JSEC SG 9.a-R

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JUNOS for Security Platforms
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9.a
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1194 North Mathilda Avenue

Sunnyvale, CA 94089
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USA
408-745-2000
www.juniper.net
Course Number: EDU-JUN-JSEC

Juniper Networks, the Juniper Networks logo, JUNOS, NetScreen, and ScreenOS are registered trademarks of Juniper Networks, Inc. in the United States and other
countries. JUNOSe is a trademark of Juniper Networks, Inc. All other trademarks, service marks, registered trademarks, or registered service marks are the
property of their respective owners.
JUNOS for Security Platforms Student Guide, Revision 9.a
Copyright © 2009, Juniper Networks, Inc.
All rights reserved. Printed in USA.
Revision History:
Revision 9.a—July 2009
The information in this document is current as of the date listed above.
The information in this document has been carefully verified and is believed to be accurate for software Release 9.5R1.8. Juniper Networks assumes no
responsibilities for any inaccuracies that may appear in this document. In no event will Juniper Networks be liable for direct, indirect, special, exemplary, incidental
or consequential damages resulting from any defect or omission in this document, even if advised of the possibility of such damages.
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Juniper Networks reserves the right to change, modify, transfer or otherwise revise this publication without notice.
YEAR 2000 NOTICE
Juniper Networks hardware and software products do not suffer from Year 2000 problems and hence are Year 2000 compliant. The JUNOS Software has no
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known time-related limitations through the year 2038. However, the NTP application is known to have some difficulty in the year 2036.
SOFTWARE LICENSE
The terms and conditions for using Juniper Networks software are described in the software license provided with the software, or to the extent applicable, in an
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agreement executed between you and Juniper Networks, or Juniper Networks agent. By using Juniper Networks software, you indicate that you understand and
agree to be bound by its license terms and conditions. Generally speaking, the software license restricts the manner in which you are permitted to use the Juniper
Networks software, may contain prohibitions against certain uses, and may state conditions under which the license is automatically terminated. You should
consult the software license for further details.
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Contents
Chapter 1: Course Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
Chapter 2: Introduction to JUNOS Security Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

Traditional Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2-3
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Traditional Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2-8
Breaking the Tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
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JUNOS Software Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-23
Chapter 3: Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

The Definition of Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-3
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Zone Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14
Monitoring Security Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-26
Lab 1: Configuring and Monitoring Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-32
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Chapter 4: Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1
Overview of Security Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-3
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Policy Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12
Verifying Policy Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-22
Policy Scheduling and Rematching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-29
Policy Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-35
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Case Study: Monitoring Security Policies: Part 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-45
Case Study: Monitoring Security Policies: Part 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-46
Lab 2: Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-49
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Chapter 5: Firewall User Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1

Firewall User Authentication Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5-3
Pass-Through Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5-8
Web Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13
A Cleaner Method of Web Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-19
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Client Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20

Using External Authentication Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-26
Verifying Firewall User Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-28
Lab 3: Configuring Firewall Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-32
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Chapter 6: SCREEN Options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1

Multilayer Network Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6-3
Stages and Types of Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10
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Using JUNOS Software SCREEN Options—Reconnaissance Attack Handling . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16

Using JUNOS Software SCREEN Options—Denial of Service Attack Handling . . . . . . . . . . . 6-29
Using JUNOS Software SCREEN Options—Suspicious Packets Attack Handling . . . . . . . . . 6-47
Applying and Monitoring SCREEN Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-56
Lab 4: Implementing SCREEN Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-66
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Chapter 7: Network Address Translation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1
NAT Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3
Destination NAT Operation and Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8
Source NAT Operation and Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-21
Proxy ARP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-40
Monitoring and Verifying NAT Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-43
Lab 5: Network Address Translation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-48
Chapter 8: IPsec VPNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1
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VPN Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3
Secure VPN Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-6
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IPsec Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-19
Configuration of IPsec VPN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-40
IPsec VPN Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-53
Lab 6: Implementing IPsec VPNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-70
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Chapter 9: Introduction to Intrusion Detection and Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1
Introduction to JUNOS Software IDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3
IDP Policy Components and Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-7
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Signature Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-18
Case Study: Applying the Recommended IDP Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-24
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Monitoring IDP Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-28
Lab 7: Implementing IDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-36
Chapter 10: High Availability Clustering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10-1

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High Availability Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3
Chassis Cluster Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6
Chassis Cluster Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-22
Chassis Cluster Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-30
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Chassis Cluster Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-40

Lab 8: Implementing Chassis Clusters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-57
Appendix A: Acronym List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

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Appendix B: Answer Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

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iv • Contents
Course Overview
JUNOS for Security Platforms covers the configuration, operation, and implementation of SRX
Series Services Gateways in a typical network environment. Key topics within this course
include security technologies such as security zones, security policies, intrusion detection and
prevention (IDP), Network Address Translation (NAT), high availability clusters, as well as details
pertaining to basic implementation, configuration, and management. The course includes
extensive hands-on labs configuring and monitoring JUNOS Software for SRX Series devices.
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Objectives
After successfully completing this course, you should be able to perform the following:
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• Describe traditional routing and security and the current trends in
internetworking.
• Provide an overview of SRX Series Services Gateways and software architecture.
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• Describe the logical packet flow and session creation performed by SRX Series
Services Gateways.
• Describe, configure, and monitor zones.
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• Describe, configure, and monitor security policies.
• Describe, configure, and monitor firewall user authentication.
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Describe various types of network attacks.
Configure and monitor SCREEN options to prevent network attacks.
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• Explain, implement, and monitor NAT as implemented on JUNOS security
platforms.
• Explain the purpose and mechanics of IPsec VPNs.
• Implement and monitor policy-based and route-based IPsec VPNs.
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• Utilize and update the IDP signature database.

• Configure and monitor IDP policy with policy templates.
• Describe, configure, and monitor high availability chassis clusters.
Intended Audience
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The course content is aimed at operators of SRX Series Services Gateways. These operators
include network engineers, administrators, support personnel, and reseller support personnel.
Course Level
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JUNOS for Security Platforms is an intermediate level course.
Prerequisites
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• The Introduction to JUNOS Software (IJS) and JUNOS Routing Essentials (JRE)
courses or equivalent experience; and
• Basic networking knowledge including an understanding of the OSI model and
TCP/IP.
. Course Overview • v
Course Agenda
Day 1
Chapter 1: Course Introduction
Chapter 2: Introduction to JUNOS Security Platforms
Chapter 3: Zones
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Lab 1: Configuring and Monitoring Zones
Chapter 4: Security Policies
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Lab 2: Security Policies
Day 2
Chapter 5: Firewall User Authentication
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Lab 3: Configuring Firewall Authentication
Chapter 6: SCREEN Options
Lab 4: Implementing SCREEN Options
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Chapter 7: Network Address Translation
Day 3
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Lab 5: Network Address Translation
Chapter 8: IPsec VPNs

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Lab 6: Implementing IPsec VPNs
Chapter 9: Introduction to Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Lab 7: Implementing IDP
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Chapter 10: High Availability Clustering

Lab 8: Implementing Chassis Clusters
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vi • Course Agenda
Document Conventions
CLI and GUI Text

Frequently throughout this course, we refer to text that appears in a command-line interface
(CLI) or a graphical user interface (GUI). To make the language of these documents easier to
read, we distinguish GUI and CLI text from chapter text according to the following table.
Style Description Usage Example
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Franklin Normal text. Most of what you read in the Lab
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Gothic Guide and Student Guide.
Courier Console text:

New commit complete
• Screen captures
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• Noncommand-related Exiting configuration
syntax mode
GUI text elements: Select File > Open, and then
click Configuration.conf in
• Menu names
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the Filename text box.
• Text field entry
Input Text Versus Output Text

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You will also frequently see cases where you must enter input text yourself. Often this will be
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shown in the context of where you must enter it. We use bold style to distinguish text that is
input versus text that is simply displayed.

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Normal CLI No distinguishing variant. Physical interface:fxp0,

Enabled
Normal GUI
View configuration history by
clicking Configuration >
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History.
CLI Input Text that you must enter. lab@San_Jose> show route
GUI Input Select File > Save, and enter
config.ini in the Filename
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field.
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Document Conventions • vii

Defined and Undefined Syntax Variables
Finally, this course distinguishes between regular text and syntax variables, and it also
distinguishes between syntax variables where the value is already assigned (defined variables)
and syntax variables where you must assign the value (undefined variables). Note that these
styles can be combined with the input style as well.
Text where variable value is already
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CLI policy my-peers
Variable assigned.
Click on my-peers in the dialog.
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GUI
variable
CLI Text where the variable’s value is Type set policy

Undefined the user’s discretion and text where policy-name.
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the variable’s value as shown in the
GUI ping 10.0.1.1
lab guide might differ from the
Undefined
value the user must input. Select File > Save, and enter
filename in the Filename field.
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viii • Document Conventions

Additional Information
Education Services Offerings

You can obtain information on the latest Education Services offerings, course dates, and class
locations from the World Wide Web by pointing your Web browser to:
http://www.juniper.net/training/education/.
About This Publication
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The JUNOS for Security Platforms Student Guide was developed and tested using software
version 9.5R1.8. Previous and later versions of software might behave differently so you
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should always consult the documentation and release notes for the version of code you are
running before reporting errors.
This document is written and maintained by the Juniper Networks Education Services
development team. Please send questions and suggestions for improvement to
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training@juniper.net.
Technical Publications
You can print technical manuals and release notes directly from the Internet in a variety of
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formats:
• Go to http://www.juniper.net/techpubs/.
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• Locate the specific software or hardware release and title you need, and choose
the format in which you want to view or print the document.
Documentation sets and CDs are available through your local Juniper Networks sales office or
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account representative.
Juniper Networks Support

For technical support, contact Juniper Networks at http://www.juniper.net/customers/
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support/, or at 1-888-314-JTAC (within the United States) or 408-745-2121 (from outside the
United States).
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Additional Information • ix
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x • Additional Information
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This Chapter Discusses:
• Objectives and course content information;
• Additional Juniper Networks, Inc. courses; and
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• Juniper Networks Technical Certification Program (JNTCP).

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Chapter 1–2 • Course Introduction

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Introductions
This slide asks several questions for you to answer during class introductions.
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Course Introduction • Chapter 1–3

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Course Contents
This slide lists the topics we discuss in this course.
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Prerequisites
This slide lists the prerequisites for this course.
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General Course Administration
This slide documents general aspects of classroom administration.
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Training and Study Materials
This slide describes Education Services materials that are available for reference both
in the classroom and online.
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Additional Resources
This slide describes additional resources available to assist you in the installation,
configuration, and operation of Juniper Networks products.
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Satisfaction Feedback
Juniper Networks uses an electronic survey system to collect and analyze your
comments and feedback. Depending on the class you are taking, please complete the
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survey at the end of the class, or be sure to look for an e-mail about two weeks from
class completion that directs you to complete an online survey form. (Be sure to
provide us with your current e-mail address.)
Submitting your feedback entitles you to a certificate of class completion. We thank
you in advance for taking the time to help us improve our educational offerings.
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Juniper Networks Education Services Curriculum
Juniper Networks Education Services can help ensure that you have the knowledge
and skills to deploy and maintain cost-effective, high-performance networks for both
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enterprise and service provider environments. We have expert training staff with deep
technical and industry knowledge, providing you with instructor-led hands-on courses
as well as convenient, self-paced eLearning courses.
You can access the latest Education Services offerings covering a wide range of
platforms at http://www.juniper.net/us/en/training/technical_education/.
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JNTCP
The Juniper Networks Technical Certification Program (JNTCP) consists of
platform-specific, multitiered tracks that enable participants to demonstrate, through
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a combination of written proficiency exams and hands-on configuration and

troubleshooting exams, competence with Juniper Networks technology. Successful
candidates demonstrate thorough understanding of Internet and security
technologies and Juniper Networks platform configuration and troubleshooting skills.
You can learn more information about the JNTCP at
http://www.juniper.net/training/certification/.
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Certification Levels
Each JNTCP track has one to four certification levels. Associate-level and
Specialist-level exams are computer-based exams composed of multiple choice
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questions. These computer-based exams are administered at Prometric testing

centers worldwide and have no prerequisite certification requirements.
Professional-level and Expert-level exams are composed of hands-on lab exercises
that are administered at select Juniper Networks testing centers. Professional-level
and Expert-level exams require that you first obtain the next lower certification in the
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track. Please visit the JNTCP Web site at

http://www.juniper.net/training/certification/ for detailed exam information, exam
pricing, and exam registration.
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Prepping and Studying
This slide lists some options for those interested in prepping for Juniper Networks
certification.
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Any Questions?
If you have any questions or concerns about the class you are attending, we suggest
that you voice them now so that your instructor can best address your needs during
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class.
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Chapter 2: Introduction to JUNOS Security
Platforms
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• Traditional routing and security implementations;
• Current trends in internetworking;
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• SRX Series Services Gateways;

• JUNOS Software for the SRX Series; and
• Physical and logical packet flow through SRX Series devices.
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Chapter 2–2 • Introduction to JUNOS Security Platforms

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Traditional Routing
The slide lists the topics we cover in this chapter. We discuss the highlighted topic
first.
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Introduction to JUNOS Security Platforms • Chapter 2–3

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Built to Forward Packets
The primary responsibility of a router is to forward packets using Layer 3 IP addresses
found in an IP packet header. To forward packets, the router must have a path
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determination mechanism. This mechanism could be statically assigned routes,

routing protocols, or policy-based routing.
Packet Processing Is Stateless

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Traditionally, routers process packets in a stateless fashion. Routers do not keep track
of bidirectional sessions; they forward each packet individually based on the packet
header.
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Separate Broadcast Domains and Provide WAN Connectivity

Routers were originally used to separate broadcast domains. With the introduction of
advanced switching technologies and the birth of virtual LAN (VLAN) standards,
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broadcast domains can also be separated using switches. That capability, however,
does not address inter-VLAN connectivity, which still necessitates the use of routers
for forwarding traffic between VLANs. Furthermore, routers provide WAN connectivity
at the network edge.

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Layer 3 Packet Forwarding
Routers perform Layer 3 packet forwarding using routing table entries. Routers build
routing tables based on the results of dynamic routing protocols (for example, RIP,
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OSPF, IS-IS, and BGP), statically entered routes, or both of these methods. Note that
routers forward packets based on the longest prefix match. For example, in the
graphic on the slide, Router A selects interface ge-0/0/2 to send traffic to destination
10.3.3.10 because 10.3.3.10/32 is a longer prefix match than 10.3.3.0/24. If
entry 10.3.3.10/32 does not exist in the routing table, the router selects interface
ge-0/0/0 as the next hop for the same packet flow.
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Promiscuous Behavior of a Traditional Router
A traditional router is a promiscuous device that performs stateless packet
processing. It is promiscuous because once it is configured, it immediately forwards
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all traffic by default (provided, of course, that some combination of static and dynamic
routing is configured). Typically, a router operates only at Layer 3 and does not
recognize any security threats in higher-layer protocols. Furthermore, a traditional
router operates per packet, which adds to its fundamentally insecure nature, as it
cannot detect malformed sessions. The network and the router itself are immediately
vulnerable to all security threats.
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Typical Treatment of Security

Other than implementing standard access control using IP header information, most
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routers are not equipped to secure a network. Traditionally, a full security solution
involves adding a separate firewall device.
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Typical Router Positioning
Enterprise customer premise applications are served by the J Series family of service
routers and, in the case of larger enterprises, M Series routers. Enterprise data center
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applications can also be served by M Series routers. Internet service provider (ISP)
networks can be served by M Series, MX Series, or T Series routers. J Series, M Series,
MX Series and T Series routers support the rich routing and class-of-service (CoS)
features needed by networks, and maintain value, stability, and predictably high
performance.
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Traditional Security
The slide highlights the topic we discuss next.
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Adding Security to the Network
Standalone routers do not provide adequate security to enterprise networks and data
centers. As networks continue to expand, network applications continue to diversify
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and expand, and as new methods of remote communications such as telecommuting

increase, the need for added security becomes apparent. Typically, a standalone
firewall is added to the network, increasing costs and maintenance.
Requirements for Firewall Devices

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A firewall device must be capable of the following:

• Stateful packet processing based on contents of IP and higher-level
packet information, which includes TCP/UDP and the Application Layer;
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• Network Address Translation (NAT) and Port Address Translation (PAT),

achieving private-to-public translations and vice versa; and
• Establishing virtual private networks (VPNs) compounded with
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authentication and encryption.
Additional Services
The growth in network security has resulted in additional services provided by
standalone firewalls such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) network access, Intrusion
Detection and Prevention (IDP), application-level gateway (ALG) processing, and more.

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Firewall: Stateful Packet Processing
Because the main job of a firewall is to protect networks and devices, fundamental
firewall intelligence consists of the ability to make packet processing decisions based
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on IP packet header information, including its upper layers.

Stateful packet processing involves the creation of a unidirectional flow, which
consists of six elements of information—source IP address, destination IP address,
source port number, destination port number, protocol number, and a session token.
The session token is derived from a combination of a routing instance and a zone. The
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outgoing flow initiates a session table entry and the expected return flow for that
packet. Both outgoing and incoming flows comprise the session and are entered into
the session table. The session table enables bidirectional communication without any
additional configurational steps for return traffic.
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Firewall: NAT and PAT
When a security device resides at the edge of a network, it must be able to replace
private, nonroutable addresses with public addresses before traffic is sent to the
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public network. Translation can consist of replacing the IP address, port numbers, or
both, depending on the configuration. Note that NAT can be used on both source and
destination addresses, and PAT can be used on both source and destination ports.
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Firewall: Virtual Private Networks
You can use a firewall to build VPNs using the public network as an access medium
between two private sites. As such, the firewall must be able to perform the following:
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• Encapsulate the original traffic in a packet that can be transported over

the public network;
• Encrypt the original packet so that it cannot be easily decoded if it is
intercepted on the public network; and
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• Authenticate the originating device as a member of the VPN—not a

random device operating on the public network.
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Firewall Positioning
The slide illustrates a typical enterprise deployment of firewall devices. Small office
and home offices or retail storefronts use branch firewall devices to provide secured
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access to the Internet, as well as an IP Security (IPsec) VPN tunnel back to a central
site.
The enterprise firewall device at the central site provides VPN termination and firewall
protection between internal zones as well as from the Internet, and it might also
provide other security services such as IDP, Web filtering, and antispam services.
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Breaking the Tradition
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Current Trends
As boundaries of networks are becoming less clear, so are the requirements of
network edge devices. More and more enterprises are interconnecting themselves
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through an ISP’s virtual cloud by using IP. The Internet has created possibilities and
opportunities for businesses and markets, and it has erased the concept of distance.
With the Internet, however, came network vulnerabilities. Traditionally, routers have
been positioned on the edge of an enterprise network and provided very basic
network security such as stateless firewall filters. Network administrators became
used to relying on separate firewall devices positioned within enterprise DMZs. The
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consolidation of these functions at the network edge improves costs, reduces

management overhead, and increases operational simplicity.
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A New Perspective
The graphic on the slide illustrates how a device with strong routing and firewall
features can be positioned at network boundaries. Remote offices can deploy SRX
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Series branch platforms running JUNOS Software to provide both routing and security
features.
The SRX Series Services Gateway at the enterprise headquarters in this example also
provides routing and security in a high-density, modular chassis. The Dynamic
Services Architecture allows SRX Series Services Gateways to leverage new services
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with appropriate processing capabilities without sacrificing overall system

performance. SRX Series Services Gateways are next-generation systems designed to
meet the network and security requirements for the enterprise and service provider
infrastructure, and facilitate data center consolidation, rapid managed services
deployments, and security services aggregation.
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SRX Series High-End Systems
The Juniper Networks SRX Series Services Gateways for the high end are
next-generation services gateways based on a revolutionary new architecture that
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provides market-leading scalability and service integration. These devices are ideally
suited for large enterprise and service provider networks:
• Securing large enterprise data centers;
• Securing service provider and collocated data centers;
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• Aggregating departmental or segmented security solutions; and

• Securing managed services and core service provider infrastructure.
Based on the Dynamic Services Architecture, the SRX Series provides unrivaled
scalability. Each services gateway can support almost linear scalability with each
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additional Services Processing Card (SPC), enabling a fully equipped SRX5800 to

support more than 120 Gbps of firewall throughput. The SPCs are designed to support
a wide range of services enabling future support of new capabilities without the need
for service-specific hardware. Using SPCs on all services ensures that no resources
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are idle, based on specific services being used, maximizing the utilization of equipped
hardware.
The scalability and flexibility of the SRX5000 and SRX3000 lines of services gateways
are supported by equally robust interfaces. The SRX Series high-end line employs a
modular approach to interfaces where the gateway can be equipped with a flexible
number of input/output cards (IOCs).
Continued on next page.

SRX Series High-End Systems (contd.)

With the IOCs sharing the same interface slot as the SPCs, you can configure the
gateway to support the ideal balance of processing, input, and output. Hence, you can
tailor each deployment of the SRX Series to specific network requirements. With this
flexibility, you can configure the SRX5800 to support more than 400 gigabit ports,
with choices of Gigabit Ethernet or 10-Gigabit Ethernet.
The feature integration on the SRX Series is enabled by Juniper Networks JUNOS
Software. By combining the routing heritage of JUNOS Software and the security
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heritage of ScreenOS, the SRX Series is equipped with a robust list of features that
include firewall, intrusion detection and prevention (IDP), denial of service (DoS),
Network Address Translation (NAT), and quality of service (QoS).
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SRX Series High-End System Components
The SRX Series line of high end systems includes the following integral components:
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• Input/output card (IOC): To provide the most flexible solution, the
SRX Series employs the same modular architecture for SPCs and IOCs.
With the flexibility to install an IOC or an SPC on a given slot, the SRX
Series can be equipped to support an ideal balance between interfaces
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and processing capabilities.
• Network Processing Card (NPC): To ensure maximum processing
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performance and flexibility, the SRX3000 line utilizes NPCs to distribute
inbound and outbound traffic to the appropriate SPCs and IOCs, to apply
QoS, and to enforce DoS and distributed DoS (DDoS) protections. In the
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SRX5000 line, the NPC is integrated into the IOC. Note that a minimum of
one NPC must be installed in platforms in the SRX3000 line to ensure
proper functionality.
• Services Processing Card (SPC): SPCs are designed to process all
available services on the gateway. Without the need for dedicated
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hardware for specific services or capabilities, no instances exist in which

a piece of hardware is taxed to the limit while other hardware is sitting
idle. All the processing capabilities of the SPCs are designed to process
all configured services on the gateway. Note that a minimum of one SPC
must be installed in an SRX Series high-end system to ensure proper
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functionality.
• Switch Control Board (SCB): The SCB monitors and controls system
functions and provides the interconnections to all the IOCs within a
chassis through the switch fabrics integrated into the SCB. At least one
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SCB is required for the system to function. Two or three SCBs increase
capacity or provide redundancy, depending on the specific platform.
• Routing Engine (RE): The RE is an Intel-based PC platform that runs
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JUNOS Software. Software processes that run on the RE maintain the

routing tables, manage the routing protocols, control some chassis
components, and provide the interface for system management and user
access to the device.
For more information on specific SRX Series high-end system models and hardware,
visit the Juniper Networks Web site for technical publications at
http://www.juniper.net/techpubs.

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Physical Packet Flow for High-End Security Platforms
The slide illustrates physical packet flow through a high-end security platform running
JUNOS Software. The packet flow coverage includes the SRX5000 and the SRX3000
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line of products.
Physical packet flow through a high-end security platform proceeds through the
following sequence of steps:
1. A packet enters the security platform through the IOC.
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(Step 1.5: Oversubscription control applies at the IOC.)

2. The packet traverses the switch fabric from the IOC to the NPC. (In the
SRX5000 line of products, the NPC integrates with the IOC.) The NPC
performs a flow lookup. If the packet belongs to an existing flow, the NPC
forwards the packet to the SPC associated with the packet’s session. If
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the flow does not currently exist, the NPC installs a new session for the
flow and assigns the flow to an SPC for processing. The NPC also
performs QoS, policing, and shaping.
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3. The packet traverses the switch fabric to its associated SPC, where
security processing and forwarding or routing occurs.
4. The packet traverses the switch fabric back to an NPC where additional
packet processing such as shaping and QoS occurs.
5. The packet traverses the switch fabric to the IOC associated with the
egress interface and travels to the attached physical medium.

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SRX Series Branch Devices
Juniper Networks SRX Series Services Gateways for the branch provide essential
capabilities that connect, secure, and manage workforce locations sized from
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handfuls to hundreds of users. By consolidating fast, highly available switching,

routing, security, and applications capabilities in a single device, enterprises can
economically deliver new services, safe connectivity, and a satisfying end user
experience.
SRX Series for the branch operates with JUNOS Software, the proven operating system
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used by core Internet routers in all of the top 100 service providers around the world.
The rigorously tested carrier-class routing features of IP version 4 (IPv4)/IP version 6
(IPv6), OSPF, BGP, and multicast have been proven in over 10 years of worldwide
deployments.
SRX Series Services Gateways for the branch provide perimeter security, content
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security, access control, and network-wide threat visibility and control. Best-in-class
firewall and VPN technologies secure the perimeter with minimal configuration and
consistent performance. By using zones and policies, even new network
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administrators can configure and deploy an SRX Series branch device quickly and
securely. Policy-based VPNs support more complex security architectures that require
dynamic addressing and split tunneling. For content security, SRX Series for the
branch offers a complete suite of Unified Threat Management (UTM) services
consisting of intrusion prevention system (IPS), antivirus, antispam, Web filtering, and
data loss prevention through content filtering to protect your network from the latest
content-borne threats.

SRX Series Branch Devices (contd.)

Select models feature Content Security Accelerator for high-performance IPS and
antivirus performance. JUNOS security platforms for the branch integrate with other
Juniper Networks security products to deliver enterprise-wide unified access control
and adaptive threat management. These capabilities give security professionals
powerful tools in the fight against cybercrime and data loss.
Branch Platform System Components
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The SRX Series line of JUNOS security platforms include the following integral
components:
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• Multi-core processing unit: The processing unit uses multiple hardware
threads to provide data plane services including security services and
control plane services to the branch device. The SRX branch line of
platforms utilizes a system-on-a-chip (SOC) multi-core processor that
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provides the control and data plane functions as well as additional
services such as Ethernet controller technology and a cryptographic
engine.
• Physical Interface Modules (PIMs): The SRX Series line of branch and
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enterprise devices provide various media interfaces known at PIMs. The
media support includes 10/100 Ethernet, 10/100/1000 Ethernet,
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Gigabit Ethernet, T1/E1, T3/E3, ISDN, serial, ADSL and G.SHDSL
interfaces, depending on the model. Some SRX Series branch models
also contain an ExpressCard slot for utilization with a 3G wireless card to
serve as a backup for primary interfaces. Select models contain Power
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over Ethernet (PoE) enabled ports.
• Services and Routing Engine (SRE): The SRE, a field replacable unit in
the SRX650, houses the processing unit and provides processing power
for security services; routing protocol processes; and other software
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processes that control the services gateway interfaces, some of the

chassis components, system management, and user access to the
device.
For more information on specific JUNOS security platform branch models and
hardware, visit the Juniper Networks Web site for technical publications at
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http://www.juniper.net/techpubs.
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Physical Packet Flow for Branch Security Platforms
In SRX Series branch gateways, control and data plane separation is maintained using
multiple threads on multiple cores within the processor. One hardware core is used for
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control plane functions. Packets ingress the device through built-in ports or PIM ports
and pass to an Ethernet switch, which acts as the switch fabric for the device. In SRX
Series branch devices, local switching occurs at the switch so that the CPU or the NPU
is not taxed with switched traffic. As a result, security services such as security policy
and IDP are not available with locally switched traffic. The switch performs CoS
classification and traffic policing. It then passes non-locally switched packets to the
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processor where security services, routing lookup, and forwarding lookup is

performed. SRX branch devices then send egress packets to the appropriate egress
port by means of the switch.
Depending on the device type, the CPU might perform hardware acceleration and
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cryptographic acceleration. Some branch devices are equipped with a separate

regular expression (REGEX) content processor to provide hardware-based pattern
matching for IDP and antivirus acceleration.
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JUNOS Software Architecture
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JUNOS Security Platforms Versus a Traditional Router
The traditional router and a JUNOS security platform have completely different starting
points with respect to security and traffic flow.
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The traditional router begins by forwarding all traffic. Thus, the network is vulnerable
to all threats. You add security policies to reduce vulnerability until you reach the ideal
configuration. Because the traditional router begins as completely promiscuous and it
requires that you add security policies, a greater chance exists that the network will
remain vulnerable to some threats.
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An SRX Series Services Gateway running JUNOS Software begins by forwarding no

traffic. The network is secure but not functional. You add rules to allow traffic until you
reach the ideal configuration. Because a JUNOS security platform begins by
forwarding no traffic and because you must add rules, a greater likelihood exists that
the network will restrict undesirable traffic.
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JUNOS for Security Platforms Merges Routing and Security
The new features of JUNOS for security platforms bring new core security capabilities
to JUNOS Software. Because the forwarding algorithm is session-based, security
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features are tightly integrated into the forwarding plane, improving security
performance. Session-based forwarding and stateful firewall features derive from
Juniper Networks ScreenOS software.
JUNOS security platforms incorporate ALG functionality, IPsec VPNs, and screen
protection in a flowd module within JUNOS Software. Juniper Networks world-class IDP
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technology is also fully integrated into JUNOS for security platforms. We discuss these
features later in this course.
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JUNOS Software Elements
SRX Series Services Gateways use JUNOS Software as their base operating system. As
such, these devices deploy all the industry-proven processes of JUNOS Software, such
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as the routing process, management process, device control process, and others.
Another building element of JUNOS Software for security platforms is session-based
forwarding, thereby resulting in a strong suite of security features.
Packet-Based JUNOS Forwarding

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The JUNOS Software basic control plane, routing protocol process implementation,
per-packet stateless filters, policers, and CoS functions are all packet based.
Furthermore, other nonsecurity-related features, such as all interface encapsulations
and de-encapsulations, use industry-proven JUNOS Software. You can configure SRX
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Series Services Gateways using either the CLI or J-Web—the JUNOS Software-based
graphical user interface (GUI).
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Session-Based Forwarding
JUNOS Software for security platforms leverages ScreenOS software’s security
features as well as its flow-based nature. The first packet entering the device follows a
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series of path and policy determination schemes. JUNOS Software caches the session
information, the creation of which is triggered by the first packet of the flow. The
cached session is used by subsequent packets of that same flow and the reverse flow
of that session. Using the flow module, which is integrated into the forwarding path,
the hardware performs data-plane packet forwarding. Because JUNOS Software for
security platforms is security-based, all IPv4 packets entering the services gateway on
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an interface associate with an incoming zone. Likewise, all IPv4 packets exiting the
device on an interface associate with an outgoing zone. JUNOS Software for security
platforms adds a bundle of high-security features to the regular features of a router,
including stateful firewall, VPNs, NAT, ALGs, and IDP.
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Control Plane
The control plane on a JUNOS security platform is implemented using the Routing
Engine. The control plane consists of the JUNOS Software kernel, various processes,
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chassis management, user interface, routing protocols and some security features.
Many of the security features resemble ScreenOS features, including the network
security process, the VPN process, the authentication process, and Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol (DHCP). For its control plane, JUNOS Software for security
platforms deploys these features along with well-known, traditional JUNOS Software
features.
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Data Plane
The data plane on JUNOS security platforms, implemented on IOCs, NPCs, and SPCs
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for high-end devices and on CPU cores and PIMs for branch devices, consists of
JUNOS Software packet-handling modules compounded with a flow engine and
session management like that of the ScreenOS software. Intelligent packet processing
ensures that one single thread exists for packet flow processing associated with a
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single flow. Real-time processes enable JUNOS Software to perform session-based

packet forwarding.

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Logical Packet Flow Details
JUNOS security platforms handle an incoming packet as follows:
1. The software applies stateless policing filters and CoS classification to
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the packet at the ingress.

2. If the packet does not drop, the software performs a session lookup to
determine whether the packet belongs to an existing session. JUNOS
Software matches on six elements of traffic information for this
determination—source IP address, destination IP address, source port
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number, destination port number, protocol number, and a session token.

3. If the packet does not match an existing session, the software creates a
new session for it. This process is referred to as the first-packet path. If
the packet matches a session, the software performs fast-path
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processing.
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Logical Packet Flow Details (contd.)

The first packet of a flow is subject to first-packet-path processing. The software takes
the following steps during first-packet-path processing:
1. Based on the protocol used and its session layer (TCP or UDP), the
software starts a session timer. For TCP sessions, the default timeout is
30 minutes. For UDP sessions, the default timeout is 1 minute. These
values are the defaults, and you can change them.
2. The software applies firewall SCREEN options.
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3. If destination NAT is used, the software performs address allocation.
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4. Next, the software performs the route lookup. If a route exists for the
destination prefix, the software takes the next step. Otherwise, it drops
the packet.
5. The software determines the packet’s incoming zone by the interface
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through which it arrives. The software also determines the packet’s
outgoing zone by the forwarding lookup.
6. Based on incoming and outgoing zones, the corresponding security policy
is determined and a security policy lookup takes place. The software
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checks the packet against defined policies to determine how to treat the
packet.
7.
8.
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If source NAT is used, the software performs address allocation.
The software sets up the ALG service vector.
9. The software creates and installs the session. Furthermore, the software
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caches the decisions made for the first packet into a flow table, which
subsequent packets of that flow use.
10. The packet now enters the fast-path processing.
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Subsequent packets of a flow are all subject to fast-path processing. The software
takes the following steps during fast-path processing:
1. The software applies firewall SCREEN options.
2. The software performs TCP checks.
3. The software applies NAT.
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4. The software applies an ALG.

5. The software applies packet forwarding features, which include the
following:
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a. Stateless packet filters;

b. Traffic shaping by packet; and
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c. Packet encapsulation and transmission.

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Session Maintenance
When a packet enters the system and does not match any existing sessions, JUNOS
Software creates a new session based on routing and security policy information.
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Once this new session is created, the software puts it into a session hash table for
further packet matching and processing. Depending on the protocol and service (TCP
or UDP), the session is programmed with a default timeout. The default TCP timeout is
30 minutes and the UDP default timeout is 1 minute.
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Session Cleanup
If no traffic matches the session during the service timeout, JUNOS Software ages out
the session and frees it to a common resource pool for a later reuse.
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Session Run-Time Changes Propagation

The flow module is responsible for propagating any run-time changes that happen
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during the lifetime of the session. This propagation allows new packets that match the
session to forward using up-to-date information. Routing run-time changes always
propagate into the session. Security policy run-time changes might propagate into the
session in progress, based on the corresponding security policy configuration. We
discuss this topic more thoroughly in a subsequent chapter.

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Packet Flow Example: Part 1
We now apply the described decision process to a specific example. As the slide
shows, Host-B at 10.1.20.5 wants to initiate an HTTP session with the Web server at
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200.5.5.5. The traffic passes through an SRX Series Services Gateway and is
therefore subject to the decision process.
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The slide shows the packet as received by the SRX Series Services Gateway on
interface ge-0/0/1. Following the flowchart, you can track the progress of the packet
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through the services gateway:

1. Based on a lookup in the session table, the JUNOS Software determines
that this session is not an existing session.
2. The forwarding table shows that the software detects how to reach the
destination network.
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3. Now that the forwarding lookup is complete, the software can determine
the ingress and egress zones required for security policy evaluation.
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The following is a continuation of the list from the previous page:
4. The packet is from host 10.1.20.5 and is an HTTP packet. This packet
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matches the policy statement on the slide. The action for this particular
type of traffic is to permit it.
5. The SRX Series Services Gateway adds the flow information to the
session table. At the same time a return flow is automatically created and
also adds to the session table.
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6. The SRX Series Services Gateway then forwards the packet out
interface ge-1/0/0 (as determined by the destination lookup). JUNOS
Software allows traffic in both directions for this particular session to
pass without any subsequent policy evaluation.
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This Chapter Discussed:
• Traditional routing and security implementations;
• Current trends in internetworking;
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• SRX Series Services Gateways;

• JUNOS Software for the SRX Series; and
• Physical and logical packet flow through a JUNOS security platform.
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Review Questions
1.
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2.
3.
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4.
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Chapter 3: Zones
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• Zones and their purpose;
• Types of zones;
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• Application of zones;
• Configuring zones; and
• Monitoring zones.
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Chapter 3–2 • Zones

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The Definition of Zones
first.
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Zones • Chapter 3–3

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Zone Definition
A zone is a collection of one or more network segments sharing identical security
requirements. To group network segments within a zone, you must assign logical
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interfaces from the device to a zone.
Traffic Regulation Through a JUNOS Security Platform

Zones enable network security segregation. Security policies are applied between
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zones to regulate traffic through the JUNOS security platform. By default, all network
interfaces belong to the system-defined Null Zone. All traffic to or from the Null Zone is
dropped. Special interfaces including the fxp0 management ethernet interface
present in some SRX platforms, chassis cluster fabric interfaces, and internal system
em0 interfaces cannot be assigned to a zone.
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Review: Packet Flow
Recall the packet flow through a JUNOS security platform. Specifically, once the
packet enters a flow module, the device examines it to determine whether it belongs
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to an already established session. Recall that JUNOS Software matches on six

elements of traffic information to identify a session—source
IP address, destination IP address, source port number, destination port number,
protocol number, and a session token.
This chapter focuses on defining, configuring, and monitoring zones.
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Zones and Interfaces
You can assign one or more logical interfaces to a zone. You can also assign one or
more logical interfaces to a routing instance. You cannot assign a logical interface to
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multiple zones or multiple routing instances. You must also ensure that all of a zone’s
logical interfaces are in a single routing instance. Violating any of these restrictions
results in a configuration error as shown in the following examples:
[edit]
user@host# commit check
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[edit security zones security-zone trust]

'interfaces ge-0/0/2.0'
Interface ge-0/0/2.0 already assigned to another zone
error: configuration check-out failed
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Zones and Interface Assignments (contd.)

[edit]
lab@host# commit check
[edit routing-instances A interface]
'ge-0/0/0.0'
RT Instance: Interface ge-0/0/0.0 already configured under instance B
[edit routing-instances B]
'interface'
Interface ge-0/0/0.0 is in more than one routing instance (latest A)
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error: dcd_config_read fails to set parsing options
error: configuration check-out failed
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[edit]
user@host# commit check
[edit security zones security-zone untrust]
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'interfaces ge-0/0/2.0'
Interface ge-0/0/2.0 must be in the same routing instance as other
interfaces in the zone
error: configuration check-out failed"
One exception to the rule exists when all interfaces are assigned to one zone using the
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interface all configuration option. In this case, interfaces can belong to multiple
routing instances. ro
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Interfaces, Zones, and Routing Instances
The slide summarizes logical relationships between interfaces, zones, and routing
instances.
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Logical interfaces are connections to specific subnets. Zones are logical groupings of
logical interfaces with a common security requirement, and a logical interface can
belong to only one zone. Zone configuration can be as simple as a two-zone setup,
where all interfaces connected to internal networks are in one zone, and all interfaces
connected to the external world are in a different zone. A more complicated
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configuration might divide interfaces based on internal department or function in

addition to external and demilitarized zone (DMZ) connections.
A physical device can be broken up into multiple routing instances. A routing instance
is a logical routing construct within a platform running JUNOS Software. Each routing
instance maintains its own routing table and forwarding table. A routing instance can
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contain one or more zones, which cannot be shared with other routing instances.
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Zone Types
The zones within JUNOS Software can be subdivided into two categories—user-defined
and system-defined. You can configure user-defined zones, but you cannot configure
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system-defined zones. You can subdivide the user-defined category into security and
functional zones. We cover user-defined and system-defined zones in detail on the
next few pages.
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Security Zones
Security zones are a collection of one or more network segments requiring regulation
of inbound and outbound traffic through the use of policies. Security zones apply to
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transit traffic as well as traffic destined to any interfaces belonging to the security
zone. You need one or more security policies to regulate intrazone and interzone
traffic. Note that JUNOS Software does not have any default security zones, and you
cannot share a security zone between routing instances.
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Functional Zones
Functional zones are special-purpose zones that cannot be specified in security
policies. Note that transit traffic does not use functional zones. While the fxp0
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management ethernet interface is out-of-band by default, the Management Zone

allows you to assign other network interfaces the same behavior of isolating
management traffic from transit traffic.
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Null Zone
Currently there is only one system-defined zone, the Null Zone. By default, an
interface belongs to the Null Zone. You cannot configure the Null Zone. When you
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delete an interface from a zone, the software assigns it back to the Null Zone. JUNOS
Software rejects all traffic to and from interfaces belonging to the Null Zone.
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Branch Platforms
JUNOS security platforms for the branch ship from the factory with a template
configuration that includes security zones. SRX high-end platforms do not contain
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zones in the factory-default template configuration and, therefore, you must configure
required zones manually.
Factory-Default Configuration
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In branch devices’ factory-default configuration, two security zones are defined—

trust and untrust. In the template configuration, ge-0/0/0.0 belongs to the
trust zone. In addition, the factory-default configuration file has a security policy
permitting all transit traffic within the trust zone and from the trust zone to the
untrust zone. The security policy prohibits any traffic from the untrust zone to the
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trust zone. We discuss security policy in further detail in a subsequent chapter. The
zone names trust and untrust have no system-defined meaning. Like any zones
defined in the configuration, you can modify or delete them. You can revert a JUNOS
Software-based platform to its factory-default configuration by entering the load
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factory-default command from the top of the configuration hierarchy.

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Zone Configuration
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Zone Configuration Procedure
Zone configuration involves the following steps:
• Define a security or a functional zone;
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• Add logical interfaces to the zone; and

• Optionally, identify some combination of system services and protocols
allowed into the device through the interfaces belonging to the zone. If
you omit this step, all traffic entering through the zone’s interfaces
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destined for the device is blocked.

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Configuration Mode
To define a zone you must enter configuration mode, as illustrated on the slide.
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Defining a Zone Type

Once you enter the configuration mode, you can define a zone type. Recall that you
can configure only two types of zones—functional, which is used for device
management only (no transit traffic is permitted), and security. You define zones
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under the security configuration stanza. Note that user-defined zone names are
case sensitive and can contain any standard characters, like any other variable name
in JUNOS Software.
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Functional Zone Specifics

The following are two important configuration characteristics of the functional zone:
1. You can define only one type of functional zone—management; and
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2. The functional zone does not have a user-defined name.

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Adding Logical Interfaces to the Zone
Now you are ready to add logical interfaces to the zone. The slide illustrates two
variations. The first example illustrates adding interface ge-0/0/1.0 to the security
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zone, called HR, and the second example illustrates adding interface ge-0/0/1.100 to
the functional management zone. If you omit the specification of the logical unit of the
interface, JUNOS Software assumes unit 0. Also, you can assign all interfaces to a
zone by using the keyword all. Should you choose to assign all interfaces to a zone,
you will not be able to assign any interfaces to a different zone.
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Specifying Types of Traffic Permitted into the Device: Part 1
Without explicit configuration, traffic destined for a JUNOS security platform is not
permitted. You can specify types of traffic allowed into the device using the
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host-inbound-traffic configuration option under a specific zone or under an

interface configured in a zone. By default, all outbound traffic originating from the
device is always allowed.
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When specifying types of traffic permitted into a JUNOS security platform, you use
some combination of system-services and protocols configuration options.
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JUNOS Software provides you with the ability to refer to all system services and
protocols and respective ports with the help of the all keyword. To open all ports for
all services, use the any-service keyword. In addition, you can isolate any
exceptions to the referred list of protocols or system services with the help of the
except keyword. The examples on the following pages illustrate the use of this
keyword.
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Specifying Types of Traffic Permitted into the Device: Part 2 (contd.)

You can specify any of the following system services:
[edit security zones]
user@host# set security-zone HR host-inbound-traffic system-services ?
Possible completions:
all All system services
any-service Enable services on entire port range
+ apply-groups Groups from which to inherit configuration data
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+ apply-groups-except Don't inherit configuration data from these groups
dns DNS and DNS-proxy service
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except Type of incoming system-service traffic to disallow
finger Finger service
ftp FTP
http Web management service using HTTP
https Web management service using HTTP secured by SSL
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ident-reset Send back TCP RST to IDENT request for port 113
ike Internet Key Exchange
lsping Label Switched Path ping service
netconf NETCONF service
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ntp Network Time Protocol service
ping Internet Control Message Protocol echo requests
rlogin Rlogin service ro
rpm Real-time performance monitoring
rsh Rsh service
snmp Simple Network Management Protocol service
snmp-trap Simple Network Management Protocol traps
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ssh SSH service
telnet Telnet service
tftp TFTP
traceroute Traceroute service
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xnm-clear-text JUNOScript API for unencrypted traffic over TCP

xnm-ssl JUNOScript API service over SSL
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Specifying Types of Traffic Permitted into the Device: Part 2 (contd.)

You can specify any of the following protocols:
[edit security zones]
user@host# set security-zone HR host-inbound-traffic protocols ?
all All protocols
+ apply-groups Groups from which to inherit configuration data
+ apply-groups-except Don't inherit configuration data from these groups
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bfd Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
bgp Border Gateway Protocol
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dvmrp Distance Vector Multicast Routing Protocol
except Protocol type of incoming traffic to disallow
igmp Internet Group Management Protocol
ldp Label Distribution Protocol
msdp Multicast Source Discovery Protocol
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nhrp Next Hop Resolution Protocol
ospf Open Shortest Path First
pgm Pragmatic General Multicast
pim Protocol Independent Multicast
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rip Routing Information Protocol
router-discovery Router Discovery
rsvp Resource Reservation Protocol
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sap Session Announcement Protocol
vrrp Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol
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You can specify allowed traffic either at the zone level of configuration or the interface
level within a zone. As with any configuration in JUNOS Software, the precedence rule
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of more specific configuration applies here as well. In other words, interface-level

configuration (as it is more specific) overrides the zone-level configuration. In the
examples on the slide, only HTTP system services are allowed into interface ge-0/0/1,
which is part of the HR Zone. All other interfaces associated with the HR Zone can
accept all system services.
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Check Your Knowledge: Part 1
The slide shows an example of zone configuration. What types of traffic are allowed
into the specified zone and interfaces?
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The slide shows another example of zone configuration. What types of traffic are
allowed into the specified zone and interfaces?
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The slide shows the third example in this series. What does this configuration do?
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Monitoring Security Zones
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Monitoring Zones
The slide illustrates the show security zones command, which is useful for zone
monitoring. The command provides information on the zone type and name along with
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the number and names of interfaces bound to the zone.

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Monitoring Traffic Permitted into Interfaces: Part 1
Using the show interfaces interface-name extensive command enables
you to view zone specifics. The command displays information on permitted protocols
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and system services allowed into the device through the corresponding interfaces. In
addition, the command provides information on flow statistics through the interface.
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Monitoring Traffic Permitted Into Interfaces: Part 2
The slide provides the continuation of the output from the previous page.
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• Zones and their purpose;
• Types of zones;
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• Application of zones;
• Zone configuration; and
• Zone monitoring.
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Review Questions
1.
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2.
3.
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4.
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Lab 1: Configuring and Monitoring Zones
The slide provides the objective for this lab.
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• Security policy functionality;
• Components of a security policy;
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• Configuring a security policy; and

• Verification and monitoring of security policies.
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Chapter 4–2 • Security Policies

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Overview of Security Policy
first.
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Security Policies • Chapter 4–3

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What Is a Security Policy?
A security policy is a set of statements that controls traffic from a specified source to a
specified destination using a specified service. If a packet arrives that matches those
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specifications, the SRX Series device performs the action specified in the policy.
Network security policies are highly valuable for secure network functionality. Network
security policies outline all network resources within a business and the required
security level for each resource. JUNOS Software provides a set of tools to implement
a network security policy within your organization. Security policies enforce a set of
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rules for transit traffic, identifying which traffic can pass through the firewall and the
actions taken on the traffic as it passes through the firewall.
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Review: Packet Flow
The slide reviews packet flow through the flow module of a JUNOS security platform.
When the device examines the first packet of a flow, based on incoming and outgoing
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zones, it determines the corresponding security policy, and it performs a security

policy lookup. The system checks the packet against defined policies to determine
how to treat the packet.
In this chapter, we focus on the security policies portion of JUNOS Software.
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Transit Traffic Examination
JUNOS Software for security platforms always examines transit traffic by using security
policies. As illustrated on the slide, should no match exist in the security policy, the
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default security policy applies to the packet. We highlight the default security policy in
a subsequent slide.
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host-inbound-traffic Examination
If the destination of traffic is the device’s incoming interface, security policies are not
applicable. The only examination that takes place is the list of services and protocols
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allowed into that interface using the host-inbound-traffic statement within a

zone definition. (See Chapter 3: “Zones” for details.)
JUNOS Software examines security policies if the traffic destination is any interface
other than the incoming interface. This process is true regardless of whether the
incoming interface and the destination interface are in the same zone (intrazone
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traffic) or in different zones (interzone traffic).

The flowchart on the slide illustrates the order of packet examination. When the
device receives traffic destined to itself, it first examines whether the destination of
the traffic is the incoming interface. If so, it skips the policy examination. Otherwise,
the corresponding security policies evaluate the traffic. If no policy match exists for
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the traffic, the default policy action applies. We discuss the default security policy on
the next slide. If traffic matches a security policy that permits it, the device then
examines the list of services and protocols allowed into the destination interface
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within the corresponding zone, and applies the corresponding action.

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System-Default Security Policy
By default, JUNOS Software denies all traffic through an SRX Series device. In fact, an
implicit default security policy exists that denies all packets. You can change this
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behavior by configuring a standard security policy that permits certain types of traffic,
or by configuring the default policy to permit all traffic as shown in the following screen
capture.
[edit security policies]
user@host# set default-policy permit-all
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[edit security policies]

user@host#
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Factory-Default Security Policies

The factory-default template configuration file in branch security platforms has three
preconfigured security policies (not to be confused with the system-default security
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policy discussed in the previous paragraph):

1. Trust-to-trust zone policy: Permits all intrazone traffic within the trust
zone;
2. Trust-to-untrust zone policy: Permits all traffic from the trust zone to the
untrust zone; and
3. Untrust-to-trust zone policy: Denies all traffic from the untrust zone to the
trust zone.

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Security Policy Conceptual Example
We now examine an example of a packet flow through a JUNOS security platform.
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The device’s interfaces are separated into three security zones—private, external, and
public. The business requirement calls for an SSH application to be allowed from
Host B, located in the private zone, to Host D, located in the external zone. To meet the
requirement, we created the security policy illustrated on the slide.
The following is the sequence of events that takes place:
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1. Host B initiates the SSH session to Host D.

2. The JUNOS security device receives traffic and examines it using its
security policy from the private zone to the external zone. The security
policy permits that traffic.
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3. The Host B-to-Host D flow triggers the creation of the reverse flow from
Host D to Host B. The slide identifies the contents of this newly formed
session. It consists of two flows—source to destination and destination to
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source.
4. Host D sends the return traffic, from Host D to Host B. The device, using a
pre-created session, permits the return traffic through to Host B.

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Policy Ordering
Because policies execute in the order of their appearance in the configuration file, you
should be aware of the following:
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• Policy order is important.

• New policies go to the end of the policy list.
• You can change the order of policies in the configuration file using the
JUNOS Software insert command.
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• The last policy is the default policy, which has the default action of
denying all traffic.
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Editing Security Configurations
Like any other JUNOS Software configuration stanza, you can delete, deactivate,
activate, insert, annotate, and copy security policies.
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Policy Components
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Security Policy Contexts
When defining a policy, you must associate it with a source zone, or incoming zone—
named the from-zone. Also, you must define a destination zone, or an outgoing zone—
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named the to-zone. Within a direction of source and destination zones, you can define
more than one policy, referred to as an ordered set of policies, which JUNOS Software
executes in the order of their configuration.
Recall that a zone is a collection of multiple logical interfaces with identical security
requirements. JUNOS Software always checks all transit traffic—intrazone and
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interzone—through the use of security policies.
Security Policy Components

Within the defined context title, each policy is labeled with a user-defined name.
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Under the user-defined name is a list of matching criteria and specified actions,
similar to a JUNOS Software routing policy. One major difference is that each security
policy must contain a matching source address, destination address, and application.
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Actions for traffic matching the specified criteria include permit, deny, reject, log, or
count.
JUNOS Software also uses policy to invoke the use of Intrusion Detection and
Prevention (IDP) policies, the Unified Thread Management (UTM) feature for branch
devices, and firewall authentication. We discuss IDP and firewall authentication in
detail in subsequent chapters.

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Policy Match Criteria
Each of the defined policies must include the following matching criteria:
• Source addresses: This criterion can be in the form of address sets or
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individual addresses. You can group individual addresses into address

sets.
• Destination addresses: This criterion can be in the form of an address
sets or individual addresses. You can group individual addresses into
address sets.
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• Applications or application sets: This criterion can be user-defined or

system-defined. JUNOS Software supports system-crafted default
applications and application sets, referred to using the format
junos-application, where application is the name of the
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actual application. You can also define your own applications.

You must specify all matching components. If you omit any of these components,
JUNOS Software will not allow you to commit the configuration.
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Creating Address Book Entries
The slide illustrates the syntax that you must use when creating address book entries.
An address book within a zone can consist of individual addresses or address sets. An
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address set is a set of one or more addresses defined within an address book.
Address sets are useful when you must refer to a group of addresses more than once.
If the matching criteria needs no specific address, no address book entry is
necessary. In this case, you can specify the configuration option any as the source or
destination address in a security policy.
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Defining Custom Applications
JUNOS Software has many built-in applications, such as junos-rsh, junos-sip,
junos-bgp, and so forth. You can customize the list of predefined applications (thus
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expanding the overall list), which gives you the capability to support complex
applications.
To configure a custom application, define the application name, associate the
application with a protocol and ports. Use the application-protocol
configuration option to associate the custom application with an application-level
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gateway (ALG). A user-configured application has a timeout value associated with it.
JUNOS Software applies the timeout value to the created session. Once the timeout
expires, the software clears the session from the session table. You can modify the
timeout value for a specific application. Note that the new timeout value applies only
to new sessions—not to existing ones.
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Creating Policy Match Entries
You enter all policies under the from-zone...to-zone stanza for that particular
traffic direction. The from-zone...to-zone stanza associates the policies under it
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with a source zone and a destination zone. Under a specific zone direction, each
security policy contains a name, match criteria, and an action. This example focuses
on match criteria. The system executes all policies in the order of their appearance
within a configuration file.
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Basic Policy Actions
Each policy has a list of basic and advanced actions associated with it. The basic
actions are the following:
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• permit: Allows traffic flow;

• deny: Results in a silent packet drop; and
• reject: Results in a packet drop and the sending of an Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMP) unreachable message for UDP traffic and a TCP
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reset register suppression time (RST) message for TCP traffic.
Log and Count Traffic

For each of these actions, you can configure JUNOS Software to log and count traffic
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as well. To view counters, use the show security policies detail

operational mode command. We discuss logging in detail in subsequent slides.
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Advanced Permit Settings
Among the policy actions mentioned on the previous slide, the following advanced
permit settings exist:
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• Firewall authentication;
• IPsec VPN tunnel;
• IDP; and
• UTM features.
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Firewall authentication enables you to restrict and permit users accessing protected
resources that could be located in different zones. JUNOS Software offers two
methods of firewall authentication:
• Pass-through: Firewall users that are using FTP, Telnet, or the Hypertext
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Transfer Protocol (HTTP) to access protected resources across the device

receive authentication through a username and password. The JUNOS
security platform intercepts the session and then performs user
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authentication.
• Web authentication: Firewall users use HTTP or HTTP over Secure
Sockets Layer (HTTPS) to access an IP address of the JUNOS security
device, instead of the protected resource. The device acts as a proxy,
authenticating the user with a username and password and caches the
information.

Advanced Permit Settings (contd.)

We discuss firewall authentication in more detail in the chapter titled, “Firewall User
Authentication.”
If a policy associates with a preconfigured IPsec VPN tunnel, the tunnel creation
occurs dynamically upon the receipt of the first packet that matches such a policy. The
policy-based IPsec VPN can be one of two types—IKE or manual. We discuss
IPsec VPNs in more detail in the chapter titled,“IPsec VPNs.”
A policy can associate with an IDP policy. IDP policies inspect traffic and enforce
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various attack detection and prevention techniques. We discuss IDP in more detail in
the chapter titled, “Introduction to IDP”.
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In branch devices only, a policy can also associate traffic with UTM features such as
antivirus, content filtering, and Web filtering.
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Policy Components Summary
The following is a summary of the policy components:
• A security policy is positioned within the from-zone and the to-zone
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direction of traffic within configuration;

• Each policy has a set of matching conditions;
• Each policy has a set of actions that the system performs upon success
of all matching conditions;
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• Many security policies within the same direction of the flow can exist; and
• Policy order is important, because policies execute in the order of their
appearance in the configuration file.
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Verifying Policy Operation
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Control Plane Logging
JUNOS Software logs control plane events either locally or to an external syslog device.
Locally stored logs are stored on the Routing Engine under the /var/log directory;
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you can view them by using the show log log-name operational mode command.
To configure logs to be sent to an external syslog server, use the host configuration
option. The example on the slide shows the control plane logging statements present
in a factory-default configuration.
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Branch Device Data Plane Logging
Data plane logging in JUNOS security platforms for the branch can be stored locally or
on an external system log (syslog) server. Use the session-close and
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session-init configuration options within a security policy to log the start and
close of sessions matching a policy.
The slide illustrates a sample log file configuration for branch devices. Logs are stored
locally in the /var/log directory when designated with a filename. To send logs to
an external device, use the host IP address configuration option.
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The default facility and severity for data plane session logging is user info. To
enable a Network and Security Manager (NSM) device to be able to retrieve logs,
name the log file default-log-messages, as shown on the slide, and include the
structured-data configuration option.
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High-End SRX Series Data Plane Logging
Data plane logging in high-end SRX Series devices must go to an external syslog
device. JUNOS Software does not support local data plane logging because of the high
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volume of session handling that a high-end SRX Series Services Gateway supports.
The slide illustrates the configuration of data plane logging for SRX Series high-end
devices.
Currently, JUNOS Software supports one stream of logging traffic. Supported
collection devices include UNIX syslogd-based servers and Juniper Networks STRM.
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Logging Sessions in Security Policy
Use the session-close and session-init configuration options to log the start
and close of sessions matching a policy. The slide illustrates the configuration of the
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policy log action.
Collecting Security Policy Statistics

Use the count security policy action to collect statistics and make them available
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using operational show commands. The count security policy action is not necessary
to enable statistics collection in security policy logs. Logs containing
session-close messages contain statistics by default. The case study later in this
chapter provides examples of both forms of statistics collection.
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Operational Monitoring Commands
Various show commands are available for monitoring the application of security
policy. The show security policies command allows you to view details about
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an applied policy such as the policy index number, policy matching conditions, and
policy actions. Use the detail command option to view statistics associated with
policy counters.
The show security flow session command displays active sessions on the
device and each session’s associated security policy. Note that this command output
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is categorized per Services Processing Unit (SPU) application-specific integrated

circuit (ASIC). The following output is from a services gateway containing two services
processing cards (SPCs) and therefore, four total SPUs. Only one session is active on
the services gateway:
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user@host> show security flow session

0 sessions displayed
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Session ID: 210000935, Policy name: permit-ftp/5, Timeout: 1768

In: 10.100.0.2/50054 --> 10.200.1.2/21;tcp, If: ge-1/2/1.10
Out: 10.200.1.2/21 --> 10.100.0.2/50054;tcp, If: ge-1/0/1.40

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Tracing Security Policy
The configuration shown on the slide enables the tracing of security policy evaluation
and sessions on a JUNOS security platform. Use the packet-filter configuration
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option to log only details concerning selected sessions. Note that because of the
architectural design of Juniper Networks security and routing platforms, you can
enable reasonably detailed tracing in a production network without negative impact
on overall performance or packet forwarding. However, it is a good practice to disable
traceoptions when not troubleshooting the device to reduce the impact on system
resources.
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Policy Scheduling and Rematching
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Policy Scheduling
A policy scheduler is a method for scheduling a policy execution for a specified
duration or a set of durations. A policy scheduler is optional. A scheduler supports
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system time updates either through manual configuration or through the Network
Time Protocol (NTP) by synchronizing itself with the time changes.
Rules for Scheduling

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The following rules apply to policy scheduling:

• An individual policy can have only one scheduler applied;
• Multiple policies can use the same scheduler; and
• A scheduler must be referenced in a policy to become active. Without a
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defined scheduler within a policy, the policy is always active.

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Security Policy Scheduler Components
A security policy scheduler provides you with the flexibility to identify the start date and
time and stop date and time for policy enforcement. In particular, the scheduler
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components include the following:

• Slot schedule: This component consists of the start date and time and
the stop date and time of policy enforcement; and
• Daily schedule: This component consists of the start time, the stop time,
the all-day option, and the exclude option.
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Policy Scheduler Details
A policy scheduler turns on recurrently or once at the specified time. Recall that a
policy scheduler activates and deactivates a policy according to the scheduled time,
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which you configure. Once you create the scheduler, you must apply it to a policy. The
default behavior of a policy is to execute at all times.
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Optionally Applying the policy-rematch Statement
JUNOS Software’s default behavior is to not disturb sessions in progress when you
make configuration changes to security policies. For example, you can modify an
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address field or modify the actions of a policy used for session examination. By
default, because a session was pre-established, it continues to be operational without
any interruptions. You can change that default behavior by enabling the
policy-rematch statement. Once you enable the statement, every time a
configuration change to a policy occurs, it reflects in the sessions in progress.
Configuration changes, such as source addresses, destination addresses, and
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application changes, cause policy re-evaluation as the system performs a policy

lookup. If the newly matched policy is not the policy referred to by the session, the
session clears. If an IPsec VPN change occurs, the JUNOS security platform clears the
session.
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Optionally Applying policy-rematch Statement (contd.)

The following list explains the actions that JUNOS Software performs on impacted
sessions in progress based on whether the policy-rematch flag is enabled or
disabled.
• When the policy-rematch flag is enabled:
– The software inserts a policy: no impact;
– The software modifies the action field of a policy from permit
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to either deny or reject: all existing sessions are dropped; and
– The software modifies some combination of source address,
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destination addresses, and applications fields: JUNOS Software
re-evaluates policy lookup.
• When the policy-rematch flag is disabled (default behavior):
– The software inserts a policy: no impact;
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– The software modifies the action field of a policy from permit
to either deny or reject: all existing sessions continue; and
– The software modifies some combination of source address,
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destination addresses, and applications fields: all existing
sessions continue unchanged.
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Note that irrespective of the value of policy-rematch policy flag, deletion of the
policy causes the device to drop all impacted existing sessions.
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Policy Case Study
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Case Study: Creating Policies
The next series of slides presents an example and configurations for a setup in which
two zones exist—HR and Public. The private PCs A and B, located in the HR Zone, must
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communicate with Server C in the Public Zone using a custom application set.
Restrictions are placed on the rest of the 10.1.0.0/16 network that are logged and
counted.
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Case Study: Entering Host Addresses into the HR Zone
The slide presents the configuration that adds host addresses belonging to zone HR.
The hosts include PC_A and PC_B, whose addresses are 10.1.10.5 and 10.1.20.5
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respectively. The rest of the 10.1.0.0/16 subnet is also defined, which is named
other-10-1 in the address book. In addition, the PC_A and PC_B addresses are
grouped into an address set named HR_PCs.
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Case Study: Entering Host Addresses into the Public Zone
The slide presents the configuration that adds host addresses belonging to the Public
Zone. The Public Zone has Server_C, whose address is 1.1.70.250. The rest of the
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1.1.7.0/24 subnet is also defined, named other-1-1-70 in the address book. In

addition, an address set, named address-Public, consists of the Server_C
address for now.
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Case Study: Adding New Applications
The slide presents the configuration of a new application, HR-telnet, for the HR
Zone. The configuration shows that the new application is added under the
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applications stanza. In addition, the new application set, named

HR-Public-applications consists of two predefined applications, junos-ftp
and junos-ike, and the newly defined HR-telnet application.
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Case Study: Creating Policy Entries: Part 1
We must now define the policies from the HR Zone to the Public Zone. We must define
two policies. The purpose of the first one, named HR-to-Public on the slide, is to
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permit traffic from the HR Zone to Public Zone, provided that its source address
belongs to the address set HR_PCs, its destination address belongs to the address
set address-Public, and its application is part of HR-Public-applications.
Matching traffic is logged and counted.
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Case Study: Creating Policy Entries: Part 2
The slide shows the definition of the next policy for the same direction—from the HR
Zone to the Public Zone. This policy denies packets, logs, and counts packets for only
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the following cases:

• The source address of the packet must be other-10-1;
• The destination address must be other-1-1-70; and
• The application must be junos-ftp.
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If a packet does not match the previous policy—HR-to-Public—or—

otherHR-to-Public, the default security policy examines it, resulting in the device
dropping it.
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Case Study: Optionally Creating a Scheduler
We now create a scheduler named schedulerHR. Its purpose is to activate policy
HR-to-Public on a daily basis, from 9:00 am until 5:00 pm, excluding weekends
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(Saturday and Sunday). Because HR-to-Public is the only policy that permits some
traffic, application of the scheduler results in the JUNOS security device blocking all
traffic completely on a daily basis after 5:00 pm and on weekends.
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Case Study: Optionally Applying a Scheduler
The slide shows the application of the previously defined scheduler schedulerHR to
the HR-to-Public policy.
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Check Your Knowledge
What are the answers to the questions posed on the slide?
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Case Study: Monitoring Security Policies: Part 1
The slide shows the output of the show security policies detail command
for one of the policies in the case study. We removed some content for brevity.
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Case Study: Monitoring Security Policies: Part 2
The slide shows an example of the data plane log output resulting from live FTP traffic
transiting the case study’s security policy. We captured the output on an external UNIX
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syslogd-enabled server.
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• Security policy functionality;
• Security policy configuration, including:
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– Policy match conditions;

– Policy actions—basic and advanced;
– Policy scheduling; and
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• Security policy verification and monitoring.

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Review Questions
1.
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2.
3.
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Lab 2: Security Policies
The slide provides the objective for the lab.
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• The purpose of firewall user authentication;
• Implementing pass-through authentication;
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• Implementing Web authentication;

• Using client groups; and
• Monitoring firewall user authentication.
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Chapter 5–2 • Firewall User Authentication

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Firewall User Authentication Overview
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Firewall User Authentication • Chapter 5–3

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The Purpose of Firewall User Authentication
Firewall user authentication provides another layer of protection in the network on top
of security zones, policies, and screens. With firewall authentication, you can restrict
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or permit users individually or in groups. Users attempting to access a network

resource receive a prompt from JUNOS Software for a username and password even if
a security policy is in place permitting the traffic.
Users can be authenticated using a local password database or using an external
password database. JUNOS Software supports RADIUS, Lightweight Directory Access
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Protocol (LDAP), or SecurID authentication servers.

The example on the slide illustrates a user (Host A) attempting to access a network
resource belonging to the Public Zone. With firewall user authentication configured,
the user must first authenticate with the JUNOS security platform before accessing
the resource. In this example, the device can query an external authentication server
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to determine the authentication result. The security policy must also allow traffic flow.
Once the user receives authentication, subsequent sessions from the same source IP
address bypass firewall user authentication. This behavior is especially important
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when considering the usage of firewall user authentication for a network that might
have source-based Network Address Translation (NAT) employed.

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Pass-Through Authentication
Two types of firewall user authentication are available—pass-through or Web
authentication. Pass-through authentication must first be triggered by Telnet, FTP, and
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Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic. In this type of firewall authentication, the
user initiates a session to a remote network device or resource. If traffic matches the
security policy configured for pass-through authentication, the SRX Series Services
Gateway intercepts the session. The user receives a prompt for a username and
password. If the authentication is successful, subsequent traffic from the same
source IP address is automatically allowed to pass through the device, provided it
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matches the applied security policy.
Web Authentication
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Web authentication is valid for all types of traffic. With Web authentication configured,
users must first directly access the JUNOS security platform using HTTP. The user
enters the address or hostname of the device into a Web browser and then receives a
prompt for a username and password. If authentication is successful, the user can
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then access the restricted resource directly. Subsequent traffic from the same source
IP address is automatically allowed access to the restricted resource, as long as
security policy allows for it.

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Local Authentication
JUNOS Software supports local authentication on the JUNOS security platform itself as
well as RADIUS, LDAP, and SecurID external authentication servers. The local
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password database supports authentication and authorization.
RADIUS Authentication
JUNOS Software supports Juniper Network’s Steel-Belted Radius for authentication as
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well as authorization. The JUNOS security platform acts as a RADIUS client and
communication uses UDP. RADIUS uses a shared secret key to encrypt user
information during the exchange.
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LDAP Authentication
An LDAP server is another form of external authentication server. JUNOS Software
supports authentication only when utilizing an LDAP server. JUNOS Software is
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compatible with LDAP Version 3 and Microsoft Windows Active Directory.


SecurID Authentication
An RSA SecurID server can be used for external authentication. This method allows
users to enter either static or dynamic passwords as credentials. A dynamic password
is a combination of a user’s PIN and a randomly generated token that is valid for a
short period of time. JUNOS Software supports SecurID servers for authentication only
and does not support the SecurID challenge feature.
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The slide illustrates the process used for pass-through firewall authentication. A user
attempts to connect directly to a remote network resource using either Telnet, HTTP, or
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FTP. The JUNOS security platform intercepts the first packet and stores it in memory.
The device prompts the end user for a username and password. If authentication is
successful, a configurable banner displays to the user, and the original buffered
packet travels to its destination. JUNOS Software allows subsequent traffic from the
same source IP address until the user is idle for 10 minutes. At this point,
authentication must be performed again for further traffic to pass through the device.
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The default idle timeout of 10 minutes is configurable as shown:

[edit access profile profile-name]
user@host# set session-options client-idle-timeout ?
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<client-idle-timeout> Time in minutes of idleness after which access is

denied
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Creating an Access Profile
The slide provides an example of a basic access profile. This example shows the
configuration of a user-defined profile name. One or more clients are configured
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within the profile, representing end users. The client-name represents the username.
The password is entered in plain-text format but displays in encrypted form when you
view the configuration.
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Associating the Access Profile with an Authentication Type
Once an access profile has been defined, it must be associated with pass-through
firewall authentication. The slide shows a basic example of this configuration. JUNOS
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Software also allows you to set a customized banner that will display to the end user.
JUNOS Software can display an initial login banner, a successful authentication
banner, and a failed authentication banner when configuring pass-through
authentication.
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Apply Pass-Through Authentication as Policy Action
Enable pass-through and Web authentication using security policies. To be subject to
firewall user authentication, traffic must align with the policy’s matching conditions
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and have an extended action of permit, specifying the type of firewall authentication to
use. The slide shows an example of applying pass-through firewall authentication to a
security policy.
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Web Authentication
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Web Authentication
The slide illustrates the process used for Web firewall authentication. A user that
requires access to a remote network resource must first access the JUNOS security
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platform directly using a Web browser. The device prompts the end user for a
username and password. If authentication is successful, a configurable banner
displays and the user gains permission to access the remote resource. JUNOS
Software allows subsequent traffic from the same source IP address until the user is
idle for 10 minutes. At this point, authentication must be performed again for further
traffic to pass through the device. The default idle timeout of 10 minutes is
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configurable as shown here:

[edit access profile profile-name]
user@host# set session-options client-idle-timeout ?
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<client-idle-timeout> Time in minutes of idleness after which access is

denied
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Enabling the HTTP Process
To use Web authentication, the SRX Series device must initiate the httpd process. The
slide highlights the required configuration to enable this system process for the
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device. The highlighted configuration allows HTTP access for Web management using
the J-Web user interface and also allows for the use of Web authentication. You can
also configure this feature to restrict access to an individual interface or a group of
interfaces. The security zone containing the interface to be used for Web
authentication (or for the J-Web user interface) must allow HTTP traffic as host
inbound traffic.
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Enabling Interface for Web Authentication
The interface that users access for Web authentication must be enabled for
authentication. The slide illustrates a sample configuration for enabling Web
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authentication on the ge-0/0/0 interface. We recommend using a secondary IP

address as the Web authentication address. The Web authentication address must be
in the same subnet as the primary interface address. Use the preferred
configuration option to ensure that traffic sourced from this interface continues to use
the primary address as its source address.
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Creating an Access Profile
Web authentication can use the same profile as pass-through authentication. The
example on the slide shows the configuration of a user-defined profile name. One or
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more clients are configured within the profile representing end users. The client-name
represents the username. The user enters the password in plain-text format but it
displays in encrypted form when you view the configuration.
Associating the Access Profile with an Authentication Type

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The access profile must associate with Web authentication using the same
configuration structure as pass-through authentication. The slide shows a basic
example of this configuration. JUNOS Software also allows you to set a customized
banner that will display to the end user. Web authentication supports a customized
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banner for successful authentication only.

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Applying Web Authentication as Policy Action
Pass-through and Web authentication are enabled using security policies. To be
subject to firewall user authentication, traffic must align with the policy’s matching
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conditions and have an extended action of permit, specifying the type of firewall
authentication to use. The slide shows an example of applying Web firewall
authentication to a security policy.
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A Cleaner Method of Web Authentication
Directly accessing the device through a browser before gaining access to a remote
resource is burdensome. To alleviate this burden, JUNOS Software allows Web
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redirection. The slide illustrates the configuration of Web redirection. With Web
redirection enabled, the device responds to the user device with an HTTP redirect
message, which tells the user device to use HTTP to access the JUNOS security
platform at a particular address. JUNOS Software uses the address of the interface on
which the initial user request was received. You must enable Web authentication for
this interface and for the system itself, just as you would for standard Web
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authentication.
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Client Groups
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Using Client Groups
A client group is a list of groups associated with a client. Client groups allow for easier
management of multiple firewall users. Security policy references client groups in the
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same manner in which it references individual clients. The slide shows a simple
conceptual example of using client groups to manage multiple users. The next two
slides utilize this example for illustrating the configuration of client groups.
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Adding Client Groups to a User
The slide provides an example configuration of three users associated with various
groups. A number of groups (contained in square brackets in the example
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configuration) represent a client group.

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Configuring a Policy to Use Client Groups
Once client groups have been organized, groups can be referenced in a security policy
with firewall authentication. Groups can be used in place of individual clients. The
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slide illustrates the use of a client group in a security policy. In this example, Group-A
from the previous slide is subject to pass-through authentication.
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Which Users Have Telnet Access to the Engineering Resource?
In the referenced example configuration, firewall authentication is enabled and the
security policy specifies only client group Group-A. Client group Group-A associates
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with user1 and user2. Therefore, user1 and user2 have access to the engineering
remote network resource (if they authenticate successfully).
What if All Three Users Use the Same Source IP Address?

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Firewall user authentication is based on the source IP address. As we discussed

earlier in this chapter, once firewall authentication is successful, subsequent sessions
from the same source IP address are not subject to further authentication within the
idle timeout period. In this example, if user1 or user2 were to authenticate first, user3
would also be able to access the remote engineering resource.
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Default Client Groups
JUNOS Software allows the configuration of a default client group to serve as a
catch-all for all users within an access profile. This setup allows ease of management
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by categorizing users in access profiles. If a user or client does not associate with a
client group and a default client group exists, the user associates with the default
client group. The client group can consist of one or more groups.
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Using External Authentication Servers
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Adding Servers to the Access Profile
You configure external authentication server details within an access profile. JUNOS
Software supports only one external authentication server for access profiles, but you
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can use it in conjunction with the local password database. You must specify an
authentication order if you plan to use an external server. The JUNOS security platform
will try to authenticate with the first method listed. If the configuration does not list the
password database in the authentication order and the listed method of external
authentication is unreachable, JUNOS Software still consults the local password
database. However, if the listed external authentication method fails, JUNOS Software
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does not consult the local password database, denying user access.
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Verifying Firewall User Authentication
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Viewing the Authentication Table
The first example on the slide illustrates how to view the current authentication table.
This table contains a list of users and their associated access profiles. It shows the
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source IP address, source and destination security zones, the authentication result,
and the current age of the idle timer. You can also sort the authentication table by
source IP address or user ID by issuing the command with the address or
identifier command options as shown in the following output:
user@host> show security firewall-authentication users ?
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<[Enter]> Execute this command
address Locate authentication entry by ip address
identifier Locate authentication entry by id
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Viewing Authentication Table History

The slide shows how to view a historical authentication table. This table keeps a
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record of firewall authentication attempts in brief form, including date and time
stamps. This command also supports the use of the address and identifier
command options.

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• The purpose of firewall user authentication;
• Implementation of pass-through authentication;
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• Implementation of Web authentication;

• Using client groups; and
• Monitoring firewall user authentication.
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Review Questions
1.
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2.
3.
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Lab 3: Configuring Firewall Authentication
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• SCREEN options and their meanings;
• Various types of attacks prevented by SCREEN options;
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• SCREEN options advantages;

• Configuration of SCREEN options; and
• Applying and monitoring SCREEN options.
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Chapter 6–2 • SCREEN Options

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Multilayer Network Protection
first.
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SCREEN Options • Chapter 6–3

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Networks Are Under Attack
Although basic network security issues have changed very little over the past decade,
the network security landscape has changed dramatically. Today’s IT professionals
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must still protect the confidentiality of corporate information, prevent unauthorized

access, and defend the network against attacks. They also face new challenges as
their networks become more complex and dynamic. The following list examines some
of these issues:
• Ubiquitous Internet access: The growing availability of Internet access
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has made every home, office, and business partner a potential entry
point for an attack. The corporate network is vulnerable to attacks that
hackers can deliberately launch and from remote users logging onto the
corporate network and unknowingly hiding an attack within their
sessions. The trend of working at home and using a work PC for personal
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use increases the possibility of dangerous and annoying attacks such as

spyware, phishing, and spam.
• Internal attacks: While stopping external attacks remains a constant
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challenge, the attacks that originate from inside the network by

employees are equally challenging. Internal attacks can range from
unauthorized server or resource access to a disgruntled employee
destroying or stealing proprietary information.

Networks Are Under Attack (contd.)

• Regulatory compliance: As new national and industry regulations
emerge, security is a continual emphasis. Whether the requirement is to
encrypt all data or simply to protect it from unauthorized access,
complying with these new regulations complicates matters for you as a
security administrator.
• Changing levels of trust: Remote employees, business partners,
customers, and suppliers might have different levels of access to
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corporate resources. You must take appropriate measures to protect the
corporate network at all these levels. While the number of applications to
which remote users have access through the demilitarized zone (DMZ)
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increases, companies are simultaneously trying to reduce costs by
minimizing the application instances between internal and external
users. This approach makes it necessary for security policies to
accommodate application use by both groups.
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Points of Vulnerability Equal Points of Control
The key to striking a balance between tight network security and the network access
required by employees, business partners, and customers is a layered security
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solution. A layered security solution gives you a complete set of tools you can deploy to
achieve end-to-end security from the remote site to the data center. If one layer fails,
the next layer stops the attack, limits the damage that might occur, or does both.
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Points of Vulnerability Equal Points of Control (contd.)

Layered security allows you to apply the appropriate level of resource protection to the
various network entry locations based upon your different security, performance, and
management requirements. The following are vulnerable points in the network:
• Remote access occurs when a user connects to the corporate network
through a public or private connection. The key security goal to pursue
with remote access is the protection of content and user identity as they
traverse the network.
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• Site-to-site communications, both employee and nonemployee, are the
interactions between two offices of any type or any size. The site-to-site
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security layers must protect resources at both sites from external threats
such as session hijacking, U-turn attacks, and Trojan or worm attacks
launched from a trusted PC that has been compromised. Internal attacks
are increasingly common and can include unauthorized server access,
improper use of bandwidth, and planting of spyware.
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• The network perimeter represents the point at which external traffic
gains initial access to the network, as well as the point through which
internal traffic traverses the Internet. With the diversity of traffic that the
perimeter represents, the security solution must protect against the
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widest range of attacks using an assortment of security layers that can
include a VPN, denial of service (DoS) protection, a firewall, antivirus
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scanning, an intrusion detection service (IDS), and possibly antispam
scanning.
• At the heart of an enterprise is the network data center (or network core)
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where the applications and data that drive day-to-day business reside.
Financial, human resources, and manufacturing applications with
supporting data represent the company crown jewels and, if
compromised, can sink even the most stable enterprise. The core
network security layers must protect these business-critical resources by
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preventing unauthorized user access, containing internal attacks

launched by disgruntled employees, and protecting against
application-level attacks.
• In conjunction with applying layered security to the network core, IT
departments are increasingly deploying security internally on LANs to
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prevent unauthorized user access to network resources, to encrypt and

decrypt communications, and to contain damage that might occur if an
attack succeeds.
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Attack Detection System: SCREEN Options
The most obvious element of JUNOS Software for security platforms is basic access
control using security policies. These policies define who and what has access to the
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network. JUNOS Software uses stateful inspection to protect the network from
malicious content. With stateful inspection, JUNOS security platforms collect data
such as source and destination IP addresses, source and destination port numbers,
and packet sequence numbers from TCP and UDP pseudosessions. The device then
maintains this data in state tables for future use in analyzing traffic.
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Through the deployment of custom security zones, you can use JUNOS Software not
only to protect the perimeter of your network, but also to provide segmentation of your
internal infrastructure. Used internally, SRX Series Services Gateways provide
additional layers of access control to protect against the organization's sprawling
definition of authorized user.
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Using SCREEN options, JUNOS security platforms can protect against more than 30
different internal and external attacks, including SYN flood attacks, UDP flood attacks,
and port scan attacks. DoS attack protection leverages stateful inspection to look for
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and then allow or deny all connection attempts that require crossing an interface on
their way to and from the intended destination.
When applied, SCREEN options pertain to traffic at its entry point. JUNOS Software
applies SCREEN checks to traffic prior to the security policy processing, thereby
resulting in less resource utilization.

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Review: Packet Flow
Before discussing SCREEN options, we revisit packet flow through a JUNOS security
platform. Note that SCREEN processing occurs before any packet processing, which
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results in fewer resources used and better protection of the JUNOS security platform
itself.
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Stages and Types of Attacks
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Stages of an Attack
To understand SCREEN option configuration, we must first discuss the stages of
network attacks and the types of network attacks. A network attack consists of three
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major stages. In the first stage, the attacker performs reconnaissance on the target
network. This reconnaissance might consist of many different kinds of network
probes. In this information-gathering phase, the attacker works to gather information
about the target network, any open ports, and the operating systems in use.
In the second stage, the attacker launches an attack at the target network. To protect
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themselves, attackers must also conceal the origin point of the attack and attempt to
remove any evidence that an attack took place.
Depending on the type of attack, a third phase can occur. After infiltrating a trusted
machine, the attacker can use that machine as a point of origin for further invasion of
the network. Traffic now appears to originate from the trusted system, which might not
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be subject to the same security scans as an outside system.

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IP Address Sweep
Attackers can better plan their attack when they first know the layout of the targeted
network, possible entry points, and constitution of their victims.
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An address sweep occurs when one source IP address sends Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMP) packets to different hosts. The purpose of this scheme is to
send traffic to various hosts in hope that one replies, thus revealing an address to
target.
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Port Scanning
A port scan occurs when one source IP address sends IP packets containing TCP SYN
segments to different ports at the same destination IP address. The purpose of this
scheme is to scan services in hope that one port will respond, thus identifying a
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service to target.
IP Options
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RFC 791, “Internet Protocol,” specifies a set of options to provide special routing
controls, diagnostic tools, and security. RFC 791 states that these options are
“unnecessary for the most common communications” and, in reality, they rarely
appear in IP packet headers. When they do appear, they are frequently being put to
illegitimate use.

OS Probes
An attacker might try to probe the targeted host to learn its operating system. Because
TCP standards do not dictate how to respond to anomalous traffic, different operating
systems respond differently to anomalies. The response to the anomaly gives the
attacker information about the type of operating system running on a given host.
Evasion Techniques
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Whether gathering information or launching an attack, the attacker generally tries to
avoid detection. Although some IP address and port scans are blatant and easily
detectable, more advanced attackers use a variety of means to conceal their activity.
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Forms of Denial of Service Attacks
The intent of a DoS attack is to overwhelm the targeted victim with a tremendous
amount of fake traffic so that the victim becomes so preoccupied processing fake
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traffic that it is unable to process legitimate traffic. In the case of a router or firewall
device, the goal of a DoS attack is to fill up the device session table so that no new
sessions can establish. An attacker can also launch a network DoS or a DoS targeting
various operating systems.
This chapter explains each of the attacks and JUNOS Software’s ability to handle
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these attacks.
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Types of Attacks: Suspicious Packets
Attackers can craft packets to perform reconnaissance or launch DoS attacks.
Sometimes the intent of a crafted packet is unclear, but its crafted nature suggests
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that it is being put to an insidious use.

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Using JUNOS Software SCREEN Options—Reconnaissance Attack
Handling
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SCREEN Options—Best Practices
Prior to analyzing JUNOS Software SCREEN options in detail, we discuss best practice
suggestions for SCREEN option use.
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You should understand the applications and their behavior within your network before
you begin implementing features that might have an impact on legitimate traffic.
Furthermore, you must understand the traffic patterns traversing your network. To
determine appropriate thresholds for limit-based SCREEN functions, you must first
know what is typical of your network. For example, if you want to enable SYN flood
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protection, you must first determine what constitutes an acceptable number of

connection requests. This determination requires a period of observation and analysis
to establish a baseline for typical traffic flows. You must also consider the maximum
number of concurrent sessions required to fill up the session table of the particular
JUNOS security platform you are using. To see the maximum number of sessions that
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your session table supports, use the CLI command show security flow
session summary. Remember the output of this command reports statistics for
each Services Processing Unit (SPU) separately.
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You can use the alarm-without-drop statement, as illustrated on the slide, to

gather the traffic going to and through your JUNOS security platform. The gathered
information might help you to better understand your network’s vulnerabilities.
Typically, you want to deploy SCREEN options only in vulnerable zones.

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IP Address Sweep and TCP Port Scan—The Attack
An address sweep occurs when one source IP address sends a predefined number of
ICMP packets to various hosts within a predefined interval of time. The purpose of this
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attack is to send ICMP packets, which are typically echo requests, to various hosts,
hoping that at least one host replies. Once attackers receive a reply, they uncover an
address, which becomes a target.
Port scanning occurs when one source IP address sends IP packets containing TCP
SYN segments to a predefined number of different ports at the same destination IP
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address within a predefined time interval. This attack attempts to scan the available
services hoping that at least one port responds, thereby identifying an attack target.
The Defense
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JUNOS Software internally logs the number of ICMP echo request packets from one
remote source. You can set up a threshold interval, ranging from 1000 to 1,000,000,
measured in microseconds for those ICMP packets. The default threshold value is
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5000. By using the default settings, if a remote host sends ICMP echo request traffic
to 10 addresses in 0.005 seconds (5000 microseconds), the JUNOS security device
flags that remote host as an address sweep attacker. The flagging process results in
the rejection of all further ICMP echo requests from that host for the remainder of the
configured threshold time period.

The Defense (contd.)

For TCP port scanning protection, JUNOS Software internally logs the number of
different ports scanned from one remote source. The configured threshold value is in
microseconds, ranging from 1000 to 1,000,000. The default threshold value is 5000
microseconds. JUNOS Software flags the traffic as an attack when 10 ports are
scanned within the threshold value. Once port scanning detection triggers, JUNOS
Software silently drops all further packets from the remote source for the remainder of
the configured threshold time period.
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IP Address Sweep and Port Scanning—SCREEN Options
The slide illustrates an IP address sweep or port scanning attack. During an IP
address sweep attack, the attacker, using one source IP address, sends ICMP packets
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to different hosts in hopes that at least one host replies, thereby uncovering an
address to target.
During a port scanning attack, the attacker, using one source IP address, sends IP
packets containing TCP SYN segments to a defined number of different ports at the
same destination IP address within a defined interval. The attacker hopes that at least
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one port responds, thereby uncovering a service to target.

To block IP address sweeps or TCP port scans originating in a particular security zone,
you must perform the configuration illustrated on the slide. Note that this
configuration only defines the SCREEN option—it does not activate it. To activate the
SCREEN option, you must apply it within a security zone. We address this topic later in
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the chapter.
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The Attack
RFC 791 specifies a set of options within an IP packet, providing special routing
controls, diagnostic tools, and security. Within an IP packet header, these options
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come after the destination address field. Although the original intent for these options
was to enhance network functionality, most common communications do not require
them. As the Internet expanded and continues to expand, attackers have started
abusing the options field of a packet, causing problems to networks and network
devices. An attacker can abuse the record route, timestamp, security, and stream ID
fields.
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The Defense
To compensate for the vulnerability that these IP options fields create, JUNOS
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Software tracks packets that have any of these option fields used, flags them as a
network reconnaissance attack, and records the event. You can view the events in the
SCREEN counters list for the ingress interface.
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IP Options—SCREEN Options
The slide illustrates an IP packet header, highlighting the options field. An attacker can
misuse bits within the options field to cause problems with networks. You can define
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SCREEN options to detect the IP options that an attacker can use. These IP options
fields include record route, timestamp, security, and stream ID. JUNOS Software flags
an event in which a device configured with the appropriate SCREEN options receives a
packet with any of these IP options. JUNOS Software marks the event as a network
reconnaissance attack and records the associated ingress interface.
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The slide illustrates the syntax for this SCREEN option definition. You can configure
each of the options independently. Note that this configuration only defines the
SCREEN options—it does not activate them. To activate the SCREEN options, you must
apply them within a security zone. We address this topic later in the chapter.
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The Attack
Prior to launching an exploit, an attacker might probe the targeted host, trying to learn
its operating system. Various operating systems react to TCP anomalies in different
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ways. With that knowledge, an attacker can decide which further attack might inflict
more damage to the device, the network, or both.
The Defense
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JUNOS Software configured with the appropriate SCREEN options blocks operating
system probes by detecting any of the following invalid TCP flag settings:
• Both SYN and FIN flags set;
• FIN flag set and ACK flag not set; or
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• No flags set.
TCP traffic matching any of these criteria is immediately, and silently, dropped.
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Operating System Probes—SCREEN Options
The slide illustrates the TCP header, highlighting the SYN and FIN flags, which an
attacker might use to launch the attack. The slide also illustrates the configuration of
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SCREEN options designed to block these probes. You configure each statement
independently as follows:
• To detect the condition when both SYN and FIN flags are set, use the
syn-fin configuration option;
• To detect the condition when the FIN flag is set and the ACK flag is not
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set, use the fin-no-ack configuration option; and

• To detect the condition when no flags are set, use the tcp-no-flag
configuration option.
Note that this configuration only defines the SCREEN options—it does not activate
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them. To activate the SCREEN options, you must apply them within a security zone. We
address this topic later in the chapter.
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The Attack
IP address spoofing is one of the earliest and most well known attacks. An attacker
simply inserts a fake source address into the packet header source address field in an
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attempt to make the packet appear as if it is coming from a trusted source.
The Defense
JUNOS Software provides IP address spoofing detection with the help of forwarding
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table entries. JUNOS Software compares the source IP address of an incoming packet
with the closest prefix match found in its forwarding table. If the interface associated
with that prefix is different from the ingress interface of the packet, the software
concludes that the packet has a spoofed source IP address and discards it. Once it
detects IP spoofing, JUNOS Software silently drops all spoofed packets.
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IP Spoofing Detection—SCREEN Option
The slide illustrates an IP spoofing attack in which the attacker uses an IP address
belonging to the range of IP addresses within the private zone. JUNOS Software
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compares the source IP address 168.10.10.1 of the incoming packet with the closest
match prefix found in its forwarding table, which is 168.10.10/24. It then detects that
the interface associated with prefix 168.10.10/24 is different from the ingress
interface of the packet, which is ge-1/0/0. The software concludes that the packet
has a spoofed source IP address and discards it.
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To set up the JUNOS Software IP spoofing SCREEN option, you must perform the
configuration shown on the slide. Note that this configuration only defines the
SCREEN option—it does not activate it. To activate the SCREEN option, you must apply
it within a security zone. We address this topic later in the chapter.
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The Attack
Source routing allows users to specify the packet’s desired path when traversing a
network. This feature provides additional aid to users during network troubleshooting.
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Unfortunately, over the years, attackers have started to abuse source route options.
They use the fields to hide their true address and access restricted areas of a network
by specifying a different route.
The Defense
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Depending on the configuration, JUNOS Software either blocks any packets with loose
or strict source route options settings, or detects those options as being set, and
records them. If you choose to block the suspect packets, the software silently
discards the packets.
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IP Source Route Options—SCREEN Options
Using the illustration shown on the slide, we assume that network 3.3.3.0/24 checks
for spoofed IP addresses. The attacker, who is aware of this checking, wants to direct
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traffic through network 5.5.5.0/24. The attacker spoofs the source address to be part
of network 5.5.5.0/24, and by using the loose source option, directs the packet
through network 5.5.5.0/24. Because the packet came from the 5.5.5.0/24 network
and has the source address of that subnet, it seems to be valid. However, it has the
loose source route option set. We also assume that you enabled the SCREEN option
that discards the packets with the source route option set. As a result, when the
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packet arrives at the ge-1/0/0 interface, the JUNOS security platform rejects it.
To set up the JUNOS Software IP source route options SCREEN options, you must
perform configuration as shown on the slide. You can configure each of the options
independently. Note that this configuration only defines the SCREEN options—it does
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not activate them. To activate the SCREEN options, you must apply them within a
security zone. We address this topic later in the chapter.
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Using JUNOS Software SCREEN Options—Denial of Service Attack
Handling
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Goals of DoS Attacks
If attackers discover a firewall, they might launch a DoS attack against it. In fact, many
attackers consider the successful DoS firewall attack to be equivalent to a network
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attack because a firewall under DoS stops sending any traffic to and from a protected
network.
Firewall and Router Device DoS Attacks

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An attacker might use two methods in an attempt to immobilize a JUNOS security

platform. Because JUNOS Software for security platforms is a session-based operating
system in which each packet flow creates a session, DoS attacks attempt to fill up the
session table in the hope that the device will reach its session table limit. Attackers
can use two methods to fill up the session table: session table flood and SYN-ACK-ACK
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proxy flood.
Network DoS Attacks

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A network DoS attack results in the flooding of many network resources with
enormous amounts of some combination of SYN, ICMP, and UDP packets. Depending
on the learned intelligence information, an attacker might target a specific host or a
specific network segment for attacks. JUNOS Software has the capability to mitigate
those attacks, which we discuss in the upcoming pages.

OS-Specific DoS Attacks

Should attackers identify an OS in use, they might launch an OS-specific DoS attack,
focusing on one-packet or two-packet kills. These attacks include the Ping of Death
attack, the Teardrop attack, and the WinNuke attack. JUNOS Software has the
capability to mitigate these attacks, which we discuss in the upcoming pages.
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The Attack
The slide lists some of the forms that session table floods can take.
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The Defense
To control session table floods, JUNOS Software offers the ability to set up a
source-based session limit so that it can prevent attacks such as the Nimda virus
(which infects servers and then generates massive amounts of traffic from those
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servers). By recognizing that all connection attempts originate from the same source
IP address, JUNOS Software’s session table flood control also mitigates any attempts
to fill up the session table of the attacked JUNOS security device.
In addition to the source-based session limit, JUNOS Software offers the flexibility to
limit the number of concurrent sessions to the same destination IP address, which
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protects your device from a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. DDoS attacks
can come from hundreds of various hosts, known as zombie agents, which are under
the control of an attacker.
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Session Table Flood—SCREEN Option
The slide illustrates the required configuration to limit the number of concurrent
sessions based on source IP address, destination IP address, or both.
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JUNOS Software offers a default maximum number for a source-based or

destination-based session limit, which is 128 concurrent sessions. The valid range of
sessions depends upon the type of JUNOS security platform.
Note that the configuration shown on the slide only defines the SCREEN option. To
activate the SCREEN option, you must apply it within a security zone. We address this
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topic later in the chapter.

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Firewall and Router Device DoS—SYN-ACK-ACK Proxy Flood: The Attack
A SYN-ACK-ACK attack uses TCP connections. The attacker, using a seemingly normal
TCP connection, sends the SYN-ACK-ACK pattern, hoping that the targets will respond
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and immobilize themselves. In the illustration shown on the slide, a malicious user
initiates a Telnet connection. The user sends a SYN segment to the Telnet server
behind the JUNOS security platform. JUNOS Software intercepts the SYN segment,
creates an entry in its session table, and proxies a SYN-ACK segment to the user. The
user replies with an ACK segment. At this point, the initial 3-way handshake is
complete. The server sends a login prompt to the user. The malicious user does not
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log in. Instead, such a user continues to initiate SYN-ACK-ACK sessions, leading the
device’s session table to its limit, which can result in rejecting legitimate connection
requests.
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SYN-ACK-ACK Proxy Flood: The Defense
SYN-ACK-ACK proxy protection enables a JUNOS security platform to detect malicious
intent behind a seemingly normal TCP connection. Because the device acts as a proxy
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for a TCP connection, creating a session table and proxying a SYN-ACK segment to the
sender, it can detect SYN-ACK-ACK sessions appearing after the success of the initial
session setup. JUNOS Software rejects further connection requests from an IP
address after the number of connections from that address reaches the SYN-ACK-ACK
proxy threshold. The default value of the proxy threshold is 512 connections from a
single IP address. The configured threshold can range from 1 to 250,000
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connections.
The slide illustrates the syntax required to configure the SYN-ACK-ACK proxy flood
SCREEN option, limiting the number of concurrent TCP sessions from a single source.
Note that this configuration only defines the SCREEN option—it does not activate it. To
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activate the SCREEN option, you must apply it within a security zone. We address this
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The Attack
A SYN flood occurs when a network resource becomes overwhelmed with SYN
segments initiating uncompleted connection requests to the point where it cannot
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accept legitimate connections. Very often a SYN flood attack inundates a site with SYN
segments containing forged or spoofed IP source addresses with nonexistent or
unreachable addresses, thereby forcing the targeted network resources to respond
with SYN/ACK segments to those addresses, then wait for responding ACK segments.
As the SYN/ACK segments travel to nonexistent or unreachable IP addresses, a
response never occurs, thus leading to a connection timeout. SYN floods also fill up
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the memory buffer of the targets, potentially disrupting the operating system. A SYN
flood is usually directed at one or more network resources resulting in a network DoS.
The Defense
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JUNOS Software can prevent SYN floods by limiting the number of SYN segments per
second permitted to pass through the JUNOS security platform. You can set the attack
threshold based on the destination address, source address, or both. This behavior
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shields hosts on the protected network from incomplete 3-way handshakes. The next
two pages list the specifics of these protection schemes.

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SYN Floods—SCREEN Options
The slide illustrates the JUNOS Software SCREEN options that you can implement to
handle SYN floods.
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Note that the illustrated configuration only defines the SCREEN option. To activate the
SCREEN options, you must apply it within a security zone. We address this topic later
in the chapter.
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SYN Floods—SCREEN Options (contd.)

You can set up the following threshold parameters for proxying uncompleted TCP
connection requests:
• Alarm threshold: This threshold is the number of proxied, half-complete
TCP connection requests per second before an alarm logs. This counter
begins after the below attack threshold triggers.The default and
configurable range varies by device type.
• Attack threshold: This threshold is the number of SYN segments per
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second required to trigger the SYN proxy mechanism. Although you can
set any threshold number within a specified range, we recommend that
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you determine normal traffic patterns at your sites. The default and
• Source threshold: This threshold is the number of SYN segments
received per second from a single source IP address, regardless of the
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destination IP address and port number. Once requests reached the
threshold, further connection attempts drop. The default and
• Destination threshold: This threshold is the number of SYN segments
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received per second for a single destination IP address and destination
port pair. Once requests reach the threshold, further connection
attempts to the destination drop. The default and configurable range
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varies by device type.
• Timeout: This parameter is the maximum length of time before a
half-completed connection drop from the queue. The default is 20
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seconds, and the range is 1–50 seconds.
Although these threshold parameters are independent of each other, you can
combine the SCREEN options in the configuration for better protection against
attacks.
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SYN Cookie Advantages
As mentioned previously when we discussed SYN floods, SYN segments directed at
network resources can render a network segment unusable. The SYN cookie feature
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helps JUNOS security platforms ensure receipt of a valid SYN cookie response prior to
allowing processing of a new TCP connection flow, thereby avoiding the invoking of
resource-intensive actions such as route and session lookups. A SYN cookie is
stateless, and as such it does not set up a session, which requires policy and route
lookups. This stateless nature is the prime advantage of using a SYN cookie over the
traditional SYN proxying mechanism.
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SYN Cookie Details

The SYN cookie was originally invented by D. J. Bernstein and Eric Shenk. Its purpose
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is to minimize the impact of spoofed SYN flood attacks. The SYN cookie uses a
cryptographic hash to generate a unique TCP initial sequence number (ISN) when it
receives a SYN segment. The hash uses a counter, local address, foreign address, and
local and foreign ports to generate the cookie. JUNOS Software then sends a SYN/ACK
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segment back with this cookie as an ISN. After it receives the ACK segment back, it
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SYN Cookie Handling
The slide illustrates how a TCP connection establishes when a SYN cookie is active.
Once the SYN cookie is enabled, the JUNOS security platform becomes the
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TCP-negotiating proxy for the destination host. It replies to each incoming SYN
segment with a SYN/ACK segment containing an encrypted cookie as its ISN. If there
is no response to the packet containing the cookie, the software notes the attack as
an active SYN attack, thereby stopping it.
However, if the initiating host responds with a TCP packet containing the cookie plus 1
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in the TCP ACK field, the software extracts the cookie, subtracts 1 from the value, and
recomputes the cookie to validate that it is a legitimate ACK message.
If the cookie is legitimate, the software starts the TCP proxy process by setting up a
session and sending a SYN to the destination host with the source information from
the original SYN message. When JUNOS Software receives a SYN/ACK from the
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destination host, it sends ACK messages to the destination and the originating hosts.
Now the connection establishes and the two hosts can communicate directly.
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ICMP Flood—The Attack
An ICMP flood typically occurs when ICMP echo request messages overload the victim,
causing resources to stop responding to valid traffic.
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ICMP Flood—The Defense

JUNOS Software allows you to set up a threshold, which, once exceeded, invokes the
ICMP flood attack protection feature. Once requests exceed the threshold value (set in
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packets per second), the software ignores any further ICMP echo request messages
for the remainder of that second plus the next second. The default and configurable
range varies by device type.
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UDP Flood—The Attack

UDP flooding occurs when an attacker sends IP packets containing UDP datagrams
with the purpose of slowing down the target to such a degree that it cannot accept any
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valid connections.
UDP Flood—The Defense

JUNOS Software UDP flood protection enables you to set up the threshold value,
which, once exceeded, invokes the UDP flood attack protection feature. The default
value and configurable range are in packets per second and vary by device type.

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ICMP and UDP Flood Handling—SCREEN Options
The slide illustrates an attacker trying to overload the target with an ICMP flood, a UDP
flood, or both. The slide illustrates the configuration syntax for ICMP and UDP flood
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protection. Note that the configuration shown on the slide only defines the SCREEN
options. To activate the SCREEN options, you must apply them within a security zone.
We address this topic later in the chapter.
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The Attack
A LAND attack occurs when an attacker sends spoofed SYN packets containing the IP
address of the target as both the destination and the source IP address. A receiving
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system responds by sending the SYN-ACK packet to itself, creating an empty

connection that lasts until it reaches the session idle timeout. Flooding a system with
such empty connections can overwhelm one or more network resources resulting in a
network DoS.
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The Defense
When you enable the JUNOS Software SCREEN option to block LAND attacks, JUNOS
Software combines elements of the SYN flood defense and IP spoofing protection to
detect software and block any malicious attempts of this nature.
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LAND Attack—SCREEN Option
The slide illustrates the impact of the LAND attack on network resources.
Once you enable the LAND attack SCREEN option, the network is protected from the
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attack.
The slide illustrates the configuration syntax for the LAND attack SCREEN option. Note
that the illustrated configuration only defines the SCREEN option. To activate the
SCREEN option, you must apply it within a security zone. We address this topic later in
the chapter.
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The Attacks
The Ping of Death is an OS-targeted attack. It uses an oversized ICMP packet (larger
than 65,507 bytes), which can trigger a wide range of adverse OS reactions, including
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DoS, crashing, freezing, and rebooting.

Teardrop attacks exploit the reassembly of fragmented IP packets. One of the fields in
the IP header is the fragment offset field, which indicates the starting position of the
data contained in a fragmented packet relative to the data of the original
unfragmented packet. When the sum of the offset and size of one fragmented packet
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differ from that of the next fragmented packet, the packets overlap. A server
attempting to reassemble such a packet can crash.
WinNuke is a DoS attack targeting any computer on the Internet running Windows.
The attacker sends a TCP segment, usually to NetBIOS port 139 with the urgent flag
set, to a host with an established connection. This TCP segment introduces a NetBIOS
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fragment overlap, which causes many machines running Windows to crash.

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The Defense
To handle the Ping of Death attack, the JUNOS Software SCREEN option detects
oversized and irregular ICMP packets, even when the attacker hides the total packet
size by purposefully fragmenting it. To handle the Teardrop attack, the JUNOS
Software SCREEN option detects the discrepancy in a fragmented packet and drops it.
To handle the WinNuke attack, the software detects the urgency flag, unsets it, clears
the pointer, and forwards the modified packet. It then logs the attempted WinNuke
attack event.

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PC-Based OS DoS—SCREEN Options
The slide illustrates the syntax for configuring the Ping of Death, Teardrop, and
WinNuke SCREEN options.
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Note that the illustrated configuration only defines the SCREEN options. To activate
the SCREEN options, you must apply them within a security zone. We address this
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Using JUNOS Software SCREEN Options—Suspicious Packets Attack
Handling
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The Attack
ICMP, when used properly, provides an excellent aid for error reporting and network
probe capabilities. Typically, ICMP packets have very short messages. Therefore,
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typically, ICMP packets do not fragment.
The Defense
JUNOS Software blocks any fragmented ICMP packet. In addition, the software drops
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ICMP packets with a length greater than 1024 bytes.

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ICMP Abnormalities Detection—SCREEN Option
The slide illustrates an IP packet header, highlighting the protocol field, which is equal
to 1 for ICMP, the total packet length field, the fragment offset field, and the M (more
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fragments) field. Once you set the ICMP abnormalities detection SCREEN option,
JUNOS Software blocks any ICMP packets that have the M flag set or have an offset
value indicated in the fragment offset field. Furthermore, the SCREEN option can
include blocking unusually large ICMP packets (> 1024 bytes). To set up this SCREEN
option, you must perform the configuration shown on the slide.
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Note that this configuration only defines the SCREEN option. To activate the SCREEN
option, you must apply it within a security zone. We address this topic later in the
chapter.
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IP Packet Fragments—The Attack
As packets traverse different networks, it is sometimes necessary to fragment them
based on the maximum transmission unit (MTU) for each network. IP fragments might
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contain an attacker’s attempt to exploit the vulnerabilities in the packet reassembly

code of specific IP stack implementations. When the victim receives these packets,
the results can range from processing packets incorrectly to crashing the entire
system.
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Bad IP Address Options—The Attack

Some attackers can abuse the IP option fields, the original intent of which was (and
still is) to provide special routing controls, diagnostic tools, and security. By
misconfiguring these options, attackers produce either incomplete or malformed
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fields within a packet. Attackers can use these malformed packets to compromise
hosts on the network.
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The Defense
Once you define the corresponding SCREEN option, JUNOS Software detects and
drops all IP packet fragments or packets with incorrectly formatted IP options that it
receives at the interfaces bound to the SCREEN option’s protected zone.

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IP Packet Fragments and Bad IP Options Detection—SCREEN Option
The slide illustrates an IP packet header and highlights the more fragment (M),
fragment offset and IP options fields. Using the block-frag SCREEN option, JUNOS
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Software checks whether the M field is set or if a nonzero value is in the fragment
offset field. If it finds any of these values set, it begins blocking fragmented IP
packets.
Attackers can configure the IP options field incorrectly, resulting in incomplete or
malformed fields. To set up the bad IP options SCREEN option, you must perform the
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configuration shown on the slide.

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The Attack
IPv4 protocol field values of 137 or greater are currently unassigned and should be
used only for nonstandard or experimental protocols. Unless your network uses a
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nonstandard or experimental protocol, you should block packets containing an IPv4

protocol field value of 137 or greater.
The Defense
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drops any packet that uses an unknown protocol.
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Unknown Protocols—SCREEN Option
The slide illustrates an IP packet header and highlights the protocol field containing
the protocol number. To set up the unknown protocols detection SCREEN option, you
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must perform the configuration shown on the slide.

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The Attack
IP encapsulates a TCP SYN segment into an IP packet that initiates a TCP connection.
Because the purpose of this packet is to initiate a connection and invoke a SYN/ACK
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segment in response, the SYN segment typically does not contain any data.
Furthermore, because the IP packet is small, no legitimate reason exists for it to
fragment. A fragmented SYN packet is anomalous, and as such, it is suspect. When a
victim receives these packets, the results can range from processing packets
incorrectly to crashing the entire system.
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The Defense
drops all received SYN fragments.
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SYN Fragments—SCREEN Option
The slide illustrates IP and TCP headers and highlights the M and fragment offset
fields, which are part of the IP header, and the SYN flag, which is part of the TCP
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header. Using the syn-frag SCREEN option, JUNOS Software checks SYN segments
to see whether the M field is set or if a nonzero value is in the fragment offset field. If
it finds SYN fragments, it begins blocking the SYN fragment packets.
To set up the SYN fragment SCREEN option, you must perform the configuration
shown on the slide.
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Applying and Monitoring SCREEN Options
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Syntax for SCREEN Options Commands
The slide illustrates the JUNOS Software syntax that you must use when configuring
SCREEN options.
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First you must define the SCREEN options. Then you must apply these options to the
desired zone. Recall that JUNOS Software applies SCREEN options at the ingress zone
of the JUNOS security platform prior to applying any security policy or route lookup.
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Example
Consider the example illustrated on the slide. Two zones exist in this network: private
and public. The objective is to use SCREEN options to protect the private zone from
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ICMP abnormalities, ICMP floods, and session table floods.

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Case Study: Step 1—Creating the SCREEN Option
The slide illustrates the creation of a SCREEN option named protect, which lists the
necessary options needed to meet the objective from the previous slide. The following
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list describes the behavior of each SCREEN option:

• icmp fragment: Blocks any ICMP packets that have the More Fragments
flag set or that have an offset value indicated in the offset field.
• icmp large: Blocks any ICMP packets with a length greater than 1024
bytes.
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• icmp flood threshold: Ignores any ICMP packets received above the
configured threshold. This protection remains in effect for the duration of
the second when the threshold is reached, as well as the following
second.
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• source-ip-based session limit: Limits the number of sessions from one

source IP address to the specified number.
Note that by enabling SCREEN protection from large ICMP packets combined with
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ICMP fragmented packets, you are also automatically enabling protection from the
Ping of Death attack.

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Example: Step 2—Applying the SCREEN Option
The slide illustrates the application of the SCREEN option to the public zone.
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Attack Monitoring: Part 1
You can monitor SCREEN statistics using the show security screen
statistics zone zone-name command. You can tell which values are
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incrementing by issuing the command multiple times.

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The slide shows the result of the show security screen ids-option
screen-name command, which displays the protect SCREEN option content.
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Note the correspondence between the actual configuration of the protect SCREEN
option and the monitoring show security screen ids-option
screen-name command.
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The slide illustrates an example traceoptions configuration for monitoring
SCREEN options operations. After committing the configuration, you can view the
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resulting trace file using the show log filename command.

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• The meaning of SCREEN options;
• Various types of attacks that SCREEN options can detect and prevent;
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• Advantages of using JUNOS Software’s SCREEN options;

• Configuration of zone-based SCREEN options to block attacks; and
• SCREEN option application and monitoring.
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Review Questions
1.
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2.
3.
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5.
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Lab 4: Implementing SCREEN Options
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• The purpose and functionality of Network Address Translation (NAT) and
Port Address Translation (PAT);
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• NAT processing;
• Configuration of destination NAT
• Configuration of source NAT; and
• Monitoring and verifying NAT operation.
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Chapter 7–2 • Network Address Translation

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NAT Overview
first.
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Network Address Translation • Chapter 7–3

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Network Address Translation
Historically, the NAT concept was born because of the shortage of public IPv4
addresses. Many organizations moved to deploy so-called private addresses using the
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IPv4 private addressing space, as identified in RFC 1918. These addresses include
the following ranges:
• 10.0.0.0–10.255.255.255 (10.0.0.0/8 prefix);
• 172.16.0.0–172.31.255.255 (172.16.0.0/12 prefix); and
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• 192.168.0.0–192.168.255.255 (192.168.0.0/16 prefix).

Because private addresses are not routable within the public domain, edge network
devices can deploy the NAT feature to replace private, nonroutable addresses with
public addresses prior to sending traffic to the public network and vice versa.
Translation consists of replacing the IP address (NAT), port numbers (PAT), or both,
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depending on the configuration.

While primarily deployed to translate private addresses to public addresses, NAT can
translate from any address to any other address, including public to public and private
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to private addresses.
You can use PAT in conjunction with NAT. Specifically, PAT’s invaluable benefit is that
several hosts can use a single public address. In this situation, PAT enables a unique
host and application match during the NAT process.

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Review: Packet Flow
A JUNOS security platform implements NAT and PAT into both first path and fast path
flows processing. The slide reviews the NAT process position within the overall packet
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flow. Note that destination NAT and source NAT occur separately in the first path
packet flow.
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NAT and PAT Processing
During first packet processing, a combination of destination and source IP address
information and port translation information set up occurs. In first packet processing,
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destination NAT processing occurs before security policy and route lookups while
source NAT processing occurs after security policy and route lookups. Based on the
first packet of a session, JUNOS Software installs NAT and PAT information into the
session table for fast path processing. This information speeds up subsequent packet
processing.
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Two Basic Types of NAT
Two basic types of NAT exist—destination NAT and source NAT. Destination NAT
translates the destination IP address of a packet. Source NAT translates the source IP
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address of a packet. Both destination and source NAT can deploy either static or
dynamic address mapping.
Combination of Destination and Source NAT and PAT

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Destination and source NAT and PAT can co-exist within the same platform. You can
deploy both source and destination NAT and PAT simultaneously, applying each within
its own flow direction.
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Dynamic Versus Static Address Translation and Port Translation

Dynamic address translation implies that the association between the original
address and port and the translated address and port is not fixed. On the other hand,
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static address translation implies that the association between the original address
and port and the translated address and port is fixed and has a one-to-one mapping.
We address this topic in more detail later in the chapter.

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Destination NAT Operation and Configuration
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Destination IP Address and Port Translation
Destination IP address and port translation imply that the device translates the
destination IP address to a different IP address, the destination port number to a
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different port number, or both.
Two Mechanisms for Destination NAT and PAT

JUNOS Software supports two mechanisms to perform destination NAT and PAT:
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• Static NAT, which is a one-to-one mapping with no PAT; and

• Standard pool-based NAT, which is a one-to-one mapping with or without
PAT, using address pools.
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VoIP ALGs
Voice over IP (VoIP) application-level gateways (ALGs) dynamically generate the
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allow-incoming table for packets from the public network into the private
network. The table contains the list of dynamically generated addresses for voice
traffic.

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Matching Conditions
Traffic that requires destination NAT is subject to a two-layer matching scheme.
Similar to security policy, NAT rule creation occurs under a context indicating traffic
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direction. The directional context is the first layer of matching. NAT rules are organized
in rule-sets. Each rule-set contains this context by requiring a from clause. The from
clause can indicate an interface, zone, or routing-instance. If rule-sets overlap by
targeting the same traffic, the rule-set with the most specific context takes
precedence. Interfaces are the most specific context, while routing-instances are the
least specific.
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The second layer of matching occurs within NAT rules using a match option. These
options include source-address, destination-address, and
destination-port number. An exception to this second layer of matching is static
destination NAT, which supports only the destination-address match option.
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This information is evaluated using packet headers.
NAT Rule Actions

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Traffic that matches a directional context and NAT rule-matching condition is subject
to a NAT action. NAT actions are specified using a then clause and include off,
pool (followed by a user-defined pool name), and static-nat prefix (followed
by a user-defined address prefix). A destination NAT pool can contain a maximum of
one address or address-range and one port.

Overlap
Static NAT rules take precedence over dynamic destination NAT rules.
Note the following general guidelines regarding addresses, rule-sets, or rules that
overlap:
• Addresses used for NAT pools, whether it be source NAT pools or
destination NAT pools, should never overlap;
• If more than one rule-set matches traffic, the rule-set with the most
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specific context takes precedence; and
• Within a rule-set, the ordering of rules is significant. Rules evaluation
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occurs sequentially. In other words, if traffic matches two rules within the
same rule-set, the first rule listed in the configuration is the only rule
applied.
Use the JUNOS Software insert command to adjust rules within a rule-set.
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Live Configuration Changes
If a change is made to a NAT rule or pool that is currently in use, JUNOS Software tears
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down the affected session once the change is committed. JUNOS Software re-initiates
the session as soon as it receives further matching traffic.
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Static Destination NAT Sample Topology
The slide illustrates a sample topology that demonstrates static destination NAT using
JUNOS Software. Using the topology shown on the slide, we discuss enabling static
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destination NAT for traffic destined to 100.0.0.1 coming from the Untrust Zone. The
traffic should translate to a private IP address of 10.1.10.5.
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Static Destination NAT Configuration
The slide illustrates the required configuration to enable static destination NAT for the
given example. JUNOS Software static NAT requires a rule-set association with a
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directional context. In this example, traffic from the Untrust Zone with a destination
address of 100.0.0.1 translates to a destination address of 10.1.10.5
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Verifying the Result
Use the show security flow session command to observe NAT translation.
The output shows traffic entering the JUNOS security platform using the public
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address 100.0.0.1 from a public host at 1.1.70.6. The return traffic from this flow
originates with the private address 10.1.10.5.
Static Source NAT

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The slide illustrates the creation of a second session. Once static destination NAT is
enabled and a session triggers, JUNOS Software automatically creates a reverse static
source NAT session. Neither the destination static NAT session, nor the source static
NAT session creation occurs until traffic that matches the NAT rule actually traverses
the device.
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Pool-Based Destination NAT Sample Topology
The slide illustrates a sample topology that demonstrates pool-based destination NAT
using JUNOS Software. Using the topology shown on the slide, we will enable
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pool-based destination NAT for traffic destined to 100.0.0.1 coming from the Untrust
Zone. The traffic should translate to a private IP address of 10.1.10.5.
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Pool-Based Destination NAT Configuration with a Single Address
The slide illustrates the required configuration to enable destination NAT for the given
example. JUNOS Software pool-based NAT requires a user-defined address pool and a
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rule-set that associates with a directional context. In this example, traffic from the
Untrust Zone with a destination address of 100.0.0.1 translates to a destination
address of 10.1.10.5. This example includes a pool with only one available address
and no port translation.
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Pool-Based Destination NAT Configuration with an Address Pool
The slide illustrates the required configuration to enable destination NAT for the given
example. JUNOS Software pool-based NAT requires a user-defined address pool and a
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rule-set that associates with a directional context. In this example, traffic from the
Untrust Zone with a destination address of 100.0.0.1 translates to a destination
address within a range of 10.1.10.5 to 10.1.10.6. There is no port translation.
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Pool-Based Destination NAT Configuration with PAT
The slide illustrates the required configuration to enable destination NAT and PAT for
the given example. JUNOS Software pool-based NAT requires a user-defined address
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pool and a rule-set that associates with a directional context. In this example, traffic
from the Untrust Zone with a destination address of 100.0.0.1 and a destination port
of 80 translates to a destination address of 10.1.10.5 and a destination port of 8080.
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Result of NAT with PAT
The output shows traffic entering the device using the public destination address
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100.0.0.1 and destination port of 80 from a public host at 1.1.70.6. The return traffic
from this flow originates with the private address 10.1.10.5 and private port 8080.
The show security nat destination pool all command illustrates the
pool of translated addresses—in this case a single address—and the translated port
number. You can also view this output for an individual address pool by specifying the
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pool name instead of using the all option.

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Use the show security nat destination rule all operational mode
command to view NAT rules as JUNOS Software programs them. The output on the
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slide illustrates the rule. You can verify traffic translation by this rule by the translation
hits counter.
You can also view this output for an individual NAT rule by specifying the rule name
instead of using the all option.
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Source NAT Operation and Configuration
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Source IP Address and Port Translation
Source IP address and port translation imply that the router translates the source IP
address to a different IP address, the port number to a different port number, or both.
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Three Mechanisms for Source NAT and PAT

JUNOS Software supports three methods to perform source NAT and PAT:
• Interface-based source NAT, which is the translation of the original
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source IP address to the egress interface’s address always employing

PAT;
• Standard pool-based NAT, which is a dynamic mapping of the original
source address to an address from a user-defined pool with or without
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PAT; and
• Source NAT with address shifting, which is a one-to-one mapping of the
original source address to a user-defined pool performed by shifting the
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IP addresses without PAT.

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Matching Conditions
Traffic requiring source NAT application is subject to a two-layer matching scheme.
Similar to security policy, JUNOS Software creates source NAT rules under a context
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indicating traffic direction. The directional context is the first layer of matching. NAT
rules are organized in rule-sets. For source NAT, each rule-set contains this context by
requiring a from clause and a to clause. The from and to clauses indicate an interface,
zone, or routing-instance. If rule-sets overlap by targeting the same traffic, the rule-set
with the most specific context takes precedence. Interfaces are the most specific
context, while routing-instances are the least specific.
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The second layer of matching is performed within NAT rules using a match option.
These options include source-address and destination-address. This
information is evaluated using packet headers.
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NAT Rule Actions

Traffic that matches a directional context and NAT rule-matching condition is subject
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to a NAT action. Source NAT actions are specified using a then clause and include
off, pool (followed by a user-defined pool name), and interface (followed by a
user-defined interface name including the logical unit).

Overlap
Static source NAT (reverse mapping of static destination NAT) rules take precedence
over dynamic source NAT rules.
Note the following general guidelines regarding addresses, rule-sets, or rules that
overlap:
• Addresses used for NAT pools, whether it be source NAT pools or
destination NAT pools, should never overlap;
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• If more than one rule-set matches traffic, the rule-set with the most
specific context takes precedence; and
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• Within a rule-set, the ordering of rules is significant. Rules evaluation
occurs sequentially. In other words, if traffic matches two rules within the
same rule-set, the first rule listed in the configuration is the only rule
applied.
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Use the JUNOS Software insert command to adjust rules within a rule-set.
Live Configuration Changes
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If a change is made to a NAT rule or pool that is currently in use, JUNOS Software tears
down the session once the change is committed. JUNOS Software re-initiates the
session as soon as it receives further matching traffic.
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Interface-Based Source NAT Sample Topology
The slide illustrates a sample topology that demonstrates interface-based source NAT
using JUNOS Software. Using the topology shown on the slide, we will enable
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interface-based source NAT for traffic sourced from the network attached to the
ge-0/0/2.0 interface with a destination belonging to the Untrust Zone. The traffic
should translate to use the egress interface address 1.1.70.5.
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Interface-Based Source NAT Configuration
The slide illustrates the required configuration to enable interface-based source NAT
for the given example. Similar to static NAT, pools are not necessary for this
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configuration. Interface-based NAT requires a rule-set to associate with a directional

context. In this example, traffic from the network attached to the
ge-0/0/2.0 interface that has a destination address belonging to the 1.1.70/24 prefix
translates to a source address of the egress interface.
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The output shows traffic entering the device using the private source address
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10.1.10.5 destined to a public host at 1.1.70.6. The return traffic from this flow travels
to the translated public address 1.1.70.5.
The show security nat source summary command provides a quick look at
the rule-set, rule, context, and rule action resulting from this configuration.
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Pool-Based Source NAT Sample Topology with PAT
The slide illustrates an example topology that demonstrates pool-based source NAT
and PAT using JUNOS Software. Using the topology shown on the slide, we will enable
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pool-based source NAT with PAT for traffic destined to the Untrust Zone and sourced
from the Trust Zone. Only traffic belonging to the 10.1.10/24 network should
translate. The traffic should translate to a public source IP address of 207.17.137.229.
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Pool-Based Source NAT Configuration with PAT
The slide illustrates the required configuration to enable source NAT and PAT for the
given example. JUNOS Software pool-based NAT requires a user-defined address pool
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and a rule-set that associates with a directional context. In this example, traffic from
the Trust Zone destined to the Untrust Zone and with a source address belonging to
the prefix 10.1.10/24 translates to a source address of 207.17.137.229. In JUNOS
Software, PAT is automatically enabled for pool-based source NAT.
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10.1.10.5 destined to a public host at 1.1.70.6. Source address translation occurs

and the return traffic is sent to the public address 207.17.137.229.
The show security nat source summary command provides a quick way to
look at existing source NAT rules and pools. In this case, the source NAT pool contains
a single address, and PAT is enabled by default. The source NAT rule illustrates the
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parameters set by the configuration with an associated action of translation using

Pool A.
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PAT Is Default
As illustrated in the previous example, JUNOS Software’s implementation of source
NAT enables PAT by default. Because PAT is enabled and the number of available ports
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is near 64,000, it is rare that a source NAT pool will exhaust.
Address Persistence
Regardless of the large available source NAT pool, there is no guarantee that JUNOS
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Software will use the same source IP address for different traffic types associated
with the same source host. To ensure the use of the same address, configure the
address-persistent global source NAT option as shown on the slide.
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Pool-Based Source NAT Sample Topology Without PAT
The slide illustrates a sample topology that demonstrates pool-based source NAT
without PAT using JUNOS Software. Using the topology shown on the slide, we will
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enable pool-based source NAT without PAT for traffic destined to the Untrust Zone and
sourced from the Trust Zone. Only traffic belonging to the 10.1.10/24 network should
translate. The traffic should translate to a public source IP address range consisting of
the 207.17.137/24 network.
Disabling PAT dramatically reduces the number of addresses available in a source
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pool. Recall that previously, using PAT, approximately 64,000 variations were available
per address. Without PAT, each address in the source pool must use its original source
port, which can lead to higher pool utilization. To combat this problem, we will enable
a backup method to use the egress interface address if a pool is exhausted of
addresses. We refer to this backup method as an overflow pool. An overflow pool can
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use the egress interface (as in this example) or a separate user-defined pool. In either
case, the overflow pool must have PAT enabled, which is the mandated default for
interface-based NAT.
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Pool-Based Source NAT Configuration Without PAT
The slide illustrates the required configuration to enable source NAT without PAT for
the given example. JUNOS Software pool-based NAT requires a user-defined address
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pool and a rule-set that associates with a directional context. In this example, traffic
from the Trust Zone destined to the Untrust Zone and with a source address belonging
to the 10.1.10/24 prefix translates to a source address belonging to the 207.17.137/
24 prefix. PAT is explicitly disabled and an overflow pool is defined using the egress
interface address, in case pool A becomes exhausted of all available addresses.
Recall that interface-based source NAT uses PAT by default.
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10.1.10.5 destined to a public host at 1.1.70.6. Source address translation is

performed, and the return traffic is destined to the public address 207.17.137.127.
The show security nat source summary command provides a quick way to
look at existing source NAT rules and pools. In this case, the source NAT pool contains
the 207.17.137.1 through 207.17.137.254 address range and PAT is disabled. The
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source NAT rule illustrates the parameters set by the configuration with an associated
action of translation using pool A.
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Pool Utilization
If JUNOS Software runs out of addresses in a source NAT pool, further packets
requiring translation will drop. We already discussed one method to overcome this
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problem—using an overflow pool. While an overflow pool is a handy tool, you likely also
want to know that this situation has occurred so that you can take measures to
increase the pool size or evaluate the usage patterns.
JUNOS Software provides a pool utilization alarm for monitoring pool usage. The
utilization alarm is disabled by default. The slide shows the configuration for the pool
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utilization alarm, which is global to the source NAT stanza. The values represent a
percentage of pool utilization. Once pool utilization reaches the raise-threshold (in this
case, 50%), the JUNOS security platform sends an SNMP trap notification to a
configured network management station. If traffic falls below the clear-threshold,
JUNOS Software sends an SNMP trap to the network management station. Note that
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while the pool utilization alarm is disabled by default, if configured, the default setting
for the clear-threshold is 80 percent of the raise-threshold.
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Source NAT with Address Shifting Sample Topology
The slide illustrates a sample topology that demonstrates source NAT with address
shifting using JUNOS Software. Using the topology shown on the slide, we will enable
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source NAT with address shifting for traffic destined to the Untrust Zone and sourced
from the Trust Zone. Only traffic belonging to the 10.1.10/24 network should be
translated starting with the 10.1.10.5 address for shifting purposes. The traffic should
translate to a public source IP address range consisting of the 207.17.137/24
network.
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By definition, this type of translation is one-to-one, static, and without PAT. If the
original source address range is larger than the address range in the user-defined
pool, packets might drop. Use the previously discussed tools to assist in this situation.
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Source NAT with Address Shifting Configuration
The slide illustrates the required configuration to enable source NAT with address
shifting for the given example. JUNOS Software source NAT with address shifting
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requires a user-defined address pool and a rule-set that associates with a directional
context. In this example, traffic from the Trust Zone destined to the Untrust ZoneTrust
Zone and with a source address belonging to the 10.1.10/24 prefix translates to a
source address belonging to the 207.17.137/24 prefix. The 10.1.10.5 address is
configured as the host-address-base and serves as a starting point for address
shifting.
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10.1.10.5 destined to a public host at 1.1.70.6. Source address translation is

performed, and the return traffic travels to the public address 207.17.137.1.
The show security nat destination pool all command illustrates the
pool of translated addresses. In the example, because address shifting is used for this
pool, the full range is not listed; however, the output shows that 254 total addresses
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are available. The 10.1.10.5 address shows as the base starting address for address
shifting. The output also illustrates that PAT is disabled for this type of address
translation. You can view this output for an individual address pool by specifying the
pool name instead of using the all option.
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Pop Quiz!
The off NAT action is useful for detailed control. The configuration shown on the slide
represents how you might use a NAT off action. In this example, all traffic sourced
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from the 10.1.10.0/24 network, with the exception of traffic destined to the
172.18.20.0/24 has source NAT applied to it. Recall that the ordering of rules within a
rule-set is significant. In the example, traffic matching the directional context (from the
Trust Zone to the external zone) is first evaluated by rule 1 and then evaluated by
rule 2.
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Proxy ARP
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When to Use Proxy ARP
JUNOS Software for security platforms requires a proxy Address Resolution Protocol
(ARP) configuration whenever translated traffic belongs to the same subnet as the
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ingress interface. This task is not automatic and you must configure it as needed.
When a network device needs to send a packet to a destination IP address using
ethernet, the device sends an ARP request to obtain the layer two MAC address
associated with the destination IP address. Once that association is in place, the
sending device typically stores this information in memory and subsequently
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addresses ethernet frames to the appropriate Layer 2 MAC address. Without proxy
ARP, if an interface receives an ARP request for an address other than its own, it
ignores the packet. It assumes the packet is meant for another device attached to the
same broadcast media. Using proxy ARP, the interface acts as a proxy for the
destination by replying to ARP requests on behalf of the intended destination. Packets
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destined for the intended destination then travel to the proxying device, which can
then forward the packets to the actual destination.
The slide illustrates the configuration hierarchy and options for NAT proxy ARP.
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Proxy ARP Example
The slide illustrates a sample situation requiring proxy ARP and the associated
configuration. In the example, the device performs source translation for traffic from
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the Trust Zone, translating the private source address to a public source address in
the 1.1.70.10 to 1.1.70.100 address range. The NAT source pool belongs to the same
subnet as the public interface. For return traffic to successfully reach the 10.1.10.5
host, the device must perform proxy ARP for the 1.1.70.10–1.1.70.100 address
range.
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Monitoring and Verifying NAT Operation
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Key Monitoring Commands
The slide lists four operational mode show commands used to verify and monitor NAT
operation. We repeatedly illustrate these commands throughout examples in this
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chapter. You can use the show security nat commands for source or destination
NAT.
Traceoptions for NAT Operation

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Traceoptions are available for a more detailed view of NAT operation. The traceoptions
log is stored as /var/log/security-trace by default, or optionally, the user can define a
different log name.
NAT internal operation consists of two main components—the Packet Forwarding
Engine (PFE) and the Routing Engine (RE). The PFE is divided into two elements—the
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ukernal element and the real-time element. Traceoptions flags can be set to trace NAT
operation within the PFE ukernal, the PFE real-time element, or within the RE. The
output that follows lists all the available flags for tracing NAT operation.
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Traceoptions for NAT Operation (contd.)

[edit security nat traceoptions]
user@host# set flag ?
all Trace everything
destination-nat-pfe Trace destination nat events on PFE-ukernel side
destination-nat-re Trace destination nat events on RE side
destination-nat-rt Trace destination nat events on PFE-RT side
source-nat-pfe Trace source nat events on PFE-ukernel side
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source-nat-re Trace source nat events on RE side
source-nat-rt Trace source nat events on PFE-RT side
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static-nat-pfe Trace static nat events on PFE-ukernel side
static-nat-re Trace static nat events on RE side
static-nat-rt Trace static nat events on PFE-RT side
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• The purpose and functionality of NAT and PAT;
• NAT processing;
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• Configuring destination NAT;

• Configuring source NAT; and
• Monitoring and verifying NAT operation.
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Review Questions
1.
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2.
3.
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4.
5.
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Lab 5: Network Address Translation
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• Various types of virtual private networks (VPNs);
• Major security concerns;
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• IP Security (IPsec) VPNs and their functionality;

• IPsec VPN configuration using policy-based and route-based methods;
and
• IPsec VPN monitoring.
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Chapter 8–2 • IPsec VPNs

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VPN Types
first.
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IPsec VPNs • Chapter 8–3

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The Meaning Behind VPNs
VPNs are used to transport private network traffic over a public network infrastructure.
The term VPN has been used broadly in the networking industry for decades. For
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instance, the networking industry has referred to X.25, Frame Relay, and ATM
infrastructures as VPN networks. As the Internet spread and as carriers and service
providers migrated all their service offerings to IP, new forms of VPNs emerged.
Types of VPNs Today

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We can subdivide these new forms of VPNs into three categories:

• Clear-text VPNs: These VPNs include Layer 3 VPNs, Layer 2 VPNs
(Kompella and Martini implementations), and virtual private LAN service
(VPLS). These VPNs rely on MPLS services and the use of signaling
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protocols over IP.

• Secure VPNs: These VPNs are IPsec VPNs, carrying payload over IP
securely. We will discuss these VPN types in this chapter.
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• Combination of clear-text and secure VPNs: These VPNs are based on

Layer 3 VPNs, built on MPLS technology, and compounded with IPsec
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Secure VPNs
A network device that builds secure VPNs must be able to perform the following
actions:
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• Encrypt the original packet so that it cannot be easily decoded should it

be intercepted on the public network;
• Verify the original payload ensuring data integrity; and
• Authenticate the originating device as a member of the VPN, rather than
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a random device operating on the public network.

This chapter focuses on end-to-end static IPSec VPNs. However, note that JUNOS
security platforms also support end-to-site dynamic VPNs and VPN establishment
using the NetScreen Remote VPN client. See the Juniper Networks technical
documentation at http://www.juniper.net/techpubs for further information on these
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features.
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Secure VPN Requirements
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Security Concerns
Three driving concerns exist for network security: confidentiality, integrity, and
authentication.
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• Confidentiality: Online banking, credit card information, or a company’s

competitive information—how do we keep this information secure from
the man in the middle? We want information stored in such a way that if
someone were to capture this datagram, the information would appear
meaningless.
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• Integrity: Even though the information might be secure and hidden,

meaning that someone might not be able to determine or understand its
contents, it could still be possible for someone to change it. Someone
could tweak bits to change the data from what was originally sent
through the network. So how do we ensure that if the data is
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compromised, the remote station recognizes this fact and refuses to

process the information?
• Authentication: How does the remote station verify that the information
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came from the device from which it expected it to come? You do not want
to be communicating and sending critical information to the wrong
recipient!

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Confidentiality—Data Encryption
The first of the three VPN security concerns is confidentiality.
Encryption provides data confidentiality. Encryption is the method of taking user
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data—referred to as plaintext—and converting it into unreadable or secret data named

ciphertext. An encryption algorithm and keys (strings of bits that seed the encryption
process) are applied to the data, resulting in ciphertext.
To reverse the process and decrypt the ciphertext, you must know both the encryption
algorithm and encryption key. You can decrypt encrypted data in one of two ways:
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• Symmetric key encryption: This method uses the same key for both
encryption and decryption; and
• Asymmetric key encryption: This method uses a private key for
encryption and a mathematically related public key for decryption.
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The cipher strength depends on the key size; the larger the key, the more secure the
cipher output. The trade-off is in processing time—larger keys use more computational
cycles to encrypt and decrypt.
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Confidentiality—Symmetric Key Encryption
Symmetric key encryption is the most straightforward form of encryption with the least
amount of overhead. We refer to it as symmetric because the key used to encrypt the
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data is the same key used to decrypt the data. Thus, the same key must be known on
both sides of a connection.
Symmetric key sizes range from 40 bits–1024 bits. These keys are considered to be
very fast as they are not very long, and they are widely used for bulk data encryption.
However, because the key must be known to both the sender and the receiver, key
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management is a problem when using symmetric keys.

Examples of symmetric key encryption include Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4), Data Encryption
Standard (DES), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), and Blowfish.
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Public Key Encryption
The public, asymmetric key encryption method requires a pair of mathematically
related keys. One of the keys is kept secret and known only to the owner; this key is
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the private key. The owner distributes the other key widely and anyone can access it;
this key is the public key. You can only decrypt data encrypted by the private key by
using the corresponding public key, and vice versa. The keys are mathematically
related such that it is almost impossible to derive one key out of another.
Public key sizes range from 512 to 2048 bits. Because of the large size, these keys
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are extremely slow and generally not feasible for bulk data encryption. However, public
keys are widely used for user and device authentication (for example, digital
certificates). An example of public, asymmetric key encryption is RSA.
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Integrity
Now that we have the data encrypted as it traverses the Internet, we must ensure that
the data is not subject to modification along the way. Even though a novice hacker
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might not be able to crack the encryption algorithm and key, the hacker can still wreak
havoc by modifying bits that the encrypted payload carries. If this modification
happens, the decrypted output does not match the original data. Who knows what the
consequences might be!
Hashing solves this problem by creating a fingerprint of the data, similar to a cyclic
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redundancy check (CRC) checksum. Before data travels, it traverses a hashing engine
that produces a fixed-length hash output. It places the hash in a field in the packet
along with the data before it travels over the network. The destination device takes the
same data and runs it through the same hashing algorithm, calculating its own hash.
The destination device then compares the hash that it calculated against the hash
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carried in the packet. The same hash in both locations proves data integrity in transit.
If the hashes do not match, the packet drops.
JUNOS Software supports MD5, SHA1, and 256-bit SHA2 hashing.
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One-Way Hash Algorithms
A hash function must have two basics properties:
• You should not be able to calculate the original data from the hashed
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output. This property ensures that you cannot derive the plaintext from
the ciphertext.
• It must be mostly collision resistant. A collision occurs when two different
inputs give the same output. It must not be possible to predict a different
input value that gives the same output. This property is necessary
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because the purpose of hashing is to verify that the data has not
changed.
To see how it is possible to create a one-way function, think of the example on the
slide, which shows a modulus operation. Given the value of 3, it is not possible to
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determine the original value because an infinite range of possible answers exists.
However, this example is not suitable as a real-world hash function because it does
not satisfy the collision-resistant requirement—a malicious person can change the
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plaintext by any multiple of the modulus number and know that the hashed value
remains the same.
The most secure and widely used hash function is the Secure Hash Algorithm 1
(SHA-1). SHA-1 is preferred over Message Digest 5 (MD5), although MD5 is still widely
supported. These functions produce a fixed-length output that is useful when working
with IP packets because the overhead of transmitting the hash value is predictable.

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Integrity—The Hash Process
The following list outlines the hash process:
1. The sender runs the data through the hash process.
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2. The sender appends the hash value to the data and sends both the data
and the hash value to the receiver.
3. The receiver separates the data and the hash value.
4. The receiver hashes the data.
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5. The receiver then compares the calculated hash value to the received
hash value. If the hash values match, the data is unaltered.
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Source Authentication
Encryption protects the packet contents from being viewed on the public network.
Hashing verifies that the data is unaltered. But how do you validate the source of the
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data?
The software performs source authentication using the Hashed Message
Authentication Code (HMAC). The sender appends a secret preshared key to the data,
then performs the hash function. For hashes to successfully match, the receiver must
append the same key value to the data before performing the hash function. The key
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itself never transmits along with the data.

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HMAC Authentication
The following list outlines hashing with HMAC:
1. The sender appends the preshared key to the data, then performs the
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hash function.
2. The data and hash value travel to the receiver.
3. The receiver separates the data and the hash value.
4. The receiver appends the preshared key to the data, then performs the
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hash function.
5. The receiver then compares the calculated hash value to the received
hash value. If the hash values match, the data is unaltered. If the hash
values do not match, either the data itself is corrupt, or the keys did not
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match, meaning the source is invalid. Either way, the receiver discards
the packet.
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Key Exchange
As we already discussed, both encryption and authentication are dependent on
security keys, which leads to the problem of key exchange. If keys must be the same
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on both sides of a connection, how can you securely exchange key information?
One option is to manually configure the keys on both sides of the connection. Manual
key configuration is straightforward, but misconfigurations, especially when each
device has a different administrator, are common. Furthermore, manual configuration
usually means that keys rarely change, which is itself a potential security issue; given
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a large enough sample, any code can be broken.

Automating the key exchange process is a good idea, but we must overcome the
problem of sending keys across a public network. Anyone intercepting the key has the
ability to decode the data.
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The Solution
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman developed a solution to this problem in 1970. The
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Diffie-Hellman algorithm is a method whereby two parties can agree upon a secret key
known only to them. The strength of the technique is that it allows the participants to
create the secret value over an unsecured medium without exchanging the secret
value itself. This method also makes it impossible to perform reverse generation of
the secret if it is somehow intercepted.

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Diffie-Hellman Groups
Diffie and Hellman proposed five groups of prime numbers and generator values to
use in their key exchange algorithm. Each group generates unique keys using a
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combination of exponential and modulus calculations.

JUNOS Software supports Diffie-Hellman (DH) Groups 1, 2, and 5. The larger the
prime number—the stronger the key—and the more computationally intensive the
calculation. Diffie-Hellman Group 1 uses a 768-bit prime number. Diffie-Hellman
Group 2 uses a 1024-bit prime number. Diffie-Hellman Group 5 uses a 1536-bit prime
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number.
You must configure both tunnel peers to use the same DH group; otherwise, the key
generation process fails.
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The DH Key Exchange Process
Using the same DH group, each JUNOS security platform creates unique public and
private keys. These keys are mathematically related by means of the DH algorithm.
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The public key values exchange across the network. Each peer then runs its local
private key and the received public key value through the DH algorithm to compute a
common session key. The session key itself never passes across the network.
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IPsec Details
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IPsec Overview
IPsec is a set of standards that defines how the encryption, validation, and
authentication methods we just discussed are actually implemented in networks.
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IPsec works at Layer 3; it supports both unicast and multicast traffic.

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IPsec: A Two-Step Process
IPsec VPNs consists of two major steps:
1. IPsec tunnel establishment: You can manually establish an IPsec tunnel
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or the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol can do it dynamically.

2. IP traffic processing: During this step payload protection takes place
using security parameters defined in the tunnel establishment phase.
We cover the first step—IPsec tunnel establishment using IKE—on the next several
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Step 1: Tunnel Establishment Using Internet Key Exchange
IKE is a secure key management protocol used by IPsec to have information
exchanged in a secure and dynamic manner with little or no intervention. The IKE
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proposal exchange is Phase 1 of the IPsec tunnel establishment process. The

following attributes exchange between IPsec peers as a part of the IKE process:
• Encryption algorithm;
• Hash algorithm;
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• Authentication method; and

• Diffie-Hellman group.
Once IPsec peers negotiate these attributes, they secure future attribute exchanges
used to protect data. IKE exchanges authenticate using one of the following methods:
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• Preshared keys;
• Digital signatures; or
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• Public key encryption.

IKE is preferable to manual keys in IPsec implementations because of the ease of
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Security Associations
A security association (SA) is a set of policies and keys used to protect information.
SAs establish upon the successful completion of IKE negotiations. An SA is uniquely
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identified by the security parameter index (SPI) value, the tunnel destination address,
and the security protocol—Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) or authentication
header (AH)—in use. The lifetime of an SA can be based on either a time value or a
value determined by the volume of traffic protected by the proposal.
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SA Database
SAs are stored in a security association database. Each entry includes the name of
the particular VPN, the remote gateway IP address, the SPIs for each direction, the
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agreed-upon security protocol, encryption, and authentication algorithms and keys.

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IKE Phases
IKE tunnel establishment happens in two phases:
• Phase 1 establishes a secured channel between gateways for Phase 2
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negotiations to occur. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm

establishes a shared key for encryption.
• Phase 2 establishes the specific VPN connections. SAs are negotiated on
behalf of IPsec to determine the encryption and authentication
algorithms to use when sending user data. The SA is identified by a
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unique SPI that is also negotiated during Phase 2.

A single Phase 1 channel can establish multiple Phase 2 SAs or VPNs. If wanted, a
second Diffie-Hellman exchange can be performed during Phase 2 to negotiate a new
tunnel key. Because of the encryption on this exchange, it is named Perfect Forward
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Secrecy (PFS).
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IKE Phase 1: Main Mode
IKE main mode is used when both tunnel peers have static IP addresses. The Phase 1
exchange determines the following attributes:
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• Hash algorithm;
• DH group; and
• Authentication method:
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– Preshared keys;
– Digital signatures; and
– Public key encryption.
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The first two messages validate the peer configuration (by checking the cookie against
the locally configured peer IP address) and negotiate the parameters listed previously.
Both tunnel peers must have at least one configured matching proposal for Phase 1
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exchange success.
The next two messages exchange Diffie-Hellman public key values and nonces
necessary to compute the shared key.
The last two messages send simple identification information using the negotiated
key; these messages validate that the key calculation was correct.

IKE Phase 1: Main Mode (contd.)

For Message 1 and Message 2, peers exchange cookies and SA proposals. Cookies
are 8-byte pseudo-random numbers generated by the sending machine (I=initiator)
and receiving machine (R=receptor). Every cookie is unique to the machine and to
each particular exchange. These cookies guarantee uniqueness and replay protection
by hashing the sender's IP address, port, protocol, and timestamp, which results in a
unique identifier known only to the originator. Hence, they are included in every IPsec
packet and used to identify communication. In turn, the receptor inserts its known
cookie in Message 2 if it accepts the SA proposal.
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An IPsec SA proposal contains the following:
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• Phase 1 authentication method (main mode or aggressive mode);
• DH group number;
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• Authentication algorithm; and
• Key lifetime.
For Message 3 and Message 4, the DH public values exchange to create a common
session key. Nonces, which are essentially random numbers, also exchange at this
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time for use as seeds for keys generated later.
After both sides exchange their DH public values, a key is created on each side to
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encrypt the rest of the IKE Phase 1 messages. The session key is a result of the
exchanged public keys traveling to each partner.
Messages 5 and 6 contain the preshared key.
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IKE Phase 1: Aggressive Mode
IKE aggressive mode is used when one of the tunnel peers has a dynamic IP address
that could be a remote end user dialing in to the Internet, or a remote site using DHCP
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to acquire an IP address. (Main mode cannot be used because the first two messages
validate peer IP addresses. In the case of a dynamic host address, the peer cannot
preconfigure the address.)
Phase 1 aggressive mode must initiate by the device with the dynamic IP address. The
first two messages negotiate policy and exchange DH public values and nonces. In
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addition, the second message authenticates the responder; the ID hash is compared
with the locally configured peer ID.
The third message authenticates the initiator and provides a proof of participation in
the exchange.
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IKE Phase 2: Quick Mode
Once Phase 1 is complete, proposals exchange to establish a specific VPN. The
following attributes are negotiated in Phase 2:
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• Security protocol (ESP or AH);

• Tunnel mode or transport mode;
• Proxy IDs; and
• Optional DH group.
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Upon successful completion of quick mode, user data encrypts between the
configured IPsec peers. Both tunnel peers must have at least one matching proposal
configured for Phase 2 exchange success.
The result of Phase 2 is to create an IPsec VPN for user data to securely transmit
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through the network.

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IKE Phase 2: Quick Mode (contd.)

For Message 1 and Message 2, a Phase 2 proposal list exchanges. The list contains
encrypted and authenticated information that determines the algorithms and keys for
encrypting and authenticating user data. The Phase 2 proposal list contains the
following items:
• ESP or AH;
• DH group number (0 for no PFS);
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• Authentication algorithm;
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• Key lifetime;
• Proxy ID (policy rule); and
• DH public keys (optional if using PFS).
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Message 3 acknowledges information sent from quick mode Message 2 so that the
Phase 2 tunnel can establish.
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IPsec: A Two-Step Process—Step 2
Now that we have covered the tunnel establishment step of the IPsec process, we
cover the next step—IPsec traffic processing. Once the IPsec tunnel establishes, the
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devices are ready to send the payload using the IPsec attributes and protocols, which
ensure payload protection.
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Goal of IPsec Traffic Processing
During the IPsec traffic processing step, the devices have one goal—to ensure traffic
protection.
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IPsec Modes
IPsec handles the payload using one of two modes—transport or tunnel. We discuss
each mode in the next few pages.
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IPsec Protocols
IPsec uses two protocols to ensure payload security—the AH protocol and the ESP
protocol. Again, we discuss each of these protocols in the next few pages.
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IPsec Modes
You can implement IPsec in the following two modes:
• Tunnel mode: This mode is the most commonly implemented method.
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Tunnel mode is implemented between IPsec gateways or an IPsec

gateway and a remote client providing secure access to the networks
behind the gateway. In this method, end systems need not be aware of
the IPsec protocol suite. All encryption and decryption takes place on the
IPsec gateways on behalf of the hosts behind the gateway.
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• Transport mode: This mode is implemented between IPsec end systems.

End systems should be aware of the IPsec protocol suite. They do all the
encryption and decryption of data.
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IPsec Protocols
Two protocols exist that IPsec can use to ensure payload security—AH protocol and
ESP:
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• AH provides only data integrity, authentication, and antireplay services.

AH is identified by IP protocol number 51. It uses MD5 or SHA-1 to
provide data integrity services.
• ESP provides data confidentiality, data integrity, authentication, and
antireplay services. It does not use a transport protocol like TCP or UDP; it
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rides directly on top of IP using protocol number 50. ESP uses symmetric
key algorithms like DES, triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES), or AES,
and hash methods like MD5 and SHA-1 to provide security services.
Antireplay services ensure that third parties cannot capture and
retransmit datagrams. By checking sequence numbers, a receiver can
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determine receipt of a packet and can discard any repetitions.

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Example: Tunnel Mode AH Packets
AH authenticates only the immutable fields in the IP header. Fields like time to live
(TTL) and type of service (ToS) change during packet transit, so these fields do not
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receive authentication. The new IP header contains protocol number 51, signifying AH.
The AH header contains the following items:
• Next header: Information on the next expected segment;
• Payload length: Indicates the size of the payload;
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• SPI: An arbitrary 32-bit value that, in combination with the destination IP

address and security protocol (AH), uniquely identifies the security
association for this datagram; and
• Sequence number: An unsigned 32-bit field containing a monotonically
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increasing counter value (sequence number). It is used to detect

antireplay.
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Example: Tunnel Mode ESP Packets
In tunnel mode, the ESP header inserts between the new IP header and the original IP
header. The new IP header contains protocol 50, representing ESP. The ESP header
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contains the following information:

• SPI: An arbitrary 32-bit value that, in combination with the destination IP
address and security protocol (ESP), uniquely identifies the security
association for this datagram; and
• Sequence number: An unsigned 32-bit field containing a monotonically
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increasing counter value (sequence number); it is used to detect

antireplay.
The ESP trailer contains the following information:
• Padding/pad length: Depending on original data size, padding might be
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required to fill the packet; and

• Next header: Information on the next expected segment.
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ESP Auth is the integrity check value (that is, the hash value) for this packet.

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Traffic Processing: Part 1
The following list describes the order of traffic processing:
1. The packet arrives at the remote JUNOS security platform.
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2. JUNOS Software looks up the destination route and determines the

Egress Zone.
3. JUNOS Software looks up the security policy. The traffic matches a tunnel
policy.
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4. The original packet receives encryption.

5. JUNOS Software hashes the packet with an authentication key.
6. JUNOS Software builds the tunnel packet with a new IP header, IPsec
header, and hash value. The new packet travels to the tunnel peer.
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Traffic Processing: Part 2
This list is a continuation of the list from the previous page, describing the order of
traffic processing:
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7. The corporate JUNOS security platform receives the encrypted packet.

8. JUNOS Software looks up the incoming SPI in the local SA database. The
matching record contains encryption and authentication algorithms, and
keys.
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9. JUNOS Software compares the locally calculated hash with the received
hash.
10. JUNOS Software decrypts the packet.
11. JUNOS Software performs the routing lookup for the decrypted packet
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and determines the Egress Zone.

12. JUNOS Software checks the associated security policy. It forwards the
packet if the tunnel policy exists for the packet.
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IPsec Processing Summary
The slide provides a summary of all the steps of IPsec traffic processing.
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Configuration of IPsec VPN
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IPsec Implementation Methods
JUNOS Software offers two methods for IPsec VPN implementation:
• Policy-based VPNs: To implement this method, a security policy specifies
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as its action the IPsec VPN tunnel for transit traffic that meets the
policy’s match criteria. Policy-based VPNs are required when one
endpoint of the tunnel uses dynamic addressing. For policy-based IPsec
VPNs, a new tunnel generates for each flow of traffic that matches the
policy. Because each tunnel requires its own negotiation process and a
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separate pair of SAs, the use of policy-based IPsec VPNs can require
more resources than route-based IPsec VPNs.
• Route-based VPNs: Unlike the process for policy-based IPsec VPNs, for
route-based IPsec VPNs, a policy refers to a destination address—not an
IPsec VPN tunnel. Because a destination address is used, route-based
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VPNs are generally the best VPNs to use when a routing protocol
adjacency must be formed across the tunnel. When JUNOS Software
searches a route that must send traffic to the destination address, it
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finds a route associated with a secure tunnel interface (st0.x). The tunnel
interface is bound to a specific IPsec VPN tunnel, and traffic routes to the
tunnel if the policy action is permit. With a route-based IPsec VPN, in
most cases, only one VPN exists between two sites.

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Elements of IPsec VPN Configuration:
IPsec VPN configuration consists of three steps:
1. Configuring IKE Phase 1;
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2. Configuring IKE Phase 2; and

3. Applying the IPsec implementation method, which includes implementing
either policy-based VPNs or route-based VPNs.
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Configuring IKE Phase 1 Parameters: Step A
IKE Phase 1 configuration requires that you perform the following steps:
A. Configure IKE Phase 1 proposals;
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B. Configure IKE policies and reference the proposals; and

C. Configure the IKE gateway and reference the policy.
The slide addresses Step A, which is optional, as you can use the JUNOS Software
predefined proposals. The following are the predefined proposals:
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• basic:
– Proposal 1: preshared key, DH g1, DES, and SHA1
– Proposal 2: preshared key, DH g1, DES, and MD5
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• compatible:
– Proposal 1: preshared key, DH g2, 3DES, and SHA1
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– Proposal 2: preshared key, DH g2, 3DES, and MD5

– Proposal 3: preshared key, DH g2, DES, and SHA1
– Proposal 4: preshared key, DH g2, DES, and MD5

Configuring IKE Phase 1 Parameters: Step A (contd.)
• standard:
– Proposal 1: preshared key, DH g2, 3DES, and SHA1
– Proposal 2: preshared key, DH g2, AES128, and SHA1
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Configuring IKE Phase 1 Parameters: Step B
The slide illustrates the syntax for Step B of IKE Phase 1 configuration, which is policy
configuration. For this step you must either refer to the preconfigured proposal from
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Step A or use a system-defined proposal. Also, within the policy you must specify the
preshared key and mode of IKE—main or aggressive.
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Configuration of IKE Phase 1 Parameters: Step C
The slide illustrates the last step of IKE Phase 1 configuration, which is gateway
configuration. In this step you must refer to the policy configured in the previous step,
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define the peer address, and specify the outgoing interface. Optionally, you can
configure dead peer detection (DPD) to send a DPD request packet if the device does
not receive traffic from a peer for the number of seconds specified with the
interval option. You can also configure DPD to consider the peer unavailable after
a threshold number of interval periods is reached. For example, assume that the
interval value is 10 seconds and the threshold value is 5. If the device does not
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receive traffic from a peer for 10 seconds, it sends a DPD request packet to it. The
JUNOS security platform then considers the peer unavailable after five sequences of
waiting for 10 seconds.
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Configuring IKE Phase 2 Parameters: Step A
IKE Phase 2 configuration requires that you configure the following steps:
A. IKE Phase 2 proposals;
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B. IKE Phase 2 policies; and

C. IKE Phase 2 VPN tunnel.
The slide addresses Step A, which is optional, as you can use predefined proposals.
The following are the predefined proposals:
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• basic:
– Proposal 1: no PFS, ESP, DES, and SHA1
– Proposal 2: no PFS, DH g1, DES, and MD5
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• compatible:
– Proposal 1: no PFS, ESP, 3DES, and SHA1
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– Proposal 2: no PFS, ESP, 3DES, and MD5

– Proposal 3: no PFS, ESP, DES, and SHA1
– Proposal 4: no PFS, ESP, DES, and MD5

Configuring IKE Phase 2 Parameters: Step A (contd.)

• standard:
– Proposal 1: ESP, DH g2, 3DES, and SHA1
– Proposal 2: ESP, DH g2, AES128, and SHA1
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Configuring IKE Phase 2 Parameters: Step B
The slide illustrates the syntax for Step B of IKE Phase 2 configuration, which is policy
configuration. For this step, you must either refer to the preconfigured proposal from
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Step A or use a system-defined proposal. Also, within the policy, you have the option to
configure PFS to use with the three supported groups of DH as the method for JUNOS
Software to generate the encryption key.
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Configuring IKE Phase 2 Parameters: Step C
The slide illustrates the last step of IKE Phase 2 configuration, which is VPN
configuration. In this step, you must refer to the policy defined in the previous step, as
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well as the gateway preconfigured in Step C of IKE Phase 1. If you are configuring a
route-based VPN, you must bind the st0.x interface to the VPN, as illustrated on the
slide. If you manually set up a tunnel, you must specify all the necessary attributes
manually. Should you choose to do so, you can set up all the necessary parameters
under the security ipsec vpn configuration stanza. The optional
establish-tunnels command specifies when to activate IKE-- immediately, or
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on-traffic. The immediately option signals the device to activate IKE

immediately after VPN configuration or configuration changes are committed. The
on-traffic option signals the device to activate IKE only when payload traffic
flows.
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Applying IPsec—Policy-Based IPsec VPNs
If you are implementing a policy-based IPsec VPN, you must apply the configured VPN
from within the security policy, as illustrated on the slide.
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Applying IPsec—Route-Based IPsec VPNs
If you are implementing a route-based IPsec VPN, you must perform the following
steps:
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1. Configure the secure tunnel interface (st0.x);

2. Configure a static route or enable dynamic routing that points to the st0.x
interface;
3. Add the st0.x interface to the appropriate security zone; and
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4. Bind the st0.x interface to the IPsec VPN.

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IPsec VPN Monitoring
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Example: Creating Policy-Based IPsec VPNs Using IKE
Consider the following example: you must implement a policy-based IPsec VPN
between two SRX Series Services Gateways named Edge and Remote, as illustrated
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on the slide. A policy-based IPsec VPN implies that you must refer to the VPN tunnel
from within the policies at each end, as demonstrated on the slide.
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Example: Configuring IKE Phase 1 Parameters
The slide illustrates the configuration of the following parameters for IKE Phase 1:
1. Proposal for IKE Phase 1: Recall that this step is optional, because you
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can use JUNOS Software’s predefined proposals (the choices are basic,
compatible, or standard). On the slide, we named the configured
proposal ike-phase1-proposal. We decided to use authentication
algorithm md5, encryption algorithm 3des-cbc, a DH key exchange of
group 2, and preshared keys as the authentication method.
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2. A policy, called ike-policy1: Within the policy we specified the mode

that IKE Phase 1 will use—main mode, in this case. We referred to the
proposal ike-phase1-proposal, and we specified the preshared
key.
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3. Gateway, called ike-phase1-gateway: Within the gateway stanza

we referred to the policy ike-policy1, specified the address of peer
Remote (1.1.70.1), and specified the external interface that IKE will use
to establish the tunnel (ge-1/0/1.0). Also, we decided to use DPD so
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that a peer sends a DPD request packet to another peer if it does not
hear from it for 20 seconds. Suppose it is Edge that sends the DPD
request packet to Remote. After sending the DPD request packet, Edge
considers Remote to be unavailable after five sequences of waiting for
20 seconds.
You must repeat the illustrated configuration on the Remote device, defining the
appropriate external interface and gateway address.

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Example: Configuring IKE Phase 2 Parameters for Policy-Based IPsec
VPNs
The slide illustrates configuration of IKE Phase 2 parameters for our example. Our
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configuration consists of the following:

1. A proposal for IKE Phase 2: Recall that this step is optional because you
compatible, or standard). We named the configured proposal
ike-phase2-proposal. We decided to use authentication algorithm
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hmac-md5-96, encryption algorithm 3des-cbc, and the ESP protocol.

2. A policy called ipsec-pol1: Within the policy we referred to the
proposal ike-phase2-proposal, and we specified that IPsec will use
DH Group 2 as its PFS.
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3. A VPN tunnel, called TunnelA: Within the tunnel we referred to the

gateway ike-phase1-gateway and the IKE Phase 2 policy
ipsec-pol1. We also specified that tunnels should establish
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immediately.
Note that you should repeat the configuration illustrated for the Edge device on the
Remote device.

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Monitoring Policy-Based IPsec VPNs
Once you finish and commit all the configurations, you must ensure that the tunnels
are working properly by following the order of how IPsec works. First ensure that IKE
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Phase 1 is working properly, then ensure that IKE Phase 2 is working properly. To
check that IKE Phase 1 functions properly, check whether the SAs are formed.
Similarly, you perform IKE Phase 2 checking by viewing the resulting SAs.
The slide illustrates both commands with the resulting outputs. Also, you can view the
IPsec statistics that specify the number of transit packet bytes that the device has
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encrypted and decrypted.

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Example: Creating Route-Based IPsec VPNs Using IKE
Consider another example: In this case you need to set up the IPsec tunnel using the
route-based method and IKE. Recall that a route-based VPN requires only one tunnel
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between JUNOS security platforms, while a policy-based VPN sets up a tunnel for every
new flow.
You must ensure that both ends of the VPN tunnel have a secure tunnel interface
configured—in our case it is the st0.0 interface, with IP address 1.1.80.0/28.
Furthermore, you must ensure that each of the devices has a valid route referring to
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the st0.0 interface. In our case we are using static route 0.0.0.0/0.
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Example: Configuring a Security Zone for a Route-Based IPsec VPN
Once you configure interface st0.0, you must add it to the corresponding security
zone. In our case, we must add it to the Public security zone. Also note that
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although the slide provides the configuration for the Edge device, you must also
repeat it for the Remote device.
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Example: Configuring IKE Phase 1 Parameters
The slide illustrates the configuration of the following parameters for IKE Phase 1:
1. The proposal for IKE Phase 1: Recall that this step is optional because
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you can use JUNOS Software’s predefined proposals (the choices are
basic, compatible, or standard). We named the configured
proposal ike-phase1-proposal. We decided to use authentication
algorithm md5, encryption algorithm 3des-cbc, a DH key exchange of
group2, and preshared keys as the authentication method.
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2. A policy, called ike-policy1: Within the policy, we specified the mode

that IKE Phase 1 will use—the main mode, in this case. We referred to the
proposal ike-phase1-proposal, and we specified the preshared
key.
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3. A gateway, called ike-phase1-gateway: Within the gateway stanza

we referred to the policy ike-policy1, specified the address of the
peer Remote (1.1.70.1), and specified the external interface IKE will
use to establish the tunnel (ge-1/0/1.0). Also, we decided to use DPD so
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that a peer will send a DPD request packet to another peer if it does not
hear from it for 20 seconds. Suppose that it is Edge that sends the DPD
request packet to Remote. After sending the DPD request packet, Edge
considers Remote to be unavailable after five sequences of waiting for
20 seconds.
Note that you must repeat the illustrated configuration at the Remote device, defining
the appropriate external interface and gateway address.

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Example: Configuring IKE Phase 2 Parameters for a Route-Based IPsec
VPN
The slide illustrates configuration of IKE Phase 2 parameters for our example. Our
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configuration consists of the following:

1. A proposal for IKE Phase 2: Recall that this step is optional, because you
compatible, or standard). We named the configured proposal
ike-phase2-proposal. We decided to use authentication algorithm
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hmac-md5-96, encryption algorithm 3des-cbc, and the ESP protocol.

2. A policy, named ipsec-pol1: Within the policy we referred to the
proposal ike-phase2-proposal, and we specified that IPsec will use
DH group2 as its PFS.
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3. A VPN tunnel, called TunnelA: Within the tunnel we referred to the

gateway ike-phase1-gateway and the IKE Phase 2 policy
ipsec-pol1. We also specified that tunnels should establish
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immediately. Furthermore, we bound the st0.0 interface to the tunnel.

When you compare the configuration on the slide to the policy-based IPsec IKE
Phase 2 configuration, you will notice that the only difference between the two is the
statement binding interface st0.0 to the tunnel.
Note that we must also repeat the configuration illustrated for the Edge device at the
Remote device.

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Monitoring a Route-Based IPsec VPN: Part 1
Once you finish and commit all the configurations, you must ensure that the tunnels
work properly by following the order of how IPsec works. First ensure that IKE Phase 1
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works properly, then ensure that IKE Phase 2 works properly. To check that IKE Phase
1 functions properly, you must check whether the SAs form. Similarly, you perform IKE
Phase 2 checking by viewing the resulting SAs.
The slide illustrates both commands with the resulting outputs. Also, you can view
IPsec statistics that specify the number of transit packet bytes that the device
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encrypts and decrypts.

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One of the differentiating points of a route-based IPsec VPN is that it uses the st0
interface. Therefore, you can use the show interfaces st0.x command to view
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whether the interface is up as well as how much information transits through it. If
there is a problem in establishing the route-based IPsec tunnel, the st0 interface is
not in the up state. The slide illustrates the results of the show interface st0
detail command for the Edge device.
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The slide is the continuation of the show interfaces st0 detail command
from the previous slide. It provides statistical information for the st0 interface,
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including flow input, flow output, and flow error statistics.

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As we work with a route-based IPsec VPN, it is useful to check the routing table
entries, ensuring that an active route referring to the st0 interface exists. In our case,
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the 0.0.0.0/0 default route, using interface st0.0 as its next hop, is active.
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Other IPsec VPN Monitoring Commands
You can enable traceoptions to debug IKE Phase 1 and Phase 2. Also, you can
clear IKE Phase 1 and Phase 2 SAs and statistics using the clear security ike
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and clear security ipsec operational commands.

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Common IPsec Configuration Problems
You should be aware of the following common problems when configuring IPsec VPNs:
• Proposal mismatch: The IKE Phase 1 proposal lists configured on each
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side do not agree. In this case, the initiator of the tunnel sees
retransmissions and a retransmission limit indicator. The problem is
evident at the destination gateway (the responder). The responder
rejects all proposals sent by the initiator.
• Preshared key mismatch: The keys do not match.
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• No route information is available: To establish a gateway, you must either

configure an explicit route or a default route (or use a dynamic routing
protocol) to be used to reach the remote gateway.
• The destination gateway is misconfigured: It might happen that the
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destination gateway (responder) does not recognize the incoming

request as originating with a valid peer gateway. Any of the following
misconfigurations could cause this problem:
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– The peer gateway is not configured correctly;

– The outgoing interface is not the right one; or
– A proposal mismatch exists.

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• Various types of VPNs;
• Major security concerns;
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• IPsec VPNs and their functionality;

• IPsec VPN configuration using policy-based and route-based methods;
and
• IPsec VPN monitoring.
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Review Questions
1.
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2.
3.
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4.
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Lab 6: Implementing IPsec VPNs
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Chapter 9: Introduction to Intrusion Detection
and Prevention
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• The purpose of the JUNOS Software Intrusion Detection and Prevention
(IDP) feature;
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• Utilizing and updating the IDP signature database;

• Utilizing and configuring IDP policy using a policy template; and
• Monitoring IDP operation.
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Chapter 9–2 • Introduction to Intrusion Detection and Prevention

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Introduction to JUNOS Software IDP
first.
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Introduction to Intrusion Detection and Prevention • Chapter 9–3

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What Is IDP?
Initially, network defense consisted of basic stateless firewall protection. Network
devices, such as routers, often provided this feature. As network attacks became
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more sophisticated, network defense also had to become more sophisticated. Stateful
firewalls, authentication mechanisms, and VPN devices utilizing encrypted traffic
offered additional protection from harmful network traffic and malicious users.
Traditional firewalls might not detect some malicious traffic because manufacturers
design VPN devices and firewalls for high-speed operation of VPN control and access
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control. For these types of attacks, the solution is to use IDP.

The JUNOS Software IDP feature provides additional security beyond a firewall. While
a firewall traditionally inspects only Layers 3 and 4, JUNOS Software utilizes the IDP
feature to decode and reassemble the protocol stream and thus sees traffic from the
application’s point of view (Layer 7). When IDP reassembles the data stream, JUNOS
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Software examines the stream for specified attack patterns. If no problem with the
stream exists, JUNOS Software forwards the original packets. If the software detects a
problem within the stream, IDP can drop packets, close or drop sessions, prevent
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future sessions, and log attacks for review by network administrators.

Utilizing IDP in combination with SCREEN options, zones, security policies, and other
JUNOS security features offers a complete approach to network security.

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Fully Integrated IDP
JUNOS security platforms have IDP functionality fully integrated into JUNOS Software.
This integration means no additional hardware or operating system is necessary,
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resulting in less cost, lower management overhead, and increased operational

simplicity.
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Live Attack Database
Juniper Networks maintains a database of attack signatures for use with the IDP
feature. With a valid license, users can retrieve updates manually by running a CLI
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command or automatically by configuring a JUNOS security platform to update its

database at regular intervals. The full security package download includes various
policy templates. These policy templates offer protection against a variety of common
attacks. Once you install the templates, you can customize them to fit the traffic
patterns of a particular network.
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IDP Successes
The JUNOS Software IDP feature regularly protects networks from the latest Microsoft
vulnerabilities. The attack database updates as new threats emerge, keeping JUNOS
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Software on the leading edge of network defense. IDP allows you to stop attacks
before they fully compromise the network. In the past, you often had to take a reactive
approach to network security by parsing logs for security threats before being able to
take action. In the meantime, the network remained vulnerable. Using IDP, you can be
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proactive by stopping attacks as they occur, and by preventing future attacks. IDP
uses attack signatures to protect your network from thousands of known attacks. It
can also detect protocol anomalies to protect your network from unknown or potential
attacks. Juniper Networks maintains a Web-based security portal
(http://www.juniper.net/security) listing the latest attack database updates, Microsoft
security bulletins, attack trends, and other useful security information.

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IDP Policy Components and Configuration
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IDP Policy Framework
Policy drives the IDP attack detection engine. IDP policy enables selective
enforcement of various IDP attack detection and prevention techniques on network
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traffic passing through the IDP engine. Users can write very granular rules to match a
section of traffic based on zones, networks, and applications. Users can then apply
specific attack prevention techniques on that traffic, and take active or passive
preventive actions.
The slide illustrates the structural view of an IDP policy. An IDP policy can consist of
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two types of rulebases—an intrusion prevention system (IPS) rulebase and an exempt
rulebase. A rulebase is a collection of rules. Rules contain a collection of configuration
objects and are similar in structure to security policy because they use configuration
objects to create match conditions and resulting actions. Once you create an IDP
policy, the action of a security policy applies it. Although many IDP policies might exist
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within the configuration, only one IDP policy is active on a JUNOS security platform.
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IDP Configuration Objects
JUNOS Software uses configuration objects to build IDP rules. Use configuration
objects to match on zones, source and destination networks, applications, and
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attacks or attack groups.

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IDP Policy Matching Conditions
The slide shows a sample IDP policy configured with the JUNOS Software template
policy named Recommended. The slide shows a rule named rule 2 in an IPS rulebase
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with the matching conditions highlighted. In this case, the rule matches on traffic from
any zone and source address to any zone and destination address. The rule also
matches on an application type of default. When you select this application type, the
software bases application matches on the attack or attack group objects. JUNOS
Software automatically matches on application or service settings associated with the
defined attack or attack group object. You can also specify a configured application or
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application-set or use the any option.

The sample configuration on the slide shows a predefined attack group designed for
Internet Control Message Protocal (ICMP) attacks. Predefined attack and attack group
objects are part of the signature database that can be downloaded from Juniper
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Networks. We discuss the signature database on subsequent slides. You can also
specify custom attack and attack group objects or dynamic attack group objects.
Custom attacks and attack groups are user-defined configuration objects. The
software builds dynamic attack groups using filters that match on a particular option,
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such as an application. For more information on custom attacks and groups or

dynamic attack groups, refer to http://www.juniper.net/techpubs for the Juniper
Networks technical documentation.

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IDP Policy Actions
The slide shows the same sample policy rule as the previous slide, but with the action
section of the rule highlighted. This example defines an action of Recommended. This
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type of action is only applicable to IPS rulebases utilizing predefined attack objects. A
Juniper Networks recommended action is associated with all predefined attack
objects. A rule can have one of the following actions:
• no-action: JUNOS Software takes no action (used when you only need
to generate a log);
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• ignore-connection: JUNOS Software stops scanning traffic for the

rest of the connection;
• mark-diffserv: JUNOS Software assigns the indicated
service-differentiation value to the packet then passes it on normally;
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• drop-packet: JUNOS Software drops a packet before it can reach its

destination, but does not close the connection;
• recommended: The action that Juniper Networks recommends when it
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detects a predefined attack;

• drop-connection: JUNOS Software drops the connection, preventing
traffic for the connection from reaching its destination;

IDP Policy Actions (contd.)

• close-client: JUNOS Software closes the connection and sends a
RST packet to the client but not to the server;
• close-server: JUNOS Software closes the connection and sends a
RST packet to the server but not to the client; and
• close-client-and-server: JUNOS Software closes the connection
and sends an RST packet to both the client and the server.
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The example on the slide also illustrates a notification action. This action instructs
JUNOS Software to log the attack.
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Additional IDP Policy Actions
The slide lists a continuation of IDP policy actions. IP actions prevent repeat attacks.
This rule action applies to future sessions that have the same IP action attributes of
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the flow on which the software detects an attack. For example, you could configure
one of the IP actions in a rule to block all future HTTP sessions between two hosts if
the software detects an attack on a session between those hosts. Optionally, you can
specify a timeout value defining that the action should apply only if new sessions
initiate within a specified timeout value in seconds. (The default IP action timeout is 0,
which means no timeout.) IP action attributes consist of a combination of the following
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fields:
• Source IP;
• Destination IP;
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• Destination Port;
• From Zone; and
• Protocol.
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Additional IDP Policy Actions (contd.)

These IP action attributes can be used only in certain combinations and list as targets
in the following output:
[edit security idp idp-policy Recommended rulebase-ips rule 2]
user@host# set then ip-action target ?
destination-address Match destination
service Match source, destination, dst-port and protocol
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source-address Match source
source-zone Match source-zone
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zone-service Match source-zone, destination, dst-port, protocol
The following are possible IP actions:
• ip-block: JUNOS Software silently drops all packets matching the IP
action rule;
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• ip-close: JUNOS Software closes any new sessions matching the IP
action rule by sending an RST packet to the client and server; and
• ip-notify: JUNOS Software generates a log when it finds a session
matching the IP action rule.
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You can use the severity action to override the default attack severity to a configured
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Applying IDP Policy
You enable IDP policies by specifying the IDP policy in a security policy, as shown on
the slide. The security policy action must be to permit the flow. Note that once an IDP
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policy is in use, any change to the [edit security idp] hierarchy, the
associated security policy configuration, or the associated custom applications
causes an IDP policy recompilation when you issue the commit.
Active IDP Policy

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Recall that only one IDP policy is active on a JUNOS security platform at any given
time. The slide shows how to configure the active IDP policy.
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Evaluating IDP Rulebases
Once the software compiles an IDP policy, it pushes the policy to the data plane where
the IDP policy evaluation occurs. IDP policy evaluates only the first packet of a
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session. If a match occurs, the software creates a set of objects and caches them
within the session for use with attack detection on subsequent packets.
JUNOS Software evaluates all IDP rules (unlike security policy) but does so
sequentially. If a new session matches multiple rules, JUNOS Software performs the
most severe action among the rules. The slide shows the order of severity associated
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with rule actions.

You can make an IDP rule terminal using the configuration shown on the slide. When
the software configures a match in a terminal rule for the source, destination, zones,
and application, it does not continue to check subsequent rules for the same source,
destination, and application. It does not matter whether traffic matches the attack
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objects in the matching rule or not. This option is useful for disregarding traffic that
originates from a known trusted source. Terminal rules should appear near the top of
the rulebase and before other rules that would match the same traffic.
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Exempt Rulebases
The functionality of an exempt rulebase complements an IPS rulebase. You can write
rules in an exempt rulebase to skip detection of a set of attacks in certain traffic.
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Carefully written rules in an exempt rulebase can significantly reduce the number of
false positives generated by an IPS rulebase. Note that you must configure an IPS
rulebase before using an exempt rulebase. Rules in an exempt rulebase have the
same matching conditions as those of an IPS rulebase. The exception is that you
cannot configure the application object, which means rules match all applications.
When configuring attack or attack-group objects in an exempt rulebase, note that
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these attacks are attacks the software should not inspect in traffic matching this rule.
No actions are available for exempt rulebases.
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Signature Database
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The Signature Database
The signature database is one of the major components of IDP. It contains definitions
of different objects—such as attack objects, application signature objects, and service
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objects—that it uses to define IDP policy rules. As a response to new vulnerabilities,

Juniper Networks periodically provides a file containing attack database updates on
its Web site. You can download this file to protect your network from new threats. The
database lists the attack objects alphabetically, and the names consist of the attack
object group name and the name of the attack object, as shown on the slide.
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The security package, which you can download from Juniper Networks, also includes
IDP policy templates to help you implement IDP policy on your JUNOS security
platform. You can use the template policies as they are, or you can customize them for
your network environment. Templates exist for a multitude of network scenarios. The
most widely used template is called the Recommended policy. We discuss
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downloading the signature database and policy templates on subsequent slides.

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IDP Signature Update License
To update the IDP signature database, an IDP signature license is necessary. The slide
illustrates the configuration command for adding a system license, and the result of a
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successful license addition.

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Updating the Security Package Manually
You can download the Juniper Networks security package manually or automatically at
specified time intervals. The slide illustrates the operational mode commands to
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download the security package and check the status of the download. You must
connect the JUNOS security platform to the Internet to update a device directly.
Alternatively, you can download the update to a Network and Security Manager (NSM)
device, which can be configured to push the updated database to your JUNOS security
platform.
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Installing the Security Package
Once you successfully download the security package, you must install it. The slide
illustrates the operational mode commands for installing the security package and
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verifying the status of an installation.
Automatic Downloads
As mentioned previously, you can configure a JUNOS security platform to automatically
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download the security package. The slide also shows an example configuration of
automating the download.
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Signature and Attack Database Version
The slide illustrates the operational mode command used to verify the attack
database. The version includes a time and date stamp so you can check the date of
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your local database.
Checking Your Connection to the Update Server

The slide illustrates the operational mode command used to check the server
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connection from your JUNOS security platform. This command not only verifies
network connectivity, but also provides the remote database version, which is useful
for comparing version differences with the previous command output.
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Case Study: Applying the Recommended IDP Policy
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Applying the Recommended IDP Policy: Part 1
This slide and the next two slides demonstrate the steps necessary for downloading
and installing the Juniper Networks recommended IDP policy. The slide shows the
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operational mode commands used to download and install the latest policy templates
provided by Juniper Networks. Recall that a JUNOS security platform must have an IDP
signature license to download the signature database or associated policy templates.
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JUNOS Software downloads Juniper Networks policy templates in the form of a commit
script. Once you download and install the policy templates, you must activate the
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template commit script with the configuration mode command shown on the slide.
You must perform a commit action to activate a commit script. In this example, we use
the JUNOS Software CLI auto-completion feature to verify the availability of the policy
templates for configuration as the active IDP policy. For more information regarding
commit scripts, refer to http://www.juniper.net/techpubs for the Juniper Networks
technical publications.
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The next step is to set the recommended policy as the active policy. Recall that only
one IDP policy can be active on a JUNOS security platform. As illustrated on the slide,
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you must delete or deactivate the commit script. This step is important because every
subsequent commit will overwrite any changes that you made to template policies.
The final step to activating the recommended IDP policy is to apply the IDP action to a
security policy. Do not forget to commit the changes!
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Monitoring IDP Operation
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Verifying the Application of IDP Policy
The slide shows a sample output of the show security policies
policy-name command. By using the detail option, you can verify that you
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enabled IDP for this security policy.

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Monitoring IDP Status and Statistics
The slide illustrates the show security idp status command. This command
provides traffic statistics related to the IDP policy engine. It also outputs the active IDP
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policy and IDP detector version.

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IDP Counters
The command shown on the slide along with one of the command arguments provides
various counters useful in monitoring IDP operation.
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Monitoring Memory Utilization
If the IDP process runs out of memory, the software no longer evaluates traffic for
attacks. Use the command shown on the slide to monitor memory utilization.
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IDP Logging
You enable logging using the notification action. JUNOS Software stores logs
according to the data plane logging configuration present on the JUNOS security
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platform.
When you configure an IDP rule for logging, each matching event creates a log entry.
Because the software generates IDP event logs during an attack, log generation
happens in bursts, generating a much larger volume of messages during an attack. In
comparison to other event messages, the message size is also much larger for
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attack-generated messages. The log volume and message size are important
concerns for log management. To better manage the volume of log messages, IDP
supports log suppression. Log suppression limits multiple instances of the same log
occurring from the same or similar sessions over a given period of time. The software
enables log suppression by default but you can adjust attributes through configuration
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under the [edit security idp sensor-configuration log

suppression] hierarchy.
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IDP Traceoptions
You can configure IDP traceoptions to log control plane events. Currently, the only flag
available is the all flag. By default, the software logs IDP traceoptions events to the
/var/log/idpd file.

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• The purpose of the JUNOS Software IDP feature;
• Utilizing and updating the IDP signature database;
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• Utilizing and configuring IDP policy using a policy template; and

• Monitoring IDP operation.
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Review Questions
1.
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2.
3.
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4.
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Lab 7: Implementing IDP
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• High availability (HA) clustering and its functionality;
• Chassis cluster components;
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• Chassis cluster operation;

• Chassis cluster configuration; and
• Chassis cluster monitoring.
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Chapter 10–2 • High Availability Clustering

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High Availability Overview
first.
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High Availability Clustering • Chapter 10–3

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High Availability Characteristics
The JUNOS Software high availability (HA) feature provides stateful session failover.
This ability applies to TCP and UDP sessions—those that deploy Network Address
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Translation (NAT), IP Security (IPsec), or authentication, as well as those that do not.

High availability includes the synchronization of configuration files and the dynamic
runtime session states between JUNOS security platforms deploying it. The JUNOS
Software implementation of high availability clustering currently supports an
active-passive redundancy for the control plane and an active-active redundancy for
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the data plane. Check the Juniper Networks technical documentation for high
availability support specific to your platform at http://www.juniper.net/techpubs.
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High Availability Using Chassis Clusters
JUNOS Software achieves high availability on JUNOS security platforms using chassis
clustering. Chassis clustering provides network node redundancy by grouping two like
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devices into a cluster. The two nodes back each other up with one node acting as the
primary and the other as the secondary node, ensuring the stateful failover of
processes and services in the event of system or hardware failure. A control link
between services processing cards (SPCs) or revenue ports and an Ethernet data link
between revenue ports connect two like devices. JUNOS security platforms must be
the same model, and all SPCs, network processing cards (NPCs), and input/output
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cards (IOCs) on high-end platforms must have the same slot placement and hardware
revision.
The chassis clustering feature in JUNOS Software is built on the high availability
methodology of Juniper Networks M Series and T Series platforms and the TX Matrix
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platform, including multichassis clustering, active-passive Routing Engines (REs) ,

active-active Packet Forwarding Engines (PFEs), and graceful RE switchover capability.
Considering all the process implementations on M Series and T Series platforms, most
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of which have complete hardware and control plane redundancies, the JUNOS
Software implementation for JUNOS security platforms mirrors the RE and PFE backup
system and RE and PFE redundancy using Ethernet interfaces. JUNOS security
platforms add redundancy features by introducing interchassis clustering and stateful
failovers. Devices in a chassis cluster synchronize the configuration, kernel, and PFE
session states across the cluster to facilitate high availability, failover of stateful
services, and load balancing.

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Chassis Cluster Components
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Chassis Cluster Components
A chassis cluster consists of the following components:
• Cluster identification, including cluster-id id and node id;
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• Redundancy groups (RGs); and

• Chassis cluster interfaces:
– fxp1: The control plane interface;
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– fxp0: The out-of-band management interface;

– fab: The data plane interface; and
– reth: A redundancy interface.
We address all chassis cluster components in the next section of this chapter.
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cluster-id Details
You can deploy up to fifteen chassis clusters in your environment. A unique
cluster-id value, which ranges from 1–15, identifies each cluster. A JUNOS
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security platform can belong to only one cluster at any given time. The device ignores
high availability configuration and acts as a standalone device if a cluster-id
value is zero. When a device joins a cluster, it becomes a node within that cluster,
identified by a node id. If you choose to alter a cluster-id id or node id
parameter, you must reboot the device to activate the changes.
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node id Details
The node id uniquely identifies a JUNOS security platform within a cluster. Because
only two nodes can exist in a cluster, node id values range from 0–1.
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Recall the interface naming structure used by JUNOS Software:

(media type)-(fpc slot #)/(pic slot #)/(port #), for example, ge-1/0/3.
In the case of JUNOS security platforms, the Flexible PIC Concentrator (FPC) can be
either an IOC , an SPC, a Physical Interface Module (PIM), or a fixed interface. The
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software uses the node id value to offset the FPC slot value in the interface name of
a device. Specifically, the software uses the following formula to calculate the FPC slot
number:
Cluster interface FPC slot number=
(node id * max FPC slots) + standalone FPC slot number.
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For example, a Juniper Networks SRX5800 Services Gateway has a maximum of 12

slots. Using the FPC slot number calculation, you can determine that the second slot
on node 1 of a chassis cluster uses an interface name of ge-13/x/y or xe-13/x/y.
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Redundancy Group
A redundancy group (RG) is an abstract construct that includes and manages a
collection of objects. It contains objects on both nodes of a cluster. An RG is primary
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on one node and backup on the other node at any given time. When an RG is primary
on a node, its objects on that node are active.
JUNOS security platforms support up to 256 RGs. RGs are independent units of
failover, and one RG’s primacy does not affect the other RG’s primacy. In other words,
one of the RGs can be primary on node 0, while the other RG is primary on node 1.
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When an RG fails over, all its objects fail over together.

When you initialize a JUNOS security platform in chassis cluster mode, the system
creates a redundancy group called RG0. RG0 manages the primacy and failover
between the REs on each node of the cluster. As is the case for all redundancy groups,
RG0 can be primary on only one node at a time. The node on which RG0 is primary
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determines which RE is active in the cluster. You must explicitly create RGx in the
configuration and manage interface redundancy. RGx can contain up to 15 redundant
Ethernet interfaces called reth interfaces. We discuss reth interfaces in detail later in
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Three RG Object States
An RG object can be in one of the following three states:
• A blank state, which is the starting state for an RG;
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• A primary state; or
• A secondary state.
RG Object State Transitions

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As indicated on the diagram on the slide, an RG object state can transition from blank
to either primary or secondary. In addition, an RG object in the primary state can
transition to the secondary state, and vice versa. Both primary and secondary states
can transition back to the blank state when you delete an RG from the configuration
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file or when the device reboots.

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RG Primacy Rules
The rules for RG primacy are as follows:
• An RG is primary on the node with the higher priority.
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• By default, both nodes have the same priority for RG0, but you can
change the default setting to specify which node is primary for RG0. You
must explicitly configure the node priority for RGx.
• If you initialize both nodes of a cluster at the same time and you do not
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change the default setting for RG0 node priority, Node 0 takes
precedence.
• If one node of the cluster initializes before the other, the first node to
initialize takes precedence and remains the primary node for the RG
unless the preempt configuration option is present. Note that the
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RG State Transitions
For RGx to fail over automatically to another node, the software must monitor its
interfaces. When you configure an RGx, you can specify a set of interfaces the RG is to
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monitor for status, checking whether the interface is up or down. When you configure
an interface for RGx to monitor, you give it a weight value. RGx has a threshold
tolerance value initially set to 255. When an interface monitored by RGx becomes
unavailable, the software subtracts its weight from the threshold. When the threshold
reaches zero, all objects within RGx fail over to the other node.
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Illustration of RGx’s Use for Load Balancing
This slide illustrates an example of load balancing between two nodes of a cluster.
Specifically, RG1 is primary on Node 0 for destination network 10.10.0.0/16, and RG2
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is primary on Node 1 for destination network 10.20.0.0/16. In addition, RG1 is

secondary on Node 1 for destination network 10.10.0.0/16, and RG2 is secondary on
Node 0 for destination network 10.20.0.0/16.
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Chassis Cluster Interfaces—reth
A reth is a pseudo-interface that includes a physical interface from each node of a
cluster. A reth can contain either two physical Ethernet interfaces, referred to as child
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interfaces of the reth interface. Each reth can contain only two interfaces because a
cluster contains only two nodes. Although reth interfaces must be the same kind—
either Fast Ethernet, Gigabit Ethernet, or 10-Gigabit Ethernet—they do not need to be
in the same slots on each node. A reth child interface associates with the reth
interface as part of the child interface configuration. A reth child interface inherits
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properties of its parent interface. A reth interface inherits its failover properties from
RGx. Consequently, a reth interface can remain active even if one of its child
interfaces becomes unavailable. Only one child interface of a reth interface can
accept and send traffic at a time. A reth interface has a virtual MAC address, which is
based on the cluster ID and the interface ID.
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Chassis Cluster Interfaces—fxp0
JUNOS security platform management interfaces allow out-of-band network access
and network management to each node in the cluster. Only high-end security
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platforms contain an fxp0 interface. For branch security platforms in a chassis cluster,
JUNOS Software designates one of the revenue ports to act as the fxp0 interface.
Refer to your product’s documentation at http://www.juniper.net/techpubs to
determine which port acts as the fxp0 interface for your specific branch device.
We recommend giving each node in a chassis cluster a unique IP address for the fxp0
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interface of each node. This practice allows independent node management. To

accomplish this practice, you must configure interfaces in separate configuration
groups under the [edit groups] configuration hierarchy. We cover details
regarding configuration of groups later in this chapter.
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Chassis Cluster Interfaces—fxp1
Each SPC on a high-end SRX Series platform has two ports for use as a chassis cluster
control link, named fxp1. Currently, the software supports only a single control link. On
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high-end security platforms, the control link connects through ports on SPCs. Use
Port 0 if the RE is in RE Slot 0 within the chassis, and use Port 1 if the RE is in RE Slot
1. Branch security platforms use revenue ports for the chassis cluster control link.
Check the documentation specific to your device to determine which port to use.
On high-end security platforms, configuration is necessary to designate the ports
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associated with fxp1 as shown:

[edit chassis cluster]
user@host1# show
control-ports {
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fpc slot port port;

fpc slot port port;
}
The system provides each fxp1 control link interface with an internal IP address and
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uses the proprietary Trivial Network Protocol (TNP) to transmit the session state, the
configuration file, and liveliness signals across the nodes. JUNOS Software
periodically transmits heartbeat signals over the control link to determine the health
of the control link. If the number of missed heartbeats reaches the configured
threshold and the fabric link is operational, the system signals a control link failure.

Chassis Cluster Interfaces—fxp1 (contd.)

If the control link fails, JUNOS Software disables the secondary node to prevent the
possibility of each node becoming primary for all RGs, including RG0.
Once a secondary node is disabled, you must reboot the node to resume operation.
You can make this reboot automatic on some JUNOS security platforms using the
control-link-recovery configuration option as follows:
{primary:node0}[edit chassis cluster]
user@host# show
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Chassis Cluster Interfaces—fab
JUNOS Software uses the fabric (fab) interface for the high availability data plane.
When the system creates the fab interface, the software assigns it an internally
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derived IP address that it uses for packet transmission. The fab is a physical
connection between two Ethernet interfaces on the same LAN. Both interfaces must
be the same media type. Unlike the control link that has system-determined
interfaces, you specify the physical interfaces to use for the fab data link in the
configuration.
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Similar to the fxp1 control link, the fab link uses fabric probes to determine the health
of the link. If JUNOS Software determines that there has been a fabric link failure, it
disables the secondary node, and a reboot is required to restore operation.
JUNOS Software does not support traditional interface features such as firewall filters,
policies, logical interfaces, or system services on the fab link, and the fab link is not
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configured under a security zone. Although JUNOS Software does not support
fragmentation on the fab link, it does support jumbo frames up to 8980 bytes.
Therefore, we recommend that no interface in a chassis cluster exceed this maximum
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transmission unit (MTU) size.

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Purpose of Real-Time Objects
To provide for session or flow redundancy, the data plane synchronizes its state by
sending special payload packets named real-time objects (RTOs) from one node to the
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other across the fab data link. By transmitting information about a session between
the nodes, RTOs ensure the consistency and stability of sessions if a failover occurs;
thus, they enable the system to continue to process traffic belonging to existing
sessions. To ensure session information synchronization between the two nodes, the
data plane gives RTO packets priority over transit traffic.
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Dynamics of RTOs
JUNOS Software creates RTOs dynamically in memory. Some examples of dynamically
created RTOs include session table entries and IPsec security associations (SAs).
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Chassis Cluster Interface Summary
The slide summarizes all the cluster interfaces that we just discussed.
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Chassis Cluster Operation
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Cluster Operation: Forming a Cluster
The first chassis in a cluster forms a cluster upon booting up. It transitions from the
blank state to the primary state.
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Cluster Operation: Joining a Cluster
A chassis can join an existing cluster. The RG0 of the joining chassis transitions from
the blank state to the secondary state. RGx transitions from the blank state to either
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the primary state or the secondary state based on a combination of priorities and
preempt configurations. The join operation causes the joining chassis to perform
configuration synchronization as well. A join operation might cause the existing cluster
node to change its RGx states from primary to secondary.
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Cluster Operation: Leaving a Cluster
A leave action happens when a node chassis reboots or powers off. This leave action
can trigger RG state changes from secondary to primary in another cluster node.
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Cluster Operation: Splitting a Cluster
JUNOS Software offers automatic protection from split scenarios by disabling the
secondary node if either the control link or the fabric link suffers a loss of keepalives
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or heartbeat messages. You must reboot the disabled node to have it rejoin the
cluster. However, if JUNOS Software detects a failure on both links simultaneously,
such as in the case of a system failure, both devices become primary nodes.
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Cluster Operation: Merging a Cluster
A merge action happens when a split cluster regains connectivity. The merged cluster
can cause RG state transitions from primary to secondary.
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One Node Handling Transit Traffic
The slide illustrates the packet flow in active-passive mode for the data plane. In this
case, Node 0 is the primary node, and Node 1 is the secondary node.
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Both Nodes Handling Transit Traffic
In active-active mode for the data plane, two nodes handle transit traffic. This slide
illustrates the packet flow in which ingress and egress interfaces are on different
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devices of a cluster. The node containing the egress interface for the first flow in a
session always acts as the host of the session. In this case, the flow’s active session is
on Node 1, and the flow’s backup session is on Node 0.
At this time, JUNOS security platforms support active-active mode for the data plane
only. The control plane always acts in an active-passive fashion, with the secondary
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node providing redundancy to the primary node.

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Chassis Cluster Configuration
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Connecting the Two Devices
Ensure that you interconnect two JUNOS security platforms of the same model, with
SPCs inserted in identical slots (on a high-end platform), as follows:
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• Connect the ports for use as the control link. On high-end platforms, use
the SPC port with the same number as the RE slot. On branch platforms,
use the appropriate revenue port specific to the model of device.
• Connect the Ethernet interfaces of the two nodes to create the fabric link
(fab interface).
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Configuring Control Ports

For high-end platforms, enable the SPC control plane ports in the configuration and
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commit the configuration.
Enabling Clustering
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Enabling chassis clustering involves setting a cluster-id id and node id on

each chassis in the cluster. The cluster-id value is the same on both nodes. To
activate clustering, once you set the cluster-id id and the node id, you must
reboot the node designated as the primary device first, then reboot the desired
secondary node.

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Enabling the Chassis Cluster
The slide illustrates the configuration required to enable the SPC control plane ports
for high-end security platforms.
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It also displays the syntax of a command that is necessary to set up the cluster-id
id and node id. Note that you perform this command in operational mode and the
mandatory reboot is available as part of the command.
Enabling the Chassis Cluster on the Second Node

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Because the second node inherits the configuration associated with the primary node,
no control port configuration is necessary. The slide illustrates the operational mode
command required to add the second node to the chassis cluster.
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Cluster Configuration Steps
Once you reboot a node of a cluster, you are ready to configure other cluster
parameters. The slide lists the configuration steps you must follow to accomplish
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cluster configuration.
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Configuring the Management Interface
You configure management access to the cluster by defining a unique hostname for
each node and assigning a unique IP address for the fxp0 interface on each node.
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Note that the configured group names must be node0 and node1. You must apply
the configured groups using the apply-groups configuration stanza, as illustrated
on the slide.
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Configuring Fabric Interfaces
You configure the fab interface between the two nodes using the syntax illustrated on
the slide. The member interface for fab0 is an Ethernet interface on Node 0, and the
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member interface for fab1 is an Ethernet interface on Node 1. Both fab interfaces
must be of the same media type.
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Configuring a Redundancy Group
The slide illustrates the syntax necessary for configuring an RG. You perform the
configuration under the chassis cluster configuration stanza. The configuration
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includes specifying the following:

• The node priorities (the higher number takes precedence);
• The number of gratuitous Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) requests
that an interface can send to notify other network devices of its presence
after an RG to which it belongs fails over;
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• Weights to the monitored interfaces; and

• An optional preemption, which allows a node with a better priority to
initiate a failover to become primary for the configured RG.
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Configuring a Redundant Ethernet Interface
To create a reth interface, you configure the two physical interfaces independently.
You configure the rest of the parameters pertaining to reth interfaces at the
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interfaces reth number configuration stanza. Once you commit the

configuration, all child interfaces of a reth interface inherit those parameters.
Because reth interfaces are pseudo-interfaces, you must define the number of reth
interfaces in a cluster by configuring reth-count.
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Configuring Cluster Failover Parameters
The following are the cluster failover parameters that you can configure, should you
choose to alter their default values:
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• heartbeat-interval: Interval or duration when all nodes in the

cluster receive the heartbeat message broadcast; and
• heartbeat-threshold: Number of missed heartbeats that must be
exceeded to declare the cluster node dead.
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Disabling a Chassis Cluster
The slide illustrates the operational mode command used to remove a JUNOS security
platform from a cluster. Enter it first on the primary node and then on the secondary
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node. Because it will have its configuration synced to the primary node configuration,
the secondary node will also need its interfaces renamed.
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Chassis Cluster Monitoring
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Example: Network Diagram Prior to Issuing the Cluster-Forming
Command
Consider the example on the slide. Two high-end security platforms, host1 and host2,
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interconnect together using Gigabit Ethernet interfaces as well as SPC control ports in
Slot 3. We connected both nodes to the server site using the ge-0/0/0 interface and
to the Internet using the ge-1/0/0 interface.
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Form a Cluster
To form a cluster using high-end security platforms, you must configure the control
ports on the node. Because the secondary node’s configuration will be synchronized
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with the primary node’s configuration, you are only required to configure control ports
on the node designated as primary. Make sure to commit the configuration.
For all JUNOS security platforms, use the operational mode commands shown on the
slide to set the cluster identification number and node identification number. The
operational mode command also allows you to perform the mandatory reboot on each
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device. Remember to perform this operation first on the node designated to be the
primary node and then on the node designated as secondary.
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Example: Network Diagram After Issuing the Cluster-Forming Command
After you reboot the SRX Series Services Gateways, they form a cluster. The cluster
formation results in interface names changing, as illustrated on the slide.
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Cluster Status Check
Use the show commands illustrated on the slide to display the status of the chassis
cluster and the cluster interfaces.
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Configuring the Management Interface
Next, configure the management interface using the groups and apply-groups
configuration stanzas, as illustrated on the slide.
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Configuring the Fabric Interfaces
In the example on the slide, the fab0 and fab1 interfaces of the cluster use ge-0/0/2
and ge-12/0/2 physical interfaces. The slide depicts the configuration of the fab0 and
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fab1 interfaces as well as the resulting status. Note that the fab interfaces now show
a link status of up.
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Configuring a Redundancy Group
The slide illustrates the configuration of RG0 and RG1. Node 0 is primary because its
priority is higher than Node 1’s priority. RG1 monitors the ge-0/0/0 interface
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connected to the server site. If the ge-0/0/0 interface becomes unavailable, RG1 fails
over to Node 1 and the ge-12/0/0 interface.
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Viewing Redundancy Groups
To view the RG status, use the show chassis cluster status command. This
command allows you to see which nodes are primary and secondary for RG0 and RG1.
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You can also verify that you enabled preemption or if a manual failover is in effect. We
discuss manual failovers on a subsequent slide.
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Configuring reth Interfaces
In the example on the slide, one reth interface is shown—reth1—and it belongs to
RG1. Interfaces ge-0/0/0 and ge-12/0/0 constitute the reth1 interface. The total
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number of reth interfaces that the cluster will recognize is two (based on a
reth-count value).
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Configuring Cluster Failover Parameters
According to the configuration on the slide, heartbeat messages between the nodes in
the cluster happen every 1200 milliseconds. In addition, the system assumes the
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node is dead if the number of missed heartbeats exceeds five.

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Monitoring Cluster Statistics
Use the show chassis cluster statistics command to display chassis
cluster counters. The counters are useful for troubleshooting and verifying proper
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operation.
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Manual Failover
You can initiate a failover manually with the request command shown on the slide. A
manual failover bumps up the priority of the redundancy group for that member to
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255. Be careful with manual failovers. An RG0 failover implies an RE failover. An RE

failover kills all processes running on the primary node and spawns them on the new
primary RE, which can result in a loss of state, such as routing state.
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Resetting a Manual Failover
After a manual failover, the new primary node continues in that role until a reset or
failback occurs. If a failback occurs, the manual failover is lost, and the software
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bases state election on priority and preempt settings. A failback in manual failover
mode can occur if the primary node fails or if the threshold of an RG reaches zero.
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Chassis Cluster Logging
Use the show log jsrpd command to view chassis cluster events. The jsrpd
process is the process associated with managing chassis cluster events. For some
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chassis cluster events, the software dynamically populates this log.
Traceoptions
You can also configure traceoptions for chassis cluster operations. You can set flags
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for many events.

{primary:node0}[edit]
user@host# set chassis cluster traceoptions flag ?
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all Trace all events

cli Trace CLI events
configuration Trace configuration events
eventlib Trace event library events
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fsm Trace finite state machine events

heartbeat Trace JSRPD heartbeats
init Trace initialization events
interface Trace interface related events
routing-socket Trace routing socket events
socket Trace socket events
uspipc Trace USP IPC events

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• High availability clustering and its functionality;
• Chassis cluster components;
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• Chassis cluster operation;

• Chassis cluster configuration; and
• Chassis cluster monitoring.
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Review Questions
1.
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2.
3.
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4.
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Lab 8: Implementing Chassis Clusters
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Appendix A: Acronym List
AES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Advanced Encryption Standard
AH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . authentication header
ALG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .application-level gateway
ARP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Address Resolution Protocol
ASIC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .application-specific integrated circuit
n
CoS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . class-of-service
CRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . cyclic redundancy check
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DDoS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . distributed denial of service
DES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Data Encryption Standard
DHCP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DMZ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . demilitarized zone
DoS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . denial of service
uc
DPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .dead peer detection
ESP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Encapsulating Security Payload
FPC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Flexible PIC Concentrator
GUI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . graphical user interface
d
HA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .high availability
HMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Hashed Message Authentication Code
ro
HTTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Secure Sockets Layer
ICMP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Internet Control Message Protocol
IDP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Intrusion Detection and Prevention
ep
IDP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . initial domain part
IDS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . intrusion detection service
IKE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Internet Key Exchange
IOC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .input/output card
IPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . intrusion prevention system
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IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IP Security
IPv4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IP version 4
IPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IP version 6
ISN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . initial sequence number
ISP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Internet service provider
JNTCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Juniper Networks Technical Certification Program
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LDAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lightweight Directory Access Protocol

MD5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Message Digest 5
MTU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . maximum transmission unit
NAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Network Address Translation
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NSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Network and Security Manager

NTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Network Time Protocol
PAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Port Address Translation
PFE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Packet Forwarding Engine
N
PFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Perfect Forward Secrecy

PIM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Physical Interface Module
PoE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Power over Ethernet
QoS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . quality of service
RE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Routing Engine
RST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . register suppression time
SA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . security association
SCB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Switch Control Board
Acronym List • A–1

SHA-1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Secure Hash Algorithm 1
SPC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . services processing card
SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .security parameter index
SPU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Services Processing Unit
SSL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Secure Sockets Layer
TNP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Trivial Network Protocol
ToS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . type of service
TTL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . time to live
UTM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Unified Threat Management
VLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . virtual LAN
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VoIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . voice over IP
VPLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .virtual private LAN service
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VPN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .virtual private network
d uc
ro
ep
rR
fo
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A–2 • Acronym List

Appendix B: Answer Key
This chapter contains no review questions.
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Chapter 2: Introduction to JUNOS Security Platforms
1.
tio
Traditionally, routers process packets on a per-packet basis.
2.
Traditionally, firewalls process packets based on stateful flows.
uc
3.
JUNOS for security platforms uses session-based packet forwarding and by default does not
allow traffic to pass, whereas traditional JUNOS Software uses packet-based forwarding and by
d
default allows all traffic to pass.
4. ro
The first packet of a new session is subject to first-path packet processing.
Chapter 3: Zones
ep
1.
A zone is a collection of one or more network segments sharing identical security requirements.
2.
rR
Overall, there are two types of zones in JUNOS Software—user-defined and system-defined
zones. User-defined zones include security and functional zones, both of which you can
configure. The Null Zone is a system-defined zone that you cannot configure. The security zone
facilitates transit packets and packets to the device itself. The functional zone facilitates only
management traffic. The Null Zone is a placeholder for interfaces that do not belong to any
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zone. All interfaces belonging to the Null Zone drop all packets.
3.
To configure a zone, you must perform the following steps: (1) Define a security zone or a
functional zone; (2) Add logical interfaces to the zone; and (3) Optionally, add services and
ot
protocols that must be permitted into the device.

4.
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You can specify traffic types to be allowed into a JUNOS security platform using the
host-inbound-traffic statement.
Answer Key • B–1

1.
The basic components of a policy are: (1) policy name; (2) source zone and destination zone;
(3) matching conditions, consisting of one or many source addresses or sets, one or many
destination addresses or sets, one or many applications or sets; and (4) actions.
2.
The default action for every policy set is to deny traffic.
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3.
The policy scheduler enables the user to dynamically activate or deactivate a security policy. If
tio
you deactivate a policy, and no other matches are found, the default security policy examines
the packet.
4.
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You can reorder policies using the JUNOS Software insert command.
d
1.
JUNOS Software supports RADIUS, LDAP, and SecurID external authentication servers.
2.
ro
In pass-through authentication, the user attempts to access the remote network resource
directly, and the JUNOS security platform intercepts the session to perform firewall
ep
authentication, while buffering the session. The buffered session is released as long as
authentication is successful. In Web authentication, the user must first access an IP address
belonging to the JUNOS security device using a Web browser; the authentication is performed
using this HTTP session. The user can then proceed to access the remote network resource as
long as authentication is successful. FTP, Telnet, and HTTP traffic trigger pass-through
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authentication, while an HTTP session must trigger Web authentication.

3.
A client group is a list of groups associated with a client. Groups can be used in security policies
in place of individual clients for ease of management.
fo
4.
Use the show security firewall-authentication history command to view a
history of firewall authentication attempts.
ot

1.
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The purpose of SCREEN options in JUNOS Software is to offer better network protection to the
networks behind the JUNOS security platform, and to the device itself, from malicious
information or attacks.
B–2 • Answer Key

Chapter 6: SCREEN Options (contd.)
2.
The available SCREEN options include IP address sweep detection, port scanning detection,
network investigation triggering, operating system probe blocking, abnormal SYN and FIN flags
setting detection, IP spoofing detection, bad IP source route options detection, ICMP
abnormalities detection, and DoS attack detection.
3.
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Beyond offering network and host protection against malicious attacks, the main advantage of
using SCREEN options is that JUNOS Software performs SCREEN checks prior to security policy
processing, which results in fewer resources used for malicious packet processing.
tio
4.
There are two main goals for a DoS attack: immobilizing hosts and immobilizing networks.
5.
uc
Apply SCREEN options under the security zones configuration stanza.
d
1.
ro
Destination NAT processing occurs before security policy processing and source NAT processing
occurs after security policy processing.
2.
ep
Static source NAT is supported in one of two ways—using source NAT with address shifting or
the automatic creation of a return session when using static destination NAT.
3.
The NAT off action is for detailed control within NAT rule-sets.
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4.
A NAT proxy ARP configuration is necessary when the translated address belongs to the same
subnet as the ingress interface.
5.
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The commands used to monitor NAT operations are show security flow session, show
security nat source summary (or show security nat destination summary),
show security nat source pool (or show security nat destination pool),
and show security nat source rule (or show security nat destination
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rule).

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1.
The three major security concerns are confidentiality, integrity, and authentication.
2.
The main difference between ESP and AH is that AH does not provide confidentiality, while ESP
does.
Answer Key • B–3

Chapter 8: IPsec VPNs (contd.)
3.
JUNOS Software supports the use of the MD5 and SHA protocols to ensure data integrity.
4.
The two modes available in IKE Phase 1 are main and aggressive.
Chapter 9: Introduction to Intrusion Detection and Prevention
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1.
tio
JUNOS Software processes the rule with the most severe action.
2.
The exempt rulebase exempts specified traffic from IDP policy.
uc
3.
Evaluation of a rulebase stops only when the software matches a terminal rule.
4.
d
To apply an IDP policy, you must make it the active policy and reference an IDP action in a
security policy.

ro
1.
ep
The control plane of a chassis cluster uses SPC ports on high-end systems and revenue ports
on branch platforms and is named fxp1. The data plane connects using physical ports named
fab0 and fab1.
rR
2.
The fab interface serves as the data plane link between nodes in a chassis cluster and
transmits RTOs to replicate session state between the two nodes.
3.
An RG is an abstract entity that manages the redundancy of a group of objects. The software
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creates RG0 when a chassis cluster forms to manage primacy of REs. The software uses RGx
to manage primacy of reth interfaces.
4.
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The default threshold for interface monitoring is 255.

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B–4 • Answer Key

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n

JUNOS for Security Platforms

1194 North Mathilda Avenue

Course Number: EDU-JUN-JSEC

Chapter 1: Course Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

Chapter 2: Introduction to JUNOS Security Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

Chapter 3: Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

Chapter 5: Firewall User Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1

Client Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20

Chapter 6: SCREEN Options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1

Using JUNOS Software SCREEN Options—Reconnaissance Attack Handling . . . . . . . . . . . 6-16

Chapter 8: IPsec VPNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1

Chapter 10: High Availability Clustering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10-1

Chassis Cluster Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-40

Appendix A: Acronym List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

Appendix B: Answer Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

• Utilize and update the IDP signature database.

JUNOS for Security Platforms is an intermediate level course.

Chapter 8: IPsec VPNs

Chapter 10: High Availability Clustering

CLI and GUI Text

Style Description Usage Example

Courier Console text:

Input Text Versus Output Text

Style Description Usage Example

Normal CLI No distinguishing variant. Physical interface:fxp0,

Document Conventions • vii

Style Description Usage Example

Text where variable value is already

CLI Text where the variable’s value is Type set policy

viii • Document Conventions

Education Services Offerings

About This Publication

Juniper Networks Support

• Juniper Networks Technical Certification Program (JNTCP).

Chapter 1–2 • Course Introduction

Course Introduction • Chapter 1–3

Chapter 1–4 • Course Introduction

Course Introduction • Chapter 1–5

Chapter 1–6 • Course Introduction

Course Introduction • Chapter 1–7

Chapter 1–8 • Course Introduction

Course Introduction • Chapter 1–9

Chapter 1–10 • Course Introduction

a combination of written proficiency exams and hands-on configuration and

Course Introduction • Chapter 1–11

questions. These computer-based exams are administered at Prometric testing

track. Please visit the JNTCP Web site at

Chapter 1–12 • Course Introduction

Course Introduction • Chapter 1–13

Chapter 1–14 • Course Introduction

• SRX Series Services Gateways;

Chapter 2–2 • Introduction to JUNOS Security Platforms

Introduction to JUNOS Security Platforms • Chapter 2–3

determination mechanism. This mechanism could be statically assigned routes,

Packet Processing Is Stateless

Separate Broadcast Domains and Provide WAN Connectivity

Chapter 2–4 • Introduction to JUNOS Security Platforms

Introduction to JUNOS Security Platforms • Chapter 2–5

Typical Treatment of Security

Chapter 2–6 • Introduction to JUNOS Security Platforms

Introduction to JUNOS Security Platforms • Chapter 2–7

Chapter 2–8 • Introduction to JUNOS Security Platforms