan on the chest with a knife
while the latter appeared to be trying to stand up from the bench. Although Allan had several stab wounds
on different parts of his body, he managed to stand up and run inside Bambi's house, with Anacito chasing
him. Bambi immediately locked the door from the inside to prevent Anacito from entering. But the latter
tried to force the door open by thrusting a knife at the door shutter. He also threw stones at the door.
After a short while, Anacito left.
With Anacito gone, Bambi went out to ask the aid of his neighbors so he could bring Allan to the hospital.
He saw Anacito's two brothers and asked for their assistance. But one of them merely said: "Never mind
because he [referring to Anacito] is mentally imbalanced."As nobody from among his neighbors responded
to his plea for help, Bambi carried Allan on his shoulders and dragged him to the lower portion of the
neighborhood. Several persons, who were having a drinking session, helped Bambi bring Allan to the
hospital. Allan, however, died about fifteen minutes later.

[Demetrio Patrimonio’s case]

At about 7:45 p.m. of the same day, prosecution witness Tomas Bacsal, Jr., of Barangay San Pablo,
Catbalogan, Samar, was in the house of Demetrio Patrimonio, Sr., seeking medical advice from the latter's
wife. While there, Tomas heard a commotion outside. He looked out from the balcony and saw people
running. He learned that Anacito had stabbed somebody.
After about fifteen minutes, while Tomas was on his way home, he saw Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr. He
likewise noticed Anacito hiding in a dark place. When Demetrio Jr. reached the national highway, near the
so-called "lover's lane," Anacito emerged from his hiding place and stabbed Demetrio Jr. with a knife about
three to four times.

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Tomas immediately ran to the house of the Demetrios to inform them of what he had just witnessed. He
then saw Demetrio Jr. running towards his parents' house, but the latter did not make it because he
collapsed near the fence. Tomas also caught sight of Anacito running towards the direction of the house
of the Opurans. Meanwhile, Demetrio Jr. was brought by his parents to the Samar Provincial Hospital,
where he died the following day.
Dr. Angel Tan, Medical Specialist II of the Samar Provincial Hospital, conducted an autopsy on the cadavers
of Allan and Demetrio Jr. He found five stab wounds on Allan's body, one of which was fatal because it
affected the upper lobe of the right lung and bronchial vessel. Demetrio Jr. sustained four stab wounds
and died of pulmonary failure due to hypovolemia from external and internal hemorrhage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant, Anacito Opuran, is guilty of the crimes of murder

RULING:
We AFFIRM, with modifications as to the damages, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan,
Samar, Branch 29, finding appellant Anacito Opuran guilty of the crimes of murder in Criminal Case No.
4693 and homicide in Criminal Case No. 4703, and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, respectively. Apart from the P50,000 civil indemnity, he is
ordered to pay (1) the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., in the amounts of (a) P50,000 as moral damages;
(b) P25,000 as temperate damages; and (c) P25,000 as exemplary damages, or a total of P150,000; and (2)
the heirs of Allan Dacles in the amounts of (a) P50,000 as moral damages; and (b) P10,000 as temperate
damages, or a total of P110,000.
Costs de oficio.

For its part, the defense presented, as its first witness, the appellant himself, Anacito Opuran. He declared
that on the evening of 19 November 1998, he was resting in their house in Canlapwas, another barangay
in Catbalogan, Samar. He never went out that night. While he was sleeping at about 8:30 p.m., eight
policemen entered his house, pointed their guns at him, and arrested him. He was brought to the police
station and detained there until the following morning. He denied being present at the place and time of
the stabbing incidents. He admitted knowing Demetrio Jr. as a distant relative and friend whom he had
not quarreled with. As for Allan, he never knew him. He had no misunderstanding with prosecution witness
Bambi Herrera. He asserted that the accusations against him were fabricated because he was envied and
lowly regarded by his accusers.
Anacito seasonably appealed to us from the decision attributing to the trial court grave error in
disregarding the exempting circumstance of insanity. He contends that he was suffering from a psychotic
disorder and was, therefore, completely deprived of intelligence when he stabbed the victims. Even
assuming in gratis argumenti that he is criminally liable, he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance under
paragraph 9, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, which is "illness as would diminish the exercise of the
willpower of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts." He likewise

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maintains that since treachery was not specifically alleged in the Information as a qualifying circumstance,
he cannot be convicted of murder for the death of Demetrio Jr.
In the determination of the culpability of every criminal actor, voluntariness is an essential element.
Without it, the imputation of criminal responsibility and the imposition of the corresponding penalty
cannot be legally sanctioned. The human mind is an entity, and understanding it is not purely an
intellectual process but is dependent to a large degree upon emotional and psychological appreciation. A
man's act is presumed voluntary. It is improper to assume the contrary, i.e. that acts were done
unconsciously, for the moral and legal presumption is that every person is presumed to be of sound mind,
or that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person. Thus, the presumption under
Article 800 of the Civil Code is that everyone is sane. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by
evidence of insanity, which under Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code exempts a person from criminal
liability.
Interestingly, Anacito failed to raise insanity at the earliest opportunity. He invoked it for the first time in
the year 2000 and only after he had already testified on his defenses of alibi and denial. It has been held
that the invocation of denial and alibi as defenses indicates that the accused was in full control of his
mental faculties. Additionally, the trial judge observed that, during the hearings, Anacito was attentive,
well-behaved, and responsive to the questions propounded to him. Thus, the shift in theory from denial
and alibi to a plea of insanity, made apparently after the appellant realized the futility of his earlier
defenses, is a clear indication that insanity is a mere concoctionor an afterthought.In any event, Anacito
failed to establish by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed Demetrio Jr. and Allan
Dacles. He is thus presumed sane, and we are constrained to affirm his conviction.

We agree with the trial court that treachery cannot be appreciated as far as the killing of Allan is concerned
because the sole eyewitness did not see the commencement of the assault.For treachery to be considered,
it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no particulars are
known as to how the killing began, the perpetration with treachery cannot be supposed.
Treachery was correctly appreciated in the killing of Demetrio Jr. Anacito was lying in wait for his victim in
a dark place at the national highway. When Demetrio Jr. reached the "lover's lane," Anacito emerged from
his hiding place and stabbed the former several times. Anacito's attack came without warning; it was
deliberate and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to
resist or defend himself.
We do not find merit in appellant's contention that he cannot be convicted of murder for the death of
Demetrio Jr. because treachery was not alleged with "specificity" as a qualifying circumstance in the
information. Such contention is belied by the information itself, which alleged: "All contrary to law, and
with the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery." In any event, even after the recent amendments
to the Rules of Criminal, Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words
such as qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense.
We, therefore, sustain the penalty imposed by the trial court on Anacito. For the crime of murder, which
is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, he was correctly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, the
lower of the two indivisible penalties, since there was no other aggravating circumstance attending the

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commission of the crime. For the crime of homicide, which is punishable by reclusion temporal, he may be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty whose minimum is within the range of prision mayor and whose
maximum is within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period, there being no modifying
circumstances.

Verdadero v. People, G.R. No. 216021, 2 March 2016

FACTS:

Prosecution’s side: On March 12, 2009, Maynard Plata and his father Romeo were at the Baggao Police
Station. Together with Ronnie Elayde, they went there to report that Verdadero had stolen the fan belt of
their irrigation pump.

After a confrontation with Verdadero at the police station, they made their way home on a tricycle but
stopped at a drugstore to buy some baby supplies. Romeo proceeded towards a store near the drugstore
while Ronnie stayed inside the tricycle. From the drug store, Maynard saw Verdadero stabbing Romeo,
after he was alerted by the shouts of Ronnie.

Verdadero stabbed Romeo on the left side of the latter’s upper back with the use of a Rambo knife. He
again struck Romeo’s upper back, just below the right shoulder. Maynard tried to help his father but
Verdadero attempted to attack him as well. He defended himself using a small stool,
which he used to hit Verdadero in the chest.

Meanwhile, Ronnie ran towards the police station to seek assistance. The responding police officers
arrested Verdadero, while Maynard and Ronnie brought Romeo to a clinic but later died upon the arrival
at the CVMC.

DEFENSE: Since 1999, Verdadero had been an outpatient of CVMC’s Psychiatric

Department as he claimed to hear strange voices and had difficulty in sleeping. While on July 21, 2003, he
was diagnosed with schizophrenia and was given medications to address his mental illness.

On March 12, 2009 (the day of the incident), Miriam (sister of the accused) proceeded to CVMC, after she
heard of the stabbing incident. There, she saw Verdadero removing the IV tubes connected to his body and,
thereafter, locked himself inside the comfort room.

On Jan 4, 2011, Dr. Ethel Maureen Pagaddu conducted a mental examination on Verdadero. She
confirmed that as early as 1999, that he was diagnosed with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003. Dr. Pagaddu
agreed with Dr. Andres-Juliana that Verdadero had suffered a relapse on the day of
the stabbing incident.

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Still RTC and CA convicted Verdadero of Homicide due to lack of proof that that he was completely of
unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime. Thus, raising this present petition
to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: W/N THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER’S CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT
THAT HIS INSANITY AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT WAS ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE

HELD:

YES. The Court finds that Verdadero sufficiently proved that he was insane at the time of the stabbing.
Thus, the Court (SC) takes a view different from that of the CA as the latter concluded that Verdadero’s
insanity was not clearly proven. Further, Dr. Pagaddu categorically testified that Verdadero was suffering
a relapse at the time of the stabbing incident.

Dr Pagadu, without any reservations, stated that Verdadero was suffering a relapse of his schizophrenia at
the time of the stabbing incident. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude, on the basis of the testimony of an
expert witness, that Verdadero was of unsound mind at the time he stabbed Romeo.

Schizophrenia: Chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and
reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions.

Art. 12, par. 1, of The Revised Penal Code exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, i.e., appellant is deprived of reason; he acts without the least discernment because of
complete absence of the power to discern; or, there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will. The onus
probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance, and he must prove it by clear and convincing evidence

Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness
who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to
conclude that the accused was insane based on his own perception;or is qualified as an expert, such as a
psychiatrist.

Also, the finding of Verdadero’s insanity is supported by the observations made by Maynard, a witness for
the prosecution. Also, he perceived that Verdadero was again of unsound mind noting that he had reddish
eyes and appeared to be drunk. Moreover, he was immediately transferred to the psychiatry department
because of his impaired sleep and to control him from harming
himself and others which are consistent with Dr Paggadu’s testimony.

In appreciating insanity in favor of Verdadero, the Court absolves him from criminal responsibility. He is,
nevertheless, responsible to indemnify the heirs of Romeo for the latter's death. An exempting
circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the accused is freed from the
criminal liability.

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PETITION GRANTED. ACQUITTED

People v. Genosa, 341 SCRA 493, 419 SCRA 537

Automatic REVIEW of the decision of the RTC finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
parricide, sentencing her to death.

FACTS:
Different version of facts from Defense and prosecution.

FACTS FROM THE PROSECUTION

On Nov 15, 1995, Ben and Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their salary. They each had 3 bottles
of beer before heading home. They arrived at the house of Ben and appellant was not present. Ben went
inside while Basobas went to a nearby store to place a bet. On his way home he passed Ben’s house and
he heard the appellant say “I will not hesitate to kill you” to which Ben replied “Why kill me when I’m
innocent?” That was the last time Basobas saw Ben alive. Since then, he noticed that their house was
always closed.

Next day appellant asked Paderog, her close friend and neighbor to look after her pig because she was
going to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. On the same day Valida was waiting for a bus when she saw the
appellant leaving the house with her 2 kids. They all rode the same bus but did not talk since appellant did
not seem to want to talk to him.

Nov 18, neighbors of Matiga told him about the foul odor emanating from the house they rented. He
destroys the padlock and found the lifeless body of Ben in the unlocked bedroom. Ben’s mother identifies
his body later that day. Dr Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for 2-3 days and concluded that the cause
of death is cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage.

APPELLANT ADMIST KILLING BEN. On Nov 15, she went to look for Ben but did not find him there. Found
Ben drunk at another house. Ben nagged appellant for following him, challenging her to a fight. She ignored
him and attended to their children who were doing homework. Ben switched off the light and cut the
television antenna wire. She ran to the bedroom but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She
fell on the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. She packed his clothes because she wanted him
to leave. Ben sees his packed clothes and drags appellant towards a gun inside a locked drawer. He got a
cutter from his wallet, but she smashed his arm with a pipe. She ran inside the bedroom. Appellant insists
she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She supposedly distorted the drawer where the gun
was. He did not die on the spot but in the bedroom.

FACTS FROM THE DEFENSE

Marivic and Ben were married with 3 kids. They were neighbors and knew each other since elementary
school; they were third degree cousins. Marivic testified that after the first year of their marriage, Ben

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became cruel and was a habitual drinker and frequented cockpits. She said that he would beat her and
witnesses who were not closely related to her also testified to the abuse she received from Ben. She
further says that she tried to leave their marriage 5 times, but they would always reconcile. Marivic said
that on the night that she killed him he was violent because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu.

Marivic insists that she shot Ben with a gun and he died in the bedroom, that their fights could be heard
by anyone who would pass by their house. She left the house for Manila the next day, rented a room, and
got a job as a field researcher under the alias Marivic Isidro, did not tell anyone she was leaving Leyte and
wanted to deliver the baby safely, and was arrested in Laguna. She further stated that she threw the gun
away and does not know what happened to the pipe she once used to smash him, that she was wounded
by Ben on her wrist with the bolo.

The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an investigation was made of the foul
odor emitting from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses and
some defense witnesses during the trial. Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo says that Marivic fits the profile of a
battered woman.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the lower court erred in finding as a fact that they had been legally married.
(2) Whether or not it is vital to know the specific cause of Ben’s death
(3) Whether or not the Battered Woman Syndrome is a valid self-defense.

HELD:
(1) NO. In Parricide, the key element of relationship of the victim and the offender is the marriage
cert. In its absence, oral evidence can suffice if it is not objected to.
a.Appellant admitted being married to Ben. Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive
except when (1) the admission was made through a palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact made

(2) NO. Determining which of these admitted acts caused the death is not dispositive of the guilt or
defense of appellant.

(3) YES.
A. Definitions. Battered woman - a woman repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her
rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men.
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering
cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a
second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman

Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the
home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency
to accept responsibility for the batterers actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve

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More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of violence
(1) the tension-building phase
(2) the acute battering incident
(3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase

B. SELF-DEFENSE. Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. However, victim had
already retreated to the bedroom when she attacked him. Thus, Marivic’s killing of Ben was not completely
justified under the circumstances.

DECISION:
The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of cumulative provocation that
broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. This psychological paralysis she suffered
diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of
Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. The acute battering she
suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight months
pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state,
which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn child.

There was no treachery because when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot
be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned
and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant

Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS, as well as the benefits
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be released from custody on parole,
because she has already served the minimum period of her penalty while under detention during the
pendency of this case.

RULING:
GUILTY OF PARRICIDE with two mitigating circumstances. Penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period,
6 years, 1 day to reclusion temporal in its medium period, 14 years, 8 months, 1 day.

RA 9262 (Re: Battered Woman Syndrome)

See also: Maria Diory F. Rabajante, The Privilege of Being Insane: An Examination of, and a Saner
Alternative to the Insane Rule on Insanity Defense, 49 San Beda L.J. 1 (March 2012)

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2. Minority
RA 9344 as amended by RA 10630.
People v. Doqueña, G.R. No. 46539, 27 September 1939, 68 Phil. 580

FACTS
Between 1-2 pm of November 19, 1938, the now deceased Juan Ragojos and one Epifanio Rarang were
playing volleyball in the yard of the intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Province of Pangasinan.
Valentin Doquena (accused) intervened and catches the ball, tossed it at Juan Ragojos, hitting him on the
stomach. Ragojos chased Doquena, and upon catching him, slapped Doquena on the nape, and punched
him in the face. After doing this, Ragojos went back to Rarang to resume playing volleyball. Insulted,
Doquena looked for something to throw at Ragojos, finding none; he got his cousin's (Romualdo Cocal)
knife, and confronted Ragojos. Ragojo's denied Doquena's request for a fight and resumed playing.
Valentin Doqueña approached Juan Ragojos and challenged the latter to give him another blow with his
fist, to which the deceased answered that he did not want to do so because he (Juan Ragojos) was bigger
than the accused. Juan Ragojos, ignorant of the intentions of the accused, continued playing and, while he
was thus unprepared and in the act of stopping the ball with his two hands, the accused stabbed him in
the chest with the knife which he carried.

The court held that the accused acted in discernment in performing the act and was conscious of the
nature and consequences of his acts, therefore his defense that he was a minor was untenable (given that
the Doquena was a 7th grade pupil, one of the brightest in his class, and was an officer in the CAT program),
and thus convicted him of the crime of homicide. In accordance to the Article 80 of the RPC amended by
Commonwealth Act no. 99 ordered him to be sent to the training School for Boys until he reaches the age
of majority.

ISSUE
Whether or not the accused acted with discernment

HELD
YES.
To determine whether or not a minor acted with discernment (1) State of mind at the time the crime was
committed (2) the time he might have had at his disposal (3) the degree of reasoning he could have had
at that moment.

The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under
fifteen years of age but over nine who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances accorded by the records in each
case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only
before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial.
Decision affirmed with cost to the appellant.

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Ortega v. People, G.R. No. 151085, 20 August 2008

FACTS: Joemar Ortega, 14 years old was charged with the crime of Rape in two separate informations
dated 1998, for allegedly raping an about 8 year old girl 3 times on different occasions. In the version of
execution, In the second occasion, the victim, AAA, testified that petitioner inserted his penis into her vagina
and she felt pain. The third and last occasion happened when Petitioner went to the house of the victim
where her brother caught her and the petitioner naked waist down and having intercourse. The brother
then told the incident to his mother, MMM. She testified that when she asked AAA what happened, AAA
told her that petitioner inserted his fingers and penis into her vagina. Victim described petitioner's penis as
about five (5) inches long and the size of two (2) ballpens. She, likewise, narrated that she saw pubic hair
on the base of his penis. Mother examined victim's vagina and she noticed that the same was reddish and
a whitish fluid was coming out from it. They went to the rural officer of the locality for examination and
found no indication that she was molested. They then went to Dr. Joy Ann Jocson , Medical Officer IV of the
Bacolod City Health Office. Where he made an unofficial written report showing that there were abrasions
on both right and left of the labia minora and a small laceration at the posterior fourchette. She also found
that the minor injuries she saw on AAA's genitals were relatively fresh; and that such abrasions were
superficial and could disappear after a period of 3 to 4 days. Subsequently, an amicable settlement was
reached between the two families through the DAWN Foundation, an organization that helps abused
women and children. Part of the settlement required petitioner to depart from their house to avoid contact
with AAA. As such, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality. However, a year later, the family
of the victim charged the petitioner with 3 counts of rape, inwhich the petitioner plead not guilty.

The RTC ruled that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct Participation of
the crime of RAPE. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court that petitioner's defense of denial could not
prevail over the positive identification of the petitioner by the victim AAA and her brother BBB, which were
categorical, consistent and without any showing of ill motive. During the pendency of the case in the SC,
RA 9344 Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act was enacted that establishes a comprehensive system to manage
children in conflict with the law. At the case at bar, because the petitioner was a minor under 15 years of
age at the commission of the crime, he can be relieved from criminal liability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can avail exempting circumstance provided by the newly enacted law
on minors in conflict with law.

RULING: Yes, the petitioner can avail the exempting circumstance that will relieve him from criminal liability
because the law enacted was favorable to the accused, and is therefore retroactive in application. Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act provides that a child under 15 years of age in the commission of the offense shall
be exempt from criminal liability, but is subject to an intervention program. Exemption from criminal
liability, however, does not include exemption from civil liability. Section 64 of the newly enacted law also
provides that cases of children under 15 years of age at the commission of the crime, shall immediately be
dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer.

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It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged
rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the
testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioners age was never assailed in any of the proceedings before
the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was below 15 years
of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.

However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2) counts of rape committed
against AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption from civil liability.
AAA is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, pursuant to Article
2219 of the Civil Code, without the necessity of additional pleading or proof other than the fact of rape.
Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury necessarily resulting from the odious crime
of rape. The Court therefore held that the case against Joemar Ortega is hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is
hereby referred to the local social welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate
intervention program.

People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, 20 July 2011.

FACTS: Task Forcer Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report that
Mantalaba who was 17 yrs old was selling shabu at that time. They conducted buy bust operation, The two
poseur-buyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said to be in the act of selling shabu. PO1
Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet
of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the appellant. The poseur-
buyers went back to the police officers and told them that the transaction has been completed. He was
then arrested after that. After a buy-bust operation, inventory and inspection of items recovered were
conducted and two informations was filed against Mantalaba which was later on consolidated. He pleaded
not guilty.
However, RTC found Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was penalized of reclusion perpetua
to death and fine of 500,000 for selling shabu and for illegally possessing shabu, Mantalaba was penalized,
in application of the ISL, 6 yrs and 1 day as minimum and 8 yrs as maximum of prision mayor and fine of
300k. CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Thus, the present appeal.

Mantalaba contends that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him and that there was no evidence
of actual sale between him and the poser-buyer during the buy-bust operation. He also argues that the
chain of custody of the seized shabu was not established. Finally, he asserts that an accused should be
presumed innocent and that the burden of proof is on the prosecution and insists that the prosecution did
not present any evidence that an actual sale took place.

ISSUE: Whether Mantalaba is guilty of drug trafficking and possession.

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HELD: The petition is unmeritorious. Petitioner is guilty.

A sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the
offense, to wit:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore.

From the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the elements have been
satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject dangerous drug,
as well as the marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also clear as to
the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted.

The rule is that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect
because trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify. This is
more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court's findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.

Incidentally, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor
for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with
strong and convincing evidence.

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is
justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an
accused arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance
is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

As to his minority, Mantalaba was minor during the buy-bust operation but was of legal age during the
promulgation of the decision. It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect after the promulgation of the RTC's
decision against Mantalaba when said appellant was no longer a minor.. The RTC did not suspend the
sentence in accordance with PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) and Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with
the Law that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of the judgment. However, as ruled in People
vs Sarcia, suspension of sentence can still be applied but NOT when the offender upon the promulgation of
judgment is 21 yrs old. or older. Mantalaba is now 21 yrs old, therefore his suspension of sentence is already
moot and academic.

Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can now be appreciated in fixing the
penalty that should be imposed. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one
degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW),
the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and

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the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no other
mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.

Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442

Petition assails the constitutionality of the curfew ordinances issued by Mayors Herbert Bautista (Quezon
City), Joseph Estrada (Manila) and John Rey Tiangco (Navotas). The Petitioners prays to prohibit, desist
from implementing and enforcing the issuances as it is contrary to RA 9344 or Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act.

FACTS:

President Rodrigo Duterte campaigned for the implementation of nationwide curfew for minors. Several
local governments in Metro Manila started to implement curfew ordinances on minors through police
operations which was widely known as “Oplan Rody”. Among the local governments the following
respondents implemented curfew ordinances were Mayors Herbert Bautista, Mayor Joseph Estrada and
Mayor John Rey Tiangco.

Petitioners formed Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) which was composed of young adults
and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the rights and
welfare of the youth and minors. They prayed for the unconstitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances on the
grounds that:
-The ordinance results in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement which they assailed to be void for the
vagueness of doctrine. There was no clear provisions on how law enforcers should apprehend and properly
determine the age of alleged curfew violators.
-The ordinance suffers from over breadth by impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.
They claim that they should exempt working students or students with evening classes and the list do not
cover range and breadth of legitimate activities or reasons why minors shouldn’t be out at night.
-The ordinance deprives the minors of the right to liberty and travel without substantive due process and
fails to pass strict scrutiny test and for employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their purpose.
-The ordinance deprives parents of their primary right of rearing the youth without substantive due
process. The petitioners contends that there is no compelling state interest to impose curfews contrary to
the parents prerogative to impose and exercise their right to rear their children.
-Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344 “Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act”

The petitioners instead suggested massive street lighting programs, installation of CCTVs in public street
and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as a means of protecting children and preventing crimes at
night. Also, the imposition of a more reasonable sanction was brought about through mandatory parental
counseling and education seminars informing parents of the reasons behind the curfew. The petitioners
contends that imprisonment was a harsh penalty for parents who allow their kids to be out during the
curfew hours.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.

RULING:

Petition was partly granted. Declaring Manila and Navotas as UNCONSTITUTIONAL while Quezon City
Ordinance as CONSTITUTIONAL.

Under the strict scrutiny test, the government has the burden of proof in terms of proving that the
ordinance is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. After thorough evaluations of the provisions
of each of the Ordinances, it was decided that only the Quezon City Ordinance met the requirements, and
that those of Manila and Navotas were either narrowly drawn or that the exemptions trample with the
minor’s fundamental rights to freedom. The court said that both ordinances protect the rights to
education, to gainful employment, and to travel at night from school or work; However, even with those
safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account for
the reasonable exercise of the minors’ rights of association, free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably
assemble, and of free expression, among others.

The Court added that the exceptions under the Manila ordinance were too limited and, thus, unduly
trample upon protected liberties. It likewise observed that while the Navotas ordinance was apparently
more protective of constitutional rights than the Manila ordinance, it still provided insufficient safeguards
in that it hindered minors from engaging in legitimate non-school or non-church activities in the streets; it
effectively prohibited minors from attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi or dawn
masses) at night without accompanying adults; and it did not accommodate avenues for minors to engage
in political rallies or attend city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right to
peaceably assemble and to free expression. In addition, the Court ruled that the penal provisions of the
Manila Ordinance which impose reprimand and fines/imprisonment on minors are in conflict with Section
57-A of RA 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006), as amended, which provides that no penalty
shall be imposed on children for violations of juvenile status offenses. Hence, following the rule that
ordinances should always conform with the law, these provisions must be struck down as invalid.

The Court noted that the Quezon City ordinance “stands in stark contrast to the first two ordinances as it
sufficiently safeguards the minors constitutional rights” as its list of exceptions is more narrowly drawn to
sufficiently protect the minors rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble,
and of free expression. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that
enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and
therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State’s purpose.

3. Accident

US v. Tañedo, L-5418, 12 February 1910, 15 Phil. 196

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FACTS: The defendant in this case was accused of the crime of murder committed, they alleged that on or
about the 26th day of January of this year, the accused, with the intention of killing Feliciano Sanchez,
invited him to hunt wild chickens, and, upon reaching the forest, with premeditation shot him in the breast
with a shotgun which destroyed the heart and killed him. After seeing that Sanchez was wounded, Tanedo
ran back to his workers, he left his shotgun behind or by a tree and asked Bernardino Tagampa, to tell
him about the occurrence because he is his friend and that he was a relative of the deceased, and when
Tagampa heard of this they went together to see the dead body. That evening the accused and Tagampa
went together to dispose of the body finally. They took it from the cogon grass where it lay concealed and
carried it about seventeen or eighteen hundred meters from the place where it had originally fallen, and
buried it in an old well, covering it with straw and earth and burning straw on top of the well for the purpose
of concealing it. Tagampa said that he helped the accused dispose of the body because he was afraid of
him, although he admits that the accused in no way threatened or sought to compel him to do so.

Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by a gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were
found at the scene of the crime prior to the trial, the accused denied all knowledge of the crime, but later
confessed during the trial.
The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac and
sentenced to fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnification
and costs.

So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior relations between the accused and the deceased
had been normal. The deceased was a tenant on land belonging to a relative of the accused. There was no
enmity and no unpleasant relations between them. No attempt was made to show any. There appears to
have been no motive whatever for the commission of the crime. The Government has not attempted to
show any. The only possible reason that the accused could have for killing the deceased would be found in
the fact of a sudden quarrel between them during the hunt. That idea is wholly negative by the fact that
the chicken and the man were shot at the same time, there having been only one shot fired.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court is correct in ruling that there is criminal liability

HELD: NO, The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted, and his discharge
from custody ordered, costs de oficio. So ordered.

Article 1 of the Penal Code:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntary unless the contrary shall appear.

Article 8, subdivision 8,:

He who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere accident without liability
or intention of causing it.

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Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:

A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case
of a reasonable doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal

The American doctrine is substantially the same. If life is taken by misfortune or accident while in the
performance of a lawful act executed with due care and without intention of doing harm, there is no
criminal liability. In the case where there is no evidence of negligence upon the part of the accused. Neither
is there any question that he was engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the accident occurred.
Neither is there any evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the deceased. The only
thing in the case at all suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his concealment and denial.

Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required to prove such a defense by
a preponderance of the evidence, because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon
the State to show that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the evidence, both that for the
State and the prisoner, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing was accidental or
intentional, the jury should acquit.( State vs. Legg).

Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue in a prosecution for homicide, which must be
submitted to the jury. And since a plea of misadventure is a denial of criminal intent (or its equivalent)
which constitutes an essential element in criminal homicide, to warrant a conviction it must be negative by
the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.

People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 172695, 29 June 2007, 526 SCRA 215
Facts:
Guillermo Antiporta, father of the Consorcia Antiporta Castillo, narrated that the Isaias Castillom came
home drunk and was in an angry mood. Isaias kicked the door and table, and then threw the electric fan
away. He was prevailed upon by Guillermo to take a rest. But Isaias did not heed the advice of Guillermo
as he took instead his sling and arrow from the house ceiling where he was keeping them. Dejectedly, he
went to the adjacent house of her daughter-in-law Yolanda. From there, Guillermo heard the victim crying
and, afterwards, shouting at the accused. Guillermo concernedly ordered Yolanda to see what was
happening inside the house of Consorcia, and Yolanda obeyed. On her way, Yolanda met the accused
carrying the bloodied body of Consorcia. Guillermo, the accused, and Yolanda brought Consorcia to the
hospital but to no avail. The accused disappeared and did not enter the clinic where the victim was rushed
for treatment. He was later found by the police hiding inside a toilet at a nearby barangay.
It was later discovered that the killing was immediately preceded by a quarrel between the accused and
his wife. The autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained a punctured wound in the neck, a vital
organ, which fatally lacerated her jugular vein causing massive hemorrhage. The accused contended that
he was practicing the use of weapon when Consorcia was hit by the arrow.
The trial court found the accused guilty of parricide.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused can invoke the exempting circumstance of accident.

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Held:
No, the accused cannot invoke the exempting circumstance of accident.
There is no merit in appellant's contention that assuming he was the one who killed his wife, the
same was accidental and not intentional. The exempting circumstance of accident is not applicable in the
instant case. Article 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, provides:
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — The following are exempt from criminal
liability:
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without
fault or intention of causing it.
"Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and
convincing evidence. The defense miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof. The essential requisites
for this exempting circumstance are:
1. A person is performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.
Playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow cannot be considered as performing a "lawful act." Thus, on
this ground alone, appellant's defense of accident must be struck down because he was performing an
unlawful act during the incident. As correctly found by the trial court:
Furthermore, mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable under the law. In penalizing the act, the
legislator took into consideration that the deadly weapon was used for no legal purpose, but to inflict
injury, mostly fatal, upon other persons. Let it be stressed that this crude weapon cannot attain the
standards as an instrument for archery competitions. To sustain the accused's assertion that he was
practicing the use of said weapon at the time of the incident is patently absurd. The defense even failed
to rebut Guillermo Antiporta's testimony that the accused was keeping said sling and arrow inside his
house.
Other than his claim that the killing was accidental, appellant failed to adduce any evidence to prove the
same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The decision that appellant is guilty of parricide is AFFIRMED.

People v. Retubado, G.R. No. 124058, 10 December 2003

FACTS:

Shortly before Nov 5, 1993 someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the younger brother of the
appellant who was mentally ill. Someone inserted firecracker in a cigarette pack and gave it to Edwin. He
brought the cigarette home and placed it on the dining table as he was having dinner with his father.

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Momentarily, the firecracker exploded. The suspect was Emmanuel Cañon, Jr. The Cañons and the
appellant were neighbors. The matter was brought to the barangay who conducted an investigations. It
turned out that Emmanuel Cañon Jr was not the culprit. The barangay considered the matter closed;
however, the appellant was decided on confronting Cañon Jr.

On Nov 5, 1993 at around 9pm, Emmanuel Cañon Sr., 50 years old, a pedicab driver decided to go home
to end the day. He drove his pedicab and stopped at the junction when Retubado saw him and confronted
him. Cañon Sr ignored him, Retubado pushed the pedicab which nearly fell in the canal. Cañon Sr ignored
him and proceeded to his house. The victim arrived at his home, whilst being followed still by Retubado.
Shortly after Emmanuel has entered the house, the appellant arrived and tarried at the porch. Emmanuel
opened the door and demanded why he was being followed. Retubado said that he just wanted to talk to
Cañon Jr, but Sr. told the appellant that he was already asleep. Norberta Cañon, the wife of the victim,
went outside to pacify her husband. It was when Jessie pulled a gun from under his T-shirt and shot
Emmanuel Sr. on the forehead. The latter fell to the floor as the appellant walked away. Norberta called
for help. Relatives arrived at the scene; however, Emmanuel Cañon Sr died shorlty after being brought to
the Tuburan District Hospital.

The appellant admitted shooting the victim, but he contended that he was merely performing a lawful
act with due care; hence, cannot be criminally liable for the victim’s death. He claimed that he insisted
that Emmanuel wake up his son. Emmanuel went to his room and emerged holding a handgun with his
right hand. Emmanuel’s trigger finger was outside the trigger guard, and he held the firearm with the
muzzle facing downward. Fearing that he would be shot, the appellant took a hold of Emmanuel’s gun
with his left hand and pulled the gun towards victim’s stomach. The two struggled with the gun which then
suddenly went off and the bullet hit Emmanuel’s forehead. When Norberta went out the house to seek
for help, the appellant went back to his house and changed his clothes. He left the gun on the dining table
which was then taken by the appellant’s brother Edwin who then threw the gun into the sea.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the death of Emmanuel Cañon may be ruled as an accident (No)

RULING:

Jesus Retubado alias Jessie was charged and convicted of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer
reclusion perpetua and directing him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Emmanuel Cañon the sum of
P50,000. In this appeal before the Supreme Court, the appellant asserted that he was merely performing
a lawful act of defending himself when he grabbed the victim’s hand which held the gun, which accidentally
fired and hit the victim’s forehead. He claimed that the accident was not his fault He asserted that when
he wrestled with the victim for the possession of the gun, he was merely defending himself. He contended
that he had no intention of killing the victim as he merely wanted to talk to the victim’s son.

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The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying circumstance under Article 12 paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code. It is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the accused with clear and
convincing evidence. By admitting causing the injuries and killing the victim, the accused must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution because if such
evidence is weak by the accused fails to prove his defense, the evidence of the prosecution can no longer
be disbelieved.

We agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that there is no treachery in the present case to
qualify the crime to murder. The 2 conditions must be present (a) the employment of the means of
execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and (b) the means
of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. The prosecution failed to adduce an iota of
evidence to support the confluence of the abovementioned conditions. Thus, the appellant is guilty oonly
of homicide under Article 249 of the RPC.

The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. He turned himself in to the
police authorities prior to the issuance of the warrant for his arrest.

The Supreme Court modified the decision of the trial court and found the appellant guilty of homicide
only and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison sentence. The Court found no basis to deviate from
the findings of the trial court that the appellant was the provocateur, the unlawful aggressor and the
author of a deliberate and malicious act of shooting the victim at close range. But, the Court agreed with
the appellant’s contention that there was no treachery in the case to qualify the crime to murder. The
appellant was also entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

The appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The appellant Jesus Retubado alias Jessie is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of homicide defined in and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor, in
its medium period as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal, in its medium period as maximum, and
to pay the heirs of the victim, Emmanuel Cañon, P50,000 as civil indemnities; P50,000 as moral damages
and P25,000 as temperate damages.

Pomoy v. People, G.R. No. 150647, 29 September 2004, 439 SCRA 439
FACTS:
On January 4, 1990, the victim Tomas Balboa, a teacher in Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries
in Iloilo, was arrested in connection with a robbery which took place in the municipality in December 1989.
He was taken to the headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary and detained with another suspect of
the robbery case. Petitioner Roweno Pomoy, a police sergeant, directed the victim to come out for tactical
interrogation at the investigation room.
At that time, the petitioner had a .45 caliber pistol tucked in a holster which was hanging by the side of
his belt and only the handle protruded from the holster. When petitioner and the victim were near the
investigation room, 2 gunshots were heard. Pomoy was seen holding said pistol, facing Balboa, who was
lying in a pool of blood.

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When the commanding officer arrived, he disarmed Pomoy and had Balboa brought to the hospital, but
Balboa was already dead. Upon the request of Mrs. Balboa, an autopsy was conducted by the NBI. It was
found that the entrance of wound no. 1 was to the left side of the chest about the left nipple and exited
to the right side of the back. Its trajectory was backwards then downwards from left to right. As to the
possible position of the assailant, the nozzle of the gun was probably in front of the victim and was more
to the left side, and the gun must have been a little bit higher than the entrance wound. Wound No. 2 was
located immediately below the arch of the ribs, left side. Its direction was backwards and laterally upwards.
It was estimated that when it was inflicted, the assailant must have pointed the gun's nozzle to the right
side front of the victim. The distance between the entrance points of wounds No. 1 and No. 2 was found
to be about 16.0 centimeters.

Defense’s Version:
Erna Basa: While she was working on the backlogs in their office in the camp, she heard some noise and
exchange of words which were not clear, but seemed there was growing trouble. When she opened the
door, he saw the petitioner and the victim grappling for the possession of the gun. The grappling happened
so fast, the gun was pulled out of the holster, she was not certain who pulled it, and then there was
explosion
Eden Legaspi: She was in the investigation room when she heard a commotion outside. She remained
seated on the bench. After the commotion, Erma opened the door and she saw two persons grappling for
the possession of the gun and then two successive shots rang out. She did not leave the place where she
was, but she stood up and saw one of the two men fall down.
Roweno Pomoy: When he had his right hand on the doorknob of the investigation room, Balboa suddenly
approached him and grabbed his gun. He put his right hand on the gun handle and used his left hand to
fend off Balboa. They grappled, he was still holding with his right hand the gun handle and using his left
hand to fend off the victim while Balboa using the right hand to try to grab the gun. In 2-3 seconds, the
gun was drawn from the holster, and after 5 more seconds the gun fired while Balboa was to the right of
him, and then Balboa fell.

The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court, finding Pomoy guilty of homicide and discrediting his
claim that Balboa’s death was an accident:
1. Balboa was not successful in his attempts to gram the said firearm, since Pomoy was in control
of it when the shots were fired.
2. The gun had been locked prior to the accident and immediately before it went off, it was Pomoy
who released the safety lock before he deliberately fired;
3. The location of the wounds found on the body of the victim did not support the assertion that
there was grappling
4. The gun is not prone to accidental firing and the fact that the victim was shot twice in different
vital parts negate the claims that it was an accident.

ISSUES:
1.WON the shooting of Tomas Balboa was the result of an accident
2.WON petitioner was able to prove self-defense

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RULING:
Petition is granted and the assailed decision reversed. Petitioner is acquitted.
1.Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. – The following are exempt from criminal
liability:
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without
fault or intent of causing it.
Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to the victim was not due to the
fault or negligence of the accused, but to circumstances that could not have been foreseen or controlled.
Thus, in determining whether an accident attended the incident, courts must take into account the dual
standards of lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or negligence. This determination inevitably brings
to the force the main question in the present case: Was the petitioner in control of the said firearm at the
very moment the shots were fired?
No. The petitioner did not have control of the gun during the scuffle. The victim persistently attempted to
wrest the weapon from him, while he resolutely tried to stop those attempts.
The Court held that the release of the gun’s safety lock and firing of the gun are both accidental. Because
the grappling of the said weapon was first and vicious, the safety lock could have been accidentally
released. The fact that there were two shots fired does not necessarily and conclusively negate the claim
that the shooting was accidental because the said gun is a semi-automatic pistol, which is more prone to
accidental firing when possession thereof becomes the object of a struggle.
The elements of accident are:
1. the accused was at the time of performing a lawful act with due care;
2. the resulting injury was caused by mere accident;
3. on the part of the accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause the injury
In this case, all the elements are present. At the time of the incident the accused was a member of the
Philippine National Police. It was in the lawful performance of his duties as investigating officer that, under
the instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from his cell for a routine interrogation and it was in
the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that the petitioner defend his possession of the
weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer of the law, petitioner
was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a detained person
in his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in the
vicinity, including petitioner himself. At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit to any
intent to cause injury to the deceased, much less kill him. Furthermore, Nicostrato Estepar, the guard in
charge of the detention of Balboa, did not testify to any behavior on the part of petitioner that would
indicate the intent to harm the victim while being fetched from the detention cell.
2. Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of accident, in which there is no
intent to kill. Self-defense necessarily contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order to defend oneself
from imminent danger. The fatal shots in the case did not occur due to any conscious effort; they appeared
to be the spontaneous and accidental result of both parties’ attempt to possess the firearm.
Since, it was found that the death of the victim was the result of accidental firing, discussion of whether
the acts of the petitioner constitute self-defense is unnecessary.

4. Irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of a greater injury

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US v. Caballeros, G.R. No. 1352, 29 March 1905, 4 Phil. 350

Facts:
The defendants (Cabelleros, Baculi, et. al) have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu for
being accessories in the crime of assassination or murder of American Teachers Louis Thomas, Clyde
France, John Wells and Ernest Eger for taking part in the burial of the corpses of the victims to conceal the
crime.

According to Roberto Baculi, he did assist in the burial corpses but only because he was compelled to do
so by the murderers. This was corroborated by the prosecution witness Teodoro Sabate, an eyewitness to
the crime. Witness was present during the killing; Baculi was in a banana plantation on his property
gathering bananas when he heard the shots and he began to run but was seen by the murderers, Damaso
and Isidro; that they called to him and striking him with the butts of their guns and forced him to bury the
corpses.

Issue:
WON the defendants are exempt from liability by reason of irresistible force

Ruling:
Yes. The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible force.

For Baculi, with corroborating testimony of Sabate shows that he was only compelled by the murderers to
bury the corpses of the victims.

As for Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he took part in the execution of the crime with which he
has been charged; there is conclusive proof to the contrary since Baculi, and Sabate both expressly declare
that he did not take part of the burial nor was he in the place of occurrence when the burial happened.
His confession of supposed liability and guilt made before an official of the Constabulary cannot be
considered as legal proof, because the witness says that Baculi was the only one who made the confession
voluntarily. It appears from the statement of Meliton Covarrubias, a witness to the prosecution, that
Caballeros made the confession because of the promise made to him that nothing would be done to them.
Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely and voluntarily without force, intimidation or
promise of pardon cannot be accepted as proof on a trial.

The defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime which seems to be the
motive for the conviction is not punished in the Penal Code and therefore cannot render defendants liable.

Judgment appealed from is Reversed. Defendants are acquitted.

People v. Loreno, L-54414, 9 July 1984, 130 SCRA 311

Facts:

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In an information filed before the CFI of Camarines Sur, accused Eustaquio Lorenk and Jimmy Marantal
were charged with the crime of Robbery with Double Rape.

In the evening of 7 January 1978, Brgy Captain Elias Monge was at his house Barangay Magsaysay,
Libmanan, Camarines Sur. He was with his two daughters Monica, 14 and Cristina, 22 and were preparing
to attend the dance to be held at the barrio proper that evening. They had to wait as his wife, Beata was
changing the diaper of Cristina’s baby. The other people in the house were his two sons, Mario and Nilo,
and their farm helper Francisco Fabie.

Around 7PM, 4 men went to their houses, saying that there was a letter from the chief for Elias. Elias who
was in the sala went out and was handed the letter. He could not see what was written because it was
dark so he invited one of them in (one wearing dark sweater), the other stayed at the balcony. They then
saa that the letter says “Kami mga NPA”, Monica rushed to her mother and told her what happened.
Cristina attempted to grab the bolo from the kitchen but was held back by the one wearing dark sweater
and told them not to make any scandal.

Fabie, being ordered to fetch water, and upon reaching the sala recognized Loreno as one of the men. All
were ordered to lie flat on their stomachs on the floor. Loreno then tied all the victims with ratan, they
even cut the baby’s hammock and used it to reinforce in tying their hands together behind their backs.
Loreno was ordered by the one in dark sweater to drive the barking dog downstairs away, he held Fabie
and brought him downstairs, and upon reaching the corner of the house Fabie saw Marantal as Loreno’s
flashlight focused on him.

As Loreno and Fabie returned to the saka, the dark sweater guy hog hold of Monica and dragged her up
to the room located above the balcony. He ordered her to reveal where her piggybank savings were and
when she said she had none, he ransacked her room and the man forcibly removed her pants and raped
her. She struggled but he boxed and slapped her. Meanwhile, Loreno pointed his gun at the others in the
sala, threatening them, as they heard her shouts for help. He then brought Beata to the master’s bedroom
and then to the teacher’s room, ordering her to open the aparador and trunk with her keys and he got all
the contents and brought them to the sala dragging Beata.

Dark sweater guy went back, dragging the crying Monica and then turned to Cristina and dragged her to
another room and raped her. He also boxed her as she struggled, losing consciousness only waking up as
he was done with her. While this was happening, a third man entered the sala and ordered Loreno to cover
the victims with a mat and he complied. The man then proceeded to the kitchen and returned with rice. A
fourth man appeared and asked for cigarettes and when he said he had them in his pockets, standing up,
he was boxed and he fell to the floor. Loreno asked Elias to accompany him to his neighbor’s house, Elias
resisted but he pointed his gun at him, Loreno soon desisted as they got to the balcony.

He then went to the room where Cristina was and tried to kiss and touch her private parts but was
interrupted by his fellow men, told to hurry up because a man was approaching. He released her and
ordered her to breastfeed her crying kid. The men one by one went down from the house bringing all the

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things they robbed. The dark sweater guy returned to the sala and touched Cristina’s thighs and told them
not to tell anybody, or he would kill them. Then they all left.

They were robbed of the following: jewelry, two mosquito nets, 3 blankets, one caldero of rice, one
reversible jacket, three chickens, one camera, one beach towel, cash amounting PHP 6.5K, and several
others, with a total of P10,619.50

Elias and his family reported the incident the next day at the PC Headquarters at Camp Tara, bringing the
ropes and rattan. He was given a written recommendation, to be physically examined at the hospital with
his daughter Monica. Cristina was told that there was no need to submit for examination because she was
married.

The case was investigated by Sgt. Victoriano del Socorro on 10 January. After Elias narrated what happened
and named two accused, his team made an ocular inspection of the place and then went to pick up the
two accused and brought to the PC camp. The two were duly identified upon confrontation as the two
robbers. During investigation, the two refused to give written statements and even tried to persuade the
family if they could just talk and settle the matter to which Elias declined.

Physical examination on Elias showed a close wound that was healing, located at the right side of the
middle portion of the thorax, a “resolving hematoma, fight cestal region”. Monica on ther hand sustained
fresh and incomplete lacerations on her hymen, no spermatozoa were found. Any sperm ejected during
orgasm during the rape already disappeared since sperms only stay for 72 hrs, and she was examined on
the 10th, with the incident having happened on the the night of 7th.

The appellants claimed that they acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. Although admitting that they were present
during the incident, the two claims they were only forced by the dark sweater guy who claimed to be
members of the NPA operating in the locality, alongside his companions. If they did not comply, they and
their family will be killed.

The two plead not guilty but the lower court rendered judgment, finding them guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Robbery with Double Rape.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellants can be exempted from liability having acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury?

Ruling:
The court finds the contention untenable.

A person who acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury exempt from criminal liability because he did not act with
freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only without will

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but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending and
of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not
done. The compulsion must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or
self-defense in equal combat.

However, a perusal of the appellants’ statements show that not only do they admit their participation, but
also the facts established were inconsistent of having acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force
and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury.

As for Loreno:
1. Loreno being armed with a short firearm and pointing it to the victims which enabled the men to ransack
the house
2. Upon reaching the balcony with the dark sweater guy, he positioned next to the post in the balcony while
the other delivered the letter to Elias. Loreno admitted that without prior instructions be positioned
himself that way, an act which showed his voluntary participation.
3. He tied the victims himself with rattan which he admits being the one to furnish the rattan having found
it inside the house
4. Pointing his gun at the victims in the sala when Monica was being raped telling them not to rise if they
wanted to live
5. Him dragging Beata to the rooms and ordering her to open the trunk and aparador with her keys and
getting the contents and bringing them to the sala, pouring it to the floor, he acted alone without threat
or assistance of the dark sweater guy
6. His act of embracing and trying to kiss and touch Cristina’s private parts after being raped.

Macalintal:
1. Upon being recognized by Fabie, Macalintal kicked him twice as if warning him
2. Standing at the gate, he must have heard Monica’s cries for help, must have known that she was being
abused
3. Acting as a lookout he gave his companions effective means and encouragement to commit the crimes
4. He did not raise a voice to protest or at least try to prevent the commission of the crimes

All of these demonstrated the voluntary participation and the conspiracy of the appellants.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 127755, 14 April 1999, 305 SCRA 740
Facts:
Accused Joselito Del Rosario was found guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
he was sentenced to suffer the death penalty and to pay damages to the heirs of the victim.
Joselito del Rosario, Ernesto Marquez alias "Jun," Virgilio Santos alias "Boy Santos" and John Doe alias
"Dodong" were charged with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for having robbed
Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion
thereof shot and killed her.

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Facts established by the prosecution from the eyewitness account of tricycle driver Paul Vincent Alonzo:
Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of Nita's Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three
women flagged him. Parked at a distance of about one and a-half (1½) meters in front of him was a tricycle
driven by accused Joselito del Rosario. At that point, Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman grappling for
possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of the two men armed with a gun started chasing a
man who was trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher kicked the woman sending her to the
ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and while the woman was still on the ground he shot her on
the head. The bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle of accused del Rosario where someone
inside received the bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver while his companion entered the
sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the plate number of the
tricycle. He also recognized the driver, after which he went to the nearest police headquarters and
reported the incident.

Joselito del Rosario’s version of the incident:

At around 5:30 in the afternoon he was hired for P120.00 by a certain "Boy" Santos, his co-accused.
Their original agreement was that he would drive him to a cockpit at the Blas Edward Coliseum. However
despite their earlier arrangement Boy Santos directed him to proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun"
Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya. He (del Rosario) acceded. Subsequently, he was asked to proceed and stop
at the corner of Burgos and General Luna Sts. where Bisaya alighted on the pretext of buying a cigarette.
The latter then accosted the victim Virginia Bernas and grappled with her for the possession of her bag.
Jun Marquez alighted from the tricycle to help "Dodong" Bisaya. Accused del Rosario tried to leave and
seek help but "Boy Santos" who stayed inside the tricycle prevented him from leaving and threatened in
fact to shoot him.

Meanwhile, "Dodong" Bisaya succeeded in taking the victim's bag, but before boarding the tricycle
"Jun" Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head. the three (3) men alighted and warned del Rosario
not to inform the police authorities about the incident otherwise he and his family would be harmed. Del
Rosario then went home. Because of the threat, however, he did not report the matter to the owner of
the tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the police.

Issue:
Whether or not there was the presence of threat and irresistible force employed upon Del Rosario by
his co-accused.

Held:
The conviction of del Rosario must be set aside. His claim for exemption from criminal liability under Art.
12, par. 5, Revised Penal Code as he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force must be sustained.
He was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunpoint by his co-accused
from leaving the crime scene during the perpetration of the robbery and killing, and was only forced to
help them escape after the commission of the crime.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of
an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act
with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act.

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The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not
only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent
and impending; and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily
harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character
as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.
As a rule, it is natural for people to be seized by fear when threatened with weapons, even those less
powerful than a gun, such as knives and clubs. People will normally, usually and probably do what an
armed man asks them to do, nothing more, nothing less. In the instant case, del Rosario was threatened
with a gun. He could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under
the same circumstances would be more concerned with his personal welfare and security rather than the
safety of a person whom he only saw for the first time that day.
Taking the testimony of witness Alonzo in juxtaposition with the testimony of del Rosario, it can be
deduced that "Jun" Marquez was the person witness Alonzo was referring to when he mentioned that a
helper of the lady was chased "by the other man," and that this "other man" could not be "Boy" Santos
.who stayed inside the tricycle and to whom the bag was handed over. This conclusion gives credence to
the claim of del Rosario that "Boy" Santos never left the tricycle, and to his allegation that "Boy" Santos
stayed inside the tricycle precisely to threaten him with violence and to prevent him from fleeing; that
there could have been no other plausible reason for "Boy" Santos to stay in the tricycle if the accused was
indeed a conspirator; that "Boy" Santos could have just left the tricycle and helped in the commission of
the crime, particularly when he saw the victim grappling with "Dodong" Bisaya and resisting the attempts
to grab her bag; and, that "Boy" Santos opted to remain inside the tricycle to fulfill his preordained role of
threatening del Rosario and insuring that he would not escape and leave them behind.
There is no doubt that the fear entertained by del Rosario because of the gun directly pointed at
him was real and imminent. Such fear rendered him immobile and subject to the will of Boy Santos, making
him for the moment an automation without a will of his own. In other words, in effect, he could not be
any more than a mere instrument acting involuntarily and against his will. He is therefore exempt from
criminal liability since by reason of fear of bodily harm he was compelled against his will to transport his
co-accused away from the crime scene.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City convicting accused
JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the accused is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.|

5. Insuperable cause
People v. Bandian, G.R. No. 45186, 30 September 1936, 63 Phil. 530 (see also: separate opinion of J.
Villareal)

FACTS:
About 7:00 AM, Valentin Aguilar saw his neighbor, Josefina Bandian, got to a thicket apparently to respond
to the call of nature. few minutes later, he again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained
with blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to support
herself. He ran to her aid and, having noted that she was every weak and dizzy, he supported and helped
her go up to her house and placed her in her own bed. He called on Adriano Comcom who lived nearby, to

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help them, and later requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon
the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the body of newborn babe near
a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments beforeUpon being asked
whether the baby which had just been shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in the
affirmative.

Upon being noticed of the incident of 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno,
president of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to the appellant's house and found
her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the oor of her house and beneath it, directly under the bed, were
full of blood. Basing his opinion upon said facts, the physician in question declared that the appellant gave
birth in her house and in her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it for
the purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had theretofore been living
maritally, because the child was not but of another man with whom she had previously had amorous
relations. To give force to his conclusions, he testi ed that the appellant had admitted to him that she had
killed her child, when he went to her house at the time and on the date above-stated.

ISSUE: WON Bandian is guilty of infanticide

HELD:
By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the child in question died. Dr.
Nepomuceno himself af rmed that the wounds found on the body of said child were not caused by the
hand of man but by bites of animals, the pigs that usually roamed through the thicket where it was found.

Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed wilfully or consciously, or

at least it must be the result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where said
crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the person who commits them, under said circumstance,
must be in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may
be held liable.

The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her child's death in one way or another,
or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or
abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her
second lover, Luis Kirol, took place three years before the incident. He believed from the beginning,
affirming such belief when he testified at the trial, that the child carried by the appellant in her womb was
his, and he testi ed that he and she had been eagerly waiting for the birth of the child. The appellant,
therefore, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.

The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the thicket, according to her,
to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a long time, was perfectly
lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later
abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by strong
dizziness and extreme debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all happened by mere accident,

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with no fault or intention on her part. The law exempts from liability any person who so acts and behaves
under such circumstances.

In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting that the appellant
was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take her child therefrom,
having been so prevented by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, it should be held that the
alleged errors attributed to the lower court by the appellant are true; and it appearing that under such
circumstances said appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, she is
hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had been accused and convicted, with costs de oficio, and as
she is actually confined in jail in connection with this case, it is ordered that she be released immediately.

C. Other exculpatory causes

1. Instigation
People v. Lua Chu, G.R. No. 34917, 7 September 1931, 56 Phil. 44
People v. Doria, G.R. No. 125299, 22 January 1999, 301 SCRA 668

2. Pardon (Art. 266-C and Art. 344)

3. Absolutory circumstances
a. Art. 6 (3)
b. Art. 20
c. Art. 247
d. Art. 280*
e. Art. 332
Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales v. People, G.R. No. 181409, 11 February 2010.

D. Mitigating Circumstances
1. Classes of Mitigating Circumstances
a. Privileged
i. Art. 13 (2) and Art. 68
ii. Art. 13 (1) and Art. 69
People v. Jaurigue, G.R. No. 384, 21 February 1946, 76 Phil. 174
Facts:
● Nicolas and Avelina Jaurigue - prosecuted in Court of First Instance of Tayabas for crime of murder, but
Nicolas, Avelina’s father, was acquitted, while Avelina was found guilty of homicide
● 1942, Laguna, Amado Capiña, the deceased, had been courting Avelina to no avail.
○ One month before, Capiña snatched a handkerchief that belonged to Avelina.
○ September 13, Capiña approached Avelina while she was feeding a dog, and spoke of his love for her, but
she flatly refused. He suddenly embraced her, kissed her, and touched her breast. She slapped him, gave
him fist blows, and kicked him. After that incident, decided to arm herself with a long fan knife for self-
protection.
○ September 15, at around midnight, Capiña climbed and entered the room where she was sleeping. Felt
her forehead, evidently with the intention of abusing her, and she immediately screamed for help, which

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awakened her parents. Capiña came out from where be bad hidden and kissed the hand of Nicolas, asking
for forgiveness. Lozada, the barrio lieutenant, and Capiña’s parents came to house and apologized for
misconduct of Capiña.
○ September 20, Avelina received information that Capiña had falsely boasted about having taken liberties
with her person, that she asked him to elope with her, and if he didn't marry her - she would take poison.
■ That night, in the chapel, Avelina, sitting next to the door, was approached by Capiña, and with the greatest
imprudence, placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh. Avelina, conscious of her personal dignity
and honor, pulled out the knife with the intention of punishing Capiña’s offending hand. He seized her
right hand, but she quickly grabbed the knife with her left hand and stabbed Capiña at the base of the left
side of the neck - which was necessarily mortal.

Issue: WON Avelina can invoke defense of honor

Held:
● No; As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in killing her aggressor, in the
defense of her honor; However, the means employed by Avelina Jaurigue in the defense of her honor was
evidently excessive, and due to the facts and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared
completely exempt from criminal liability.
○ Mitigating circumstances: (1) immediately and voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered to the barrio
lieutenant; (2) acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against her a few moments
before; (3) provocation to produce passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and self-control;
and (4) claims that she had not intended to kill the deceased but merely wanted to punish his offending
hand with her knife.
○ No evidence to show that defendant and appellant had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel
that night … she is not a criminal by nature, and happened to jill under the greatest provocation.
● In the case at bar, defendant and appellant committed the crime of homicide, but with at least 3 mitigating
circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in her favor. Entitled to a reduction by one or two
degrees in the penalty to be imposed upon her. Sentenced to indeterminate penalty ranging from two
months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months, and one day of prision
correccional, as maximum, with accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to indemnify heirs of deceased
Capiña in sum of P2,000.

People v. Narvaez, L-33466-67, 20 April 1983, 121 SCRA 389

FACTS:
Mamerto Narvaez is guilty of two counts of homicide qualified by treachery with aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. At
about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano Juan, Jesus Verano and Cesar Ibanez together
with the two deceased Davis Fleischer (secretary-treasurer of Fleischer and Co., Inc.) and Flavino Rubia
(asst. manager of FCI) were fencing the land of George Fleischer the father of the deceased. The place is
the boundary of highway and hacienda of the Fleischers in Maitum, South Cotabato. Narvaez was awaken
by the sound of his house being chiseled and he saw the fencing going on that if the fencing will go on
appellant would be prevented from going into his house and ricemill bodega. He addressed the group

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saying -'Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk it over - what is good,'
addressing the deceased Rubia, who is appellant's compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however, answered:
'No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.' Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot
Fleischer, hitting him. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing there is a gun on
the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him.
Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal
battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time
of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to
Fleischer and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleischer
(though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter
terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove his house
from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after receiving the letter. Defendant claims he killed in
defense of his person and property. Court ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders,
Court sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted
in defense of his person
2. Whether or not the court a quo also erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in
defense of his rights

HELD
NO. There is no question that there was aggression on the part of the victims: Fleischer was ordering, and
Rubia was actually participating in the fencing. This was indeed aggression, not on the person of appellant,
but on his property rights.

YES. The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying circumstance of self
defense or defense of one's rights under paragraph I of Article 11, Revised Penal Code. When the appellant
fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
The third element of defense of property is present, i.e., lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
appellant who was defending his property. As a matter of fact, there was no provocation at all on his part,
since he was asleep at first and was only awakened by the noise produced by the victims and their laborers.
His plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk things over with him was no provocation at all.

Since not all requisites are present defendant is credited of special mitigating circumstance of incomplete
defense. The appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since not all the elements for
justification are present. He should therefore be held responsible for the death of his victims, but he could
be credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to paragraph 6,
Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

The court ruled that Narvaez is guilty of homicide beyond reasonable doubt of only two, mitigated by the
privileged extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense as well as two generic mitigating

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circumstance (1) voluntary surrender (2) obfuscation without any aggravating circumstance. Narvaez is
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of arresto mayor and indemnify each group of 4,000 pesos but due to
the under detention of 14 years since he surrender on august 22, 1968 his immediate release is hereby
ordered with no cost.

People v. Ulep, G.R. No. 132547, 20 September 2000

Facts:
SPO1 Ernesto Ulep is convicted for the murder of Buenaventura Wapili. His case is automatically elevated
for review to the Supreme Court due to the imposed penalty of death.
On December 22, 1995 at around 2:00am at Mundog Subdivision, Poblacion, Kidapawan, Cotabato,
Buenaventura Wapili was having a high fever and was heard talking insensibly to himself in his room. Dario
Leydan, his brother-in-law, convinced him to come out and talk. But Wapili refused. A little later, there
was a disturbance inside the room as if Wapili was smashing the furniture. His brother in law was trying to
calm him down but to no avail. Wapili locked himself in his room. Later on, he went out naked and chased
his brother in law. Leydan and neighbours tried to tie him with rope but to no avail so he got loose in the
village.
Leydan went to a policewoman, Norma Plando, to report the incident and while this was happening, Wapili
turned up in front of the policewoman’s house and banged her vehicle so she called for assistance.
The three responding policemen, armed with M-16 rifles, arrived around 4:00am. SPO1 Ulep fired a
warning shot and told Wapili to put down his weapon or they would shoot him. According to the police,
Wapili was armed with a bolo and a rattan stool (according to the relatives, Wapili had no bolo, but only
rattan stool). However, Wapili refused and instead advanced towards the police officers. At about two or
three meters away, SPO1 Ulep shot the victim, hitting various parts of the his body. As the victim slumped
to the ground, SPO1 Ulep fired another bullet into his head and literally blew his brains out.
The Office of the Ombudsman for the Military filed an Information for murder against SPO1 Ulep. The
accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and insisted that he acted in self-defense. On October 27, 1997,
the trial court convicted the accused of murder and sentenced him to death.

Issue:
WON SPO1 Ulep is guilty of murder.

Ruling:
No. He is liable for HOMICIDE.
Before the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Art. 11, par. 5, of RPC may be successfully
invoked, the accused must prove the presence of two (2) requisites, namely, that he acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or an office, and that the injury caused or the
offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise
of such right or office.
In the instance case, the second requisite is absent. When he fatally shot the victim in the head even after
the latter slumped to the ground cannot be exonerated. Obviously, it was unnecessary even perhaps in his
desire to take no chances.

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For the appreciation of self-defense, the elements are: the existence of unlawful aggression on the part of
the person injured or killed by the accused; reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. In the case, the
records show that when the appellant fired while the victim was already lying on the ground affirmed the
absence of aggression. The first indispensable requisite for self-defense being absent is fatal to the claim.
The presence of the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right
is deemed a special or privileged mitigating circumstance. Such circumstance cannot be offset by
aggravating circumstances but also reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law
in accordance to Article 69 of the RPC. Undoubtedly, the instant case would have fallen under Art. 11, par.
5 of The Revised Penal Code had the two (2) conditions therefor concurred.

Furthermore, the court credited in favor of the appellant the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. The police blotter shows that appellant immediately reported to the police
headquarters and voluntarily surrendered himself after the incident.
In appreciation of the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a
right lowered the penalty by one degree from reclusion temporal to prision mayor. The existence of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender imposed the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period.
The Supreme Court held SPO1 Ulep guilty of Homicide instead of Murder. He is sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of 4 years, 2 months and 10 day of prision correccional medium as minimum,
to 6 years, 4 months and 20 days of prision mayor minimum as maximum. He is further ordered to
indemnity the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000 and to pay the costs

Guillermo v. People, G.R. No. 153287, 20 January 2009.

FACTS:

PROSECUTION’S VERSION: The prosecution presented Vicente Alon (Vicente) and Eddie Roque (Eddie) as
witnesses in the trial that followed; Dr. Ricardo Betita, Jr. (Dr. Betita), Baby Lou Felipe (Baby Lou), and the
three accused – the petitioner, Arnaldo Socias, and Joemar Palma – took the witness stand for the defense.

Vicente Alon averred that at 5:40 in the afternoon of July 21, 1996, Winnie Alon, Wilfredo Cabison, Eddie
Roque, and him [sic] were at the public market of Cuartero, at [sic] the restaurant of Melecio Heyres to
eat.8 Noel Guillermo, Arnel Socias, and Joemar Palma were at the restaurant drinking beer. Noel Guillermo
and Arnel Socias are known to him since childhood since they come from the same barangay. Joemar
Palma is known to him only recently in that incident.

While sitting at the table inside the restaurant, an altercation between Arnel Socias and Winnie Alon
regarding the cutting of wood by a chain saw [sic] transpired. Noel Guillermo suddenly took hold of Winnie
Alon and stabbed the latter at the neck three (3) times.11 Joemar Palma went to the kitchen and got a
knife. Arnel Socias hit him with a bottle of beer by [sic] the head. He fell down and lost consciousness.

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Winnie Alon resisted trying to struggle, but could not move because he was ganged up by the three.

Significantly, Vicente admitted on cross-examination that he and Winnie were already drunk even before
they went to the restaurant where the stabbing took place.13

Eddie corroborated the testimony of Vicente on material points, particularly on the state of their
intoxication even before going to the scene of the stabbing. His testimony on what transpired at the
restaurant was summarized in the RTC decision.

According to Dr. Betita, the cause of death was massive hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds.22 He
added that the three (3) stab wounds were probably caused by a sharp-bladed instrument like a knife.

PETITIONER’S VERSION: Noel Guillermo testified that at 5:30 in the afternoon of July 21, 1996, he was in
Cuartero at the restaurant of Melecio Heyres,together with Arnel Socias and Joemar Palma drinking beer,
consuming only about half a bottle, when Winnie Alon, Eddie Roque, Vicente Alon, and Wilfredo Cabison
arrived and ordered beer from Babylou Felipe. Winnie Alon came to him and requested to join them in
their table which he affirmatively answered. Winnie Alon then had an altercation with Arnel Socias
regarding "labtik" (string used in marking wood to be cut).

Winnie Alon challenged Arnel Socias to a contest on clean or straight cutting of wood. Arnel declined the
challenge. Winnie Alon got angry and told him that he has long been in [the] chain saw [sic] business but
"you’re stupid" ("gago ka!"). Arnel responded: "If the wood is crooked and you would deviate from line,
you’re stupid.

Winnie Alon suddenly stood up and said to Arnel: "Don’t ever call me stupid," pointing his finger to Arnel.
Winnie Alon was so furious and grabbed Arnel Socias by the collar. Arnel tried to release the hold of Winnie
from his collar. While he was pacifying the two telling them to settle the matter peacefully, Winnie Alon
turned to him and said: "you also," then struck him with a beer bottle. He was hit at the right top of his
head thrice. He stood up and boxed Winnie who again picked up a bottle break [sic] it against the wall,
and struck him with the broken bottle. He stepped back, pulled his knife, and stabbed him three (3) times
but cannot remember what part of his body was hit by his successive stabs

Now, The petitioner essentially claims that the RTC and the CA erred in failing to recognize the existence
of all the elements of self-defense.

ISSUE: W/N SELF DEFENSE SHOULD BE APPRECIATED

HELD: YES.

ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur;

First. Unlawful aggression;

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Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

COURT: In the present case, court found it beyond dispute that the victim Winnie started the fight that
ended in his death; he struck the petitioner on the head when the latter intervened to pacify the quarrel
between Winnie and Arnaldo. In short, the victim was the unlawful aggressor while the petitioner was in
the lawful act of pacifying the quarreling parties; thus, the latter has in his favor the element of unlawful
aggression by the victim.

it is also established that the petitioner did not provoke the fight that ensued; he was a third party to the
quarrel between the original protagonists – Winnie and Arnaldo – and did not at all initiate any provocation
to ignite the quarrel. Thus, the petitioner also has the element of lack of sufficient provocation in his favor.

The third element – the reasonableness of the means to repel the aggression – is the critical element that
the lower courts found lacking in the petitioner’s case.

In the present case, the attack on the petitioner came as he intervened in a quarrel between the victim
and another party. As we concluded above, the court deem it established that the victim was the unlawful
aggressor who attacked the petitioner. Physical evidence shows that indeed the petitioner suffered the
following injuries:

The weapons that caused these injuries were a beer bottle and, quite possibly, fingernails as the victim
and the appellant grappled with each other.47 In contrast, the victim suffered three stab wounds: at the
neck, at the abdomen and in the chest. The weapon used was a Batangas knife that admittedly belonged
to the petitioner. Thus, the physical evidence in the case stands

The petitioner claims self-defense on the position that Winnie, after hitting him on the head three times
with an empty bottle, grabbed another bottle, broke it against the wall, and thrust it towards him. It was
at this point that the petitioner used his knife to inflict Winnie’s fatal wounds. Clearly, the petitioner wants
to impress upon us that his response to Winnie’s attack was reasonable; he used a knife to repel an
attacker armed with a broken beer bottle.

Since the petitioner’s plea of self-defense lacks only the element of "reasonable means," the petitioner is,
therefore, entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. Consequently,
the penalty for homicide may be lowered by one or two degrees, at the discretion of the court.

The CA affirmed the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as maximum, as imposed by the RTC on petitioner. We affirm this to be the legally
correct and proper penalty to be imposed upon petitioner.

We also affirm the P50,000.00 death indemnity awarded to Winnie’s heirs, in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence as well as moral damages

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PETITION DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the CA dated November 15, 2001 and April 5,
2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 24181 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the petitioner is
ordered to pay the heirs of Winnie Alon the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages. Costs against the
petitioner.

b. Ordinary
i. Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
People v. Ural, L-30801, 27 March 1974, 56 SCRA 138

Facts:
● 1974, Zamboanga del Sur, Appeal of defendant Ural from decision of Judge Ericta of CFI of Zamboanga del
Sur, convicting him of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify heirs
of Napola in sum of P12,000 and pay the costs.
● Conviction based on testimony of Alberto, former detention prisoner in Zamboanga del Sur. Alberio was
accused of murder and then set at liberty on 1966 after posting bail. Went to Barrio Camongo where his
father resided. Intended to go back to his residence, but night overtook him in the town. He decided to
sleep in the municipal building where there would be more security.
○ Upon arrival at 8:00 pm, witnessed Ural inside the jail boxing detention prisoner Napola, who collapsed
on the floor. Ural stepped on the body, left, and returned with a bottle – poured contents on Napola’s
recumbent body. Then, ignited it with a match and left the cell. Napola screamed in agony, shouted for
help, but nobody came to succor him.
○ Alberto left the municipal building, but before departure – Ural cautioned him: “You better keep quiet of
what I have done.”
● Dr. Bakil, municipal health officer, certified that Napola, who she treated twice, sustained 2 nd degree burns
on arms, neck, left side of the face and one-half of the body including the back. Eventually, after Napola
died, the sanitary inspector issued a certificate of death indicating, “burn” as the cause of death.
● TC – deplored half-hearted manner in which prosecution handled the case … bewailed prosecutor’s failure
to present de la Serna and Ogoc, fellow detention prisoners who witnessed the burning of Napola.
○ Noted that Paler, victim’s widow, was a vital witness who should have been presented as a witness to
prove the victim’s dying declaration or statements which were part of res gestae.
● In appeal, appellant’s three assignment of error – issue of credibility or the sufficiency of the prosecution’s
evidence to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. According to Ural: Around 9:00 pm, in the municipal jail
for guard duty. Heard a scream for help from Napola, and found Napola’s shirt in flames. With help of
Ogoc and Siton, Ural removed Napola’s shirt … and did not summon a doctor because, according to Napola,
the burns were not serious.
○ Ogoc’s common-law wife, who TC branded as “complete liar,” testified that she heard Napol’as scream for
help, also saw Napola’s shirt burning – didn’t know how it happened. She said that Ural and Siton removed
Napola’s shirt and put out the fire.
○ Matugas, a policeman, declared that he was relieved as guard by Ural at 8:30 pm, and denied that Alberio
was in the municipal building at 8:00 pm.

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Issue: WON mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong can be used in the case
at bar

Held:
● YES
● TC saw demeanor and behavior of the witnesses – chose to believe Alberio … SC does not find any
justification for disbelieving Alberio.
○ Case is covered by Article 4 of RPC – “criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.”
○ Further, TC correctly held that the accused took advantage of his public position (Par 1, Art 14, RPC) …
could not have maltreated Napola if he was not a policeman on guard duty, so he had access to cell where
Napola was confined, and was under his custody.
● Law protects the police officer in the proper discharge of his duties, it must at the same time just as
effectively protect the individual from the abuse of police.
● TC failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance – “that the offender had no intention to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed” under Par 3, Art 13, RPC.
○ Manifest from proven facts that appellant Ural had no intention to kill Napola. Design was only to maltreat
him may be because in his drunken condition, he was making a nuisance of himself inside the detention
cell. When Ural realized the consequences of his felonious act, he allowed Napola to secure medical
treatment at the municipal dispensary.
○ Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of his
official position.
● TC properly imposed penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is the medium period of the penalty for murder.

People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 139542, 21 June 2001, 359 SCRA 352
FACTS:
·Accused Inocencio Gonzalez, Jr. was charged, tried and subsequently found guilty of the complex crime
of Murder for the death of Feliber Andres (pregnant wife of Andres), Double Frustrated Murder for the
injuries sustained by John Kenneth Andres (two year old son) and Kevin Valdez (nephew) and Attempted
Murder against Noel Andres (private complainant).

·In the afternoon of October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m. both the families of the private complainant Noel
Andres and that of the accused-appellant Inocencio Gonzalez were on their way to the exit of the Loyola
Memorial Park.
oAt the intersection near the Garden of Remembrance, while the accused-appellant Gonzalez was turning
left towards the exit and the complainant Noel Andres was headed straight along the road to the exit their
two vehicles almost collided. Noel Andres was able to timely step on the brakes.
oThe appellant continued driving along his way while Noel Andres drove behind the appellant's vehicle for
some time and cut him off when he found the opportunity to do so.

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oNoel Andres then got out of his vehicle and knocked on the appellant's car window, calmly told the
appellant to be careful with his driving and informed the latter that he, Andres, is with his family and to
this Gonzalez allegedly replied, "Accidents are accidents, what's your problem."
oAndres stated that he saw the appellant turning red in anger so he decided to go back to his vehicle when
he was blocked by the appellant's son who said, "Anong problema mo sa erpat ko."
oAndres testified that he felt threatened and so he immediately boarded his vehicle, sat at the driver's
seat, closed the door, and partially opened the car window just wide enough to talk back to appellant's
son, Dino.
oSuddenly, one of his passengers said "Binaril kami". He turned to his wife Feliber Andres and saw her
bloodied and unconscious. He turned around and saw his son Kenneth and nephew Kevin were also
wounded.
oAndres admitted in court that he and Dino were shouting at each other so that he did not hear the shot.
Andres then got out of his vehicle to warn the appellant not to flee.
oHe then took the wounded members of his family to the exit where there was an ambulance standing
by. The three were then taken to the Sta. Monica Hospital and were later transferred to the Quezon City
Medical Center.

ISSUE:
1. WON the trial court committed reversible error when it found treachery was present in the commission
of the crime.
2. WON the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to appreciate voluntary surrender, passion
and obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong be
considered as mitigating circumstances.

RULING:
The decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED. The appellant is hereby found guilty of homicide for
the death of Feliber Andres and is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum. For each count of the slight physical injuries committed against Kenneth
Andres and Kevin Valdez, the appellant is hereby sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor.

1. For treachery to be appreciated two elements must concur: 1) the employment of means of
execution that would insure the safety of the accused from retaliatory acts of the intended victim and
leaving the latter without an opportunity to defend himself and 2) the means employed were
deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.
In the case at bar, the encounter between Noel Andres and the accused-appellant was a chance
encounter. They were total strangers before their vehicles almost collided at an intersection inside the
memorial park. The heated exchange of remarks that followed the near collision was fanned by a short
temper, which in the case of the accused-appellant, was augmented by the improvident use of a firearm
resulting in the death of Feliber Andres, wife of Noel Andres. It has been consistently held by this court
that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the spur of the moment or that were
preceded by heated altercations are generally not attended by treachery for lack of opportunity of the
accused to deliberately employ a treacherous mode of attack. Thus, the sudden attack made by the

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accused due to his infuriation by reason of the victim’s provocation was held to be without treachery.
Sudden attacks made by the accused preceded by curses and insults by the victim or acts taunting the
accused to retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive behavior of the victim were held to be without
treachery as the victim was sufficiently forewarned of reprisal. For the rules on treachery to apply the
sudden attack must have been preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim and without
provocation on the part of the latter. We affirm the recommendation of the Solicitor-General that the
shooting was not attended by treachery and accordingly the crime committed for the death of Feliber
Andres is homicide and not murder.

2. The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete

defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, pleaded by the defense, were not
convincingly proved and none can be considered in the imposition of penalties. The testimony of
prosecution witness contradicts the appellant’s pretense of voluntary surrender. The mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not obtaining. For this mitigating circumstance to be
considered, it must be shown that: (1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was
committed by the intended victim; (2) that the crime was committed within a reasonable length of time
from the commission of the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the accused's mind; and that
(3) "the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or
revenge.” Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong committed and that the
provocation must be commensurate to the crime committed. The sufficiency of provocation varies
according to the circumstances of the case. The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres towards the appellant
and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient provocation to shoot at the
complainant’s vehicle. The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense
of a relative is also unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing and shouting at the appellant and his
son do not amount to an unlawful aggression against them, Dino Gonzalez. Finally, the plea for the
appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid
of merit. This mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means
employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed. The intention of the
accused at the time of the commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of
attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim. The appellant’s use of a gun, although not
deliberately sought nor employed in the shooting, should have reasonably placed the appellant on guard
of the possible consequences of his act. The use of a gun is sufficient to produce the resulting crimes
committed.

ii. Sufficient provocation

People v. Pagal, L-32040, 25 October 1977, 79 SCRA 570

Facts:
● 1969, Manila, Accused, Pagal and Torazo charged with crime of robbery with homicide. “Willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to gain, and by means of violence, take away from Gau Guan, cash
amounting to P1,281 … for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry away the said amount …
with intent to kill and taking advantage of their superior strength, treacherously attack, assault and use

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personal violence upon the said Gau Guan by stabbing him with an icepick and clubbing him with an iron
pipe on different parts of the body – inflicting mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause
of his death thereafter.”
○ Generic aggravating circumstances: nighttime purposely sought to better accomplish criminal design;
evident premeditation; and disregard of the respect due the offended party; and, with abuse of
confidence, the accused being employees of the offended party.
○ During arraignment, counsel de oficio of accused informed trial court of intention to plea guilty provided
they be allowed to prove the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat on part of the
offended party immediately preceding the act, and having acted upon impulse to produce passion and
obfuscation.
● Both accused were arraigned and pleaded guilty to offense charged ... Trial court decision: “Both accused
are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide and
there being proven the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, evident premeditation and disregard of
respect due the offended party – offset only by the mitigating circumstance of their plea of guilty,
sentences each one of them to DEATH and indemnify heirs P12,000 for death of Guan; P15,000 for moral
damages; P15,000 for exemplary damages; P1,281 representing the amount taken; and to pay
proportionately the costs.”

Issues:
WON TC erred in convicting him of crime of robbery instead of declaring him liable only for his individual
acts
WON TC erred in not appreciating in their favor the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation,
passion or obfuscation.
WON TC erred in considering aggravating circumstances of nighttime, evident premeditation, and
disregard of respect due the offended party on account of rank and age

Held:
● No; Denial of conspiracy cannot be given credence due to clear and convincing confession of his guilt
signed by him before police investigators after commission of the crime. Also, when he pleaded guilty to
the charge, deemed to have admitted commission of the crime but the circumstances surrounding its
commission … plea of guilty – sufficient to sustain a conviction even for a capital offense without the
introduction of further evidence.
● NO; Appellants contention - devoid of merit
○ (1) Alleged provocation, which caused obfuscation of appellants, arose from the same incident – alleged
maltreatment/ill-treatment of the appellants by the deceased, but two mitigating circumstances cannot
be considered as two distinct and separate circumstances;
○ (2) Circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be mitigating in a crime which is planned and calmly
meditated before its execution;
○ (3) Maltreatment that appellants claim to have committed against them occurred much earlier than date
of the commission of the crime … Provocation in order to be a mitigating circumstance must be sufficient
and immediately preceding the act
● NO; YES; YES;

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○ NO; SC: TC correctly considered aggravating circumstance of nocturnity because act was purposely and
deliberately sought by the appellants to facilitate commission of crime.
○ Yes; however, in crime of robbery with homicide, there must be an evident premeditation to kill besides
stealing. However, in case at bar, original plan was only to rob and they killed deceased when the latter
refused to open the “kaha de yero,” and fought with them.
○ Yes; further, aggravating circumstance that crime was committed with insult/in disregard of respect due
the offended party on account of his rank, age or sex – only taken into account only in crimes against
persons or honor, when commission of crime – there is some insult or disrespect … robbery with homicide
is primarily a crime against property and not against persons.

Urbano v. People, G.R. No. 182750, 20 January 2009

FACTS:
This petition for review under Rule 45 seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA). The RTC found petitioner Rodel Urbano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.
The victim Brigido Tomelden and petitioner were at the compound of the Lingayen Water District (LIWAD)
in Lingayen, Pangasinan, having just arrived from a picnic in the nearby town of Bugallon, Pangasinan,
where, with some other co-workers, they drunk beer in a restaurant. While inside the compound, the two
had a heated altercation in the course of which Tomelden hurled insulting remarks at petitioner. Reacting,
petitioner asked why Tomelden, when drunk, has the penchant of insulting petitioner.
The exchange of words led to an exchange of blows. Cooler heads succeeded in breaking up the fight, but
only for a brief moment as the protagonists refused to be pacified and continued throwing fist blows at
each other. Then petitioner delivered a "lucky punch", as described by eyewitness Orje Salazar, on
Tomelden's face, which made Tomelden topple down. Tomelden was on the verge of hitting his head on
the ground had their companions not caught him and prevented the fall. The blow, however, caused
Tomelden's nose to bleed and rendered him unconscious.
Tomelden informed his wife, Rosario, of the fight the previous night and of his having been rendered
unconscious. He complained of pain in his nape, head, and ear which impelled Rosario to immediately
bring him to the Lingayen Community Hospital where Dr. Daisy Arellano examined him and treated his
lacerated left index finger, contusions, and hematoma at the right cerebrum.
Tomelden went back to the hospital complaining of dizziness, headache, and other pains. Rosario brought
Tomelden to the Sison Memorial Provincial Hospital in Dagupan City, where the attending physician, Dr.
Ramon Ramos, diagnosed Tomelden suffering from "brain injury, secondary to mauling to consider
cerebral hemorrhage".
Tomelden was confined in the provincial hospital, and, due to financial constraints, was thereafter
discharged despite signs negating physical condition improvement. Upon reaching their house, however,
Tomelden again complained of extreme head pain, prompting his wife to bring him back to the Lingayen
Community Hospital. This time, things turned for the worst, the doctor noting that Tomelden appeared to
be semi-conscious, sleepy, uncooperative, and not responding to any stimulant. Tomelden died that day

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due to "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage
due to mauling incident".
The defense presented petitioner who denied having any intention to kill, asserting that hypertension, for
which Tomelden was receiving treatment, was the cause of the latter's death.

ISSUES:
1. WON the Court erred in affirming the decision of the [RTC] finding [him] guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.
2. WON the Court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation
on the part of the victim and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong in favor of the petitioner.

RULING:
The decision is, in the light of the presence and the appreciation of two mitigating circumstances in favor
of petitioner, hereby MODIFIED by decreasing the term of imprisonment. As thus modified, petitioner
Rodel Urbano is hereby sentenced to serve an indeterminate prison term of from two (2) years and four
(4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, with whatever imprisonment he has already served fully credited in the service of this sentence.
The rest of the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
1. It was through the direct accounts of the prosecution witnesses of the events that transpired
during the fisticuff incident . . . more specifically the landing of the "lucky punch" on the face of [Tomelden],
taken together with the result of the medical examinations and autopsy report which described the death
of the victim as "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral
hemorrhage due to mauling incident" that we are convinced that the "lucky punch" was the proximate
cause of [Tomelden's] death. The prosecution had satisfactorily proven that it was only after the incident
that transpired on September 28, 1993 that the victim was hospitalized on several occasions until he
expired, twelve days later . . . . It is moreover of no consequence whether the victim was able to report for
work during the intervening days . . . .
We find no reason to depart from the doctrinal rule that great weight is accorded the factual findings of
the trial court, particularly with respect to the ascertainment of the credibility of witnesses. There was
absence of any ill motive on the part of . . . Salazar who in fact testified that he was a friend of both
[petitioner] and [Tomelden]; more so on the part of the attending physicians.

2. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Art. 13, RPC provide as follows:

Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances:
3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.

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4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act.
When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential element of self-
defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of exciting,
inciting, or irritating anyone; it is not enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying; the
provocation must be sufficient to excite one to commit the wrongful act and should immediately precede
the act. This third requisite of self-defense is present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the
aggressor; (2) when, even if provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the
provocation was sufficient, it was not given by the person defending himself; or (4) when even if a
provocation was given by the person defending himself, it was not proximate and immediate to the act
of aggression.
In the instant case, Tomelden's insulting remarks directed at petitioner and uttered immediately before
the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation.
Moreover, the mitigating circumstance that petitioner had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed should also be appreciated in his favor. While intent to kill may be presumed from the fact
of the death of the victim, this mitigating factor may still be considered when attendant facts and
circumstances so warrant, as in the instant case. Consider: Petitioner tried to avoid the fight, being very
much smaller than Tomelden. He tried to parry the blows of Tomelden, albeit he was able, during the
scuffle, to connect a lucky punch that ended the fight. And lest it be overlooked, petitioner helped carry
his unconscious co-worker to the office of the LIWAD's general manager. Surely, such gesture cannot
reasonably be expected from, and would be unbecoming of, one intending to commit so grave a wrong as
killing the victim. A bare-knuckle fight as a means to parry the challenge issued by Tomelden was
commensurate to the potential violence petitioner was facing. It was just unfortunate that Tomelden died
from that lucky punch, an eventuality that could have possibly been averted had he had the financial
means to get the proper medical attention. Thus, it is clear that the mitigating circumstance of "no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" must also be appreciated in favor of petitioner
while finding him guilty of homicide. That petitioner landed a lucky punch at Tomelden's face while their
co-workers were trying to separate them is a compelling indicium that he never intended so grave a wrong
as to kill the victim.

iii. Vindication of a wrong

People v. Benito, L-32042, 13 February 1975, 74 SCRA 271
This is a mandatory review of the judgment of the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila in Criminal Case No.
CCC-VI-609, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Alberto Benito y Restubog," imposing upon the accused,
Alberto Benito y Restubog upon his plea of guilty to the charge of murder, the penalty of "death.
Facts:
About 5:30 pm of December 12, 1969, the victim Pedro Moncayo Jr., Assistant Chief of Personnel
Transaction and Acting Chief of the Administrative Division of the Civil Service Commission, while driving
on P. Paredes St/ in front of the Office of the Civil Service Commission was followed by the accused, and
when he was about to turn at the intersection of P. Paredes and Lepanto St., Manila, the accused shot him
eight times with a .22 caliber revolver, causing the victim's death.

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The accused was charged with murder and when the case was called for trial, through counsel de parte,
he manifested his desire to withdraw his previous plea of not guilty and substitute it with a plea of guilty
without prejudice to proving mitigating circumstances. The prosecution manifested that it would
controvert whatever mitigating circumstances the accused would prove and also prove other aggravating
circumstances. The trial court repeatedly explained to the accused the nature and consequences of his
plea of guilty to the offense charged and warned him that the maximum penalty imposable is death.
Notwithstanding the explanation and warning of the trial court, the accused, assisted by his counsel de
parte upon being re-arraigned, entered a plea of guilty. The accused presented evidence to prove
mitigating circumstances and the prosecution subsequently introduced evidence to prove aggravating
circumstances not mentioned in the information.
The Court sentenced the accused to death after finding him guilty as principal in the crime of murder
qualified by treachery, with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and disregard of the
respect due to the offended party on account of his rank, offset by the mitigating circumstance of
accused's plea of guilty.

Issue:
WON the lower court erred in considering the mitigating and aggravating circumstances attendant to
the commission of the crime to determine the proper penalty to be imposed on the accused.

Ruling:
The guilt of the appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt, with two mitigating
circumstances in his favor, that of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender. However these are offset by the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and disregard of respect due to the deceased. The
crime of murder being punishable with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death (Art. 248,
Revised Penal Code), the penalty, pursuant to Article 248 in relation to Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code, should be, imposed in its medium period, reclusion perpetua.
The penalty of death imposed by the trial court is hereby modified and reduced as above indicated, to
reclusion perpetua with accessories of the law.

1.Mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender

The intention of the accused to surrender could be discerned from the fact that after committing the
crime, he did not escape but instead called up the police and when the policemen arrived at the crime
scene, he voluntarily approached and told them that he would help in connection with the case as he knew
the suspect as well as the motive.
While he did not told the police immediately that he was the assassin, he confided to the investigators
that he was voluntarily surrendering and also surrendering the murder weapon.
The Court ruled that the accused must be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.

2.Mitigating Circumstance of Vindication of a grave offense

It is the contention of the accused that the crime was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave
offense done by the victim against the accused and, therefore, must be credited in his favor.

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The grave offense done by the victim was an alleged remark “that the CSC is a hangout of thieves” made
in the presence of the accused at about 11 am of Dec. 12, 1969. The accused felt offended because he was
facing then criminal and administrative charges on several counts involving his honesty and integrity.
The Court held that the victim’s remark itself was general in nature and not specifically directed to the
accused and cannot be considered a grave offense. Other people could not possibly know that the victim
was insulting the accused unless they were aware of his current situation, hence, said remark might be
considered a mere provocation and not grave offense which might have impelled the accused to kill the
victim in immediate retaliation. Because the provocation was not sufficient and did not precede the act, it
may not be considered as a mitigating circumstance.

3.Mitigating circumstance that sufficient provocation or threat

The accused also claims that the lower Court should have considered the mitigating circumstance that
sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the deceased immediately preceded the act because of the
alleged statement of the deceased in Tagalog uttered at about 7:00 p.m. on the night of December 11,
1969, "Umalis ka na nga diyan baka may mangyari pa sa iyo at baka ipayari kita dito" (Get out of there,
because something might happen to you and because I might have you finished here).
The statement was supposed have been uttered in the presence of other people almost 24 hours before
the crime was committed. It was not accompanied by any overt act against the accused.
The provocation or threat did not immediately precede the shooting. The accused had almost a day to
mull over the alleged threat or provocation before he reacted by shooting the victim.
The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court on rejecting the claim of the accused to this mitigating
circumstance.

4.Aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank

The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank considered by the lower Court against the accused is
being assailed on the ground that at the time of the murder, the accused was no longer connected with
the CSC as the decision in the administrative case against him ordering his dismissal from the service
became effective February 16, 1966.
When the accused saw and talked with the victim regarding his administrative case, the motive for the
murder, the accused made it clear that he recognized the deceased as his superior officer. The mere fact
that the dismissal of the accused from office was made immediately executory was of no moment since
he appealed that decision and the case was still pending and, by his own allegation, he was later
completely exonerated by the CS Board of Appeals in its decision of February 17, 1971.
It may be true that this aggravating circumstance was considered against the accused even if it was not
alleged in the information, but this is an aggravating circumstance, and not a qualifying circumstance that
would change the nature or affect the gravity of the crime committed, but one which is capable of being
proven and taken into consideration even if it was not alleged in the information.
The lower Court in considering this generic aggravating circumstance against the accused did not violate
his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him for murder.
This aggravating circumstance was correctly considered against the accused.

5.Aggravating Circumstance of Evident Premeditation

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The accused claimed that this aggravating circumstance should not be considered against him because
although he pleaded guilty, the prosecution sought and was allowed to adduce evidence to show the
criminal participation of appellant in the commission of the offense and the background of the crime
imputed to him, and the evidence submitted by the prosecution failed to establish the elements of the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. It is further argued that the prosecution is deemed to
have thereby waived the effect of the unconditional plea of guilty by the accused so far as the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation is concerned.
Contrary to the claim of the accused, the prosecution successfully proved the existence of evident
premeditation because of his own declaration, which narrates fully the several attempts of the accused to
talk with the deceased; how he was rebuffed in those attempts and even insulted, and that he was jobless
after having been dismissed from the office on allegedly fabricated charges made by the deceased. His
declaration provided a strong motive for him to retaliate against the victim by taking the law into his hands.

Bacabac v. People, G.R. No. 149372, 11 September 2007

Facts:
Hernani Quidato (the victim) was at a dance hall in the company of Eduardo Selibio (Eduardo) and
Melchor Selibio (Melchor). And so were Jonathan Bacabac (Jonathan) and Edzel Talanquines (Edzel).
Jonathan and Edzel left the dance hall. Not long after, the victim and his companions also left and
on their way home, they encountered Jonathan and Edzel. It appears that the two groups then and there
figured in a misunderstanding.
On his way home, Jesus Delfin Rosadio (Jesus), who was also at the dance hall, noticed a
commotion. He soon saw that Melchor was "hugging" Edzel, and later "tying" Jonathan "with his hands".
Still later, he saw the victim hit Edzel with a "stick."He thus told the victim and his companions that Edzel
is the son of Councilor Jose Talanquines, Jr. (Jose), whereupon Eduardotold him (Jesus) to go away for
they might shoot him. Jesus thus left and proceeded to Edzel's residence to report to his father what he
had witnessed. In the meantime, Edzel and Jonathan managed to flee.
The victim and his companions thereafter headed for home in the course of which they met Pat.
Ricardo Bacabac (herein petitioner), together with Edzel and Jonathan who are his nephews, and Edzel's
father, Jose, his mother, and two sisters at the corner of M.H. Del Pilar and Sto. Domingo Streets. Petitioner
and Jose were carrying M-16 armalites, while Jonathan and Edzel were carrying a piece of wood and a
revolver, respectively.
Jesus thereupon pointed to the victim and his companions as the ones who had manhandled
Jonathan and Edzel. The victim apologized, explaining that he and his companions mistook Jonathan and
Edzel for other persons. Jesus blurted out, however, "You are just bragging that you are brave. You are
only bullying small children." Petitioner, at that instant, fired his armalite into the air, while Jose fired his
armalite ("as if spraying his rifle from right to left") at the victim and Eduardo, even hitting Jonathan in the
thigh as he (Jonathan) "was on the move to strike [the victim] with a piece of wood." Eduardo fell. And so
did the victim who was in a kneeling position, and as he was raising his hands in surrender, Jose shot him
again.
The victim, Eduardo, and Jonathan were brought to the hospital. The victim was pronounced dead
on arrival. Eduardo died two hours later.

Issue:

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Whether or not Petitioner should have been credited with the mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication of a grave offense.

Held:
No, Petitioner cannot be credited with the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a
grave offense.
As for petitioner's invocation of the mitigating circumstance of "immediate vindication of a grave
offense", it fails. For such mitigating circumstance to be credited, the act should be, following Article 13,
paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, "committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the
one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted
brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degree." The offense committed on Edzel was
"hitting" his ear with a stick (according to Jesus), a bamboopole (according to Edzel).By Edzel's own
clarification, "[he] was hit at [his] ear, not on [his] head." That act would certainly not be classified as
"grave offense". And Edzel is petitioner's nephew, hence, not a relative by affinity "within the same
degree" contemplated in Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appellate court's decision is AFFIRMED.

iv. Passion or obfuscation

US v. Hicks, G.R. No. 4971, 23 September 1909, 14 Phil. 217

FACTS
Augustus Hicks (accused-appellant) an Afro-American and Agustina Sola, a Christian Moro woman, illicitly
lived together in the municipality of Parang, Cotabato, Moro Province, until trouble arising between them
in November 1907, Agustina quitted Hick's house, and, separating from him, went to live with her brother-
in-law, Lues Corrales. A few days later she contracted new relations with another negro named Wallace
Current, a corporal in the Army who then went to live with her in the said house.

December 21, 1907 at about 7:30 p. m., Augustus Hicks together with a soldier named Lloyd Nickens called
at said house, and from the sala called out to his old mistress who was in her room with Corporal Current,
and after conversing with her in the Moro dialect for a few minutes, asked the corporal to come out of
said room; in response thereto the corporal appeared at the door of the room, and after a short
conversation, Current approached Hicks and they shook hands, when Hicks asked him the following
question: "Did I not tell you to leave this woman alone?," to which Current replied: "That is all right, she
told me that she did not want to live with you any longer, but if she wishes, she may quit me, and you can
live with her." The accused then replied: "God damn, I have made up my mind;" and as Corporal Current
saw that Hicks, when, he said this, was drawing a revolver from his trousers' pocket, he caught him by the
hand, but the latter, snatching his hand roughly away, said: "Don't do that," whereupon Current jumped
into the room, hiding himself behind the partition, just as Hicks drew his revolver and fired at Agustina
Sola who was close by in the sala of the house. The bullet struck her in the left side of the breast; she fell
to the ground, and died in a little more than an hour late.

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Upon hearing the shot Edward Robinson, who was also in the house, went to render assistance and
wrested the weapon from the hand of the accused. Hicks immediately fled from the house and gave
himself up to the chief of police of the town, H. L. Martin, asking him to lock him up in jail; and, when a
few minutes later a policeman came running in and reported that Hicks had fired a shot at Agustina, the
said chief of police caused Hicks to be arrested. The latter, when once in jail, threw eight revolver cartridges
out of the window; these were picked up by a policeman who reported the occurrence and delivered the
cartridges to his chief.

Hicks Version
When he (Hicks) withdrew his hand from Current, who had seized him, he fell backward but managed to
support himself on his two hands, and when he got up again Current threatened him with a revolver thrust
into his face; whereupon he also drew his revolver, just as Edward Robinson caught him from behind,
when his revolver went off, the bullet striking Augustina

ISSUE
Whether or not mitigating circumstance is present?

HELD
Augustus Hicks is guilty of murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia), she being
suddenly and roughly attacked and unexpectedly injured upon with a 45-caliber revolver, at close, if not
point blank range, while the injured woman was unarmed and unprepared, and at a time when she was
listening to a conversation, in which she was concerned, between her aggressor and a third person, and
after usual and customary words had passed between her and her aggressor. From all of the foregoing it
is logically inferred that means, manners, and forms were employed in the attack that directly and specially
insured the consummation of the crime without such risk to the author thereof as might have been offered
by the victim who, owing to the suddenness of the attack, was doubtless unable to flee from the place
where she was standing, or even escape or divert the weapon.

No mitigating circumstance is present, not even that mentioned in paragraph 7 of article 9 of the Penal
Code, to wit, loss of reason and self-control produced by jealousy as alleged by the defense, inasmuch as
the only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate
from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.

US v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 7094, 29 March 1912, 22 Phil. 429

FACTS:

Defendant (De la Cruz), the convict, in the heat of passion, killed the deceased, who had theretofore been
his querida (concubine or lover) upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual
acquaintance

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It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Hicks (14 Phil. Rep.., 217), we held that the "causes which mitigate the
criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those
which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions," and declined to give the benefit of the
provisions of this article to the convict in that case on the ground that the alleged causes for his loss of self-
control did not "originate from legitimate feelings." But in that case we found as facts that:

All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused, deliberately and after due reflection
had resolved to kill the woman who had left him for another man, and in order to accomplish his perverse
intention with safety, notwithstanding the fact that he was already provided with a clean and well-
prepared weapon and carried other loaded cartridges besides those already in his revolver, he entered the
house, greeting everyone courteously and conversed with his victim, in what appeared to be in a proper
manner, disguising his intention and calming her by his apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order
to successfully accomplish his criminal design, behaving himself properly as he had planned to do
beforehand.

In the former case the cause alleged "passion and obfuscation" of the aggressor was the convict's vexation,
disappointment and deliberate anger engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue to live in illicit
relations with him, which she had a perfect right to do; his reason for killing her being merely that he had
elected to leave him and with his full knowledge to go and live with another man. In the present case
however, the impulse upon which defendant acted and which naturally "produced passion and
obfuscation" was not that the woman declined to have illicit relations with him, but the sudden revelation
that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another. As said by the
supreme court of Spain in the above-cited decision, this was a "sufficient impulse" in the ordinary and
natural course of things to produce the passion and obfuscation which the law declares to be one of the
extenuating circumstances to be taken into consideration by the court.

ISSUE: W/N there is an extenuating/mitigating circumstance present

HELD: YES. There is an extenuating circumstance present in the case. The Court is of the opinion that the
defendant acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation when
he caught his querida in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance.

The Court mentioned the view taken by the Supreme Court of Spain regarding a case with similar state of
facts:

A man who kills a woman (his lover) for having caught her in her underclothes with another man and
afterwards shoots himself inflicting a serious wound should be responsible for the act but with extenuating
circumstance considered because he acted as such due to strong emotion which impelled him to perform
the criminal act. The situation presents a sufficient impulse in the natural and ordinary course to produce
the violent passion and obfuscation which the law regards as a special reason for extenuation. The Court
also differentiated this case from US v Hicks:

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In the Hicks case, the cause of the alleged passion and obfuscation of the defendant was his vexation,
disappointment, and deliberate anger due to the woman’s refusal to live with him. The act of killing was
done with premeditation and preparation. Prior to the accomplishment of his criminal design, he acted
properly in front of his victim in order to mask his true intentions.

In this case, the impulse upon which defendant acted and which naturally produced passion and
obfuscation was because of the sudden revelation that she was untrue to him.

Modified by a finding that the commission of the crime was marked with the extenuating circumstance set
out in subsection 7 of article 9, and by the reduction of the penalty of fourteen years eight months and one
day of reclusion temporal to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, the judgment of conviction
and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be and are hereby affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant.

People v. Gelaver, G.R. No. 95357, 9 June 1993, 223 SCRA 310

This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC finding Eduardo Gelaver guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Parricide sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of his wife, Victoria Pacinabao,
in the amount of P30,000.

FACTS:

Appellant testified that he was married to Victoria Pacinabao, with whom he begot four children. They lived
together at their conjugal home until July 3, 1987 when she abandoned her family to live with her
paramour. He did not know the name of his wife's paramour nor the name of the owner of the house where
his wife and her paramour had lived together.

On March 24, 1988, after appellant was informed by his daughter that his wife and paramour were living
at a house in front of the Sto. Niño Catholic Church, he immediately went to that place. Upon entering the
house, he saw his wife was lying on her back and her paramour on top of her, having sexual intercourse.

Gelaver’s version of the killing was that when his wife saw him, she pushed her paramour aside. Her
paramour immediately stood up, took a knife placed on top of the bedside table and attacked appellant.
The latter was able to wrest possession of the knife and then used it against the paramour, who evaded
the thrusts of the appellant by hiding behind the victim. Thus, it was Victoria who received the stab intended
for the paramour. As to why he continued to stab his wife, Gelaver claimed that his mind had been
"dimmed" or overpowered by passion and obfuscation by the sight of his wife having carnal act with her
paramour.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not the court erred in sentencing Eduardo Gelaver of reclusion perpetua for Parricide, instead
of destierro for killing under exceptional circumstances in pursuant to Art 247 of the RPC.

RULING:

The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED except with MODIFICATION that the indemnity should be
increased to P50,000.

The following requisites must be established by to raise Art 247 as a defense:

1.That a legally married person or a parent surprises his spouse or his daughter, the latter under 18 years
of age and living with him, in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person.
2.That he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious physical injury in
the act or immediately thereafter.
3. That he has not promoted or facilitated that prostitution of his wife or daughter, or that he or she has
not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.

Implicit in this exceptional circumstance is that the death caused must be the proximate result of the
outrage; overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. In this case,
appellant claimed that he caught his wife and her paramour in sexual intercourse. However, his testimony
is tainted with inconsistencies. Gelaver failed to inform the police that he killed his wife when he saw her
having sexual intercourse with her paramour. As noted by the Solicitor General, the natural thing for a
person to do under the circumstances was to report to the police the reason for killing his wife.

Gelaver also claimed that he chased the paramour but was unable to overtake him and at the same time,
he testified that the paramour stayed in the room and used the victim as a shield against appellant's attack
with the knife. He also claimed that upon entering the gate of the fence, he saw his wife and her paramour
having carnal act and at the same breath, he testified that he saw his wife and her paramour only when
he opened the main door of the house.

The court found that it is contrary to human nature that the appellant claimed that he went to confront
the paramour of his wife unarmed, and that he never learned the name of the paramour in spite of the fact
that his wife, allegedly, had been living with the paramour in the same town for almost a year before the
incident.

The court is correct in finding the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to the
authorities. Eduardo immediately after committing the offense, voluntarily placed himself at the disposal
of the police authorities as evidenced by the entry in the official police blotter. On the other hand, erred in
finding the presence of the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation "as a result of his
(appellant's) wife leaving their home and their children." Before this circumstance may be taken into
consideration, it is necessary to establish the existence of an unlawful act sufficient to produce such a
condition of mind. The act producing the obfuscation must not be far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might have recovered his equanimity. The
crime was committed almost a year after the victim had abandoned the conjugal dwelling.

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People v. Bello, L-18792, 28 February 1964

FACTS:
Guillermo who was about 54 years old and Alicia who was about 24 years old, lived together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage. The accused who had no means of substantial livelihood except
that of making "kaingin" and who apparently was then in financial straits induced Alicia Cervantes to
accent an employment as entertainer in a bar and restaurant establishment known as Maring's Place.
Guillermo used to watch her there everyday. on May 15 he saw Alicia enter the Gumaca theater with a
man whom the accused found later was caressing his common-law wife inside the movie house, then, he
took her out from the movie house and warned her to be more discreet inher personal conduct in Gumaca.
On May 20, 1958 about 3:00 pm, Guillermo visited Maring’s Place to ask Alicia for money, but Maring, the
owner of the Place, and Alicia refused to give money, Maring telling him to forget Alicia completely because
he was already an old man, an invalid besides and should stop bothering Alicia.

He proceeded to walk home empty handed, but upon passing Bonifacio Street, he came across the
Marasigan brothers who mocked him saying “So this is the man whose wife is being used by Maring for
white slave trade”. The self-loathing Guillermo proceeded to Paty’s place and downed give glasses of Tuba.
About 9:00pm of the same day, Guillermo returned to Maring’s Place and without much ado held Alicia
from behind with his left hand in the manner of a boa strangulating its prey and with his right hand stabbed
Alicia several times with a balisong. Realizing what he had done, he ran to Gumarca and surrendered to
the police there.

He was found guilty by the Court of First Instance.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the victim should be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of passion or
obfuscation, albeit his relationship with the victim being merely a common-law marriage?

HELD:
Yes.
Alicia was stabbed at the back, the wound was but a part and continuation of the aggression. The four (4)
stab wounds (the 3 others were in the breast, hypogastric region, and in the left wrist — as shown in the
certificate of the Municipal Health Officer) were inflicted indiscriminately, without regard as to which
portion of her body was the subject of attack. The trial court itself found that the stab in the back was
inflicted as Alicia was running away. For this reason, treachery cannot be imputed.

Evident premeditation was, likewise, not established. The accused had been carrying a balisong with him
for a long time as a precaution against drunkards, and without any present plan or intent to use it against
his common-law wife. That he watched her movements daily manifested his jealous character, but there is
no evidence that from this jealousy sprouted a plan to snuff out her life.

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The evidence does not show, either, any superior strength on the part of the accused, and, not possessing
it, he could not take advantage of it. True that he was armed with a balisong , but he was old and baldado
(invalid), while Alicia was in the prime of her youth, and not infirm. The facts are not sufficient to draw a
comparison of their relative strength. Possession of a balisong gives an aggressor a formidable advantage
over the unarmed victim, but the physique of the aggressor ought also to be considered. At any rate, taking
into account the emotional excitement of the accused, it is not clearly shown that there was "intencion
deliberada de prevalerse de la superioridad o aprovecharse intencionadamente de la misma” i.e.,
deliberate intent to take advantage of superior strength.

The crime was committed at night-time, but the accused did not seek or take advantage of it the better to
accomplish his purpose. In fact, Maring's Place was bright and well-lighted; hence, the circumstance did
not aggravate the crime.

Since the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength,
which could have qualified the crime as murder, were not present, and since the generic aggravating
circumstances of night-time and abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness have not been
established, the accused can only be liable for homicide.

No obvious ungratefulness is inferable from the fact that the killer was penniless while the victim, was able
to earn a living and occasionally gave him money, since both lived together as husband and wife.

The accused's insistence that his common law wife abandon her work as hostess and live with him again,
and his rage at her rejection of the proposal, cannot be properly termed as arising from immoral and
unworthy passions, and therefore the accused in the case at bar can be given the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance of having acted on a provocation sufficiently strong to produce passion and obfuscation.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision should be, and hereby is, modified. This Court finds the accused-
appellant, Guillermo Bello, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, attended by two (2)
mitigating circumstances: (a) passion and obfuscation, and (b) voluntary surrender; and, therefore,
imposes upon him an indeterminate sentence ranging from a minimum of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor to a maximum of ten (10) years of prisión mayor; orders him also to personally indemnify
the heirs of Alicia Cervantes in the amount of P6,000.00, and to pay the costs. So ordered.

v. Voluntary surrender or plea of guilt

People v. Amaguin, G.R. Nos. 54344-45, 10 January 1994, 229 SCRA 166

FACTS:
Prosecution and defense have different versions of facts. The court decides that the version of the
prosecution is credible. The Oro brothers, Hernando, Diosdado, and Danilo, with their brother-in-law, was
invited by their eldest brother Pacifico to celebrate their town fiesta. At 5PM he accompanied them to the

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plaza where they could get a ride. They met the Maguin brothers while on their way. Celso Amaguin told
Pacifico, “Pare, come here.” To which he replied that he had to accompany his brothers first. Celso
immediately grabbed his butcher's knife, rushed towards Pacifico and hacked him. Gildo Amaguin, his
younger brother, followed with an indian pana aiming at Danilo, who was hit on his chest. Gildo then
stabbed Diosdado with a knife. Willie Amaguin, the eldest, appeared and shot Pacifico, Diosdado, and the
fleeing Danilo. Diosdado was kneeling and pleading for his life when he was against hot by Willie, who
fired again at Pacifico. Gildo and Celso repeatedly stabbed Pacifico.
Danilo Oro who was hit with the slingshot ran and was pushed by Hernandez Oro to seek cover. Their
brother-in-law was stabbed, fled to the plaza and flagged down a cab to take him to the hospital.

ISSUES:
I. Whether the crime was homicide or murder
II. Whether there was conspiracy
III. If voluntary surrender should be appreciated

HELD:
I. It was homicide. The killing cannot be qualified by treachery because the accused did not employ means
which would insure the execution of the crime without risking themselves to harm. They attacked a group
of people who could have been armed, and it was highly probable that one of them would be able to offer
resistance.
II. There was conspiracy because Celso and Gildo simultaneously attacked the Oro brothers. Acted in
unison and cooperation to achieve the felonious objective. Willie is not an accomplice for lack of evidence
linking him to conspiracy. Liable for his own acts.
III. Willie and Gildo turned themselves in a week after. Voluntary surrender should be appreciated. All of
its elements are present: (1) Offender has not been arrested, (2) Surrenders to the authority, (3) Surrender
is voluntary. Celso remains at large.

RULING:
Willie Amaguin is found GUILTY of HOMICIDE aggravated by abuse of superior strength (shot Pacifico while
lying with fatal stab wounds) offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE with the same aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Gildo Amaguin GUILTY of two separate crimes of HOMICIDE.

People v. Dela Cruz, L-45284, 29 December 1936, 63 Phil. 874

Facts:
Francisco de la Cruz, Fernando Legaspi and three other persons whose identities are still unknown attacked
Yu Wan by giving him blows with fist on the face and other parts of the body, inflicting upon him physical
injuries which require medical attendance of more than one but less than nine days. They also took off
with P26 of Yu Wan’s cash.

Upon arraignment the two pleaded not guilty. During the trial and after 2 witnesses have testified, the
tao withdrew their plea of not guilty and substituting it with guilty. De la Cruz was sentenced to 6 months

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1 day of prision correccional and, being a habitual delinquent, sentenced furthermore with the additional
penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor. Legaspi was sentenced to 10 months of prision mayor. De
la Cruz appealed from this sentence.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellant’s plea of guilty constitutes as a mitigating circumstance

Ruling:
No. The Appellant’s plea of guilty does not constitute a mitigating circumstance. For it to be so, the plea
must be spontaneous and made prior to the presentation of evidence. The confession of guilt constitutes
a mitigation of the penalty for it is an act of repentance and respect for the law, indicates a moral
disposition in the accused favorable to his reform. The benefit of this mitigation is not applicable to the
accused, only pleading guilty after presentation of evidence by prosecution.

** the allegations of the information with respect to de la Cruz’s being a habitual delinquent are not
sufficient to consider him a habitual delinquent.

Wherefore, eliminating the penalty by reason of habitual delinquency, considering the presence of
aggravating circumstance in the commission and without any mitigating circumstance, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant is sentenced to 6 months of arresto mayor as minimum to 6
years 10 months 1 day of prision mayor as maximum, affirming the appealed sentence in all other respects,
with the costs.

vi. Deafness, muteness, blindness, or other physical defect which restricts the offender’s means of action,
defense, or communication
vii. Illness as would diminish the exercise of will-power without depriving the offender of consciousness of
his acts.

viii. Analogous circumstances

Canta v. People, G.R. No. 140937, 28 February 2001

FACTS:
Gabriel acquired a cow from his sister. On afternoon Agapay (caretaker) left it to graze in the mountain 40
meters away from his hut. At 9AM the next day it was gone, leaving hoof prints which led to the house of
Vallejos. He was told that Canta took it. Gardenio and Tura, who took care of the cow before, was
instructed to claim it, but the petitioner’s wife told them that he delivered the cow to his father, the
barangay captain. They met Canta on the way to the Captain’s house, and he told them that the owner
should claim it. Nevertheless they identified the cow and was told that Canta will call them the next day
so he can talk ot his father. He never called.

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Thus, Gabriel reported the matter. Petitioner admitted that he took the cow, but he said that he owned it
and showed two certificates of ownership, that he lost the cow and his uncle told him that his cow was in
the hands of Agapay. The certificate of ownership was not confirmed by the municipality, and was later
found to be obtained through fraudulent means; issued by the janitor in the municipal treasurer’s office
10 days after Gabriel’s cow was stolen.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable under Anti-Cattle Rustling Law.

The elements of cattle-rustling according to PD 533:
(1) Large cattle is taken
(2) Belongs to another
(3) Taking is done without consent of owner
(4) Taking is done by any means, methods, or scheme
(5) Taking is with or without intent to gain
(6) Taking is done with or without violence or intimidation against person or force upon things

HELD: Guilty. Requisites are all present.

The benefit of mitigating circumstance ANALOGOUS TO VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
Elements of voluntary surrender:
(1) Offender has not been arrested
(2) Surrenders to the authority
(3) Surrender is voluntary

No complaint was filed against him when he surrendered the cow to the municipal hall, thus the presence
of the intention of saving them from the trouble of having to recover the cow from him. The circumstance
is analogous and should benefit the petitioner.

E. Aggravating Circumstances
Art. 14 and 62 of the RPC.
People v. Legaspi, G.R. Nos. 136164-65, 20 April 2001
FACTS
Edgar Legaspi was charged with the crimes of rape and robbery. The prosecution's motion that the two
cases be jointly tried was granted. For its part, the defense pointed out that accused-appellant had been
previously treated at the National Center for Mental Health from February 28 to March 2, 1996. The
arraigned was moved on November 18, 1997 due to the accused-appellant was mentally incapable to
stand the rigors of trial.

At around 2:00 in the morning of February 11, 1997, complainant Honorata Ong, who was then sleeping
inside her house with her three daughters, was awakened by the sound of their door opening. She initially
thought that it was her husband coming home from work. When Honorata opened her eyes, however, she
saw a man armed with a knife standing by her feet. More terrifying, the man already had his pants and
briefs down on his knees and he was pointing to her eldest daughter. Alarmed, Honorata told the man not
to touch her daughter. The man poked his knife at her and told her to stand up and then was made to lie

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down on the adjacent sofa. Thereafter, the man removed Honorata's panties and had sex with her. All this
time, he had his knife at Honorata's neck. Honorata noticed that the man reeked of alcohol. After slaking
his lust, Honorata's assailant stood up then asked for money. Since the man still had his knife pointed at
her, Honorata could do nothing but comply. She gave him the only money she had, several bills amounting
to P500.00.

Before leaving the house Legaspi threatened Honorata and her daughters if she will report the incident
and out of fear she could do nothing but close the door. Later that day Honorata narrate her defilement
to her sister-in-law and upon describing him, Honorata's sister-in-law exclaimed that she knew a person
living in Manapat Street fitting the description. That afternoon Honorata and her husband reported the
incident to the barangay captain. The brgy captain together with two tanods patrolled the area and on the
next day they nab the person matched with the given description of Honorata. They brought the person
to the brgy for confirmation and he was positively identified by Honorata as the rapist and later detained
by the police.

On the next day, she undergoes a medico-legal at the NBI but no evident signs of extra-genital physical
injuries were found on her body.

ISSUE
Whether or not the court erred in not ruling that he is entitled to the exempting circumstance of insanity.

HELD
For insanity to be considered, Paragraph 1, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code requires a complete
deprivation of rationality in committing the act, that the accused be deprived of reason, that there be no
consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete absence of the power to discern.
The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved, however, for there is a presumption that acts
penalized by law are voluntary.

To prove his insanity, accused-appellant's counsel points to his confinement at the National Center for
Mental Health prior to the incident in question. Likewise, his counsel claims that when Honorata saw
accused-appellant, the latter's pants and briefs were already down on his knees. He takes this to be an
indication of insanity. The mere confinement in the NCMH is not an indication of insanity. The accused
also failed to provide proof and evidences that he is diagnosed of insanity and the fact that he is discharged
it is an implication that he’s recovered. He who relies on such insanity proved at another time must prove
its existence also at the time of the commission of the offense and that he failed to do so.

One's pants and briefs on one's knees do not indicate deprivation of reason rather it shows the lechery
and depravity of accused-appellant. Mental depravity which results not from any disease of the mind, but
from a perverted condition of the moral system, where the person is mentally sane, does not exempt one
from responsibility for crimes committed under its influence.

The court did not error in finding Honorata’s testimony clear and straightforward, thus the accused is guilty
of the crime rape.

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1. Classes of Aggravating Circumstance

a. Generic
b. Qualifying
c. Specific
d. Inherent
e. Special
2. Taking advantage of public office
People v. Capalac, L-38297, 23 October 1982, 117 SCRA 874

Facts: It happened on September 20, 1970 at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the scene of the gory
incident being a duly licensed cockpit in the City of Iligan. The aggressor, Jimmy, after stabbing moises
capalac, attempting to escape, was confronted by two brothers of Moises, Jesus Capalac, originally
included in the information but now deceased, and appellant Mario Capalac. The attempt of Magaso to
board a jeep was unsuccessful, he having alighted after two shots were fired in succession. Knowing that
he was completely at the mercy of the two brothers, he raised his hands as a sign of surrender, but they
were not to be appeased. He was pistol-whipped by appellant Mario Capalac, being dealt several blows
on the head and the face. After he had fallen to the ground, Jesus Capalac stabbed the deceased on the
chest three or four times. He was brought to the hospital where he died, the cause, according to the
coroner's report, being "hemorrhagic shock due to a wound of the heart."

ISSUE: WON
1. there is Aggravating Circumstance of Abuse of Official Duty
2. There is conspiracy
3. Mitigatiing Circumstance of Vindication of duty
4. It is qualified as Murder

HELD:

1. The mere fact that appellant Mario Capalac is a member of the police force certainly did not of itself
justify the aggravating circumstance of advantage being taken by the offender of his public position be
considered as present. He acted like a brother, instinctively reacting to what was undoubtedly a vicious
assault on his kin that could cause the death of a loved one. It would be an affront to reason to state
that at a time like that and reacting as he did, he purposely relied on his being a policeman to commit
the act. He pistol-whipped the deceased because he had his pistol with him. It came in handy and he
acted accordingly.

2.Act of brothers suffice conspiracy. who apparently were not apprehended as they were not included

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in the information, attacked the hapless victim, would suffice to show conspiracy. They apparently had
one purpose in mind, to avenge the stabbing of Moises Capalac. Such a reaction, as noted at the outset,
is quite understandable. It was not to be expected that they would even bother to inquire why their
brother was stabbed. It was enough that it was done. They were impelled by a common purpose. They
acted in concert. There is sufficient basis for the finding of conspiracy then.

3. yes. his Court has taken into consideration this mitigating circumstance. Certainly it seems probable
that the reason why the lower court failed to do so was the fact that appellant was a member of the
police force. That is not conclusive. What is decisive is the fact that the brothers Capalac, responsive to
what is a traditional norm of conduct, reacted in a manner which for them was necessary under the
circumstances. That was a fulfillment of what family honor and affection require. The aggressor who did
them wrong should not go unpunished. This is not to justify what was done. It offers though an
explanation. At the same time, the rule of law, which frowns on an individual taking matters into his
own hands, requires that every circumstances in favor of an accused should not be ignored

4. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution there of which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." (Article 14, par.
16 of the Revised Penal Code.)

Mag- aso's situation was hopeless. Any defense he could have put up would be futile and unavailing. His
hands were raised in surrender. That notwithstanding, he was pistol- whipped. When lying prostate on
the ground, he was stabbed. It must be remembered that, according to the testimonial evidence, there
were two other persons assisting the brothers Capalac. If they were not included in the information. the
explanation would appear to be that they managed to elude capture. There was no risk, therefore, to
the aggressors, no hope for the victim

People v. Gapasin, G.R. No. 73489, 25 April 1994, 231 SCRA 728

● Prior Proceedings:
○ January 10, 1980 - Nicanor Saludares and Loreto Gapasin - arrested, and on January 17, 1980 - posted bail,
but Gapasin ordered to remain in custody of Capt. Bellen, commanding officer of 118th Constabulary
Company.
○ Due to LOI 947 and LOI 1011, which vests jurisdiction on Military Tribunals of crimes against persons and
property committed with use of unlicensed firearms, trial court ordered turn over of case and accused to
Military Tribunal for further proceedings on August 27, 1980.
○ Accused filed motion for reconsideration of trial court order on grounds that case was not covered by LOI
947, which was issued after the crime was committed. Eventually, General Order 69, on January 12, 1981,
transferred records of the case to trial court from Military Tribunal.
○ 1983-1984, trial court denied appellant’s application for bail, so appellant filed second and third motions
for bail, which were also denied. Appellant filed urgent motion praying transfer of custody to Col. Mesa,
Provincial Commander of Isabela - denied. Filed petition for certiorari before Intermediate Appellate Court

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alleging trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to apply Sec 4, PD 1850 - granted and
ordered transfer to custody of his military commander.
○ After almost 6 years, trial ensued.
Facts:
● October 1979, Isabela, Carrido, prosecution witness, and Ballad left house of Teppang after attending
“pamisa” for Teppang’s deceased father. Calpito followed them, and while walking on barangay road,
Calpito shot by appellant with an armalite rifle.
○ When Calpito fell on the ground, appellant fired more shots at him. Then Amor Saludares planted a .22
revolver on left hand of Calpito.
○ Faustina Calpito ran to her fallen husband after hearing shots, but Nicanor Saludares pointed his gun at
her, and Soriano fired his gun upwards. Saludares warned that he would kill any relative of Calpito who
would come near him … Faustina and relatives scampered away as the group chased after them.
● Autopsy showed Calpito sustained 4 gunshot wounds - Dr. Layugan opined that victim was in standing
position when he was shot by someone positioned to his right.
● Appellant invoked self-defense … testified that mission order on September 23, 1979 to investigate report
regarding presence of unidentified men in Barrio San Jose, Isabela. Instructed by Sgt. Ignacio to get in
touch with Nicanor Saludares, who may give him information on identities of persons with unlicensed
firearms. Saludares informed Gapasin that Calpito had an unlicensed firearm.
○ Saludares informed Gapasin that it would be best to see Calpito during burial of his relative … Attended
“pamisa” in house of Teppang, but did not confront Calpito to avoid creating a disturbance at the “pamisa”
○ Waited in yard of Saludares’s house for Calpito to pass by. When Calpito was about 3 meters away,
appellant asked him what was bulging in his waist … Calpito took a step back, drew his firearm and fired
twice at appellant - missed because appellant dropped to the ground while firing his armalite.

Issue: WON TC erred in applying aggravating circumstances, particularly taking advantage of public
position

HELD: NO
● Appeal hinges primarily on credibility of witnesses, which appellant claims were naturally biased against
him as relatives of victim. However, SC reiterated principle that it will not interfere with findings of TC
unless plainly overlooked undisputed facts of substance and value which would alter result of case.
○ Also, fact that prosecution witnesses are relatives of victim does not necessarily indicate bias which would
impair credibility. Absence of proof of ill motive from witnesses, relationship between witness and victim
does not undermine credibility.
● Appellant’s claim of self-defense belied by finding of TC that victim was shot by someone who was standing
on his right side. Appellant’s version - in front of victim when he fired at the victim, retaliating while
dropping to the ground - crumbles when physical evidence that victim sustained two gunshot wounds
which entered right side of his body and gunshot wound on the right side of his head.
● Had Appellant and Saludares not intended to harm victim, could have apprehended him. If they verified
possession of an unlicensed firearm, appellant could have reported it to his superiors, so issuance of
warrant of arrest and seizure of unlicensed firearm.
● Appellant contended that crime is homicide, but TC correctly ruled murder was committed. Treachery
attended commission of crime.

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○ Requisites: (a) employment of means of execution that gives person who is attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or retaliate; (b) means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
○ Appellant deliberately executed the act where Calpito was unaware and helpless. Further, evident
premeditation was proven by the evidence showing that execution of the criminal case was preceded by
cool thought and reflection - evident premeditation considered only as a generic aggravating
circumstance.
● Information alleged three other generic aggravating circumstances: ignominy, abuse of superior strength
and taking advantage of public position. TC correctly ruled out ignominy, since autopsy did not show other
injuries; correctly held that treachery absorbed abuse of superior strength; and, properly appreciated
taking advantage of public position as an aggravating circumstance, since Gapasin - member of Philippine
Constabulary, and committed the crime with an armalite which was issued to him when he received his
mission order.
○ Voluntary surrender may be considered, but offset by aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of
public position … so, only generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation may be appreciated
against Gapasin.
● Proper penalty - reclusion perpetua

3. Insult to public authority

People v. Tiongson, L-35123-24, 25 July 1984, 130 SCRA 614
At 5 30 PM Rudy TIongson escaped from jail, with de la Cruz and Santiago. While escaping, Tiongson killed
Zosimo Gelera, a member of the police force and PC constable Aurelio Canela who went in pursuit of them.
Tiongson was charged with murder qualified by treachery in two separate information. He was found
guilty, with the following aggravating circumstances: evident premeditation, in contempt or with insult to
public authorities, crime was committed in an uninhabited place, and abuse of superior strength, which
resulted in the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the cases are now under mandatory review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Qualifying and aggravating circumstances are present.
HELD: HOMICIDE without any aggravating circumstances.
1. There was no treachery. Qualifying or aggravating circumstances should be proved in an incontestable
manner, presumptions are insufficient. No witness in the killing of police force Gelera. PC Sgt Saway who
also chased Tiongson testified that PC Canela was warned to seek cover but he disregarded the warning.
2. No evident premeditation.
a. Gelera - Ruled out in absence of sufficient proof.
b. Canela – killed 10 minutes after accused escaped from jail. Could not have planned his killing.
3. No contempt of or insult to public authorities. They are the victims against whom the crime was
committed.
4. Place of occurrence not an uninhabited place and it was not deliberately sought by the accused
Uninhabited place should be isolated and far from human habitation. The place was merely declared as
700 meters away from the Municipal Building.

People v. Magdueño, L-68699, 22 September 1986, 144 SCRA 210

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People v. Tac-an, G.R. Nos. 76338-89, 26 February 1990.

Facts:

Renato Tac-an and Francis Escano were close friends being classmates in high school and members of the
local Bronx gang. Francis withdrew from the gang on the advice of his mother who saw that Renato carried
a handgun on his visits to their home. Things started turning sour between the two, and came to a head
on Dec 14, 1984. After an earlier altercation on that day, Renato went home and got his gun. He entered
the Mathematics class under Mr. Damaso Pasilbas in Rm15 and shouted for Francis. After locating the
victim he fired at him but missed. He was later able to hit him in the head as he was running to the door
with his classmates to escape. After this, Renato paced outside in the hallway. A teacher unknowing that
Renato was the culprit, asked him for help unwittingly informing him that Francis was still alive. Renato
immediately re- entered the room and saying "So, he is still alive. Where is his chest?" Standing over
Francis sprawled face down on the classroom floor, Renato aimed at the chest of Francis and fired once
more. The bullet entered Francis' back below the right shoulder, and exited on his front chest just above
the right nipple.

Tac-an was charged with illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866. An amended information for
murder was subsequently filed aggravated by the use of illegal possession of firearms.

Issue:

Whether or not illegal possession of a firearm is a special aggravating circumstance in crimes of homicide
and murder?

Ruling:

No. Under an information charging homicide or murder, the use of an unlicensed firearm is not an
aggravating circumstance nor can it be used to increase the penalty for the second offense of homicide or
murder to death or reclusion perpetua. The character of the instrument used in taking or destroying
human existence is not one of those included in the enumeration of aggravating circumstances under
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.

On the other hand, under an information for unlawful possession of a firearm or ammunition, P.D. 1866
authorizes the increase of the imposable penalty for unlawful possession if the unlicensed firearm was
used to destroy human existence. Though it is not one of the enumerated aggravating circumstances in
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, it may still be considered to increase the penalty imposed because
of the explicit provision of the said special law.

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4. Disregard of rank, age, or sex, and dwelling;

People v. Diaz, G.R. No. L-24002, 21 January 1974.

This is an appeal of defendants Francisco Diaz and Gerardo Diaz from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Samar convicting them of murder.

Gerardo was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, while Francisco was sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal.

Appellant Francisco Diaz admits that he killed Tadia. He justifies the killing on the ground of self-defense.
His younger brother Gerardo denies any participation in the killing. He has set up the easily contrivable
defense of alibi.

So, the main issue is whether credence can be accorded to Francisco Diaz's plea of self-defense and
Gerardo's alibi.

The alternative issues are whether the brothers conspired to kill the victim and whether treachery and
evident premeditation should qualify the killing as murder. The trial court did not pass upon those
ancillary issues.

Prosecution: About two o'clock in the afternoon of September 4, 1963 Remegia Carasos, a fourteen-year
old girl, and her first cousin, Anita Pacaira (Pakaira), eleven years old, were gathering camotes in a farm
located at a place fittingly called Sitio Camotian, Barrio Perito, municipality of Sta. Margarita, Western
Samar.

There suddenly appeared Francisco Diaz (Ansing or Francing), a twenty-four year old unmarried farmer
of that place, whom Remegia and Anita had known for many years. Without any preliminaries, he
embraced Remegia from behind and against her will and held her breast.

She shouted for help, saying Reacting to Remegia's cry for help, Anita, with a bolo, struck Francisco on
the head and hands. Francisco released Remegia and fled.

Tadia (grandpa) immediately reported the incident to the barrio lieutenant

The following day, September 5th, Tadia, accompanied by his teenage granddaughters, Remegia and
Anita, was on his way to the poblacion of Sta. Margarita to file complaint. He was walking ahead,
followed by Remegia and Anita one braza behind him.

While they were ascending the hill or cliff Francisco Diaz and his younger brother Gerardo (Adong),
twenty-one years old, appeared on the crest of the hill. Both were wearing denim pants and white shirts.
Gerardo was armed with a locally made shotgun called bardog, about fifty inches long. He immediately
fired sidewise at Tadia while about four meters from the latter, hitting him in the neck. The shot felled

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Tadia. He rolled down the lower part of the cliff near the Alao Creek and lay there flat on his back with
his catopis

Then, the brothers jumped to the lower part of the cliff. Francisco placed his foot on the prostrate body
of Quintin Tadia, bent over him and repeatedly stabbed him in different parts of his body. Francisco was
armed with a bolo commonly called utak which is used in gathering firewood.

Tadia died on the spot where he fell. Gerardo placed his bardog on a moss-covered stone called palanas
about three brazas from Tadia's body. Remegia informed her father and the inhabitants of the barrio
about the ambuscade and the killing of her grandfather. Gerardo Diaz went home while Francisco
surrendered to the authorities.

Gerardo Diaz was arrested. He did not resist arrest

ISSUE: AC OF DISREGARD OF RANK, AGE, SEX OR DWELLING OF THE OFFENDED PARTY

(AGE ON THIS CASE) - NO

● TREACHERY? - YES
ABUSE OF AUTHORITY? -YES

HELD:

The circumstance of old age cannot be considered aggravating. There was no evidence that the accused
deliberately intended to offend or insult the age of the victim. That circumstance may be absorbed in
treachery

There was treachery (alevosia) because the brothers made a deliberate surprise or unexpected assault
on Tadia. They literally ambushed him. They waited for him on the cliff, a high ground which rendered
it difficult for him to flee or maneuver in his defense.

Tadia was shot sidewise while he was ascending the hill or cliff burdened by his catopis or food basket.
That was another circumstance which handicapped him in resisting the assault. The initial attack was
successful. Tadia fell and rolled down the cliff and landed near the creek below. In that helpless state,
he was ruthlessly stabbed by Francisco Diaz.

The attack was also attended with abuse of superiority. Two armed young men unexpectedly assaulted
an unarmed sexagenarian. However, abuse of superior strength is merged with treachery.

As to Francisco Diaz, evident premeditation should be appreciated. It should be recalled that the
embracing incident was reported by Tadia to the barrio lieutenanT. It may reasonably be assumed that
Francisco Diaz became aware that same afternoon that Tadia, who was his neighbor, was going to the
poblacion to lodge a complaint against him. That would explain why early in the morning, he and his
brother were already in the hill or cliff waiting for Tadia who was on his way to town.

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Premeditation, which was alleged in the information as a qualifying circumstance, should be considered
only as generic aggravating circumstance with respect to Francisco Diaz since treachery has already
been used to qualify the killing as murder). In his case, it is offset by the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender to the authorities.

The penalty for murder, which is reclusion temporal maximum to death, should be imposed in its medium
period on Francisco Diaz. He should be sentenced to reclusion perpetua (Arts. 64[4] and 248, Revised
Penal Code).

With respect to Gerardo Diaz, as no generic aggravating and mitigating circumstances can be considered
in his case, he was properly sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua (Arts. 64[1] and 248,
Revised Penal Code).

People v. Arizobal, G.R. No. 135051-52, 14 December 2000, 348 SCRA 143
Facts:
Clariti Arizobal, Erly Lignes, Rogelio Gemini and 2 others were charged with Robbery in Band with Homicide
for robbing and slaying Laurencio Gimenez and his son Jimmy Gimenez.

On 24 March 1994, Laurencio and his wife Clementina were sound asleep in their house in Masbate when
around 9:30 in the evening, Laurencio woke her up to open the door because there were persons outside.
After she kit the kerosene lamp, she went to open the door and was confronted by armed men pointing
their guns at her. She recognized Arizobal and Lignes, but the last one was wearing a mask. Arizobal asked
Clemencio where his guin is to which Clementina replied that they did not have. The one wearing maskara
stood guard at the door as the two men barged into the master’s bedroom and forcibly opened the
aparador. They ransacked the cabinet and scattered everything on the floor and took the PHP8,000 that
they found. They then ordered Laurencio to go with them to Jimmy’s house and he left with them against
his will. Clementina said that shortly after they left she heard gunshots.

Erlinda, wife of Jimmy narrated that on that night, Jimmy and Francisco Gimenez arrived and informed her
that they had already bought carabao. After handing her the certificate of large cattle, and while he was
skinning the chicken for their supper, three men appeared and ordered them to lie face down. One of
them pushed her to the ground while others tied Francisco and Jimmy as they whipped the latter with an
armalite rifle.

The robbers took the liberty of consuming the food and cigarettes in her sari-sari store. They then
ransacked the household for variables, taking PHP1,000 from her sari-sari store and told them to produce
PHP100,000 in exchange of Jimmy's life. Since they could not produce the
amount, they offered their certificate of large cattle, but the men only threw it back to Erlinda. The men
the dragged Jimmy outside the house with Laurencio, brought them to some 50m away while leaving
Arizobal and Lignes to guard. Moments later she heard the burst of gunfire. When the masked men
returned, one of them told her that her husband and father-in-law had been killed for trying to escape.

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The court found both accused guilty of robbery with homicide and sentenced to death.

Issue:
W/N the aggravating circumstance of by dwelling should be appreciated

Ruling:

The trial court is correct in appreciating dwelling as an aggravating circumstance. Generally, dwelling is
considered inherent in the crimes which can only be committed in the abode of the victim, such as trespass
to dwelling and robbery in an inhabited place. However, in robbery with homicide the authors can commit
the heinous crime without transgressing the sanctity of the victim’s domicile. In the case at bar, the
robbers demonstrated and impudent disregard of the inviolability of the victim’s abode when they forced
their way in, looter their houses, intimidated and coerced the inhabitants into submission, disabled
Laurencio and Jimmy by tying their hands before dragging them out of the house to be killed.

Treachery cannot be appreciated, for the crime is primarily a crime against property and not against
persons, the homicide being incidental to the robbery and not the main purpose and object of the
criminals.

By band also cannot be appreciated for there exists no proof that more than three armed malefactors
united the commission of robbery. While it was said that 5 men took part in the crime, there is no proof
that at least 4 of them were armed. Likewise, Nocturnity did not attend. For it to be so, accused must have
deliberately and intentionally sought to commit the crime in nighttime, for the cover of darkness to
accomplish their devious design without being identified. On the contrary, the locus criminis was well
lighted and nighttime was merely incidental.

The decision is affirmed.

People v. Daniel, G.R. No. L-40330, 20 November 1978

Paleng was a 13 year old and was temporarily boarding at a house in Baguio CIty as she was a 1st year high
school student. At 3 in the afternoon she just arrived from Tublay CIty, her residence, in a Dangwa bus. It
was raining so she waited inside but after a few minutes the accused started molesting her, asking her
name and trying to hold her bag. She called the attention of the driver and conductor but they also seemed
afraid of him.

She left the bus, the accused still following him and when she rode a jeep the accused sat beside her. The
jeep reached her destination and she alighted there. The accused also alighted and tried to carry her bag.
When she reached her boarding house she was about to close the door but the accused came in. she
entered her room, the accused came in and pulled an 8-inch dagger and told her, “If you talk, I will kill
you.” he held her hair and forced her to lie on her bed while removing the buttons of his pants.. He put a

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handkerchief on her mouth and held a dagger on her neck. He put the dagger down on her bed but she
could not escape because the accused was 5’7” while she was only 4’8”. He used his thigh to separate her
legs and succeeded in having carnal knowledge. Margarita lost consciousness and when she recovered he
was already gone.

The following morning her father came to visit her and she confided in him. She was examined in the
Baguio General Hospital where the doctor concluded that the “defloration was recent,” and that she was
a virgin before the incident.

Defense of Daniel: They were acquainted with each other and was having consensual sex, in fact it was the
second time. He promised to marry her so he was surprised when she filed an instant complaint.

The court believes Margarita when she says that she was surprised when the appellant followed her to
her house and that she did not know it. She also could not ask for help when they were walking on the
street because Daniel was not doing anything to her.

In a crime of rape, force need not be irresistible; "it need but be present, and so long as it brings about the
desired result, all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible, is beside the point”

Intimidation was used on Margarita and she submitted herself for fear of her life and safety, because
Daniel was armed with a dagger.

The penalty of death should be imposed but for the lack of necessary votes, the penalty next lower in
degree is applicable. Reclusion Perpetua.

People v. Apduhan, L-19491, 30 August 1968

Facts:

This is an automatic review of the judgment convicting Apolonia Apduhan Jr. of robbery with homicide
and sentencing him to death. The act was committed with the special aggravating circumstance that the
the crime was committed by a band with the use of unlicensed firearms, and other aggravating
circumstances being:
1. That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended parties without any provocation from the
latter.
2. That the nighttime was purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the crime; and
3. That advantage was taken of superior strength

On or about 23 May 1961, in Mabini, Bohol Apduhan and 5 other persons, armed with unlicensed firearms,
daggers and deadly weapons, unlawfully entered the houses of spouses Honorato and Antonia Miano.

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They hacked and shot Geronimo Miano (son of the two) and Norberto Aton which caused their deaths.
They tooo away PHP 322.00

During trial, Apduhan changed his former plea of not guilty to a plea of guilty. After the trial judge had
repeatedly apprised him of the severity of the offense, and the strong possibility that the capital penalty
might be imposed upon him despite the plea, Apduhan persisted to plead guilty with the request that
death penalty be not imposed.

The court rendered its decision finding accused guilty, sentencing him to death.

Since Apduhan voluntarily confessed his guilt in open court, the case was subject to review concerning the
correctness of the penalty imposed.

Issue: W/N the penalty imposed was correct

The prosecution contends that, apart from the generic aggravating circumstances present, the special
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms by a band as provided in Art. 296 is applicable
(maximum of the penalty is to be imposed) in connection with Art. 294 (1) (in case of homicide during
robbery, penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua to death). Defense contends that if the use of
unlicensed firearms, if appreciated, must be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance that may
be offset by the existence of mitigating circumstance.

Ruling:
The court finds the contention untenable.

Art. 296 is exclusively linked and applicable to the antecedent provision of Art. 295 on robbery in band.
Art. 295 is only applicable to subdivisions 3, 4, 5 of Art. 294. Thus although the use of unlicensed firearm
is a special aggravating circumstance in Art. 296, it cannot be applied in relation to Art. 294(1) which is
Robbery with Homicide. In order for it to be such, the offense charged must be robbery by a band pursuant
to Art. 295. Since Art. 295 is not applicable to 294(1) then the special aggravating circumstance cannot be
considered in fixing the penalty imposable for robbery with homicide under Art. 294(1) even if said crime
was committed by a band with the use of firearms.

The accused only have the plea of guilty as mitigating (which the court deems to be not spontaneous and
insistent). This constitutes an admission of the facts alleged and the aggravating circumstances. There is
no need for prosecution to prove them since the plea of guilty has supplied the requisite proof.

The settled rule is that dwelling is at aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation of persons. The
rationale behind the pronouncement is that this class of robbery could be committed without the necessity
of transgressing the sanctity of home. It shows greater perversity in the accused and produces greater
alarm.

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Due to failure to secure the required number of votes, the death penalty cannot be legally imposed. The
next lower in degree is to be imposed.

Decision affirmed with modifications. Death penalty is reduced to Reclusion Perpetua.

5. Abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness

People v. Mandolado, L-51304-05, 28 June 1983, 123 SCRA 133

FACTS: "In the morning of October 3, 1977, Julian Ortillano, Martin Mandolado, Conrado Erinada and
Anacleto Simon, trainees/draftees of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and assigned to the 3rd Infantry
Battalion of the Philippine Army, were passengers of a bus bound for Midsayap, North Cotabato (p. 8,
t.s.n., Feb. 21, 1979). They alighted at the bus terminal in Midsayap and decided to drink ESQ rum. All were
in uniform, armed and belonging to the same military outfit.

While drinking, Conrado nd Anacleto decided to join appellants in going to Pikit, North Cotabato, home
base of appellants. After drinking for about an hour, appellant Mandolado got drunk and went inside the
public market. When he returned, grabbed his .30 caliber machine gun and started Aring. His companions
tried to dissuade him but he nonetheless continued firing his gun. Sensing trouble, COnrado and Anacleto
ran away and boarded passing Ford Fiera with some passengers on board. Appellants followed and
boarded also the vehicle . The soldiers forced the driver of the Ford Fiera to bring them to the Midsayap
crossing. After alighting to the vehicle, Appellan
t Mandolado Ared his .30 caliber machine gun at the speeding vehicle hitting the right side of the back of
the driver's sister who was then on board said vehicle.

While waiting, a privately owned jeep, driven by Herminigildo Tenorio, passed by. On board said jeep
which was bound for Cotabato City were Nolasco Mendoza and two (2) others, but the latter two alighted
at said crossing. Conrado and Anacleto boarded the jeep. Thereafter, appellants ran after the jeep, shouted
at Herminigildo Tenorio, the driver thereof, to stop the vehicle and subsequently, both appellants
Mandolado and Ortillano boarded the jeep. On the way, both appellants kept firing their guns prompting
Herminigildo Tenorio to remark, "Kung hindi kayo tatahimik, ibabangga ko itong jeep". Upon learning that
it is bound for COtobato and not on Pikit, appellant Mandolado got angry, "cocked" his gun and ordered
the driver to stop. Conrado and Anacleto jumped off the jeep and run towards s their detachment camp.
Appellants also got off the jeep. Thereupon, appellant Mandolado Ared his .30 caliber machine gun at and
hit the occupants of the jeep. Appellant Ortillano likewise, Ared his armalite, not at the occupants of said
jeep but downwards hitting the ground which were heard by both Conrado Erinada and Anacleto Simon
who were then already about 50 meters away from the jeep while running towards their detachment
camp. Although it was then raining torrentially, Anacleto Simon recognized the bursts of gunfire as those
of a machine gun.

Therefter, upon returning to their camp at pikit, appellants returned their firearms, but did not report the
incident. The following day, appellants proceeded to Davao City and upon arriving, appellants went to see
a movie and afterwards proceeded to the Office of Doña Ana, a shipping Arm, where they saw a certain
Sgt. Villanueva who was then leaving for Luzon. Sgt. Villanueva informed the appellants that they were

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suspects in the Tenorio and Mendoza killings. However, before appellants could board the ship bound for
Manila, they were apprehended by a team led by Lt. Licas and investigated. Appellant Mandolado
admitted the killing of Tenorio and Mendoza whereas appellant Ortillano admitted his presence at said
killings and of his having fired his armalite downwards after appellant Mandolado Ared upon the killed the
afore-named victims.

a ballistic test was conducted by Sgt. Leon , on the irearms issued to appellant Mandolado, Anacleto Simon
end Conrado Erinada, this reveal identical impressions as the test specimens of Ave empty shells fired from
appellant Mandolado's machine gun. Whereas the armalite shells recovered from the scene of the crime
reveal non-identical impressions with the shells fired from the armalites of Conrado Simon and Anacleto
Erinada. He then concluded that the .30 caliber shells recovered from the scene of the crime were fired
from the same machine gun issued to appellant Mandolado.

ISSUE: WON
1. It was Murder
2. Aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of one's position, abuse of confidence, obvious
ungratefulness
3. Mitigating circumstance of drunkenness

HELD:

1. The killing of the two victims in the case at bar is CORRECTLY QUALIFIED AS MURDER, there being
present the qualifying circumstance of treachery which is alleged in the information. There is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make (Art. 14, p-graph 16, Revised Penal Code).
The prosecution evidence is quite clear and explicit that when appellants alighted from the jeep, the
accused Mandolado immediately Ared his 30 caliber machine gun at the occupants of the jeep, the victims
Nolasco Mendoza and Herminigildo Tenorio, and both of them died instantaneously on the spot, and from
this sudden means or manner of attack, it can reasonably be concluded that it tended directly to insure its
execution without risk to the appellant-assailant and also deprived the victims of any chance or
opportunity to defend themselves.

2. Aggravating circumstance of TAKING ADVANTAGE OF ONE'S POSITION, not considered. There is no

persuasive showing that herein appellants being draftees of the Army, in full military uniform and carrying
their high powered Firearms, facilitated the commission of the ones they were charged. It may be
conceded that as draftees. the accused could easily hitch-hike with private vehicles, as in the case of
Tenorio's owner-type jeep but there is no evidence that when they stopped the jeep the accused already
intended to shoot the occupants of the vehicle.

ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE; WHEN CONSIDERED AGGRAVATING; LIKEWISE NOT SHOWN. In order that abuse
of confidence he dented as aggravating. it is necessary that "there exists a relation of trust and confidence

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between the accused and one against whom the crime was committed and the accused made use of such
a relationship to commit the crime”, that the confidence between the parties must be immediate and
personal such as would give that accused some advantage or make it easier for him to commit the crime;
that such confidence was a means of facilitating the commission of the crime. In the instant case, there is
absolutely no showing of any personal or immediate relationship upon which confidence might rest
between the victims and the assailants who had just met each other then.

NO OBVIOUS UNGRATEFULNESS because LACK OF THE REQUISITE TRUST. Similarly, there could have
been no obvious ungratefulness in the commission of the crime for the simple reason that the requisite
trust of the victims upon the accused prior to the criminal act and the breach thereof as contemplated
under Article 14, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code are manifestly lacking or non- existent. In all likelihood,
the accused Army then in their uniforms and holding their high-powered firearms cowed the victims into
boarding their jeep for a ride at machine gun point which certainly is no source of gratefulness or
appreciation.

3. The trial Court's finding about the accused's state of intoxication should credit both accused with the
mitigating circumstance of drunkenness which shall reduce the penalty to be imposed upon the accused
in the computation thereof.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Martin Mandolado is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder murder in for the killing of Nolasco Mendoza and Herminigildo Tenorio. There being no
aggravating circumstance but having found and appreciated drunkenness which is not habitual as a
mitigating circumstance, hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
as maximum in each of the two cases..

The accused-appellant Julian Ortillano is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in
the crime of murder in for the killing of Nolasco Mendoza and Herminigildo Tenorio. Similarly, there being
no aggravating circumstance but having found and appreciated the mitigating circumstance of
drunkenness which is not habitual in his favor, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of four (4) years, two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as maximum in each case.

6. The crime is committed in the palace of Chief Executive, in his presence, where public authorities are
engaged in the discharge of their duties, or place dedicated to religious worship;

7. Nighttime, uninhabited place, or by a band;

People v. Garcia, L-30449, 31 October 1979, 94 SCRA 14

FACTS:

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The legal verdict hinges on the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution, Mrs. Corazon
Dioquino Paterno, sister of the deceased, Apolonio Dioquino, Jr. During her residence at Pasay City, her
brother Apolonio visited her family for about twenty times.

Before the incident which gave rise to this case, Corazon's husband informed her that he saw Apolonio
engaged in a drinking spree with his gang in front of an establishment known as Bill's Place at M. de la Cruz
Street, Pasay City.

Upon learning this information from her husband, Corazon obtained permission to leave the house at 3:00
a.m. so she could fetch her brother. At that time, she had not been aware that Apolonio was in Pasay City;
she had been of the belief that he was with his family in Pampanga. She went to fetch him because she
wanted him to escape the untoward influence of his gang. In explaining the rationale for her nocturnal
mission, she employed in her sworn statement the following language: "Dahil itong si Junior ay meron na
kaming nabalitaan na naaakay ng barkada niya sa paggawa ng hindi mabuti."
On her way, as she rounded the corner of P.C. Santos Street, Corazon saw her brother fleeing a group of
about seven persons, including the two accused, Antonio Garcia and Reynaldo Arviso. She recognized the
two accused because they were former gangmates of her brother; in fact, she knew them before the
incident by their aliases of "Tony Manok" and "Rene Bisugo," respectively.
Corazon saw that the chase was led by the two accused, with Antonio carrying a long sharp instrument.
During the incident, she exerted efforts to identify the other group members, taking care to conceal herself
as she did so. She heard a gunshot which caused her to seek cover.
When she ventured to look from where she was hiding, about 20 meters away, she saw the group catch
up with her brother and maltreat him. Some beat him with pieces of wood, while others boxed him.
Immediately afterwards, the group scampered away in different directions. Antonio was left behind. He
was sitting astride the prostrate figure of Apolonio, stabbing the latter in the back with his long knife.

When Corazon mustered the courage to approach her brother, she saw that he was bathed in a pool of
his own blood. The incident threw her in a state of nervous confusion, and she resolved to report the
incident to her younger sister, who lived at Lakandula Street, Pasay City. Her sister in turn decided to break
the news to their father at Muntinlupa.

The deceased suffered 22 stab wounds in the different portions of his hips; in the front portion of the chest
and neck; in the back portion of the torso; and in the right hand. He testified that the wounds sustained
by the deceased brought about a massive hemorrhage which caused death.

Both the accused, Antonio Garcia and Reynaldo Arviso, took refuge in the defense of alibi.

The court concluded that "the two accused took part in the perpetuation of the crime charged." It gave
short shrift to the defense of alibi presented by the two accused, noting that, by their own admission, the
two accused were residents of the vicinity of the crime.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not:
1.Qualifying circumstance of treachery? Nope.
2.Qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation? Nope.
3.Crime qualified as murder? Nope. Homicide.
4.Mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender? Yep.
5.Aggravating circumstance of abuse of superiority? Yep.
6.. Aggravating circumstance of nocturnity? Yep.

HELD:
It is claimed that there is absolute absence of evidence to show that Reynaldo was a direct participant and
that the only evidence against him is that he was seen pursuing the victim. However, the finding of
Reynaldo's guilt stems, not from his direct participation in the criminal execution, but from his
participation in the conspiracy to kill the deceased. His participation in the conspiracy is supported by
Corazon's testimony that he and Antonio were the leaders of the pack following closely at the heels of the
victim.
Those who are members of the band of malefactors by which a murder is committed and are present at
the time and place of the commission of the crime, thus contributing by their presence to augment the
power of the band and to aid in the successful realization of the crime, are guilty as principals even if they
took no part in the material act of killing the deceased.

A conspiracy may be entered into after the commencement of overt acts leading to the consummation of
the crime.

Conspiracy implies concert of design and not participation in every detail of execution.

When a group of seven men, more or less, give chase to a single unarmed individual running for his life,
and they overtake him and inflict wounds on his body by means of shooting, stabbing, and hitting with
pieces of wood, there is conspiracy to kill; and it does not detract from their status as conspirators that
there is no evidence of previous agreement, it being sufficient that their wills have concurred and they
labored to achieve the same end.

Under normal conditions, conspiracy generally presupposes premeditation. But in the case of implied
conspiracy, evident premeditation may not be appreciated, in the absence of proof as to how and when
the plan to kill the victim was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out, so that it cannot be
determined if the accused had "sufficient time between its inception and its fulfillment dispassionately to
consider and accept the consequences." There should be a showing that the accused had the opportunity
for reflection and persisted in executing his criminal design.

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Even in the absence of evident premeditation, the crime of murder in this case might still be qualified by
treachery, which is alleged in the information. But the defense argued that treachery was not present.
We are so convinced. It is an elementary axiom that treachery can in no way be presumed but must be
fully proven.

Where the manner of the attack was not proven, the defendant should be given the benefit of the doubt,
and the crime should be considered homicide only.

However, in this case we believe that the correct qualifying circumstance is not treachery, but abuse of
superiority. Here we are confronted with a helpless victim killed by assailants superior to him in arms and
in numbers. But the attack was not sudden nor unexpected, and the element of surprise was lacking. The
victim could have made a defense; hence, the assault involved some risk to the assailants. There being no
showing when the intent to kill was formed, it cannot be said that treachery has been proven.

We find that abuse of superiority attended the offense, following a long line of cases which made this
finding on parallel facts. Our jurisprudence is exemplified by the holding that where four persons attacked
an unarmed victim but there was no proof as to how the attack commenced and treachery was not proven,
the fact that there were four assailants would constitute abuse of superiority.

The offense took place at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. It may therefore be said that it was committed at
night, which covers the period from sunset to sunrise, according to the New Civil Code, Article 13. The
Revised Penal Code, Article 14, Provides that it is an aggravating circumstance when the crime is
committed in the nighttime, whenever nocturnity may facilitate the commission of the offense. There are
two tests for nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance: the objective test under which nocturnity is
aggravating because it facilitates the commission of the offense; and the subjective test, under which
nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely sought by the offender. These two tests should be
applied in the alternative.

In this case, the subjective test is not passed because there is no showing that the accused purposely
sought the cover of nighttime.

A group of men were engaged in a drinking spree, in the course of which one of them fled, chased by seven
others. The criminal assault on the victim at 3:00 a.m. was invited by nocturnal cover, which handicapped
the view of eyewitnesses and encouraged impunity by persuading the malefactors that it would be difficult
to determine their identity because of the darkness and the relative scarcity of people in the streets. These
circumstances combine to pass the objective test, and we find that nocturnity is aggravating because it
facilitated the commission of the offense. Nocturnity enticed those with the lust to kill to follow their
impulses with the false courage born out of the belief that they could not be readily identified.

The information alleges that the crime of murder was attended by the two qualifying circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation. Neither of these qualifying circumstances was proved; hence, the
killing can not be qualified into murder, and constitutes instead the crime of homicide, which is punished
by reclusion temporal.It is not controverted that the accused voluntarily surrendered to the authorities;

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they are therefore entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. This lone mitigating
circumstance, offset by the two generic aggravating circumstances of abuse of superiority and
nocturnity, produces the result that in the crime of homicide, one aggravating circumstance remains.

People v. Rodas, G.R. No. 175881, 28 August 2007

FACTS:
Titing Asenda, a resident of Boyos, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, was at Milaub, Denoyan, Zamboanga
del Norte, to help his brother, Danilo Asenda, in the harvesting of the latters corn.
August 9, 1996: at around 8:00 in the evening, a benefit dance at Milaub was being held which was
sponsored by Boboy Raquilme. Among those roaming in the vicinity of the dance hall were Alberto Asonda
and Ernie Anggot. They stopped and hung out near the fence to watch the affair. Titing Asenda was
standing near them.They saw Charlito Rodas, Armando Rodas, Jose Rodas, Jr., and Jose Rodas, Sr.
surrounding Titing Asenda. Suddenly, without a word, Charlito Rodas, armed with a hunting knife, stabbed
Titing at the back. Armando Rodas then clubbed Titing with a chako hitting him at the left side of the nape
causing him to fall. Jose Rodas, Sr. handed to Jose Rodas, Jr. a bolo which the latter used in hacking Titing,
hitting him on the left elbow. Alberto Asonda and Ernie Anggot tried to help Titing but Armando Rodas
prevented them by pointing a gun at them and firing it towards the sky. After the assailants left, Alberto
Asonda and Ernie Anggot approached Titing Asenda who was already dead. They informed Danilo Asenda
that his brother was killed. The police arrived the following day after being informed of the incident.
Charlito Rodas8 and Jose Rodas, Jr. 9 withdrew their previous pleas of “NOT GUILTY” and entered their
respective pleas of “GUILTY” for the lesser crime of Homicide. RTC found accused-appellants Armando
Rodas and Jose Rodas, Sr. guilty of the crime of Murder

ISSUE:

Whether or not aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, abuse of superior strength, treachery and evident
premeditation is present?

RULING:
Appellants Armando Rodas and Jose Rodas, Sr. are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder as
defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by
treachery. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in the commission of the crime, they are
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Nocturnity: NO
This circumstance is considered aggravating only when it facilitated the commission of the crime, or was
especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose of impunity. The essence of this
aggravating circumstance is the obscuridad afforded by, and not merely the chronological onset of,
nighttime. Although the offense was committed at night, nocturnity does not become a modifying factor
when the place is adequately lighted and, thus, could no longer insure the offenders immunity from
identification or capture. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to show that nighttime facilitated the

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commission of the crime, or was especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose of
impunity. The crime scene was sufficiently lighted by a Petromax which led to the identification of all the
accused.

Abuse of Superior Strength: YES

There was glaring disparity of strength between the victim and the four accused. The victim was unarmed
while the accused were armed with a hunting knife, chako and bolo. It is evident that the accused took
advantage of their combined strength to consummate the offense. This aggravating circumstance, though,
cannot be separately appreciated because it is absorbed in treachery.

Treachery: YES
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to
the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.
In the case under review, the victim was completely unaware that he was going to be attacked. He was
not forewarned of any danger to himself as there was no altercation or disagreement between the accused
and the victim. If treachery may be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned, more so should it
be appreciated when the victim was not, as in the case at bar. The suddenness of the attack, the number
of the accused and their use of weapons against the unarmed victim prevent the possibility of any defense
or retaliation by the victim. The fact that the victim was already sprawled on the ground and still Jose Jr.
hacked him with a bolo clearly constitutes treachery

Evident Premeditation: NO
For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be established:
(1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime;
(2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and
(3) sufficient lapse of time between decision and execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.

The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at
a calm judgment. In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to show any presence of the elements

People v. Damaso, L-30116, 20 November 1978, 86 SCRA 370 (uninhabited)

FACTS: At about 9 o'clock in the evening of November 21, 1959, Donata and Victoriano heard the barkings
of dogs outside their house. Shortly, two men armed with guns, entered, pointed their weapons at them,
tied up the hands of Victoriano, covered him with a blanket and asked Donata for the wereabouts of her
daughter Catalina Sabado. Stricken by fear, Donata kept silent and blocked the door leading to her

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daughter's room but was promptly pushed aside. Donata was then ordered to open an "aparador" from
which the two men took valuables like jewelry, clothing, documents, and cutting instruments. All the while,
Donata and Victoriano could hear the movements and voices of some three to four other persons beneath
the house.

The two men brought Catalina Sabado down from the house and then asked where they could find Susana
Sabado, Donata's other daughter who was then in her store located about five meters away in the same
house. Thereafter, Donata heard the men opening the door to Susana's store. After several minutes, feeling
that the intruders had left, Donata untied the hands of Victoriano and asked him to go to the store to see
if her daughters were there. When the two women could not be found, Donata sent Victoriano to the barrio
lieutenant to report the incident. Accordingly, Victoriano went to the barrio lieutenant and the two later
went to town to inform the police of the occurrence.

It was only the following morning when the two women were found already dead with wounds in several
parts of their bodies. They were found in a sugar plantation belonging to one Ignacio Fabros, located about
one hundred meters from Donata Rebolledo's house.

Dr. Carlos Briones, Municipal Health Officer of Victoria performed the autopsy on the two bodies and
reported that the deaths were caused by profuse hemorrhage due to a fatal, big, wide, gaping and deep
lacerated wound just above the Adam's apple. He also testified in court that the death weapon must have
been a sharp instrument with a pointed tip, like a scythe.

DEFENSE:

Fausto Damaso stated that he was with his co-accused Gregorio, Eugenio, Alviar and Espejo on the night
the Sabado sisters were killed; that he never went into the house of Donata Rebolledo as Eugenio and
Gregorio were the ones who did; that it was Gregorio and Eugenio who actually did the killing while he,
Alviar and Espejo merely stood by; that the victims were stabbed and their throats cut with a reaping knife
(pangapas or lait); that the killing was motivated by the failure of the older woman (Catalina) to pay for a
carabao bought from Gregorio; and that on that evening, Gregorio, Eugenio, Alviar and Espejo were
carrying caliber .45 pistols while he was unarmed.

ISSUE:
W/N THERE IS AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE PRESENT ON THIS CASE

HELD:
YES.

The aggravating circumstance of band exists whenever more than three armed malefactors act together
in the commission of an offense. Counsel concedes that at least three of the accused-appellants, namely
Eugenio, Alviar, and Gregorio, ,were armed during the commission of the crime. He doubts, however,
whether accused Damaso carried any weapon and whether the "two stones" carried by accused Espejo fall
under the category of “arms.”. It is clear from the above, that Damaso was armed during the night of the

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commission of the crime, and it is immaterial what kind of firearm he carried, the only important thing
being that he was armed. In this case, the presence of an armed band is to be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance under Article 14(6) of the Revised Penal Code inasmuch as the crime committed
was that provided for and penalized in Article 294, paragraph 1 and not under Article 295,

Treachery is present if the victim is killed while bound in such a manner as to be deprived of the opportunity
to repel the attack or escape with any possibility of success. The fact that the bodies of Catalina and Susana
were found dead with their arms tied behind their backs as well as the admission of Gregorio in his
confession (Exhibit "Q") that he killed the sisters while their arms were held by Eugenio and Damaso lead
Us to conclude that the killing of the two women was done under treacherous circumstances.

The uninhabitedness of a place is determined not by the distance of the nearest house to the scene of the
crime, but whether or not in the place of commission, there was reasonable possibility of the victim
receiving some help. 8 Considering that the killing was done during nighttime and the sugarcane in the
field was tall enough to obstruct the view of neighbors and passersby, there was no reasonable possibility
for the victims to receive any assistance. That the accused deliberately sought the solitude of the place is
clearly shown by the fact that they brought the victims to the sugarcane field although they could have
disposed of them right in the house of Donata Rebolledo where they were found. Thus, in People v. Saguing,
the Court considered the crime as having been committed in an uninhabited place because the killing was
done in a secluded place at the foot of a hill, forested, and uninhabited.

The trial court considered separately the three circumstances of armed band, treachery and uninhabited
place where under other situations one may be considered absorbed or inherent in the other. There is ample
justification for this. The elements of each circumstance subsist independently and can be distinctly
perceived thereby revealing a greater degree of perversity on the part of the accused.

The penalty is to be imposed in its maximum period by reason of the presence of three aggravating
circumstances found by the trial court, to wit: that the robbery was committed by a band, with treachery,
and in an uninhabited place. There is likewise the additional aggravating circumstance that the robbery
was committed in the dwelling of the victim. Donata Rebolledo which although not alleged in the
Information is however established by the evidence.

8. Crime committed on the occasion of conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic, or other calamity
or misfortune;
9. Aid of armed men or persons who afford impunity;
10. Recidivism
People v. Baldera, L-2390, 24 April 1950, 86 Phil. 189
Facts:
A Casa Manila bus loaded with passengers left Batangas bound for Manila. On the highway, it was
held up by a group of five or six armed men. One of these, later identified as herein appellant Pedro
Baldera, who was then armed with a .45 caliber pistol, fired a shot, and this was followed by a hail of
bullets coming from different directions. As a result, several passengers, among them Jose Cabrera, Jose

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Pastor and Francisco Mendoza, were wounded. After the firing had ceased, appellant got on the bus and,
threatening the passengers with his gun, took money from Jose Pastor, Ponciana Villena, and Francisco
Mendoza. Appellant then alighted and ordered the bus to proceed, whereupon the driver headed for the
municipal building of San Jose and there reported the incident to the authorities. The wounded were taken
to the hospital, where Jose Cabrera died from his wounds on the following day. Jose Pastor, who was
wounded in the left leg, was cured in two months, while Francisco Mendoza's gunshot wound in the right
shoulder healed in 15 days.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in appreciating the circumstance of recidivism.
Held:
Yes, the lower court did err in appreciating against the accused the circumstance of recidivism by
reason of his previous conviction for theft, it appearing that that crime was committed on or about
December 30, 1947 (Exhibit E) while the offense now charged took place seven days before that date.
In conclusion, we find appellant guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and serious and less
serious physical injuries with two aggravating circumstances. But there being no sufficient vote to impose
the extreme penalty, appellant can be sentenced to life imprisonment only.

11. Reiteracion
12. Habitual delinquency (Art. 62, par. 5);
People v. Melendrez, G.R. No. 39913, 19 December 1933, 59 Phil. 154
Facts:
Ricardo Melendrez and Elias Martinez conspiring together and helping each other willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously forcibly broke open the door of the store, an inhabited house belonging to and occupied
by Tin Bun Boc, and once inside the said store, with intent of gain and without the consent of the owner
thereof, took, stole and carried away therefrom the personal properties of the said Tin Bun Boc.
The accused Ricardo Melendrez is a habitual delinquent, he having been previously convicted by final
judgment of competent courts twice of the crime of theft and once of the crime of estafa and having been
last convicted of the crime of estafa on September 3, 1932.
Issue:
Whether the aggravating circumstance of recidivism should be taken into consideration.
Held:
The fiscal contends that the aggravating circumstance of recidivism should be taken into account against
the appellant. This claim of the fiscal is in accordance with the judgment rendered by this court in banc in
the case of People vs. Aguinaldo (47 Phil., 728) while the old Penal Code was in force. But the enforcement
of the Revised Penal Code has resulted in a difference of opinion regarding this point on the part of the
members of this court. For this reason, after reviewing all the decisions affecting this matter, rendered by
this court both in banc and in division, it is now held that the aggravating circumstance of recidivism
should be taken into account in imposing the principal penalty in its corresponding degree,
notwithstanding the fact that the defendant is also sentenced to suffer an additional penalty as a
habitual delinquent.

Dissenting (Abad Santos):

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I cannot give my assent to the proposition that in the imposition of the penalty prescribed by law for the
crime committed by the appellant, the aggravating circumstance of recidivism should be taken into
consideration. The appellant is a habitual delinquent, and under our law and upon the facts of this
particular case, recidivism is an inherent element of habitual delinquency.
It seems clear from the provisions of law above quoted that if, within a period of ten years from the date
of his release or last conviction of the crime of robo, hurto, estafa, or falsificacion,a person be found guilty
of the same crime for the second time, he would be a recidivist; and if he be found guilty for the third
time or oftener, he would be deemed a habitual delinquent. The law determines the effect to be given
to a second conviction, and it also determines the effect of a third, fourth, and fifth conviction. In imposing
the penalty prescribed for the third, fourth or fifth conviction of any of the crimes mentioned, it seems to
me beyond the purpose of the law to take again into consideration the legal effect of the previous, second
conviction.

13. Quasi- recidivim (Art. 160)

i14. Price, reward, or promise;
15. Inundation, fire, poison, etc.
16. Evident premeditation;
US v. Manalinde, G.R. No. 5292, 28 August 1909, 14 Phil. 77
Facts:
Moro Manalinde was arrested and pleaded guilty for the crime of murder. He confessed that he had
perpetrated the crime herein mentioned, stating that his wife had died about one hundred days before
and that he had come from his home in Catumaldu by order of the Datto Rajamudah Mupuck, who had
directed him to go juramentado in Cotabato in order to kill somebody, because the said Mupuck had
certain grievances to avenge against a lieutenant and a sergeant, the said datto further stating that if he,
Manalinde, was successful in the matter, he would give him a pretty woman on his return, but that in case
he was captured he was to say that he performed the killing by order of Maticayo, Datto Piang, Tambal
and Inug. In order to carry out his intention to kill two persons in the town of Cotabato he provided himself
with a kris, which he concealed in banana leaves, and, traveling for a day and a night from his home, upon
reaching the town, attacked from behind a Spaniard (Juan Igual) who was seated in front of a store and,
wounding him, immediately after attacked a Chinaman (Choa), who was close by, just as the latter was
placing a tin that he was carrying on the ground and as he was about to enter a store near by, cutting him
on the left shoulder and fleeing at once; he further stated that he had no quarrel with the assaulted
persons.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime perpetrated qualifies for aggravating circumstances

HELD:
YES.

In the commission of the crime of murder the presence of aggravating circumstances 3 and 7 of article 10
of the Penal Code should be taken into consideration in that promise of reward and premeditation are

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present, which in the present case are held to be generic, since the crime has already been qualified as
committed with treachery because the accused confessed that he voluntarily obey the order given him by
Datto Mupuck to go juramentado and kill someone in the town of Cotabato, with the promise that if he
escaped punishment he would be rewarded with a pretty woman. Upon complying with the order the
accused undoubtedly acted of his own violation and with the knowledge that he would inflict irreparable
injury on some of his fellow-beings, depriving them of the life without any reason whatever, well knowing
that he was about in commit a most serious deed which the laws in force in this country and the
constituted authorities could by no means permit. Datto Mupuck, who ordered and induced him to
commit the crimes, as well as the accused knew perfectly well that the might be caught and punished in
the act of committing them.

As to the other circumstance it is also unquestionable that the accused, upon accepting the order and
undertaking the journey in order to comply therewith, deliberately considered and carefully and
thoughtfully meditated over the nature and the consequences of the acts that he will commit.

The fact that the arrangement between the instigator and the tool considered the killing of unknown
persons, the first encountered, does not bar the consideration of the circumstance of premeditation. The
nature and the circumstances which characterize the crime, the perversity of the culprit, and the material
and moral injury are the same, and the fact that the victim was not predetermined does not affect nor
alter the nature of the crime. The person having been deprived of his life by deeds executed with
deliberate intent, the crime is considered a premeditated one as the firm and persistent intention of the
accused from the moment, before said death, when he received the order until the crime was committed
is manifestly evident. Even though in a crime committed upon offer of money, reward or promise,
premeditation is sometimes present, the latter not being inherent in the former, and there existing no
incompatibility between the two, premeditation can not necessarily be considered as included merely
because an offer of money, reward or promise was made, for the latter might have existed without the
former, the one being independent of the other. In the present case there can be no doubt that after the
crime was agreed upon by means of a promise of reward, the criminal by his subsequent conduct showed
a persistency and firm intent in his plan to carry out the crime which he intentionally agreed to execute, it
being immaterial whether Datto Mupuck did or did not conceive the crime, once Manalinde obeyed the
inducement and voluntarily executed it.

For the above reasons and in view of the fact that no mitigating circumstance is present to neutralize the
effects of the aggravating ones, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed with
costs, provided however, that the penalty imposed on the culprit shall be executed in accordance with the
provisions of Acts Nos. 451 and 1577, and that in the event of a pardon being granted he shall likewise be
sentenced to suffer the accessory penalties imposed by article 53 of the Penal Code.

People v. Ilaoa, G.R. No. 94308, 16 June 1994, 233 SCRA 231
On 15 June 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City found Ruben and Rogelio guilty of murder with
the attendant circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and cruelty, and
imposed upon them the penalty of "life imprisonment."

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Facts:
In the early morning of November 5, 1987, a decapitated body of a man, who later identified through his
voter’s ID as Nestor de Loyola, was found in the grassy portion of Tinio St., Sta. Maria Phase I, Balibago,
Angeles City.
·Apart from the decapitation, the deceased bore 43 stab wounds in the chest as well as slight burns all
over the body.
·The head was found some 2 feet away from the corpse.
Five persons, Ruben E. Ilaoa, Rogelio E. Ilaoa, Rodel E. Ilaoa, Julius Eliginio and Edwin Tapang, were charged
for the gruesome murder of Nestor de Loyola. However, only the brothers Ruben and Rogelio stood trial
since the other accused escaped and were never apprehended.
As found by the trial court, in the late evening of November 4, 1987, appellant Ruben Ilaoa was engaged
in a drinking session with the deceased Nestor de Loyola together with several others. Ruben was heard
arguing with Nestor.
A few moments later, Ruben mauled and kicked the deceased with the help of their drinking companions
just outside Ruben’s apartment. As the deceased cried “Aray! Aray!” and “Pare, bakit niyo ako ginaganito?
Hirap na hirap na ako” appellant dragged the deceased with the help of Julius Eliginio to the apartment
from where a man’s cries were continued to be heard later.
To further seal the case against him, Ruben borrowed the tricycle of Alex Villamil at 2am of November 5,
1987 because a neighbor was about to give birth and had to be rushed to the hospital. However, he was
seen driving the tricycle alone with a sack, which looked like it contained a human body, placed in the
sidecar. At 3am of the same morning, the tricycle was returned with bloodstains on the floor.

Issue:
WON the aggravating circumstances were correctly appreciated

Ruling:
NO. RUBEN E. ILAOA was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, instead of murder.
Accused-appellant ROGELIO E. ILAOA, however, is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for obvious
insufficiency of evidence.
Evident Premeditation
Evident premeditation cannot be considered. There is nothing in the records to show that appellant,
prior to the night in question, resolved to kill Nestor de Loyola, nor is there proof to show that such killing
was the result of meditation, calculation or resolution on his part.
On the contrary, the evidence tends to show that series of circumstances which culminated in the killing
constitutes an unbroken chain of events with no interval of time separating them for calculation and
meditation.
Abuse of Superior Strength
Abuse of superior cannot be considered because there was no evidence that the appellant was physically
superior to the deceased and that the former took advantage of such superior strength to overcome the
latter’s resistance to consummate the offense.
Cruelty
The fact that the victim’s body was decapitated, bore 43 stab wounds (24 of which are fatal), and was
dumped in the street is not sufficient to show cruelty where there is nothing which show that appellant

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caused the victim to suffer slowly and painfully and inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral pain
for his pleasure and satisfaction.

People v. Bibat, G.R. No. 124319, 13 May 1998, 290 SCRA 27

FACTS
Gari Bibat stabbed to death one Lloyd del Rosario on October 12, 1992 at around 1:30 p.m. along G. Tuazon
cor. Ma. Cristina Sts., Sampaloc, Manila. The victim was on his way to school waiting for a ride when he
was stabbed. Thereafter the suspect fled while the victim was brought to the United Doctors Medical
Center (UDMC) where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
The incident was witnessed by Nona Avila Cinco, a laundry woman, who testified that on October 14,
1992, while she was at Funeraria Gloria waiting for her bettor, she saw a person about one meter away
talking to the accused. Said person told the accused "O pare, anduon na. Puntahan mo na. Siguruhin mo
lang na itumba mo na." to which the accused answered: "Oo ba. Ganito ba, ganito ba?" (as the witness
was speaking, she was demonstrating with her arms.)

After hearing the accused, she left towards Honrades Street to see another bettor. She first went inside a
house and after a while, she went outside where she saw the accused along Honrades Street, entering an
alley. She walked along with the accused. She and the accused were even able to look at each other.
While the victim was going out of a gate, the accused hurried towards the victim and took a pointed object
from a notebook, then stabbed the victim in the left chest twice. She was only about 4 to 5 meters away
from the scene of the crime. Thereafter, the accused fled, the victim shouted for help. Upon hearing the
shouts of the victim, the accused returned and stabbed the victim again in the middle part of the chest.
She then left the scene of the crime after the accused ran away. She reported the matter to the authorities
only on July 20, 1993 because she was afraid.

Florencio Castro testified among others that he saw the accused together with four others inside the
Gloria Memorial Homes along G. Tuason St. on October 14, 1992. One of them used the phone inside said
place to call somebody. The rest stayed besides the one calling. He saw one of them open a notebook
where a stainless knife was inserted. He heard the one using the phone, asking "kung nasaan." Thereafter,
the group went out and left towards the direction of BalicBalic. Rogelio Robles, testified among others that
the accused Gari Bibat had been going to his place at 424 Berdad St., Sampaloc, Manila, for a long time
already because their Samahang Ilocano (SI) president, Tonton Montero, is his neighbor. Before the
incident occurred, Tonton Montero told him (witness) about a rumble in school whereby somebody died.
The group of the accused was planning to take revenge against the victim, Lloyd del Rosario.

He further testified that he only knows Lloyd del Rosario by the face because the latter is from his place.
He only knew what had happened to Lloyd after that fateful incident because 6 or 7 of the members of
the group arrived, all with a "tusok" and they even kept two (2) guns in his house. Gari Bibat was one of
the 6 or 7 people he saw on that day, with a "tres-cantos" or "veinte nueve" tucked in his (Bibat's) waistline.
He further narrated that he actually saw the killing of the victim that even before the day Lloyd died; they
(accused and companions) already hid some guns and "tusok" in his house.

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Gari Bibat testified among others that on October 14, 1992, he was staying in his house Sampaloc, Manila;
at that time it was his mother's birthday; that he was reviewing his lessons from 7:00 o'clock to 10:00
o'clock in the morning in preparation for his final oral exams on October 14, 1992; that Marte Soriano, a
friend of his and a neighbor were in his house; that after lunch, they (he and Marte Soriano) left for school
at 12:35 noon; that they did not pass by Funeraria Gloria; that he and his friend were able to reach the
school; that he had a review of with his classmates up to 1:45 o'clock in the afternoon, after which they
proceeded to their room for the final exams; that their examination lasted from 7:30 to 4:30 o'clock in the
afternoon; that he passed the subject with a grade of 2.25; that he does not know Nona Cinco but only
later in the precinct; that he saw Rogelio Robles who was also detained at the Manila City Jail; that when
he asked why Rogelio Robles testified against him, Robles told him that it was merely concocted because
the complainant is Robles' neighbor whom he cannot refuse; that he does not know Tonton Montero; that
he did frequent Verdad St., near Rogelio Robles' house, neither did he go there on October 14, 1992
between 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon; that he is not a member of Samahang Ilocano fraternity
but the United Ilocandia fraternity, a school fraternity; that he could not remember of his fraternity being
involved in any school rumble as the same is a very peaceful group which promotes brotherhood; that
they did not have a quarrel with the victim who is already dead because the latter is not studying at
Arellano University; that with respect to the death of Lloyd del Rosario, the same is an added charge
(ipinatong) to him and that he was just implicated therein; that he knows nothing about it. Marte Soriano
and Lino Asuncion III also testified that Bibat is telling the truth.

Rogelio Robles was recalled to the stand to testify contrary to what he had previously stated in court. He
testified that he did not really see what transpired on October 14, 1992 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon
that he only assisted the parents of the victim because they come from the same place; that the father of
the victim handed to him the handwritten statement which he (witness) based his previous testimony;
that he did not actually see the killing.

ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation

HELD
There is evident premeditation when the following requisites are met:
1. The time when the offender determined (conceived) to commit the crime
2. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination
3. A sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.

The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and
rejection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive
at a calm judgment.

Appellant contended that the testimony of Robles which is the basis of the first requisite of evident
premeditation was not sufficiently proven and cannot be considered credible. The court ruled that even
without the testimony of Rogelio Robles, the presence of the first requisite of evident premeditation

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appears to have been thoroughly and sufficiently established. The determination or conception of the plan
to kill the victim could be deduced from the outward circumstances that happened on the fateful day of
October 14, 1992. Records show that at 11:30 in the morning of October 14, 1992, prosecution witness
Nona Cinco saw the accused with some companions at Funeraria Gloria. She personally heard the plan to
kill someone. Another prosecution witness, Florencio Castro, who works at the Funeraria Gloria also saw
the group of Gari Bibat in the said place. At around 1:30 in the afternoon, Nona Cinco saw the appellant
for the second time. She saw the appellant hurry towards the victim, take a pointed thing from a notebook
and with the use of such weapon, stab the victim on the chest. These overt acts clearly evinced that the
appellant clung to his resolution to kill the victim. From the time Nona Cinco heard the plan to kill someone
at 11:30 up to the killing incident at 1:30 in the afternoon of the same day, there was a sufficient lapse of
time for appellant to reflect on the consequences of his dastardly act.

As held in the case of People v. Dumdum "the killing of the deceased was aggravated by evident
premeditation, because the accused conceived of the assault at least one hour before its perpetration." In
the case under examination, two hours had elapsed from the time appellant clung to his determination to
kill the victim up to the actual perpetration of the crime.

17. Craft, fraud, or disguise;

People v. Empacis, G.R. No. 95756, 14 May 1993, 222 SCRA 59
Facts:
● 1986, Cebu, 5 men – Empacis, Langomez, Solis, Carlito Antiga and Bebe Antiga – indicted for crime of
robbery with homicide under Art. 294 (1) in relation to Art. 296 of RPC
○ Langomez – never apprehended. Carlito Antiga died during the trial. Solis and Bebe Antiga – absolved by
court because prosecution failed to clearly and positively prove complicity
● Empacis’ participation based on testimony of widow and son Saromines, neighbor Bulak, Rural Health
Physician Dr. Ortiz and testimony of accused Empacis
● 9 pm, September 1986 – Saromines spouses closing their store located in their house, when Langomez
and Empacis came in and asked to buy sardines and rice … was served, and ate the meal.
○ After eating, Langomez told Fidel Saromines to sell him cigarettes, but Langomez announced a “hold-up”
and commanded Saromines to give up his money – P12,000 … Saromines suddenly decided to fight to keep
money, and they grappled. Langomez stabbed Saromines 3 times, and Empacis joined and stabbed
Saromines.
○ Gunshots heard outside the house, and Bulak recorgnized Carltio Antiga.
○ 13 year-old son, Peter Saromines saw his father fighter, and heard his father cry for help, so he grabbed
a long bolo and rushed to his father’s defense and struck Empacis and inflicted two wounds on him – right
shoulder and in neck
○ Langomez and Empacis fled, but Fidel Saromines already died from his injuries – 4 stab wounds in the
upper back, and 2 of those penetrated the lungs and heart which were fatal
● Empacis went to clinic of Dr. Deiparine at around 10-11 pm, and said he was assaulted without warning in
the Market … Next day, police officers came to Dr. Deiparine’s clinic asking for a man treated for wounds
from a bladed weapon – was directed straight to Empacis

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● Defense: Langomez and Empacis went to store of Saromines spouses, acknowledged that Langomez went
upstairs to buy cigarettes, and he saw them grappling with each other. However, denies that he joined
Langomez, claims that he tried to stop Langomez, and then attacked by a boy with a bolo.
● RTC – ruled that guilty of robbery with homicide; conspiracy existed; and aggravating circumstances
present: (a) “in the dwelling”, (b) “in the nighttime”, (c) “employment of craft and fraud”, and (d)
“advantage of superior strength”

Issue: WON all aggravating circumstances were present

Held:
● Yes; review of the record fails to reveal to SC any error on the part of the TC of sufficient gravity to justify
reversal or modification of its verdict
○ Conspiracy proved by the evidence … accused came to Saromines store at night, acting as bona fide
customers, and demanded money which they evidently had prior knowledge. Empacis acted in concert by
simultaneous acts helped Langomez to get the money and subdued him by stabbing Saromines 4 times, 3
from Langomez and 1 from Empacis
○ Dwelling properly appreciated because no provocation from Saromines
○ Nighttime properly appreciated because adequate showing that nocturnity was deliberately sought after
by the robbers to facilitate the felony
○ Craft and Fraud properly appreciated, as they pretended to be bona fide customers and gained entry into
the store and into another part of dwelling
○ Evidence shows that Empacis helped Langomez stab the victim, and so they took advantage of combined
strength and bladed weapons to overcome unarmed victim and ensure success of felonious design

18. Taking advantage of superior strength, or means employed to weaken the defense;
People v. Bigcas, G.R. No. 94534, 2 July 1992, 211 SCRA 631
Facts:
Rodrigo Bigcas and Quiliano Butron were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of killing Ambrocio
Palapar by the RTC of Bohol, Branch IV in Tagbilaran City.
The version of the prosecution revolved around the testimonies of the two eyewitnesses, Rosito Doydoy
and Jesus Calape.
According to Doydoy, in the evening on July 25, 1988, he was on his way home with his son when he saw
3 persons involved in a commotion. While hiding behind the grass, he saw Butron strike Palapar 2 times
with a piece of wood on his back. When Palapar tried to escape, he was chased by Bigcas, who stabbed
Palapar with a bolo twice at the back, and the chase continued until Bigcas was able to stab the victim at
the back of his right knee which caused him to fall on the ground. Palapar said "Long, stop because I will
die of these wounds" after he fell on the ground. Butron shouted at him saying "I will kill you, Boyax" and
he then hit the victim twice with a piece of wood on the right jaw while Bigcas stabbed the victim several
times. Both appellants left the victim with Butron telling Bigcas. "You own the killing and these two bolos
and I will be with you anywhere."
Calape testified on the same facts. He declared that he left his house at 9 o'clock that night to go to the
house of his "kumpadre Imo," whose real name is Maximo Tiro, to borrow the a carabao as he wanted to

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haul posts for his house. While on his way, he saw the victim Palapar being attacked by the two appellants.
Butron hit Palapar twice with a piece of wood at his back. Bigcas told the victim to fight but the latter
refused. Palapar pleaded for his life but appellant Bigcas instead stabbed him twice, also at the back. Due
to his fear after seeing Bigcas stab the victim, Calape ran home and told his wife what he witnessed. The
next morning, he heard that the victim died.
The defense presented a version based on the testimonies of the two appellants.
On July 28, 1988, around 2:30 pm, Bigcas was at the store in Buyong, Pilar. About 6:30, Butron arrived at
the same store. Palapar, who was already intoxicated, arrived and drank 'tuba' with the group of Bigcas
and Butron. He requested for more drinks but Butron refused as he had no more money. He got angry and
called Butron stingy. He challenged Butron to fight but the latter remonstrated with him. Palapar placed
his hand on Butron's shoulders and told him not to worry. He held the waist of Butron, grabbed the knife
from the latter's waist and challenged everybody to fight.
Someone reported the incident to the police and Pfc. Ponciano Butron responded together with another
policeman. Pfc. Butron took the knife from Palapar and ordered him to go home, but he required Bigcas
and Butron to stay a while and let Palapar leave ahead. Fifteen minutes after Palapar had left, Bigcas and
Butron left together with some other persons. Butron walked ahead as he was bringing something for his
family.
On their way, Bigcas and a certain Anasco met appellant Butron running and already wounded. Out of fear,
Anasco ran away. Bigcas brought Butron to surrender to the police at the municipal building. Butron
reported to the police what happened. Bigcas later accompanied Butron to the hospital where Butron was
confined. Butron complemented the testimony by narrating that, on his way home, he saw Palapar
standing in the middle of the road. He greeted Palapar by his nickname "Boyax" but received no answer.
As he was passing by Palapar, he was stabbed with a bolo, hitting his stomach. He backtracked but the
victim followed him and gave him three stab thrusts which he parried. He was able to take hold of the
victim's hand holding the bolo and wrestled the same from him. He then repeatedly stabbed Palapar until
the latter fell. When he went to the police, he also surrendered the bolo used in the alleged killing. He was
brought by Bigcas and the police to the hospital where he was treated and confined for four days.

Issue:
WON the appellants are guilty of murder

Ruling:
The judgment appealed from is MODIFIED, with accused-appellants being hereby DECLARED guilty of
homicide, with due extenuation by voluntary surrender.

Self-defense
The theory of self-defense is based on the necessity on the part of the person attacked to prevent or repel
the unlawful aggression. When said danger or risk ceased to exist, appellants had no justification in law or
in fact to attack the former aggressor. When the accused that had been attacked by the victim, succeeded
in taking the bolo away and the later manifested the refusal to fight, the accused was not justified in killing
him.

Treachery

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The trial court's holding that treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance against
appellants is correct, since there is no evidence that in the commission of the crime they deliberately
adopted means, methods or forms considered in law as treacherous.

Nocturnity
The RTC erred in acceptance of nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance. Even the prosecution witnesses
testified that, during the incident, the moon was shining brightly. The light was bright enough to see what
was going on and to recognize the assailants. Moreover, nocturnity neither facilitated the commission of
the crime nor was it purposely sought by appellants in order to afford impunity. It, therefore, does not
qualify as an aggravating circumstance under either the subjective or objective tests laid down by this
Court for it to be considered as such.

Abuse or taking advantage of superior strength

For this qualifying circumstance to be appreciated, it is not sufficient to be superior in number or
strength. It is necessary that the accused must have cooperated and intended to use or secure advantage
from such superior strength. The Court find that the prosecution has fallen short of proof that appellants
bad specifically contrived or deliberately intended and prepared to take advantage of superior strength in
a projected assault against the victim. This requisite cannot be drawn from mere assumptions or
conjectures, for qualifying circumstances must be proved as conclusively as the crime itself.

Conspiracy
Bigcas disclaimer of liability is unavailing because there are two eyewitnesses who testified that the
appellants acted in a concerted manner in bringing about the death of Palapar which indicates the
existence of conspiracy between them.

19. Treachery;
People v. Sangalang, L-32914, 30 August 1974, 58 SCRA 737
Facts:
Ricardo Cortez left his nipa hut to gather tuba from a coconut tree nearby. Flora Sarno, his wife, was left
inside the hut. While he was on top of the tree gathering tuba, he was struck by a volley of shots. He fell
to the ground at the base of the coconut tree.
His wife Flora heard three successive shots coming south of the hut. She went outside the hut.
From a distance of about twenty-five meters, she saw five men, each armed with a long firearm, firing at
her husband. He was already wounded and was lying on the ground at the foot of the coconut tree
She recognized Laureano Sangalang as one of the five armed men who were firing at her husband.
She and her brother Ricardo Sarno had known Sangalang since their childhood. She also recognized
Conrado Gonzales, Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the other malefactors.
Flora ran towards the place where her husband had fallen. She shouted, "Bakit ninyo pinagbabaril
ang aking asawa". The five persons fired at her. She was then about twenty meters away from them. She
retreated to the hut for cover. She heard some more shots. After the lapse of about five minutes, Laureano

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Sangalang and his companions left the place. When Flora returned to the spot where her husband was
prostrate, he was already dead.
Issue:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of treachery should be appreciated against the accused.
Held:
Yes, treachery should be appreciated.
The victim was shot at while he was gathering tuba on top of a coconut tree. He was unarmed and
defenseless. He was not expecting to be assaulted. He did not give any immediate provocation. The
deliberate, surprise attack shows that Sangalang and his companions employed a mode of execution which
insured the killing without any risk to them arising from any defense which the victim could have made.
The qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia), which was alleged in the information, was duly
established. Hence, the killing can be categorized as murder. Treachery absorbs the aggravating
circumstance of band.

People v. San Pedro, L-44274, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 306

People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 120282, 20 April 1998, 289 SCRA 213
Facts:
Eulogio Velasco, floor manager of the Cola Pubhouse along EDSA, was sitting outside the Pubhouse
talking with his co-worker, Dorie. Soon, Antonio "Tony" Dometita, one of their customers, came out of
the pubhouse. As he passed by, he informed Eulogio that he was going home. When Tony Dometita was
about an armslength from Eulogio, however, appellant Robert Castillo suddenly appeared and, without
warning, stabbed Tony with a fan knife on his left chest. As Tony pleaded for help, appellant stabbed him
once more, hitting him on the left hand.
Responding to Tony's cry for help, Eulogio placed a chair between Tony and appellant to stop
appellant from further attacking Tony. He also shouted at Tony to run away. Tony ran towards the other
side of EDSA, but appellant pursued him.
Eulogio came to know later that Tony had died. His body was found outside the fence of the Iglesia
ni Cristo Compound, EDSA, Quezon City.
Velasco’s testimony is corroborated by Melinda Mercado’s statement that Leo Velasco informed
her that Dometita was stabbed. Robert Castillo was walking away from the pubhouse with the bladed
weapon. Leo Velasco himself detailed the way Castillo stabbed the deceased Antonio Dometita.
Issue:

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Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of treachery should be appreciated.

Held:
Yes, we hold that the killing was qualified by treachery. "Treachery is committed when two conditions
concur, namely, that the means, methods, and forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and that such means, methods, and forms of execution were
deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person."These requisites were
evidently present in this case when the accused appeared from nowhere and swiftly and unexpectedly
stabbed the victim just as he was bidding goodbye to his friend, Witness Velasco. Said action rendered it
difficult for the victim to defend himself. The presence of "defense wounds" does not negate treachery
because, as testified to by Velasco, the first stab, fatal as it was, was inflicted on the chest. The incised
wounds in the arms were inflicted when the victim was already rendered defenseless.

People v. Arizobal, G.R. No. 135051-52, 14 December 2000, 348 SCRA 143

FACTS:

On 24 March 1994, around 9:30 in the evening ,Laurencio and his wife Clementina were sound asleep in
their house in Masbate. Laurencio woke her up to open the door because there were persons outside. After
she kit the kerosene lamp, she went to open the door and was confronted by armed men pointing their
guns at her. She recognized Arizobal and Lignes, but the last one was wearing a mask. Arizobal asked
Clemencio where his guin is to which Clementina replied that they did not have. The one wearing maskara
stood guard at the door as the two men barged into the master’s bedroom and forcibly opened the
aparador. They ransacked the cabinet and scattered everything on the floor and took the PHP8,000 that
they found. They then ordered Laurencio to go with them to Jimmy’s house and he left with them against
his will. Clementina said that shortly after they left she heard gunshots.

Erlinda, wife of Jimmy narrated that on that night, Jimmy and Francisco Gimenez arrived and informed her
that they had already bought carabao. After handing her the certificate of large cattle, and while he was
skinning the chicken for their supper, three men appeared and ordered them to lie face down. One of them
pushed her to the ground while others tied Francisco and Jimmy as they whipped the latter with an armalite
rifle.

The robbers took the liberty of consuming the food and cigarettes in her sari-sari store. They then ransacked
the household for variables, taking PHP1,000 from her sari-sari store and told them to produce PHP100,000
in exchange of Jimmy's life. Since they could not produce the amount, they offered their certificate of large
cattle, but the men only threw it back to Erlinda. The men the dragged Jimmy outside the house with
Laurencio, brought them to some 50m away while leaving Arizobal and Lignes to guard. Moments later
she heard the burst of gunfire. When the masked men returned, one of them told her that her husband and
father-in-law had been killed for trying to escape.

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Erly Lignes who testified in his defense explained that on 24 March 1994 at around 9:30 in the evening he
was at the house of a neighbor, one Noli Hermosa, attending a house blessing in San Pedro, Cataingan,
Masbate. He helped as cook and food server. The occasion was attended by around twenty (20) well-
wishers who feasted on fried chicken and tuba. In fact, two (2) of his friends, Andres Lapay and Alberto
Senelong, were among the group of drinkers. The celebration finally ended at 1:00 o'clock in the morning.
Early that morning he went home, which was only about a hundred meters away

The court found both accused guilty of robbery with homicide and sentenced to death.

ISSUE: Whether or Not treachery could be appreciated as Aggravating Circumstance

HELD: The accused stand charged with, tried and convicted of robbery with homicide. This special complex
crime is primarily classified in this jurisdiction as a crime against property, and not against persons,
homicide being merely an incident of robbery with the latter being the main purpose and object of the
criminals.

As such, treachery cannot be validly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance under Art. 14 of The
Revised Penal Code. This is completely a reversal of the previous jurisprudence on the matter decided in a
litany of cases before People v. Bariquit.

People v. Escote, G.R. No. 140756, 4 April 2003, 400 SCRA 603

Rodolfo Cacatian was driving a Five Star Passenger bus headed to Pangasinan at around 3AM. On board
was Romulo Digap, the counductor, and one of the passengers was the deceased SPO1 Manio, Jr., seated
on the rear portion of the bus on his way home. At Balintawak, passengers boarded the bus, including
Escote and Acuyan who were wearing maong pants, rubber shoes, hats and jackets. Escote seated on the
3rd seat near the aisle, while Acuyan stood by the door in the mid portion of the bus beside Romulo.
When they reached Bulacan, Escote and Ayucan announce a holdup. They fired their guns upward to
awaken and scare the passengers. They took the valuables of the pasengers. Escote also took from
Cacatian the fares he had collected from the passengers. They then went to Manio, Jr. took his
identification card and his service gun and told him, “Pasensya ka na Pare, papatayin ka naming, baril mo
rin ang papatay sayo.” He pleaded for mercy, saying that he has a family, but they ignored and they shot
him on the mouth, right ear, chest, and right side of his body. Cacatian also heard the other felon saying,
“Ganyan lang ang pumatay ng tao. Para ka lang pumapatay ng manok.” They told Cacatian that after they
alight the bus, he should continue driving and not report the incident. They alighted in Mexico, Pampanga.
The robbery was over in 25 minutes.
Cacatian and Digap reported the incident when they reached Mabalacat, Pampanga. Manio, Jr. suffered
from 12 gunshot wounds, 6 entry shots and 6 exit wounds.
Escote and Acuyan were arrested and entered a plea of not guilty. Escote escaped from the provincial jail.
Acuyan interposed the defense of alibi, which was not believed by the court. Escote was rearrested and
no longer adduced evidence in his behalf.

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The trial court did not specify the aggravating circumstances mandating the imposition of death penalty
but it is evident in the facts that treachery was attendant in the commission of the crim.
They shot Manio treacherously on the occasion of robbery when they simultaneously shot him point blank
as he was begging for his life. All the elements of treachery are present. Treachery may also be appreciated
even if the victim was warned if he was defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the infliction. He was
also shot at close range, thus insuring his death.
ISSUE:
1. Whether treachery can be appreciated as a GAC in robbery with homicide
a. If the answer is affirmative in the aforementioned issue, if it can be appreciated in this case.
HELD:
YES. Robbery with homicide is a special complex crime and a single offense at the same time. But this court
has previously held that in crimes against property the aggravating circumstance of treachery cannot be
appreciated. According to the Revised Penal Code, treachery is only applicable to crimes against persons.
However, the RPC is a reproduction of the 180 Penal Code of Spain and the Codigo Penal Reformado de
1870. The SC of Spain has consistently applied treachery as a GAC to robbery with homicide, and therefore,
it can also be applied in this case. It is nevertheless not qualifying since the word “homicide” is used in its
generic sense.
(Art 62) Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it constitute a crime especially
punishable by law nor is it included by the law in defining the crime of robbery with homicide and
prescribing the penalty therefor. Treachery is likewise not inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide.
Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide
for the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime.
In the application of treachery as GAC, it look at the crime of homicide which is a crime against persons.
The complex crime does not lose its classification as a crime against property but the GAC is appreciated
merely to increase the penalty. Be that as it may, treachery cannot be appreciated in this case because it
was not alleged in the information as mandated by sec 8 rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense and specify its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the
section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Although at the time the crime was committed, generic aggravating circumstance need not be alleged in
the Information, however, the general rule had been applied retroactively because if it is more favorable
to the accused. Even if treachery is proven but it is not alleged in the information, treachery cannot
aggravate the penalty for the crime.
RULING: Penalty changed to reclusion perpetua.

People v. Villonez, G.R. Nos. 122976-77, 16 November 1998, 359 Phil. 95, 1998

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Accused-appellants REGANDO VILLONEZ, RUEL SANTOS, and EMERLITO SANTOS pray for a reversal of their
conviction for MURDER decreed in a Joint Decision rendered on 23 November 1995 by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malabon, Metro Manila.

Upon arraignment, REGANDO and RUEL entered a plea of not guilty.

Meanwhile, accused-appellant EMERLITO, together with Eduardo Reynaldo, Fernando, and Rudy, all
surnamed Santos, was likewise charged with murder in an information

Edgar Jimenez testified that on 3 May 1994, at around 9:00 p.m., while he was resting inside his store at
Hulo, Malabon, Metro Manila, a certain Tonton informed him that his close friend GERARDO LONGASA had
a fistfight with one "Rudy," alias "Dede,"9 at Liwayway Street, Baritan, Malabon. Edgar proceeded to the
area to mediate, since LONGASA and Rudy were both his friends. Edgar passed through Javier II Street in
going to Liwayway Street. At Javier II Street, a group of seven armed men, including accused-appellants,
attacked Edgar. RUEL hit Edgar on his forehead and back with a bottle. Edgar was able to escape from his
attackers. While fleeing, he ran past LONGASA, who seemed drunk. When Edgar called LONGASA, the
attackers were already upon LONGASA. 10

While he was about eight arms' length away front LONGASA, Edgar saw EMERLITO hit LONGASA with a 2
x 2 inches piece of wood. Simultaneously, REGANDO and RUEL struck LONGASA with bottles. Rudy Santos
and Eddie Santos then stabbed LONGASA seven and eight times, respectively, even as two other persons
named Rey and Budda held LONGASA's arms. LONGASA fell to the ground. Edgar saw all these because the
scene of the incident was illuminated by a big fluorescent lamp located about three arms' length away.
Edgar rushed to LONGASA's house and reported the incident to the latter's parents.

Dr. Mendez explained that the abrasions were caused by hard, rough surface, possibly cement or a piece
of wood. The contusions and lacerations were caused by a blunt object, which could have been a piece of
wood, a bottle, a pipe, or any other hard object. The incise wounds or stab wounds were caused by a sharp-
bladed or sharp-edged instrument. Of the six stab wounds suffered by LONGASA, stab wounds numbered
1 and 3 on LONGASA's chest caused the latter's death

REGANDO interposed alibi and denial. He claimed that on 3 May 1994, between 7:30 and 8:00 p.m., he
was having a conversation with Arthur Aquino at the premises of RUEL's house. Someone passed by the
house and reported a slaying incident at Javier II Street. Curious, REGANDO and Aquino went to the scene
of the incident and there found LONGASA lying in a pool of his own blood. Arthur Aquino, REGANDO's
"gangmate," corroborated the latter's testimony RUEL, who was 16 years old at the time the crime in
question was committed, also put up the defense of alibi. EMERLITO also relied on alibi for his defense. He
declared that at the time of the incident he was at Javier II to borrow P500 from his mother.

ISSUE: W/N THERE IS AC OF TREACHERY - YES

ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH -YES
CONSPIRACY - YES

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YES. The victim had engaged in a fight previous to the killing and was thus forewarned of an attack against
him. Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of danger to his person.
What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or
to retaliate. 31 The overwhelming number of the accused, their use of weapons against the unarmed
victim, and the fact that the victim's hands were held behind him preclude the possibility of any defense by
the victim.

The other qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which the trial court appreciated, will no
longer be taken against accused-appellants, for it is absorbed in treachery

Also, The bromidic defense of alibi cannot benefit accused-appellants. In the face of the positive
identification of the accused by Edgar, such defense is worth nothing. Besides, accused-appellants were
unable to prove that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene at the time the crime
was committed.

As to the trial court's finding of conspiracy among the accused, we find the same to be supported by
evidence. For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that there be an agreement for an appreciable period to
the occurrence. It is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same
purpose and were united in its execution.

In this case, the accused simultaneously attacked LONGASA, with two of them holding the victim's hands
or arms. Some struck LONGASA with a piece of wood or bottles and two others stabbed him. The attack
continued until LONGASA fell dead. These acts clearly point to a joint purpose to accomplish the desired
end.

AFFIRMED: Accused-appellants REGANDO F. VILLONES, EMERLITO N. SANTOS, and RUEL L. SANTOS of the
crime of murder and sentencing the first two accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the
third accused, to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum;

People v. Guzman, G.R. No. 169246, 26 January 2007

FACTS:
After attending a worship service at the Iglesia ni Kristo church in his barangay, Michael Angelo Balber
proceeded home. While Michael was casually walking along the corner of Sto. Nino Street and Mactan
Street, Nicolas Guzman (appellant) and his two companions, who were drinking nearby, suddenly
approached and surrounded Michael. Appellant positioned himself at the back of Michael while his two
companions stood in front of Michael. In an instant, they grabbed the shoulders of Michael and
overpowered the latter. One of the appellant's companions, whom the prosecution witnesses described
as a male with long hair, drew out a knife and repeatedly stabbed Michael on the stomach. Unsatisfied,
the appellant's other companion, whom the prosecution witnesses described as a male with flat top hair,
took the knife and stabbed Michael on the stomach. As the finale, appellant went in front of Michael, took

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the knife and also stabbed Michael on the stomach. When Michael fell on the ground, appellant kicked
him at the body. Upon noticing that the bloodied Michael was no longer moving, appellant and his two
companions fled the scene.

ISSUE:
Whether or not:
1. Treachery as an aggravating circumstance? NOPE. QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE.
2. Evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance? NOPE.

HELD:
Treachery is a sudden and unexpected attack under the circumstances that renders the victim unable and
unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack.

It is an aggravating circumstance that qualifies the killing of a person to murder. Article 14, paragraph (16)
of the Revised Penal Code states the concept and essential elements of treachery as an aggravating
circumstance.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

Two essential elements/conditions are required in order that treachery may be appreciated: (1) The
employment of means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offender's safety from
any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, who has, thus no opportunity for self-defense or
retaliation; (2) deliberate or conscious choice of means, methods or manner of execution. Further, it
must always be alleged in the information and proved in trial in order that it may be validly considered.

In the instant case, treachery was alleged in the Information against appellant. Moreover, all the essential
elements/conditions of treachery were established and proven during the trial.

As viewed from the foregoing, the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack of appellant and his two
companions rendered Michael defenseless, vulnerable and without means of escape. It appears that
Michael was unarmed and alone at the time of the attack. Further, he was merely seventeen years of age
then. The stab wounds sustained by Michael proved to be fatal as they severely damaged the latter's large
intestine.

The fact that the place where the incident occurred was lighted and many people were walking then in
different directions does not negate treachery. It should be made clear that the essence of treachery is
thesudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his
part.

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This is even more true if the assailant is an adult and the victim is a minor. Minor children, who by reason
of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. Thus, when an adult person illegally attacks
a minor, treachery exists.

As we earlier found, Michael was peacefully walking and not provoking anyone to a fight when he was
stabbed to death by appellant and his two companions. Further, Michael was a minor at the time of his
death while appellant and his two companions were adult persons.

The essence of evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance is that the execution of the criminal
act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during
a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.
In the case at bar, there is no evidence to show that appellant and his two companions had previously
planned and reflected in killing Michael. When appellant and his two companions saw Michael on that
fateful night, they immediately pounced on him. The thought of killing Michael came into the minds of
appellant and his two companions only when they saw Michael walking on the road. Indeed, the killing of
Michael was sudden and unplanned.

As in the instant case, and there are no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall
be applied. Since there is no mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the present case, and, treachery
cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance as it was already taken as a qualifying
circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.

20. Ignominy;
People v. Torriefel CA-GR. No. 659-R, 29 November 1947, 45 OG 803
Facts:
On 17 December 1972 Oscar Torrefiel and Leon Ormeo, on their way to their headquarters in the
mountains, stopped at the residence of Eady and his wife Ceferina Cordero in the barrio of Colban,
municipality of Himamaylan, Province of Negros. The purpose of the appellants who were the guerillas of
the USAFFE was to ask for khaki clothes from Eady. They demanded Eady to help them with khaki clothes
but the latter explained that he had none other than what he was wearing.

While they were talking, Ceferina came to the balcony where they were at and demanded what the two
wanted in the house and the appellants explained. Ceferina then scolded them and told them that all their
clothings and belongings had been looted by USAFFE soldiers. Torrefiel got angry and threatened to slap
Ceferina and brought out his revolver. Eady intervened and said that no slapping could be done in his
presence. The appellants then charged the two with being fifth columnists as they refused to give aid to
the soldiers and decided to take them to the headquarters. The appellants explained that the purpose of
their decision was to make the two prove their charge that USAFFE were looters.

The two consented but were allowed to take supper beforehand and bring along blankets and mosquito
nets for their use in the mountains. They were then blindfolded in order that they may not be able to learn
their way. Ormeo and Ceferina had gone ahead while Torrefiel and Eady took the wrong way. So they went

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back to the guardhouse and Eady was left there while he tried to look for another way to reach the other
two but failed so he went back to find Eady had escaped. He then used another way and found Ormeo and
Ceferina where the two stopped to wait for them. He told Ormeo what happened and Ormeo rushed back
to the guardhouse to look for Eady but failed.

As soon as Ormeo left, she was about to urinate when Torrefiel pushed her and she fell down on the road
head upwards. He then carried her to a log and placed her buttocks thereon. He then began to unbutton
his pants and after having done si he took out his penis and wound cogon leaves around it. Cerefina’s
blindfold fell down a little so she saw him doing this. Torrefiel then pressed her throat and then raped her.
She said that with the position she was, with Torrefiel pressing on her throat she could not move not shout
and that when she got home she cleaned her vagina and saw some cogon leaves inside and that it had
been bleeding.

She also claimed that Ormeo also raped her afterwards.

They desisted from bringing Ceferina to the headquarters.

When Ceferina got home she asked her servant about her husband and was told he was hiding. Eady came
back after hiding the afternoon the next day. Ceferina told him she was abused by Torrefiel. Eady brought
the matter to the guerilla headquarters and prepared a written denunciation.

Both were found guilty of the charge of rape.

Issue:
Whether or not there are any aggravating circumstance that may be appreciated?

Ruling:
Yes. The manner in which appellant raped the offended party by winding cogon grass around his penis
augmented the wrong done by increasing its pain and adding ignominy thereto.

**The aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be appreciated because the meeting if appellant and
the victim was unexpected and started in the afternoon. The desire to rape formed suddenly when the
opportunity presented itself and it does not appear that it was taken advantage of by the offender.

The judgment appealed from is modified. Ormeo was acquitted as the Court did not derive from victim’s
testimony any disgust or anger against him, and the first charge was only against Torrefiel. They found
merit in his claim when he said that he was only included in the charge when he refused to testify against
Torrefiel. The court is not satisfied with the evidence against him.

People v. Jose, L-28232, 6 February 1971, 37 SCRA 450

FACTS

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The complainant, Magdalena "Maggie" de la Riva, was, at the time of the incident, 25 years old and
single; she graduated from high school in 1958 at Maryknoll College and finished the secretarial course in
1960 at St. Theresa's College. Movie actress by profession, she was receiving P8,000.00 per picture. It was
part of her work to perform in radio broadcasts and television shows and appearance as guest in other
shows.
So it was that at about 4:30 o'clock in the morning of June 26, 1967, Miss De la Riva, homeward
bound from the ABS Studio on Roxas Blvd., Pasay City, was driving her bantam car accompanied by her
maid Helen Calderon, who was also at the front seat. Her house was at No. 48, 12th Street, New Manila,
Quezon City. She was already near her destination when a Pontiac two-door convertible car with four men
aboard (later identified as the four appellants) came abreast of her car and tried to bump it. She stepped
on her brakes to avoid a collision, and then pressed on the gas and swerved her car to the left, at which
moment she was already in front of her house gate; but because the driver of the other car (Basilio Pineda,
Jr.) also accelerated his speed, the two cars almost collided for the second time. This prompted Miss De la
Riva, who was justifiably annoyed, to ask: "Ano ba?" Forthwith, Pineda stopped the car which he was
driving, jumped out of it and rushed towards her.
The girl became so frightened at this turn of events that she tooted the horn of her car
continuously. Undaunted, Pineda opened the door of Miss De la Riva's car and grabbed the lady's left arm.
The girl held on tenaciously to her car's steering wheel and, together with her maid, started to scream.
Her strength, however, proved no match to that of Pineda, who succeeded in pulling her out of her car.
Seeing her mistress' predicament, the maid jumped out of the car and took hold of Miss De la Riva's right
arm in an effort to free her from Pineda's grip. The latter, however, was able to drag Miss De la Riva toward
the Pontiac convertible car, whose motor was all the while running.
When Miss De la Riva, who was being pulled by Pineda, was very near the Pontiac car, the three
men inside started to assist their friend: one of them held her by the neck, while the two others held her
arms and legs. All three were now pulling Miss De la Riva inside the car. Before she was completely in,
appellant Pineda jumped unto the driver's seat and sped away in the direction of Broadway Street. The
maid was left behind.
The complainant was made to sit between Jaime Jose and Edgardo Aquino at the back seat; Basilio
Pineda, Jr. was at the wheel, while Rogelio Cañal was seated beside him. Miss De la Riva entreated the
appellants to release her; but all she got in response were jeers, abusive and impolite language, and threats
that the appellants would finish her with their Thompson and throw acid at her face if she did not keep
quiet. In the meantime, the two men seated on each side of Miss De la Riva started to get busy with her
body: Jose put one arm around the complainant and forced his lips upon hers, while Aquino placed his
arms on her thighs and lifted her skirt. The girl tried to resist them. She continuously implored her captors
to release her, telling them that she was the only breadwinner in the family and that her mother was alone
at home and needed her company because her father was already dead. Upon learning of the demise of
Miss De la Riva's father, Aquino remarked that the situation was much better than he thought since no
one could take revenge against them. By now Miss De la Riva was beginning to realize the futility of her
pleas. She made the sign of the cross and started to pray. The appellants became angry and cursed her.
Every now and then Aquino would stand up and talk in whispers with Pineda, after which the two would
exchange knowing glances with Cañal and Jose.

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The car reached a dead-end street. Pineda turned the car around and headed towards Victoria
Street. Then the car proceeded to Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa Street, Shaw Boulevard, thence to Epifanio
de los Santos Avenue. When the car reached Makati, Aquino took a handkerchief from his pocket and,
with the help of Jose, blindfolded Miss De la Riva. The latter was told not to shout or else she would be
stabbed or shot with a Thompson. Not long after, the car came to a stop at the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City.
The blindfolded lady was led out of the car to one of the rooms on the second floor of the hotel.
Inside the room Miss De la Riva was made to sit on bed. Her blindfold was removed. She saw Pineda
and Aquino standing in front of her, and Jose and Cañal sitting beside her, all of them smiling meaningfully.
Pineda told the complainant: "Magburlesque ka para sa amin." The other three expressed their approval
and ordered Miss De la Riva to disrobe. The complainant ignored the command. One of the appellants
suggested putting off the light so that the complainant would not be ashamed. The idea, however, was
rejected by the others, who said that it would be more pleasurable for them if the light was on. Miss De la
Riva was told to remove her stockings, in order, according to them, to make the proceedings more exciting.
Reluctantly, she did as directed, but so slowly did she proceed with the assigned task that the appellants
cursed her and threatened her again with the Thompson and the acid. They started pushing Miss De la
Riva around. One of them pulled down the zipper of her dress; another unhooked her brassiere. She held
on tightly to her dress to prevent it from being pulled down, but her efforts were in vain: her dress,
together with her brassiere, fell on the floor.
The complainant was now completely naked before the four men, who were kneeling in front of
her and feasting their eyes on her private parts. This ordeal lasted for about ten minutes, during which the
complainant, in all her nakedness, was asked twice or thrice to turn around. Then Pineda picked up her
clothes and left the room with his other companions. The complainant tried to look for a blanket with
which to cover herself, but she could not find one.
Very soon, Jose reentered the room and began undressing himself. Miss De la Riva, who was sitting
on the bed trying to cover her bareness with her hands, implored him to ask his friends to release her.
Instead of answering her, he pushed her backward and pinned her down on the bed. Miss De la Riva and
Jose struggled against each other; and because the complainant was putting up stiff resistance, Jose cursed
her and hit her several times on the stomach and other parts of the body. The complainant crossed her
legs tightly, but her attacker was able to force them open. Jose succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
the complainant. He then left the room.
The other three took their turns. Aquino entered the room next. A struggle ensued between him
and Miss De la Riva, during which he hit her on different parts of the body. Like Jose, Aquino succeeded in
abusing the complainant. The girl was now in a state of shock. Aquino called the others into the room.
They poured water on her face and slapped her to revive her. Afterwards, three or the accused left the
room, leaving Pineda and the complainant. After some struggle during which Pineda hit her, the former
succeeded in forcing his carnal desire on the latter. When the complainant went into a state of shock for
the second time, the three other men went into the room, again poured water on the complainant's face
and slapped her several times. The complainant heard them say that they had to revive her so she would
know what was happening. Jose, Aquino and Pineda then left the room. It was now appellant Cañal's turn.
There was a struggle between him and Miss De la Riva. Like the other three appellants before him, he hit
the complainant on different parts of the body and succeeded in forcing his carnal lust on her. They told
her to tell her mother that she was mistaken by a group of men for a hostess, and that when the group

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found out that she was a movie actress, she was released without being harmed. She was warned not to
inform the police; for if she did and they were apprehended, they would simply post bail and later hunt
her up and disfigure her face with acid.
Mention must be made of the fact that while each of the four appellants was struggling with the
complainant, the other three were outside the room, just behind the door, threatening the complainant
with acid and telling her to give in because she could not, after all, escape, what with their presence.
After the sexual carnage, they gave Miss De la RIva her clothes and told her to dress up and clean herself.

Wherefore, the court finds that the accomplices Pueng, Guanzon and Guion, on the ground that the
prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against them, the Motion to Dismiss filed for and in
their behalf is hereby granted, and the case dismissed against them
ISSUE:
Whether or not ignominy is present in this case?
RULING
YES. Undoubtedly, rape is that which is punishable by the penalty reclusion perpetua to death,
under paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended by Republic Act 4111 which took effect on June 20, 1964.
Under the law, rape is committed by having canal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances: (1) by using force and intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason and
otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present. The crime of rape shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua. Whenever the rape is committed the use of a deadly weapon or by
two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
Therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes committed,
and the latter is the more serious; hence, pursuant to the provision of Art 48 of the RPC, the penalty
prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period. Consequently, the appellants should suffer the
extreme penalty of death. In this regard, there is hardly any necessity to consider the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature of the penalty to be imposed.
However, said crime as attended with the following aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime,
appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the commission of these crimes; (b)
abuse of superior strength, the crime having been committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with
one another; (c) ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the complaint to exhibit to them her complete
nakedness for ten minutes before raping her, brought about a circumstance which tended to make the
effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) the use of motor vehicle.
Of the three principal-appellants (Jose, Aquino and Cañal), none of them may claim aggravating
circumstances has been offset by the mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda should, however, be
credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which does not in the least
affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the reason that there would still be three
aggravating circumstances remaining.

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Before the actual promulgation of the decision, the Court received a formal manifestation on the
part of the Solicitor general to the effect that Rogelio Cañal, one of the herein appellants, died in prison
on December 28, 1970. As a result, the case is dismissed as to him alone, and only insofar as his criminal
liability is concerned, with one-fourth (1/4) of the costs declared de officio.
Wherefore, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: Jaime G. Jose, Basilio Pineda,
Jr., and Eduardo P. Aquino are pronounced GUILTY of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape,
and each and every one of them likewise convicted of three (3) of the crimes of rape. As a consequence
thereof, each of them is hereby sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all of them shall jointly and severally,
indemnify the complainant of the sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a total of 40,000.00;
and each shall pay one-fourth of the costs.

People v. Butler, L-50276, 27 January 1983, 120 SCRA 281

FACTS
Accused-appellant Michael Butler and the victim, Enriquita Alipo alias Gina Barrios were together at
Colonial Restaurant in Olongapo City. They were seen together by Lilia Paz, an entertainer and friend of
the victim, who claimed to have had a small conversation with the accused and one Rosemarie Suarez.The
accused left the restaurant with the victim, after the latter invited Rosemarie to come to her house that
night.

Emelita Pasco, housemaid of the victim testified that Gina came home with Michael. They immediately
went into the former’s bedroom. Shortly thereafter, the victim left the room with a paper containing the
ff. words: MICHAEL BUTLER, 44252-8519 USS HANCOCK. She then rushed back to her room after
instructing Pasco to wake her up in the morning. Before sleeping Rosemarie arrived and had a small
conversation with her.

Pasco, in the morning, knocked at the door. She found that the victim was lying on her bed, facing
downward, naked up to the waist, with legs spread apart with a broken figurine beside her head. She
immediately called the landlord and the authorities.

An investigation was conducted by the authorities. After being located and identified as a crew member
of USS Hancock, the accused was brought to the legal office of the ship. The accused was searched,
handcuffed and was brought to the Naval Investigation Services Resident Agency office. The result of the
NISRA investigation was a document taken from the accused consisting of 3 pages signed and initialed on
all pages by him and containing a statement that he was aware of his constitutional rights and a narration
of the facts of the case.

Dr. Roxas (medico-legal officer) testified that the anal intercourse happened after the victim’s death. He
also testified that the victim died of asphyxia due to suffocation when extreme pressure was exerted on
her head pushing it downward, thereby pressing her nose and mouth against the mattress.

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After trial, the accused was found guilty of murder. A motion for new trial was filed by the accused-
appellant alleging that he was a minor at the time the offense was committed. The motion was denied. A
motion for reconsideration was subsequently filed which was also denied. Hence, a petition for
mandamus.
ISSUE
1.Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder qualified by
abuse of superior strength, with aggravating circumstances of treachery and scoffing at the corpse of the
victim
2.Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the accused the benefits of Section 192 of P.D. 603 before
its amendment by P.D. 1179 on August 15, 1977

HELD
1.NO. The Court held that there was an abuse of superior strength attending the commission of the crime.
It is not only the notorious advantage of height that the accused had over his helpless victim, he being 6
feet tall and weighing 155 lbs. while the girl was only 4 ft. 11 inches tall, but also his strength which he
wielded in striking her with the figurine on the head and in shoving her head and pressing her mouth and
nose against the bed mattress, which pressure must have been very strong and powerful to suffocate her
to death and without risk to himself in any manner or mode whatsoever that she may have taken to defend
herself or retaliate since she was already struck and helpless on the bed, that convinced Us to find and
rule that the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

The evidence on record, however, is not sufficient to show clearly and prove distinctly that treachery
attended the commission of the crime since there was no eyewitness account of the killing. The
extrajudicial confession of the accused merely stated, thus: "I thought she was going to do something
dangerous to me so I grabbed her, and we started wrestling on the bed. She grabbed me by the throat and
I picked up a statue of Jesus Christ that was sitting on the bedside stand and I hit her in the head. She fell
flat on her face." Although the figurine was found broken beside her head, the medical report, however,
do not show any injury or fracture of the skull and no sign of intracranial hemorrhage.

The aggravating circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the deceased applies against the
accused since it is established that he mocked or outraged at the person or corpse of his victim by having
an anal intercourse with her after she was already dead. The fact that the muscles of the anus did not close
and also the presence of spermatozoa in the anal region as testified to by Dr. Angeles Roxas, the medico-
legal officer, and confirmed to be positive in the Laboratory Report clearly established the coitus after
death. This act of the accused in having anal intercourse with the woman after killing her is, undoubtedly,
an outrage at her corpse. It is true as maintained by the defense that the aggravating circumstance of
outraging.

2.YES. Records disclose that at the time of the commission of the crime on August 8, 1975, said accused
was seventeen (17) years, eleven (11) months and four (4) days old, he having been born on September 4,
1957 in Orlando, Florida, U.S.A. The accused declared that he was eighteen (18) years old as evidenced by
the certification issued by Vice Consul Leovigildo Anolin of the Consul General of the Philippines in New
York City dated November 14, 1975. The trial court rationale is that the accused had not invoked the

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privilege granted under Article 192 of P.D. 603 before its amendment because the records manifestly show
the vigorous plea of the accused for its application not only in the Motion for New Trial but also in the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the accused.

The lower court erred in not applying the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603 suspending all further
proceedings after the court had found that the accused had committed the acts charged against him,
determined the imposable penalty including any civil liability chargeable against him. The trial court should
not have pronounced judgment convicting the accused.
The penalty of death was not justified. Since murder was committed by the accused, under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, the crime is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
The accused is a minor and he is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which
reduces the penalty one degree lower and that is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its medium period, or ten (10) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months (Article 68, Revised Penal Code). With one aggravating circumstance, that of outraging at the
corpse of the victim, the penalty imposable is the maximum period which is reclusion temporal medium
or fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
Imposing the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty is eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
as maximum

People v. Saylan, L-36941, 29 June 1984, 130 SCRA 159

FACTS:
The complaining witness, Eutropia A. Agno, a married woman, was a classroom teacher of the Malinao
Elementary School.

On their way home from the public market, Eutropia and Nilsonita (five-year old daughter) boarded a
passenger jeepney and while inside the vehicle she (Eutropia) noticed that the other passengers were Rudy
Gonzales, a grade I pupil of the Malinao Elementary School, the appellant, Rafael Saylan, and a couple
whom she did not know.

The jeepney, however, could only travel up to the Malinas Citrus farm and so they had to walk all the way
to Barrio Malinao .

After walking some distance and upon reaching a trail for carabaos, the appellant suddenly pulled a dagger
about eight inches long and pointed it at Eutropia and said, “Do not shout, Nang, I will kill you!” He placed
his arms around the neck of Mrs. Agno with the dagger pointed at her left breast, and then dragged her
towards the carabao trail.

The appellant ordered everybody to stop and told the children (Nilsonita and Rudy Gonzales) to stay
behind and threatened to kill them if they persisted in following them.

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Thereafter, appellant again dragged Eutropia by her hand and brought her towards a creek near a coconut
tree which was about five meters away from where Nilsonita and Rudy Gonzales were.

The appellant then ordered Eutropia to remove her panty which she refused at first, but appellant
threatened to kill her, so she removed her panty after which appellant ordered her to lie down.
Subsequently, appellant placed himself on top of the victim and inserted his penis into her vagina and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her by moving his buttocks up and down.

After the third intercourse, appellant ordered Eutropia to stand up and then he bent her body downwards
with her hands and knees resting on the ground. When the latter was already in this position, appellant
then placed himself behind her, inserted his penis into her vagina and executed a push and pull movement
in the dog's way of sexual intercourse.

After the fifth intercourse, and after satisfying his sexual lust, appellant asked Eutropia if she will tell her
husband what he did to her and the latter answered, 'I will not tell". But she only said this so that appellant
would let her go home.

Afterwards, Eutropia and appellant returned to the place where the children were left and upon arriving
thereat, they found Nilsonita, who was sleeping beside Rudy, and was carried by the appellant and then
they all proceeded to Malinao.

After walking some distance, Eutropia saw the house of her friend "Ben" where they stayed the night.
Appellant, who was then carrying Nilsonita, and Rudy Gonzales, were also allowed to go upstairs.

Meanwhile, Eutropia requested Ben to fetch her husband.

When Eutropia woke up that evening, her husband was already there. She then asked him whether the
appellant was still around, and in reply, he told her that appellant had already left. Eutropia then told her
husband that she was raped by the appellant.

Upon learning of the dastardly act committed by the appellant, he advised his wife to submit herself to a
medical examination.

The accused did not deny having had sexual intercourse with Mrs. Agno

ISSUE:
Whether or not the following aggravating circumstances should be appreciated:
1.Abuse of superior strength? NOPE.
2.Nocturnity? NOPE.
3.Despoblado (uninhabited place)? YEP.
4.Ignominy? YEP.
5.Reiteracion (habituality)? NOPE.

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6. Disregard of rank? NOPE.

HELD:
The complaint alleges the following aggravating circumstances: abuse of superior strength, nocturnity,
despoblado, ignominy, and reiteracion.
The trial court disregarded superiority because it "is inherent in the crime of rape or is absorbed in the
element of force." It also did not consider nocturnity "there being no evidence that the accused purposely
sought it to facilitate the commission of this rape."

Despoblado was present according to the trial court because: "The accused dragged the offended party,
at the point of a dagger, to the carabao trail, about 10 meters from the junction, but 40 to 50 meters below
to better attain his purpose without interference, and to better secure himself from detection and
punishment. Even the junction where the two children were left is already 400 meters from the nearest
house. While there maybe occasional passersby, this does not destroy its being an uninhabited place. We
hold that the trial court for the reasons stated correctly held that the crime was committed in an
uninhabited place.
The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the missionary position,
i.e. male superior, female inferior, but also "The same position as dogs do" i.e., entry from behind.

The trial court also held that "there is no reiteracion because one of the offenses, namely Robbery in Band,
for which the accused has been penalized, was committed after the commission of this rape case, and the
penalty imposed on the other offense of Frustrated Homicide, is lighter than the penalty for rape."

Although not alleged in the complaint, the trial court stated that the offense was aggravated by disregard
of rank because it was a fact known to the appellant that Mrs. Agno was a school teacher. The appellant
claims that this circumstance cannot be assigned to him because there was no deliberate intent to offend
or insult the rank of Mrs. Agno. The Solicitor General agrees with the appellant for the same reason.

People v. Sultan, G.R. No. 132470, 27 April 2000, 331 SCRA 216
FACTS:
One evening Juditha Bautista was on her way home from a visit to her cousin (Cristina Mansilongan); when
she passed the dark alley in her cousin's compound she was accosted by someone, later identified as
accused-appellant Fernando L. Sultan, who pointed a sharp instrument (ice pick) at her neck and
announcing it was a "hold-up." He grabbed her and brought her to a house along the alley which turned
out to be his. Once inside the house, he made her sit down. He offered her a drink; she refused it. Then he
started divesting her of her watch, ring, earrings, and necklace the values of which are now reflected in
the Decision of the court a quo, and her cash of P130.00. After taking her valuables, he started kissing her
on the lips and cheeks. As if to discourage him from making further sexual advances, she told him that she

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was married with two (2) children but accused-appellant was not dissuaded from pursuing his intentions.
While pointing an ice pick at her he ordered her to undress. She acceded for fear that he would kill her as
she was under constant threat. After she had completely undressed, accused-appellant ordered her to lie
down on the floor. He then kissed her again from head down. Still she could not resist him because of fear.
He went on top of her, held her two (2) hands on the level of her head, spread her thighs and inserted his
penis into her vagina. The coital encounter lasted for ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes. The appellant raped
her twice. He told her that he loved her and that he would answer for what he had done to her.

In her effort to release herself from his clutches she "agreed" to elope with him. Perhaps convinced that
she was going to run away with him, he allowed her to go home at noon to get her things. He even
accompanied her to the highway to get a ride home.

When Juditha arrived home she saw her sister Antonette in the house. Juditha lost no time in narrating
her harrowing experience to her sister. Immediately Antonette called her brother SPO1 Fernando M.
Bautista who resides in Bulacan. He then advised Juditha to go back to the house of accused-appellant for
the "planned elopement" so that he and his two (2) companions could stage an arrest.

When Juditha arrived at accused-appellant's place, he was already waiting for her outside the store
nearby. They boarded a passenger bus while SPO1 Bautista and his companions trailed them. Upon seeing
her brother and his companions, Juditha motioned to them. They immediately approached accused-
appellant and boxed him before they could arrest him. The other passengers of the bus joined in hitting
accused-appellant. This caused a commotion in the bus. Some policemen who were in the barangay hall
across the street saw the disturbance. He was later on transferred to the police headquarters for further
interrogation.

At the police station the authorities investigated Juditha who readily identified accused-appellant as her
robber and rapist. The police then requested for physical examination to find signs of sexual abuse.
Medico-Legal Inspector Dr. Dennis G. Bellin found no external signs of violence although there was a deep
fresh laceration at 5 o'clock position in Juditha's hymen.

ISSUE:
Whether or not multiple rape can be considered as an aggravating circumstance

HELD:
NO.

Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[a]ny person who, with intent to gain, shall take any
personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of person, or using
force upon anything, shall be guilty of robbery." When accused-appellant divested complaining witness of
her personal belongings he committed the crime of robbery. All the elements necessary for its execution
and accomplishment were present, i.e., (a) personal property belonging to another, (b) unlawful taking,
(c) intent to gain, and (d) violence or intimidation.

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Accused-appellant might not have employed force in committing the rape but he definitely used
intimidation which was sufficient to make complainant submit herself to him against her will for fear of
life and personal safety.

The Information charges accused-appellant with the special complex crime of robbery with rape. The
record shows that the prosecution has established that he committed both robbery and rape with the
intent to take personal property of another preceding the rape. Under Art. 294, par. (1), of the Revised
Penal Code, ". . .[a]ny person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of persons
shall suffer: 1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, . . . when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape . . ." Complaining witness Juditha Bautista was raped twice on the occasion of the
robbery.

In this regard, this Court had declared in some cases that the additional rapes committed on the same
occasion of robbery would not increase the penalty. There were also cases, however, where this Court
ruled that the multiplicity of rapes committed could be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.

Finally, in the recent case of People v. Regala, the Court held that the additional rapes committed should
not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance despite a resultant "anomalous situation" wherein
robbery with rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes in terms of gravity.

The Court realized that there was no law providing for the additional rape/s or homicide/s for that matter
to be considered as aggravating circumstance. It further observed that the enumeration of aggravating
circumstances under Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive, unlike in Art. 13 of the same Code
which enumerates the mitigating circumstances where analogous circumstances may be considered,
hence, the remedy lies with the legislature.

Consequently, unless and until a law is passed providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s may be
considered aggravating, the Court must construe the penal law in favor of the offender as no person may
be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute.

Under this view, the additional rape committed by accused-appellant is not considered an aggravating
circumstance. Applying Art. 63, par. (2), of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "(i)n all cases in
which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be
observed in the application thereof . . .2. (w)hen there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied," the lower penalty of
reclusion perpetua should be imposed on accused-appellant.

21. Unlawful entry;

22. Breaking of wall, roof, floor, door, or window;
23. Aid of persons under fifteen years old, use of motor vehicles, airships, or other similar means;
24. Cruelty;

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25. Organized or syndicated crime group;

26. Use of illegal firearms or explosives – see RA 10591
People v. Ladjaalam, G.R. Nos. 136149-51, 19 September 2000
Facts:
Four Informations were filed against appellant Walpan Ladjaalam in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), three of which he was found guilty, to wit:
1. Maintaining a drug den in violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972); -- In his house in Rio Hondo, Zamboanga City.
2. Illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by
Republic Act. No. 8294; - He was armed, along with other men, with M-14 Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite
Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives
3. Direct assault with multiple attempted homicides. – For firing at the policemen who were at the time
performing their lawful duties
4. Charged with illegal possession of drugs – For methamphetamine hydrochloride discovered form the foil
sheets found at the house of Walpan (Shabu)

He was with his co-accused wife Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini but the cases were
dismissed for them upon reinvestigation. The following information was provided by the prosecution:
·In the afternoon of September 24, 1997, more than thirty (30) policemen proceeded to the house of
appellant and his wife to serve the search warrant when they were met by a volley of gunfire coming from
the second floor of the said house.
·They saw that it was the appellant who fired the M14 rifle towards them.
·Policemen took cover in the concrete fence. And slowly went inside the House
·After gaining entrance, they saw two old women and young girl and 3 children.
·Upon seeing to policemen 1 old woman went up with a child.
·This opted one of this policeman to shout “Don’t shoot the second floor! There are children”
·The two of the police officers proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant firing the
rifle.
·As he noticed their presence, the appellant went inside the bathroom, dismantled the window, and
jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring house.
·He was subsequently arrested at the back of his house after a brief chase.
·Several firearms and ammunitions were recovered from appellant’s house.
·Also found was a pencil case with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside, each containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
·A paraffin test was conducted and the casts taken both hands of the appellant yielded positive for
gunpowder nitrates.
·Records show that appellant had not filed any application for license to possess firearm and ammunition,
nor has he been given authority to carry firearms.

Issue:
WON use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

Ruling:

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NO. The appealed Decision was affirmed with modifications. Appellant is found guilty only of two
offenses: (1) Direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon and (2) Maintaining
a drug den.
The trial court's ruling and the OSG's submission exemplify the legal community's difficulty in grappling
with the changes brought about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now are opposing views on how to interpret
Section 1 of the new law, which provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
"Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition
Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. — The penalty
of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000)
shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess
any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part
of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall
be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in
diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered
firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other
firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no
other crime was committed by the person arrested.
"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
"If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an
element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible
officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow
any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or
persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow
any of them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of
their residence in the course of their employment.
"The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm
outside his residence without legal authority therefor."

Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall unlawfully possess any firearm or
ammunition shall be penalized, “unless no other crime was committed”. Furthermore, if homicide or
murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. Since the crime committed was direct assault and not
homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.
The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that “no
other crime was committed by the person arrested.” If the intention of the law in the second paragraph

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were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph.
Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should [the courts].
A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there
can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the “other crime” is murder
or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate
offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can
no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms. The Court is aware that this ruling effectively
absolves the appellant of illegal possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty
heavier than that for direct assault.
While the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the
accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an
even lighter offense, like alarm and scandal or slight physical injuries, both of which are punishable by
arresto menor. This consequence, however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose
wisdom is not subject to the Court’s review. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise
should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning
detached from the manifest intendment and language of the legislature. [The Court's] task is
constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and [this Court]
have done so in this case. To keep things simple: No illegal possession of fire arm. Illegal possession of
firearm will only be applied if there are no other crimes committed. He committed Direct Assault with
Attempted Homicide, therefore, no Illegal Possession of Firearm. Also, No aggravating cause there wasn’t
any homicide or murder.

Celino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170562, 29 June 2007

FACTS
Two separate informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City charging petitioner with
violation of Section 2(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 6446 (gun ban),1[3] and Section 1, Paragraph 2 of
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 82942 [4] (illegal possession of firearm).

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash contending that he "cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession of
firearms (R.A. 8294) if he was also charged of having committed another crime of violating the Comelec
gun ban under the same set of facts.” The trial court denied the motion to quash on the ground that "the
other offense charged is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294” The denial was affirmed on appeal.
Hence this petition, where petitioner contends that the mere filing of information for gun ban violation
against him necessarily bars his prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. Petition fails.

R.A. 8294
SECTION 1 Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms
or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms or Ammunition.

"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall
be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in
diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered

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firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other
firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no
other crime was committed by the person arrested.

"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

"If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an
element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat.

ISSUE
Whether or not the court err in denying the motion to quash

HELD
NO. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that
"no other crime was committed by the person arrested." If the intention of the law in the second paragraph
were to refer ojnly to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so. As accusation is not
synonymous with guilt, there is yet no showing that petitioner did in fact commit the other crime charged.
Consequently, the proviso does not yet apply.

In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, any information for
illegal possession of firearm should be quashed because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be
tried together with such other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or
homicide, or absorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat.
Conversely, when the other offense involved is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, then the
separate case for illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted.

27. Use of dangerous drugs while committing a felony – Sec. 25 of RA 9165

28. Use of information and communications technologies in committing a felony – Sec. 6, RA 10175
F. Alternative Circumstances
1. Relationship
People v. Atop, G.R. No. 124303-05, 10 February 1998, 286 SCRA 157

Private complainant Regina Guafin, told the court that she is a granddaughter of Trinidad Mejos and that
the accused Alejandro Atop is the common law husband of said Trinidad Atop. Her mother is a daughter of
said Trinidad Atop [and lives in Pangasinan. She is an illegitimate child and she does not even know her
father. Since her early childhood she stayed with her grandmother Trinidad Atop and the accused at
Barangay Santa Rosa.

Sometime in 1991 when she was already 10 years of age the accused started having lustful desire on her.
The accused then inserted his finger into her vagina. She told her grandmother about this but her
grandmother did not believe her. She was then told by her grandmother, Trinidad Mejos, that what her

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grandfather did to her was just a manifestation of fatherly concern. She continued staying with her
grandmother and her common law husband Alejandro Atop, the herein accused.

1st Rape: 12 y/o: On October 9, 1992, she was called by the accused Alejandro Atop to do something for
him. When she approached him the accused rushed towards her, removed her panty and inserted his male
organ into her vagina. She was not able to do anything to resist him because the accused gagged her mouth
and was carrying a knife with him. When her grandmother returned home she told her what the accused
did to her but her grandmother, again, refused to believe her

2nd Rape: Only she and the accused were then at their house at Barangay Santa Rosa, Matag-ob, Leyte as
her grandmother was at San Vicente attending to a delivery. Again, she told her grandmother about the
heinous acts that the accused did to her but her Lola refused to believe her.

3rd Rape: December 26, 1994, the accused again raped her. She could not ask for help because her mouth
was gagged by the accused. Aside from gagging her, the accused carried a knife which he placed at his
side.

She reported the incidents of rape that happened in 1992, 1993 and 1994 only in January 1995. It took her
so long to report the said incidents because she was afraid. The accused threatened to kill her should she
tell anybody about that incidents.

Thereafter, she filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial Judge of Matag-ob, Leyte

Accused Alejandro Atop [then 37 years old] testified that he and Trinidad Mejos (grandma) had been living
together as husband and wife for about 10 years already.

ISSUE: W/N ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES - RELATIONSHIP PRESENT?

HELD: NO

Sec. 11. - Article 335 of the [Revised Penal] Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of
the parent of the victim.

Undisputed is the fact that appellant is not the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. He is the
common-law husband of the girl's grandmother. Needless to state, neither is appellant the victim's "parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree." Hence,
he is not encompassed in any of the relationships expressly enumerated the aforecited provision.

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It is a basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the
accused. Courts must not bring cases within the provision of a law which are not clearly embraced by it. No
act can be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by statute; so, too, no person who is not clearly
within the terms of a statute can be brought within them.Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor
of the accused.

Penalties Imposable

For the rape incidents on October 9, 1992 and sometime in 1993, the court a quo correctly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the two criminal acts. The third rape incident, however, occurred
after the effectivity of RA 7659, the law which imposed the death penalty on certain heinous crimes. Under
this amendatory law, the penalty for rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon is reclusion perpetua
to death. This provision is applicable in the instant case, since private complainant was threatened with a
knife when appellant consummated his beastly acts on her.

In cases where the penalty prescribed is composed of two indivisible penalties and there is neither an
aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance in the commission of the felony, the lesser penalty should be
applied. Since there was no modifying circumstance even in the third rape, the penalty therefor should be
reclusion perpetua, not the graver penalty of death as imposed by the court a quo. As earlier explained, the
attendant relationships enumerated under Sec. 11 of RA 7659 do not apply either

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that Appellant
Alejandro Atop shall not suffer the penalty of death but shall SERVE three (3) terms of reclusion perpetua,
one for each of the three (3) counts of rape for which he was found GUILTY by the trial court,

2. Intoxication
US v. McMann, L-2229, 1 July 1905, 4 Phil. 561

FACTS:
The defendant, Mc Mann, and one McKay were packers at Camp Vicars in Mindanao, employed by the
Quartermaster's Department of the Army. On the day in question the defendant had charge of some mules
about one and one half miles from the camp. McKay was not on guard at the time, but, for some reason
which does not appear, was near the place where the defendant was stationed with the mules. McKay
went to the house of a Moro, Amlay Pindolonan, for the purpose of getting matches with which to light
his cigar. With his revolver in his hand he attempted to enter the house, but the owner would not allow
him to do so. A few moments later the defendant arrived at the same house. He attempted to enter, but
was unable to do so on account of the opposition of the owner. He also carried his revolver in his hand
with the hammer raised ready to be discharged. A Moro named Master, who was there at the time, was
carrying the head of a bolo with one hand, holding the blade in the other. The defendant snatched the
bolo from him, cutting his fingers. This Moro left for the camp to report the matter to the authorities. Soon
after this McKay and the Moro Pindolonan, being seated side by side at a distance of from 3 to 6 feet from

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the defendant, who was either standing or sitting on the stairway which led into the house, the latter
raised his pistol and fired at McKay. The bullet struck him in the back of the head and killed him instantly.
The Moro at once jumped up, looked around to see where the shot came from, and started to run,
whereupon the defendant shot him. The exact nature of his injuries does not appear, but it appears that
at the time of the trial, about a month after the event, he was still in the hospital. At some time, probably
after killing of McKay, although the defendant says it was before, the latter killed a dog which was on the
premises. The defendant and McKay were both drunk at this time.

ISSUE:
Whether or not habitual drunkness can be credited as an aggravating circumstance

RULING:
That the defendant fired the shot which killed McKay is practically admitted by him in his testimony and
the fact is also proved by three or four eyewitnesses. It is claimed by his counsel in this court that the
shooting was accidental and that he had no intention of killing McKay. In the face of the positive testimony
of the witnesses there is no ground for saying that the shooting was accidental. Two of the Moros testified
that they saw him discharge his revolver at McKay; in no event was the discharge of the revolver
accidental. |

The court held that the defendant was drunk 8at the time the act was committed, but held also that
drunkenness was habitual with him and therefore his condition could not be taken into consideration for
the purpose of lessening the sentence. The defendant in this court claims that the court erred in holding
that drunkenness was habitual with the defendant. However, testimonies provided that the accused has
been known to drink often and that he frequently retires drunk in the quarters as told by the witness. The
court finds that the habitual drunkness of the accused be certain. Quoting Commonwealth v Whitney with
“The exact degree of intemperance which constitutes a drunkard it may not be easy to define, but speaking
in general terms, and with the accuracy of which the matter is susceptible, he is a drunkard whose habit is
to get drunk, 'whose ebriety has become habitual.' To convict a man of the offense of being a common
drunkard it is, at the least, necessary to show that he is an habitual drunkard. Indeed the terms 'drunkard'
and 'habitual drunkard' mean the same thing”. Ludwick v Commonwealth “A man may be an habitual
drunkard, and yet be sober for days and weeks together. The only rule is, Has he a fixed habit of
drunkenness? Was he habituated to intemperance whenever the opportunity offered?"
The judgment of the court below is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the defendant.
||
3. Degree of Instruction
People v. San Pedro, L-44274, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 306

V. Persons Criminally Liable

A. Principals – Art. 17
People v. Yanson-Dumancas, G.R. No. 133527-28, 13 December 1999, 320 SCRA 584
Facts:
Accused- appellants were charged with Kidnapping for Ransom with Murder of Danilo Lumangyao and
Rufino Gargar Jr. Among the 13 accused charged, 3 (Charles Dumancas, Police officers Pahayupan and

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Canuday Jr.) were acquitted, 9 (Yanson-Dumancas, Pol. Col. Torres, Pol. Col. Abeto, Pol. Officer Lamis,
Geroche, Gargallano, Fernandez, Divinagracia, Delgado) were convicted as principals and 1 accused (Cesar
Pecha) as accessory.

On Feb. 20 1992 Jeanette Yanson Dumancas was swidnled in a fake gold bar transaction losing PHP 352,000
to Danilo Lumangyao and his cohort. August 5, Lamis told the others (Geroche, Fernandez, Gargallano, etc)
the plan to abduct Lumangyao and Gargar Jr. Then they went to the office of Col. Torres and were told
that if the two were found, they were to be brought and hid in Dragon Lodge Motel.

On 6 August, Moises Grandeza (State Witness) invited Lumangyao and Gargar Jr. to Tinolahan Eatery.
When they arrived, Geroche and others were waiting for them. Fernandez, Geroche and Lamis entered
the eatery and handcuffed the two. They were brought to the office of Yanson-Dumancas, they were
manhandled and Jeanette inquired about the money swindled and the two replied that it was already
spent. They were then brought to Dragon Lodge and thereafter Abeto, Pahayupan and Canuday arrived
and investigated the two regarding the gold bar. Yanson-Dumancas ordered Geroche to take care of the
two.

Grandeza and two others went to Col. Torres and informed him that the two were already captured. Torres
told ordered to keep the victim so that nobody would see them. The group and victim then transferred to
D’Hacienda Motel. The two were then investigated by Yanson-Dumancas about the money and got the
same reply. She again ordered Geroche to take care of them.

The group again moved to two other motels but returned to D’Hacienda and it was there when they
planned to kill the victims, hatched by Geroche and Fernandez.

On 7 August the group partook of a supper, and Abeto, Canuday, Pahayupan entered the room and asked
Fernandez what they are going to do with the two, to which he replied that he will be responsible for them.

Geroche and others then when to Geroche’s house and took an armalite rifle. Around 12 midnight, the
two victims were blindfolded and handcuffed and brought to Hda. Pedrosa in Brgy. Aljis. The two were
ordered to alight and sit by the side of the road. Grandeza was ordered by Geroche to hold the hands of
Lumangyao and Gargar Jr. behind their backs.

Gargallano shot Gargar at the back of his head using a baby armalite. Geroche then shot Lumangyao with
a .45 cal Pistol at his lower right jaw. The two bodies were loaded on the land cruiser and brought to Hda
Siason where Pecha and Hilado buried them in them in the shallow grave that they dug.

The next day the bodies were recovered. The following day, the group went to Torres and told him of what
they did, Torres told them that nobody knows what they have done and hide for the NBI are after them.
The next day he told them to hide because the NBI are already investigating. Nenita Bello, a relative of the
victims went to Torres to plead for help but was turned down because the case involved the military and
bigtimes.

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After the NBI conducted its investigation, state prosecutors took over and filed the two cases.

Issue:
Whether Yanson-Dumancas’ conviction of guilty as principal for the crime of kidnapping for ransom with
murder was proper?

Ruling:

No. Art. 17 of the RPC provides that:

Art. 17. Principals. — the ff. are considered principals:

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have
been accomplished.

The court examined whether Y-D indeed performed the following acts: (a) directly forcing the killers to
commit the crime, or (b) directly inducing them to commit the crime.

Directly forcing them to commit a crime:

There are two ways: (1) using irresistible force; (2) by causing uncontrollable fear. Upon review of the
testimony of witnesses, the court found nothing to conclude that she used both upon the accused-
appellants. The plan to abduct and kill the victims was hatched on 5 August without her involvement or
participation. There is no evidence that she directly forced the participants of said meeting to come up
with the plan. The only basis of her conviction relied upon by the trial court is the supposed command
given by her to Geroche to take care of the two. The command alone cannot constitute irresistible force
or causing uncontrollable fear.

Directly inducing another to commit a crime:

There are two ways: (1) by giving a price or offering reward of promise (2) using words of command. The
court finds no evidence that she offered any price, reward or promise to the appellants should they abduct
and kill the victims. Only Ricardo Yanson lent money to Col. Torres. No money came from her. The trial
court’s surmise that the money delivered by Ricardo to the group was with her knowledge and approval
is completely baseless.

Does “take care of the two” constitute as words of command which may be a sufficient basis to convict
her as principal by inducement. In order for it to result to conviction, the ff. must be present: (1)
inducement be made with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime, and (2) such
inducement be the determining cause of the commission by material executor. To constitute inducement,
there must exist on the part of the inducer the most positive resolution and most persistent effort to
secure the commission, together with the presentation to the person induced of the very strongest kind
of temptation to commit the crime.

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Based on the standards, “take care of the two” does not constitute the command required to justify a
finding that she is guilty as principal by inducement. The utterance must precede the commission of the
crime itself. The abduction had already taken when she uttered those words. It could not have been what
induced the commission. It was also proven by the prosecution witness Grandeza that the intention of Y-
D was to allow the law to its course. She told Geroche “Doming, bring the two to PC or police and I will call
Atty. Geocadin so that proper cases could be filed against them.” when two answered negative when she
asked about the whereabouts of the money. It cannot be basis for conviction.

** For Abeto’s case, his only participation was to serve the search warrant on Helen Tortocionms residence
and the interrogation of the victims at D’Hacienda Motel. He was never part ofthe conspiracy. After due
consideration, his constitutional right to presumption of innocence, coupled with presumption of
regularity in the performance or official function having simply followed the order of superior officers.
** Torres died during the pendency of the case and thus criminal and civil liability.

Yanson-Dumancas and Abeto are acquitted and ordered released from detention. Torres’ case is dismissed
by reason of his death. Other decisions are affirmed.

People v. Maluenda, G.R. No. 115351, 27 March 1998, 288 SCRA 225
Facts:
Raul Mondaga, Rodrigo Legarto and Daniel Maluenda were convicted of kidnapping and sentenced with
reclusion perpetua.

On Aug. 19, Engr. Resus and his wife arrived at their residence at Lianga, Surigao del Sur, from a novena
they attended. The three were waiting for them, and declared that they came upon orders of a certain
Father Simon with directive to solicit money and medicines needed for the victims of recent military-NPA
encounter. They demanded medicines and money in the amount of P20,000 and then lowered to P10,000
and P5000 and the couple still cannot produce amount. When they said that any amount will do, they gave
P500 and P800 worth of medicines. They demanded that they be driven by car by Engr. Resus to San Roque
but the couple said the car was not in good condition and so they demanded that they be driven early next
morning. They warned the couple not to tell anybody for they will kill and blow up the clinic if they do so.

The next morning Engr. Resus drove Mondaga to Andanan, and upon passing Andanan met Legarto.
Maluenda and Alex then rode with Mondaga and Resus to Barobo. Upon reaching Barobo, Mondaga told
Resus that they would go to San Francisco instead, but soon after they stopped at Alegria and never
reached San francisco. In Alegria Mondaga ordered Resus to go with them. Against his will he conceded.
They hiked for 2 hours between the boundary of Candon and Alegria. Upon reaching a hut, Mondaga told
him that he forgot something and had to go back and told him to stay there, and so Resus and others spent
the night in the farmhut.

Mondaga then demanded from Dr. Resus P300,000 for the release of her husband. She can only produce
P10k to which Mondaga said he would collect the next day. He then told her to look for Eng. Resus’ firearm

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and she gave it to him. He demanded for the use of Engr. Resus motorcycle but she said it was not working.
So Mondaga instructed her to get Legarto’s motorcycle which she did.

At around 4Am the next day, Mondaga arrived at the clinic. Legarto also arrived in his motorcycle.
Mondaga demanded that she go with them but she made excuses, she then had her helper Maria Abne
go with them. They left the clinic with the money and firearm. They hiked and reached the hut. Mondaga
gave a note from Dr. Resus stating “Daddy, I have committed only P10k”, and told him that he can afford
P300k. Resus pleaded with him and he lowered the amount to P200k. Resus signed the note stating
“Mommy, it’s up to you to produce the amount.” They left Abne with Resus.

Legarto then went to Dr. Resus and told her that Mondaga was waiting for them. So she went with him
and met with Mondaga and went to a deserted place. He gave the note. Dr. Resus said she fan only
produce P100k, he accepted on the condition that he would no longer return the motorcycle to Legarto
and P50k be given as payment. He instructed Legarto to deliver the P100k and the original license of the
motorcycle. The two left, leaving Mondaga behind.

Dr. Resus secured the money from the mayor of San Francisco after telling him what happened. It was
delivered to Legarto on 22 August. Mondaga then arrived at the hut and told Engr. Resus that he would
be released but he would come back in three months to pay the balance. Abne and Resu were released.

Mondaga, Maluenda and Legarto were later arrested.

Issue:
Whether or not Legarto should be held liable as Principal

Ruling:
No. In light of the evidence presented, he should only be held liable as an accessory.

Art. 17 provides that Principals are: “3. those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another
act without which it would not have been accomplished.” He cannot be convicted with this definition.
Legarto’s participation in the incident were linited to acts committed after the abduction was already
consummated. He was not with the kidnappers: 1) when they forcibly solicited money and medicine 2)
when they brought victim to Alegria, and 3) when Mondaga demanded ransom for the victim’s release.
Together with Abne, he accompanied Mondaga to the hideout in Alegria only upon Dr. Resus’ request. The
prosecution failed to piece together a clear story as to how Legarto figured in the kidnapping caper. The
evidence of him transporting Maluenda and Alex was unsupported. Engr. Resus did not see the two
alighting the motorcycle, they only met Legarto on his way back. He did not see Legarto transporting the
two.

The alleged direct participation of in the kidnapping is without factual basis. It is nothing more than an
inference drawn from presumption. Circumstantial evidence was not established and cannot be given
evidentiary weight to support conviction as principal by indispensable cooperation.

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He may not have had a direct hand in the kidnapping but he received part of the ransom and used it to
pay the arrears in his motorcycle loan. He took part in the crime subsequent to the commission of the
crime by profiting from its effects. He is criminally liable as an accessory. Under Art. 19, accessories are
defined as those who (1) have knowledge of the commission of the crime (2) did not take part in its
commission as principal or accomplice, but (3) took part in it subsequent to its commission by any of the
three modes enumerated in this article, one of which is by profiting or by assisting the offender to profit
from the effects of the crime.

The appeal is partially granted. Decision modified as regards Legarto. He is found guilty as an accessory.

People v. Montealegre, L-67948, 31 May 1988

FACTS: At about 11:30 in the evening of March 11, 1983, while Edmundo Abadilla was eating at the
Meding's Restaurant in Cavite City, he detected the smell of marijuana smoke coming from a nearby table.
Intending to call a policeman, he quietly went outside and saw Pfc. Renato Camantigue in his car whom
he hailed to report the matter. After parking his vehicle, Camantigue joined Abadilla in the restaurant and
soon there after the two smelled marijuana smoke from the table occupied by Vicente Capalad and the
accused-appellant. Camantigue then approached the two and collared both of them, saying
"Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano?"
While Camantigue was holding the two, Montealegre with this right hand and Capalad with his left hand,
Capalad suddenly and surreptitiously pulled out a knife from a scabbard tucked in the right side of his waist
and started stabbing Camantigue in the back. Camantigue let loose Montealegre to draw the gun from his
holster but Montealegre, thus released, restrained Camantigue's hand to prevent the latter from
defending himself. Montealegre used both his hands for this purpose, as Capalad continued stabbing the
victim. While they were thus grappling, the three fell to the floor and Capalad, freed from Camantigue's
grip, rose and scampered toward the door. Camantigue fired and, continuing the pursuit outside, fired
again. Capalad fled into a dark alley. Camantigue abandoned the chase and asked to be brought to a
hospital. Capalad was later found slumped in the alley with a bullet wound in his chest. Neither Camantigue
nor Capalad survived, both expiring the following day.

The accused-appellant, for his part, escaped during the confusion.Having been informed of the incident,
Capt. Cipriano Gilera of the Cavite police immediately organized a team that went to look for him that very
night.They did not find him in his house then but he was apprehended in the morning of March 12, 1983,
on board a vehicle bound for Baclaran. He gave his name as Alegre but later admitted he was the fugitive
being sought.

Autopsy of the Camantigue's body, testified that death was caused by severe shock due to massive internal
hemorrhage caused by seven stab wounds affecting the heart, lungs, liver, stomach, pancreas, and
diaphragm.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Accused Appellant is a Principal
2. Whether or not Conspiracy exist

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Held:
Based on the testimony of the accused, It is incredible that as one of the principal figures of the stabbing
incident, he could not have not known, nor could he later not remember, that startling event that even
mere onlookers could not forget.
The accused-appellant was correctly considered a co-principal for having collaborated-with Capalad in the
killing of the police officer. The two acted in concert, with Capalad actually stabbing Camantigue seven
times and the accused-appellant holding on to the victim's hands to prevent him from drawing his pistol
and defending himself. While it is true that the accused-appellant did not himself commit the act of
stabbing, he was nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having prevented Camantigue from resisting the
attack against him. The accused-appellant was a principal by indispensable cooperation under Article 17,
par. 3, of the Revised Penal Code.

As correctly interpreted, the requisites of this provision are:

(1) participating in the criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal
purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime charged; and

(2) cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act

without which it would not have been accomplished.

2. The prosecution contends that although there was no evidence of a prior agreement between Capalad
and Montealegre, their subsequent acts should prove the presence of such conspiracy. The Court sustains
this view, which conforms to our consistent holding on this matter: "Conspiracy need not be established
by direct proof as it can be inferred from the acts of the appellants. It is enough that, at the time the
offense was committed, participants had the same purpose and were united in its execution; as may be
inferred from the attendant circumstances."

Accused Appellant was convicted of the complex crime of murder, as qualified by treachery, with assault
upon a person in authority.

People v. Madali, L-67803, 30 July 1990

FACTS
Crimes stemmed from an altercation between the son of the Madali spouses, Ramon, and the group of
Felix Gasang, who was twenty years old when he was killed. It appears that on October 26, 1979, Felix
figured in a fistfight with someone who was a friend of Ramon. The latter interceded and mauled Felix
with a "chako". One of Felix's companions then was Agustin Reloj.

The following day, the police summoned Felix to the municipal building. Felix's mother, Desamparada
Gasang, went with him. At the police station, Ricarte Madali, a police officer, angrily scolded Felix and his
cousin, Arnaldo Fadriquilan, and told them that because they were "very brave", he would put them in jail
for twelve hours. Madali added after asking about Felix's age that he would "sow bullets" in the body of
Felix. According to witness policeman Aristeo Fetalino, Madali also uttered, "Kailangan sa imo lubongan
bala" which means, what you need is a bullet embedded in you. Madali's father-in-law,

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Agustin Mortel, who arrived at the police station, agreed with Madali that Felix and his group must be
"sown with bullets" to eradicate them. Another group mate of Felix was detained at the municipal jail but
Felix was sent home with his mother.

At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of October 31, 1979, Felix and his cousin, Agustin Reloj, went home
together from the town plaza. Their houses were located near each other in sitio Marawi, barangay Cagbo-
aya, San Agustin, Romblon. Felix and Agustin parted ways at the Marawi bridge. Felix dropped by the store
of Coroy Mangao to buy cigarettes while Agustin proceeded home. Around fifteen meters from the house
of Ricarte Madali, the latter accosted, him, held him by his arm and said, "So you are here, you devil, now
you are finished. I have been waiting for you. I have been watching for you for three nights already." Then
Madali dragged Agustin towards the gate of his (Madali's) house. When Agustin asked Madali why he was
dragging him, Madali said that the reason was because Agustin helped in fighting his son.

As one of Agustin's feet stepped over the knee-high fence at the gate of the Madali residence, he was
clubbed by Annie Madali with a piece of wood. Annie struck him first on the left shoulder and would have
given him another blow had not Agustin freed himself from Madali's hold. Annie landed that blow on
Madali instead. Agustin was looking back as he ran away when Madali shot him. He was hit below his right
hip. He fell to the ground and did not get up fearing that Madali might shoot him again. Agustin was still
lying down on the ground with his eyes focused on Madali when Felix Gasang arrived. He saw Annie
beamed her flashlight at Felix and she said, "Here comes another."

Agustin saw Felix raising his hands as Annie focused her flashlight on Felix. Felix told Madali that he would
not fight with him but then Madali shot Felix twice. Felix fell to the ground. Madali was still near the gate
of his house when Cipriano Gasang arrived. Annie beamed her flashlight at Cipriano and she said, "Here
comes, here comes another, fire upon him." Madali shot Cipriano who fell to the ground. Merlinda
Gasang, who was with her father Cipriano, clung to the fence nearby and shouted that she was also hit.
Then Desamparada Gasang arrived and shouted for help. One Romeo Manes came and carried away
Merlinda. Agustin slowly stood up and as he walked towards his house, he saw Roman Galicia (Galicha)
and the Madali spouses who were then entering their gate.

Merlinda Gasang was at home when she heard an explosion. Her father, Cipriano, was also at home then
but after the second shot, he went out of the house towards the direction of the source of the gunfire.
There was a minute interval between the first and the second shots but only a second elapsed between
the second and the third shots. The fourth shot came about two minutes later. Cipriano was "beyond the
gate" of the Madali residence when he was shot by Madali. Merlinda was around three meters from her
father. She saw Annie focused her flashlight at Cipriano and she heard Annie say, "Yara pa, yara pa, barila"
meaning "Here comes another one, here comes another one, shoot." That was when the fourth explosion
occurred and Merlinda heard her father exclaim that he was hit. Merlinda felt that she was also hit. She
did not fall to the ground because she was able to take hold of the wooden fence. She saw both her
brother Felix and Agustin lying flat on the ground with the latter's head turned to one side.

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Merlinda shouted for help. Romeo Manes came and brought her to the Tablas Island Emergency Hospital.
She did not notice anymore where Ricarte Madali was at that time because she was looking towards the
direction of their house. She saw her mother running to her. The bodies of Cipriano and Felix Gasang were
not removed from the road until around midnight. They were brought to the Gasang residence for autopsy.

ISSUE
Whether or not the lower court erred in finding Annie Mortel Madali guilty as principal by direct
participation

HELD
The Court finds that proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been established as to the existence of
conspiracy between the Madali spouses. While direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy as it may
be shown by acts and circumstances from which may logically be inferred the existence of a common
design among the accused to commit the offense(s) charged, the evidence to prove the same must be
positive and convincing considering that conspiracy is a facile devise by which an accused may be ensnared
and kept within the penal fold. With this and the principle that in criminal prosecution, doubts must be
resolved in favor of the accused, as guides, the Court rules that the liability of Annie Mortel Madali with
respect to the crimes committed herein, is only that of an accomplice.

Annie's participation in the shooting of the victims consisted of beaming her flashlight at them and warning
her husband of the presence of other persons in the vicinity. By beaming her flashlight at a victim, Annie
assisted her husband in taking a good aim. However, such assistance merely facilitated the commission
of the felonious acts of shooting. Considering that, according to both of the Madali spouses, "it was not
so dark nor too bright" that night o r that "brightness and darkness were equally of the same
intensity."Ricarte Madali could have nevertheless accomplished his criminal acts without Annie's
cooperation and assistance.

Neither may Annie's shouts of "here comes, here comes another, shoot" be considered as having incited
Ricarte to fire at the victims to make Annie a principal by inducement. There is no proof that those inciting
words had great dominance and influence over Madali as to become the determining cause of the crimes.
The rapidity with which Madali admittedly fired the shots eliminated the necessity of encouraging words
such as those uttered by Annie.

The fact that Annie dealt a blow on Agustin while he was being dragged by Madali to their yard does not
make her a principal by direct participation. Annie's act, being previous to Madali's act of shooting Agustin,
was actually not indispensable to the crime committed against Agustin.

B. Accomplices – Art. 18
Abejuela v. People, G.R. No. 80130, 19 August 1991, 200 SCRA 806

• Abejuela, businessman engaged in manufacture and fabrication of hand tractors and other agricultural
equipment, had a savings deposit with Banco Filipino, Tacloban Branch.

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• April-May 1978, Abejuela befriended by Balo, Jr., employees of Banco Filipino. Became close, would dine
together, go to nightclubs or have drinking sprees. Balo, Jr. became godfather of Abejuela’s daughter. Balo
also offered financial assistance in Abejuela’s welding business.
• August 1978, Balo went to Abejuela to borrow his passbook. Abejuela surprised and thought that it was
possible for Balo to use his passbook. Balo showed him checks, which were apparently proceeds of his
father’s insurance policy. Balo wanted to deposit in Abejuela’s account with Banco Filipino, since Balo
barred from opening an account because he was savings bookkeeper of the bank. Balo insisted because
he could facilitate immediate encashment and avail some privileges. Assured Abejuela that there was
nothing wrong in allowing Balo to use passbook.
• August 8, 1978, Balo returned passbook where a deposit of P20,000.00 was reflected. Abejuela also
withdrew for Balo amount worth P15,000.00.
• Practice continued for some time, and account of Abejuela reflected a total deposit of P176,145.00 and a
total withdrawal of P176,607.96.
• Abejuela borrowed P20,000.00 from Balo, but he paid his loan by borrowing P10,000.00 from he father
and paying P10,000.00 from his business. Eventually closed his account by surrendering passbook and
withdrawing balance of his deposit.
• Bank’s accountant and interest bookkeeper discovered discrepancy between interest reconciliation
balance and subsidiary ledger balance. Could not locate the posting reconciliation and proof of
reconciliation.
• Saw Abejuela’s account reflected large deposits totaling P176,145.25 but cannot locate deposit slips.
• After investigation, manager, accountant and bookkeeper convinced that Balo, the savings bookkeeper,
manipulated ledger by posting fictitious deposits after banking hours.
• Abejuela was implicated because he was owner of passbook used by Balo in accomplishing scheme.
• Balo was reported killed by members of NPA in Eastern Samar on suspicion that he was a PC
informed/collaborator.
• TC dismissed case but without prejudice to civil action for recovery of damages, and also reinstatement of
instant criminal action in event that accused would be alive.
• TC-Abejuela guilty as accomplice of complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document.
CA-affirmed decision of TC.

WON Abejuela is an accomplice

• No; SC inclined to believe that petitioner Abejuela was completely unaware of malevolent scheme of Balo.
From Balo’s admissions, it was he who deceived Abejuela … and no one would have questioned Balo’s
source of money - insurance proceeds of his late-father.
• Abejuela was hoodwinked into believing that Balo had money, considering they were close friends and
compadres.
• Even without Abejuela’s passbook, false deposits could still have been posted by Balo in the savings
account of Abejuela.
• Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Abejuela had knowledge of the fraud of Balo.
Only fault was negligence in lending passbook.

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• Knowledge of criminal intent of principal is essential for Abejuela can be convicted as an accomplice in the
crime. There must be a cooperation by Abejuela in execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts.
• Acquitted, but civilly accountable because he failed to exercise prudence and care.

People v. Doble, L-30028, 31 May 1982, 114 SCRA 131

• June 1966, Navotas, Rizal, bank robbery committed in band with multiple homicide, multiple frustrated
homicide and assault upon agents of persons in authority.
• Late in the night of June 13, 1966, 10 men almost all of them heavily arkmed left the shores of Manila
and proceeded to Navotas, Rizal using a banca to rob Navotas Branch of the Prudential Bank and Trust
Company.
• Once there, 8 men disembarked and proceeded to the bank. Opened the vault by firing at it, but could
not get anything since compartments were locked. Men went to the teller cages and got P10,438.95.
• After a while, 8 men returned to the banca with “bayongs” and sped away.
• Among those killed: Sgt. Alcala of Philippine Constabulary, Sgt. Aguilos, Cpl. Evangelista of Navotas Police
Department, and Estrella - market vendor.
• Among those injured: Pat. Ocampo, Manalus, Fabian, Fuerten, and de la Cruz.

WON Simeon Doble, Antonio Romaquin, and Cresencuo Doble guilty as accomplices

• Simeon Doble: No; OSG recommended acquittal because evidence only shows that malefactors met in
his house to discuss the plan to rob the bank. However, circumstance alone does not conclude his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Facts do not show that he performed any act tending to perpetration or the
robbery, nor that he took a direct part therein or induced other persons to commit, or that he cooperated
in its consummation by some act without which it would not have been committed.
• At most, his act amounted to joining in aconspiracy - not punishable.
• Only link between Simeon and crime is that his house was used as the meeting place of the malefactors
for final conference before proceeding to Navotas. His 5-year old foot injury would only make him a
liability.
• Cresencio Doble: Yes; guilty beyondj reasonable doubt as accomplices for crime of robbery in band.
• Testified that extrajudicial statements which their conviction was principally made - inadmissible for
allegedly being obtained by force and intimidation.
• Stated that he was boxed in the chest while Sgt. Lawson hit him with the butt of a gun causing him to lose
consciousness. Also, made to lie on a table while peppery liquid was forced over his face, and then forced
to sign a piece of paper he could not read.
• However, no medical certificates to attest to injuries afflicted to them - disproves their claim. Also,
evidence from another accused, Aquino, admitted that no violence applied to him when he gave his
statement. Evidence enough that shows appellants could not have been dealt differently from Aquino.
Cresencio gave Romaquin a note not to divulge names of companions - shows non-employment of coercive
means.

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• Also hinted that death of suspect Dizon while attempting to escape affected freedom of will to give
statement. However, killing happened after statements made for interrogation.
• Cresencio, through extrajudicial statement, said Joe Instik, gang leader, asked if he could procure a banca
for robbery. Approached Romaquin who was told that they would board a launch for a trip to Palawan.y
• However, consent to look for a banca does not necessarily make him a co-conspirator. Neither would it
appear that Joe Intsik wanted to draft Cresencio into his band. Stayed in the boat to guard Romaquin.
Stated he didn't have a gun, but Romaquin stated he did - to prevent Romaquin from leaving. Cresencio
said one malefactor stayed behind near them to ensure they don't leave.
• Cresencio not given any loot.
• Accomplice because Creaencio consented to look for banca for robbery.
• Antonio Romaquin: Yes; guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplices for crime of robbery in a band.
• Romaquin gave similar story of torture and maltreatment in order to force him to admit culpable
participation in heist. (Not granted, same reason as above).
• Did not know about the robbery until after they have reached the location. Sum of P441.00 could
represent only rental of his banca and for cooperation he extended to malefactors which is indispensable.
• Accomplice because Romaquin provided banca and brought the malefactors to the bank and carried them
away after robbery to prevent apprehension. Further, his act of hiding the money he received and
reprinting his boat all attest to guilty conscience arising from cooperation.
• Accomplice is one who, not being principal as defined in Art 17 of ROC, cooperated in execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts (Art. 18, RPC). Must be a community of unlawful purpose
between principal and accomplice and assistance knowingly and intentionally given to supply material and
moral aid in consummation of offense and in an efficacious way

People v. Doctolero, G.R. No. 34386, 7 February 1991, 193 SCRA 632
Facts:
Ludovico and his brothers, Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero, were charged with and convicted of the crime
of multiple murder for the death of the victim
s, Epifania Escosi, Lolito de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and unspecified physical injuries for
the injuries sustained by Jonathan Oviedo (minor - 1 and ½ years old).
• Ludovico (Principal) – 3 life imprisonment (Cadena Perpetua) and 4 months and 1 day to 6 months of AM
for physical injuries.
• Conrado and Virgilio (Accomplices) – 10 years and 1 day of PM to 17 years and 4 months of RT for each
victim and additional of 2 months and 1 day to 4 months of AM for physical injuries.
According to Marcial Sagun (witness), at about 6:30 in the evening of November 8, 1970, Marcial Sagun,
Maria Sagun (wife), Lolita Oviedo and Antonio Oviedo (Maria’s brother) met the accused Ludovico
Doctolero at the crossing of the road in Barrio Bindo while on their way home. Ludovico, without warning
and without cause or reason, held the left shoulder of Marcial Sagun with his left hand and struck Marcial
Sagun with a bolo. Marcial evaded the blow and wrestled with Ludovico for the possession of bolo.
According to the testimony of Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy, which was corroborated by Maria Oviedo-Sagun,
that while she was cleaning palay in the yard of her uncle (the deceased Marcelo Doctolero), she saw the
three brothers throw some stones at the house of Marcial Sagun and while throwing stones, Ludovico
shouted for the men in the house to come out. She went towards the house of Marcial Sagun and saw the
three accused coming down from the house Of Marcial.

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About that time, Marcelo Doctolero (half-brother of Antonio and the uncle of the accused), was going
towards the house of Marcial Sagun. Marcelo was struck by the accused several times (9 wounds) with
their bolo.
The TC held that Conrado and Virgilio participated as accomplices in the crime.

Issue:
WON the court erred in ruling that Conrado and Virgilio participated as accomplices

Ruling:
No. The Trial Court correctly ruled that Conrado and Virgilio participated as an accomplice.
There is no question that while the three appellants were still stoning and hurling challenges at the house
of Marcial Sagun, they must have already heard the two women thereat protesting what they were doing
and shouting back at them, after which all the three appellants went up the house. Under these facts, it is
impossible that both Virgilio Doctolero and Conrado Doctolero did not know or were not aware when
Ludovico was brutally killing Lolita (1 wound) and Epifania (9 wounds) and wounding the child.
Furthermore, from the nature, number, and locations of the many wounds sustained by the two women
and child, it could not have been possible for Virgilio and Conrado not to hear either the screams of pain
of the victims or the contact between the blade of his bolo and their bodies when their brother Ludovico
was ruthlessly hacking them several times.
Under these circumstances, it is obvious that Conrado and Virgilio knew what was going on inside the
room of the house at the time, but they just stood by and did nothing to stop their brother from brutally
hacking the victims to death. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that the two appellants, Conrado and
Virgilio, merely stood by as their brother Ludovico Doctolero was murdering the two deceased women,
ready to lend assistance. Indeed, there is no question that the presence of these two appellants upstairs
in the house of Marcial Sagun gave their Ludovico Doctolero the encouragement and reliance to proceed
in committing the heinous crimes against two defenseless women and a child.
Where one goes with the principals and in staying outside of the house while the others went inside to
rob and kill the victim, the former effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral aid making
him guilty as an accomplice. One can be an accomplice even if he did not know of the actual crime intended
by the principal provided he was aware that it was an illicit act.
Whatever doubt the court a quo entertained on the criminal responsibility of appellants Conrado and
Virgilio Doctolero did not refer to whether or not they were liable but only with regard to the extent of
their participation. There being ample evidence of their criminal participation, but a doubt exists on the
nature of their liability, the courts should favor the milder form of liability or responsibility which is that of
being mere accomplices, no evidence of conspiracy among the appellants having been shown.
The decision of the trial court is MODIFIED. Conrado Doctolero’s penalty: 3 indeterminate sentences of
10 years of PM to 17 years and 4 months of RT each for the death of the 3 victims, and 20 days of AM for
the less serious physical injuries inflicted on Jonathan Oviedo.

Note: During the pendency of the petition:

Virgilio - died
Ludovico - withdrew his appeal

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People v. De Vera, G.R. No. 128966, 18 August 1999, 312 SCRA 640
Facts:
The prosecution presented an eyewitness in the person of Bernardino Cacao. While bringing out
the garbage, the witness saw a car passing by, driven by victim Frederick Capulong together with four
other passengers. He knew the victim by name who was a resident of the subdivision. He recognized and
identified two of the passengers as Kenneth Florendo and Roderick Garcia, both familiar in the
subdivision.
Cacao did not at first notice anything unusual inside the car while it passed by him, but then he
heard unintelligible voices coming from the car as it was cruising around Denver Loop Street, a circular
road whose entrance and exit were through the same point. His curiosity taking the better part of him,
Cacao walked to the opposite side of the road from where he saw the car already parked. Moments later,
he saw the victim dragged out of the car by Florendo and brought to a grassy place. Florendo was holding
a gun. Upon reaching the grassy spot, Florendo aimed and fired the gun at the victim, hitting him between
the eyes. After the shooting, Florendo and his companions fled in different directions.

Version of the Defense:

Edwin de Vera admitted that, as of June 8, 1992, he and Kenneth Florendo were already close
friends for about a year. Edwin had slept in Kenneth’s house from June 6 to June 8, 1992. Later at around
10:30 am of June 8, Kenneth passed by Edwin's house to invite him back to [the former's] house that
morning and to bring Elmer along.
Edwin and Elmer later went to and arrived at Kenneth's house at 11:00 am. After lunch, Kenneth
asked Edwin to go with him to Filinvest without telling why. It was Deo who mentioned to Edwin that
Kenneth was going to see a friend. Edwin was not aware if Kenneth had also asked the others to go with
him to Filinvest, but the four of them — Kenneth, Edwin, Elmer, and Deo — later proceeded to Filinvest in
Kenneth's car. Edwin sat at the back seat. The time was past 12:00 noon.
Kenneth drove his car. Upon reaching Filinvest, Kenneth stopped at a house and the four of them
alighted in front of the house. Edwin did not know whose house it was. Kenneth and Elmer told Edwin and
Deo to wait near the car because they were going to see a friend. At that point in time, Edwin knew the
person, whom Kenneth and Elmer went to see, by name, never having met him personally before then.
From his conversation with Deo, Edwin found out that the house was where Deo stayed.
Then, Edwin heard the voices of Kenneth and his friend and they appeared to be arguing ('. . .
parang nagtatalo sila'). The voices came from some twenty-two meters away. Not before long, Edwin also
heard a gunshot which came from where Kenneth and Elmer had gone to. He was shocked because he

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was not used to hearing gunfire. Frightened, he panicked and ran away from the place. His singular thought
while running was to get out of Filinvest. Deo also ran away.

Appellant’s Extrajudicial Statement

First, appellant knew of Kenneth Florendo's malevolent intention.
"T: Ito bang balak ni Kenneth para patayin itong si Frederick ay alam mo ba ito at pumayag kang maging
kasapakat nito?
S: Sinabi po niya ito sa akin. Hindi po ako pumayag. Pero noong araw na iyon ay nagkahiyaan na lamang at
napilitan akong sumama."
Second, appellant's companions were armed that day, a fact which revealed the unmistakable plan
of the group.
"T: Ikaw ba ay mayroong dalang armas noong hapon na iyo[n]?
S: Wala po akong dalang armas. Pero itong si Kenneth ay mayroong dalang dalawang baril[,] sina Deo at
Elmer ay wala. Pero noong naroroon na kami sa lugar ay ibinigay ni Kenneth ang isang baril niya kay Deo
at itong si Elmer ay mayroong nang dalang baseball bat."
Third, he cooperated with the other accused in the commission of the crime by placing himself at
a certain distance from Kenneth and the victim in order to act as a lookout. This is clear from the following
portion of his statement:
"S: Kabarkada ko po si Kenneth at dalawang araw po akong nakitulog sa kanila at noong araw ng June 08,
1992 ay sinabihan ako ni Kenneth Gumabao na huwag raw akong uuwi, dahil [mayroon] daw po kaming
lakad. Pagkaraan ng ilang oras ay dumating naman itong si Roderick Garcia @ Deo at may sinabi sa kanya
itong si Kenneth at sinabi naman ito sa akin ni Deo na kaysa raw maunahan siya ni Frederick Sumulong
[sic] ay uunahan na raw po niya ito. Umalis po itong si Kenneth na kasama ang kanyang nobya at itong si
Deo, para ihatid ang kanyang sa hospital at bago sila umalis ay sinabihan ako ni Kenneth na sunduin ko
raw itong si Elmer Castro at magbhihai [magbihis] na rin daw ako at pagdating nila ay . . . lalakad na raw
po kami. Mga ilang oras pa ay sinundo ko na itong si Elmer Castro at pagdating namin sa bahay nila Kenneth
ay naroroon na itong si Kenneth at Deo. Matapos magpalit ng damit itong si Kenneth ay sumakay na kami
sa kanilang kotse at nagtuloy sa kanilang katabing bahay at doon ay kumain kami. Pagkatapos noon ay
umalis na kami at nagtuloy sa F[i]l-Invest. P[a]gdating namin sa isang lugar doon sa medyo malayo-layo sa
bahay nila Deo ay bumaba na itong si Deo at Elmer at sila ay nagpunta doon sa lugar ng pinagbarilan para
kunin ang bayad sa utang ni Fred[er]ick Capulong sa tiyuhin ni Deo. Pagkaraan ng ilang minuto ay
sumunod po kami ni Kenn[e]th sa lugar at ako ay naiwan nang medyo malayo-layo sa lugar upang
tignan kung mayroong darating na tao. Samantalang si Kenneth ay lumapit kina Deo at Frederick at
kasunod noon ay nagkaroon ng sagutan itong si Kenneth at Frederick at nakita kong inaawat ni Deo itong
si Kenneth. Hindi nakapagpigil itong si Kenneth at nasipa niya s[i] Frederick at kasunod noon ay binunot
niya ang kanyang baril na kalibre .38 at pinaputukan niya ng isang beses itong si Frederick na noong tamaan
ay natumba sa lupa. Lumapit si Elmer kina Kenneth habang binabatak ni Kenneth itong si Frederick at
kasunod po noon ay lumapit sa akin si Deo at sinabihan ako na tumakbo na kami. Tumakbo na po kami,

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pero ako po ay nahuli ng mga security guard ng Subdivision at itong si Deo ay nahuli naman sa kanilang
bahay. Itong sina Kenneth at Elmer ay hindi pa nahuhuli."

Issue:
Whether De Vera is an accomplice or a conspirator.

Held:
De Vera was an accomplice. Knowing that Florendo intended to kill the victim and that the three
co-accused were carrying weapons, he had acted as a lookout to watch for passersby. He was not an
innocent spectator; he was at the locus criminis in order to aid and abet the commission of the crime.
These facts, however, did not make him a conspirator; at most, he was only an accomplice.
The Revised Penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when "two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." To prove conspiracy, the
prosecution must establish the following three requisites: "(1) that two or more persons came to an
agreement, (2) that the agreement concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) that the execution of
the felony (was) decided upon." Except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown
that the accused performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The Court has held that in most
instances, direct proof of a previous agreement need not be established, for conspiracy may be deduced
from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action and community of interest.
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as "those persons who, not being
included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts." The
Court has held that an accomplice is "one who knows the criminal design of the principal and cooperates
knowingly or intentionally therewith by an act which, even if not rendered, the crime would be
committed just the same." To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must be present: (1)
the "community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;" and (2) the performance of previous or
simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.
The distinction between the two concepts needs to be underscored, in view of its effect on
appellant's penalty. Once conspiracy is proven, the liability is collective and not individual. The act of one
of them is deemed the act of all.In the case of an accomplice, the liability is one degree lower than that of
a principal.
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal
design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon
such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached the decision,
and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be
committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be
committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the

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authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the
perpetration of the offense.
In the present case, Appellant De Vera knew that Kenneth Florendo had intended to kill Capulong
at the time, and he cooperated with the latter. But he himself did not participate in the decision to kill
Capulong; that decision was made by Florendo and the others. He joined them that afternoon after the
decision to kill had already been agreed upon; he was there because "nagkahiyaan na." This is clear from
his statement, which we quote again for the sake of clarity:
"T: Ito bang balak ni Kenneth para patayin itong si Frederick ay alam mo ba ito at pumayag kang maging
kasapakat nito?
S: Sinabi po niya ito sa akin. Hindi po ako pumayag. Pero noong araw na iyon ay nagkahiyaan na lamang at
napilitan akong sumama."
Significantly, the plan to kill could have been accomplished without him. It should be noted further
that he alone was unarmed that afternoon. Florendo and Garcia had guns, and Castro had a baseball bat.
In any event, the prosecution evidence has not established that appellant was part of the
conspiracy to kill the victim. His participation, as culled from his own Statement, was made, after the
decision to kill was already a fait accompli. Thus, in several cases, the Court has held:
"Lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, that creates the doubt whether they had acted as principals or
accomplices in the perpetration of the offense, impels this Court to resolve in their favor the question, by
holding . . . that they were guilty of the 'milder form of responsibility,' i.e., guilty as mere accomplices."

Garces v. People, G.R. No. 173858, 17 July 2007

Prosecution’s Version: On August 2, 1992, between 8:00 and 9:00 o’clock in the evening, AAA was on her
way to the chapel when the five accused suddenly appeared and approached her. Rosendo Pacursa covered
her mouth with his hands and told her not to shout or she will be killed. He then brought her inside a nearby
tobacco barn while his four companions stood guard outside.

Inside the barn, Pacursa started kissing AAA. Private complainant fought back but to no avail. Thereafter,
Pacursa succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. After a while, they heard people shouting and calling
the name of AAA. At this point, petitioner Ernesto Garces entered the barn, covered AAA’s mouth, then
dragged her outside. He also threatened to kill her if she reports the incident.

Upon reaching the house of Florentino Garces, petitioner released AAA. Shortly afterwards, AAA’s relatives
found her crying, wearing only one slipper and her hair was disheveled. They brought her home but when
asked what happened, AAA could not answer because she was in a state of shock. After a while, she was
able to recount the incident.

Rosendo Pacursa denied that he raped the victim, while his co-accused presented alibis as their defense.

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Defense: Pacursa testified that he and AAA were sweethearts for almost a year prior to the incident. On
the night of August 2, 1992, he was on his way to the house of Antonio Pira, Jr. to watch a televised
basketball game when he saw AAA. The latter allegedly wanted to have a talk with him so he led her to the
tobacco barn about 15 meters away, so that no one might see them. They were alone by the door of the
barn talking, embracing and kissing. They only parted ways when he saw the relatives of AAA. He denied
having sexual intercourse with her. After the incident, he received a letter8 from AAA asking him to elope

On the other hand, petitioner, Antonio Pira, Jr., and Aurelio Pira, testified that they were watching a
televised basketball game at the house of Antonio Pira, Jr. at the time the alleged rape transpired. They
denied seeing Pacursa that night.

Trial Court: Pacursa guilty of Forcible Abduction with Rape while petitioner Garces was found guilty as an
accessory to the crime. Antonio Pira, Jr. and Aurelio Pira were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence

Both Pacursa and petitioner appealed the decision with the Court of Appeals. However, Pacursa
subsequently withdrew his appeal. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: W/N GARCES IS CONSIDERED AS AN ACCOMPLICE TO THE CRIME

HELD: YES.

Petitioner claims that no rape was committed and that there is no evidence to show that he covered the
mouth of the complainant when he brought her out of the barn.

The facts show that petitioner participated in the commission of the crime even before complainant was
raped. He was present when Pacursa abducted complainant and when he brought her to the barn. He
positioned himself outside the barn together with the other accused as a lookout. When he heard the
shouts of people looking for complainant, he entered the barn and took complainant away from Pacursa

Having known of the criminal design and thereafter acting as a lookout, petitioner is liable as an
accomplice, there being insufficient evidence to prove conspiracy, and not merely as an accessory. As
defined in the Revised Penal Code, accomplices are those who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate
in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.34 The two elements necessary to hold
petitioner liable as an accomplice are present: (1) community of criminal design, that is, knowing the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; and (2)
performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime

With respect to petitioner, the penalty imposed upon accomplices in a consummated crime is the penalty
next lower in degree than that prescribed for the felony. Since simple rape is punishable with reclusion
perpetua, the penalty of reclusion temporal should also be imposed on petitioner in its medium period in
the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

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RULING:

Accused Rosendo Pacursa is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE, and being a
minor at the time the crime was committed, is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.

Petitioner Ernesto Garces is found guilty as an accomplice to the crime of rape, and is also sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to 15 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

C. Accessories – Art. 19 and 20 (RPC); PD 1612; PD 1829

People v. Talingdan, L-32126, 6 July 1978, 84 SCRA 19
Facts:
Bernardo Bagabag was murdered in his own house in Abra on June 24, 1967 by Talingdan, Tobias,
Berras, Bides and Teresa Domogma, his alleged wife (there is no proof of their marriage that could be
presented to the prosecution).
The murder was witnessed by Corazon, the eldest child of Bernardo and Teresa whom she testified
to the crime committed by the accused-appellants. Bernardo and Teresa have had several conflicts in their
married life and the latter was suspected of having an illicit affair with Talingdan, a policeman who lives
nearby. After Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation with the accused. These
subsequent acts of her constitute concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime which
makes her liable as an accessory to the crime.
Prior to the violent incident, Bernardo and Teresa have had several conflicts in their married life
because Teresa would often withdraw from their house and each time Bernardo took time to look for her.
The longest even for more than 3 weeks. It was suspected that Teresa is having an illicit affair with
Talingdan, a policeman who lives nearby.
Two days before the crime, Teresa was slapped several times by Bernardo after a violent quarrel.
She sought the help of Talingdan who challenged Bernardo to come down, but the latter refused. Then,
Talingdan left after shouting "If I will find you someday, I will kill you."
The following day, Corazon overheard her mother’s meeting with the other accused-appellants about their
plot to kill her father in a small house located about 300 -400 meters away from their house. She
approached and heard one of them say, “Could he elude a bullet?” Corazon was then driven away by her
mother saying, “You tell your father that we will kill him.”
On the night of the murder, Corazon was cooking food for supper in the kitchen of their house, she
saw her mother go down the house through the stairs and go to the yard where she met with the other
appellants. As Corazon was in their “batalan” (3-4 meters away from where the appellants were). She
could not hear them but she recognized all of them.
As supper was then ready, the child caged her parents to eat, Bernardo who was in the room
adjoining the kitchen did not heed his daughter's call to supper but continued working on a plow, while
Teresa also excused herself by saying she would first put her small baby to sleep. After eating supper alone,
Corazon told her father about the persons outside but he ignored her. He went to the kitchen and sat on
the floor near the door then he was fired from below the stairs of the batalan. The four accused then

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climbed the stairs of the "batalan" carrying their long guns and seeing that Bernardo was still alive,
Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again. Bides and Berras did not fire their guns at that precise time, but
when Corazon tried to call for help Bides warned her, saying "You call for help and I will kill you", so she
kept silent. The assailants then fled from the scene, going towards the east.
Corazon confessed to her father’s relatives the identities of the murderers during his burial.
The trial court found them guilty of the offense and so the five accused appealed to their
conviction.

Issue:
WON Teresa Domogma is an accessory to the crime of murder.

Ruling:
YES. The court affirmed the decision held by the trial court that the accused are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and the wife of the victim Teresa Domogma is guilty as accessory to the same
murder.
Not showing the actual cooperation on her part with her co-appellants in their culpable acts does
not mean she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is in the record morally convincing proof that
she is at the very least an accessory to the offense committed by her co-accused. She was inside the room
when her husband was shot. As she came out after the shooting, she inquired from Corazon if she was
able to recognize the assailants of her father. When Corazon Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras
and Bides as the culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone,
she went to the extent of warning her, "Don't tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody."
Later, when the peace officers who repaired to their house to investigate what happened, instead
of helping them with the information given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no suspects in mind.
In other words, whereas, before the actual shooting of her husband, she was more or less passive in her
attitude regarding her co-appellants' conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him, after Bernardo was
killed, she became active in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute
"concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an accessory
after the fact under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.

Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, G.R. No. 111426, 11 July 1994

Petitioner was found guilty for violating the Anti-Fencing Law. Ordered the trial court to receive additional
evidence on the “correct valuation” of the pieces of jewelry involved to determine the penalty to be
imposed. Department of Public

Encarnacion, the undersecretary of Works and Highways, just arrived at his residence at around 9:45PM
from the airport. He left his maids and driver to pick up his belongings and while he proceeded inside his
house. 5 men proked their guns to his driver and maid and they were dragged inside the house. They
pointed a gun at him and made him lie face down. Ransacked the house to take cash, jewelries, and other
personal properties then left. He immediately reported to the police. An operation group was assigned to
the case.
He also reported to the Western Police District. A group of WPD representatives came and asked for the

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list of belongings and a sketch of the individuals. He was tols that some of his items were in Chinatown as
tipped by an informant police. An entrapment ensued: he will pretend to be a buyer with his wife. They
were able to recognize the jewelry stolen at the stall of Norma Pamintuan: earring and ring studded with
diamonds and gold chain with crucifix. Invited her to precinct and investigated the same.
Petitioner insists she did not know the items were stolen, surrendered the items and gave them to wife.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether the 3rd element of fencing is present
(2) Whether the court proved the value of php93,000 for the stolen valuables

HELD:
(1) The guilt of accused-appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt. All the elements of the crime
of fencing in violation of the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 (P.D. No. 1612):
1. A crime of robbery of theft has been committed
2. A person, not a participant in said crime, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells; or in any manner deals in any article or item, object or anything of value;
3. With personal knowledge, or should be known to said person that said item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery of theft;
4. with intent to gain for himself or for another
Accused is not a mere accessory but a principal. The crimes of robbery and theft, and fencing, are separate
and distinct offenses. The state may choose to prosecute him either under the RPC or PD 1612, although
the preference for the latter would seem inevitable considering that fencing is a malum prohibitum, and
PD 1612 creates a presumption of fencing and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the
property.
3rd element: Anti-fencing Law, sec 5. 'PRESUMPTION ON FENCING. – Mere possession of any goods,
article, item object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery of thievery shall be prima
facie evidence of fencing.' The petitioner failed to rebut the presumption and solely relied on the
testimony of her brother who disclosed that she was engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry and that
she used to buy from a certain Fredo. Fredo was not presented as a witness ans it was not establishe that
he was a licensed dealer of jewelry.

(2) the findings are based only in the testimony of Mr. Encarnacion. He admitted that only one earring was
recovered. Its value was reduced from 15k to 7.5k. Total value is php87,000.

Section 3(a) of P.D. No. 1612 provides that the penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon the accused
if value is more than P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00. Exceeds the latter sum, the penalty of
prision mayor in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00. Total penalty shall
not exceed 20 years. This penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty pertaining
thereto provided in the RPC shall also be imposed.
The maximum penalty in this case would then be 18 years and 5 months, which is within the range of
reclusion temporal maximum. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law which allows the imposition of
an indeterminate penalty which, with respect to offenses penalized by a special law, shall range from a
minimum which shall not be lower than the minimum prescribed by the special law to a maximum which

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should not exceed the maximum provided therein, the petitioner can thus be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as minimum
to eighteen (18) years and five (5) months of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum, with the
accessory penalties corresponding to the latter.
RULING: petition is partly GRANTED, setting aside the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals insofar
as it sets aside the penalty imposed by RTC of Manila and orders the remand of the case for the trial court
to receive evidence with respect to the correct value of the properties involved. Decision of RTC AFFIRMED
subject to the modification of the penalty which is hereby reduced to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from Ten (10) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor maximum as minimum to Eighteen (18) years and
Five (5) months of Reclusion Temporal maximum as maximum, with the accessory penalties if the latter.

VI. Plurality of Crimes

A. Compound crime (delito compuesto)
People v. Tabaco, G.R. No. 100382, 19 March 1997

FACTS:
In the evening of March 22, 1987, the 117th PC stationed at Aparri, Cagayan, under then Lt. James
Andres Melad, sponsored a cock derby, under the name of Jose Ting, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located
at Aparri, Cagayan. This being so, peace officers in uniform with long firearms were assigned as guards to
maintain peace and order at the cockpit arena namely: (1) Sgt. Benito Raquepo; (2) CIS Roque P. Datugan,
both from the 117th PC and (3) Pat. Andres Semana, INP, Aparri, Cagayan. Accused Mario Tabaco who was
in civilian clothes claims to have been also assigned by his Commanding Officer of 117th PC, to verify the
presence of NPAs and assist in the protection of VIPs in the cockpit arena, bringing with him his M-14
issued firearm. Other peace officers who came to participate were: (1) Policeman Mariano Retreta of INP,
Buguey, Cagayan, who arrived with the deceased Jorge Siriban and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., Licerio Antiporda
II; (2) Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer of 117th PC Company; (3) Policeman Romeo Regunton (deceased) who was also
armed, arrived in company with the deceased Ex-Mayor Arreola; (4) Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, INP
Buguey; (5) Pat. Barba; and (6) CIC PC Paragas.
At about nine (9) o'clock in the evening of same date, the group of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola of
Buguey, Cagayan, arrived at the cockpit arena. His companions were (1) Antonio Villasin; (2) Rosario
Peneyra; (3) victim Loreto Pita, Jr. and/or five (5) of them including the Mayor. They occupied and were
(4th row) north western part cockpit-gate. Others seated with the Mayor were: (1) the late Capt. Oscar
Tabulog; (2) the late Pat. Romeo Regunton, who was at the back of the mayor; (3) the late Felicito Rigunan.
The accused CIC Tabaco was seated on the arm of the bench situated at the lower portion of the arena
about more than three (3) meters away, (infront and a little bit in the west), from the place where the late
Mayor and his group were seated (at the 4th row of seats upper portion). During the ocular inspection
conducted, the Court noticed the distance to be more than three (3) meters, and/or probably 4-5 meters.

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At about ten (10) o'clock 1987, while the accused Mario Tabaco was seated as described above, he
suddenly without warning or provocation, shot the late mayor Jorge Arreola, with his M-14 rifle, followed
by several successive burst of gunfire, resulting in the shooting to death of the late Mayor Arreola, Capt.
Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Romeo Regunton, although the latter managed to run passing
through the western gate near the gaffers cage but was chased by accused Tabaco. Regunton was later
found dead inside the canteen of Mrs. Amparo Go inside the Octagon cockpit arena.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317, involving the killings of Oscar Tabulog, Jorge
Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, respectively, are complex crimes and should have been
prosecuted under only one information?

RULING:
We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion perpetua for
all four murder cases. The trial court holding that a complex crime was committed since "the evidence
shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or successive automatic
gun fires, meaning continuous (emphasis ours) does not hold water.
The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said case, there was only one bullet
which killed two persons. Hence, there was only a single act which produced two crimes, resulting in a
specie of complex crime known as a compound crime, wherein a single act produces two or more grave
or less grave felonies.In the case at bench, there was more than one bullet expended by the accused-
appellant in killing the four victims. The evidence adduced by the prosecution show that Tabaco entered
the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-machine gun. 28 He fired the weapon, which contained 20 rounds
of bullets in its magazine, continuously. When the rifle was recovered from Tabaco, the magazine was
already empty. Moreover, several spent shells were recovered from the scene of the crime.
“In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the death of each
of the five persons who were killed by appellant and the physical injuries inflicted upon each of the two
other persons injured were not caused by the performance by the accused of one simple act as provided
for by said article. Although it is true that several successive shots were fired by the accused in a short
space of time, yet the factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to each death caused or
physical injuries inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct and separate shot fired by the accused,
who thus made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as those resulting from every single act that
produced the same. Although apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses successively in a matter of
seconds, yet each person killed and each person injured by him became the victim, respectively, of a
separate crime of homicide or frustrated homicide. Except for the fact that five crimes of homicide and
two cases of frustrated homicide were committed successively during the tragic incident, legally speaking
there is nothing that would connect one of them with its companion offenses. (emphasis ours)”
In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger of the
Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its special mechanism, the person firing it has only to keep pressing
the trigger with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which
should produce the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them.

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The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda. True, the case of Pineda provided us with a definition
of what a complex crime is. But that is not the point. What is relevant is that Art. 48, was not applied in
the said case because the Supreme Court found that there were actually several homicides committed by
the perpetrators. Had the trial court read further, it would have seen that the Supreme Court in fact
recognized the "deeply rooted . . . doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such
acts constitute separate and distinct crimes." Clarifying the applicability of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, the Supreme Court further stated in Pineda that "to apply the first half of Article 48, . . . there must
be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law." 33 (emphasis
supplied) The firing of several bullets by Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire,
constitutes several acts. Each person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of murder.
There is no showing that only a single missile passed through the bodies of all four victims. The killing of
each victim is thus separate and distinct from the other. In People vs. Pardo 34 we held that: Where the
death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two different shots, two separate murders,
and not a complex crime, are committed. Furthermore, the trial court's reliance on the case of People vs.
Lawas is misplaced. The doctrine enunciated in said case only applies when it is impossible to ascertain the
individual deaths caused by numerous killers. In the case at bench, all of the deaths are attributed, beyond
a shadow of a doubt, to the accused-appellant. Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a
burst of gunfire cannot be considered a complex crime. They are separate crimes. The accused-appellant
must therefore be held liable for each and every death he has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four
sentences of reclusion perpetua.

People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 127663, 11 March 1999 ****

FACTS:

On September 17, 1995, at around 8:00 in the evening, William Montano (16 years
old), Randy Tibule (17 years old), Jean Marie Garcia, Willie Acosta, Sandra Montano and Ramon Garcia, Jr.
were at the house of Randy Tibule in Manaoag,
Pangasinan. They were discussing how to go to the wedding party of Jean Marie's cousin in Sitio
Cabaoangan.

After discussion, they rode in the tricycle driven by Ramon Garcia going to Cabaoangan. Behind Garcia
were Tibule and Willie. Jean was seated inside the side car with Sandra and William Montano.

After making a turn along the barangay road leading to Sitio Cabaoangan, they met appellant Rolando
Valdez and his companions who were armed with guns. The tricycle's headlight flashed on their faces.
Without warning, they pointed their guns and fired at Montano's group. Thereafter, after uttering the
words, "nataydan, mapan tayon"

The shooting incident left Ramon Garcia, Jean Marie Garcia, Sandra Montano and Willie Acosta dead.

trial court rendered a judgment of conviction in the two cases:

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1. the accused ROLANDO VALDEZ y LIPURDA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MULTIPLE MURDER WITH DOUBLE FRUSTRATED MURDER.
2. the accused ROLANDO VALDEZ y LIPURDA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM AND AMMUNITIONS

Accused-appellant predicated his argument on the mistaken premise that he was not positively identified
in the case at bar although he admitted that it was established that he was at the scene of the crime. This
argument will not hold simply because accusedappellant had been positively identified by eyewitnesses
and victims William Montano and Randy Tibule.

ISSUE: WHETHER or not accused appellant is gulty of Complex Crime

HELD:

The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ARTICLE 48. Penalty for complex crimes — When a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.

It is clear from the evidence on record, however, that the four crimes of murder resulted not from a single
act but from several individual and distinct acts. For one thing, the evidence indicates that there was more
than one gunman involved, and the act of each gunman is distinct from that of the other. It cannot be said
therefore, that there is but a single act of firing a single firearm. There were also several empty bullet shells
recovered from the scene of the crime. This confirms the fact that several shots were fired. Furthermore,
considering the relative positions of the gunmen and their victims, some of whom were riding the
motorized tricycle itself while the others were seated inside the sidecar thereof, it was absolutely
impossible for the four victims to have been hit and killed by a single bullet. Each act by each gunman
pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons
constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to the complex crime of multiple murder. We
therefore rule that accused-appellant is guilty, not of a complex crime of multiple murder, but of four
counts of murder for the death of the four victims in this case In the same manner, accused- appellant is
likewise held guilty for two counts of frustrated murder.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
for the crime of murder. Without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission
of the crime, the medium penalty is the lower indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. In the case at bar,
accused-appellant, being guilty of four separate counts of murder, the proper penalty should be four
sentences of reclusion perpetua. In addition, he being guilty of two counts of frustrated murder, accused-
appellant must be meted out an indeterminate sentence ranging from a minimum of 6 years and 1 day of
prision mayor to a maximum of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal for each offense.

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People v. Sanchez, G.R No. 131116, 27 August 1999, 313 SCRA 254

Facts: Around 10:00 am, Malabanan testified that accused Ding Peradillas arrived and asked for mayor
Sanchez. Peradillas informed mayor Sanchez that there would be a birthday party that night at Dr. Virgilio
Velecina's house in Lanot, Calauan, Laguna, near the abode of Peradillas. Peradillas assured mayor Sanchez
of Nelson Peñalosa's presence thereat. Dr. Velecina was a political opponent of mayor Sanchez for the
mayoralty seat of Calauan, Laguna. Mayor Sanchez then replied, "Bahala na kayo mga anak. Ayusin lang
ninyo ang trabaho," and left the premises. Peradillas immediately called Corcolon and Averion and relayed
the message — "Ayos na ang paguusap at humanap na lang ng sasakyan." All the accused, including
Malabanan, understood it as an order to kill Nelson Peñalosa, one of the political leaders of Dr. Velecina.

Peradillas, Corcolon and Averion made arrangements to acquire two-way radios and a vehicle for the
operation. At 6:00 pm, Peradillas and Malabanan proceeded to mayor Sanchez' house where they met
Averion and Corcolon, with the car and two-way radios.

At around 7:00 in the evening, Malabanan and the three accused boarded the car and went to near Dr.
Velecina's house. Peradillas alighted and walked towards his own house, near Dr. Velecina's house, to
check whether Nelson Peñalosa was at the party. Thereafter, using the two-way radio, Peradillas informed
the occupants of the car that Nelson Peñalosa's jeep was leaving the Velecina compound. Accused Averion
immediately drove the car to the front of Peradillas' house and the latter hopped in the car's back seat.
Corcolon sat in the front seat beside him; witness Malabanan sat at the left side of the backseat and
Peradillas stayed at the right side of the backseat. The group pursued Peñalosa's jeep. When the accused's
car was passing Victoria Farms, located about 100 meters from Peñalosa compound, Corcolon ordered
Averion to overtake Peñalosa's jeep. As the car overtook the jeep, Peradillas and Corcolon fired at
Peñalosa's jeep, using M-16 and baby armalite rifles, executed in automatic firing mode. There were three
bursts of gunfire. Based on the sketch prepared by Malabanan, illustrating the relative position of their car
and Nelson's jeep at the time of the shooting, the assailants were at the left side of the jeep.

Rickson Peñalosa, son of Nelson Peñalosa, fell from the jeep. The jeep, however, continued running in a
zigzag position until it overturned in front of Irais Farm. After the shooting, the accused proceeded to the
house of mayor Sanchez in Bai, Laguna, and reported to mayor Sanchez that Peñalosa was already dead.
The trial court considered the crime as a complex crime of double murder punishable under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code. However, at the time of the commission of the offense on April 13, 1991, there
was a constitutional proscription on the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, each of the accused was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and to pay damages to the heirs of the victims, as earlier quoted.

ISSUE: WON There is a complex Crime

HELD: In People v. Vargas, Jr., we ruled that several shots from a Thompson sub-machine, in view of its
special mechanism causing several deaths, although caused by a single act of pressing the trigger, are
considered several acts. Although each burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger

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of the submachinegun, in view of its special mechanism the person firing it has only to keep pressing the
trigger of the sub-machinegun, with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of
pressing the trigger which should be considered as producing the several felonies, but the number of
bullets which actually produced them.

In the instant case, Malabanan testified that he heard three bursts of gunfire from the two armalites used
by accused Corcolon and Peradillas. Thus, the accused are criminally liable for as many offenses resulting
from pressing the trigger of the armalites. Therefore, accused are liable for two counts of murder
committed against the victims, Nelson and Rickson Peñalosa, instead of the complex crime of double
murder.

B. Complex crime proper (delito complejo)

People vs. Hernandez, L-6025-26, 18 July 1956, 99 Phil. 515
Facts:
Around March 15, 1945, the accused Hernandez conspired, confederated and cooperated with each
other as well as 31 other defendants on the crime of rebellion with multiple murders, arsons and robberies.
The accused were officers, members or affiliated with the Congress of Labor Organization, formerly known
as Committee on Labor Organization, an institution of the Communist Party of the Philippines. Their work
also were tied to the Huks (HMB) who have risen publicly with the purpose of removing from territory
from the Philippines from the government. They initiate armed raids, sorties and ambushes against police,
army and civilian targets. The court viewed such activities (murder, arson, planned destruction of property,
pillage, looting, etc.) as necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion.
The prosecution maintained that Hernandez is charged with rebellion complexed with murders,
arsons and robberies, for which the capital punishment may be imposed. The defense contends, among
other things, that rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. The lower court
sentenced Hernandez merely to life imprisonment. A petition for bail was filed by Amado Hernandez on
December 28, 1953, which was denied by a resolution of the Supreme Court dated February 2, 1954. A
similar petition for bail was filed by Hernandez on June 26, 1954 and renewed on December 22, 1955.

Issue:
WON rebellion can be complex with components of murder, arson, etc.

Ruling:
NO.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: "When a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period."
Pursuant to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code "any person, merely participating or executing
the commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. “The
penalty is increased to prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20, 000 for "any person who promotes,
maintains or heads a rebellion or insurrection or who, while holding any public office or employment, takes
part therein":

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1. "engaging in war against the forces of the government",

2. "destroying property", or
3. "committing serious violence",
4. "exacting contributions or"
5. "diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated".
Whether performed singly or collectively, these five (5) classes of acts constitute only one offense,
and no more, and are, altogether, subject to only one penalty — prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
P20,000.

One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of said Article 135, is by
"engaging in war against the forces of the government" and "committing serious violence" in the
prosecution of said "war". These expressions imply everything that war connotes, namely; resort to arms,
requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to
property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its
wake — except that, very often, it is worse than war in the international sense, for it involves internal
struggle, a fight between brothers, with a bitterness and passion or ruthlessness seldom found in a contest
between strangers. Being within the purview of "engaging in war" and "committing serious violence", said
resort to arms, with the resulting impairment or destruction of life and property, constitutes not two or
more offense, but only one crime — that of rebellion plain and simple. Inasmuch as the acts specified in
said Article 135 constitute, one single crime, it follows necessarily that said acts offer no occasion for the
application of Article 48, which requires therefor the commission of, at least, two crimes.
Political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes
as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime
usually regarded as common like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance
"to the Government the territory of the Philippines Islands or any part thereof," then said offense becomes
stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the
former acquires the political character of the latter.
There is one other reason — and a fundamental one at that — why Article 48 of our Penal Code
cannot be applied in the case at bar: If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes
were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable
upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor,
in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding
12 years of prision mayor; and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of
aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him.
However, under Article 48, said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence
of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of
the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant. Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted
for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which
would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately.
The crime charged in the amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under
such charge cannot exceed 12 years of prision mayor and a fine of P20, 000; and that, in conformity with

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the policy of the Supreme Court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said
defendant may be allowed bail.

Enrile vs. Salazar, G.R. No. 92163, 5 June 1990, 184 SCRA 217
Facts:
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by
law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the
strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103,
in Criminal Case No. 9010941.
The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors
composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and
Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10,
1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila,
without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The
following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he
was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo
Dula Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for
habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging
that he was deprived of his constitutional rights being:
1) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
2) charged with criminal offense which no complaint was filed or preliminary offense conducted;
3) denied his right to bail;
4) arrested under a warrant where the judge did not first determine probable cause.
Enrile insists that there is no such crime as rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder.
He invoked the ruling in the landmark case of People vs Hernandez where it was ruled that rebellion cannot
be complexed with common crimes such as murder; as such, the proper crime that should have been
charged against him is simple rebellion – which is bailable.
Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him. He
claimed that it only took Judge Salazar one hour and twenty minutes (from the raffling of the case to him)
to issue the warrant. He claimed that such period is so short that it was impossible for the judge to have
been able to examine the voluminous record of the case from the prosecution’s office – that being, the
constitutional provision that a judge may only issue a warrant of arrest after personally determining the
existence of probable cause has not been complied with.

Issue:
WON the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito complejo)

Ruling:

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NO. The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned
information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must
be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final
conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in
character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the amount
of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the
corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
The Court initially deliberated on either abandoning the Hernandez Doctrine and adopting Article 48,
holding the Hernandez doctrine but only to offenses committed in furtherance of rebellion but not to acts
committed in the course of rebellion, or maintain the doctrine as applying to make rebellion absorb all
other offenses committed in its course. By majority vote, the ruling in People v. Hernandez remains a good
law.
There is a fundamental reason why Article 48 of the Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at
bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately, if could
be done, the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: 1) for the crime of
rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon
the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and 2) for the crime
of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present.
In other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be
imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in
the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the
theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.

People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 141125, 28 February 2002

Facts:
This is an automatic review pursuant to Art. 47 of the RPC, as amended by Sec 22 of RA 7659 of the RTC
decision of Baguio City convicting accused-appellant Jeffrey Garcia of Forcible Abduction with Rape and 3
counts of Rape and sentencing him to death.

Cleopatra Changlapon was a sophomore student of Physical Therapy at the Baguio Central University. She
was on her way home from school, when as she was passing by Bonifacio Street, she saw a white van
approaching. She stopped to let it pass but it suddenly stopped and rear slide door opened and she was
pulled by the arms. She struggled but something was sprayed on her face that made her eyes sting and
feel dizzy. She shouted and felt a fist blow on her stomach and she fell unconscious.

When she woke up she was inside a roomy, undressed , lying on a bed, with 4 men. The first man with
bombay features was already naked and laid on top of her. She struggled but he held her left arm, while
Garcia held her right arm after he burned her chin with cigarette. The two other men held her legs and
kept them apart to let the first man rape her. They boxed her thighs and burned her legs with cigarettes.

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After he was finished with her, Garcia laid on top of her. One man sat on her right leg while the other held
her left leg. She tried to box Garcia but bombay guy held her right arm while Garcia held her left. He had
raped her in that position.

The third man with pimples went on top of her. Bombay kept his hold on her right arm, while pimple guy
held her left. She tried to close her legs but she got hit on the right thigh which forced her to keep her legs
apart. He had successfully raped her.

The fourth man then took his turn. She was already feeling helpless and too tired to struggle. Bombay guy
burned her panties with lighted cigarette. As she closed her eyes she heard the men laughing. After he
was done he got up. Her private parts were aching, she was feeling dizzy and tried to move but Garcia hit
her on the abdomen.

Again, they sprayed something on her face then she blacked out. She woke up by the roadside. It was still
dark and she already had her clothes on. A taxi passed bu and picked her up and brought her home. Her
aunt saw her crying as she alighted the taxi and noticed that her clothes were inverted and she smelled
bad. As they asked her what happened she kept crying, when she gained her composure she told them
she was raped by 4 men.

The next day she was brought to Baguio Police Station. After giving her statement she was brought to the
crime laboratory of the city police and was examined. Where results show multiple second degree burns,
MIming her identification of Garcia as one of her rapists.

On 27 July, formal charges for forcible abduction with rape were brought against him and three John Does.
He was convicted.

Issue:
Whether or not Garcia is guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and three other counts
of rape

Ruling:
Yes. Garcia is guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. He should also be held liable for
the other counts of rape committed by his co-accused considering the clear conspiracy among them shown
by their obvious concerted effort to perpetrate the crime. They had helped one another for the
consummation of the crime. While one mounted her, the other three held her arms and legs. They also
burned her with cigarettes to stop her from struggling.

It is also correctly held by the trial court that there can be only one complex crime of forcible abduction
with rape. The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape. The subsequent acts can
no longer be considered as separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. Therefore accused-
appellant should be convicted of one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and three separate
acts of rape.

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The penalty for complex crimes is the penalty for the most serious crimes which shall be imposed in its
maximum period. Rape is the most serious and when committed by 2 or more is punishable with reclusion
perpetua to death under Art. 266-B of RPC. Thus appellant should be sentenced to death.

Decision affirmed with modifications. Accused is sentenced to suffer penalty of death for the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape and reclusion perpetua for each count of rape. He is ordered to pay
complainant for actual and moral damages and civil indemnity.

Batulanon v. People, G.R. No. 139857, 15 September 2006

FACTS:
Polomok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Leonila Batulanon as its Cashier/Manager from
May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to
the member of the cooperative.

During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were
discovered. It was found that Batulanon falsified four commercial documents, all checks/cash vouchers
representing granted loans to different persons namely: Omadlao, Oracion, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon,
making it appear that said names were granted a loan and received the amount of the checks/cash
vouchers when in truth and in fact the said persons never received a grant, never received the checks, and
never signed the check vouchers issued in their names. In furtherance, Batulanon released to herself the
checks and received the loans and thereafter misappropriated and converted it to her own use and benefit.

Thereafter, four Informations for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents were filed against
Batulanon. The prosecution presented Medallo, Gopio, Jr. and Jayoma as witnesses. Medallo, the posting
clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash vouchers testified that Batulanon forged
the signatures of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo. Gopio, Jr. stated that Oracion is Batulanon’ sister-in-law
and Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the
cooperative is not open to minors.

On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon of Estafa through Falsification
of Commercial Documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, hence this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether the crime committed by Batulanon was Falsification of Private Documents.

RULING:

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Yes. Although the offense charged in the Information is Estafa through Falsification of Commercial
Documents, Batulanon could be convicted of Falsification of Private Documents under the well-settled rule
that it is the allegation in the information that determines the nature of the offense and not the technical
name given in the preamble of the information.

As there is no complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Private Documents, it is important to

ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with Falsification of a Private Document or with Estafa. If
the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be
charged is falsification. If the Estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the
proper crime is Estafa. We find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents in the cases of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo.

In the case of Dennis Batulanon, records show that Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What
she did was to sign: “by: Ibatulanon” to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of
Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the modes of Falsification under Article 171 because there is
nothing untruthful about the fact that she used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter,
obtained the proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful
or false statements, which is not attendant in this case. As to whether, such representation involves fraud
which caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for
falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that Batulanon is also guilty of Falsification
of Private Document with respect to the case involving the cash voucher of Dennis Batulanon.

C. Continuing crime (delito continuado)

People v. Madrigal-Gonzales, L-16688, 30 April 1963
Facts:
The accused-appellee Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales was charged with malversation of public funds. Said
accused, while administrator of the Social Welfare Administration (SWA), appropriated, took and
misappropriated the said amount on five different occasions comprised within the period from February,
1954 to September, 1955.
Simultaneously on the same date, the same accused-appellee Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales was
charged with the crime of falsification of public documents under 27 separate information. In said 27
separate information, it was alleged that cash aids were given when no such aide were indeed distributed
to the persons named, and at the time and place and in such amounts specified, or by making and/or
causing it to appear that certain relief supplies or merchandise were purchased by the accused Pacita
Madrigal-Gonzales when in truth and in fact no such relief supplies were purchased, thereby making
untruthful statements in a narration of fact in said public and official documents.
The accused alleged that said 27 separate information for falsification indeed constitute only one
indictable offense of falsification considering that the falsifications allegedly committed separately as
described under said separate information were but the result or product of one single criminal impulse or

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intent, and the same are therefore in the nature of a continuing offense which should be alleged and
prosecuted only under one information.
It was argued that since all the falsifications were supposedly committed within a specific period
(from December 1954 to September, 1955), and that the allegations in the different information for
falsification are the same, said acts were but the product or result of a singular criminal intent; that no less
than the prosecution in said cases had admitted in a manifestation, that the charges are "related to similar
if not the same transactions and the evidence of the prosecution being in great part the same for all said
charges"; and that the falsifications were committed to conceal the malversation.
\
Issue:
Whether or not the 27 falsifications were the product of only one criminal intent.
Held:
No, the 27 falsifications constitute separate and independent crimes, which are not continuous.
One reason advanced by the trial court and the Solicitor General in holding that the falsifications
constituted a continuing offense, proceeding from a single criminal intent is that, according to the
manifestation of the City Fiscal and Special Prosecutor, the motive for these falsifications, was to conceal
the malversation. However, the existence of the motive to conceal the malversation, in the cases at bar,
is a question of fact which should be ventilated in a formal trial, in connection with the defense of double
jeopardy. The Court cannot assume that the purpose of committing the twenty-seven (27) falsifications
was to conceal the malversation. This is so because there is no showing that for every particular amount
they had malversed on a certain period, they had purposely perpetrated the corresponding falsification,
to cover up such amount, until the whole amount proposed to be malversed, shall have been completely
misappropriated. In the absence of such showing, it is to be presumed that in the falsification of each
document, the criminal intent was separate and distinct.|
It will be noted that although all the information in the 27 falsification cases were uniformly
worded, the numbers of the vouchers alleged to have been falsified and the amounts thereof, are
different. We have in the three (3) cases, subject of the proceeding at bar, Voucher No. 4, dated September
3, 1955, for P2,275.00; Voucher No. 6, dated September 6, 1955, for P3,590.00 and Voucher No. 13, dated
September 6, 1955, for P3,410.00. The other information also show different vouchers, dates and
amounts. These undeniable facts, alleged in the information, evidently show that different acts of
falsification were committed on different vouchers and covering distinct amounts. Each information did
not refer to all said acts of falsification. Neither is there merit in the argument that said acts of falsification
constituted a continuing offense, so as to have them all prosecuted in only one information.

Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, L-41054, 28 November 1975

Facts:
The private respondent Benjamin Lu Hayco was a former employee of petitioner Units Optical Supply
Company in its optical supply business. 124 complaints of estafa under Article 315, para. 1-b of the Revised

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Penal Code were filed against him by the petitioner company. After the procedural preliminary
investigation, the Office of the City Fiscal filed seventy-five (75) cases of estafa against private respondent.
Except as to the dates and amounts of conversions, the 75 informations commonly charge that ". . . the
said accused, being then an employee of the Units Optical Supply Company . . ., and having collected and
received from customers of the said company the sum of . . . in payment for goods purchased from it,
under the express obligation on the part of the said accused to immediately account for and deliver the
said collection so made by him to the Units Optical Supply Company or the owners thereof . . ., far from
complying with his said aforesaid obligation and despite repeated demands made upon him . . . did then
and there . . . misappropriate, misapply and convert the said sum to his own personal use and benefit by
depositing the said amount in his own name and personal account with the Associated Banking
Corporation and thereafter withdrawing the same.
A civil action for accounting was likewise filed by Lu Chiong Sun, the owner of the Units Optical
Supply Company, complaining that during his hospital confinement from September 27, 1972 to October
30, 1972, private respondent initiated discharging the business functions and prerogatives of the company.
And to paint a shade of validity to this exercise of powers, private respondent, thru fraud, deceit and
machinations duped Lu Chiong Sun into affixing his signature and thumbprint on a general power of
attorney in his (private respondent's) favor. With the use of this deed, private respondent closed the
accounts of Lu Chiong Sun with the Equitable Banking Corporation and, thereafter, opened accounts in his
own name with the same bank and with the Associated Banking Corporation.
Benjamin Lu Hayco claimed that the filing, prosecution and trial of the seventy-five (75) estafa cases
against him is not only oppressive, whimsical and capricious, but also without or in excess of jurisdiction
of the respondents City Fiscal and the City Court Judges of Manila. Private respondent asserts that all the
indictments narrated in the seventy-five (75) informations were mere components of only one crime, since
the same were only impelled by a signed criminal resolution or intent. On October 31, 1974, the lower
court dismissed the petition on the ground that the series of deposits and the subsequent withdrawals
thereof involved in the criminal cases were not the result of only one criminal impulse on the part of
private respondent.

Issue:
Whether or not the basic accusations contained in the 78 informations against private respondent
constitute a single crime of estafa.

*Discussion on continuous crime:

Apart and isolated from this plurality of crimes (ideal or real) is what is known as "delito
continuado" or "continuous crime". This is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single
criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division. In order that it may exist, there should be "plurality
of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated
and unity of criminal intent and purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal
provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose
or aim.”
So long as the act or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal impulse it is usually held to
constitute a single offense to be punished with the penalty corresponding to the most serious crime,
imposed in its maximum period.

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Held:
The daily abstractions from and diversions of private respondent of the deposits made by the customers
of the optical supply company from October 2, 1972 to December 30, 1972 cannot be considered as
proceeding from a single criminal act within the meaning of Article 48.
The abstractions were not made at the same time and on the same occasion, but on variable dates.
Each day of conversion constitutes a single act with an independent existence and criminal intent of its
own. All the conversions are not the product of a consolidated or united criminal resolution, because each
conversion is a complete act by itself. Specifically, the abstractions and the accompanying deposits thereof
in the personal accounts of private respondent cannot be similarly viewed as "continuous crime". An
individual abstraction or misappropriation results in a complete execution or consummation of the
delictual act of defalcation. Private respondent cannot be held to have entertained continuously the same
criminal intent in making the first abstraction on October 2, 1972 for the subsequent abstractions on the
following days and months until December 30, 1972, for the simple reason that he was not possessed of
any fore-knowledge of any deposit by any customer on any day or occasion and which would pass on to
his possession and control. At most, his intent to misappropriate may arise only when he comes in
possession of the deposits on each business day but not in futuro, since petitioner company operates only
on a day-to-day transaction. As a result, there could be as many acts of misappropriation as there are times
the private respondent abstracted and/or diverted the deposits to his own personal use and benefit. Thus,
it may be said that the City Fiscal had acted properly when he filed only one information for every single
day of abstraction and bank deposit made by private respondent. The similarity of pattern resorted to by
private respondent in making the diversions does not affect the susceptibility of the acts committed to
divisible crimes.
In this form of estafa, fraud is not an essential element. "Fraudulent intent" in committing the
conversion or diversion is "very evidently not a necessary element of the form of estafa here discussed;
the breach of confidence involved in the conversion or diversion of trust funds takes the place of fraudulent
intent and is in itself sufficient. the alleged act of private respondent in causing, with intent to defraud, Lu
Chiong Sun to affix his signature and thumbprint on the general power of attorney is immaterial and
ineffective insofar as the charges of conversions are concerned. If at all, the said document may serve only
the purpose of closing the accounts of Lu Chiong Sun with the banks and nothing more. Definitely, there
is no necessity for it before private respondent could commit the acts of defalcation. As a matter of fact,
private respondent resorted to this document only on October 17, 1972, or 15 days after he had already
commenced the abstraction on October 2, 1972.

People v. Mallari, G.R. No. L-58886, 13 December 1988

Facts:
Petitioner Consuelo E. Mallari was accused of the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document.
Petitioner contended that the decision in CA-G.R. No. 19849-CR placed her twice in jeopardy of being
punished for the same offense as she had previously been convicted, sentenced and probationed for the
same offense in CA-G.R. No. 20817-CR entitled "People of the Philippines versus Consuelo Mallari.”
The Information in CA-G.R. No. 20817-CR reads:

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"That on or about December 15, 1970 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused CELESTINO
HALLAZGO, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila and accused CARLOS SUNGA, DOMINGO
ESPINELLI and CONSUELO MALLARI, all private individuals, conspiring, and confederating together with
others whose true names and whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud JULIA S. SACLOLO thru falsification of a public
document in the following manner, to wit: the said accused having somehow obtained possession of T.C.T.
No. 42694, issued by the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, belonging to Leonora I. Balderas and
duly registered in the latter's name and by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations
which they made to said Julia S. Saclolo to the effect that said Leonora I. Balderas was badly in need of
money and that she was offering the aforesaid lot as collateral for a loan of P1,500.00 then executing,
forging and falsifying a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage acknowledged before accused CELESTINO
HALLAZGO, Notary Public for and in the City of Manila and entered in the latter's notarial register and
therefore a public document, by then and there signing and/or causing to be signed the signature 'Leonora
I. Balderas,' thereby making it appear as it did appear in said document, that said Leonora I. Balderas had
participated in the execution of this Deed of Real Estate Mortgage by signing her name thereon when in
truth and in fact as the said accused or any of them to sign her name thereon and by means of other
deceits of similar import, induced and succeeded in inducing said Julia Saclolo to give and deliver as in fact
the latter gave and delivered to said accused the said amount of P1,500.00 said accused well knowing that
their manifestations were false and untrue and were made solely for the purpose of obtaining as in fact
they did obtain the said amount of P1,500.00 which, one (sic) in their possession, they did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, misappropriate, misapply and convert to their own personal use and
benefit to the damage and prejudice of said Julia S. Saclolo in said amount of P1,500.00, Philippine
Currency."
The Information in CA-G.R. No. 19849-CR is the exactly same as the one in CA-G.R. No. 20817-CR (the
one above). However, in CA-G.R. No. 19849-CR, the victim is Remegio G. Tapawan.
In CA-G.R. No. 20817, the Court of Appeals made the following observations:
Witness Remegio Tapawan explained how Julia Saclolo became the mortgagee of the land in
question by declaring that the accused Consuelo E. Mallari||| came to his house in Rosario, Cavite on
December 10, 1970, bringing two (2) land titles both in the name of Leonora Balderas and told him that
she wanted to mortgage the titles for P1,500.00 each because she and her cousin Leonora Balderas were
in great need of money to pay some taxes with the Bureau of Customs where they have some goods
impounded. Not having enough money Tapawan refused.||| The appellant, however, returned on
December 15, 1970 with two titles and pleaded anew with Remegio Tapawan and his wife for assistance
because of her and Balderas' great need of money. Tapawan gave in but because he had only P1,500.00
while the accused needed P3,000.00 he took her to his mother-in-law, Julia Saclolo and was able to secure
the amount of P1,500.00. On the information given by Consuelo Mallari that the deed of mortgage would
be prepared in the office of Atty. Celestino Hallazgo at M.H. del Pilar, Manila where the mortgagor Leonora
Balderas would show up, Tapawan proceeded to the place indicated. Immediately upon Tapawan's arrival,
Atty. Hallazgo phoned someone and within 20 minutes the person arrived whom Consuelo Mallari and
Atty. Hallazgo introduced to Remegio Tapawan as Leonora Balderas. Thereafter, the mortgage deeds
where prepared — one in favor of Julia Saclolo and the other in favor of Remegio Tapawan for P1,500.00

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each. The mortgage loan of P3,000.00 was accordingly delivered to the person who posed as Leonora
Balderas. Consuelo Mallari and Domingo Espinelli, assigned as witnesses to the said documents. Later,
during the preliminary investigation at the Fiscal's Office, Tapawan learned that he was folled (sic) because
the person who posed as Leonora Balderas was a man by the name of Carlos Sunga, who, at the time the
mortgage was constituted, was dressed in a woman's attire. Neither Remegio Tapawan nor Julia Saclolo
were able to recover a portion of the mortgage loan.”
Issue:
Whether or not the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document committed by Consuelo Mallari
is a continued crime.
Held:
Yes, Mallari committed a continued crime.
A comparison of the Information filed in the two cases under consideration as well as the findings
of facts of the appellate court tells us that they refer to the same series of acts. These series of acts amount
to what is known in law as a continued, continuous or continuing offense.
A continued crime is a single crime consisting of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal
resolution. It is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by
an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy. Although there are series of acts, there is only
one crime committed. Hence, only one penalty shall be imposed.
The crime of estafa thru falsification of public document committed by Consuelo Mallari, although
consummated through a series of acts, was "set on foot" by the single intent or impulse to defraud
Remegio Tapawan of a total amount of P3,000.00. And contrary to the appellate court's observation, there
was only one deceit practiced by petitioner on the two (2) victims, i.e., that being in need of money,
Leonora Balderas was willing to mortgage two (2) lots as security for a loan of P3,000.00. It was, in fact, by
mere play of fate that the second victim, Julia Saclolo, should be dragged into the swindle by reason of
Tapawan having only P1,500.00 at that time. That there were two (2) victims, however, did not accordingly
convert the crime into two separate offenses, as the determinative factor is the unity or multiplicity of the
criminal intent or of the transactions. For "the fact should not be lost sight of that it is the injury to the
public which a criminal action seeks to redress, and by such redress to prevent its repetition, and not the
injury to individuals."
The singularity of the offense committed by petitioner is further demonstrated by the fact that the
falsification of the two (2) public documents as a means of committing estafa were performed on the same
date, in the same place, at the same time and on the same occasion.
It has also been ruled that when two information refer to the same transaction, the second charge
cannot prosper because the accused will thereby be placed in jeopardy for the second time for the same
offense.

Santiago v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 109266, 2 December 1993

FACTS:

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● Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of Revised Rules of Court to set aside: (a) Resolution dated March 3,
1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of Sandiganbayan and to declare Presiding Justice Garchitorena
disqualified from acting in said criminal case; and (b) the Resolution of said court promulgated on March
14, 1993 which deemed as “filed” 32 Amended Informations against petitioner.
● May 1, 1991, Petitioner charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 with violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019 or Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act – allegedly committed by her in favoring “unqualified” aliens with the
benefits of the Alien Legalization Program
● November 6, 1992, Petitioner moved to defer arraignment on grounds that there was a pending motion
for inhibition, which was denied, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars
● November 10, 1992, Petitioner filed motion for a bill of particulars … that stated that, “information alleged
that petitioner had approved the application for legalization of ‘aliens’ and gave them indirect benefits
and advantages it lacked a list of the favored aliens.”
● November 13, 1992, on the motion for a bill of particulars, prosecution stated categorically that they would
file only one amended information against the petitioner
● December 8, 1992, prosecution filed a motion to admit the 32 Amended Informations
● March 3, 1993, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued the questioned Resolution denying the motion for
his disqualification

ISSUES:
WON Garchitorena should be disqualified (NOT IMPORTANT)
WON the prosecution should have filed one amended information or 32 amended informations

HELD:
● NO; It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing permission of
Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure that journalist Benigno viewed as uncalled for,
which petitioner states that shows Garchitorena’s “conclusions that he has subconsciously drawn in his
public statements.” Public Statements was a letter of Garchitorena, written in defense of dignity and
integrity of Sandiganbayan, merely stating that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with no
exception, have to secure permission to leave the country.
● Office of Special Prosecutor of Office of Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended
Informations into one information charging only one offense.
○ Definitions of continues crime:
■ Plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal
intent or purpose
■ Consists of several crimes, but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator
■ Offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution
○ Technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner’s case, and there should only be
one information to be filed against her. 32 Amended Informations charge delito continuado or “continued
or continuous crime” which is difficult to define and apply in Criminal Law
■ Original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act – approving application for
legalization of aliens not qualified under law to enjoy such privilege

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D. Composite Crimes/Special Complex Crimes

1. Art. 266-B
2. Art. 267
3. Art. 294
4. Art. 297
5. Art. 320
E. Complex crimes in relation to Quasi-crimes
Ivler v. San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, 17 November 2010

VII. Penalties
A. Imposable penalties
1. Principal penalties
a. Capital punishment – Sec. 19, Art III of the 1987 Constitution; RA 7659, RA 8177; RA 9346; Art. 40 and
47 Revised Penal Code; RA 9346
People v. Bon, G.R. No. 166401, 30 October 2006

FACTS:

Eight (8) Informations were filed within the period 21 August 2000 to 23 February 2001 by the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against Alfredo Bon (appellant), charging him with the rape of
AAA and BBB, the daughters of his older brother. All these cases were consolidated for trial. The rapes
were alleged to have been committed in several instances over a span of six (6) years. Both AAA and BBB
testified against appellant, their uncle, and both identified him as the man who had raped them.

The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape. It further considered the qualifying
circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship of the victims and appellant, the latter being
the former's relative by consanguinity within the third degree.

The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 6906 and 6908 to attempted rape.
The sentence was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9346 which ended
the imposition of death penalty. The proximate concern as to the appellant is whether his penalty for
attempted qualified rape which under the penal law should be two degrees lower than that of
consummated rape, should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: What is the properly penalty for the crimes convicted?

RULING:

The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals can no longer be affirmed
in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, Section 2 of which mandates that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold the death sentences

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imposed by lower courts, but must, if the guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when appropriate.

Upon the other hand, Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code establishes that the penalty to be imposed upon
the principals of an attempted felony must be a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law
for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.

The penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law" for attempted rape is the prescribed
penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been under eighteen years of age and
to have been raped by her uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The
determination of the penalty two degrees lower than the death penalty entails the application of Articles
61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees
lower than death is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals
on appellant for attempted rape.

Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for attempted rape, with a
maximum penalty within the range of reclusion temporal, and a minimum penalty within the range of the
penalty next lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act No. 9346 had not been enacted, the Court would have
affirmed such sentence without complication. However, the enactment of the law has given rise to the
problem concerning the imposable penalty. Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term within reclusion
temporal since that is the penalty two degrees lower than death. With the elimination of death as a
penalty, does it follow that appellant should now be sentenced to a penalty two degrees lower than
reclusion perpetua, the highest remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so
followed, appellant would be sentenced to prision mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal.

The consummated felony previously punishable by death would now be punishable by reclusion perpetua.
At the same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would, under the foregoing premise in this
section, be penalized one degree lower from death, or also reclusion perpetua. It does not seem right, of
course, that the same penalty of reclusion perpetua would be imposed on both the consummated and
frustrated felony.

Thus, RA 9346 should be construed as having downgraded those penalties attached to death by reason of
the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that manner will a clear and consistent rule emerge as to the
application of penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies, and for accessories and accomplices. In the
case of appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two
degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of
his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead, prision
mayor.

b. Afflictive penalties
i. Reclusion perpetua – RA 7659, Art. 27 of Revised Penal Code
People v. Lucas, G.R. No. 108172, 25 May 1994 (Kelseypatootie)

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In a sworn statement 1 taken on 16 February 1991, Chanda Lucas y Austria, then seventeen years old,
charged her natural father, accused Jose Conrado Lucas, of attempted rape committed against her on
12 February 1991. She revealed therein that she was first raped by him when she was only nine years
old, or, as disclosed in a handwritten note at the left-hand margin of her sworn statement, "noong Nov.
26, 1982 . . . at naulit ng maraming beses."

On 19 February 1991, Chanda, assisted by her mother, Ofelia Austria-Lucas, filed two separate sworn
criminal complaints for rape and for attempted rape against her father with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City.

The cases were jointly tried after the accused had pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment. The
prosecution presented as witnesses the complainant herself; her sister, Cynthia; and Dr. Emmanuel
Aranas. The defense presented only the accused.

On 26 November 1983, she was sleeping in the bedroom with her brother and sisters. Their mother did
not sleep in their house at that time. At about 2:00 to 3:00 a.m., she awoke and realized that her father
was removing her panty and shorts. He cautioned her to keep quiet. Then, her father, who was already
naked, went on top of her and placed his sexual organ inside her vagina. She was hurt but did not resist
because her father threatened to kill her. Only her older sister Cynthia witnessed the incident. Chanda
reported the incident to her mother and her aunt but the former did nothing. When her aunt said that
her father should be jailed, her mother did not agree.

Since then, her father had been repeatedly molesting her, especially when her mother was not 9 6thd
while Chanda was only nine years old. She saw his father on top of Chanda, then she closed her eyes and
covered her face with a blanket.

Dr. Emmanuel Aranas testified and concluded that the complainant has had several sexual experiences
and was no longer a virgin. He issued a written report of his findings. 13 On cross-examination, he
declared that he found no sperm on the organ of the complainant and that there were no signs of recent
trauma or physical injuries on her.

Trial Court: Both guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape punishable under Reclusion Perpetua on both
criminal charges
Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Did the trial court erred on its decision?

HELD: YES. with modification

1. Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465 (Consummated Rape) : As regards the first charge, there is, however, a
variance between the evidence presented and the allegations of the complaint. The complaint in
Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465 charges the accused with the crime of rape committed on 26 November
1982. Both Chanda and Cynthia, however, testified that the incident took place on 26 November 1983.

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Chanda was less than twelve years old when she was raped by the accused on 26 November 1983. Since
she was born on 2 June 1973, she was then exactly ten years, five months, and twenty-four days old.

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve (12) years of age, even though neither of the circumstances
mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.

As found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, the accused had carnal knowledge of his
daughter Chanda — then below twelve years old — on 26 November 1983. In addition to her tender age
and immaturity, Chanda was, to say the least, a victim of unfavorable circumstances not of her own
making.

Her delay in reporting the sexual assaults to the authorities is thus understandable and does not affect
her credibility.

2. Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 (Attempted Rape) Considering, however, that the complaint for this
incident subject of Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 charges the accused with the crime of attempted rape,
then, as correctly pointed out by the accused in his second assigned error and concurred in by the Office
of the Solicitor General, he cannot be convicted of consummated rape.

Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides that "[w]hen there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense
as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is
proved."

The offense charged in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 (attempted rape) is necessarily included in the
offense that was proved (consummated rape). Accordingly, the accused should be convicted of
attempted rape only.

Taking into account the presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship in Criminal Case No.
Q-91-18465, the accused may finally be sentenced to thirty-four (34) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of reclusion perpetua.

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Considering again such aggravating circumstance, the accused may be sentenced in Criminal Case No.
Q-91-18466 to an indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum
as maximum.

(1) In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465, accused JOSE CONRADO LUCAS y BRIONES is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Thirty-four (34) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the offended party the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and

(2) In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466, said accused is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE only and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from Four (4) years, TWO (2) months and One (1) day of prision correccional maximum as
minimum to Ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum and to pay the
offended party the sum of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity.

People v. Lucas, G.R. No. 108172, 9 January 1995;

FACTS:
In the decision in this case, promulgated on 25 May 1994, the First Division touched on the nature of the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in the light of Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659which amended Article 27 of the
Revised Penal Code by specifically fixing the duration of reclusion perpetua at twenty (20) years and one
(1) day to forty (40) years. It opined that since no corresponding amendment to Article 76 of the Revised
Penal Code was made, the said law has not made explicit an intention to convert reclusion perpetua into
a divisible penalty. Nevertheless, it applied Article 65 of the Revised Penal Codeand stated:
"Accordingly, the time included in the penalty of reclusion perpetua (twenty [20] years and one [1] day to
forty [40] years) can be divided into three equal portions with each composing a period. The periods of
reclusion perpetua would then be as follows:
minimum — 20 years and 1 day to 26 years and 8 months
medium — 26 years, 8 months and 1 day to 33 years and 4 months
maximum — 34 years, 4 months and 1 day to 40 years.
Taking into account the presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship in Criminal Case No. Q-
91-18465, the accused may finally be sentenced to thirty-four (34) years, from (4) months and one (1) day
of reclusion perpetua."
It then modified the challenged decision of the trial court by changing the penalty in Criminal Case No. Q-
91-18465 from reclusion perpetua, as imposed by the trial court, to "imprisonment of 34 years, 4 months
and 1 day of reclusion perpetua."

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In a motion for clarification seasonably filed by the appellee on 28 June 1994 which was not opposed by
the accused-appellant in his comment, the appellee asks the Court to correct the duration of the maximum
period of reclusion perpetua from thirty-four (34) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to forty (40) years,
as stated in the decision, to thirty-three (33) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to forty (40) years.

ISSUE:
Whether the amendment of Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code by Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659 has made
reclusion perpetua a divisible penalty

HELD:
After deliberating on the motion and re-examining the legislative history of R.A. No. 7659, the Court
concludes that although Section 17 of R.A No. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from
twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its
original classification as an indivisible penalty. [I]f reclusion perpetua was reclassified as a divisible
penalty, then Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code would lose its reason and basis for existence. To
illustrate, the first paragraph of Section 20 of the amended R.A. No. 6425 provides for the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death whenever the dangerous drugs involved are of any of the quantities stated
therein. If Article 63 of the Code were no longer applicable because reclusion perpetua is supposed to be
a divisible penalty, then there would be no statutory rules for determining when either reclusion perpetua
or death should be the imposable penalty. In fine, there would be no occasion for imposing reclusion
perpetua as the penalty in drug case, regardless of the attendant modifying circumstances.

Now then, if Congress had intended to reclassify reclusion perpetua as a divisible penalty, then it should
have amended Article 63 and Article 76 of the Revised Penal Code. The latter is the law on what are
considered divisible penalties under the Code and what should be the duration of the periods thereof.
There are, as well, other provisions of the Revised Penal Code involving reclusion perpetua, such as Article
41 on the accessory penalties thereof and paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 61, which have not been touched
by a corresponding amendment. What then may be the reason for the amendment fixing the duration of
reclusion perpetua? The deliberations in the Bicameral Conference Committee and in both Chambers of
Congress do not enlighten us on this, except the cryptic statement of Senator Tolentino adverted to above
on the elimination of the "new penalty" of life imprisonment by the Bicameral conference Committee. It
may however, be pointed out that although the Revised Penal Code did not specify the maximum of
reclusion perpetua, it is apparent that the maximum period for the service of this penalty shall not
exceed forty (40) years. At most then, in fixing a specific duration for reclusion perpetua Section 21 of R.A.
No. 7659 merely restated the existing jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to MODIFY the decision of 25 May 1994 in this case by DELETING
therefrom the disquisitions on whether reclusion perpetua is a divisible penalty and SETTING ASIDE its
division into three periods and, finally, AMENDING the dispositive portion thereof to read as follows:
"(1) In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465, in addition to the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial
court, accused JOSE CONRADO LUCAS Y BRIONES is further ordered to indemnify the offended party,
Chanda Lucas y Austria, in the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00); and

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"(2) In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466, accused JOSE CONRADO LUCAS Y BRIONES is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser offense of attempted rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from Four (4) Years, Two (2) Months and One (1) Day of prision correccional
as minimum to Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the
offended party, Chanda Lucas y Austria, in the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).

People v. Latupan, G.R. No. 112453, 28 June 2001

FACTS: Around 4:00 pm, Caferino Dagulo suddenly heard the shouts of a woman and a child while he was
chopping firewoods outside his house.

Later, he saw accused, Latupan, walk walking in his direction, carrying a thin, bloodied knife. He entered
the house of Ceferino and started chasing Ceferino's wife, who was able to run to another house nearby.
He then turned to Ceferino and said, "I will kill you all." At that time, accused Latupan's clothes, chest,
hands and legs were full of blood. Accused Latupan attempted to thrust the knife into Ceferino, who was
able to parry it. Later on, accused Latupan told Ceferino to bring him to the authorities and tried to give
the knife to Ceferino. Ceferino refused to touch the knife and told accused to go to the authorities by
himself. Hearing this advice, accused ran away.

Around 4:00 pm the same day, the house of Emilio Asuncion (hereafter Emy) was 100 meters from
Ceferino's house. Upon reaching his house, he found his wife dead on the ground with several stab wounds
on her body. His one-year old son, Leo, was lying on top of Lilia Asuncion. Emy picked up Leo and saw that
the left side of Leo's face was lacerated. He saw Jaime, his three-year old son and asked where Jose, his
eldest son, was. At that moment, Emy heard the voice of Jose from upstairs of the house, asking for
medicine. He ran upstairs and saw that Jose was wounded. He asked Jose who stabbed him. Jose replied,
"Uncle Jerry, Tatang ." Seeing that Jose needed immediate medical treatment, Emy brought him to the
house of Ceferino and then returned to his house to get his two other children, Leo and Jaime. They left
the corpse of Lilia Asuncion inside Emy's house.

The children were brought to hospital. During the trip to the hospital, Emy's son, Jose, saw accused
Latupan inside the jeep. Jose pointed to accused Latupan as the one who stabbed him.

The doctors treated the injuries of Leo and Jaime. However, Jose was dead on arrival. He was only nine
years old.
Jaime, 5 years old,stated that accused Latupan stabbed his mother, stepped on him, threw his brother,
Leo, outside the window and stabbed his other brother, Jose.

Trial Court- complex offense of Double Murder the Court hereby sentences him to suffer life imprisonment
and to indemnify the heirs of the two victims in the amount of P50,000.00 each or a total of P100,000.00.
For the physical injuries suffered by Jaime Asuncion, the accused is sentenced to suffer ten (10) days
imprisonment. Likewise, for the physical injuries suffered by Leon Asuncion, the accused is also sentenced

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to suffer ten (10) days imprisonment, both to be suffered simultaneously with the more grievous sentence
of life imprisonment, plus P200.00 indemnity to each of the two victims.

ISSUE: WON Reclusion Perpetua is the proper imposable penalty

HELD: Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder at the time of the commission
of the crime in April 1991 was reclusion temporal maximum to death. The trial court convicted accused-
appellant of murder and sentenced him to "life imprisonment." The proper imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua, not life imprisonment. Obviously, the trial court intended to impose reclusion perpetua.

The penalty of life imprisonment is not the same as reclusion perpetua. They are distinct in nature, in
duration and in accessory penalties. First, "life imprisonment" is imposed for serious offenses penalized
by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed under the Revised Penal Code. Second, "life
imprisonment" does not carry with it any accessory penalty. Reclusion perpetua has accessory penalties.
Third, "life imprisonment" does not appear to have any definite extent or duration, while reclusion
perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for
pardon, although the maximum period thereof shall in no case exceed forty (40) years.

We likewise note that the trial court sentenced accused to "ten days of imprisonment" for each count of
slight physical injuries. We reiterate the rule that it is necessary for the courts to employ the proper legal
terminology in the imposition of penalties because of the substantial difference in their corresponding
legal effects and accessory penalties. The appropriate name of the penalty must be specified inasmuch as
under the scheme of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, the principal penalty for a felony has its own
specific duration and corresponding accessory penalties. Thus, the courts must employ the proper
nomenclature specified in the Revised Penal Code, such as "reclusion perpetua" not "life imprisonment"
or "ten days of arresto menor," not "ten days of imprisonment." Hence, the proper penalty for each
murder committed in April 1991, considering the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, is
reclusion perpetua, with its accessory penalties. Further, accused-appellant is liable for two counts of slight
physical injuries and must be sentenced to twenty (20) days of arresto menor, each, likewise with its
accessory penalties under the Revised Penal Code.

ii. Reclusion temporal

iii. Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification – Article 30
iv. Perpetual or temporary special disqualification – Art. 31
v. Prision mayor – Art. 27
c. Correctional penalties – Art. 27, 39, and 44
i. Prision correccional
ii. Arresto mayor
iii. Suspension
iv. Destierro
d. Light penalties – Art. 27, 39, and 44

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i. Arresto menor
ii. Public censure
e. Common penalties – Art.25
i. Fines – Art. 26, 39, and 66
ii. Bond to keep the peace – Art. 27 and 35
2. Accessory penalties – Art. 40 -45
a. Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification
b. Perpetual or temporary special disqualification
c. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the profession or calling
d. Civil interdiction
e. Indemnification
f. Forfeiture or confiscation of the instruments and proceeds of the offense
g. Payment of costs
3. Subsidiary penalty – Art. 39
See also: RA 10159
B. Application and computation of penalties
1. General rules – Art. 5, 21, 28, 29 (see also RA 10592), 46, 73-77
2. Specific Rules
a. Complex Crimes (Art. 48)
b. Crime different from that which was intended – Art. 49
c. Effect of degree of participation and stage of commission – Art. 50 -57, 60-61
d. Additional penalty for certain accessories – Art. 58
e. Impossible crimes – Art. 59
f. Effect of mitigating, aggravating, and qualifying circumstances – Art. 62-66
g. Incomplete justifying or exempting circumstances – Art. 67 and 69
h. Minors – RA 9344
3. Indeterminate Sentence Law
People v. Lanuza, G.R. No. 188562, 17 August 2011
Facts:
On appeal is the CA decision affirming the RTC judgment of Laoag City finding accused-appellant Rodel
Lanuza Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of crime of frustrated homicide. The RTC, taking into consideration
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and applying indeterminate sentence law, sentenced
to imprisonment from 4 years of prision correccional as minimum to 7 years of prision mayor as maximum.

Defense's account of the incident:

Joel Butay, outgoing security guard was handing his shotgun to the accused, the incoming security guard.
Because he did not report for duty in scheduled time, the private complainant reprimanded him. After
accused signed the logbook, Butay handed him their service firearm, a shotgun. Butay held it with both
arms with the muzzle pointed at him with the butt on the accused. At that moment accused gripped the
firearm with one hand, his pointer finger inside the trigger guard on top of the trigger itself and
“accidentally” shot Butay, on the left side of the waist. He went upstairs to call ambulance, but he then
heard a motorcycle leaving and when he went back the victim was nowhere to be seen.

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Prosecution account:
According to Butay, he did not hand the shotgun tor the accused. He merely placed it, together with the
bullets on the table. While he was asking why accused did not report during the scheduled shift, accused
got the gun and placed ammunitions inside it and shot Butay. He fell on his buttocks. Accused tried to
shoot him again but it did not fire. When accused ran upstairs he crawled to his motorcycle and went to
the hospital.

Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant appeal is with merit

Ruling:
No. The court sustains the CA decision.

Penalty
The court sustains the penalty and damages imposed against accused-appellant.

The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of frustrated homicide is one degree lower than that
prescribed by law for homicide. Under the indeterminatesentence law, the maximum of the sentence
shall be that which could be properly imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and the minimum
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by RPC.

Considering that the penalty prescribed by law for the crime of homicide is reclusion temporal, the penalty
for the crime of frustrated homicide would be prision mayor. Applying the indeterminate sentence law,
there being the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and no aggravating circumstance, the
maximum of the sentence should be within the range of prision mayor in its minimum term which has a
duration of 6 years and 1 day to 8 years, and that, on the other hand, the minimum should be within the
range of prision correccional which has a duration ig 6 months 1 day to 6 years. Thus the imposition of
imprisonment from 4 years of prision correccional as minimum to 7 years of prision mayor as maximum,
in order.

Instant appeal is denied for lack of merit.

Talampas v. People, G.R. No. 180219, 23 November 2011

Petition for review on certiorari of the affirmance of the conviction of Virgilio Talampas for homicide (for
the killing of the late Ernesto Matic y Masinloc) by the CA.

Prosecution witness Sevillo testified that at 7PM, he was in front of his house with Eduardo and Ernesto,
both surnamed Matic, repairing his tricycle when he saw the appellant riding a bicycle pass by and stop.
Talampas alighted at about 3 meters away from him, walked a few steps poked a short gun revolver at
Eduardo, and fired it hitting Eduardo who took refuge behind Ernesto. Talampas fired his gun 3 times again.
One shot hit Ernesto on his back causing him to fall facedown. Talampas ran away while the neighbors
brought the victims to the hospital.

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Another witness, Francisco Matic, testified that prior to the death of his brother who was then 44 years
old, he was driving a tricycle on a boundary system and earned php100 daily although not on a regular
basis because he sometimes played in a band for php100 per night.

Talampas’ defense was self-defense and accident. He insisted that Eduardo had hit him with a monkey
wrench which he parried and was then grappling for the monkey wrench, and while doing so saw Eduardo
holding a revolver, and struggled for the control of it, resulting to the accidental firing which hit Ernesto
during their struggling. The revolver fires again hitting Eduardo in the thigh, he seized the revolver and
shot Eduardo in the head and fled.

ISSUE: Talampas insists that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD: he is guilty of the crime of homicide.

Elements of the plea of self-defense are:
(a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and
(c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused in defending himself.

Self-defense is not present because Talampas initiated the attack on Eduardo. There was no unlawful
aggression from Ernesto or Eduardo.

He cannot invoke accident as a defense either. Accident is something that happens outside the sway of
will, and its consequences are unforeseeable. It is when a person does something legal and with due care,
but in the process produces harm. It presupposes the lack of intention to commit the wrong done. The
acts of Talampas were not lawful, being a criminal assault with his revolver against both Eduardo and
Ernesto.

The fact that the target of Talampas was Eduardo is not excuse for the hitting and killing of Ernesto.
Abberratio ictus does not exempt or mitigate criminal liability. Article 4, RPC, criminal liability is incurred
by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.

The Court finds the indeterminate sentence of 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14
years and eight months, as maximum, legally erroneous.

Penalty for homicide under Art 246 of RPC is reclusion temporal. Under sec 1 of Indeterminate Sentence
Law, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punishable under RPC or its amendments, is mandated
to prescribe an indeterminate sentence with the maximum term being that which could be imposed under
the rule of RPC, in view of attending cicumstances. The minimum term shall be the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the offense. Absent an aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14y 8m 1d to 17y 4m.
Pursuant to art 64 of RPC. Hence, limiting the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence at only 14

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years and eight months contravened the express provision of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, for such
penalty was within the minimum period of reclusion temporal. Accordingly, the Court must add one day
to the maximum term fixed by the lower courts.

The Court finds to be unnecessary the increment of one day as part of the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence. It may be true that the increment did not constitute an error, because the
minimum term thus fixed was entirely within the parameters of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Yet, the
addition of one day to the 10 years as the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence of Talampas may
occasion a degree of inconvenience when it will be time for the penal administrators concerned to consider
and determine whether Talampas is already qualified to enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. Hence, in order to simplify the computation of the minimum penalty of the indeterminate sentence,
the Court deletes the one-day increment from the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence.

RULING: guilty to homicide. 10 years of prision mayor as min, 14y 8m 1d of reclusion temporal, max.

People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, 17 December 2008. See CJ Puno Dissent and J. Corona Separate
Opinion

Review of conviction of Beth Temporada of the crime of large scale illegal recruitment, or violation of 1rt
38 of the Labor Code as amended, and 5 counts of estafa under art 315, par 2a of the RPC.
Illegal recruitment in large scale, elements:
(a) Offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers;
(b) Offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of recruitment and placement under
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the said
Code (now Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042);
(c) Offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group

Rogelio Legaspi testified that after introducing herself as the General Manager of ATTC, appellant
persuaded him to apply as a technician in Singapore. He paid to accused Bernadette Miranda a placement
fee of P35,000, and P10,000 to appellant who issued him a receipt for the amount of P45,000. Soledad
Atle and Luz Minkay, who applied as factory workers in Hongkong through co-accused, Emily Salagonos,
said that it was appellant who briefed them on the requirements for the processing of their application,
and assured them and Dennis Dimaano of immediate deployment for jobs abroad. Evelyn Estacio testified
that she paid placement fee of P40,000 to co-accused Baby Robles and also gave appellant P10,000 for
which she was issued a receipt for the amount of P5,000.

The totality of the evidence, thus, established that appellant acted as an indispensable participant and
effective collaborator of her co-accused in the illegal recruitment of complainants.

Even assuming arguendo that Temporada was unaware of the illegal nature of said activities, the same is
hardly a defense in the prosecution for illegal recruitment. Under The Migrant Workers and Overseas

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Filipinos Act of 1995, a special law, the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale is malum prohibitum and
not malum in se. Thus, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary and the fact alone that the
accused violated the law warrants her conviction.

Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 8042 prescribes the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than
P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000,000.00 for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale or by a
syndicate. The trial court, therefore, properly meted the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
P500,000.00 on the appellant.

The court affirms the conviction of appellant for five (5) counts of estafa. A person convicted for illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code may be separately convicted for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of
the RPC. The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by
means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation. The same evidence proving appellants criminal liability for illegal recruitment also
established her liability for estafa.

ISSUE: The CA erred in computing the maximum terms, since it deviated from the People v Gabres
doctrine.

RULING: Penalty for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, when the amount defrauded exceeds
P22,000.00, is prision correccional max to prision mayor min. The minimum term is taken from the penalty
next lower or anywhere within prision correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day
to 4 years and 2 months). RTC correctly fixed the min term for the five estafa cases at 4 years and 2 months
of prision correccional since this is within the range of prision correccional min and med.

The maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty of prision correccional max to prision mayor min
in its max period, adding 1 year imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that
the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years. However, the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of
prision correccional max to prisin mayor min is not prision mayor min as assumed by the RTC.
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, PC max to PM min is divided into 3 equal
portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 65
of RPC. Following this procedure, the maximum period of PC max to PM minimum is from 6y 8m 21 d to
8y. The additional penalty, when proper, is added to anywhere from 6y 8m and 21 d to 8y, by the court’s
discretion.

In computing the additional penalty, the amount defrauded is subtracted by P22,000.00, and the
difference shall be divided by P10,000.00. Any fraction of a year shall be discarded [BASIS: People v.
Pabalan, penal laws should be liberally construed for the accused]. In accordance with the above
procedure, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentences imposed by the RTC should be as follows:

In criminal cases:

(1) Amount defrauded was P57,600.00

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RTC sentence: indeterminate penalty of 4y and 2m of PC as min, to 9y 1d of PM as max. Amount defrauded

exceeds P22,000.00 by P35,600.00, 3y added to the max period of penalty (or added to anywhere from
6y, 8m 21d to 8y, at the discretion of the court). Lowest maximum term: 9y 8m and 21d of PM, and not 9y
1d of PM.

2) Amounts defrauded were P66,52, P69,520, and P69,520.

Indeterminate penalty 4y 2m, of PC as min, to 10y and 1d of PM as max for each of the three estafa cases.
4y added to max period (or from 6y 8m 21d to 8y, at the discretion of the court). Lowest max term: 10y,
8m and 21d of PM, and not 10y 1d of PM.

(3) Amount defrauded was P88,520

Indeterminate: 4y 2m of PC as min, to 11y and 1d of PM as max. 6y added to the max period (or added
from 6y 8m 21 d to 8y, at the discretion of the court). Lowest max term: 12y, 8m and 21d of RT, and not
11y 1d of PM.
C. Execution and service of penalties
1. General rules – Art. 47, 70, 78, and 86-88,
In re Petition for Habeas Corpus, Pete Lagran, G.R. No. 147270, 15 August 2001, 363 SCRA 275
FACTS
Pete C. Lagran was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City of three (3) counts of violation of
Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment one (1) year for each count and
to pay a fine. The decision became final and executory on August 6, 1997 and entry of judgment was made
on March 5, 1998. Petitioner was committed to the Quezon City Jail on February 24, 1999 and was
transferred to New Bilibid Prison on April 3, 1999.

On March 19, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus praying for his immediate release as he
had allegedly completed the service of his sentence. Citing Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, he argued
that if the penalties or sentences imposed on the accused are identical, and such penalties or sentences
emanated from one court and one complaint, the accused shall serve them simultaneously. He stated that
he has been incarcerated for two (2) years and four (4) days, counted from February 28, 2001, thus, his
detention in the New Bilibid Prison was without legal basis.

ISSUE
Whether or not accused is correct in alleging that he already completed his sentence by virtue of Article
70

HELD
Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code allows simultaneous service of two or more penalties only if the nature
of the penalties so permit. The penalties that can be simultaneously served are: (1) perpetual absolute
disqualification, (2) perpetual special disqualification, (3) temporary absolute disqualification, (4)
temporary special disqualification, (5) suspension, (6) destierro, (7) public censure, (8) fine and bond to
keep the peace, (9) civil interdiction, and (10) confiscation and payment of costs. These penalties, except
destierro, can be served simultaneously with imprisonment. The penalties consisting in deprivation of

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liberty cannot be served simultaneously by reason of the nature of such penalties. Where the accused is
sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment, the terms should be served successively.

In the case at bar, petitioner was sentenced to suffer one year imprisonment for every count of the offense
committed. The nature of the sentence does not allow petitioner to serve all the prison terms
simultaneously. Applying the rule on successive service of sentence, the Supreme Court found that
petitioner has not yet completed the service of his sentence as he commenced serving his sentence only
on February 24, 1999. His prayer, therefore, for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has no basis.

2. Probation Law (PD 968 as amended)

See also: RA 10707
3. Suspension of sentence
a. In cases of insanity – Art. 79
b. Minors
i. Section 31-35 of AM No. 02-1-18-SC
ii. RA 9344
VIII. Extinction of criminal liability
A. Total – Art.89-93
Sermonia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109454, 14 June 1994
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, for
contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C.
Nievera remained valid and subsisting.
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy has been
extinguished by prescription.
Respondent judge denied the motion to quash. He likewise denied the motion to reconsider his order of
denial.
Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and
prohibition. In the assailed decision of 21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
Petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by prescription. He avers
that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in
1975,such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record and thus constitutes notice to the whole
world. The offended party therefore is considered to have had constructive notice of the subsequent
marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was
registered. For this reason, the corresponding information for bigamy should have been filed on or before
1990 and not only in 1992.
Petitioner likewise takes issue with the "alleged concealment of the bigamous marriage" as declared by
the appellate court, insisting that the second marriage was publicly held at Our Lady of Nativity Church in
Marikina on 15 February 1975, and adding for good measure that from the moment of registration the
marriage contract was open to inspection by any interested person.

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On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin from the
commission of the crime but from the time of discovery by complainant which was in July 1991.

ISSUE:
Whether or not his prosecution for bigamy is already time-barred
[which hinges on whether its discovery is deemed to have taken place from the time the offended party
actually knew of the second marriage or from the time the document evidencing the subsequent marriage
was registered with the Civil Registry consistent with the rule on constructive notice.]

HELD:
This Court is of the view that the principle of constructive notice should not be applied in regard to the
crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the fact that a bigamous marriage is generally entered
into by the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous subsisting marriage. Also, a bigamous
marriage is generally entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a married person,
in order to conceal his legal impediment to contract another marriage.
The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is not contrary to the
well entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To compute
the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to almost
absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous marriage may
be said to be open and made of public record by its registration, the offender however is not truthful as
he conceals from the officiating authority and those concerned the existence of his previous subsisting
marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still a married person. He likewise conceals from his
legitimate spouse his bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a place
where he is not known to be still a married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under which
circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It
is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from
the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agency
(sic).
Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the offender, if the prescriptive period for the
offense of bigamy were to be counted from the date of registration thereof, the prosecution of the
violators of the said offense would almost be impossible. The interpretation urged by the petitioner would
encourage fearless violations of a social institution cherished and protected by law.

Republic v. Desierto, G.R. No. 136506, 23 August 2001, 363 SCRA 585
FACTS
On February 12, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) initiated the complaint against private
respondents for violation of R.A. No. 3019 before the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG). The complaint was subsequently referred to the Office of the Ombudsman. It alleged, among
others, that respondent Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. taking advantage of his close relationship with then
President Marcos, had caused the government, through the National Investment Development

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Corporation (NIDC) to enter into a contract with him under terms and conditions grossly disadvantageous
to the government, and, in conspiracy with the respondents members of the UCPB Board of Directors, in
flagrant breach of the fiduciary duty as administrator-trustee of the Coconut Industry Development Fund
(CIDF), manipulated the said Fund resulting in the successful siphoning of P840,789,855.53 of CIDF to his
own corporation, the Agricultural Investors, Inc. (AII) in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, to the grave damage and prejudice of public interest, the Filipino people, the Republic of the
Philippines, and the coconut farmers. Subsequently, Cojuangco, Jr. sought the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground of prescription. Graft Investigation Officer 1 Emora C. Pagunuran issued a memorandum
denominated as "Review and Recommendation" wherein she found that the offense had already
prescribed. It was approved by the Ombudsman who also ruled that the same was filed beyond the
prescriptive period of ten years as fixed under Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 3019.

ISSUE
Whether or not the ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring that the offense charged
in the complaint for violation of RA no. 3019 had already prescribed when the complaint was filed

HELD
The applicable provisions of law on prescription of offenses are found in Article 90 and Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code for offenses punishable thereunder and Act No. 3326 for those penalized by special
laws. R.A. No. 3019 being a special law, the commencement of the period for the prescription for any act
violating it is governed by Section 2 of Act No. 3326, which provides:

SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and
if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

As a rule, if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the
day it was committed. However, in cases where the time of commission is unknown, prescription shall
only run from its discovery and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

Ordinarily, there is no problem in determining the date when the crime consists of a series of acts,
especially when some or all of these acts are innocent in themselves.

In the present case, it was nearly impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the
violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the
public officials concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the loans” to perpetrate fraud
against the government. The alleged anomalous transactions could only have been discovered after the
February 1986 Revolution when one of the original respondents, then President Ferdinand Marcos, was
ousted from office. Prior to said date, no person would have dared to question the legality or propriety of
those transactions. Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with

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which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the
commission thereof and not from the day of such commission, which could have been between February
1986 after the EDSA Revolution and 26 May 1987 when the initiatory complaint was filed.

See also: Act No. 3326 as amended by Act No. 3763

Romualdez v. Marcelo, G.R. No. 165510, 28 July 2006
FACTS:
● Petitioner claims that Office of Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24
informations against him for violation of Section 7, RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) …
Ombudsman cannot revive aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by Sandiganbayan in
February 2004.
○ Defense of prescription may be raised for the first time on appeal, and no necessity for presentation of
evidence … SC may dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending in Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case
Nos. 04-231857-04-231860 pending before RTC of Manila – based on ground of prescription
● Ombudsman argues: dismissal of informations in Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner
was exempt from criminal prosecution, and new informations may be filed my ombudsman if it finds
probable cause in conduct of preliminary investigation; filing of complaint with PCGG (Presidential
Commission on Good Governance) in 1987 and filing of informatation with Sandiganbayan in 1989 –
interrupted the prescriptive period because petitioner was absent from Philippines from 1986 until 2000,
and absence interrupted prescriptive period based on Article 91, RPC
● PCGG comments: in accordance with 1987 Constitution and RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989),
Ombudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number to conduct preliminary
investigation on alleged offense of petitioner. RA 3019 and 3326 – silent to whether prescription should
begin to run when offender is absent from PH, then RPC, which answers in negative should be applied.
ISSUES:
WON preliminary investigations conducted by Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 – nullity
WON offenses have already prescribed

HELD:
● YES; SC reiterates ruling in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan because informations filed by an unauthorized
party, hence it was void.
○ Using Section 6, Rule 117 of Rules of Court, SC states that an order sustaining the motion to quash on
grounds other than extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy does not preclude filing of another
information for a crime constituting the same facts.
○ The informations filed by an unauthorized party is a defect that cannot be cured by conducting another
preliminary investigation … An invalid information is no information, and cannot be used as basis for
criminal proceedings.
● YES; Rule 117 of Rules of Court provides that accused may, at any time before he enters his plea, move to
quash the complaint and information – grounds that criminal action/liability has been extinguished …
defense of prescription can be used, as Article 89, RPC enumerates that prescription – one of those
grounds which totally extinguishes criminal liability.

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○ Petitioner being charged with violations of Section 7, RA 3019 for failure to file Statements of Assets and
Liabilities from 1967-1985 as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and from 1963-1966 as
Technical Assistant in DFA.
■ Offenses allegedly committed from 1962 until 1982, it shall prescribe in 10 years. Offenses allegedly
committed from 1982 until 1985, it shall prescribe in 15 years.
○ SC rules that prescriptive period of the offenses herein began to run from its discovery on May 1987, date
of the complaint filed by PCGG.
■ Respondents aver that in applying Article 91, RPC – absence of petitioner from the Philippines from 1986
until 2000 prevented prescriptive period from running … However, SC disagrees.
○ Re: filing of complaint with PCGG in 1987 and filing of informations with Sandiganbayan to initiate Criminal
Case Nos. 13406-13429 interrupted running of prescriptive period – offenses have already prescribed.
■ Nullity of proceedings initiated by then Solicitor General Chavez in 1987 with the PCGG, and by the PCGG
with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 – judicially settled … In contemplation of the law, no proceedings exist
that could have merited suspension of prescriptive periods.
■ Further, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, so it could not have interrupted the running of the
prescriptive periods.
○ Applicable 10 and 15 year prescriptive periods were not interrupted by any event from the time they
began to run on May 1987 … alleged offenses committed by petitioner from 1963 until 1982 prescribed
on 1997 and 2002. As such, the State has lost its right to prosecute petitioner for the offenses.

B. Partial – Art. 94-99; See also: amendments under RA 10592

Cruz III v. Go, G.R. No. 223446, 28 November 2016

FACTS:
On 4 November 1993 the decision of the RTC, Branch 168, Pasig City, respondent Rolito T. Go was
convicted of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He began serving his
sentence on 30 April 1996 at the New Bilibid Prison.

On 30 July 2008, in carrying out the Resolution and Certificate of Eligibility by then Bureau of Corrections
(BuCor) Director Oscar C. Calderon, the New Bilibid Prison Classification Board granted Go, along with
other 24 inmates, a colonist status. Accordingly, in view of his commuted sentence, Go filed a petition for
habeas corpus on 30 January 2014, pleading for his release. He posits that his original prison sentence
which shall expire on 31 January 2022 instead should have expired on 21 August 2013 upon deduction of
lawful and proper allowances for good conduct, colonist status, and preventive imprisonment based on
the provisions of Act No. 2489, otherwise known as "An Act Authorizing Special Compensation, Credits,
and Modification in the Sentence of Prisoners as a Reward for Exceptional Conduct and Workmanship and
for Other Purposes."

In opposition to Go's release, petitioners maintained that Go's sentence neither has expired nor was
commuted. According to petitioners, the grant of colonist status on Go did not carry with it the automatic
commutation of his sentence from the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua to thirty (30) years because

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only the President has the power to commute a sentence. Sans the signature of the President, any
commutation is ineffectual

On 28 April 2014, the RTC granted the petition and issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus. The RTC found that
Go's sentence was validly commuted from reclusion perpetua to 30 years pursuant to Section 7, Chapter
3 of the BuCor Manual:

Section 7. Privileges of a colonist. — A colonist shall have the following privileges:

a. credit of additional GCTA of five(5) days for such calendar month while retains said classification aside
from the regular GCTA authorized under Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code;

b. automatic reduction of life sentence imposed on the colonist to a sentence of thirty (30) years;

The BuCor Manual is very clear. No ambiguity attends that provision that once an inmate is granted a
colonist status, his life sentence is commuted to 30 years. The RTC further held that, "while it is true that
the President may commute the service of sentence of a prisoner, the law also recognizes partial reduction
of sentences under Art. 97 of the Revised Penal Code which provides for allowances of good conduct."
Contrary to petitioners' contention that the penalty of reclusion perpetua cannot be commuted to 30
years, the RTC cited Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, which speci cally provides that for perpetual
penalties like reclusion perpetua, the duration shall be computed at 30 years. Clearly, it is not correct that
only the President can commute a sentence as these provisions, i.e., Articles 70 and 97, warrant partial
extinguishment or commutation of sentence.

The pertinent portion of the Decision of the RTC granting the Writ of Habeas Corpus reads:

The court adheres therefore, to the computation of GO's expiration of sentence on August 21, 2013 which
is based on the 30 year reduction of his life sentence. His further detention beyond this period to the mind
of the court is illegal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the commutation of sentence due to good behavior is ineffective without the approval of
the President; that only President has the power to exercise executive clemency?

RULING:

Petition denied.

As correctly resolved by the trial court, while only the President can commute a prison sentence, Articles
70 and 97 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) recognize partial reduction or commutation of sentences by
providing that "for penal penalties, the duration shall be computed for 30 years and the allowances of
good conduct must be applied on top of the [good conduct time allowance] accorded to an inmate with a
colonist status."

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Accordingly, to implement the provisions of Article 97, the law has granted the Director of Prisons the
power to grant good conduct allowances. The mandate of the Director of Prisons embodied in Article 99
of the RPC is clear and unambiguous. In fact, once granted, such allowances shall not be revoked. Article
99 of the RPC explicitly states:

“Art. 99. Who grants time allowances. — Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of Prisons shall grant
allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked.”

The intent and spirit of the law in affording persons the remedy of writ of habeas corpus is to devise a
speedy and effective means to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.To rule otherwise would render
Article 99 of the RPC as a mere surplusage and would unduly impose excessive imprisonment on inmates
in violation of the basic right to liberty.

IX. Civil Liability arising from criminal liability – Art. 100-113

People v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994.

In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged
with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E.
Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy
secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of
May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to
file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.

In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not
extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General,
relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the
purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing
that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal
and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in
People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the
criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is
rendered.

With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory construction
is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.

The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the
term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a
judgment which is final and executory?

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ISSUE: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?

HELD: YES.

Citing the case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. With reference to Castillo's
criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability
is extinguished. The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment. It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability
follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the
criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of the
criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided,
of course, that death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case
wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract
of purchase and sale.

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon.

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefore may
be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which
the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action
by prescription, in cases where -during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction,
the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription

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