Experience and Research

EXPERIENCE RESEARCH TRANSFORMER
PROTECTOR
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Copyright © SERGI, referenced: fTPsc13a, dated 16/11/03 1

SERGI Presentation
SUMMARY
SERGI Experience
SERGI Research
TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR presentation
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
SUMMARY
ð Warning
ð Data Acquisition Principles
ð Transformer Explosions in the United States
ð Reminder N°1 : Transformer Vessel Explosion Process During Short circuit
ð Reminder N°2 : Transformer Oil Fire Process After Explosion
ð Water Spray Fire Extinguishing Systems
ð Transformer Electrical Protections
ð Transformer Tank Mechanical Protections
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
WARNING
 All information given in this CD-ROM are only in relation
with transformer severe malfunction situations.
 Comments on material are not related to transformer

normal operation.
 The transformer insulation rupture is considered here to

be the time reference (t=0). SERGI does not analyse the
causes of incidents, which can be provoked by any event
outside the transformer.
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
TRANSFORMER EXPLOSION AND FIRE PREVENTION
DATA ACQUISITION PRINCIPLES
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SKIP
SERGI EXPERIENCE
Transformer explosion often occurs in every country
and affects all production, transmission and
distribution companies.
Human, economic, politic, and BOSTON TOP STORIES
ecological consequences are very One Beacon Street closed because of fire
important. An electrical fire shut down a downtown office building today, sending 3,500 workers home for most of the
day. Only three minor injuries were reported from the blaze at 1 Beacon Street, which broke out about
 In most cases, sites are not protected 10:55 a.m. Boston Fire Deparment spokesman Steve MacDonald said the injuries were related to people
being evacuated from the building. No one - including the 120 firefighters who responded to the scene -
at all or equipped with materials that are was hospitalized. The four-alarm fire started in an electrical transformer on the building's 12th floor, which
A
houses no tenant offices, authorities said. It caused about $200,000 in damage. Smoke from the blaze could
not designed to prevent the explosion or be seen billowing from the middle floors of the 36-story building, which houses several law offices,
S
insurance offices and securities firms. Bob Parette of Hingham said he was about to go inside the building
control its consequences.
U
for an appointment when he heard an explosion and saw a flash of light from a manhole in the street.
Another witness, John Stimpson, reported hearing a series of small explosions which he described as
sounding like a ``21-gun salute.'' MacDonald said the building was shut down because the fire knocked out
power to its emergency exit lights and stairway lights. Boston Edison spokesman Mike Monahan said the
fire knocked out a transformer and three power lines that feed it. Part of the building was without power
today, along with part of a Suffolk University building at 8 Ashburton Place. Monahan said officials
expected the power to be routed to another transformer by tonight.
INFORMATION IS REGULARLY SPREAD BY THE PRESS WHICH

ASSOCIATES THE CIVIL AND POLITICAL RESPONSABILITIES AS WELL
AS THE ECONOMIC AND ECOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES.
As shown in the following examples...
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Business Day 18 August 1998.
tanks only 40 metres away near the coke ovens.
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
 SERGI is a transformers fire protection specialist since 1955 and has always
been dedicated to this field.
 SERGI is the only

Independent system
company in the world
specialised in this field, Direct Current Interconnection
its experience is
System 2
therefore unique.
Converter transformer and smoothing reactor for
HV-DC connection
 Transformer
explosions occurs in
power plants, System 1 Transformer
VHV Shunt
HV reactor
HV/MV MV/LV
interconnection
substations
transmission and Delivery to consumers
VHV-HV-MV
distribution networks. Power, distribution, and
special transformers
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
TRANSFORMER EXPLOSIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES
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SKIP
SERGI EXPERIENCE
SUMMARY
 Introduction
 Web Research Method
 SERGI Database
 Statistics
 Investigation Elements Analysis
 Major Transformer Incidents
Transformer Explosion Videos
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
INTRODUCTION
DESCRIPTION
 In March 2002, SERGI started a one year thorough Web search into
Transformer Explosion and Fire incidents occurring in the United
States.
 The SERGI Transformer Explosion database elaborated in 1995 was

used to collect and to classify all the information found on the web.
 One person, employed full time, records approximately five

explosions per day in the United States.
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
INTRODUCTION
OBJECTIVES
 To collect a maximum of information on Transformer Explosion

and Fire incidents in the United States.
 To analyse the data gathered in order to get a better understanding of

transformer explosion technical causes.
 To assess transformer explosion human, environmental and financial

consequences.
 To produce a scientific report focusing on the importance of

Transformer Explosion and Fire Prevention for the Risk Management
and Insurance Companies.
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
WEB RESEARCH METHOD
 Why Using The Web ?
 Search For Transformer Explosions: Where ?

 Online Media Resources
 Specialized sites
 Search For Transformer Explosions: How ?

 Search Engines
 Keywords
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
WEB RESEARCH METHOD
WHY USING THE WEB ?
 To access up-to-date and archived information. Thousands

of newspapers, magazines and journals are readily available on the
Web.
 In the United States, every single city or town has its newspaper on
the Web. It is therefore much easier to find information about
transformer incidents than it was in the past.
 To access a variety of resources (e.g: newspaper articles, technical

reports, photos and videos).
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
WEB RESEARCH METHOD
SEARCHING FOR TRANSFORMER EXPLOSIONS: WHERE ?
 Online media Resources

These include national and local newspapers,TV channels, radios and
specialized magazines.
 Newspaperlinks (http://www.newspaperlinks.com/home.cfm)
 US Newspaper Archives
(http://ibiblio.org/slanews/internet/archives.html)
 The Newslibrary (http://www.newslibrary.com)
 CNN Online Archives (http://www.cnn.com/SEARCH)
 Electricity magazines (Electricity News, Electrical World)

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SERGI EXPERIENCE
WEB RESEARCH METHOD
SEARCH FOR TRANSFORMER EXPLOSIONS: WHERE ?
 Specialized sites
 Firefighters sites (e.g: Phillyfirenews, Firehouse, LA Firefighters)
 Industrial Fire World Monthly Incident Log
 The National Response Center (NRC)
The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC)
 DAWG Database
 Grassroots Information Coordination Center (GICC)
 Energy Information Administration (EIA)
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
WEB RESEARCH METHOD
SEARCH FOR TRANSFORMER EXPLOSIONS: HOW ?
 Search Engines Used  Keywords Used

- www.yahoo.com
- www.altavista.com
- www.google.com
- www.alltheweb.com
- www.infoseek.com
- www.webcrawler.com
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
SERGI DATABASE
The SERGI database is part of a vast research programme launched by
SERGI in 1995 to understand why transformers explode and catch fire and
to examine the short-term and long-term consequences of such failures.
 The Database Structure
 General Information (location details and information sources)

 Transformer Explosion (Incident details and consequences)
 Transformer Technical Information
 Attached Files (All articles, photos, videos and other resources describing
the incident)
 Analysis (Any detailed report analysing the transformer failure)
 Document Analysis: An Example

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SERGI EXPERIENCE
SERGI DATABASE
GENERAL INFORMATION
File
Name
Reference
Site Address In service date
Country Trading Zone

State
Internet Source
Company
Address
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
SERGI DATABASE
THE TRANSFORMER EXPLOSION
INCIDENT DETAILS CONSEQUENCES

Equipment
Incident Date costs
Number of people Production
killed or injured Losses
Repair Costs
Number of people
affected Overall Costs
Evacuation
Pollution
Incident cause
Other data
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
SERGI DATABASE
TRANSFORMER TECHNICAL INFORMATION
Company Transformer
name protections
Manufacturing
date
Technical
Transformer specificities
Age
Power rate
and Voltage
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
SERGI DATABASE
Document Analysis: An Example
Number of
Outage affects 10,000 in portage people
8/30/00
Date affected
Location PORTAGE – Up to 10,000 electrical customers in Portage were without power
Wednesday morning after a Consumers Energy substation exploded. No one was injured
Site address in the accident, which happened at around 10:30 a.m. The substation is located at Mall Incident
Drive and Constitution Blvd. near Crossroads Mall in Portage.
Location
Firefighters had the fire under control by 11:00 a.m. Outage
As a result of the outage, 10 of 13 schools in the Portage Public schools district said they
Outage would operate on a half-day schedule. The schools began dismissing students at 11:10 consequences
consequences a.m. “In the interest of safety we are better off having children in their homes than we are
holding them in the school building for a number of hours without power,” said schools
superintendent James Rikkers.
10-13 schools affected
Name of More than 8,000 students were sent home early. Students whose parents were not home Pupils evacuated
when they were dropped off, were returned to their regular school site
Electricity
Company Classes are scheduled to resume on Thursday.
Duration of the
A spokesman for Consumers Energy said most customers affected by the outage had outage
power restored by noon Wednesday. A transformer failure led to the explosion. The cause
remains under investigation. Incident
Costs The company estimated the explosion caused $700,000 in damage. cause
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
STATISTICS
The Present statistics cover a period of research starting
from 11 March 2002 to 28 February 2003 for the United States.
Transformer Explosion Table

 GRAPH 1: Transformer Explosions per Year
 GRAPH 2: Transformer Explosions per state from A-M
 GRAPH 3: Transformer Explosions per state from N-W
 GRAPH 4: Transformer Explosions and Electricity Companies A-M
 GRAPH 5: Transformer Explosions and Electricity Companies N-X
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
Transformer Explosion Statistics
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSFORMER EXPLOSION AND FIRE
INCIDENTS 730
NUMBER OF FATALITIES 6
NUMBER OF PEOPLE INJURED 379
NUMBER OF PEOPLE AFFECTED BY 2.2 Million

POWER OUTAGES
NUMBER OF STATES INVOLVED 46
NUMBER OF ELECTRICITY COMPANIES INVOLVED 143
NUMBER OF ELECTRICITY COMPANIES REPORTING AT LEAST 45

THREE EXPLOSIONS
Power plants 39
Nuclear power plants 12
Substations 99
Residential areas 32
TRANSFORMER INCIDENT Downtown areas 67
LOCATIONS
Commercial businesses 48
Industries 22
Schools colleges and universities 48
Others 89
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
GRAPH 1: Transformer Explosions in the United States per Year
730 transformer explosions found on the Web since 11 March 2002 for the United States
250
Transformer Explosions in the United States per Year

200
Num ber of Explosions
150
100
50
Year
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
GRAPH 2 : Transformer Explosions per State from A-M
120
100
N u m b e r o f e x p lo s io n s
Transformer explosions in the United States per state A-M
80
60
40
20
State
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
GRAPH 3: Transformer Explosions per State From N-W
80
70
Transformer explosions in the United States per state N-W

60
50
40
30
20
10
State
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
GRAPH 4: Transformer Explosions and Electricity Companies A-M
American Electricity companies with the highest number of explosions
30
25
Transformer explosions and electricity companies A-M
20
15
10
Companies
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
GRAPH 5: Transformer Explosions and Electricity Companies N-X
American Electricity companies with the highest number of explosions
35
30
Transformer explosions and electricity companies N-X
Num ber of explosions
25
20
15
10
Companies
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
INVESTIGATION ELEMENTS ANALYSIS
The reading and recording of the information gathered from our Internet
search
have highlighted a number of issues regarding transformer failures.
 Explosion Causes
 Explosion Consequences
 Human and Social
 Environmental
 Financial
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
EXPLOSION CAUSES
The following aspects should be considered:
 Weather conditions have an impact on explosions.

Higher number of transformer failures due to peak consumption in the summer
and winter months. (e.g: use of air conditionners)
 The transformer age.

The failure risk increases with newly installed or fairly old transformers.
 Overload during operations.

Articles show that in a great number of cases transformers explode and catch fire
because they have been pushed beyond their capabilities. (power surges)
 Short-circuits are often evoked as a major cause of failure.
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31
SERGI EXPERIENCE
EXPLOSION CONSEQUENCES: HUMAN AND SOCIAL
Transformer explosions are potentially dangerous to people. Statistics for the number
of explosions recorded since March 2002 are as follows:
 Number of people killed: 6
 Number of people injured: 379
Transformer explosions can tremendouly affect people ’s daily life at work and at
home:
 Evacuations
 Traffic shutdowns
 Public buildings closed (e.g: schools, universities, businesses and offices.)
 Computer system disturbances
 Power outages ( 2.2 million people affected for the total number of explosions
recorded since March).
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
EXPLOSION CONSEQUENCES: ENVIRONMENTAL
 Transformer explosions can cause serious environmental damage

 Oil spills
 Chemical releases like PCBs
 The immediate consequences of this kind of pollution are as follows:

 Costly clean up operations
 Serious Health effects (Exposure to PCB can cause cancer)
 Lawsuit alleges due to toxic chemical contamination of property
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
CASES OF MAJOR ENVIRONMENTAL INCIDENTS WITH
TRANSFORMERS
Incident location Incident date Environmental Other information
damages
Washington, DC 1 October 1999 PCB oil was released 42 people including
in the Department of six firefighters were
Commerce building. taken to the hospital
and treated for
exposure to the oil and
smoke inhalation.
Fairfax, VA 2 April 2000 Release of 50,000 An unknown amount
gallons of transformer of the oil entered an
oil. unnamed creek, which
eventually feeds into
the Occoquan River.
Boardman, Oregon 6 May 2002 17,000 gallons of non- The amount spilled
PCB transformer oil outside of the
spilled. containment is
unknown. The plant is
located 1,500 yards
from the Columbia
River.
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
EXPLOSION CONSEQUENCES: FINANCIAL
 Transformer explosions are very costly because they often entail:
 Equipment replacement
 Production losses
 Clean up operations
 Building repairs
INCIDENT DATE COST USD - COST DETAILS

LOCATION MILLIONS
SACAJAWEA, WA 14/12/1997 3 Total cost
SOUTH BEND, IND 15/04/1999 1.35 Total cost
VENICE, ILL 10/08/2000 25 Equipment
KANSAS CITY 23/05/2000 3 Equipment
ALLSTON, MA 25/05/2002 1 Total cost
 Newspaper articles give very scanty information about transformer explosion

financial consequences. We are therefore investigating ways of calculating
production losses .
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
EXPLOSION CONSEQUENCES: FINANCIAL
An example: Boston NSTAR Transformer Explosion
On 1 October 2001, NSTAR had a major Transformer explosion. A 115 Kv transformer

on a portable substation Low bed trailer exploded causing extensive damage to
a 5 Meter in diameter cooling water intake pipe to a thermal power plant.
The transformer tank melted almost entirely. The damages are as follows:
1 Transformer and portable substation = about US$1.5 Million

2 Damages to the water intake pipe = US$ 500.000
3 Damages to the environment = US$ 2 Million
4 Total Cost = more than US$ 4 Million
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
MAJOR TRANSFORMER
EXPLOSION INCIDENTS
DORCHESTER, MA , July 2000

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SERGI EXPERIENCE
MAJOR TRANSFORMER
EXPLOSION INCIDENTS
 VENICE POWER PLANT, ILLINOIS

 HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT, NEW JERSEY
 MIRA LOMA SUBSTATION, CALIFORNIA
 HAWTHORN POWER PLANT, MISSOURI
 JONESBORO, ARKANSAS
 HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
VENICE POWER PLANT (ILL)
10 August 2000
IDENTIFICATION FORM
LOCATION Amerem, Saint Louis
FAILURE DATE 10 August 2000
SITE ADDRESS Venice Power Plant in East Saint Louis
POWER RATE 40 MVA
MECHANICAL Unsuccessful operation of the pressure relief
PROTECTION valve
EFFICIENCY
FIRE PROTECTION Fire extinguishing water spray was useless
DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT 9 transformers lost
ESTIMATED DAMAGE 20-25 Million US$
COMMENTS
The fire started on the turbine room (40 grade) when a hydraulic oil line to the
plant’s unit1 turbine ruptured. The oil ignited and fire spread to oil pooling
around the oil reservoir one grade below (5 grade). The fire on 5 grade took out
cable trays that included DC control power in the plant and switchyard, which
resulted in loss of fire pumps and inability to isolate transformers. Two
transformers ruptured and the oil ignited.
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
VENICE POWER PLANT MAJOR TRANSFORMER INCIDENT PHOTOS
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
UNIT 1 GSU UNIT 3 TRANSFORMER
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT ( NJ)
24 May 2000
IDENTIFICATION FORM
LOCATION Hope Creek Nuclear Plant, NJ
FAILURE DATE 24/05/2000
TRANSFORMER ID EBM 1258, serial : 7001791
POWER RATE 500 MVA
VOLTAGE RATE 500 Kv
MANUFACTURING 1986
DATE
START UP DATE December 86
TANK TYPE Single Phase Step up
FAILURE LOCATION Static electrification
MECHANICAL Unsuccessful protection of the Pressure Relief Valve
PROTECTION
FIRE PROTECTION Fire Extinguishing Water Spray system was useless
COMMENTS
The fire was not brought under control for 28 hours and continued to smolder for 14 days.
Recovery efforts were hindered by inability to lift the transformer without first strengthening it.
All the oil came out and drained into the concrete moat below the transformer.
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT MAJOR TRANSFORMER
INCIDENT PHOTOS
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
HOPE CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT MAJOR TRANSFORMER
INCIDENT PHOTOS
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
MIRA LOMA SUBSTATION (CAL)
11 February 2000
IDENTIFICATION FORM
LOCATION MIRA LOMA SUBSTATION, CA, USA

TRANSFORMER ID 3 AA Bank
TANK TYPE Single phase with oil conservator tank
MECHANICAL Unsuccessful operation of the Pressure
PROTECTION Relief Valve
END USER Southern California Edison
COMMENTS
Fire started at 3 AM
The neighbouring Spare Unit caught fire at 3: 50 AM
Firefighters on location at 4:00 AM
Ontario Int. Airport Crash Trucks arrive on location at 4:50
One unit fire extinguished at 4:53
5:16 Foam application
6:39 Last flames extinguished
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
MIRA LOMA SUBSTATION MAJOR TRANSFORMER INCIDENT PHOTOS
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
MIRA LOMA SUBSTATION MAJOR TRANSFORMER INCIDENT PHOTOS
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
HAWTHORN POWER PLANT, KANSAS CITY
23 May 2000
IDENTIFICATION FORM
SITE ADDRESS Hawthorn Power Station

8700 Hawthorne Road
Kansas City, Missouri 64120

POWER RATE 500.000 Kva
MANUFACTURING 1984
DATE
START UP DATE 1985
TANK TYPE Shell Type
FAILURE LOCATION LV winding explosion releasing oil &
second explosion in LV conservator tank.
FAILURE TYPE Suspected short-circuit
MECHANICAL Unsuccessful operation of the Pressure
PROTECTION Relief Valve.
FIRE PROTECTION Fire extinguishing Water Spray system
was useless.
DAMAGES 3 Million USD
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
JONESBORO (ARKANSAS)
29 April 2001
IDENTIFICATION FORM
FAILURE DATE 29 April 2001

SITE ADDRESS Electrical Substation,
Jonesboro
INCIDENT Residential area
LOCATION
POLLUTION 4 000 gallons of oil
CONSEQUENCES Site evacuation
COMMENTS
The oil burned for about 45 minutes
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
JONESBORO TRANSFORMER INCIDENT PHOTOS
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT
28 September 2001
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
HARTFORD TRANSFORMER INCIDENT PHOTOS
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
TRANSFORMER EXPLOSION VIDEOS
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
LIST OF VIDEOS
 Transformer Explosion and Fire on a Golf Course in the USA.
Video ref: Golf Colour Short .mpg
Distribution Transformer Bushing Explosion in Baranquilla, Columbia
Video ref: columbia.mpg
Transformer Explosion in Indonesia in 1998.

Video ref: indones.mpg
Transformer Explosion in StPetersburg, Russia, In October 2002.

Video ref: StPetersburgFire.asf
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
TRANSFORMER EXPLOSION ON A GOLF COURSE IN THE USA
LOCATION: Substation located next to a golf course, USA
DATE: 1999
TRANSFORMER
TYPE: 20 MVA distribution transformer
SOURCE: Amateur video
COMMENTS: The video shows the explosion of a transformer on
a golf Course. This is the only video from Our collection which
actually Conveys the violence of a transformer explosion.
The transformer tank was hit by an external arc, caused by
a short-circuit which does not trigger any electrical protection
and the arcing lasts until tank rupture.
Tank rupture is caused by a very slow oil pressure increase due to the temperature of the external arc. At this moment
two jets of oil are visible on the front and right sides of the tank.
During an arcing fault, the high temperatures generate flammable explosives gases, which initiate the transformer
explosion. As a consequence, these gases are evacuated with the transformer oil and the self-inflammable acetylene
ignites the fire when in contact with air (oxygen).
The sudden detonation gives an idea of the intensity of the explosion with the flames as high as 100 feet above the
transformer. It is easy to imagine the dramatic consequences which could result from such violent incidents in the case
of larger transformers.
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
TRANSFORMER BUSHING EXPLOSION IN BARANQUILLA, COLUMBIA
LOCATION: GTE Electranta Substation
DATE: 1991
TRANSFORMER TYPE: 30 MVA transformer
SOURCE: Evening news, Tele Heraldo
COMMENTS:
The fire was caused by a bushing explosion. A small quantity of oil, approximately 0,3m3 spilled
onto the floor and ignited.
Firefighters cooled the transformer in order to prevent the oil tank from catching fire, which
would otherwise result in more catastrophic consequences.
The fire was under control and the oil spill was contained after two hours.
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
TRANSFORMER BUSHING EXPLOSION IN INDONESIA
LOCATION: Indonesia, SURABAYA,

Gardu Induk PLN Terbakar
DATE: 1998
TRANSFORMER
TYPE: Power transformer
SOURCE: Evening news, SCTV
COMMENTS:
Reporters arrived on the incident site shortly after the firefighters. Water was poured on to
the transformer fire, with no effect.
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
TRANSFORMER EXPLOSION IN ST PETERSBOURG, RUSSIA
LOCATION: St Petersburg, Russia,

Substation 13
DATE: 22 October 2002
SOURCE: TV1
COMMENTS:
A fire occurred on 22 October 2002 at 4:40 pm in downtown St Petersburg,Vassilevsky Island, following an accident
at one of the transformers in Substation 13.
The substation was located in the courtyard of a residential building and a part of the building burnt due to the fire.
The district of Vassilevsky Island was without electricity for at least 24 hours.
The office of the Public Prosecutor has proceeded against the Utility company "Electricity of St Petersburg".
The allegation is cited as : "infringement of the fire safety rules caused heavy damage".
Following the accident, five transformers in the substation have been destroyed. The fire brigade could only
approach the transformer and commence fire extinguishing four hours after the fire started, due to the very
high temperatures generated by the burning oil.

SERGI EXPERIENCE
REMINDER N°1
TRANSFORMER VESSEL EXPLOSION

PROCESS DURING SHORT CIRCUIT
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
TRANSFORMER VESSEL EXPLOSION PROCESS
DURING SHORT CIRCUIT
1/ Internal
 short circuit
 2/ Local temperature rise

50°C
 3/ Explosive gases
Melting Temperatures
generation absorbed by
oil
Copper 1080°C Alu 660°C
 4/ Pressure rise inside
tank
 5/ Vessel explosion 50°C
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
REMINDER N°2
TRANSFORMER OIL FIRE PROCESS

AFTER EXPLOSION
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
OIL FIRE IGNITION
ð Fires ignite with the combination

FIRE of 3 elements:
1: Fuel
2: Combustive
3: Energy
ð Transformers withhold 2 of these

Oil elements: Oil and Energy
ð And are under the permanent

Energy Oxygen threat of the 3rd one : Oxygen
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
TRANSFORMER OIL FIRE PROCESS
AFTER EXPLOSION
 1/ Vessel
decompression
generates explosive
gases bubbles
 2/ Self-flammable
acetylene starts fire at HEAT
approximately 15°C
 3/ Heat at flames origin,
approximately 1000°C,
warms oil surface, which
FLAMMABLE GASES
also generates flammable
PRODUCTION AT OIL
gases
FLASH POINT
 4/ Burning oil overflow
from conservator extends
fire to whole plant
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
DATA BASE ANALYSIS RESULTS
WATER SPRAY
FIRE EXTINGUISHING SYSTEMS
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
FACTS OF TRANSFORMER FIRE EXTINGUISHING
BY WATER SPRAY SYSTEM
Power plants or substations

transformers at are often
protected by pressurised
water spray systems.
SERGI HAS VERY FEW

EXAMPLES OF
TRANSFORMER FIRE
EXTINGUISHED BY
WATER SPRAY.
SERGI DATA BASE REFERS

TO A LARGE NUMBER OF
1. Buchholz 4. Water Level Control 7. Pressure Control WATER SPRAY SYSTEMS
2. Nozzles 5. Water Tank FAILURES DURING
6. Gas Cylinder
EXPLOSION AND FIRE
3. Transformer
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
A large number of water spray systems failures has been recorded in the following cases :
 Water does not extinguish oil fires.

In some cases, well equipped fire brigades took one week to
extinguish the fire. In the following examples, fire only
stopped when all transformer oil had burned :
- Ukraine, Proton Nuclear Power Plant, 1996
- South Africa, Apollo Substation, 1989
 When the transformer explodes, the water spray pipes

located above the cover are destroyed by the blast.
Pressurised water is therefore spread by the destroyed pipes
and nearby transformers and equipment are no more
protected against fire. Consequently, fire extends to the whole
site.
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
A large number of water spray systems failures has been recorded in the following cases :
 Nozzles are quickly clogged by sand, dust, and humidity.

That is why, they must therefore be cleaned monthly. This
operation requires transformer shut down.
 The internal surface of pressurised water piping gets rusted

easily and the deposit also clogs the nozzles.
 Heavy maintenance leads to costs increase. Therefore, the

end users often leave the water spray system in improper
working condition.
 Water storage tank capacity is limited.

The fire brigades must be organised to arrive at site in less
than 10 mn after the incident, before water runs out.
Considering the fire station distant locations and heavy urban
traffic, this criteria is not fulfilled.
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
EXAMPLES OF WATER SPRAY SYSTEMS

RECORDED FAILURES
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
FAILURES OF TRANSFORMER FIRE EXTINGUISHING
In addition, the water spray system can be dangerous and sometimes provokes
transformer explosion, as in the recent case below:
 USA, South Band, Delta Star Electric, 4th January 1999,
where water spray initiated transformer explosion.
©South Bend Tribune -- January 5, 1999
BROKEN PIPE SPARKS EXPLOSION

SOUTH BEND -- A leaking water pipe drenched an electrical transformer and sparked a terrific explosion Monday afternoon at Delta Star Electric Inc.,
1125 S. Walnut St., officials said.
The fire department had been sent to the business about 4:45 p.m. Monday on a fire alarm that had been activated by flowing water, said Robert
Maciejewski, battalion chief. he building is equipped with a fire suppression sprinkler system and sudden changes in water pressure, such as when a
sprinkler is activated, can trigger the fire alarm, Maciejewski explained. Firefighters made a cursory check of the building and, after seeing no signs of fire,
were preparing to leave, Maciejewski said. Maciejewski said he decided to make one last check and was walking through a rear shop area when he
discovered a one-inch pipe, which is part of the sprinkler system, was pouring water onto a collection of transformers and electrical switching equipment.
"Something told me it wasn't quite right and I decided to make one more check of the building," Maciejewski said. "When I found the leak and saw what
was happening, I turned right around and headed for the door. »
One of the transformers exploded just as Maciejewski reached the door.
"It was quite a loud bang," he said.
Though no fire resulted from the incident, the drenched electrical equipment likely was damaged. The company was calling in electrical engineers to
assess the damage. Maciejewski said workers had a rear overhead door open earlier in the day when they were clearing snow from the entrance. He said
cold air coming through that door likely caused water in the sprinkler pipe to freeze.
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
FAILURES OF TRANSFORMER FIRE EXTINGUISHING
Some recent examples of water spray system failure are shown below for different
transformer power ratings, in various countries :
 February 99, Pakistan, Power Plant, 380 MVA

 February 98, Mexico, San Nicolas Substation, 125 MVA
 March 98, Hungary, Martonvasari Substation, 250 MVA
 August 98, Zimbabwe, Harare Substation, 120 MVA
 September 97, Nigeria, Aja Substation, 60 and 150 MVA
 August 97, Venezuela, El-Guri Hydro Power Plant, 120 MVA
 July 97, Romania, 250 MVA
 August 97, South Africa, Arnot Power Station, 400 MVA
 October 96, Ukraine, Proton Nuclear Power Plant, 1250 MVA
 February 95, Canada, British Colombia, Hydro Power Plant
 February 94, Czech Republic, Dukovany, 250 MVA
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
CO2 ATMOSPHERE
FIRE EXTINGUISHING SYSTEMS
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
COMPLEX DESIGN, EXPENSIVE AND DANGEROUS PROTECTION
TRANSFORMER MUST BE INSTALLED INSIDE A SPECIFIC BUILDING
AUDIO
SMOKE ALARM
CO2
NOOZLES DETECTORS
FIRE DETECTORS
VISUAL LARGE NUMBER OF CO2

ALARM CYLINDERS REQUIRED
CONTROL
CABINETS
AUTOMATIC
DOORS
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
WEAKNESSES OF CO2 ATMOSPHERE FIRE EXTINGUISHING SYSTEM
 The CO2 system seals the transformer room upon activation, endangering human being
trapped inside. Despite of alarms, a large number of people are often killed.
 The CO2 system is very expensive as it requires to :
 Isolate the transformer in a specific building (heavy civil works)

 install a large number of CO2 cylinders and a complex system of valves and nozzles
(expensive material, increase of failure potential causes).
 THE CO2 ATMOSPHERE SYSTEM IS ONLY A FIRE EXTINGUISHING METHOD. IT CANNOT

AVOID TRANSFORMER EXPLOSION LIKE THE SERGI PREVENTIVE METHOD.
 In case of explosion and fire, transformer and all equipment inside the room are heavily
damaged and expensive replacement are needed.
 Because of the danger for the work force, most companies in the world have forbidden
this method.
 Investigations toward suppliers show that very few systems have been sold for 10 years.
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
EXAMPLE OF A RECENT FAILURE OF CO2 FIRE EXTINGUISHING
 SERGI data base recorded a recent transformer explosion where the CO 2 Fire
Extinguishing System failed to avoid destructive explosion and fire.
11 February 1999
HONDURAS
El Cajon,
Cavern type Hydro Power Plant
100MVA transformer
49.5kA fault
CO2 at secondary bushing cable.
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
TRANSFORMER
ELECTRICAL PROTECTIONS
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
TRANSFORMER PROTECTIONS BEFORE
THE INVENTION OF EXPLOSION AND FIRE PREVENTION
Transformers are mainly protected by electrical protections
BREAKER TRIP
ELECTRICAL PROTECTIONS When one of any electrical protections

 Differential  Earth Fault is activated, the circuit breaker opens
and the transformer trips
 Over Current  Buchholz
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
TRANSFORMER PROTECTION BEFORE
THE INVENTION OF EXPLOSION AND FIRE PREVENTION
In most cases of tank explosion, electrical protections worked
normally and tripped the circuit breaker. However, the protection
efficiency is limited by the time delay of circuit breaker opening.
THE ACTUAL TECHNOLOGY, ALLOWING OPENING IN 85 MILLISECONDS, IS NOT

SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT VESSEL EXPLOSION IN CASE OF SEVERE SHORT CIRCUIT.
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
TRANSFORMER TANK
MECHANICAL PROTECTIONS
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
transformer tank
MECHANICAL PROTECTION NORMALISATION
TODAY
The sole International Standard
concerning transformers, CEI 76,
refers to electrical insulation
measurement but does not include
any regulation regarding mechanical
protection of transformer tank.
IN THE PAST
In comparison, the previous norm
“British Standard” BS 171, required
transformer tank to withstand a
maximum of 16 bar pressure.
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
EFFICIENCY COMPARISON BETWEEN
PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE AND BURSTING DISK
Approximately 30 years ago, Bursting Disks used to
ensure over pressurized oil evacuation in case of fault.
 In many cases, Bursting
Disks and associated
chimneys successfully
managed to evacuate the
energy dissipated during short
circuit without affecting the tank.
 Nowadays, transformers are mostly protected by the

Pressure Relief Valves . SERGI has only very few examples
of transformer tank explosion avoided with this kind of
protection during short circuit.
 The maximum pressure that can be withstood by the

transformer tank is now 1 bar above atmospheric pressure.
It is often admitted that transformers explode at 1.2 bar
above atmospheric pressure.
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
BURSTING DISKS WERE ABANDONED

FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS :
 Chimneys were never bound to

evacuation pits, oil was therefore
exhausted towards other equipment.
Fire was spread to nearby equipment
and the whole plant was set on fire.
 Once the oil gush had been

evacuated, air could enter the tank,
provoking internal explosion and
internal fire.
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
The Pressure Relief Valve Design

does not take into consideration
the short circuit consequences.
Spring force,
oil flow and time constant are
incompatible with the
explosion dynamics and
forbid instant evacuation of
the generated energy
Pressure Relief Valves are only designed to withstand small pressure rise due
to errors during oil refilling, filtration operations or to indicate a certain
pressure level.
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
SERGI Rupture Disk 25 Pressure Relief Valves

By patenting the Transformer Explosion and Fire Prevention, SERGI reinvented the
Bursting Disk that was efficient to prevent the tank from explosion.
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SERGI EXPERIENCE
Taking into account its Data Base

Analysis results, SERGI has
patented the new Explosion and
Fire Prevention generation :
THE TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR

Patents:
Europe n° 96932665.1 du 28/9/96 USA n° 08/836929 du 19/5/97

Japan n° PCT/FR/96/01513 du 27/9/96 China n° 96191137.9 du 27/9/96
India n° 1926CAL96 du 5/11/96 Russia n° 97110673 du 27/9/96
Mexico n° 973595 du 27/9/96 Brazil n° 9701611-0 du 2/4/97
Venezuela n° 599 du 2/4/97 South Africa n° 96/8163 du 27/9/96
etc...
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PROTECTOR
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SERGI RESEARCH
SUMMARY
ð Physical phenomenon analysis during short circuit

ð Over current, short circuit and explosion of a 20 MVA transformer
ð Study and design of power plant transformers explosion prevention
ð Pressure Relief Valve efficiency calculations by comparison to the
TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR during transformer short circuit
ð Comparison between mineral and silicon oils
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SERGI RESEARCH
PHYSICAL PHENOMENON ANALYSIS

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SERGI RESEARCH
PHYSICAL PHENOMENON ANALYSIS INSIDE THE TRANSFORMER
Since 1995, SERGI studies chemical and physical phenomena inside the
transformer tank during internal short circuit.
To understand the gas creation

phenomenon under short circuit
conditions, one must integrate
the amount of time needed to
transform oil into gas versus
the temperature.
The various parameters related to pressure rise caused by gas generation

are analysed.
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SERGI RESEARCH
The study principle lies on the released energy within the transformer tank after short
circuit.
It is conducted from small numerical simulations that involve the following equation :
 
 : Mass density
δT Cp : Constant pressure oil thermal capacity
ρCp  ρCp V grad T  div - k grad T  Qth versus temperature
δt V : Velocity vector
Qth : Thermal source density
K : Thermal conductance
By solving the differential equation, the temperature of the elementary oil volume
versus time is determined, taking also into consideration the tank and winding
geometry.
From the Navier-Stockes equation :

 : Oil relative mass density in (x,y,z)
F : Force resultant in (x,y,z)
dv 1 μ v : Oil velocity in (x,y,z)
 F  grad P1   Δ v  : Oil dynamic viscosity in (x,y,z)
v : Laplacian velocity vector
dt ρ ρ P1 : Volume oil pressure in (x,y,z) from gravitational strength and
oil flow
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SERGI RESEARCH
By associating the Navier-Stockes equation to the temperature equation previously
found, it is possible to determine the pressure P at all points of the tank.
The surface pressure P2 is calculated with the Real Gas Law :

n : Gas mole number
V : Oil volume
 2 a
 P2  n V  nb   nRT
R : Ideal gas constant
T : Oil surface temperature
 v P2 : Gas pressure
a, b : Gas generation constant
The gas temperature is extremely high at the instant of generation, so the

thermal expansion should be taken into account. The result of the
pressure rise must also take into consideration the oil static and dynamic
pressure.
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SERGI RESEARCH
TIME NEEDED FOR MINERAL OIL TO GENERATE
ONE LITRE OF FLAMMABLE GAS
For oil to generate one litre

1.2 year of gas, it takes :
1 month
4 days  1.2 year at 330°C,
10 hours
1 hour  0.036 second at 1100°C.
Time
6 minutes
36 seconds
3.6 second
0.036 second
0.0036 second
Temperature in °C
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SERGI RESEARCH
PERCENTAGE OF HYDROGEN CONTAINED INTO MINERAL OIL
VERSUS TEMPERATURE
 100% hydrogen
at 950°C
Hydrogen %
 Mixed gases
without hydrogen
at 300°C
Temperature in °C
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SERGI RESEARCH
2D/3D MODEL
The oil decomposition process under the effect of molecular agitation

by thermal effect is analysed via a general multi-physics model
« MAGNETO-THERMO-HYDRODYNAMIC ».
The software used by SERGI enables

to take into consideration all
calculation, exact transformer
geometry parameters and all types of
electrical fault.
Models calculated by COSMOS/M

software enable to define the
temperature gradient and the pressure
after a fault inside the transformer tank.
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SERGI RESEARCH
2D/3D MODEL
 Cosmos/M is a « finite elements » software

that can resolve partial derivative equations by
convergence.
 It cumulates electromagnetic, hydraulic, and

heat transfer concerns.
 The solution of static and dynamic conditions

takes into account the material physical non
linear characteristics.
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SERGI RESEARCH
MODEL OF HALF-TRANSFORMER WINDING
 1/ Geometry
Low voltage winding

High voltage winding
Voltage regulator winding
Insulation
Screen
Oil
Magnetic Circuit
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SERGI RESEARCH
MODEL OF HALF-TRANSFORMER WINDING
1/ Geometry Copper
oil
 2/ Meshing paper
Outside the transformer

velocity
 3/ Effects of exact
physical properties Magnetic circuit side
 4/ Conditions to the
limit
 5/ Charging thermal
and electromagnetic
losses in the winding
convection
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SERGI RESEARCH
TEST VISUALISATION IN STEADY STATE
WITH NOMINAL CURRENT ( I nom )
Steady state simulation  Visualisation des
allows to observe the Oil flow “hot” temperatures
temperature
Velocity (m/s)°C
Temperature °C
transformer behaviour as a 0.16
57
function of electrical charge 0.14
52
imposed. 0.12
47
0.10
42
0.8
38
0.6
33
 Fluid Velocity 0.4

28
visualisation inside the 0.2

23
tank. 0
20
 Fluid Temperature
visualisation inside the
tank Oil injection “cold”
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SERGI RESEARCH
OVER CURRENT, SHORT CIRCUIT AND
EXPLOSION OF A 20 MVA TRANSFORMER
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SERGI RESEARCH
20 MVA TRANSFORMER
LOW VOLTAGE WINDING 6 TURNS SHORT CIRCUIT
REAL TRANSFORMER EXPLOSION ANALYSIS

This case is analysed and presented because :
 Most parameters have been recorded during the
transformer short circuit and explosion.
 The transformer prototype was tested at 40% and
100% overload. All data were recorded.
 Therefore, design calculations could be verified
during normal operation, overload and short circuit.
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SERGI RESEARCH
20 MVA TRANSFORMER
NOMINAL AND OVER CURRENT CALCULATION
Nominal current : 40% over current: 100% over current:
I nominal 1.4 x I nominal 2 x I nominal
The steady state The second situation corresponds to an The third situation
corresponds to operation of two transformers in parallel, shows a transformer
transformer normal each give 70% of its nominal current rate. fed up to 200% of its
operation with normal nominal current. This is
If one transformer fails, the other must
temperature and not frequent, even if it
provide the total current. This state of 140%
pressure level. happens, it is only for a
over current can last approximately 2 hours
short time (<10 min.).
without noticeable degradation.
Temperature °C Temperature °C Temperature °C

57 166 229
52 147 203
47 129 After 176

Steady After
42 111 2 hours 150
state 10 minutes
38 93 124
33 74 98
28 56 72
23 38 46
20 20 20
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SERGI RESEARCH
20 MVA TRANSFORMER
A 6 turns short circuit is simulated on the left part of the magnetic circuit.
Temperature and pressure inside the tank are calculated before and after short circuit .
Short circuit
OFAF Transformer
Magnetic circuit
(Oil Forced and Air Forced cooling circulation).
The fault is simulated for the following cases:

 with and without circuit breaker opening
 for mineral and silicon oils
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SERGI RESEARCH
20 MVA TRANSFORMER
Temperature on the left side of the transformer without Circuit Breaker opening
Steady State Transient State Mineral oil, flash point 140 °C
0 ms 30 ms 55 ms 85 ms 105 ms
0 ms
Temperature °C
Temperature °C 881
57 769
52 657
47 544
42 432
38 320
33 207
28 95
23 20
20
The 55 milliseconds inertia
before sensible
temperature rise is due to
oil warming and energy
required for gases
generation.
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SERGI RESEARCH
20 MVA TRANSFORMER
Pressure on the left side of the transformer without Circuit Breaker opening
Transient State
Mineral oil, flash point 140 °C 30 ms 55 ms 85 ms 105 ms
bar bar bar bar

 Local pressure increases 0.021 0.039 9.047 438
up to 440 bars between 55 0.019 0.034 7.916 383
and 105 milliseconds after 0.016 0.029 6.785 328
short circuit origin. 0.013 0.024 5.654 274

0.010 0.019 4.523 219
0.008 0.014 3.393 164
 The simulation shows
0.005 0.009 2.261 109
clearly the shock wave
0.002 0.004 1.131 54
consecutive to short circuit
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
and explains the explosion
violence.
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SERGI RESEARCH
20 MVA TRANSFORMER
Evolution of average pressure within the tank during short circuit.
The transformer total volume is Montée

Mineral Oil en pression
Pressure de in
Rise l'huile
a 20 minérale dans un
MVA Transformer
transformateur de 20MVA
taken into consideration in the
calculation of average pressure. 10
Withoutsans
circuit breaker
coupure opening
du disjoncteur
The curves showing average
breakerduopens
Circuitcoupure disjoncteur en 86
after 86 ms
ms
pressure evolution within the
atm
1
tank are represented for two (bar)

bar, above
cases : Tank explosion limit
Pression
 Circuit Breaker opening 0,1
failure,
Pressure,
 Circuit Breaker opening 85 0,01

milliseconds after fault detection,
Nowadays, transformer tanks
0,001
are designed to resist to an 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
average pressure of 1 bar above Temps

Time, (ms)
milliseconds
atmospheric pressure.
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SERGI RESEARCH
20 MVA TRANSFORMER
Evolution of average pressure within the tank during short circuit.
Montée
Mineral Oil en pression
Pressure de in
Rise l'huile
a 20 minérale dans un
MVA Transformer
transformateur de 20MVA
The circuit
10
Withoutsans
circuit breaker
coupure opening
du disjoncteur
breaker opening breakerduopens

Circuitcoupure disjoncteur en 86
after 86 ms
ms
atm
1
does not prevent (bar)

bar, above
Tank explosion limit
the tank
Pression
0,1
explosion.
Pressure,
0,01
0,001
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Temps
Time, (ms)
milliseconds
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SERGI RESEARCH
Study and Design of Power Plant Transformer
Explosion Prevention
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SERGI RESEARCH
HYDRO-PLANT 150 MVA TRANSFORMER
NOT PROTECTED BY GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER
Introduction
• SERGI studied the explosion prevention of power plant
transformers because of the harsh arcing that can occur.
Hence, during arcing, power plant transformer faults are fed
for seconds due to the generator inertia.
• Therefore, designing a system able to prevent a Power

Plant transformer explosion satisfies the prevention of
any other kind of incident.
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SERGI RESEARCH
Introduction
• The study started on request of a Western US Facility
• Which suffered electricity production loss following a

severe underground hydro plant transformer explosion
• SERGI extensively investigated the event, simulating
causes, calculating the transformer tank pressure rise,
and proposed a suitable solution to avoid tank explosion
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SERGI RESEARCH
Transformer description
The studied transformer is single phase, step-up, located
downstream of a 450 MVA generator.
• Nominal Power: 150 MVA

• Primary voltage: 18 kV delta
• Secondary voltage: 133 kV L-N
• Impedance: 15.5 %
• Cooling: Forced Oil, Water cooled
• Dimension: 11" diameter , 13" high
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SERGI RESEARCH
Transformer description
Earth screen Electrical arc
Rings
Neutral screen
LV Windings
Paper Phase screen

Irrigation canal HV Windings
Transformer upper winding geometry

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Copyright © SERGI,referenced: CdTPTTPcl11a, dated 28/07/00 113

SERGI RESEARCH
Fault Analysis
22.2% 10% 10% 15.5%

G
Generator 18KV R
I
450MVA D
133K V
Short-circuit power- Icc Short-circuit power-
2131 MVA
6600 MVA
Fault scheme
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SERGI RESEARCH
Fault Analysis
The fault current was calculated with the
symmetrical component method and gave the
value of 11.8kA during the incident.
However, the utility has required SERGI to simulate the case
for different faults in order to oversize the resulting
transformer protection.
35 kA
118 kA
236 kA
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SERGI RESEARCH
Results and interpretations

Pressure gradient
• SERGI made the hypothesis that no Generator Circuit Breaker would operate during
the fault. The fault is therefore simulated all through the depressurisation process.
• The Transformer Protector operates when the internal pressure reaches 0.8 bar, 11.6 psi.
Current, Pressure gradient, Pressure gradient,

kA bar/s psi/s
35 60 855
118 130 1900
236 930 13500
Pressure gradients in bar and psi at TRANSFORMER
PROTECTOR operation per fault current
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SERGI RESEARCH
Results and interpretations

Pressure gradient
Pressure evolution for a 236 kA fault P ressure evolution for a 236 kA fault
10 200
8 Internal
Internal
150 P ressure
Pressure
6
Maximum
M aximum 100
4 tolerated tolerated
pressure pressures
2 Arc Ignition 50 Arc Ignition
0
0
0,042 0,044 0,046 0,048 0,050
0,042 0,043 0,044 0,045 0,046 0,047 0,048 0,049 0,050
Time ( s)
Time ( s)
Pressure evolution versus time for the 236 kA

fault in bar and psi
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SERGI RESEARCH
Depressurisation
Volume of gas produced at instant of depressurisation
Gas volume produced at instant of depressurisation for the

236 kA short circuit
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SERGI RESEARCH
Proposed solution
Purpose :
• Enable a fast depressurisation
• Prevent Oil - Oxygen contact
• Evacuate dangerous gases

outdoor
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Copyright © SERGI, referenced: CdTPTTPcl11a, dated 16/04/02 119

SERGI RESEARCH
Conclusion
• Generator Circuit-breaker
• Rapid Pressure relay
• Pressure Relief Valve
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SERGI RESEARCH
Efficiency comparison between Pressure
Relief Valve and TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR
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SKIP
SERGI RESEARCH
Introduction
Pressure Relief Valves were designed 30 years ago in

order to prevent transformer tank explosions due to
insulation faults.
Today, transformer explosions and fires are

frequent although tanks are still equipped with
Pressure Relief Valves.
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SERGI RESEARCH
Introduction
No bibliography on the dynamic response of Pressure Relief Valves
subjected to oil immersed arc generated pressure gradients was ever
published.
These pressure gradients were also unknown until calculated by the
Magneto-Thermo-Hydrodynamic model developed by SERGI for
transformer explosion cases. These results were published since
1999 (1, 2, 3).
(1) : Development of a Magneto-Thermo-Hydrodynamic Model and Design of a Transformer, On Load Tap Changer and Bushing Oil
Cable Box, Explosion and Fire Prevention : IEEE Section Mexico, document Referenced: epsi9901a, dated 02/05/99
(2) : Comparison of the SERGI developed Magneto-Thermo-Hydrodynamic model results with measurements made on a 160kVA
transformer, IEEE Section Mexico, Acapulco, 9th to 14th July 2000, document Referenced: epsi0001a, dated 29/05/00
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SERGI RESEARCH
Objectives
Dynamic study of the Pressure Relief Valve
• Fluid dynamic section calculation
• Determination of the spring inertia according to material properties and pressure gradients
• Energy loss calculation according to height of opening
• Hydraulic behaviour simulation
Dynamic study of the TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR
• Depressurisation Set mechanical modelling
• Transfer function determination
• Response to different pressure gradients
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SERGI RESEARCH
Objectives
Pressure Relief Valve and TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR comparison
The method consists in applying to both protections the same pressure gradients
calculated for real explosion cases
• Example n°1 : Response to a 200 bars per second pressure gradient for 4 milliseconds,
followed by a 0,8 bar constant pressure
• Example n°2 : Response to pressure gradients ranging from 60 to 930 bars/second
corresponding to 36 to 236kA (3) short circuit currents
(3) : Study and Design of Power Plant transformers Explosion and Fire Prevention : Australia, TechCon 2001, SERGI document
referenced epstp05a, dated 19/04/2001
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SERGI RESEARCH
Dynamic Study of the Pressure

Relief Valve
• Presentation of the Pressure Relief Valve studied
• Evacuation section calculation
• Evacuation section evolution versus time
• Spring response time calculation
• Hydraulic modelling
• Energy losses determination
• Evacuated oil flow calculation
• Conclusion on the dynamic study of the Pressure Relief Valve
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SERGI RESEARCH
Presentation of the Pressure Relief Valve
• Simple spring Spring inertia

1 2
• 6 inch Pressure Relief
Valve (DN150) Energy losses
• Set pressure of 0.35bar
Evacuation section
1 : Lid
2 : Springs
3 : Seat
4 : Diaphragm
5 : Top gasket 3
6 : Lateral gasket 4 5 6
Example of a two spring Pressure Relief Valve
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SERGI RESEARCH
Evacuation section calculation
Top gasket lift off, no Lateral gasket lift off, Diaphragm rise,
opening. linear ring shape opening. inverted cone shape opening.
Section A Section B Section C
5 4
6
1 : Lid
2 : Springs
3 : Seat
4 : Diaphragm
5 : Top gasket
6 : Lateral gasket Ring shape evacuation section Inverted cone shape evacuation
section
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SERGI RESEARCH
Evacuation section calculation
Ev acuation se ction e volution
14000
12000
s e ctio n (m m ²)
Evacu atio n
10000
8000
6000
4000
A B C D
2000
0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46
Diaphragm height (mm)
• When half open, the Pressure Relief Valve evacuation section is equivalent to only 15% of
its maximum opening.
• The final evacuation section is equivalent to a 128 mm diameter disk.
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SERGI RESEARCH
Spring response time calculation
• Determination of the strength
• Determination of the Pressure Relief Valve compression
• Determination of the movement equation of the diaphragm
Valve response in ms versus a pressure step

O perating disk height
45
40
35
30
in m m
25 0,4 bar
20 0,6 bar
15 0,8 bar
10 1 bar
5
0
0 2 4 6 8 10
Time in ms
Pressure Relief Valve opening time when subject to a pressure step

• Spring inertia leads to an opening delay of 4 ms when the Pressure Relief Valve is
subject to a 1 bar pressure step.
• This delay increases for small transformer overpressures.
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SERGI RESEARCH
Hydraulic finite element analysis

Energy losses are calculated with an axisymetric hydraulic modelling method
Diaphragm
Oil exhaust
section
Pressure Relief Valve

internal walls
Symmetry axis Fluid entrance
Geometry and meshing for the hydraulic finite element analysis
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SERGI RESEARCH
Energy loss determination

41 mm height
25 mm height
10 mm height
Average input speed : 0.5 m/s Average input speed : 0.97 m/s Average input speed : 2.1 m/s
Average output speed : 6.5 m/s Average output speed : 3.44 m/s Average output speed : 2.32 m/s
Finite element analysis results show the important energy losses due to the U shape of the oil
evacuation path
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SERGI RESEARCH
Energy loss determination
Exhaust velocities and sections calculation give the evolution of the oil flow versus
the diaphragm opening
Valve flow versus pressure

40
35 0,4 bar
30 0,6 bar
Flow in l/s
25 0,8 bar
20 1 bar
15
10
5
0
Opereting disk opening in mm
The maximum flow evacuated by the Pressure Relief Valve under a 1 bar pressure is
35 litres per seconds
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SERGI RESEARCH
Conclusion of the dynamic study of the
The design of Pressure Relief Valves limit their efficiency:
• When open 50%, the evacuation surface doesn’t exceed 15%
• The U shape evacuation geometry considerably increases energy losses,

therefore reducing the flow
• Spring inertia leads to an opening delay that proves to be a major
drawback
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SERGI RESEARCH
Dynamic study of the

Transformer Protector
• Presentation
• Finite element analysis
• Rupture Disk opening time
• 236 kA short circuit response versus Depressurisation Set diameter
• Depressurisation time for 35 to 236 kA short circuits
• 236 kA short circuit response for a 300mm Depressurisation Set
• Conclusion on the dynamic study of the TRANSFORMER
PROTECTOR
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SERGI RESEARCH
Presentation
The TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR prevents transformer
explosions and fires due to arcing faults.
SERGI developed a Depressurisation Set to quickly evacuate the

required oil volume to prevent transformer tanks from exploding.
The Depressurisation Set is made of a Rupture Disk and a Venturi,

essential to eliminate charge losses when evacuating the oil.
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SERGI RESEARCH
Finite Element Analysis
Mechanical and hydraulic

characteristics of the
TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR were
analysed and formalised in
depressurisation calculations
conducted for different short circuit
types and intensity.
Calculation methods, simulations and results for several short

circuits have been published since 1999 (1, 2, 3).
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SERGI RESEARCH
Rupture Disk opening time

In order to fight the rapid pressure increase, the TRANSFORMER
PROTECTOR is designed to react in terms of milliseconds.
Rupture Disk opening
100
90 Fault
80 0,8 bar
70
Radius (mm)
60 35,4 kA
50
118 kA
40
30 236 kA
20
10
Fault type Rupture Disk opening time 0
0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5
35 kA 1.8 ms
Time (ms)
118 kA 1.2 ms
236 kA 0.6 ms Rupture Disk opening time versus pressure
gradients
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SERGI RESEARCH
236 kA short circuit response versus
Depressurisation Set diameter
100, 150, 200, 250 and 300 mm Depressurisation Set
after a 236 kA short circuit
The Depressurisation Set

4
diameter plays an important
100 mm
3
role in the depressurisation
Pressure (bar)
150 mm
200 mm
process.
2
250 mm
300 mm
1
Maximum tolerated
The choice of the operating
pressure
pressure is a crucial
0
0,046 0,047 0,048 0,049 0,05 0,051
element.
Time (s)
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SERGI RESEARCH
Depressurisation time for 35 to 236 kA

short circuits
Current, kA Time, millisecond

35 27
118 8
236 3.5
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SERGI RESEARCH
236 kA short circuit response, 300mm

Depressurisation Set
300 mm Depressurisation Chamber after a 236 kA surge
1,4
1,2
1
Pressure (bar)
Without Rupture Disk

0,8
Maximum tolerated pressure
300 mm
0,6
0,4
0,2
0
0,046 0,0465 0,047 0,0475 0,048 0,0485 0,049 0,0495 0,05
Time (s)
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SERGI RESEARCH
Comparative study of the

Pressure Relief Valve and the
TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR
• Presentation
• Example n°1 : Response to a pressure step
• Example n°2 : Response to pressure gradients between 60

and 930 bars per second
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SERGI RESEARCH
Comparative study of the Pressure Relief

Valve and the TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR
In this study, parameters in favour of the Pressure Relief Valve

were integrated in the calculation, such as an operating pressure of
0.35 bar which gives a maximum opening.
For the TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR, standard conditions were

used since previous publications were done with these parameters.
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SERGI RESEARCH
Example n°1
Response to pressure step
• Pressure step
• Evacuation section evolution versus opening time
• Efficiency comparison between Pressure Relief Valve
and TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR
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SERGI RESEARCH
Pressure step
200 bar per second gradient for 4 milliseconds,

followed by a 0,8 bar step
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SERGI RESEARCH
Evacuation section evolution expressed

in diameter, versus opening time
evacuation diameter is 150mm
Pressure Relief Valve equivalent

diameter is 125mm
TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR complete opening = 3 ms

Pressure Relief Valve complete opening = 5 ms
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SERGI RESEARCH
Flow comparison
Flow for an 0.8 bar pressure step
12’’ (DN300) Depressurisation Set
980
Rupture Disk 12 inches
910
840 Rupture Disk 10 inches
770 Rupture Disk 8 inches 10’’ (DN250) Depressurisation Set

700 Rupture Disk 6 inches
630 Pressure Relief Valve 6 inches
560
8’’ (DN200) Depressurisation Set
Flow in l/s
490
420
350 6’’ (DN150) Depressurisation Set
280
210
140
70 6’’ (DN150) Pressure Relief Valve
0
0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 4 4,5 5
Time in ms
TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR flow, DN 150 mm = 8 PRVs, DN 150 mm

TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR flow, DN 300 mm = 31 PRVs, DN 150 mm
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SERGI RESEARCH
Example n°2
Application to different short circuit cases
Comparison for electrical arcs in oil for a 150 MVA transformer

for the following currents:
35 kA
118 kA
236 kA
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SERGI RESEARCH
35 kA short circuit
Pressure evolution for a 34,5kA fault
5
4,5
Without protection
4
3,5
With a Pressure Relief Valve Vessel explosion
Pressure in bar
3 With a 6 inch Rupture Disk

with the Pressure
2,5 Pressure limit
2 Relief Valve
1,5
1
0,5
0
200 210 220 230 240 250 260 270 280
Time in ms
The Pressure Relief Valve reduces the pressure gradient but does not prevent the
explosion. The TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR always protects the tank
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SERGI RESEARCH

Pressure evolution for a 118kA fault
4,5
4 Without protection
3,5 With a Pressure Relief Valve
3 10 inch Rupture Disk Vessel explosion
Pressure (bar)
2,5 Pressure limit

with the Pressure
2
1,5
Relief Valve
1
0,5
0
0,0700 0,0720 0,0740 0,0760 0,0780 0,0800 0,0820 0,0840 0,0860 0,0880
Time (s)
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SERGI RESEARCH

Pressure evolution for a 236kA fault
4
Without protection
With a Pressure Relief Valve
Vessel explosion
With a 12 inch RuptureDisk with the Pressure
3 Pressure limit
Relief Valve
Pressure (bar)
2
The Pressure
1 Relief Valve is
closed at the
0
instant of
0,044 0,045 0,046 0,047 0,048 0,049
Time (sec) explosion
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SERGI RESEARCH
Conclusion
The Pressure Relief Valve design limits their efficiency
• When open 50%, the evacuation surface doesn’t exceed 15%.
• The U shape evacuation geometry considerably increases energy losses,

therefore reducing the flow. Therefore, the Pressure Relief Valve can not
evacuate the oil volume that would prevent the explosion.
• Spring inertia leads to an opening delay that proves to be a major
drawback. This delay is intolerable for strong short circuits. The
transformer might explode before the Pressure Relief Valve could open.
• Oil and pollutant self flammable gas are evacuated on the transformer
lid, therefore propagating the fault to other installations.
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SERGI RESEARCH
Conclusion
• Oversized
• Compensate technology limitations
• Reliability
• Ecological
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SERGI RESEARCH
Comparison between
MINERAL and SILICON oils
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SERGI RESEARCH
COMPARISON BETWEEN MINERAL AND SILICON OILS
BEFORE VESSEL EXPLOSION Time required to generate one liter of

explosive gases
GAZ GENERATION PROCESS 0,01
The energy immediately released by

electric arc destroys the long dielectric
Time, Hours
0,001
oil molecules, which are split into smaller
gas molecules such as methane, ethane,
propane, butane, ethylene, acetylene, etc.
0,0001
At 1000°C :
 Mineral oil creates a liter of
explosives gases in 200 0,00001
800 850 900 950 1000 1050 1100 1150 1200
milliseconds.
Temperature,°C
 Silicon oil creates a liter of Silicon oil
explosives gases in 500 Mineral oil
milliseconds.
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SERGI RESEARCH
BEFORE VESSEL EXPLOSION Hydrogen Percentage in Explosive Gas

Versus Temperature
GAZ PRODUCED 100
Hydrogen, percent age

90
The different gases percentage
80
inside the gas mixture varies
with the oil temperature in the 70
short circuit area. 60
50
The gas mixture is identical for
silicon and mineral oils : 40
30
 At 300°C it contains no
20
hydrogen.
10
 From 900°C the mixture contains
100 % of hydrogen. 0
300 450 600 750 900 1050 1200
The mix of self-flammable acetylene
and highly explosive hydrogen Silicon oil Temperature, °C
explains the might of a transformer Mineral oil
explosion.
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SERGI RESEARCH
Comparaison entre huile minérale et huile
BEFORE VESSEL EXPLOSION Pressure rise following
silicone a short circuit
PRESSURE RISE INSIDE VESSEL 20
18 20MVA transformer
6 turns secondary short circuit.
Gas production provokes fast pressure rise 16
without circuit breaker opening
bar
inside tank: 14
Pression (bar)
12
 Silicon Oil delays explosion of
Pressure,
10
approximately 20 milliseconds only.
8
 Pressure gradient is the same for silicon 6
and mineral oils, around 50 bars per second. 4
2
VESSEL EXPLOSION LIMIT
COMPARISON 0
0 50 100 150
Before transformer explosion, Silicon Oil Time,

Tempsmilliseconds
(ms)
behaves exactly like Mineral Oil and Silicon oil

generates the same explosive, flammable Mineral oil
gases.
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SERGI RESEARCH
FIRE PROCESS
1/ Vessel
 decompression
generates explosive
gases bubbles
acetylene starts fire HEAT
 3/ Heat at flames origin,
approximately 1000°C,
warms oil surface, which
also generates explosive FLAMMABLE GASES
gases PRODUCTION AT OIL
 4/ Burning oil overflow FLASH POINT
from conservator extends
fire to whole plant
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SERGI RESEARCH
FIRE PROCESS
Flash Point
 Mineral Oil : 140°C
 Silicon Oil : 240°C
During transformer oil fire, mineral and
silicon oil flash points must be compared
with the temperature at flame origin, which
is around 1000°C. HEAT
COMPARISON
Obviously, the temperature gap between

140°C and 240°C is a side effect in
comparison with 1000°C at flame origin. FLAMMABLE GASES PRODUCTION
AT OIL FLASH POINT
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SERGI RESEARCH
CONCLUSION
EFFICIENCY COMPARISON
 Before tank explosion, studies have demonstrated that Mineral Oil behaves like
Silicon Oil. Explosion is only delayed 20 milliseconds and the same explosive,
flammable gases are generated.
 During fire, 140°C and 240°C flash points have to be compared to the flame origin
temperature at the oil surface, approximately 1000°C. Flash points difference appears
to be a side effect as the same flammable gases are generated.
COST COMPARISON
 The Silicon Oil is very expensive, approximately five time more than Mineral Oil.
 Due to the poor Silicon Oil heat exchange parameters, transformer cooling systems
have to be oversized. Such transformers are 20% more expensive.
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SERGI RESEARCH
ALL THESE RESULTS LEAD TO THE INVENTION OF THE
TRANSFORMER EXPLOSION AND FIRE PREVENTION METHOD
WHICH IS THE ORIGIN OF THE
TRANSFORMER
PROTECTOR
Presented here...
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PROTECTOR
Search Quit

SERGI TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR
SUMMARY
ð SERGI Transformer Protector Design Calculation
ð TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR presentation
ð Installation examples
ð TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR elements presentation
ð Logic Diagrams
ð Fire Extinction Back up Principle
ð Retrofitting On Existing Transformers
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DESIGN CALCULATIONS
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DESIGN CALCULATIONS
 The system is designed to

evacuate the energy following a
very intense short circuit.
 The design must ensure fast

tank depressurisation during
and after short circuit.
 Contact between oil and air

must be avoided during the
depressurisation process,
before the oil is evacuated
towards a safe and remote
area.
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PRESENTATION
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STP : Vessel protection for transformers from 0.5 to 20MVA
MTP : Vessel protection for Power plant and Indoors transformers
above 5MVA
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TRANSFORMER
PROTECTOR EXPLOSION AND FIRE PREVENTION FOR
TRANSFORMERS FROM 0.5 A 20 MVA
STP
Rupture Disk With Integrated
Shock Absorber Opening Detector
INSIDE OUTSIDE
Bushing
Gas Evacuation Pipe to
Air
Non Return Valve
FIRE EXTINCTION BACK UP
OPTIONAL ONLY Nitrogen Cylinder
N2
Electrical Actuator
Oil - Gas Separation
Nitrogen Injection Tank
Pipe
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TRANSFORMER
PROTECTOR EXPLOSION AND FIRE PREVENTION FOR
TRANSFORMERS FROM 0.5 TO 20 MVA
STP
 1/ Pressure increase
2/ Opening of the
INSIDE OUTSIDE
 Rupture Disk
and evacuation of the
oil-gas mixture
 3/ Opening of the
Non Return Valve N2
 4/ Nitrogen injection
 5/ Stop the explosive

gas production
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TRANSFORMER
PROTECTOR TRANSFORMER AND ON LOAD TAP CHANGER
EXPLOSION AND FIRE PREVENTION
STP-A
Rupture Disks With Integrated
Opening Detector Shock Absorber
INSIDE OUTSIDE
Bushing
Gas Evacuation Pipe
to outdoors
Non Return Valve
Nitrogen Cylinder
N2
Electrical Actuator
Oil – Gas Separation
Nitrogen Injection Tank
Pipe
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STP : Vessel protection for transformers from 0.5 to 20MVA
MTP : Vessel protection for Power plant and Indoors transformers
above 5MVA
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TRANSFORMER
PROTECTOR
TYPE MTP FOR TRANSFORMERS FROM 5 MVA
MTP
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TRANSFORMER
PROTECTOR
TYPE MTP FOR TRANSFORMERS FROM 5 MVA
MTP Rupture disk with integrated
opening detector and
Valve Buchholz
Decompression Chamber
Rupture disk for

OLTC
N2
Nitrogen injection pipe
Nitrogen
cylinder
Oil-Gas
Separation Tank
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 1/ Pressure rises
 2/ Explosion
of the disk,
depressurisation,
evacuation of the
oil-gases mixture
 3/ Nitrogen injection
 4/ Explosive gases
production is N2
stopped
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Even though the tank has the priority to be protected, the statistics demonstrates the
importance to protect the other oil capacities. FAILLURE ORIGIN
%
Rate (%) 50
45
In many cases, a failure from the On Load Tap Changer 40
35
or Bushing can spread to the transformer tank. 30
25
20
15
10 18 34 48
The same principle, using the Rupture Disk with 5
integrated explosion detector and nitrogen injection, is 0
Winding Bushing OLTC
used in this case to stop the explosive gas production.
The extension of the prevention system is simply done by connecting the depressurisation
pipe from On Load Tap Changer and Bushing to the tank explosion and fire prevention
system.
This technique proposes a global solution, for all transformer oil capacities, with only one
system, for less cost.
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TRANSFORMER
LTP-A
The On Load Tap Changer is the failure origin in 48% of the cases.
Over pressure diaphragms are frequently integrated

to the cover.
diaphragm
Unfortunately, no flange
1 6 allows connecting the
5
diaphragm to an oil passage.
1 - cover diaphragm
2 - tap changer 2 During short circuit, it results
3 - selector in a bazooka effect that
4 - tap changer motor propagates fire to the
4 3
5 - protection relay
transformer and its
6 - conservator oil
environment.
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TRANSFORMER
LTP-A
The On Load Tap Changer is the failure origin in 48% of the cases.
The diaphragm on the cover is sometimes

replaced by a Pressure Relief Valve.
In case of short circuit, where the On

Load Tap Changer is equipped with the
Pressure Relief Valve, the cover is often
ejected by the pressure effect.
It proves the inefficiency of the Pressure

Relief Valve.
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TRANSFORMER
LTP-A
To channel the oil gush following an internal fault in the On Load Tap Changer, SERGI
proposes a system of depressurisation, evacuation, and cooling, all integrated in the
TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR : type LTPA.
Flange for the quick depressurisation piping towards the TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR
SERGI Rupture Disk

with integrated
explosion detector
Flange for nitrogen
injection
ON LOAD TAP
CHANGER Cover with integrated
flange to install SERGI
Rupture Disk
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INSTALLATION EXAMPLES
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Indoor Transformer Protector, type MTP
Gas Evacuation Pipe to the Atmosphere
Transformer
Nitrogen Cylinder Cabinet

Oil-Gas Separation Tank
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Indoor Transformer Protector, Type MTPAB
Bushing Gas Exhaust
Depressurisation Pipe to
Set Atmosphere
OLTC Depressurisation Set
Transformer
Depressurisation Chamber
Oil – Gas Separation Tank

Nitrogen Cylinder Cabinet
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ELEMENTS PRESENTATION
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Transformer Protector Operational Sets
Transformer Horizontal Depressurisation Set
1. Transformer interface
2. Isolation Valve
3. Absorber
4. Rupture disk
5. Decompression Chamber
6. Shock Wave Protection Shutter
7. Support Plate
8. Vibration Absorbers
9. Support
10. Support Fixation
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Transformer Vertical Depressurisation Set
1. Transformer interface
2. T-piece for adaptation
3. Pressure Relief Valve
4. Isolation Valve
5. Absorber
6. Rupture Disk
7. Vibration Absorbers
8. Decompression Chamber
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On Load Tap Changer Depressurisation Set
1. Rupture Disk
2. 6” Decompression
Chamber elbow
3. Nitrogen Injection
ð After suffering internal
overpressure, the
Rupture Disk
depressurizes the Tap
Changer.
ð Oil then flows from the
Tap Changer, through the
Elbow, to the Oil – Gas
Separation Set.
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Oil - Gas Separation Set
1. Non Return Valve

2. Explosive gases evacuation to remote safe
area
3. Oil Drain Pipe from Depressurisation Set
ð The oil flows from the Decompression

Chamber, through the Shock Wave
Protection Shutter, into the Oil – Gas
Separation Set.
ð Oil remains at the bottom.
ð Gas rises and flows through a non-return
valve and an exhaust pipe to a remote place
where it can safely burn.
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Explosive Gas Elimination Set
1. Exhaust to Transformer main tank

2. Exhaust to OLTC
3. In/Out of service lamp
ð Explosive Gas Elimination Sets can
come with multiple Nitrogen exhausts.
ð Each exhaust is designed to provide a
different flow of Nitrogen.
ð Each exhaust can be divided to enable
multiple injection points.
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Conservator Isolation Set
ð Should the transformer tank or

any pipe rupture, a consequent
flow of oil will be created.
ð Without a SERGI Conservator
Shutter, the total conservator oil
volume will be spilled, possibly
fuelling a fire.
ð The SERGI Conservator Shutter
is designed to close once the oil
flow reaches a critical value,
preventing the Conservator
from being drained.
ð The closing of the Shutter can
also be monitored.
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LOGIC DIAGRAMS
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SKIP
SMALL TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR, STP TYPE, LOGIC DIAGRAM
EXPLOSION PREVENTION, Logic 1

OPTIONAL, Logic 2
Instantaneous depressurisation EXTINCTION BACK UP
Optional
Transformer OnLoad
LoadTap
Tap
Transformer On
Changer Any Electrical Fire
Rupture Changer Fire
Rupture or Protection
Disk
Disk or RuptureDisk
Rupture Disk detectors
detectors
Model STP-A
and and
and and
Immediate nitrogen injection Nitrogen injection after 20 seconds

 End of explosive gases generation  Oil evacuation is required to avoid
 Evacuation of explosive, flammable burning oil overflow before nitrogen injection
gases  Oil stirring
 Air(oxygen) contact with self-flammable  Oil surface cooling
gases avoided
 Oil cooling with nitrogen flow trough  Fire extinction in less than 5 minutes
radiators during 45 minutes  Nitrogen injection during 45 minutes
 Damage limitation of the parts affected
by short circuit
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LARGE TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR, MTP TYPE, LOGIC DIAGRAM
EXPLOSION PREVENTION, Logic 1 EXTINCTION

BACK UP
Instantaneous depressurisation Logic 2
Optional Optional
Electrical Fire
Transformer Fire
On Load Tap Oil Bushing protections Detectors
Detectors
Rupture Changer
Rupture Buchholz
Disk Rupture Disk
Disk Differential
1 or 3 tap changers 3 or 6 bushings
Earth Fault
Model LTP-A Model LTP-B
Over Current Manual
or
or start-up
and and
and and
Immediate nitrogen injection Nitrogen injection after

20 seconds
 End of explosive gases generation
 Oil stirring
 Evacuation of explosive, flammable gases
 Oil surface cooling
 Air(oxygen) contact with self-flammable gases avoided
 Oil cooling with nitrogen flow trough radiators  Fire extinction in less
than 5 minutes
 damage limitation of the parts affected by short circuit
 Nitrogen injection
 Nitrogen injection during 45 minutes during 45 minutes
Search

LARGE TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR, LTP TYPE, LOGIC DIAGRAM
EXPLOSION PREVENTION, Logic 1 EXTINCTION

BACK UP
Instantaneous depressurisation Logic 2
Optional Optional
Electrical Fire
Transformer Fire
On Load Tap Oil Bushing protections Detectors
Detectors
Rupture Changer
Rupture Buchholz
Disk Rupture Disk
Disk Differential
1 or 3 tap changers 3 or 6 bushings
Earth Fault
Model LTP-A Model LTP-B
Over Current Manual
or
or start-up
and and
and and
Immediate nitrogen injection Nitrogen injection after

20 seconds
 End of explosive gases generation
 Oil stirring
 Evacuation of explosive, flammable gases
 Oil surface cooling
 Air(oxygen) contact with self-flammable gases avoided
 Fire extinction in less
 Oil cooling with nitrogen flow trough radiators
than 5 minutes
 damage limitation of the parts affected by short circuit
 Nitrogen injection
 Nitrogen injection during 45 minutes during 45 minutes
Search

FIRE EXTINCTION BACK UP PRINCIPLE
Search
SKIP
FIRE EXTINCTION BACK UP PRINCIPLE
 1/ Pressure rises Oil exhaust during 20
 2/ Rupture
Disk and
tank explosion
seconds before
nitrogen injection
FIRE EXTINCTION
 3/ Oil and gases

evacuation
50
140
140
°C
140
°C
°C
50 °C°C
140 °C
 4/ Shutter closes
gases starts fire N2
 6/ Nitrogen injection 50 °C
mixes oil, provoking
fire extinction within
2 minutes
 7/ Nitrogen is injected during 45 minutes

Search

RETROFITTING ON EXISTING
TRANSFORMERS
Search
SKIP
RETROFITTING ON EXISTING TRANSFORMERS
The SERGI TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR is easily retrofitted without

tank machining by using the existing interfaces.
DEPRESSURISATION PIPING NITROGEN INJECTION PIPING
Man Holes, Pressure Relief Valves and Existing Valves Existing Valves and plugs
(oil sampling and draining)
Search

RETROFITTING ON EXISTING TRANSFORMERS
The TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR can be retrofitted on the Transformer

cover by using a vertical Depressurisation Set
ð The TRANSFORMER
PROTECTOR can be
retrofitted on transformer
covers by replacing the
Pressure Relief Valve by a
T-piece and installing a
Vertical Depressurisation Set
ð Any manhole available on

the transformer can be used
as a base for retrofitting of a
Vertical or Horizontal
Search

CONCLUSION
SERGI experience in the field of transformer explosion and fire in addition

with the research conducted for many years leads to the development of
a general multi-physics model “MAGNETO-THERMO-
HYDRODYNAMIQUE”.
This research allows to understand the phenomenon, resulted from insulation failure in
the transformer tank.
The research result improves the conception of the explosion and fire prevention method,
the TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR, which is designed for :
 compensating the technology limitation of the circuit breaker,
which only opens when the explosion process has already taken
place,
 overcoming the failure of the transformer
tank mechanical protection in case of short
circuit,
 avoiding the tank explosion by short
circuit and, therefore, preventing fire.
Search

CONCLUSION
By protecting the On Load Tap Changer and the bushing as well, the
TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR proposes a global solution for all
transformer oil capacities with only one system, for less cost.
The TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR enables to protect power plants and substation from
enormous consequences, not only in terms of accidents or human casualties, but also in
terms of environment protection.
Search

CONCLUSION
The application of TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR in existing power plants or substations

is frequently the only possibility to protect the sites because no other protection is
specifically designed for this purpose. It allows to reduce the financial consequences of
explosion and fire :
 transformer replacement, in fact the transformers protected by the

TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR can be repaired quickly ;
 replacement of other neighbouring equipment and building which are often
affected in case of transformer fire ;
 electricity production loss which is also taken into account in most cases ;
 repair of the pollution damage to the environment ;
 maintenance, because the TRANSFORMER PROTECTOR needs only a

simple yearly verification.
In addition, the retrofitting on the transformer is done without machining the tank, but by
using existing connection possibility (valves, manholes, etc…)
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 : (33) 1 39 22 48 40 : (33) 1 39 22 11 11 / 48 51
@: sergi@sergi-france.com
productionl@sergi-france.com
development@sergi-france.com
administration@sergi-france.com
quality@sergi-france.com
trading@sergi-france.com
SERGI, P.O. Box 90, 78260 Achères, France
Web site : www.sergi-

Search france.com
Copyright © SERGI,referenced: CdTPTTPcl07a, dated 04/04/02 202

Experience and Research

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EXPERIENCE RESEARCH TRANSFORMER

Copyright © SERGI, referenced: fTPsc13a, dated 16/11/03 1

Copyright © SERGI, referenced: fTPsc13a, dated 16/11/03 2

Copyright © SERGI, referenced: fTPsc13a, dated 16/11/03 3

 Comments on material are not related to transformer

 The transformer insulation rupture is considered here to

Copyright © SERGI, referenced: fTPsc13a, dated 16/11/03 4

DATA ACQUISITION PRINCIPLES

INFORMATION IS REGULARLY SPREAD BY THE PRESS WHICH

Copyright © SERGI, referenced: fTPsc13a, dated 16/11/03 6

-- report by VHeadline/VENews Carson --

A near disaster at deBHP

Port Kembla steelworks

Preliminary investigations bywhich

was 300 feet.Après

No.2 station. TheCorporation

eight to nine-kilometre dioxines et furannes fut ainsi limitée. Après la décontamination

Copyright © SERGI, referenced: fTPsc13a, dated 16/11/03 7

 SERGI is the only

Copyright © SERGI, referenced: fTPsc13a, dated 16/11/03 8

 Web Research Method

 Investigation Elements Analysis

 Major Transformer Incidents

Transformer Explosion Videos

Copyright © SERGI, referenced: fTPsc13a, dated 16/11/03 10

 The SERGI Transformer Explosion database elaborated in 1995 was

 One person, employed full time, records approximately five

Copyright © SERGI, referenced: fTPsc13a, dated 16/11/03 11

 To collect a maximum of information on Transformer Explosion

 To analyse the data gathered in order to get a better understanding of

 To assess transformer explosion human, environmental and financial

 To produce a scientific report focusing on the importance of

Copyright © SERGI, referenced: fTPsc13a, dated 16/11/03 12

 Why Using The Web ?

 Search For Transformer Explosions: Where ?

 Search For Transformer Explosions: How ?

Copyright © SERGI, referenced: fTPsc13a, dated 16/11/03 13

WHY USING THE WEB ?

 To access up-to-date and archived information. Thousands

 To access a variety of resources (e.g: newspaper articles, technical

Copyright © SERGI, referenced: fTPsc13a, dated 16/11/03 14

 Online media Resources

 CNN Online Archives (http://www.cnn.com/SEARCH)

 Electricity magazines (Electricity News, Electrical World)

Copyright © SERGI, referenced: fTPsc13a, dated 16/11/03 15

 Firefighters sites (e.g: Phillyfirenews, Firehouse, LA Firefighters)

 Industrial Fire World Monthly Incident Log

 The National Response Center (NRC)

The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC)

 Grassroots Information Coordination Center (GICC)

 Energy Information Administration (EIA)

Copyright © SERGI, referenced: fTPsc13a, dated 16/11/03 16

SEARCH FOR TRANSFORMER EXPLOSIONS: HOW ?

 Search Engines Used  Keywords Used

Copyright © SERGI, referenced: fTPsc13a, dated 16/11/03 17

 The Database Structure

 General Information (location details and information sources)

 Document Analysis: An Example

Copyright © SERGI, referenced: fTPsc13a, dated 16/11/03 18

Country Trading Zone

Copyright © SERGI, referenced: fTPsc13a, dated 16/11/03 19

INCIDENT DETAILS CONSEQUENCES

Copyright © SERGI, referenced: fTPsc13a, dated 16/11/03 20