II. B.

Picart Vs Smith (Definition & Elements of Quasi-delict/Culpa Aquiliana and Factors in Determining Negligence-
Foreseeability)
FACTS:
 In 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union, Amado Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge.
Before he had gotten half way across, Frank Smith Jr. approached from the opposite direction in an automobile,
going at the rate of about 10 or 12 miles per hour.
 As Smith neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He
continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him
that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
 Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the
apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the
bridge instead of going to the left.
 As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the
machine. In so doing Smith assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. The pony had not as yet
exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop.
 Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, Smith, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or
slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed.
 When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, Smith
quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it was then
standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened
and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing.
 In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The
horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.
 As a result of its injuries the horse died. Picart received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and
required medical attention for several days.

ISSUE: WON Smith is guilty of negligence.

RULING: YES
 As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and rider would pass over
to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this
would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety
in front of the moving vehicle.
 In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and
from this moment it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place
of greater safety.
 The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car
to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass
sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran
straight on until he was almost upon the horse.
 When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the
law.
 The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
o The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would
be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines
liability by that.
  FORESEEABILITY (Factors in Determining Negligence, Part 5 of the Syllabus):
 The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be
always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the f facts involved in the particular case.
 Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern
their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them.
 They are not, and are not supposed to be, take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn
of danger.
 Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If
so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be
held to exist.
 Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this:
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
 A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would, in our opinion, have recognized that the course
which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and rider as
a reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty
to guard against the threatened harm.

DISPOSITION:
 From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is here
rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with costs of both
instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the
plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of -his apparel, and lawful interest on the whole to the date
of this recovery. The other damages claimed by the plaintiff are remote or otherwise of such character as not to
be recoverable. So ordered.

NOTES:
 It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence
in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent;
and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be
noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the
person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and f ails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

II. C. Cangco vs Manila Railroad Co.

Facts:
 Jose Cangco was a clerk of the Manila Railroad Co. with a monthly wage of P25
o He comes to office using a pass supplied by the company which entitled him to ride upon the company’s
trains free of charge
 On January 20, 1915, the plaintiff was returning home by rail from his daily labors; and as the train drew up to the
station in San Mateo the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second-class car where he was riding and, making his
exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right
hand for support
 On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins
to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends along in front of said
office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches
  As the train slowed down another passenger, named Emilio Zufiiga, also an employee of the railroad company,
got off the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground
 When the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his
feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell
violently on the platform
o His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was
badly crushed and lacerated
o It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before
it came to a full stop
o The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was lighted
dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred
were difficult to discern, especially to a person emerging from a lighted car
 It was the customary season for harvesting watermelons, and a large lot had been brought to the station for
shipment to the market
o They were piled on the platform in a row, one upon the other
o Row of sacks was so placed that there was a space of only about two feet between the sacks of melons
and the edge of the platform
 He was then brought to a hospital were his arm was amputated (Total expenses were P790.25)
 Cango filed a case against the company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees
of the company in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace
to the security of passenger alighting from the company’s trains
 Railroad company’s defense:
o Involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an
obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of
approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was
his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before
alighting
o Under the doctrine of comparative negligence, if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence,
no liability is imposed upon defendant, whereas if the accident was caused by defendant's negligence and
plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned.
 CFI ruled in favor of the railroad company, stating that:
o Although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were
so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had
failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering
Issue no. 1:
Whether or not the railroad company can be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiff

Ruling:
 YES, the railroad company is liable based on culpa contractual, not culpa contractual
 The SC ruled that it cannot be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in
piling these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as
he alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained
by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned
unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence.
 It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and
that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that
contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance
 That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in the legal viewpoint from that presumptive
responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted
by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision
  Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extracontractual
obligations—or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa
contractual
 The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-contractual culpa based upon
negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant personally, and
that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in complete accord with
the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability created by article 1903 is
imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority
existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or omission, was the
cause of it.
 On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or
agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact, is not based upon
a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost
diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his contract.
Application:
 The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and
to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (Civil Code, article 1258)
 That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof
that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants

Issue no. 2:
Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff

Ruling:
 In this particular instance, that the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the
fact that it came to stop within six meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of person alight
from trains under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company has kept its
platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any
injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to
provide a safe alighting place.
 We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on
Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:
o The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to
alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether
an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the
passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not
the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary
prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on
Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
 Or, if we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep., 809), we may
say that the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted
from the train which would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train under the
conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so
to desist was contributory negligence.
 As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following
circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the
roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting
passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping
off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable
and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young
 manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would
have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such
act — that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly — the age, sex, and physical condition
of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered.
Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less capable than men of alighting with safety under such
conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be
noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at
this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step
which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the
conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized
by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.

Damages awarded:
 The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and
that the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing that employment. Defendant
has not shown that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according to the
standard mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a fair compensation for
the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also entitled to recover
of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services, and other incidental
expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries

II. D. RAKES vs ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC CO.

Tracey, J.
NATURE: APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
DOCTRINES:
 In order to enforce the liability of an employer for injuries to his employee, it is not necessary that a criminal action
be first prosecuted against the employer or his representative primarily chargeable with the accident. No criminal
proceeding having been taken, the civil action may proceed to judgment.
 The responsibility of an employer to his employee arises out of the contractual relations between them and is
regulated by article 1101 and the following articles of the Civil Code.
 The doctrine known as the "Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the employer where the injury was incurred through
the negligence of a fellowservant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
 The negligence of the injured person contributing to his injury but not being one of the determining causes of the
principal accident, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but only in reduction of his damages. Each party is
chargeable with damages in proportion to his fault.

FACTS:
 M.H. Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s.
 A gang of eight negro laborers, including Rakes, were working in the company’s yard and they were transporting
heavy iron rails using two hand cars from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the Malecon in Manila.
o Each hand car carrying the opposite ends of the rails.
 The hand cars were pulled by rope from the front and other workers are pushing the cars from behind.
 The plaintiff was walking alongside the hand car.
 There were no side guards installed on the sides of the cars but the rails were secured by ropes.
 The track where the hand cars move were also weakened by a previous typhoon.
o It was alleged that Atlantic’s foreman was notified of said damage in the tracks but the same were left
unrepaired.
  While the hand cars were being moved and when it reached the depressed portion of the track, and while Rakes
was beside one of the hand cars, the ropes gave in and the rails slipped thereby crushing his leg and causing it to
be amputated.
 The plaintiff sought for damages against the defendant alleging that the accident happened through the
negligence of the latter.
o Rakes won against Atlantic Gulf.
o He was awarded 5,000 pesos for damages.
 The trial courts found the defendant liable.
o Implied that by the relation between the parties, the employer is bound to provide safe appliances for the
use of the employee.
o That
 Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered their workers to be walking
only before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the cars have no side guards to protect them
in case the rails would slip.
 Atlantic also alleged that Rakes should be suing the foreman as it was him who neglected to have the tracks
repaired; that Rakes himself was negligent for having known of the depression on the track yet he continued to
work.

ISSUE # 1: Is plaintiff liable for contributory negligence?

RULING # 1: NO
RULING:
 Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate
causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury,
between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not
entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt.
 For instance, the cause of the accident under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to
replace it. This produced the event giving occasion for damages—that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding
of the iron rails.
 To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an element
of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly through his act or
omission of duty, that would have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for which he
would have been responsible.
 Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in
conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the
defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his
own imprudence.

ISSUE # 2: Whether or not the plaintiff’s injury is a risk incident to his employment.
RULING # 2: NO
 It is evident that this cannot be the case if the occurrence was due to the failure to repair the track or to duly
inspect it, for the employee is not presumed to have stipulated that the employer might neglect his legal duty.
Nor may it be excused upon the ground that the negligence leading to the accident was that of a fellow-servant
of the injured man.
 It is not apparent to us that the intervention of a third person can relieve the defendant from the performance of
its duty nor impose upon the plaintiff the consequences of an act or omission not his own. Sua cuique culpa nocet.
 This doctrine, known as "the fellow-servant rule," we are not disposed to introduce into our jurisprudence.
RE PLAINTIFF’S CARELESSNESS (That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work)
 There is nothing in the evidence to show that the plaintiff did or could see the displaced timber underneath the
sleeper. The claim that he must have done so is a conclusion drawn from what is assumed to have been a probable
condition of things not before us, rather than a fair inference from the testimony.
 While the method of construction may have been known to the men who had helped build the road, it was
otherwise with the plaintiff who had worked at this job less than two days. A man may easily walk along a railway
without perceiving a displacement of the underlying timbers. The foreman testified that he knew the state of the
track on the day of the accident and that it was then in good condition, and one Danridge, a witness for the
defendant, Working on the same job, swore that he never noticed the depression in the track and never saw any
bad place in it.
 The sagging of the track this plaintiff did perceive, but that was reported in his hearing to the foreman who neither
promised nor refused to repair it.His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight depression
of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severe American
rule.
 On this point we accept the conclusion of the trial judge who found as facts that "the plaintiff did not know the
cause of the one rail being lower than the other" and "it does not appear in this case that the plaintiff knew before
the accident occurred that the stringers and rails joined in the same place."

RE PLAINTIFF’S CARELESSNESS (That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards,
either before or behind it)
 While the judge remarks that the evidence does not justify the finding that the car was pulled by means of a rope
attached to the front end or to the rails upon it, and further that the circumstances in evidence make it clear that
the persons necessary to operate the car could not walk upon the plank between the rails and that, therefore, it
was necessary for the employees moving it to get hold upon it as best they could, there is no specific finding upon
the instruction given by the defendant to its employees to walk only upon the planks, nor upon the necessity of
the plaintiff putting himself upon the ties at the side in order to get hold upon the car.
 Therefore the findings of the judge below leave the conduct of the plaintiff in walking along the side of the loaded
car, upon the open ties, over the depressed track, free to our inquiry.
 While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were
expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the workmen testify
that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car,
and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load.
 On this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the
extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing
himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.

DISPOSITIVE: Judgment Modified

NOTES:
 The distinction is thus clearly set forth by Manresa in his commentary on article 1093:
o "We see with reference to such obligations, that culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different
senses; either as culpa, substantive and independent, which 011 account of its origin arises in an
obligation between two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; or as an incident in the
performance of an obligation which already existed, which cannot be presumed to exist without the other,
and which increases the liability arising from the already existing obligation.
o "Of these two species of CII?/MI the first one mentioned, existing by itself, may be also considered as a
real source of an independent obligation, and, as chapter 2, title 16 of this book of the code is devoted to
it, it is logical to presume that the reference contained in article 1093 is limited thereto and that it does
 not extend to those provisions relating to the other species of culpa (negligence), the nature of which we
will discuss later." (Vol. 8, p. 29.)
 And in his commentary on articles 1102 and 1104 he says that these two species of negligence may be somewhat
inexactly described as contractual and extra-contractual, the latter being the culpa aquiliana of the Roman law
and not entailing so strict an obligation as the former.

II. E. Corliss vs Manila Rail Road (Definition & Elements of Quasi-delict/Culpa Aquiliana, AND Ordinary diligence)

Facts:
 Ralph Corliss, 21 years old, died when the jeep he was driving collided with a locomotive of defendant-appellee
Manila Railroad Company at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga in front of the Clark Air Force
Base
 Lower court dismissed the complaint for recovery of damages filed by Preciolita V. Corliss, the wife
o after summarizing the evidence, lower court concluded that the deceased “in his eagerness to beat, so to
speak, the oncoming locomotive, took the risk and attempted to reach the other side, but unfortunately
he became the victim of his own miscalculation."

 there is no dispute as to the following: “In December 1956, plaintiff, 19 years of age, married Ralph W. Corliss, Jr.,
21 years of age, x x x; that Corliss, Jr. was an air police of the Clark Air Force Base; that at the time of the accident,
he was driving the fatal jeep; that he was then returning in said jeep, together with a P.C. soldier, to the Base; and
that Corliss, Jr. died of serious burns at the Base Hospital the next day, while the soldier sustained serious physical
injuries and burns."

Witness for plaintiff-appellant #1 – Ronald J. Ennis:

 that at the time of the accident, he was awaiting transportation at the entrance of Clark Field, which was about
40 to 50 yards away from the tracks and that while there he saw the jeep coming towards the Base.
 He said that said jeep slowed down before reaching the crossing, that it made a brief stop but that it did not
stop— dead stop. Elaborating, he declared that while it was slowing down, Corliss, Jr. shifted into first gear and
that was what he meant by a brief stop. He also testified that he could see the train coming from the direction of
San Fernando and that he heard a warning but that it was not sufficient enough to avoid the accident.

Witness for plaintiff-appellant #2 – Virgilio de la Paz:

 he was at the Balibago checkpoint and saw the train coming from Angeles and a jeep going towards the
direction of Clark Field. He stated that he heard the whistle of the locomotive and saw the collision. The jeep,
which caught fire, was pushed forward. He helped the P.C. soldier. He stated that he saw the jeep running fast
and heard the tooting of the horn. It did not stop at the railroad crossing, according to him.

Main witness for defendant-appellee – Teodorico Capili:

 “who was at the engine at the time of the mishap and who “testified that before the locomotive, which had
been previously inspected and found to be in good condition, approached the crossing, that is, about 300
meters away, he blew the siren and repeated it in compliance with the regulations until he saw the jeep
suddenly spurt, and that although the locomotive was running between 20 and 25 kilometers an hour and
although he had applied the brakes, the jeep was caught in the middle of the tracks.''

Issue #1 (in relation to definition): How is negligence defined?

Ruling #1:
 Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions, United States v. Juanillo and United States v. Barias.
 Cooley’ formulation was quoted with approval in both the Juanillo and Barias decisions.
o Thus: “Judge Cooley, in his work on Torts (3d ed.), Sec. 1324, defines negligence to be:
“The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.”

 There was likewise a reliance on Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co.

o Thus: “Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not
an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care
and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of
care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.”

 To repeat, by such a test, no negligence could be imputed to defendant-appellee, and the action of plaintiff-
appellant must necessary fail. The facts, being what they are, compel the conclusion that the liability sought to be
fastened on defendant-appellee had not arisen.

Application:
 This action is predicated on negligence, the Civil Code making clear that whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being negligence, is under obligation to pay for the damage done. Unless it could be
satisfactorily shown, therefore, that defendant-appellee was guilty of negligence then it could not be held liable.

 The crucial question, therefore, is the existence of negligence.

 The above Civil Code provision, which is a reiteration of that found in the Civil Code of Spain, formerly applicable
in this jurisdiction, had been interpreted in earlier decisions. Thus, in Smith v. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co.,
Manresa was cited to the following effect:” ‘Among the questions most frequently raised and upon which the
majority of cases have been decided with respect to the application of this liability, are those referring to the
determination of the damage or prejudice, and to the fault or negligence of the person responsible therefor. These
are the two indispensable factors in the obligations under discussion, for without damage or prejudice there can
be no liability, and although this element is present no indemnity can be awarded unless arising from some
person’s fault or negligence'."

Plaintiff argument:
 Plaintiff-appellant, in her brief, however, would seek a reversal of the judgment appealed from on the ground that
there was a failure to appreciate the true situation.
 Thus the first three assigned errors are factual in character. The third assigned error could be summarily disposed
of. It would go against the evidence to maintain the view that the whistle was not sounded and the brakes not
applied at a distance of 300 meters before reaching the crossing.

Issue #2 (Ordinary diligence): Did Corliss Jr observed ordinary diligence in this case?

Ruling #2: NO
  The first two assigned errors would make much of the failure of the lower court to hold that the crossing bars not
having been put down and there being no guard at the gate-house, there still was a duty on the part of Corliss to
stop his jeep to avoid a collision and that Teodorico Capili, who drove the engine, was not qualified to do so at the
time of the accident.

 For one cannot just single out a circumstance and then confidently assign to it decisive weight and significance.
Considered separately, neither of the two above errors assigned would call for a judgment different in character.
Nor would a combination of acts allegedly impressed with negligence suffice to alter the result. The quantum of
proof required still had not been met.
 The alleged errors fail of their desired effect. The case for plaintiff-appellant, such as it was, had not been
improved. There is no justification for reversing the judgment of the lower court.

 It cannot be stressed too much that the decisive considerations are too variable, too dependent in the last
analysis upon a common sense estimate of the situation as it presented itself to the parties for us to be able to
say that this or that element having been isolated, negligence is shown.
 The factors that enter the judgment are too many and diverse for us to imprison them in a formula sufficient of
itself to yield the correct answer to the multi-faceted problems the question of negligence poses.
 Every case must be dependent on its facts. The circumstances indicative of lack of due care must be judged in
the light of what could reasonably be expected of the parties.
 If the objective standard of prudence be met, then negligence is ruled out.

 In this particular case, it would be to show less than fidelity to the controlling facts to impute negligence to
defendant-appellee. The first three errors assigned certainly do not call for that conclusion.

 Considering the purposes and the general methods adopted for the management of railroads and railroad
trains, we think it is incumbent upon one approaching a railroad crossing to use all of his faculties of seeing and
hearing. He should approach a railroad crossing cautiously and carefully. He should look and listen and do
everything that a reasonably prudent man would do before he attempts to cross the track.”

 What Justice Cardozo announced would merely emphasize what was set forth earlier that each and every case
on questions of negligence is to be decided in accordance with the peculiar circumstances that present
themselves. There can be no hard and fast rule. There must be that observance of that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands. Thus defendant-appellee acted. It is undeniable then
that no negligence can rightfully be imputed to it.

 What commends itself for acceptance is this conclusion arrived at by the lower court: “Predicated on the
testimonies of the plaintiff’s witnesses, on the knowledge of the deceased and his familiarity with the setup of
the checkpoint, the existence of the tracks; and on the further fact that the locomotive had blown its siren or
whistle, which was heard by said witnesses, it is clear that Corliss, Jr. was so sufficiently warned in advance of
the oncoming train that it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident—and this consisted simply in
stopping his vehicle before the crossing and allowing the train to move on.
 A prudent man under similar circumstances would have acted in this manner. This, unfortunately, Corliss, Jr.
failed to do."

Decision of the lower court dismissing the complaint is affirmed.

II. I. Jarco Marketing Corporation v CA
G.R. No. 129792. December 21, 1999
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

 In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners seek the reversal of the
17 June 1996 decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. CV 37937 and the resolution denying their motion
for reconsideration.
o The assailed decision set aside the 15 January 1992 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati
City, Branch 60 in Civil Case No. 7119 and ordered petitioners to pay damages and attorneys fees to
private respondents Conrado and Criselda (CRISELDA) Aguilar.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvels Department Store, Makati City.
o Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the stores branch manager, operations
manager, and supervisor, respectively.
 Private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar (ZHIENETH).
 In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH were at the 2nd floor of Syvels Department Store,
Makati City.
 CRISELDA was signing her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of
wind and heard a loud thud.
 She looked behind her.She then beheld her daughter ZHIENETH on the floor, her young body pinned by the bulk
of the stores gift-wrapping counter/structure.
 ZHIENETH was crying and screaming for help. Although shocked, CRISELDA was quick to ask the assistance of the
people around in lifting the counter and retrieving ZHIENETH from the floor.
 ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she was operated on.
 The next day ZHIENETH lost her speech and thereafter communicated with CRISELDA by writing on a magic
slate.
 The injuries she sustained took their toil on her young body.
o She died fourteen (14) days after the accident or on 22 May 1983, on the hospital bed. She was six years
old.
o The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained.
 After the burial of their daughter, private respondents demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the
hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses which they had incurred.
o Petitioners refused to pay.
o In their answer with counterclaim, petitioners denied any liability for the injuries and consequent death
of ZHIENETH.
o They claimed that CRISELDA was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by allowing
her to freely roam around in a store filled with glassware and appliances.ZHIENETH too, was guilty of
contributory negligence since she climbed the counter, triggering its eventual collapse on her.
 Consequently, private respondents filed a complaint for damages.
 In its decision the trial court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim after finding that the preponderance of
the evidence favored petitioners.
o It ruled that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter on ZHIENETH was her act of clinging to it.
o It believed petitioners witnesses who testified that ZHIENETH clung to the counter, afterwhich the
structure and the girl fell with the structure falling on top of her, pinning her stomach.
o In contrast, none of private respondents witnesses testified on how the counter fell.
o The trial court also held that CRISELDAs negligence contributed to ZHIENETHs accident.
o In absolving petitioners from any liability, the trial court reasoned that the counter was situated at the
end or corner of the 2nd floor as a precautionary measure hence, it could not be considered as an
attractive nuisance.
 o Its structure was safe and well-balanced. ZHIENETH, therefore, had no business climbing on and clinging
to it.
 Private respondents appealed the decision.
o They contended negligence could not be imputed to CRISELDA for it was reasonable for her to have
let go of ZHIENETH at the precise moment that she was signing the credit card slip.
o And vigorously maintained that the proximate cause of ZHIENETHs death, was petitioners negligence
in failing to institute measures to have the counter permanently nailed.
o The Court of Appeals, however, decided in favor of private respondents and reversed the appealed
judgment. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter.

ISSUE: Whether or not Zhieneth, a minor, is conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence?
RULING:
 Yes, Zhieneth is conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
 Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children below
nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence.
o In his book, former Judge Cezar S. Sangco stated: In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is
conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from
criminal liability.
o The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over
nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment.
o Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability,
either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be
incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in
the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law.
 The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of
contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Application:
 Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no
injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners theory that the counter was stable and sturdy.
 For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse.
 The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence
on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all.
 Shaped like an inverted L, the counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica.
 It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not secured.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the
Court of Appeals of 17 June 1996 in C.A. G.R. No. CV 37937 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO
ORDERED.
NOTES:
DOCTRINE OF ATTRACTIVE NUISSANCE
 “One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character
likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith
or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a
trespasser in the premises”.
o The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question although its danger is
apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to
 approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children. (Hidalgo
Enterprises, Inc. v. Balandan, et al., 91 Phil. 488, 490 [1952]).
ACCIDENT- An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is “a
fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or
partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom
it happens.”

Negligence- Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable
man would not do. Negligence is “the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree
of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.”

Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person
concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented
by any means suggested by common prudence.

IV. ROMULO ABROGAR and ERLINDA ABROGAR vs COSMOS BOTTLING COMPANY and INTERGAMES, INC.
Nature: This case involves a claim for damages arising from the negligence causing the death of a participant in an
organized marathon bumped by a passenger jeepney on the route of the race
FACTS:
 To promote the sales of "Pop Cola", defendant Cosmos, jointly with Intergames, organized an endurance
running contest billed as the "1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon" scheduled to be held on June 15, 1980
 The organizers plotted a 10-kilometer course starting from the premises of the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP
for brevity), through public roads and streets, to end at the Quezon Memorial Circle
 Plaintiffs' son Rommel applied with the defendants to be allowed to participate in the contest and after
complying with defendants' requirements, his application was accepted and he was given an official number
 Consequently, on June 15, 1980 at the designated time of the marathon, Rommel joined the other participants
and ran the course plotted by the defendants.
 As it turned out, the plaintiffs' (sic) further alleged, the defendants failed to provide adequate safety and
precautionary measures and to exercise the diligence required of them by the nature of their undertaking, in
that they failed to insulate and protect the participants of the marathon from the vehicular and other dangers
along the marathon route.
 Rommel was bumped by a jeepney that was then running along the route of the marathon on Don Mariano
Marcos Avenue (DMMA for brevity), and in spite of medical treatment given to him at the Ospital ng Bagong
Lipunan, he died later that same day due to severe head injuries.
 On October 28, 1980, the petitioners sued the respondents in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal to recover
various damages for the untimely death of Rommel. Cosmos denied liability, insisting that it had not been the
organizer of the marathon, but only its sponsor;
o that its participation had been limited to providing financial assistance to Intergames;
o that the financial assistance it had extended to Intergames, the sole organizer of the marathon, had
been in answer to the Government's call to the private sector to help promote sports development and
physical fitness;
o that the petitioners had no cause of action against it because there was no privity of contract between
the participants in the marathon and Cosmos; and
o that it had nothing to do with the organization, operation and running of the event.
  Intergames asserted that
o Rommel's death had been an accident exclusively caused by the negligence of the jeepney driver;
o that it was not responsible for the accident;
o that as the marathon organizer, it did not assume the responsibilities of an insurer of the safety of the
participants;
o that it nevertheless caused the participants to be covered with accident insurance, but the petitioners
refused to accept the proceeds thereof;
o that there could be no cause of action against it because the acceptance and approval of Rommel's
application to join the marathon had been conditioned on his waiver of all rights and causes of action
arising from his participation in the marathon;
o that it exercised due diligence in the conduct of the race that the circumstances called for and was
appropriate, it having availed of all its know-how and expertise, including the adoption and
implementation of all known and possible safety and precautionary measures in order to protect the
participants from injuries arising from vehicular and other forms of accidents; and,
o accordingly, the complaint should be dismissed

RTC RULING:
 Judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs-spouses Romulo Abrogar and Erlinda Abrogar and against defendants
Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc. and Intergames, Inc.
 The RTC observed:
o that the safeguards allegedly instituted by Intergames in conducting the marathon had fallen short of
the yardstick to satisfy the requirements of due diligence as called for by and appropriate under the
circumstances;
o that the accident had happened because of inadequate preparation and Intergames' failure to exercise
due diligence;
o that the respondents could not be excused from liability by hiding behind the waiver executed by
Rommel and the permission given to him by his parents because the waiver could only be effective for
risks inherent in the marathon, such a:s stumbling, heat stroke, heart attack during the race, severe
exhaustion and similar occurrences;
o that the liability of the respondents towards the participants and third persons was solidary, because
Cosmos, the sponsor of the event, had been the principal mover of the event, and, as such, had derived
benefits from the marathon that in turn had carried responsibilities towards the participants and the
public;
o that the respondents' agreement to free Cosmos from any liability had been an agreement binding only
between them, and did not bind third persons; and
o that Cosmos had a cause of action against Intergames for whatever could be recovered by the
petitioners from Cosmos.

CA RULING:
 From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that the role of the appellant Cosmos was limited to providing financial
assistance in the form of sponsorship. Appellant Cosmos' sponsorship was merely in pursuance to the company's
commitment for spo1is development of the youth as well as for advertising purposes. The use of the name
Cosmos was done for advertising purposes only; it did not mean that it was an organizer of the said marathon.
As pointed out by Intergames' President, Jose Castro Jr., appellant Cosmos did not even have the right to
suggest the location and the number of runners.
 To hold a defendant liable for torts, it must be clearly shown that he is the proximate cause of the harm done to
the plaintiff. The nexus or connection of the cause and effect, between a negligent act and the damage done,
must be established by competent evidence.
  In this case, appellant Cosmos was not negligent in entering into a contract with the appellant Intergames
considering that the record of the latter was clean and that it has conducted at least thirty (30) road races.
 Also there is no direct or immediate causal connection between the financial sponsorship and the death of
Rommel Abrogar. The singular act of providing financial assistance without participating in any manner in the
conduct of the marathon cannot be palmed off as such proximate cause. In fact, the appellant spouses never
relied on any representation that Cosmos organized the race. It was not even a factor considered by the
appellants-spouses in allowing their son to join said marathon.
 In view of the fact that both defendants are not liable for the death of Rommel Abrogar, appellants-spouses are
not entitled to actual, moral, exemplary damages as well as for the "loss of earning capacity" of their son.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the conduct of
the marathon (ORDINARY DILIGENCE)
RULING:
 Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, it consists of the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature
of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time and of the place."
 The Civil Code makes liability for negligence clear under Article 2176, and Article 20.
 A careful review of the evidence presented, in accordance with the foregoing guidelines reasonably leads to the
conclusion that the safety and precautionary measures undertaken by Intergames were short of the diligence
demanded by the circumstances of persons, time and place under consideration. Hence, Intergames as the
organizer was guilty of negligence.
 The Court considered the "safeguards" employed and adopted by Intergames not adequate to meet the
requirement of due diligence. The circumstances of the persons, time and place required far more than what
Intergames undertook in staging the race.
 Due diligence would have made a reasonably prudent organizer of the race participated in by young,
inexperienced or beginner runners to conduct the race in a route suitably blocked off from vehicular traffic for
the safety and security not only of the participants but the motoring public as well.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not Intergames had foreseen the harm posed by the situation but had not exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the risk (FORSEEABILITY)

RULING:

 A careful review of the evidence presented, particularly the testimonies of the relevant witnesses, in accordance
with the foregoing guidelines reasonably leads to the conclusion that the safety and precautionary measures
undertaken by Intergames were short of the diligence demanded by the circumstances of persons, time and
place under consideration. Hence, Intergames as the organizer was guilty of negligence.

 It is relevant to note that the participants of the 1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon were mostly minors aged 14 to 18
years joining a race of that kind for the first time.
 The combined factors of their youth, eagerness and inexperience ought to have put a reasonably prudent
organizer on higher guard as to their safety and security needs during the race, especially considering
Intergames' awareness of the risks already foreseen and of other risks already known to it as of similar events in
the past organizer.
 There was no question at all that a higher degree of diligence was required given that practically all of the
participants were children or minors like Rommel; and that the law imposes a duty of care towards children and
minors even if ordinarily there was no such duty under the same circumstances had the persons involved been
adults of sufficient discretion. In that respect, Intergames did not observe the degree of care necessary as the
organizer, rendering it liable for negligence. As the Court has emphasized in Corliss v. The Manila Railroad
 Company, where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of
ordinary care under the circumstances.
 The circumstances of the persons, time and place required far more than what Intergames undertook in staging
the race. Due diligence would have made a reasonably prudent organizer of the race participated in by young,
inexperienced or beginner runners to conduct the race in a route suitably blocked off from vehicular traffic for
the safety and security not only of the participants but the motoring public as well. Since the marathon would be
run alongside moving vehicular traffic, at the very least, Intergames ought to have seen to the constant and
closer coordination among the personnel manning the route to prevent the foreseen risks from befalling the
participants. But this it sadly failed to do.

IV. Test of Negligence/Standard of Care

c. Presumption of Negligence

i. Belgian Overseas Chartering and Shipping N.V. vs. Philippine First Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 143133. June 5, 2002
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
Nature of the Case: This case is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

Doctrine in relation to PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE for COMMON CARRIERS:

Proof of the delivery of goods in good order to a common carrier and of their arrival in bad order at their destination
constitutes prima facie fault or negligence on the part of the carrier. If no adequate explanation is given as to how the
loss, the destruction or the deterioration of the goods happened, the carrier shall be held liable therefor.

FACTS:
 On June 13, 1990, CMC Trading A.G. shipped on board the M/V ‘Anangel Sky’ at Hamburg, Germany 242 coils of
various Prime Cold Rolled Steel sheets for transportation to Manila consigned to the Philippine Steel Trading
Corporation (consignee).
 On July 28, 1990, M/V Anangel Sky arrived at the port of Manila and, within the subsequent days, discharged the
subject cargo.
 Four (4) coils were found to be in bad order B.O. Tally sheet No. 154974.
 Finding the four (4) coils in their damaged state to be unfit for the intended purpose, the consignee Philippine
Steel Trading Corporation declared the same as total loss.
 Despite receipt of a formal demand, defendants-appellees refused to submit to the consignee’s claim.
 Consequently, Phil. First Insurance Co. (plaintiff-appellant) paid the consignee P506,086.50, and was
subrogated to the latter’s rights and causes of action against defendants- appellees.
 Subsequently, plaintiff-appellant instituted this complaint for recovery of the amount paid by them, to the
consignee as insured.
 Belgian Overseas Chartering and Shipping N.V and Jardine Davies Transport Services, Inc. (defendants-
appellees) impugned the propriety of the suit against them

Arguments of defendants-appellees (petitioner):

 That the damage and/or loss was due:
o To pre- shipment damage,
o To the inherent nature, vice or defect of the goods, or
o To perils, danger and accidents of the sea, or
o To insufficiency of packing thereof, or
 o To the act or omission of the shipper of the goods or their representatives.
 That their liability, if there be any, should not exceed the limitations of liability provided for in the bill of lading
and other pertinent laws.
 That, in any event, they exercised due diligence and foresight required by law to prevent any damage/loss to
said shipment.
 In their attempt to escape liability, petitioners further contend that they are exempted from liability under
Article 1734(4) of the Civil Code.
o That the notation “metal envelopes rust stained and slightly dented” printed on the Bill of Lading as
evidence that the character of the goods or defect in the packing or the containers was the proximate cause
of the damage.

RTC Ruling:
 Dismissed the Complaint because respondent had failed to prove its claims with the quantum of proof required
by law.
 It likewise debunked petitioners’ counterclaim, because respondent’s suit was not manifestly frivolous or
primarily intended to harass them.

CA Ruling:
 Ruled that petitioners were liable for the loss or the damage of the goods shipped, because they had failed to
overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on common carriers.
 Petitioners’ claim that the loss or the deterioration of the goods was due to preshipment damage was
inadequately proven.
 The notation “metal envelopes rust stained and slightly dented” placed on the Bill of Lading had not been the
proximate cause of the damage to the four (4) coils
 As to the extent of petitioners’ liability, the CA held that the package limitation under COGSA was not applicable,
because the words “L/C No. 90/02447” indicated that a higher valuation of the cargo had been declared by the
shipper.
 CA, however, affirmed the award of attorney’s fees.

 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE 1: Did the petitioners overcome the presumption of negligence of a common carrier?

RULING 1:
 No. The petitioners did NOT overcome the presumption of negligence of a common carrier.
 Well-settled is the rule that common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence and vigilance with respect to the safety of the goods and the
passengers they transport.
 Thus, common carriers are required to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and “to use all
reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristics of the goods tendered for shipment, and to
exercise due care in the handling and stowage, including such methods as their nature requires.”
 The extraordinary responsibility lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of
and received for transportation by the carrier until they are delivered, actually or constructively, to the
consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them.
 Owing to this high degree of diligence required of them, common carriers, as a general rule, are presumed to
have been at fault or negligent if the goods they transported deteriorated or got lost or destroyed.
 That is, unless they prove that they exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting the goods.
  In order to avoid responsibility for any loss or damage, therefore, they have the burden of proving that they
observed such diligence. Also, there are exceptions to the presumption of fault or negligence for common
carriers [refer to Notes below]
 Corollary to the foregoing, mere proof of delivery of the goods in good order to a common carrier and of their
arrival in bad order at their destination constitutes a prima facie case of fault or negligence against the carrier.
 If no adequate explanation is given as to how the deterioration, the loss or the destruction of the goods
happened, the transporter shall be held responsible.

Application:
 In this case, the petitioners failed to rebut the prima facie presumption of negligence. This was revealed by a
review of the records and more so by the evidence adduced by respondent
o First, as stated in the Bill of Lading, petitioners received the subject shipment in good order and
condition in Hamburg, Germany.
o Second, prior to the unloading of the cargo, an Inspection Report prepared and signed by
representatives of both parties showed the steel bands broken, the metal envelopes rust-stained and
heavily buckled, and the contents thereof exposed and rusty.
o Third, Bad Order Tally Sheet No. 154979 issued by Jardine Davies Transport Services, Inc., stated that
the four coils were in bad order and condition.
 Normally, a request for a bad order survey is made in case there is an apparent or a presumed
loss or damage
o Fourth, the Certificate of Analysis stated that, based on the sample submitted and tested, the steel
sheets found in bad order were wet with fresh water.
o Fifth, petitioners—in a letter addressed to the Philippine Steel Coating Corporation and dated October
12, 1990—admitted that they were aware of the condition of the four coils found in bad order and
condition.
 All these conclusively prove the fact of shipment in good order and condition and the consequent damage to
the four coils while in the possession of petitioner, who notably failed to explain why.
 Further, petitioners failed to prove that they observed the extraordinary diligence and precaution, which the
law requires a common carrier to know and to follow to avoid damage to or destruction of the goods entrusted
to it for safe carriage and delivery.

 While it is true that the words “metal envelopes rust stained and slightly dented” were noted on the Bill of
Lading, there is no showing that petitioners exercised due diligence to forestall or lessen the loss.
 Having been in the service for several years, the master of the vessel should have known at the outset that
metal envelopes in the said state would eventually deteriorate when not properly stored while in transit.
 Equipped with the proper knowledge of the nature of steel sheets in coils and of the proper way of transporting
them, the master of the vessel and his crew should have undertaken precautionary measures to avoid possible
deterioration of the cargo.
 BUT none of these measures was taken.
 Having failed to discharge the burden of proving that they have exercised the extraordinary diligence required
by law, petitioners cannot escape liability for the damage to the four coils.

(In relation to Issue 1)

ISSUE 2: Were the petitioners exempted from liability under Article 1734(4) of the Civil Code?

RULING 2:
 No. The petitioners were not exempted from liability under Article 1734(4) of the Civil Code.
 From the evidence on record, it cannot be reasonably concluded that the damage to the four coils was due to
the condition noted on the Bill of Lading.
  The aforecited exception refers to cases when goods are lost or damaged while in transit as a result of the
o Natural decay of perishable goods or the
o Fermentation or evaporation of substances liable therefor,
o The necessary and natural wear of goods in transport,
o Defects in packages in which they are shipped, or
o The natural propensities of animals.
 None of these is present in the instant case.
 Further, even if the fact of improper packing was known to the carrier or its crew or was apparent upon ordinary
observation, it is not relieved of liability for loss or injury resulting therefrom, once it accepts the goods
notwithstanding such condition.
 Thus, petitioners have not successfully proven the application of any of the aforecited exceptions in the present
case.

OTHER ISSUES:
Other arguments of petitioners:
 That pursuant to Section 3, paragraph 6 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), respondent should have
filed its Notice of Loss within three days from delivery.
 They assert that the cargo was discharged on July 31, 1990, but that respondent filed its Notice of Claim only on
September 18, 1990

ISSUE 3: Was there a need to file a notice of loss in this case?

RULING 3:
 No. There was no need to file a notice of loss in this case.
 The above-cited provision of COGSA provides that the notice of claim need not be given if the state of the
goods, at the time of their receipt, has been the subject of a joint inspection or survey.
 As stated earlier, prior to unloading the cargo, an Inspection Report as to the condition of the goods was
prepared and signed by representatives of both parties.

ISSUE 4: Will recovery be barred upon failure to file notice of loss within three days?

RULING 4:
 No. Recovery will not be barred upon failure to file notice of loss within three days.
 As stated in the same provision, a failure to file a notice of claim within three days will not bar recovery if it is
nonetheless filed within one year.
 This one-year prescriptive period also applies to the shipper, the consignee, the insurer of the goods or any legal
holder of the bill of lading.
 In the present case, the cargo was discharged on July 31, 1990, while the Complaint was filed by respondent on
July 25, 1991, within the one-year prescriptive period.

ISSUE 5: Is the package limitation of liability applicable?

RULING 5:
 Yes. The package limitation of liability is applicable.
 A stipulation in the bill of lading limiting to a certain sum the common carrier’s liability for loss or destruction
of a cargo—unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value—is sanctioned by law
  There are, however, two conditions to be satisfied:
(1) The contract is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and
(2) It has been fairly and freely agreed upon by the parties.
 The rationale for, this rule is to bind the shippers by their agreement to the value (maximum valuation) of their
goods.
 The provisions on limited liability are as much a part of the bill of lading as though physically in it and as though
placed there by agreement of the parties
 However, in this case, there was no stipulation in the Bill of Lading limiting the carrier’s liability.
 Neither did the shipper declare a higher valuation of the goods to be shipped.
 This fact notwithstanding, the insertion of the words “L/C No. 90/02447 cannot be the basis for petitioners’
liability.

 The Civil Code does not limit the liability of the common carrier to a fixed amount per package.
 In all matters not regulated by the Civil Code, the right and the obligations of common carriers shall be governed
by the Code of Commerce and special laws
 Thus, the COGSA, which is suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code, supplements the latter by establishing
a statutory provision limiting the carrier’s liability in the absence of a shipper’s declaration of a higher value in
the bill of lading

 In light of the foregoing, petitioners’ liability should be computed based on US$500 per package and not on the
per metric ton price declared in the Letter of Credit.
o Considering, therefore, the ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines and the fact that the Bill of Lading clearly
disclosed the contents of the containers, the number of units, as well as the nature of the steel sheets,
the four damaged coils should be considered as the shipping unit subject to the US$500 limitation.
[Refer to Notes below for further discussion]

Disposition: Petition is partly granted and the assailed decision modified. Petitioners’ liability is reduced to US$2,000
plus interest at the legal rate of six percent from the time of the filing of the Complaint on July 25, 1991 until the finality
of this Decision, and 12 percent thereafter until fully paid.
____________________
NOTES:
As to the EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE required for COMMON CARRIERS:
 This strict requirement is justified by the fact that, without a hand or a voice in the preparation of such contract,
the riding public enters into a contract of transportation with common carriers.
 Even if it wants to, it cannot submit its own stipulations for their approval.
 Hence, it merely adheres to the agreement prepared by them. [Contract of adhesion]

EXCEPTIONS to the PRESUMPTION OF FAULT or NEGLIGENCE:

 The presumption of fault or negligence will not arise if the loss is due to any of the following causes:
1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
2) An act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
3) An act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or the container; or
5) An order or act of competent public authority.
 This is a closed list.
 If the cause of destruction, loss or deterioration is other than the enumerated circumstances, then the carrier is
liable therefor.
Re: Prescription:
 In Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that a claim is not barred by prescription as
long as the one-year period has not lapsed.
 Thus, in the words of the ponente, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.:
o “Inasmuch as the neither the Civil Code nor the Code of Commerce states a specific prescriptive period
on the matter, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)—which provides for a one- year period of
limitation on claims for loss of, or damage to, cargoes sustained during transit—may be applied
suppletorily to the case at bar.”

Re: Bill of Lading:

 A bill of lading serves two functions:
o First, it is a receipt for the goods shipped.
o Second, it is a contract by which three parties—namely, the shipper, the carrier, and the consignee—
undertake specific responsibilities and assume stipulated obligations.
 In a nutshell, the acceptance of the bill of lading by the shipper and the consignee, with full knowledge of its
contents, gives rise to the presumption that it constituted a perfected and binding contract.
 Further, a stipulation in the bill of lading limiting to a certain sum the common carrier’s liability for loss or
destruction of a cargo—unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value—is sanctioned by law.
 There are, however, two conditions to be satisfied:
o (1) The contract is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and
o (2) It has been fairly and freely agreed upon by the parties.
 The rationale for, this rule is to bind the shippers by their agreement to the value (maximum valuation) of their
goods.

V. Helen Palsgraf, Respondent vs The Long Island Railroad Company, Appellant.

-Motion for Reconsideration.

Court of Appeals of New York
Argued February 24, 1928
Decided May 29, 1928

FACTS:
• Mrs. Helen Palsgraf was standing on a platform of a (Long Island Railroad Company’s) railroad after buying a
ticket to go to a beach (Rockaway Beach).
• A train stopped at the station, bound for another place. Two men ran to catch it.
• Although the train was already moving, one of the men reached the platform of the car.
• The other man, carrying a package, jumped aboard the car, but seemed unsteady as if about to fall. A guard
on the car, who had held the door open, reached forward to help him in, and another guard on the platform pushed
him from behind. In this act, the package was dislodged and fell upon the rails.
• It was a small package (15 inches long and covered by a newspaper) which contained fireworks, but there
was nothing in its appearance to give notice that they were fireworks.
• The fireworks when they fell exploded. The shock of the explosion threw down some scales at the other end
of the platform, many feet away.
• The scales struck Mrs. Palsgraf, causing injuries for which she sues.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mrs. Palsgraf can sue the company for the unforeseeable injury caused the negligence of
their guards.
 RULING (summarized):
• NO.
• It was held that the Long Island Railroad Company was not liable to Mrs. Helen Palsgraf (claimant).
• In this respect, it was held that a claimant must, in order to bring a claim in negligence, demonstrate that
there has been some violation of her personal rights.
• While it was acknowledged that the guards who caused the package of fireworks to fall were negligent in
doing so, it was not considered that they were negligent to the claimant. There was no indication that the content of
the package was fireworks or that dropping it would cause it to explode.
• Furthermore, the claimant was standing some distance away from the package. Therefore, it was considered
that if the defendant was held liable to the claimant in these circumstances, a defendant would be liable in any
circumstance for almost any loss. APPLICATION: In this case, the conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its
relation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to Helen Palsgraf standing far away. Relatively to
her it was not negligence at all. The “rights” that are said to have been violated and should have been complained of
in relation to the acts of the guards is of the man carrying the package. Even here, the man was not injured in his
person nor even put in danger. The purpose of the act, as well as its effect, was to make his person safe. If there was a
wrong to him at all, which may very well be doubted, it was a wrong to a property interest only, which is the safety of
his package.

RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:

• The conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong
in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away. Relatively to her it was not negligence at all.
• Nothing in the situation gave notice that the falling package had in it the potency of peril to persons thus
removed. Negligence is not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected interest, the violation of a
right.
• "Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do”

• If no hazard was apparent to the eye of ordinary vigilance, an act innocent and harmless, at least to outward
seeming, with reference to her, did not take to itself the quality of a tort because it happened to be a wrong, though
apparently not one involving the risk of bodily insecurity, with reference to some one else.

• "In every instance, before negligence can be predicated of a given act, back of the act must be sought and
found a duty to the individual complaining, the observance of which would have averted or avoided the injury.”
• "The ideas of negligence and duty are strictly correlative”. The plaintiff sues in her own right for a wrong
personal to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to another.

• Here, by concession, there was nothing in the situation to suggest to the most cautious mind that the parcel
wrapped in newspaper would spread wreckage through the station. If the guard had thrown it down knowingly and
willfully, he would not have threatened the plaintiff's safety, so far as appearances could warn him. His conduct would
not have involved, even then, an unreasonable probability of invasion of her bodily security. Liability can be no greater
where the act is inadvertent.

• Negligence is not a tort unless it results in the commission of a wrong, and the commission of a wrong
imports the violation of a right.

• One who seeks redress at law does not make out a cause of action by showing without more that there has
been damage to his person. If the harm was not willful, he must show that the act as to him had possibilities of danger
so many and apparent as to entitle him to be protected against the doing of it though the harm was unintended.
 • Liability for other damage; The victim does not sue derivatively, or by right of subrogation, to vindicate an
interest invaded in the person of another. Thus to view his cause of action is to ignore the fundamental difference
between tort and crime. He sues for breach of a duty owing to himself.

• The law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to the case before us. The question of liability is
always anterior to the question of the measure of the consequences that go with liability.
• If there is no tort to be redressed, there is no occasion to consider what damage might be recovered if there
were a finding of a tort.
• We may assume, without deciding, that negligence, not at large or in the abstract, but in relation to the
plaintiff, would entail liability for any and all consequences, however novel or extraordinary.
• There is room for argument that a distinction is to be drawn according to the diversity of interests invaded by
the act, as where conduct negligent in that it threatens an insignificant invasion of an interest in property results in an
unforseeable invasion of an interest of another order, as, e. g., one of bodily security. Perhaps other distinctions may
be necessary. We do not go into the question now. The consequences to be followed must first be rooted in a wrong.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:The judgment of the Appellate Division and that of the Trial Term should be reversed,
and the complaint dismissed, with costs in all courts.

DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE ANDREWS:

(summary):

• Justice Andrews finds the concept of the court to be narrow. as he explains in an illustrative examples: 1.
“Should we drive down Broadway at a reckless speed, we are negligent whether we strike an approaching car or miss
it by an inch. The act itself is wrongful. It is a wrong not only to those who happen to be within the radius of danger
but to all who might have been there— a wrong to the public at large. Due care is a duty imposed on each one of us
to protect society from unnecessary danger, not to protect A, B or C alone.”. The proposition is this. Every one owes to
the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others. Such an
act occurs. Not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be expected to result, but he also who is in fact
injured, even if he be outside what would generally be thought the danger zone.

• 2. an overturned lantern that may burn all of the city We may follow the fire from the shed to the last
building. We rightly say the fire started by the lantern caused its destruction. When a lantern is overturned the firing
of a shed is a fairly direct consequence. Many things contribute to the spread of the conflagration—the force of the
wind, the direction and width of streets, the character of intervening structures, other factors. We draw an uncertain
and wavering line, but draw it we must as best we can. We trace the consequences—not indefinitely, but to a certain
point. And to aid us in fixing that point we ask what might ordinarily be expected to follow the fire or the explosion.

3. It’s like building a dam, but are negligent as to its foundations. Breaking, it injures property down stream. We
are not liable if all this happened because of some reason other than the insecure foundation. But when injuries do
result from our unlawful act we are liable for the consequences. It does not matter that they are unusual, unexpected,
unforeseen and unforseeable. But there is one limitation. The damages must be so connected with the negligence that
the latter may be said to be the proximate cause of the former.

• There needs be duty due the one complaining but this is not a duty to a particular individual because as to
him harm might be expected. Harm to some one being the natural result of the act, not only that one alone, but all
those in fact injured may complain. We have never, I think, held otherwise.

• Indeed in the Di Caprio case we said that a breach of a general ordinance defining the degree of care to be
exercised in one's calling is evidence of negligence as to every one. We did not limit this statement to those who might
 be expected to be exposed to danger. Unreasonable risk being taken, its consequences are not confined to those who
might probably be hurt.

• There is no such thing as a plaintiff (in relation to Palsgraf) suing by "derivation or succession." Her action is
original and primary. Her claim is for a breach of duty to herself—not that she is subrogated to any right of action of
the owner of the parcel or of a passenger standing at the scene of the explosion.

• The right to recover damages rests on additional considerations. The plaintiff's rights must be injured, and
this injury must be caused by the negligence.

• Negligence may be defined roughly as an act or omission which unreasonably does or may affect the rights of
others, or which unreasonably fails to protect oneself from the dangers resulting from such acts. Here I confine myself
to the first branch of the definition. Nor do I comment on the word "unreasonable." For present purposes it
sufficiently describes that average of conduct that society requires of its members.

• There must be both the act or the omission, and the right. It is the act itself, not the intent of the actor, that is
important. In criminal law both the intent and the result are to be considered. Intent again is material in tort actions,
where punitive damages are sought, dependent on actual malice— not on merely reckless conduct. But here neither
insanity nor infancy lessens responsibility.

• There are some hints that may help us. The proximate cause, involved as it may be with many other causes,
must be, at the least, something without which the event would not happen. The court must ask itself whether there
was a natural and continuous sequence between cause and effect. Was the one a substantial factor in producing the
other? Was there a direct connection between them, without too many intervening causes? Is the effect of cause on
result not too attentuated? Is the cause likely, in the usual judgment of mankind, to produce the result? Or by the
exercise of prudent foresight could the result be foreseen? Is the result too remote from the cause, and here we
consider remoteness in time and space. Clearly we must so consider, for the greater the distance either in time or
space, the more surely do other causes intervene to affect the result.

Applying the principle of promixate cause:

• This last suggestion is the factor which must determine the case before us. The act upon which defendant's
liability rests is knocking an apparently harmless package onto the platform. The act was negligent. For its proximate
consequences the defendant is liable. If its contents were broken, to the owner; if it fell upon and crushed a
passenger's foot, then to him. If it exploded and injured one in the immediate vicinity, to him also as to A in the
illustration. Mrs. Palsgraf was standing some distance away. How far cannot be told from the record—apparently
twenty-five or thirty feet. Perhaps less. Except for the explosion, she would not have been injured. We are told by the
appellant in his brief "it cannot be denied that the explosion was the direct cause of the plaintiff's injuries." So it was a
substantial factor in producing the result—there was here a natural and continuous sequence—direct connection. The
only intervening cause was that instead of blowing her to the ground the concussion smashed the weighing machine
which in turn fell upon her. There was no remoteness in time, little in space. And surely, given such an explosion as
here it needed no great foresight to predict that the natural result would be to injure one on the platform at no
greater distance from its scene than was the plaintiff. Just how no one might be able to predict. Whether by flying
fragments, by broken glass, by wreckage of machines or structures no one could say. But injury in some form was
most probable.
Under these circumstances I cannot say as a matter of law that the plaintiff's injuries were not the proximate
result of the negligence. That is all we have before us. The court refused to so charge. No request was made to submit
the matter to the jury as a question of fact, even would that have been proper upon the record before us.
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and CARBONEL vs IAC

Feliciano, J.
NATURE: PETITION for review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
FACTS:
 November 15, 1975, at about 1:30 AM, Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner
meeting with his boss, the general manager of a marketing corporation.
 Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General
Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when
his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed.
o He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-½ meters
away from his car.
 The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc., was parked on the
right hand side of General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming traffic.
o The dump truck was parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the
way of oncoming traffic.
o There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump
truck, front or rear.
 The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver,
with the permission of his employer Phoenix.
 Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car
smashed into the dump truck.
o He suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and
loss of two gold bridge dentures.
 Dionisio commenced an action for damages claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the
negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck.
 Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own
recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights
on and without a curfew pass.
o They sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck
driver.
 TRIAL COURT: Ordered Phoenix and Carbonel to pay the plaintiff’s hospital bills, loss of expected income, moral
and exemplary damages, his attorney’s fees and the cost of suit.
o Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
 CA: Affirmed the trial court’s decision but modified the award of damages.

ISSUE # 1: Did Dionisio possessed a valid and effective curfew pass?

RULING # 1: NO
 Private respondent Dionisio was not able to produce any curfew pass during the trial. Instead, he offered the
explanation that his family may have misplaced his curfew pass.
 He also offered a certification (dated two years after the accident) issued by one Major Benjamin N. Libarnes of
the Zone Integrated Police Intelligence Unit of Campo Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, which was said to have
authority to issue curfew passes for Pampanga and Metro Manila.
o This certification was to the effect that private respondent Dionisio had a valid curfew pass. This
certification did not, however, specify any pass serial number or date or period of effectivity of the
supposed curfew pass.
 We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night
of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night.
o The relevance of possession or non-possession of a curfew pass that night lies in the light it tends to shed
on the other related issues: whether Dionisio was speeding home and whether he had indeed purposely
 put out his headlights before the accident, in order to avoid detection and possibly arrest by the police in
the nearby police station for travelling after the onset of curfew without a valid curfew pass.

ISSUE # 2: Was Dionisio driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the dump truck?
RULING # 2: YES
 We think that an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a stationary object in the dead
of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous, rather than reflective, reactions from observers
who happened to be around at that time.
 The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as part of the res gestae and should have been
considered by the trial court.
 Clearly, substantial weight should have been ascribed to such testimony, even though it did not, as it could not,
have purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at which Dionisio was travelling just before impact
with the Phoenix dump truck.

ISSUE # 3: Did Dionisio’s headlights accidentally malfunctioned?

RULING # 3: NO
 The Intermediate Appellate Court expressly found that the headlights of Dionisio's car went off as he crossed the
intersection but was non-committal as to why they did so.
 It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the
intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area)
knew was not far away from the intersection.
 We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by private respondent
Dionisio—i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if
convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright"
split seconds before contact with the dump truck.

ISSUE # 4: Was Dionisio intoxicated during the incident?

RULING # 4: NO
 The evidence here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno to the effect that private respondent Dionisio
smelled of liquor at the time he was taken from his smashed car and brought to the Makati Medical Center in an
unconscious condition.
 This testimony has to be taken in conjunction with the admission of Dionisio that he had taken "a shot or two" of
liquor before dinner with his boss that night.
 We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor
as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence.
 There simply is not enough evidence to show how much liquor he had in fact taken and the effects of that upon
his physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. We are also aware that "one shot or two" of hard
liquor may affect different people differently.

ISSUE # 5: Was Dionisio negligent?

RULING # 5: YES
 The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent Dionisio was
negligent the night of the accident.
 He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his
headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump
truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.

ISSUE # 6: Was the legal and proximate cause of the collision brought about by the way the truck was parked?
RULING # 6: YES
 The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and
that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause," and that consequently
Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier
negligence of Carbonel.
 We note that the petitioners' arguments are drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various
jurisdictions in the United States but we are unable to persuade ourselves that these arguments have any validity
for our jurisdiction.
 We note, firstly, that even in the United States, the distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the
petitioners would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited." Professors Prosser and Keeton
make this quite clear:
o CAUSE and CONDITION: Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm
and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive
static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable.
o But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played
an important part in producing the result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and
passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces
which have gone before.
o The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act may be culpable
because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to
bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created, the
defendant will not escape responsibility.
o Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily
affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who falls into it a month
afterward.
o "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions,; but the distinction is now almost
entirely discredited.
o So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the
defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even
in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important, but the nature
of the risk and the character of the intervening cause. "
 We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather
an indispensable and efficient cause.
o The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in all probability not have
occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices.
o The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down
General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible.
o In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and
therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.
o What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable consequence of
the risk created by the negligent manner in which the truck driver had parked the dump truck.
o In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly
situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created.
o Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain
of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the
juris vinculum of liability.
 We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent
 Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil
Code of the Philippines).

ISSUE # 7: Should the “Last Clear Chance” Doctrine be applied in this case?
RULING # 7:
 The theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio
had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to take
that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone.
 The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is
a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines.
 The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of another common law
doctrine or rule—that of contributory negligence. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any
recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff s negligence was relatively minor as
compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The common law notion of last clear chance
permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the
last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so.
 Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a
jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the
plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
 Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law matrix and
utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so.
 Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence—the plaintiffs or the
defendant's—was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise
in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or
"immediate."
 The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff s and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is
only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature
of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or
omission for the rest of the community.
 The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for
his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had
become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. To
accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must
respond for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission.
 Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the
members of society. To accept the petitioners' proposition must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.
 Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer Phoenix
in supervising its employees properly and adequately. The respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly
in our opinion, that Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of negligence.
o The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever
there was work to be done early the following morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort
on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from
company premises, is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.
 Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of private respondent
Dionisio on one hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, we believe that the demands of
substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio.
o Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00
as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent
 Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be
solidarily liable therefor to the former.
o The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the
petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel.
o We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the respondent
appellate court.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by reducing the aggregate amount
of compensatory damages, loss of expected income and moral damages private respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20%
of such amount. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.

V. Factors in Determining Negligence

b. Time

i. Adzuara vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125134. January 22, 1999

Ponente: Bellosillo, J.
Nature of the Case: This case is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Xerxes Adzuara
Y Dotimas (petitioner) was found guilty by the trial court of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with less
serious physical injuries. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Through this petition for review on
certiorari, he seeks the reversal of his conviction.

Doctrine in relation to the DETERMINATION OF NEGLIGENCE as to TIME:

Ordinary care and vigilance would suffice while driving at half past 1:00 o’clock in the morning along an almost deserted
avenue, which may consist of keeping a watchful eye on the road ahead and observing the traffic rules on speed, right
of way and traffic light.

FACTS:
 Xerxes Adzuara y Dotimas (petitioner) was then a law student.
 On 17 December 1990, at half past 1:00 o’clock in the morning, petitioner and his friends Rene Gonzalo and
Richard Jose were cruising in a 4-door Colt Galant sedan with plate number NMT 718 along the stretch of
Quezon Avenue coming from the direction of EDSA towards Delta Circle
 Traveling at approximately 40 kilometers per hour.
 Upon reaching the intersection of 4th West Street, their car collided with a 1975 4-door Toyota Corona sedan
with plate number PMD 711 owned and driven by Gregorio Martinez.
 Martinez had just attended a Loved Flock meeting with his daughter Sahlee and was coming from the eastern
portion of Quezon Avenue near Delta Circle.
 He was then executing a U-turn at the speed of 5 kph at the north-west portion of Quezon Avenue going to
Manila when the accident occurred.
 The collision flung the Corona twenty (20) meters southward from the point of impact causing it to land atop
the center island of Quezon Avenue.
 The Galant skittered southward on Quezon Avenue’s western half leaving its left rear about four (4) meters past
the Corona’s right front side.
 The principal points of contact between the two (2) cars were the Galant’s left front side and the Corona’s right
front door including its right front fender.
  Both petitioner and Martinez claimed that their lanes had green traffic lights although the investigating
policeman Marcelo Sabido declared that the traffic light was blinking red and orange when he arrived at the
scene of the accident an hour later.

 Sahlee Martinez, who was seated on the Corona’s right front seat, sustained physical injuries which required
confinement and medical attendance at the National Orthopaedic Hospital for five (5) days.
 As a result she missed classes at St. Paul’s College for two (2) weeks.
 Petitioner and his friends were treated at the Capitol Medical Center for their injuries.
 On 12 July 1991 petitioner was charged before the RTC of Quezon City with reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property with less serious physical injuries under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
 He pleaded not guilty to the charge.
 Before the presentation of evidence, private complainant Martinez manifested his intention to institute a
separate civil action for damages against petitioner.

RTC Ruling:
 Convicted petitioner after trial and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment and to pay fine

CA Ruling:
 Affirmed RTC decision, but deleted fine
 Denied petitioner’s MR

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

Petitioner’s arguments:
 That his post-collision conduct does not constitute sufficient basis to convict where there are no factual
circumstances warranting a finding of negligence, and
 That the medical certificate by itself and unsubstantiated by the doctor’s testimony creates doubt as to the
existence of the injuries complained of.
ISSUE: Was the petitioner negligent?
RULING:
 Yes. The petitioner was found to be negligent.
 NEGLIGENCE is the want of care required by the circumstances.
 It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the
parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require.
 WHAT DEGREE OF CARE AND VIGILANCE THEN DID THE CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE?
o At half past 1:00 o’clock in the morning along an almost deserted avenue, ordinary care and vigilance
would suffice.
o This may consist of keeping a watchful eye on the road ahead and observing the traffic rules on speed,
right of way and traffic light.

Application:
 In this case, the claim of petitioner that Martinez made a swift U-turn which caused the collision is not credible
since a U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running straight
ahead.
 Nonetheless, no evidence was presented showing skid marks caused by the car driven by Martinez if only to
demonstrate that he was driving at a fast clip in negotiating the U-turn.
  On the other hand, the speed at which petitioner drove his car appears to be the prime cause for his inability
to stop his car and avoid the collision.
 His assertion that he drove at the speed of 40 kph. is belied by Martinez who testified that when he looked at
the opposite lane for any oncoming cars, he saw none;
 Then a few seconds later, he was hit by Adzuara’s car.
 The extent of the damage on the car of Martinez and the position of the cars after the impact further confirm
the finding that petitioner went beyond the speed limit required by law and by the circumstances.

General Rule:
 It is a rule that a motorist crossing a thru-stop street has the right of way over the one making a U-turn.
Exception:
 BUT if the person making a U-turn has already negotiated half of the turn and is almost on the other side so that
he is already visible to the person on the thru-street, the latter must give way to the former.
 In this case, petitioner was on the thru-street and had already seen the Martinez car.
 He should have stopped to allow Martinez to complete the U-turn having, as it were, the last clear chance to
avoid the accident, which he ignored.
 In fact, he never stopped.
 Rather, he claimed that on the assumption that he was negligent, the other party was also guilty of contributory
negligence since his car had no lights on.
 The negligence of Martinez however has not been satisfactorily shown.
 Petitioner insists that the traffic light facing him at the intersection was green which only indicated that he had
the right of way.
o But the findings of the court a quo on the matter countervail this stance, hence, this Court see no reason
to disturb them.

 A perusal of the decision of the trial court shows that there are factual circumstances warranting a finding of
negligence on the part of petitioner. This was further elaborated upon by the CA in its decision [Refer to Notes
below]
 In this case, nothing on record shows that the facts were not properly evaluated by the court a quo. As such, the
Court finds no reason to disturb their findings.
 It bears to stress that the appreciation of petitioner’s post-collision behavior serves only as a means to
emphasize the finding of negligence, which is readily established by the admission of petitioner and his friend
Renato that they saw the car of Martinez making a U-turn but could not avoid the collision by the mere
application of the brakes.

Disposition: Petition denied. Judgment affirmed.

____________________
NOTES:
Findings of the Trial Court:
 The defense version cannot prevail against the prosecution version satisfactorily demonstrating that the subject
accident occurred because of Xerxes’ reckless imprudence consisting in his paying no heed to the red light and
making V-1 (Galant car) proceed at a fast clip as it approached and entered the intersection.
 Gregorio’s basic claim, substantially corroborated by Sahlee’s testimony—in sum to the effect that when he
made V-2 (Corona car) proceed to turn left, the left-turn arrow was lighted green or go for V-2 and it was red
light or stop for V-1—is the same basic version he gave in his written question-and-answer statement to the
police investigator on 13 December 1990;
  Certainly, the clear consistency of Gregorio’s posture respecting such crucial, nay decisive, material
circumstance attending the subject accident underscores the veracity of the prosecution version, even as it
tends to indicate the scant measure of faith and credence that can be safely reposed on the defense version.

Findings of the CA:

 Gregorio testified that when the arrow of the traffic light turned green, he turned left at the speed of five
kilometers per hour. While he was already at the middle of the western half of Quezon Avenue, his car was
smashed by appellant’s vehicle.
 This was corroborated by the testimony of Sahlee Martinez.
 Their declarations were confirmed by physical evidence: the resulting damage on Gregorio’s car as shown by the
exhibits. The dent on the main frame of Gregorio’s car attests to the strong impact caused by appellant’s car.
Such impact proves that appellant must have been running at high speed.
 At the time of the collision, the trial court found that the arrow for left turn was green and the traffic light facing
appellant was red. Given these facts, appellant should have stopped his car as Gregorio had the right of way.
There could be no debate on this legal proposition.
 Appellant testified that he was driving slowly, about 40 kilometers per hour.
 This is refuted by the fact that the colliding vehicles were thrown 20 meters away from the point of impact;
 In fact, Gregorio’s car rested on top of the center island of Quezon Avenue, while appellant’s car stopped at the
middle of the lane of Quezon Avenue facing towards the general direction of Quiapo

RE: Inconsistencies on minor points:

 To weaken the evidence of the prosecution, petitioner assails the testimony of Martinez as being replete with
inconsistencies.
 The records however reveal that these inconsistencies refer only to minor points which indicate veracity rather
than prevarication by the witness.
 They tend to bolster the probative value of the testimony in question as they erase any suspicion of being
rehearsed.

RE: Evidence; Medical Certificates:

 Finally, petitioner claims that the medical certificate presented by the prosecution was uncorroborated by actual
testimony of the physician who accomplished the same and as such has no probative value insofar as the
physical injuries suffered by Sahlee are concerned.
 Regretfully, this Court cannot agree.
 The fact of the injury resulting from the collision may be proved in other ways such as the testimony of the
injured person.
 In the case at bar, Sahlee Martinez testified that her injuries as described in the medical certificate were caused
by the vehicular accident of 17 December 1990.
 This declaration was corroborated by Gregorio.
 This, no less, is convincing proof.

PEOPLE VS RAMIREZ

FACTS:
 Bartolome Quiaoit invited Pedro Ramirez, the accused herein, Victoriano Ranga, the deceased, and Agustin
Menor to hunt in the mount Balitok of the municipality of Nueva Era, Province of Ilocos Norte
 Upon the hunters having arrived at a place in mount Balitok, Pedro Ramirez, who was carrying the shotgun of
Bartolome Quiaoit with a lantern, happened to hunt a deer, and then he told his companions to stay there and
watch over the prey while he entered the forest to get it
  The shotgun was heard hitting Victoriano Ranga in the eye and the right temple, who thereafter died on that
night as a result of the wounds.
 The only witness who could testify upon the act complained of is naturally Agustin Menor who was near the
deceased when the latter was shot
 On the other hand the defendant, testifying as witness in his behalf, admits being the author of the shot which
caused the death of Victoriano Ranga
o that on that night after getting the first prey, he told his companions to stay there, watching over the
prey, while he was going away looking for another; and so he did, because otherwise it would have been
hard for them to find the prey, if no one would have been left there; that being far away from his
companions, he seemed to have seen with his lantern something like the eyes of a deer about fifty
meters from him and then he shot it; but much to his surprise, on approaching what he thought was a
deer, it proved to be his companion Victoriano Ranga. The same witness says that he did not expect to
find his companions in that spot, for he had warned them not to leave, but they left, the place.

ISSUE: Whether the crime committed by the defendant was homicide through reckless imprudence

RULING: Yes
 The testimony of the two witnesses as to the distance of the accused from them when he fired the gun for the
second time is contradictory.
 On the other hand, there is not in the record any circumstances as to whether or not the deceased and the
witness Agustin Menor were in the same place where they were left by the defendant, when the latter fired.
 The night being dark like that when the event took place, the hunter in the midst of a forest without paths is
likely to get confused as to his relative situation; and after walking around, he may think having gone very far,
when in fact he has not, from the point of departure. and so, judging the case from what the two witnesses
Agustin Menor and Pedro Ramirez have testified to, and taking into account that there existed no motive
whatever for resentment on the part of the defendant against the offended party, we are compelled to
conclude that the act complained of constitutes homicide through reckless imprudence.
 The defendant, who was carrying a firearm to hunt at nighttime with the aid of a lantern, knowing that he had
two companions, should have exercised all the necessary diligence to avoid every undesirable accident, such as
the one that unfortunately occurred on the person of Victoriano Ranga.
 While the fact that the defendant, a few days after the event, has offered to the mother of the deceased a
carabao and a horse by way of indemnity, indicates on the one hand that the defendant admitted the
commission of the crime, on the other it shows that he performed that act without criminal intent and only
through a real imprudence.

DISPOSITION: Wherefore the penalty of one year and one day of prision correccional, with the accessories prescribed by
the law, must be imposed upon him, and with modification, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other
respects, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

HEDY GAN y YU, petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:
• On July 4, 1972 at about 8:00 o'clock, the accused Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard,
Tondo, Manila.
• While in front of house no. 694 of North Bay Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney parked
on one side of the road, one following the other about two to three meters from each other.
 • As the car driven by the accused approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle
coming from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake and bypass the one in front of it and
thereby encroached the lane of the car driven by the accused.
• To avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle, the defendant swerved to the right and as a
consequence, the front bumper of the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man who was about to cross the boulevard from
south to north, pinning him against the rear of the parked jeepney.
• The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney to move forward hitting the rear of the parts truck ahead
of it.
• The pedestrian was injured, the Toyota Sedan was damaged on its front, the jeep suffered damages on its rear
and front paints, and the truck sustained scratches at the wooden portion of its rear.
• The body of the old man who was later Identified as Isidoro Casino was immediately brought to the Jose Reyes
Memorial Hospital but was (pronounced) dead on arrival.
• An information for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence was filed against petitioner in view of the above
incident. She entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and the case was set for trial.
• Meanwhile, petitioner sought and was granted a re-investigation by the City Fiscal, as a result of which the trial
fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case against petitioner during the resumption of hearing on September 7, 1972.
The grounds cited therefor were lack of interest on the part of the complaining witness to prosecute the case as
evidenced by an affidavit of desistance submitted to the trial court and lack of eyewitness to sustain the charge.
• The motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal was never resolved. The Court instead ordered the prosecution to
present its evidence. After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence.
• On December 22, 1972, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the of- offense charged.
• Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
• Wherefore, as modified, the accused Hedy Gan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide thru simple imprudence and, pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, she is
hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of three (3) months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor and
to indemnify the heirs of Isidoro Casino in the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (Pl2,000.00) without, however,
any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. 3

ISSUE: Whether or not The Court of Appeals erred in holding that when the petitioner saw a car travelling directly towards
her, she should have stepped on the brakes immediately or in swerving her vehicle to the right should have also stepped
on the brakes or lessened her speed, to avoid the death of a pedestrian.

RULING: YES.
• The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results
to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so,
the law imposes the duty oil the doer to take precaution against its mischievous results and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence. 5
• A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence." 6
• Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence
resulting in Homicide.
• The appellate court in finding the petitioner guilty said:
 • The accused should have stepped on the brakes when she saw the car going in the opposite direction followed
by another which overtook the first by passing towards its left. She should not only have swerved the car she was driving
to the right but should have also tried to stop or lessen her speed so that she would not bump into the pedestrian who
was crossing at the time but also the jeepney which was then parked along the street. 7
• The course of action suggested by the appellate court would seem reasonable were it not for the fact that such
suggestion did not take into account the amount of time afforded petitioner to react to the situation she was in. For it
is undeniable that the suggested course of action presupposes sufficient time for appellant to analyze the situation
confronting her and to ponder on which of the different courses of action would result in the least possible harm to
herself and to others.
• Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no evidence was presented by the prosecution with respect to the relative
distances of petitioner to the parked jeepney and the oncoming overtaking vehicle that would tend to prove that
petitioner did have sufficient time to reflect on the consequences of her instant decision to swerve her car to the light
without stepping on her brakes. In fact, the evidence presented by the prosecution on this point is the petitioner's
statement to the police 8 stating::
• And masasabi ko lang ho umiwas ho ako sa isang sasakyan na biglang nagovertake sa sasakyan na aking
kasalubong kung kaya ay aking kinabig sa kanan ang akin kotse subalit siya naman biglangpagtawid ng tao o victim
at hindi ko na ho naiwasan at ako ay wala ng magawa . Iyan ho ang buong pangyayari nang nasabing
aksidente.9 (Emphasis supplied)
• The prosecution having presented this exhibit as its own evidence, we cannot but deem its veracity to have
been admitted by it. Thus, under the circumstances narrated by petitioner, we find that the appellate court is asking
too much from a mere mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best judgment to extricate
herself from a difficult and dangerous situation caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle. Petitioner certainly could
not be expected to act with all the coolness of a person under normal conditions. 10 The danger confronting petitioner
was real and imminent, threatening her very existence. She had no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough
time to heed the very powerfull instinct of self-preservation.
• Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that the petitioner was driving her car within the legal limits. We
therefore rule that the "emergency rule" enunciated above applies with full force to the case at bar and consequently
absolve petitioner from any criminal negligence in connection with the incident under consideration.
• We further set aside the award of damages to the heirs of the victim, who by executing a release of the claim
due them, had effectively and clearly waived their right thereto.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
• WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting petitioner HEDY GAN y YU of the crime of Homicide thru
Simple Imprudence. She is no longer liable for the P12,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the appellate court to the
heirs of the victim.

McKee vs IAC (Factors in Determining Negligence; Emergency Rule)

FACTS:
 Between 9 & 10 o'clock in the morning of 8 January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway,
between Angeles City & San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo
truck, Loadstar owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose
Koh.
 The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George
Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
o Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the mother of minors George, Christopher and
Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc, on the other hand, was the baby sitter of 1 1/2 year old Kim.
 At the time of the collision, Kim was seated on the lap of Loida Bondoc who was at the front passenger's seat of
the car while Araceli and her two (2) sons were seated at the car's back seat.
  Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with two hundred (200) cavans of rice
weighing about 10,000 kilos, was travelling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was
bound for Manila.
 The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando.
 When the northbound car was about (10) meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys
suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car.
o The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn
back.
o Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched
on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane.
o Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck.
o The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.
 An information was filed against Ruben Galang, charging him for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide, physical injuries, and damage to property. He was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges
in the information. The conviction was affirmed by the CA and achieved finality after the denial by the CA of his
MR and the denial by the SC of his Petition for Review.
 Two civil cases were filed. The first one, by the wife and children of Jose Koh, and the second one by Araceli and
her husband for the death of Kim and injuries to Araceli and her other children. The respondents were impleaded
against as the employers of Ruben Galang – Galang was not included. The cases here are based on quasi-delict.
These cases were eventually consolidated.
 The trial court dismissed the civil cases and awarded the respondents damages and attorney’s fees.
 On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the dismissal was reversed. This was based on its finding that it
was Galang’s inattentiveness or reckless imprudence that caused the accident.
 However, upon filing by the respondents of an MR, the IAC set aside its original decision and upheld that of the
trial court because the fact that Koh’s car invaded the lane of the truck and the collision occurred while still in
Galang’s lane gave rise to the presumption that Koh was negligent.

ISSUE: WON Koh is guilty of negligence.

RULING: NO
 Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the
car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate
peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several
meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car.
 Under what is known as the emergency rule, “one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required
to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty
of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.”
 Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of the car, We find that Jose Koh adopted the
best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that
he was not guilty of negligence.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the respondent Court of 3 April 1984 is SET ASIDE
while its Decision of 29 November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED, subject to the modification that the
indemnity for death is increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee. Costs
against private respondents. SO ORDERED.

Valenzuela v CA
G.R. No. 115024; February 7, 1996
KAPUNAN, J.:
These two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court stem from an action to recover
damages by petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for injuries sustained by her in a
vehicular accident in the early morning of June 24, 1990.

FACTS:
 This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical injuries sustained in a vehicular
accident.
 Plaintiff's version of the accident is as follows:
o At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue
Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta
Avenue.
o Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted
place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed.
o Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her
home in that car's condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her
emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the
left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was
suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the
name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc.
o Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which
was destroyed, and then fell to the ground.
o She was pulled out from under defendant's car.
o Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to
the rest of the body.
 Defendant’s version of the accident:
o Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent.
o He was on his way home, travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was raining, visibility was affected and
the road was wet.
o He testified that he was driving along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the
direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San
Juan, with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with "full bright lights".
o Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle,
and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking
lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly lighted.
o He alleged in his defense that the left rear portion of plaintiff's car was protruding as it was then "at a
standstill diagonally" on the outer portion of the right lane towards Araneta Avenue (par. 18, Answer).
o He confirmed the testimony of plaintiff's witness that after being bumped the car of the plaintiff
swerved to the right and hit another car parked on the sidewalk.
o Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she was not
a licensed driver.
 After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross
negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
o The trial court likewise held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally liable for
damages pursuant to Article 2180.
o It ordered the defendants to jointly and severally to pay.
 As a result of the trial court's decision, defendants filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and for
Reconsideration, citing testimony in Criminal Case O.C. No. 804367 (People vs. Richard Li), tending to show that
the point of impact, as depicted by the pieces of glass/debris from the parties' cars, appeared to be at the center
of the right lane of Aurora Blvd.
 The trial court denied the motion.
  Defendants forthwith filed an appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals.
o In a Decision rendered March 30, 1994, the Court of Appeals found that there was "ample basis from the
evidence of record for the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's car was properly parked at the right,
beside the sidewalk when it was bumped by defendant's car."
o Dismissing the defendants' argument that the plaintiff's car was improperly parked, almost at the
center of the road, the respondent court noted that evidence which was supposed to prove that the car
was at or near center of the right lane was never presented during the trial of the case.
o Defendant Li's testimony that he was driving at a safe speed of 55 km./hour is self serving; it was not
corroborated.
 In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the
Court of Appeals, in its decision, however, absolved the Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. from any
liability towards petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela and reduced the amount of moral damages to P500,000.00.
 Consequently, both parties assail the respondent court's decision by filing two separate petitions before this
Court.
o Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944, contends that he should not be held liable for damages because the
proximate cause of the accident was Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela's own negligence.
 Alternatively, he argues that in the event that this Court finds him negligent, such
negligence ought to be mitigated by the contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
o On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela assails the respondent court's decision
insofar as it absolves Alexander Commercial, Inc. from liability as the owner of the car driven by Richard
Li and insofar as it reduces the amount of the actual and moral damages awarded by the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant Richard Li is liable for the damages sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela?
RULING:
 Yes, Richard Li is liable for the damages sustained by Valenzuela.
 One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to Li’s disingenuous and patently self-serving
asseverations.
 The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at
the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the road conditions on a
principal metropolitan thorough fare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had ample time to react to the
changing conditions of the road if he were alert—as every driver should be—to those conditions.
 Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses.
 Physiological “fight or flight” mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs,
alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc.
 Li’s failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could therefore have been only due
to either or both of the two factors:
o that he was driving at a “very fast” speed as testified by Rodriguez;
o that he was under the influence of alcohol.
 Either factor working independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road conditions, since
normally he would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela’s car, rather than be in a situation forcing
him to suddenly apply his brakes.
 Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the
accident.
 “Negligence, as it is commonly understood, is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others.”
 It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
 We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, that negligence is the want of care required by the
circumstances.

ISSUE: Whether Valenzuela is guilty of contributory negligence?

RULING:
  Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he
has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.
 Based on the foregoing definition, the standard or act to which, according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to
have conformed for her own protection was not to park at all at any point of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking
zone.
o We cannot agree.
 Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not
to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation
(emergency rule).
 The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous situations and does not
require the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes
threatening conditions.
 Under the “emergency rule” adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds
himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may
be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence.
 A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a
point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists.
 She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley
where she would likely find no one to help her.
 It would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora
Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other
motorists.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alexander Commercial Inc. is liable for the damages sustained by Valenzuela based on pater
familias for failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his
employees?
RULING:
 Yes, Alexander Commercial Inc. is liable for the damages sustained by Valenzuela based on pater familias for
failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his
employees.
 The employer’s primary liability under the concept of pater familias embodied by Art. 2180 (in relation to Art.
2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or tortious in character.
 His liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection
and supervision of its employees.
o Once evidence is introduced showing that the employer exercised the required amount of care in
selecting its employees, half of the employer’s burden is overcome.
o The question of diligent supervision, however, depends on the circumstances of employment.
 Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of its employee during
the performance of the latter’s assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article
2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
 The employer is not expected to exercise supervision over either the employee’s private activities or during the
performance of tasks either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the employee’s tasks.
 The case at bench presents a situation of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large companies
with either their employees of managerial rank or their representatives.
o Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide cars under the first plan, require rigorous
tests of road worthiness from their agents prior to turning over the car (subject of company
maintenance) to their representatives.
 o In other words, like a good father of a family, they entrust the company vehicle only after they are
satisfied that the employee to whom the car has been given full use of the said company car for
company or private purposes will not be a threat or menace to himself, the company or to others.
o When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to its employee, it in effect
guarantees that it is, like every good father, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege
reasonably and responsively.
 Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all
kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the business
and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car,
the managerial employee or company sales agent.
 As such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of furthering the company’s
image, a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to
whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably
and responsibly.
 In fine, Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care aand
diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li.
 No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain
the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car.
 Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for
entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be
jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the
accident.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is modified with the effect of REINSTATING
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. SO ORDERED.

JUNIO vs Manila Railroad (Gravity of harm)

Facts:
 Consolacion Junio, a young woman, 22 years of age, and Beatriz Soloria, another young woman of 18 years,
represented by her father, Fausto Soloria, who was appointed her guardian ad litem, brought these actions in
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to recover from the defendant, Manila Railroad Company, damages
suffered by them in an accident that occurred at the railroad crossing situated at the outskirts of the town of
Calasiao, Pangasinan, when the automobile in which they were passengers collided with a locomotive belonging
to the aforementioned defendant.
o Consolacion Junio was a dancer earning from six pesos (P6) to eight pesos (P8) a day for two or three
days every week that she danced. She lost her right leg which was amputated, suffered a fracture of her
right arm and was wounded on her occipital region.

 At about 11:40 o'clock on the night of April 13, 1930, the plaintiffs herein with some other persons were
traveling in a PU-Car on the road between Calasiao and Santa Barbara.
 When they arrived at the intersection of the road and the defendant's railway, the car tried to cross the track
and collided with the engine of the night express which left Dagupan for Manila at 11 o'clock that same night
and which was then passing over the crossing in question at great speed.
 As a result of the collision, the car was thrown some distance, plaintiff Junio's right leg was amputated and her
right arm fractured, and Soloria received various injuries on her head.
  The aforementioned crossing is situated in the town of Calasiao and the same is presumed to be dangerous due
to the fact that gates were required at that crossing. (Section 83, Act No. 1459, as amended by Act No. 2100.)

 On the night of the accident, the gates were not lowered and there was no notice to the effect that they were
not operated at night or that they were temporarily out of order. However, a notice to the effect that that was a
railroad crossing was there.

 The gate in question was about 300 meters from the railroad station at Calasiao; that on each side of the
crossing there was a wooden bar operated only during the daytime by a woman employee of the defendant, and
that just before the crossing on one side of the road leading from the town of Calasiao there was a signpost
bearing the notice, "RAILROAD CROSSING", written crosswise.

Allegations:
 In the case under consideration, the driver alleges that he slowed down from 19 miles an hour, at which rate he
was then going, to 16 miles, and that he was on the lookout for any approaching train,
 while the engineer insists that he rang the bell and sounded the whistle before reaching the crossing.
 Both parties claim to be free from guilt, and if the defendant company were completely so, the plaintiffs would
have no cause of action against it.

Issue: Whether or not both the defendant Manila Railroad and driver of the car are negligent?

Ruling: Yes

 From the evidence, it is obvious that the defendant as well as the driver of the car in which the plaintiffs were
passengers were negligent, the former because, by installing the gates at the place or crossing where the
accident occurred, it had voluntarily imposed upon itself the obligation to operate them even at night and to
close them every time a train passed in order to avoid causing injury to the public. It has been said that the gates
constitute an invitation to the public to pass without fear of danger, and failure to operate them conveniently
constitutes negligence on the part of the company.

 The driver was, likewise, negligent because he did not comply with his duty to slacken the speed of the car and
to "look and listen" before crossing the intersection and, above all, because he did not maintain a reasonable
speed so as to permit him to stop any moment if it were necessary in order to avoid an accident. If, in the
present case, the car had been running at a reasonable speed, there is no doubt that he could have stopped it
instantly upon seeing the train from a distance of 5 meters.

 As a general rule, the rights and obligations between the public and a railroad company at a public crossing
are mutual and reciprocal. Both are under mutual obligation to exercise due care to avoid causing or receiving
injury. Each is in duty bound to exercise reasonable or ordinary care commensurate with the risk and danger
involved.

Notes:
 the negligence of a driver, who, in turn, is guilty of contributory negligence, cannot be imputed to a passenger
who has no control over him in the management of the vehicle and with whom he sustains no relation of master
and servant. This rule is applied more strictly when, as in the present case, hired cars or those engaged in public
service, are involved.
 There is nothing of record to show that the appellants herein have incurred in any negligence imputable to them
and we do not see any reason whatsoever why they should be made responsible for the driver's negligence. The
 doctrine established in the cases cited should be applied to the case at bar and it should be held that the
appellants herein are entitled to recover from the appellee damages occasioned by the accident of which they
were victims.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and It is ordered that the appellee pay to Consolacion Junio
the sum of P3,000 and to Beatriz Soloria P300, with costs of both instances, So ordered.

US vs Clemente
Facts:
 On June 1912 in Manila, Enrique Clemente drove a street car driving at full speed (around 23 miles per hour)
 A mother was buying crude oil from a store across the street of their house, when she noticed that her 3-year old
child was crossing the street from their house (most probably to follow his mother)
 When the mother saw the car fast approaching, she signaled to the driver to stop the car
 Other bystanders who also noticed the car fast approaching also signaled to the car to stop
 However, the driver did not make any effort to stop the car
 He then hit the child, and it took a distance of 36.8M for the car to make a complete stop after the impact
 The child was dragged by the car, fracturing and destroying its skull and causing instant death
 An information was filed for homicide thru reckless negligence
 Trial court decision:
o Only found Clemente guilty of a violation of a city ordinance thru imprudence and negligence, and
sentenced to 5 months of arresto mayor
 Thus, prompting this appeal by the US

Issue:
WON the driver should be guilty for homicide thru reckless negligence

Ruling:
 YES
 It is the duty of any person driving a vehicle in the public thoroughfares to reduce the same to control, ready to
be stopped at any moment, if he sees a child below' the years of understanding in such place that it can, by any
reasonable chance, place itself in a dangerous position with respect to the vehicle
 In such case the vehicle must be under such control that, if the child, by some sudden or unexpected movement,
places itself in the way of the vehicle, it can be stopped in time to avert injury
 No one is able to determine what a child of that age will do, and it is incumbent upon the driver of a vehicle, on
seeing such child in the street, to take such care that, no matter what, within reasonable limits, the child may do,
it will nevertheless be safe
Application
 This defendant, so far as the great preponderance of the evidence is concerned, took no adequate precautions to
prevent the accident which occurred
 It is undoubted that he saw the child in the street, very probably making its way toward the street-car track; yet
he continued the car at its maximum speed, without regard to what the child might do
 Such conduct cannot be permitted. Vehicles cannot be driven in the public streets in such a way as to endanger
the life of a child below the thinking age who may have strayed upon the streets in search of its mother, or who
may be there for any other reason.
  Having no judgment of its own, the drivers of vehicles must substitute their judgment for its; not having the
intelligence to direct itself, men who drive cars or vehicles must exercise their intelligence.
 It may be true, as defendant claims, that the child by a sudden dart placed itself in front of the car, but that is no
excuse for the defendant
 He should have anticipated that very thing and should have acted accordingly

Taylor VS Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company

Facts:
 The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system
in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within the
city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor.
 September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon: David Taylor, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more
mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics with a boy
named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose
of visiting Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature
engine.
 After leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy, they walked across the open space in the
neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces
 They found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground
 These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it 2
long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity
 They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a
considerable explosive power
 The boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried them home
 After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and they went to Manuel's home
 The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps
o Trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket - no result
o Break the cap with a stone - failed
o Opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got
matches
 David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents
 An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three
 Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started
to run away, received a slight cut in the neck
 Manuel had his hand burned and wounded
 David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such
an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeon
 The RTC held that Manila Railroad and Light Co is liable for damages

ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to damages (Person Exposed to the risk)
RULING: No
 In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally
and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day
as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he
was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that,
despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was
amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by
 the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of
electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors
brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was
about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be
dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time when he put the
match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.
 True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be
expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries
which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act,
and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that
"according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be
required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him
under such circumstances.
 We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the
danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in
the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the
exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate
act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own
willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the
negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was
the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.

DISPOSITION : Twenty days after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the court
below, without costs to either party in this instance, and ten days thereafter let the record be returned to the court
wherein it originated, where the judgment will be entered in favor of the defendant for the costs in first instance and the
complaint dismissed without day. So ordered.
December 15 (Res Ipsa Loquitur to The State)
RAMOS vs CA
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Kapunan, J.
FACTS:
 Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos, until the afternoon of June 17, 1985, is a 47-year old robust woman married to Rogelio E.
Ramos, an executive of PLDT Company. They have three children.
 Erlinda underwent cholecystectomy, a surgical procedure to remove stone from her gall bladder.
 Her surgeon Dr. Hosaka will conduct the surgery at the De Los Santos Medical Center. He assured them that he
would find a good anesthesiologist. He charged a fee of P16, 000, including the anesthesiologist’s fee.
 She was scheduled to have her surgery on June 17, 1985, at around 9AM.
 At around 7:30 A.M. of June 17, 1985 and while still in her room, she was prepared for the operation by the
hospital staff. Her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, who was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical
Center, was also there for moral support. She was allowed to stay during the operation for moral support.
 The operation was delayed. Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for the operation.
 Dra. Guiterrez, the anesthesiologist “botched” the administration of the anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into
coma and suffer brain damage.
o Herminda noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda.
o She heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist.
o The patient’s nailbed became bluish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position—a position
where the head of the patient is placed in a position lower than her feet which is an indication that there
is a decrease of blood supply to the patient’s brain.
 Dr. Hosaka informed Rogelio that something went wrong during the intubation.
o The doctors were asked by the hospital to explain what happened.
o They said that the patient had bronchospasm.
o She was also diagnosed to be suffering from “diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage.”
 The family sued the hospital, the surgeon and the anesthesiologist for damages. The petitioners showed expert
testimony showing that Erlinda’s condition was caused by the anesthesiologist in not exercising reasonable care
in “intubating” Erlinda.
o Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist saying “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.”
 RTC held that the anesthesiologist omitted to exercise due care in intubating the patient. The surgeon was remiss
in his obligation to provide a “good anesthesiologist” and for arriving 3 hours late. The hospital
ISSUE: Is res ipsa loquitur applicable in this case?
RULING: YES
 Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.”
 The phrase “res ipsa loquitur” is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the
surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s
prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.
o Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the
defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of
care.
 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge
and experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part
of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the
defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and
on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of
the accident itself. Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.
 Much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, does not create or constitute
an independent or separate ground of liability. Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the nature of
 a procedural rule. It is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a
substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of negligence.
 In other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof
of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such proof, permitting the plaintiff to present along with the
proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or
presumption of negligence, and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof.
 Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following REQUISITES must be satisfactorily shown: 1. The
accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; 2. It is caused by an
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and 3. The possibility of contributing
conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
o The fundamental element is the “control of the instrumentality” which caused the damage.
o Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant. In order to have the
benefit of the rule, a plaintiff, in addition to proving injury or damage, must show a situation where it is
applicable, and must establish that the essential elements of the doctrine were present in a particular
incident.
 APPLICATION: We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. Obviously, brain damage,
which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation. In
fact, this kind of situation does not happen in the absence of negligence of someone in the administration of
anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube. Normally, a person being put under anesthesia is not rendered
decerebrate as a consequence of administering such anesthesia if the proper procedure was followed.
Furthermore, the instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all
under the exclusive control of private respondents, who are the physicians-in-charge. Likewise, petitioner Erlinda
could not have been guilty of contributory negligence because she was under the influence of anesthetics which
rendered her unconscious.
 Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed while the patient
is unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control of the physicians, we hold that a practical
administration of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur. Moreover, the liability of the physicians and
the hospital in this case is not predicated upon an alleged failure to secure the desired results of an operation nor
on an alleged lack of skill in the diagnosis or treatment as in fact no operation or treatment was ever performed
on Erlinda. Thus, upon all these initial determination a case is made out for the application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur.
 ADDITIONAL RULING: Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove
that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with
because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of
expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters
that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts.
Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient
has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the
statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are
observable by any one may be given by non-expert witnesses.
 Despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been measurably enlarged, it does not automatically apply
to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show that he
is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used
but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to
situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation,
that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had
been exercised.
 It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or
surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not
required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific
treatment did not produce the desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the
only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished.
ISSUE: Were the respondents negligent?
RULING: YES, they were all negligent and are solidary liable.
 We hold that private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care
of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous condition.
 In the instant case, the records are helpful in furnishing not only the logical scientific evidence of the pathogenesis
of the injury but also in providing the Court the legal nexus upon which liability is based.
 With regard to Dra. Gutierrez, we find her negligent in the care of Erlinda during the anesthesia phase. As borne
by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient. This fact was attested to by Prof.
Herminda Cruz, Dean of the Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing and petitioner’s sister­in­law, who was in
the operating room right beside the patient when the tragic event occurred.
 Although witness Cruz is not an anesthesiologist, she can very well testify upon matters on which she is capable
of observing such as, the statements and acts of the physician and surgeon, external appearances, and manifest
conditions which are observable by any one.
 This is precisely allowed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur where the testimony of expert witnesses is not
required. It is the accepted rule that expert testimony is not necessary for the proof of negligence in nontechnical
matters or those of which an ordinary person may be expected to have knowledge, or where the lack of skill or
want of care is so obvious as to render expert testimony unnecessary.
 Dr. Orlino Hosaka, as the so called “captain of the ship,” it is the surgeon’s responsibility to see to it that those
under him perform their task in the proper manner. Respondent Dr. Hosaka’s negligence can be found in his failure
to exercise the proper authority (as the “captain” of the operative team) in not determining if his anesthesiologist
observed proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka
verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not escape us that
respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlindas
cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter’s operation. Because of this, he had little or
no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in
his professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in
Erlinda’s condition.
 The basis for holding an employer (Hospital) solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of
others based on the former’s responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas.
 Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of
a good father of the family to prevent damage. In other words, while the burden of proving negligence rests on
the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the respondents (parent, guardian, teacher or
employer) who should prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
 In the instant case, respondent hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree
of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar nature,
respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. Having failed
to do this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlinda’s condition.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are hereby modified so as to
award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages
computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that
petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages; 3) P1,500,000.00 as
temperate damages; 4) P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages and attorney’s fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit. SO
ORDERED.
NOTES:
 The Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give primordial consideration to the health and welfare of their
patients. If a doctor fails to live up to this precept, he is made accountable for his acts. A mistake, through gross
negligence or incompetence or plain human error, may spell the difference between life and death. In this sense,
the doctor plays God on his patient’s fate.

ii. Solidum v. People, G.R. No. 192123, March 10, 2014 (Res Ipsa Loquitur)
Facts:
 Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 19922 with an imperforate anus. (No opening in the anus)
 Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large
intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side
of his body.
 On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through
operation.
 Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito Luceño, Dr. Donatella
Valeña and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and petitioner
Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum).
 During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma lasted for two weeks,
but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move.
 Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila against the attending
physicians.
 The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, but was transferred to the RTC

RTC RULING:
 On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries
 Upon motion of Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella to reconsider their solidary liability,18 the RTC excluded
them from solidary liability as to the damages

CA Ruling:
 The CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum.
 They ruled that:
o In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent
upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its
fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care.
o Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the
patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to
show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that
the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the
injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce
expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care.
o Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary
conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
o The res ipsa loquitur test has been known to be applied in criminal cases. Although it creates a
presumption of negligence, it need not offend due process, as long as the accused is afforded the
opportunity to go forward with his own evidence and prove that he has no criminal intent. It is in this
light not inconsistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused.
 Dr. Solidum filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied his motion

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable in this case
RULING: NO
 Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself."
 o The doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that "where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under
the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care."
o It is simply "a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the
very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the
person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the
defendant who is charged with negligence.
o It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or
common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself.
 Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.
 The doctrine, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a given case, is not meant to and does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence against the party charged.
o It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof, and helps the plaintiff in
proving a breach of the duty.
o The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available.
 Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations:
o leaving of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation,
o injuries sustained on a healthy part of the body which was not under, or in the area, of treatment,
o removal of the wrong part of the body when another part was intended,
o knocking out a tooth while a patient’s jaw was under anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils,
o and loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff was under the influence of anesthetic, during or following
an operation for appendicitis, among others.
 Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been measurably enlarged, it does not
automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the
defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence
 It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or
surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not
required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific
treatment did not produce the desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the
only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished
 The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or
unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary
professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the
average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence.
 If there was such extraneous intervention, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is
called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could
 In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must first be satisfied, to
wit:
o (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
o (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged; and
o (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person
injured
 The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inappropriate. Although it should be
conceded without difficulty that the second and third elements were present, considering that the anesthetic
agent and the instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient, being then
 unconscious during the operation, could not have been guilty of contributory negligence, the first element was
undeniably wanting.
 Luz delivered Gerald to the care, custody and control of his physicians for a pull-through operation. Except for
the imperforate anus, Gerald was then of sound body and mind at the time of his submission to the physicians.
 Yet, he experienced bradycardia during the operation, causing loss of his senses and rendering him immobile.
Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate,
scientifically termed as bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through operation, or
during the administration of anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did not prove that the negligence of
any of his attending physicians, including the anesthesiologists, had caused the injury.
 In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in the course of the operation that the lack of oxygen
could have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting them to administer atropine to the patient.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence
RULING: NO
 Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree
of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury. Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an
act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
to perform or failing to perform such act.
 The negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence no matter in what it consists, cannot
create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of
an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence and unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
 The Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence beyond reasonable doubt because the
circumstances cited by the CA were insufficient to establish that Dr. Solidum had been guilty of inexcusable lack
of precaution in monitoring the administration of the anesthetic agent to Gerald
 An action upon medical negligence – whether criminal, civil or administrative – calls for the plaintiff to prove by
competent evidence each of the following four elements namely:
o a.) the duty owed by the physician to the patient, as created by the physician-patient relationship, to act
in accordance with the specific norms or standards established by his profession;
o b.) the breach of the duty by the physician’s failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard of
care;
o c.) the causation, is, there must be a reasonably close and casual connection between the negligent act
or omission and the resulting injury; and
o d.) the damages suffered by the patient.
 In the medical profession, specific norms on standard of care to protect the patient against unreasonable risk,
commonly referred to as standards of care, set the duty of the physician in respect of the patient. The standard
of care is an objective standard which conduct of a physician sued for negligence or malpractice may be
measured, and it does not depend therefore, on any individual’s physician’s own knowledge either. In
attempting to fix a standard by which a court may determine whether the physician has properly performed the
requisite duty toward the patient, expert medical testimony from both plaintiff and defense experts is required.

ISSUE: Whether Ospital ng Maynila shall be held jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum with regard to indemnification
for damages (Not about the topic ako lang gibutang just in case mangutana c sir)
RULING:No. The judgment was flawed in logic and in law.
  In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the
criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. It is puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the
CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite
the obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum.
The judgment rendered against Ospital ng Maynila void was the product of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction.
 The Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to be heard was
not respected from the outset. The R TC and the CA should have been alert to this fundamental defect. Verily,
no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party.
Such a rule would enforce the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
 Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would be properly
enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched
here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly,
pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation
“engaged in any kind of industry.” The term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or
business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry. However, Ospital ng Maynila,
being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and
humanitarian work. Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum
must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the
operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly,
assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here), the
execution against him was unsatisfied due to him being insolvent.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES AND SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on January 20, 2010; ACQUITS Dr. Fernando P. Solidum of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to
serious physical injuries; and MAKES no pronouncement on costs of suit.

iii. ATTY. REYES G. GEROMO, FLORENCIO BUENTIPO, JR., ERNALDO YAMBOT and LYDIA BUSTAMANTE vs.
LA PAZ HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

G.R. No. 211175 January 18, 2017

FACTS:
• Petitioners Atty. Reyes G. Geromo (Geromo), Florencio Buentipo, Jr. (Buentipo), Ernaldo Yambot (Yambot), and
Lydia Bustamante (Bustamante) acquired individual housing units of Adelina in San Pedro, Laguna from La Paz, through
GSIS financing. [as evidenced by their deeds of conditional sale.]
• The properties were all situated along the old Litlit Creek.
• In 1987, Geromo, Bustamante and Yambot started occupying their respective residential dwellings, which were
all located along Block 2 (Pearl Street) of the said subdivision.
• After more than two (2) years of occupation, cracks started to appear on the floor and walls of their houses.
• The petitioners, through the President of the Adelina Homeowners Association, requested La Paz, being the
owner/developer, to take remedial action.
• They collectively decided to construct a riprap/retaining wall along the old creek believing that water could be
seeping underneath the soil and weakening the foundation of their houses.
• Although La Paz was of the view that it was not required to build a retaining wall, it decided to give the
petitioners ₱3,000.00 each for expenses incurred in the construction of the said riprap/retaining wall.
• The petitioners claimed that despite the retaining wall, the condition of their housing units worsened as the
years passed. When they asked La Paz to shoulder the repairs, it denied their request, explaining that the structural
defects could have been caused by the 1990 earthquake and the renovations/improvements introduced to the units
that overloaded the foundation of the original structures.
 • In 1998, the petitioners decided to leave their housing units in Adelina.
• Upon the request of the petitioners in Mary 2002, the Municipal Engineer of San Pedro and the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) conducted an ocular
inspection of the subject properties.
• They found that there was "differential settlement of the area where the affected units were constructed. "
• On the basis thereof, Geromo, Buentipo, Yambot and Bustamant filed a complaint for breach of contract with
damages against La Paz and GSIS before the HLURB.
• They all asserted that La Paz was liable for implied warranty against hidden defects and that it was negligent in
building their houses on unstable land. Later on, the said complaints were consolidated.
• La Paz, in its Answer, averred that:
1. it had secured the necessary permits and licenses for the subdivision project; that the houses thereon were built in
accordance with the plans and specifications of the National Building Code and were properly delivered to the
petitioners;
2. that it did not violate Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957 as it was issued compliance documents, such as development
permits, approved alteration plan, license to sell, and certificate of completion by HLURB;
3. that the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHILVOLCS), based on the serial photo interpretation of
its field surveyors in 1996, reported that a portion of the topography of the subdivision developed an active fault
line; and lastly, that there were unauthorized, irregular renovation/alteration and additional construction in the said
units.
• Hence, it argued that it should not be held liable for any damage incurred and that the same should be for the
sole account of the petitioners.
• In its defense, GSIS moved for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action. It asserted that the
deeds of conditional sale were executed between La Paz and the petitioners only and that its only participation in the
transactions was to grant loans to the petitioners for the purchase of their respective properties.
The Decision of the HLURB Arbiter: (Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board)
• the HLURB Arbiter found La Paz liable for the structural damage on the petitioners' housing units, explaining
that the damage was caused by its failure to properly fill and compact the soil on which the houses were built and to
maintain a three (3) meter easement from the edge of the creek as required by law.
• As to GSIS, the HLURB ruled that there was no cogent reason to find it liable for the structural defects as it
merely facilitated the financing of the affected units. The decretal portion of the decision of the HLURB Arbiter reads:
Dispositive Portion of the HLURB Arbiter:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Ordering respondent La Paz Housing and Dev't. Corp. to immediately undertake and cause the necessary repairs/
construction of the subject units to make it suitable for human habitation for which it was originally intended for;
2) In the alternative, if it is no longer possible for the said units to be repaired to make it suitable for human habitation,
respondent LPHDC is hereby ordered to give each complainant a substitute property of the same nature and area, more
or less, within the subdivision project or in any project owned and developed by LPHDC within the vicinity of San Pedro,
Laguna;
3) Ordering respondent LPHDC to pay complainants.
The Decision of the HLURB
Board of Commissioners
4. the HLURB Board of Commissioners set aside the Arbiter's decision, explaining that there was no concrete evidence
presented to prove that the houses of the petitioners were indeed damaged by the failure of La Paz to comply with
the building standards or easement requirements.
• The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the HLURB Board of Commissioners denied their motion in its
Resolution.
• Aggrieved, the petitioners elevated the case to the OP which initially dismissed the appeal on December 18, 2006 for
late filing.
• The petitioners questioned the dismissal before the CA and, in its Decision, the appellate court reversed the resolution
of the OP and ordered the latter to resolve the appeal on the merits.
• The OP finally rendered a decision:
1. Dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. It found that on the culpability of La Paz, the petitioners merely relied on
the report submitted by the team that conducted the "ocular inspection" of the subject properties. It wrote that
"[w]hat is visual to the eye, though, is not always reflective of the real cause behind. xxx other than the ocular
inspection, no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of damage on the housing units."
2. According to the OP, the petitioners "did not even show that the plans, specifications and designs of their houses
were deficient and defective."
3. It concluded that the petitioners failed to show that La Paz was negligent or at fault in the construction of the
houses in question or that improper filing and compacting of the soil was the proximate cause of damage. 17
• the petitioners appealed the OP decision,
The CA Decision
5. CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners.
6. Affirmed the ruling of the OP and found that the petitioners had no cause of action against La Paz for breach of
warranty against hidden defects as their contracts were merely contracts to sell, the titles not having been legally
passed on to the petitioners.
7. It likewise ruled that La Paz could not be held liable for damages as there was not enough evidence on record to prove
that it acted fraudulently and maliciously against the petitioners. 18
• Hence, the present petition
• Petitioner’s Claims:
8. La Paz was grossly negligent when it constructed houses over a portion of the old Litlit Creek. La Paz merely covered
the old creek with backfilled materials without properly compacting the soil.21 They argue that they, or any buyer for
that matter, could not have known that the soil beneath the cemented flooring of their housing units were not
compacted or leveled properly and that the water beneath continuously seeped, causing the soil foundation to soften
resulting in the differential settlement of the area.
ISSUE : Whether or not La Paz should be held liable for the structural defects on its implied warranty against hidden
defects.

RULING:YES.

Under the Civil Code, the vendor shall be answerable for warranty against hidden defects on the thing sold under the
following circumstances:
Art. 1561. The vendor shall be responsible for warranty against the hidden defects which the thing sold may have, should
they render it unfit for the use for which it is intended, or should they diminish its fitness for such use to such an extent
that, had the vendee been aware thereof, he would not have acquired it or would have given a lower price for it; but said
vendor shall not be answerable for patent defects or those which may be visible, or for those which are not visible if the
vendee is an expert who, by reason of this trade or profession, should have known them.
Art. 1566. The vendor is responsible to the vendee for any hidden faults or defects in the thing sold, even though he was
not aware thereof.
This provision shall not apply if the contrary has been stipulated and the vendor was not aware of the hidden faults or
defects in the thing sold.
For the implied warranty against hidden defects to be applicable, the following conditions must be met:
a. Defect is Important or Serious
i. The thing sold is unfit for the use which it is intended
ii. Diminishes its fitness for such use or to such an extent that the buyer would not have acquired it had he been aware
thereof
b. Defect is Hidden
c. Defect Exists at the time of the sale
d. Buyer gives Notice of the defect to the seller within reasonable time
• Here, the petitioners observed big cracks on the walls and floors of their dwellings within two years from the time they
purchased the units. The damage in their respective houses was substantial and serious. They reported the condition of
their houses to La Paz, but the latter did not present a concrete plan of action to remedy their predicament.
• They also brought up the issue of water seeping through their houses during heavy rainfall, but again La Paz failed to
properly address their concerns. The structural cracks and water seepage were evident indications that the soil
underneath the said structures could be unstable.
• Verily, the condition of the soil would not be in the checklist that a potential buyer would normally inquire about from
the developer considering that it is the latter's prime obligation to ensure suitability and stability of the ground.
• Furthermore, HLURB Director Belen G. Ceniza, after confirming the cracks on the walls and floors of their houses,
requested MGB-DENR and the Office of the Municipal Mayor to conduct a geological/geohazard assessment and
thorough investigation on the entire Adelina subdivision.
• Records reveal that a portion of Pearl Street itself had sunk, cracking the concrete pavement of the road. For several
years, the petitioners had to endure the conditions of their homes while La Paz remained silent on their constant follow-
ups. Eventually, they had to leave their own dwellings due to safety concerns.
• Based on the said findings, the Court is of the considered view that the petitioners were justified in abandoning their
dwellings as they were living therein under unsafe conditions. With the houses uncared for, it was no surprise that, by
the time the case was filed in 2004, they were in a worse condition.
• La Paz remained unconcerned even after receiving incident reports of structural issues from homeowners and despite
constant follow-ups from them for many years. In fact, the petitioners took it upon themselves to build a riprap/retaining
wall due to La Paz's indifference.
• One of the purposes of P.D. No. 957, also known as The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree, is to
discourage and prevent unscrupulous owners, developers, agents, and sellers from reneging on their obligations and
representations to the detriment of innocent purchasers
• Considering the nature of the damage sustained by the structures, even without the findings of the local
governmental agency and the MGB-DENR, La Paz is still liable under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In the case
of D.M Consunji, Inc. v. CA, the Court expounded on this doctrine in this wise:
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
• While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not
generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendants part, under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing
or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a
presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is
charged with negligence.
• x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the control or
management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of
things would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or,
as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from
or was caused by the defendant's want of care.
• One of the theoretical bases for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not available.
• The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality
which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that
the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon
the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence.
• The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether
culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
• It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the
cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the
defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains.
• The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory that
under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show
that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendants negligence is beyond plaintiffs power.
• Under the said doctrine, expert testimony may be dispensed with to sustain an allegation of negligence if the following
requisites obtain: a) the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; b) the cause of
 the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge; and c) the injury suffered must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.29

APPLICATION:
• In this case, the subdivision plan/layout was prepared and approved by La Paz. The actual excavation, filling and levelling
of the subdivision grounds were exclusively done under its supervision and control.
• There being no contributory fault on the part of the petitioner, there can be no other conclusion except that it was the
fault of La Paz for not properly compacting the soil, which used to be an old creek.
• It should have taken adequate measures to ensure the structural stability of the land before they started building the
houses thereon.1âwphi1 The uneven street pavements and visible cracks on the houses were readily apparent yet La
Paz did not undertake any corrective or rehabilitative work.
• La Paz's argument that the damage could have been sustained because of the 1990 earthquake or through the various
enhancements undertaken by the petitioners on their respective structures was not substantiated. Records undeniably
show that the petitioners had raised their concerns as early as 1988 - before the earthquake occurred in 1990.
GSIS not liable
• As to the petitioners' prayer to make GSIS jointly and severally liable with La Paz, the Court finds that there is no legal
basis to juridically bind GSIS because it was never a party in the contracts between La Paz and the petitioners.
• The housing loan agreements that the petitioners entered into with GSIS were separate and distinct from the purchase
contracts they executed with La Paz. GSIS merely agreed to pay the purchase price of the housing unit that each
petitioner purchased from La Paz. It was merely the lender, not the developer.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 9, 2004 Decision of the HLURB Arbiter is hereby REINSTATED with
MODIFICATIONS to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered
1) Ordering respondent La Paz Housing and Development Corporation to immediately undertake and cause the necessary
repairs/construction of the subject units to make it suitable for human habitation for which it was originally intended;
2) In the alternative, if it would no longer possible for the said units to be repaired to make it suitable for human habitation,
ordering respondent La Paz to give each petitioner another property of the same nature and size, more or less, within the
subdivision project or in any project owned and developed by La Paz in San Pedro, Laguna, or pay the monetary equivalent
thereof; and
3) Ordering respondent La Paz to pay each of the petitioners:
a. the sum of ₱200,000.00 as temperate damages;
b. the sum of ₱150,000.00 as moral damages;
c. the sum of ₱150,000.00 as exemplary damages;
d. the sum of ₱100,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
e. cost of suit.
All awards shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until full
payment, in line with recent jurisprudence.41
SO ORDERED.

Africa vs Caltex
Facts:
 It appears that in the afternoon of March 18, 1948 a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of
Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila.
 It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of
the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted.
 The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside
them.
  Their owners, among them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the first as
alleged owner of the station and the second as its agent in charge of operation.
 Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed as the cause of the fire
 The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents
had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees

Issue:
 Where the reports prepared by the Manila Police and Fire Departments and Captain Tinio of the AFP admissible
as evidence?

Ruling:
 Police Department report:
o Investigation disclosed that at about 4:00 P.M. March 18, 1948, while Leandro Flores was transfenng
gasoline from a tank truck, plate No. T5292 into the underground tank of the Caltex Gasoline Station
located at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Antipolo Street, this City, an unknown Filipino lighted a Cigarette
and threw the burning match stick near the main valve of the said underground tank. Due to the gasoline
fumes, fire suddenly blazed. Quick action of Leandro Flores in pulling off the gasoline hose connecting the
truck with the underground tank prevented a terrific explosion. However, the flames scattered due to the
hose from which the gasoline was spouting. It burned the truck and the following accessorias and
residences
 The Fire Department report:
o In connection with their allegation that the premises was (sic) subleased for the installation of a cocacola
and cigarette stand, the complainants furnished this Office a copy of a photograph taken during the fire
and which is submitted herewith. It appears in this picture that there are in the premises a cocacola cooler
and a rack which according to information gathered in the neighborhood contained cigarettes and
matches, installed between the gasoline pumps and the underground tanks
 The report of Captain Tinio reproduced information given by a certain Benito Morales regarding the history of the
gasoline station and what the chief of the fire department had told him on the same subject
 Section 35, Rule 123, provides that:
o “entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by
a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts’
therein stated.”
 There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must
have been acquired by him personally or through official information
Application:
 Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be considered here. Obviously the material facts recited in
the reports as to the cause and circumstances of the fire were not within the personal knowledge of the officers
who conducted the investigation.
 As to some facts the sources thereof are not even identified. Others are attributed to Leopoldo Medina, referred
to as an employee at the gas station where the fire occurred; to Leandro Flores, driver of the tank truck from
which gasoline was being transferred at the time to the underground tank of the station; and to respondent Mateo
Boquiren, who could not, according to Exhibit VAfrica, give any reason as to the origin of the fire.
 To qualify their statements as “official information” acquired by the officers who prepared the reports, the
persons who made the statements not only must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the
duty to give such statements for record.
  The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule; the facts stated therein were not
acquired by the reporting officers through official information, not having been given by the informants pursuant
to any duty to do so.

Issue 2:
Without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, does the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply?

Ruling:
 YES
 Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant
or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its
management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care

Application:
 Gasoline is a highly combustible material, in the storage and sale of which extreme care must be taken. On the
other hand, fire is not considered a fortuitous event, as it arises almost invariably from some act of man.
 The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire
occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known
how the fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever.
 It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care.

VI. The Tortfeasor

a. Direct Tortfeasor
ii. Junio v. Manila Railroad, G.R. No. L-37044-45, March 29, 1933
Ponente: Imperial, J.
Nature of the Case: This case is an appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Pangasinan, which absolved the defendant,
without costs.
Consolacion Junio, a young woman 22 years of age, and Beatriz Soloria, another young woman of 18 years, represented
by her father, Fausto Soloria, who was appointed her guardian ad litem, brought these actions in the CFI of Pangasinan to
recover from the defendant, Manila Railroad Company, damages suffered by them in an accident that occurred at the
railroad crossing situated at the outskirts of the town of Calasiao, Pangasinan, when the automobile in which they were
passengers collided with a locomotive belonging to the aforementioned defendant.

FACTS:
 The plaintiffs-appellants were passengers who took the PU-car in Bayambang and were bound for Asingan, via
Dagupan
 At about 11:40 o'clock on the night of April 13, 1930, the plaintiffs herein with some other persons were
traveling in a “PU-Car” on the road between Calasiao and Santa Barbara.
 When they arrived at the intersection of the road and the defendant's railway, the car tried to cross the track
and collided with the engine of the night express which left Dagupan for Manila at 11 o'clock that same night
and which was then passing over the crossing in question at great speed
 As a result of the collision, the car was thrown some distance:
o Plaintiff Junio's right leg was amputated and her right arm fractured, and
o Soloria received various injuries on her head.
  The aforementioned crossing is situated in the town of Calasiao and the same is presumed to be dangerous
due to the fact that gates were required at that crossing. (Section 83, Act No. 1459, as amended by Act No.
2100.
 On the night of the accident, the gates were not lowered and there was no notice to the effect that they were
not operated at night or that they were temporarily out of order.
 However, a notice to the effect that that was a railroad crossing was there.
 It has also been proved that the gate in question was about three hundred (300) meters from the railroad
station at Calasiao
o That on each side of the crossing there was a wooden bar operated only during the daytime by a
woman employee of the defendant, and
o That just before the crossing on one side of the road leading from the town of Calasiao there was a
signpost bearing the notice, "RAILROAD CROSSING", written crosswise
 The PU-car driven by the chauffeur, Pedro Talbo, was an old Ford bearing number plates PU-3636, which meant
that it was a hired car.
o The plate was found by the engineer on the side of the engine upon arrival at Paniqui, the next station,
which indicates that it was torn from the front of the radiator when the auto collided with the right side
of the engine of the night express.

 As a general rule, the rights and obligations between the public and a railroad company at a public crossing are
mutual and reciprocal.
o Both are under mutual obligation to exercise due care to avoid causing or receiving injury.
o Each is in duty bound to exercise reasonable or ordinary care commensurate with the risk and danger
involved.

PU-Car Driver’s allegations:

 That he slowed down from 19 miles an hour, at which rate he was then going, to 16 miles, and
 That he was on the lookout for any approaching train

Defendant’s train operator (engineer):

 He insisted that he rang the bell and sounded the whistle before reaching the crossing.

Both parties claim to be free from guilt, and if the defendant company were completely so, the plaintiffs would have no
cause of action against it.

 In the assignment of errors, the plaintiff’s attorney assigned that the trial court erred in finding the following:
o That the defendant company was not negligent in leaving its gates open at the moment of the accident
when a special night express train was passing
o That the driver of the car occupied by the plaintiffs was negligent
o That the plaintiffs were negligent or in making them responsible for the driver's alleged negligence
o That the main question in the accident was the driver's alleged negligence.
o In absolving the defendant instead of ordering it to pay the damages proven which are the subject of
these actions

ISSUE 1: Were both the defendant Manila Road and the driver of the PU-car negligent?

RULING 1:
  Yes. From the evidence, it is obvious that the defendant as well as the driver of the car in which the plaintiffs
were passengers were negligent
 The former (defendant) because, by installing the gates at the place or crossing where the accident occurred, it
had voluntarily imposed upon itself the obligation to operate them even at night and to close them every time a
train passed in order to avoid causing injury to the public.
o It has been said that the gates constitute an invitation to the public to pass without fear of danger, and
failure to operate them conveniently constitutes negligence on the part of the company.
 The driver was, likewise, negligent because he did not comply with his duty to slacken the speed of the car and
to "look and listen" before crossing the intersection
o And, above all, because he did not maintain a reasonable speed so as to permit him to stop any
moment if it were necessary in order to avoid an accident.
o If, in the present case, the car had been running at a reasonable speed, there is no doubt that he could
have stopped it instantly upon seeing the train from a distance of 5 meters

Note: The persons who instituted the action are the appellants who were mere passengers of the car
ISSUE 2: Was the driver's negligence imputable to the passengers so as to bar them from the right to recover damages
suffered by them by reason of the accident in this case?

RULING 2:
 No. In this case, the driver’s negligence was not imputable to the passengers so as to bar them from the right to
recover damages suffered by them by reason of the accident.
 It is a well-recognized principle of law that the negligence of a driver, who, in turn, is guilty of contributory
negligence, cannot be imputed to a passenger who has no control over him in the management of the vehicle
and with whom he sustains no relation of master and servant.
 This rule is applied more strictly when, as in the present case, hired cars or those engaged in public service, are
involved.
 The law almost universally now recognized is that when one accepts an invitation to ride in the vehicle of
another, without any authority or purpose to direct or control the driver or the movements of the team, and
without any reason to doubt the competency of the driver, the contributory negligence of the owner or driver of
the conveyance will not be imputed to the guest or passenger, so as to bar him of the right to recover damages
from a railroad company whose negligence occasions injury to him at a crossing while he is so riding
 As a general rule, the negligence of a driver of a vehicle approaching a railroad crossing, in failing to look and
listen for approaching trains, cannot be imputed to an occupant of the vehicle who is without personal fault,
unless such driver is the servant or agent of the occupant, unless they are engaged in a joint enterprise whereby
responsibility for each other's acts exists, or unless the occupant is under the driver's care or control or has the
right to direct and control the driver's actions, or where the driver is of obvious or known imprudence or
incompetency.
 This rule that negligence of the driver is not imputable to an occupant only applies to cases in which the
relation of master and servant or principal and agent does not exist between the parties,
o or where the occupant has no right to direct or control the driver's actions, as where the occupant is a
passenger for hire or is the guest of the owner or driver
o and has no reason to believe that the driver is careless or imprudent,
o or where the occupant is seated away from the driver or is separated from him by an inclosure so that
he is without opportunity to discover danger and inform the driver thereof
 Responsibility cannot, within any recognized rules of law, be fastened upon one who has in no way interfered
with and controlled in the matter causing the injury.
o From the simple fact of hiring the carriage or riding in it no such liability can arise.
o The party hiring or riding must in some way have cooperated in producing the injury complained of
before he incurs any liability for it.
 Application:
 In this case, there is nothing of record to show that the appellants herein have incurred in any negligence
imputable to them
 The Court did not see any reason whatsoever why they should be made responsible for the driver's negligence.
 The doctrine established in the jurisprudence cited in this case should be applied to the case at bar and it should
be held that the appellants herein are entitled to recover from the appellee damages occasioned by the
accident of which they were victims.

Disposition: Judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and it is ordered that the appellee pay to Consolacion Junio the
sum P3,000 and to Beatriz Soloria P300, with costs of both instances
____________________
NOTES:
Re: Consolacion Junio:
 She was a dancer earning from six pesos (P6) to eight pesos (P8) a day for two or three days every week that
she danced.
 She lost her right leg which was amputated, suffered a fracture of her right arm and was wounded on her
occipital region.

Tamargo v CA (VICARIOUS LIABILITY)

FACTS:
 Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which
resulted in her death.
 A civil complaint for damages was filed by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and
petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents, against respondent spouses Victor and
Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident.
o In addition, a criminal information for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed against
Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the
ground that he had acted without discernment.
 Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto
Bundoc.
o This petition for adoption was granted after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
 In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing
petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and
Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting
parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
 Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural
parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition
for adoption.
 The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed
were not indispensable parties to the action.
 Within the 15day reglementary period, or on 14 December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15 January 1988 which was denied by the trial court
since motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court—that notice of the
motion shall be given to all parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing of said motion; and that
said notice shall state the time and place of hearing.
  The trial court dismissed the notice of appeal, this time ruling that the notice had been filed beyond the 15day
reglementary period.
 The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the adopting parents of Adelberto are indispensable parties in a damage case where the actual
custody was lodged with the natural parents.

RULING: NO
 It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise
to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him.
o As Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasidelict x x x."
 Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them.
o Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
"The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company. xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."
 The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them, may be seen to be
based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents.
o The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious act,
the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the
child who is in their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental
authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such
authority.
o The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be overturned under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent the damage.

APPLICATION:
 In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occurred when parental authority was
still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that
the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the
suit for damages.
 The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a decree of adoption was issued by
the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was vested in the latter as adopting
parents as of the time of the filing of the petition for adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer with an
air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that they were therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto's
allegedly tortious conduct.
 As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the
relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law
presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
reenacted this rule:
"Article 58. Torts—Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental
authority in accordance with the Civil Code.
 Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines9 has similarly insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of
the tortious act, shall have been in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing
damage:
"Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their
parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law."
 We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and
vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened.
 We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability
upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when the adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over
the adopted child.
o Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is
essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.
 In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura
spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they
could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the
child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable.
o Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the
doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part
of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject
to their control at the time the tort was committed.
 Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above. Article 35 provides as
follows:
"Art. 35. Trial Custody.—No petition for adoption shall be finally granted unless and until the adopting
parents are given by the courts a supervised trial custody period of at least six months to assess their adjustment
and emotional readiness for the legal union. During the period of trial custody, parental authority shall be vested
in the adopting parents."
 Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period
of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are
given actual custody of the child during such trial period.
 In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or had already been completed at the time
of the air rifle shooting; in any case,actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the
adopting parents.
 Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable
parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of petitioners'
complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

OTHERS:
 This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the
doctrine of "imputed negligence" under AngloAmerican tort law, where a person is not only liable for torts
committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for
whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and
responsibilities of parents—their parental authority—which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining
of the child.5 The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by the Court in Cangco v. Manila
Railroad Co. 6 in the following terms:
"With respect to extracontractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature to elect—and our Legislature has so elected—to limit such liability to cases in which
the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of public
policy, to extend that liability , without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for
the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a
position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has
elected to limit extra contractual liability— with certain well defined exceptions—to cases in which moral
 culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having
failed to exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control
of one's agents or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a position of
dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in CAG. R. No. SP15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for
further proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses. This Decision is immediately
executory. SO ORDERED.

NOTES:
"Article 36. Decree of Adoption.—If, after considering the report of
the Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement
agency and the evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied
that the petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and educate
the child, that the trial custody period has been completed, and
that the best interests of the child will be promoted by the
adoption, a decree of adoption shall be entered, which shall be
effective as of the date the original petition was filed. The decree
shall state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be
known." (Italics supplied)

"Art, 39. Effect of Adoption.—The adoption shall:

xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except
where the adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;"
xxx xxx xxx"

Professional Services Inc vs Agana (vicarious liability vs. respondeat superior)

Gr No 126297, 126467, 127590
Facts:

 April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital because of difficulty of bowel
movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr, Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from “cancer of the sigmoid”
 April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of the Medical City Hospital, performed an anterior
resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary,
necessitating the removal of certain portions of it.
 Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes to
perform hysterectomy on her.
 After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation and closed the
incision.
 However, the operation appeared to be flawed. In the corresponding Record of Operation dated April 11, 1984,
the attending nurses entered these remarks:
o “sponge count lacking 2
o “announced to surgeon searched (sic) done but to no avail continue for closure.”
 After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her anal region but was told that the pain was
the natural consequence of the surgery, and was recommended to consult an oncologist
  Natividad and husband went to US to seek further treatment. After 4 months, she was told that she was free of
cancer
 Two after her return, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina
 Upon being informed, Dr Ampil proceeded to her house where he managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze
measuring 1.5 inches in width; and assuring her that the pains would soon vanish but did not come true
 The pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital.
 Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the presence of another foreign object in her vagina—a foul-smelling gauze
measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly infected her vaginal vault. A rectovaginal fistula had formed in her
reproductive organs which forced stool to excrete through the vagina.
 Another surgical operation was needed to remedy the damage
 Natividad and husband filed with the RTC Quezon city a complaint for damages against Professional Service Inc,
owner of the Medical City Hospital, Dr Ampil and Dr Fuentes
o Alleged that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving two pieces of gauze inside Natividad’s body
and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence
 Enrique Agana also filed with the PRC an administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against
Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes
o PRC Board of Medicine heard the case only with respect to Dr Fuentes because it failed to acquire
jurisdiction over Dr Ampil who was in US
 Natividad died, pending the cases, and was duly substituted by her children
 RTC decided in favor of the Aganas, and opposing party Appealed to CA
o Dismissed case against Dr Fuentes; Dr Ampil is liable to reimburse PSI
 PRC Board of Med dismissed the case against Dr Fuentes
o Prosec failed to show that Dr Fuentes was the one who left the two pieces of gauze inside Natividad’s
body and he concealed such fact

In GR 126297, PSI alleged:

 that the CA erred in holding that:
 (1) it is estopped from raising the defense that Dr. Ampil is not its employee;
 (2) it is solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil; and
 (3) it is not entitled to its counterclaim against the Aganas. PSI contends that Dr. Ampil is not its employee, but a
mere consultant or independent contractor. As such, he alone should answer for his negligence.

In GR 126467, Aganas maintained that CA:

 Erred in finding that Dr Fuentes is not guilty of negligence or medical malpractice, invoking the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor
 Pieces of gauze are prima facie proofs that the operating surgeons have been negligent

In GR 127590, Dr Ampil asserts that CA

 Erred in finding him liable without evidence that he left 2 pieces of gauze
 He pointed to other probable causes, such as:
o (1) it was Dr. Fuentes who used gauzes in performing the hysterectomy;
o (2) the attending nurses’ failure to properly count the gauzes used during surgery;
o and (3) the medical intervention of the American doctors who examined Natividad in the US

Issue #1: whether CA erred in holding Dr Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice?
Ruling #1: No.

Dr Ampil argues:
  first, Dr Fuentes left the gauzes in Natividad’s body after performing hysterectomy
 second, the attending nurses erred in counting the gauzes
 third, American doctors were the ones who placed the gauzes in her body

Court:
 Ampil’s arguments are purely conjectural and without basis
 Did not present evidence to rebut the correctness of the record of the operation
 The court is mindful that dr Ampil examined Dr Fuentes’ work and found it in order
 All major circumstances taken together directly point to Dr Ampil as the negligent party:
o First, it is not disputed that the surgeons used gauzes as sponges to control the bleeding of the patient
during the surgical operation.
o Second, immediately after the operation, the nurses who assisted in the surgery noted in their report that
the ‘sponge count (was) lacking 2’; that such anomaly was ‘announced to surgeon’ and that a ‘search was
done but to no avail’ prompting Dr. Ampil to ‘continue for closure’ x x x.
o Third, after the operation, two (2) gauzes were extracted from the same spot of the body of Mrs. Agana
where the surgery was performed.

 An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not complete until the sponges are properly
removed, and it is settled that the leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound after the incision
has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon.
 To put it simply, such act is considered so inconsistent with due care as to raise an inference of negligence. There
are even legions of authorities to the effect that such act is negligence per se.

 There are times when danger to a patient’s life precludes a surgeon from further searching missing sponges or
foreign objects left in the body. But this does not leave him free from any obligation.
 Even if it has been shown that a surgeon was required by the urgent necessities of the case to leave a sponge in
his patient’s abdomen, because of the dangers attendant upon delay, still, it is his legal duty to so inform his
patient within a reasonable time thereafter by advising her of what he had been compelled to do. This is in order
that she might seek relief from the effects of the foreign object left in her body as her condition might permit.

Application:
 Here, Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad about the missing two pieces of gauze. Worse, he even misled her that
the pain she was experiencing was the ordinary consequence of her operation. Had he been more candid, Natividad
could have taken the immediate and appropriate medical remedy to remove the gauzes from her body.
 To our mind, what was initially an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil has ripened into a deliberate wrongful act of
deceiving his patient.
 This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence.
 To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did something that a
reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient.
 Simply put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
 Dr, Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign objects, such as gauzes, from Natividad’s body
before closure of the incision. When he failed to do so, it was his duty to inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil
breached both duties. Such breach caused injury to Natividad, necessitating her further examination by American
doctors and another surgery.
 That Dr. Ampil’s negligence is the proximate cause of Natividad’s injury could be traced from his act of closing the
incision despite the information given by the attending nurses that two pieces of gauze were still missing. That
they were later on extracted from Natividad’s vagina established the causal link between Dr. Ampil’s negligence
and the injury. And what further aggravated such injury was his deliberate concealment of the missing gauzes
from the knowledge of Natividad and her family
Issue #2: whether CA erred in absolving Dr Fuentes of any liability?
Ruling #2: NO.

Aganas maintained that CA:

 Erred in finding that Dr Fuentes is not guilty of negligence or medical malpractice, invoking the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor
 Pieces of gauze are prima facie proofs that the operating surgeons have been negligent

Court: is not convinced

 res ipsa loquitur means “the thing speaks for itself.” It is the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken
with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out
a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.
 Stated differently, where the thing which caused the injury, without the fault of the injured, is under the exclusive
control of the defendant and the injury is such that it should not have occurred if he, having such control used
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation that the injury arose from the
defendant’s want of care, and the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish that he has observed due care and
diligence.

 the requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are:
o (1) the occurrence of an injury;
o (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the defendant;
o (3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those who
had control or management used proper care; and
o (4) the absence of explanation by the defendant.
 Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the “control and management of the thing which caused the
injury.”

Application:
 We find the element of “control and management of the thing which caused the injury” to be wanting. Hence,
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie.

 It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the operation of Natividad.
o He requested the assistance of Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy when Dr. Ampil found that the
malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary.
o Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter reported and showed his work to Dr. Ampil.
 The latter examined it and finding everything to be in order, allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room.
 Dr. Ampil then resumed operating on Natividad. He was about to finish the procedure when the attending nurses
informed him that two pieces of gauze were missing. A “diligent search” was conducted, but the misplaced gauzes
were not found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed.
 During this entire period, Dr. Fuentes was no longer in the operating room and had, in fact, left the hospital.

 Under the “Captain of the Ship” rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room
and all personnel connected with the operation. Their duty is to obey his orders. As stated before, Dr. Ampil was
the lead surgeon. In other words, he was the “Captain of the Ship.” That he discharged such role is evident from
his following conduct:
 o (1) calling Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy;
o (2) examining the work of Dr. Fuentes and finding it in order;
o (3) granting Dr. Fuentes’ permission to leave; and
o (4) ordering the closure of the incision.

 To our mind, it was this act of ordering the closure of the incision notwithstanding that two pieces of gauze
remained unaccounted for, that caused injury to Natividad’s body. Clearly, the control and management of the
thing which caused the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes.

 In this jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se create or constitute an
independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule.
 In other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof
of negligence. Here, the negligence was proven to have been committed by Dr. Ampil and not by Dr. Fuentes.

Issue #3: Whether PSI may be held solidarily liable for negligence of Dr Ampil?
Ruling #3: YES.
 In this jurisdiction, the statute governing liability for negligent acts is Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
 A derivative of this provision is Article 2180, the rule governing vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.
o professionals engaged by an employer, such as physicians, dentists, and pharmacists, are not “employees”
under this article because the manner in which they perform their work is not within the control of the
latter (employer).
 In other words, professionals are considered personally liable for the fault or negligence they commit in the
discharge of their duties, and their employer cannot be held liable for such fault or negligence.
 In the context of the present case, “a hospital cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of a physician or
surgeon in the treatment or operation of patients.”
 The foregoing view is grounded on the traditional notion that the professional status and the very nature of the
physician’s calling preclude him from being classed as an agent or employee of a hospital, whenever he acts in a
professional capacity.
 It has been said that medical practice strictly involves highly developed and specialized knowledge, such that
physicians are generally free to exercise their own skill and judgment in rendering medical services sans
interference.
 Hence, when a doctor practices medicine in a hospital setting, the hospital and its employees are deemed to
subserve him in his ministrations to the patient and his actions are of his own responsibility.

 The “Schloendorff doctrine” regards a physician, even if employed by a hospital, as an independent contractor
because of the skill he exercises and the lack of control exerted over his work.
o Under this doctrine, hospitals are exempt from the application of the respondeat superior principle for
fault or negligence committed by physicians in the discharge of their profession.

 In our shores, the nature of the relationship between the hospital and the physicians is rendered inconsequential
in view of our categorical pronouncement in Ramos v. Court of Appeals that for purposes of apportioning
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals
and their attending and visiting physicians.

 But the Ramos pronouncement is not our only basis in sustaining PSI’s liability. Its liability is also anchored upon
the agency principle of apparent authority or agency by estoppel and the doctrine of corporate negligence which
have gained acceptance in the determination of a hospital’s liability for negligent acts of health professionals. The
 present case serves as a perfect platform to test the applicability of these doctrines, thus, enriching our
jurisprudence.

Apparent authority
 referred to as the “holding out” theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel
 it imposes liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of the actions
of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the authority
exists
 PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital the names and specializations of the physicians
associated or accredited by it
 it “is now estopped from passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public
directory leading the public to believe that it vouched for their skill and competence.”
 Indeed, PSI’s act is tantamount to holding out to the public that Medical City Hospital, through its accredited
physicians, offers quality health care services.
 By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising their qualifications, the hospital created the
impression that they were its agents, authorized to perform medical or surgical services for its patients.
 As expected, these patients, Natividad being one of them, accepted the services on the reasonable belief that
such were being rendered by the hospital or its employees, agents, or servants

Corporate negligence or corporate responsibility

 The doctrine has its genesis in Darling v. Charleston Community Hospital. the Supreme Court of Illinois held that
“the jury could have found a hospital negligent, inter alia, in failing to have a sufficient number of trained nurses
attending the patient; failing to require a consultation with or examination by members of the hospital staff; and
failing to review the treatment rendered to the patient.”
 On the basis of Darling, other jurisdictions held that a hospital’s corporate negligence extends to permitting a
physician known to be incompetent to practice at the hospital.

 In the present case, it was duly established that PSI operates the Medical City Hospital for the purpose and under
the concept of providing comprehensive medical services to the public.
 Accordingly, it has the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility
for medical treatment. Unfortunately, PSI failed to perform such duty.
 Trial court findings which the Court agrees:
o PSI’s liability is traceable to its failure to conduct an investigation of the matter reported in the nota bene
of the count nurse. Such failure established PSI’s part in the dark conspiracy of silence and concealment
about the gauzes.

Application:
 the failure of PSI, despite the attending nurses’ report, to investigate and inform Natividad regarding the missing
gauzes amounts to callous negligence.
 Not only did PSI breach its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who practice medicine within its walls, it also
failed to take an active step in fixing the negligence committed.
 This renders PSI, not only vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
but also directly liable for its own negligence under Article 2176.

Liability:
  Anent the corollary issue of whether PSI is solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil for damages, let it be emphasized that
PSI, apart from a general denial of its responsibility, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the accreditation and supervision of the latter.
 In neglecting to offer such proof, PSI failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180 cited
earlier, and, therefore, must be adjudged solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil. Moreover, as we have discussed, PSI is
also directly liable to the Aganas.

One final word. Once a physician undertakes the treatment and care of a patient, the law imposes on him certain
obligations. In order to escape liability, he must possess that reasonable degree of learning, skill and experience required
by his profession. he must apply reasonable care and diligence in the exercise of his skill and the application of his
knowledge, and exert his best judgment.

Wherefore, we deny all petitions and affirm challenged decision of the CA

Cuadra v. Monfort (Vicarious Liability, Parents & those with parental authority)
G.R. No. L-24101 September 30, 1970
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict decided favorably to the plaintiffs and appealed by the defendant to
the Court of Appeals, which certified the same to us since the facts are not in issue.
FACTS:

 Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary
School in Bacolod City.
 On July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned them, together with three other classmates, to weed the grass in the
school premises.
 While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband, an ornamental object commonly worn by
young girls over their hair.
o Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl,
tossed the object at her.
 At that precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye.
o Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder.
 The next day, July 10, the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident to her parents,
who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment.
 She underwent surgical operation twice, first on July 20 and again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the hospital
for a total of twenty-three days, for all of which the parents spent the sum of P1,703.75.
 Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye.
 In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort,
Maria Teresa Monfort's father, the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as
moral damages; and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.

Issue: Whether or not the Monfort spouses are liable for the damages caused by their daughter?
RULING:
 No, the Monfort spouses are not liable.
 In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the
damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority
in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it.
  On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the
right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher.
 And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among
children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate, much less
guard against.
 Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child’s character which would reflect
unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame would be attributed to her parents.
 The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that befell her.
 But if the defendant is at all obligated to compensate her suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction
enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of good conscience.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
NOTES:

ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by provisions of this Chapter.

ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live
in their company.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

SCHOOLS AND TEACHERS

ST. JOSEPH COLLEGE vs MIRANDA

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Nachura, J.
FACTS:
 At around 1:30 in the afternoon, Jayson Val Miranda and his class at St. Joseph College was conducting a science
experiment about fusion sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo.
o Tabugo is the subject teacher and an employee of St. Joseph College.
o Estefania Abdan is the adviser of Jayson’s class.
 Tabugo left her class.
 In the middle of the experiment, Jayson, who was the assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the
result of the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass.
 The test tube was being held by one of his group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of Jayson. At that
instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles of which hit Jayson’s eye and the
different parts of the bodies of some of his group mates.
 Jayson’s eyes were chemically burned. He had to undergo surgery particularly for his left eye and had to spend for
his medication.
  As a result, Jayson’s mother who was working abroad, had to rush back home for which she spent P36,070.00 for
her fares and had to forego her salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at least
P40,000.00.
 Jayson and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded feelings as a result of his injury due
to petitioners’ fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and diligence incumbent upon each one of them.
Thus, they should be held liable for moral damages.
 Also, Jayson sent a demand letter to petitioners for the payment of his medical expenses as well as other expenses
incidental thereto, which the latter failed to heed. Hence, Jayson was constrained to file the complaint for
damages. [Petitioners], therefore, should likewise compensate Jayson for litigation expenses, including attorney’s
fees.
 On the other hand, petitioners SJC, Sr. Josephini Ambataliii, SFIC, and Tabugo alleged that before the science
experiment was conducted, [Jayson] and his classmates were given strict instructions to follow the written
procedure for the experiment and not to look into the test tube until the heated compound had cooled off. Jayson
violated such instructions.
 After the treatment, Jayson was pronounced ready for discharge and an eye test showed that his vision had not
been impaired or affected.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was his own negligence?
RULING: NO
 As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was the concurrent failure of petitioners
to prevent the foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment. Petitioners were
negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its
administrators and teachers.
 Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, bestows special parental authority on
the following persons with the corresponding obligation, thus:
o Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in
child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
o Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. x x x x Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
 APPLICATION: Petitioners’ negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of care and caution is
demonstrated by the following: 1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to
its students although it had full information on the nature of dangerous science experiments conducted by the
students during class; 2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the students who conduct
experiments in class; 3. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices, specifically goggles, to
shield students from expected risks and dangers; and 4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole
time her class conducted the experiment, specifically, when the accident involving Jayson occurred. In any event,
the size of the class—fifty (50) students—conducting the experiment is difficult to monitor.
 In marked contrast, both the lower courts similarly concluded that the mishap which happened during the science
experiment was foreseeable by the school, its officials and teachers. This neglect in preventing a foreseeable injury
and damage equates to neglect in exercising the utmost degree of diligence required of schools, its administrators
and teachers, and, ultimately, was the proximate cause of the damage and injury to Jayson. As we have held in St.
Mary’s, “for petitioner [St. Mary’s Academy] to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident.”
RE JAYSON’S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
 As regards the contributory negligence of Jayson, we see no need to disturb the lower courts’ identical rulings
thereon:
o “As earlier discussed, the proximate cause of [Jayson’s] injury was the explosion of the heated compound
independent of any efficient intervening cause.
 o The negligence on the part of [petitioner] Tabugo in not making sure that the science experiment was
correctly conducted was the proximate cause or reason why the heated compound exploded and injured
not only [Jayson] but his classmates as well.
o However, Jayson is partly responsible for his own injury, hence, he should not be entitled to recover
damages in full but must likewise bear the consequences of his own negligence. Petitioners] therefore,
should be held liable only for the damages actually caused by their negligence.”
 Given our foregoing ruling, we likewise affirm the lower courts’ award of actual and moral damages, and grant of
attorney’s fees. The denial of petitioners’ counterclaim is also in order.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
NOTES:
 Negligence is defined as the failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have
exercised in a similar situation. (Janssen Pharmaceutica vs. Silayro, 546 SCRA 628 [2008])

3. St. Francis High School v. CA, G.R. No. 82465, February 25, 1991 (School and teacher)
FACTS:
 Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school
picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon.
 Ferdinand's parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice,
did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the
directive that he should go back home after doing so.
 However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach.
 During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were in the water, one of the female teachers
was apparently drowning.
 Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who
drowned. His body was recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed. He was brought to a certain Dr.
Luna in Sariaya, Quezon and later to the Mt. Cannel General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
 Ferdinand’s parents filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court against the St. Francis High School, represented
by the spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, Benjamin Illumin (its principal), and the teachers: Tirso
de Chaves, Luisito Vinas, Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for Damages which
respondents allegedly incurred from the death of their 13-year old son, Ferdinand Castillo.
o Contending that the death of their son was due to the failure of the petitioners to exercise the proper
diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their son's drowning, respondents prayed of actual,
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses for litigation.
 The trial court found in favor of the respondents and against petitioners-teachers Arquio, de Chaves, Vinas,
Aragones, Jaro and Cadiz, ordering all of them jointly and severally to pay respondents the sum of P30,000.00 as
actual damages, P20,000.00 as moral damages, P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs.
 On the other hand, the trial court dismissed the case against the St. Francis High School, Benjamin Illumin and
Aurora Cadorna
 Both petitioners and respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
 The CA found the school and principal liable with the teachers.
 Hence this petition

ISSUE: Whether or not there was negligence attributable to the defendants which will warrant the award of damages to
the plaintiffs:
RULING:
  If at all petitioners are liable for negligence, this is because of their own negligence or the negligence of people
under them. In the instant case however, as will be shown hereunder, petitioners are neither guilty of their own
negligence or guilty of the negligence of those under them.
 Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at all of any negligence. Consequently they cannot be held liable for
damages of any kind.
 At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses, parents of the victim Ferdinand, allowed their son to
join the excursion.
 The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic even without knowing where it will be held, is a
sign of consent for his son to join the same
 No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the
respondents-spouses.
 Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and
exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students
who joined the picnic.
 In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout
masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming.
 Moreover, even respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that "the defendants (petitioners herein) had life
savers especially brought by the defendants in case of emergency." (p. 85, Rollo) The records also show that
both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save the child.

ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is applicable to the case at bar
RULING: No
 Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code in rendering
petitioner school liable for the death of respondent's son

 Article 2180, par. 4 states that:

“The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.”

“Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.”

 Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee,
the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the
performance of his assigned tasks.
 In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The
incident happened not within the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the
teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic.
 It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened while some members of the I-C class of St. Francis High
School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach.
 This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a
school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular activity.
 As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the
picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner show acquiescence or consent to
the holding of the same.
 The application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any jurisprudence. I
  If we were to affirm the findings of respondent Court on this score, employers wig forever be exposed to the risk
and danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees even if such act
or omission he committed while they are not in the performance of their duties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper under the circumstances surrounding the
case at bar
RULING: No
 No moral nor exemplary damages may be awarded in favor of respondents-spouses. The case at bar does not
fall under any of the grounds to grant moral damages.
o Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act or omission.
 Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, petitioners are not guilty of any fault or negligence, hence, no
moral damages can be assessed against them.
 While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to their son to join the picnic, this does not
mean that the petitioners were already relieved of their duty to observe the required diligence of a good father
of a family in ensuring the safety of the children. But in the case at bar, petitioners were able to prove that they
had exercised the required diligence. Hence, the claim for moral or exemplary damages becomes baseless.

DISPOSITION: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision dated November 19, 1987, finding petitioners herein
guilty of negligence and liable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo and awarding the respondents damages, is hereby SET
ASIDE insofar as the petitioners herein are concerned, but the portion of the said decision dismissing their counterclaim,
there being no merit, is hereby AFFIRMED.

4. Amadora et al v. CA et al., G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988

Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to graduation. The ceremonies were scheduled on
April 16, 1972. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On April 13, 1972,
while they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Daffron, fired a
gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. The victim was only seventeen years old.

FACTS:
• Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence.
• The petitioners (victim’s parents) filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against
the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher,
together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents.

• The complaint against the students was later dropped.

• After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum
of P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

• On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were
completely absolved.
 • CA Decision:
1. In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a
school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning.

2. It also held that the students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the
semester had already ended, that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun and that in any event the
defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury.

• Petitioners’ Contention was that their son was in the school to show his physics experiment as a prerequisite
to his graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the private respondents.

• The private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for the purpose of
submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody because the semester had already ended.

• There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the petitioners consider important because of
an earlier incident which they claim underscores the negligence of the school and at least one of the private
respondents.

• It is not denied by the respondents that on April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated
from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without making a report to the principal or taking
any further action .
• As Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired the gun that killed Alfredo, the
petitioners contend that this was the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and that their son would
not have been killed if it had not been returned by Damaso.

• The respondents say, however, that there is no proof that the gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo.

ISSUE: Whether or not Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.

RULING: NO.

• During the time that Alfredo was shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school notwithstanding classes
had formally ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his
physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose.
• As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student
objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right,
and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the
student continues.
•
• Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his
classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and
subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.

• On the other hand, the director, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of
them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision.

• Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or , but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
x x x … Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. Each was exercising only a general authority over
the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.

• In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering that he had earlier
confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting
the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof was shown to necessarily
link this gun with the shooting incident.

• Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the teacher of the head
of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the student. Hence, under the facts
disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.

• It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of the school only upon the start of classes
notwithstanding that before that day he has already registered and thus placed himself under its rules. Neither should
such discipline be deemed ended upon the last day of classes notwithstanding that there may still be certain requisites
to be satisfied for completion of the course, such as submission of reports, term papers, clearances and the like.
During such periods, the student is still subject to the disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself
released altogether from observance of its rules.

• During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must answer for his students' torts, in
practically the same way that the parents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. The teacher-in-
charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the
pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury,
the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and actual
physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of
such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shag be held responsible if
the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised
over him.

• APPLICATION:
• In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly named, and there was no sufficient evidence
presented to make the said teacher-in-charge liable. Absent the direct liability of the teachers because of the
foregoing reason, the school cannot be held subsidiarily liable too.

• In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the principles herein announced
that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the
latter's death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize
with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances here related, we nevertheless are unable
to extend them the material relief they seek, as a balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Cerezo vs Tuazon
Facts:
 Around noontime of 26 June 1993, a Country Bus Lines passenger bus with plate number NYA 241 collided with a
tricycle bearing plate number TC RV 126 along Captain M. Palo Street, Sta. Ines, Mabalacat, Pampanga.
  On 1 October 1993, tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus
line, her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo (“Atty. Cerezo”), and bus driver Danilo A. Foronda (“Foronda”).
 The complaint alleged that:
o At the time of the incident, plaintiff [Tuazon] was in his properlane when the secondnamed defendant
[Foronda], being then the driver and person in charge of the Country Bus with plate number NYA 241, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously operate the said motor vehicle in a negligent, careless,
and imprudent manner without due regard to traffic rules and regulations, there being a “Slow Down”
sign near the scene of the incident, and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent loss of lives
or injuries, his negligence, carelessness and imprudence resulted to severe damage to the tricycle and
serious physical injuries to plaintiff thus making him unable to walk and becoming disabled, with his thumb
and middle finger on the left hand being cut
 On 30 May 1995, after considering Tuazon’s testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial court ruled in
Tuazon’s favor.
o The trial court made no pronouncement on Foronda’s liability because there was no service of summons
on him.
o The trial court did not hold Atty. Cerezo liable as Tuazon failed to show that Mrs. Cerezo’s business
benefited the family, pursuant to Article 121(3) of the Family Code.
o The trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the damages sustained by Tuazon arising from the
negligence of Mrs. Cerezo’s employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code
 Mrs. Cerezo contends that the basis of the present petition for annulment is lack of jurisdiction.
o Mrs. Cerezo asserts that the trial court could not validly render judgment since it failed to acquire
jurisdiction over Foronda.
o Mrs, Cerezo points out that there was no service of summons on Foronda.
o Moreover, Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil action for damages in the criminal
action.

Issue:
Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling:
 YES
 Mrs. Cerezo’s contention proceeds from the point of view of criminal law and not of civil law, while the basis of
the present action of Tuazon is quasidelict under the Civil Code, not delict under the Revised Penal Code
 The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
or may give rise to an action for a quasidelict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. An aggrieved party may choose
between the two remedies.
 An action based on a quasidelict may proceed independently from the criminal action. There is, however, a
distinction between civil liability arising from a delict and civil liability arising from a quasidelict.
 The choice of remedy, whether to sue for a delict or a quasidelict, affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues
of the action.
 Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasidelict.
o In his complaint, Tuazon alleged that Mrs. Cerezo, “without exercising due care and diligence in the
supervision and management of her employees and buses,” hired Foronda as her driver. Tuazon became
disabled because of Foronda’s “recklessness, gross negligence and imprudence,” aggravated by Mrs.
Cerezo’s “lack of due care and diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees, particularly
Foronda.”
 The trial court thus found Mrs. Cerezo liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Article 2180 states in part:
o Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
 Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo’s assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case.
 o An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without
whom no final resolution of the case is possible.
 However, Mrs. Cerezo’s liability as an employer in an action for a quasidelict is not only solidary, it is also primary
and direct. Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final resolution of Tuazon’s action for damages against
Mrs. Cerezo.
 The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasidelict is solidary. Where there is a solidary
obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor
is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual
representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other
is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either.
 Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
 Moreover, an employer’s liability based on a quasidelict is primary and direct, while the employer’s liability based
on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words “primary and direct,” as contrasted with “subsidiary,” refer to the
remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits of the obligation.
 Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may
sue the employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself
committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns.
 While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employee’s criminal negligence, the employer
is also civilly liable directly and separately for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting
and supervising his employee.
 The idea that the employer’s liability is solely subsidiary is wrong.
 The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without including the author of
the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act
committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment
against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of
the employer) is in itself a principal action.
 Thus, there is no need in this case for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. The trial court’s
acquisition of jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezo is sufficient to dispose of the present case on the merits.
 In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer for the criminal
negligence of the employee as provided in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. To hold the employer liable in a
subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the employee’s delict
and corresponding primary liability are established. If the present action proceeds from a delict, then the trial
court’s jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary.
 However, the present action is clearly for the quasidelict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda.

3. Spouses Jayme v. Apostol, G.R. No. 163609, November 27, 2008

Ponente: Reyes, R.T., J.
Nature of the Case This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, which reversed
and set aside the decision of RTC Polomolok, Cotabato City, insofar as defendant Mayor Fernando Q. Miguel is concerned.
The CA absolved Mayor Miguel from any liability since it was not he, but the Municipality of Koronadal, that was the
employer of the negligent driver.

FACTS:
 Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pickup truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an
employee of the Municipality of Koronadal.
o The pickup truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession of
Ernesto Simbulan
o Lozano borrowed the pickup truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos
City to catch his Manila flight
  The pickup truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the National Highway in
Poblacion, Polomolok, South Cotabato.
 The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some fifty (50) meters away from the point of impact, a clear
indication that Lozano was driving at a very high speed at the time of the accident
 Marvin sustained severe head injuries with subdural hematoma and diffused cerebral contusion.
o He was initially treated at the Howard Hubbard Memorial Hospital.
o Due to the seriousness of his injuries, he was airlifted to the Ricardo Limso Medical Center in Davao City
for more intensive treatment.
o Despite medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after the accident (Marvin eventually died)
 Petitioners spouses Buenaventura and Rosario Jayme, the parents of Marvin, filed a complaint for damages with
the RTC against respondents
o They prayed that all respondents be held solidarily liable for their loss.
o They pointed out that that proximate cause of Marvin’s death was Lozano’s negligent and reckless
operation of the vehicle.
o They prayed for actual, moral, and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.

 In the defendant’s respective Answers, all denied liability for Marvin’s death.
o Apostol and Simbulan averred that Lozano took the pickup truck without their consent.
o Miguel and Lozano pointed out that Marvin’s sudden sprint across the highway made it impossible to
avoid the accident.
o Yet, Miguel denied being on board the vehicle when it hit Marvin.
o The Municipality of Koronadal adopted the answer of Lozano and Miguel.
o As for First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company, Inc., the vehicle insurer, it insisted that its
liability is contributory and is only conditioned on the right of the insured.
 Since the insured did not file a claim within the prescribed period, any cause of action against it
had prescribed.
RTC Ruling:
 Rendered judgment in favor of spouses Jayme.
 Defendants Fidel Lozano, Rodrigo Apostol, and Mayor Fernando Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato, are
hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff
CA Ruling: (Mayor Miguel interposed an appeal to the CA)
 In his appeal, Mayor Miguel contended that the RTC erred in ruling that he was Lozano’s employer and, hence,
solidarily liable for the latter’s negligent act.
o Records showed that the Municipality of Koronadal was the driver’s true and lawful employer.
 Mayor Miguel also denied that he did not exercise due care and diligence in the supervision of Lozano.
 The incident, although unfortunate, was unexpected and cannot be attributed to him.
 CA granted the appeal. Reversed RTC decision insofar as Mayor Miguel is concerned.
 The CA held that Mayor Miguel should not be held liable for damages for the death of Marvin Jayme
o It reiterated the settled rule that it is the registered owner of a vehicle who is jointly and severally liable
with the driver for damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries or
death sustained in the operation of the vehicles.
o Regardless of who the actual owner of the vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the
operator of the vehicle as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly and primarily
responsible for the consequences incident (sic) to its operation xxx.
Hence, this petition

Contentions of Spouses Jayme (petitioners), among others:

 That vicarious liability attaches to Mayor Miguel
 He was not a mere passenger, but instead one who had direct control and supervision over Lozano during the
time of the accident
  The element of direct control is not negated by the fact that Lozano’s employer was the Municipality of
Koronadal
 Mayor Miguel, being Lozano’s superior, still had control over the manner the vehicle was operated.

ISSUE: Is the doctrine of vicarious liability applicable in this case?

Or stated differently: May a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver assigned to him,
which resulted in the death of a minor pedestrian?

RULING:
 No. The doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability finds no application in the present case.
 Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only liable for one’s own quasidelictual acts, but also
for those persons for whom one is responsible for
o This liability is popularly known as vicarious or imputed liability
 To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the following requisites must be
established:
1) That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or through another;
2) That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has the authority to give
at all times; and
3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him.
 Significantly, to make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180, it must be established that
the injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee was performing his functions.

 In resolving the present controversy, it is imperative to find out if Mayor Miguel is, indeed, the employer of
Lozano and therefore liable for the negligent acts of the latter.
o To determine the existence of an employment relationship, this Court relied on the fourfold test.
o This involves: (1) the employer’s power of selection; (2) payment of wages or other remuneration; (3)
the employer’s right to control the method of doing the work; and (4) the employer’s right of
suspension or dismissal
Application:
 Applying the foregoing test, the CA correctly held that it was the Municipality of Koronadal which was the
lawful employer of Lozano at the time of the accident.
o It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality.
o That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of no moment.
o This Court held that an employment relationship still exists even if the employee was loaned by the
employer to another person or entity because control over the employee subsists.
 In this case, the Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozano’s employer notwithstanding Lozano’s
assignment to Mayor Miguel.
 Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions or directions to Lozano, he still
can not be held liable.

 Significantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee although the person may have the
right to control the manner of the vehicle’s operation.
 In the absence of an employment relationship establishing vicarious liability, the driver’s negligence should not
be attributed to a fellow employee who only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle.
 Whatever right of control the occupant may have over the driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an
application of the doctrine of vicarious liability.

 Further, in the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano’s employer nor the vehicle’s registered owner.
 There existed NO CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him
accountable for Marvin’s death.
 o Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the accident.
 Parenthetically, it has been held that the failure of a passenger to assist the driver, by providing him warnings
or by serving as lookout does not make the passenger liable for the latter’s negligent acts.
 The driver’s duty is not one that may be delegated to others.

As correctly held by the trial court, the true and lawful employer of Lozano is the Municipality of Koronadal. Unfortunately
for Spouses Jayme, the municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in governmental
functions and, hence, immune from suit.

“Verily, liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer.”
The law on the matter is clear: only the negligent driver, the driver’s employer, and the registered owner of the vehicle
are liable for the death of a third person resulting from the negligent operation of the vehicle.
____________________

NOTES:
In Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon, SC ruled, to wit:
 “x x x The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to it,
does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable for
their wrongful acts and omissions. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than requests
commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into with the security agency. x x x”(Emphasis supplied)

Handley v. Lombardi is instructive on this exception to the rule on vicarious liability:

 “Plaintiff was not the master or principal of the driver of the truck, but only an intermediate and superior
employee or agent. This being so, the doctrine of respondeat superior or qui facit per alium is not properly
applicable to him. His power to direct and control the driver was not as master, but only by virtue of the fact
that they were both employed by Kruse, and the further fact that as Kruse’s agent he was delegated Kruse’s
authority over the driver. x x x
 In the case of actionable negligence, the rule is wellsettled both in this state and elsewhere that the negligence
of a subordinate employee or subagent is not to be imputed to a superior employee or agent, but only to the
master or principal xxx

Metro Manila Transit Corporation vs CA (EMPLOYERS)

FACTS:
 MMTC is the operator of a fleet of passenger buses within the Metro Manila area. Musa was its driver assigned
to MMTC Bus No. 27. The spouses Rosales were parents of Liza Rosalie, a thirdyear high school student at the
University of the Philippines Integrated School.
 An MMTC bus driven by Musa hit Liza Rosalie who was crossing Katipunan Avenue in QC. An eyewitness said the
girl was already near the center of the street when the bus hit her. She fell to the ground on impact, rolled between
the two front wheels of the bus, and was run over by the left rear tires. Liza Rosalie was taken to the hospital but
died. Musa was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
 The spouses Rosales filed an independent civil action for damages against MMTC, Musa, MMTC Acting General
Manager Conrado Tolentino, and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
 the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City found MMTC and Musa guilty of negligence and ordered them to pay
damages and attorney’s fees, as follows:
 WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant Metro Manila
Transit Corporation primarily and defendant Pedro Musa subsidiarily liable to plaintiffs spouses Rodolfo V. Rosales
and Lily R. Rosales.
 Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. On August 5, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
 The spouses Rosales filed a motion for reconsideration, which the appellate court, in a resolution, dated
September 12, 1996, partly granted by increasing the indemnity for the death of Liza Rosalie from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00.
 Hence, these appeals.

MAIN ISSUE: WON the CA erred in refusing to hold MMTC and Musa, solidarily liable.

RULING: YES
 The responsibility of employers for the negligence of their employees in the performance of their duties is primary,
that is, the injured party may recover from the employers directly, regardless of the solvency of their employees.
The rationale for the rule on vicarious liability has been adumbrated thus:
o What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a deliberate
allocation of a risk. The losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a practical matter are sure to
occur in the conduct of the employers enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost
of doing business. They are placed upon the employer because, having engaged in an enterprise, which
will on the basis of all past experience involve harm to others through the tort of employees, and sought
to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent injured plaintiff, should bear them; and because
he is better able to absorb them, and to distribute them, through prices, rates or liability insurance, to
the public, and so to shift them to society, to the community at large. Added to this is the makeweight
argument that an employer who is held strictly liable is under the greatest incentive to be careful in the
selection, instruction and supervision of his servants, and to take every precaution to see that the
enterprise is conducted safely.
o MMTC is primarily liable for damages for the negligence of its employee in view of Art. 2180. Pursuant
to Art. 2181, it can recover from its employee what it may pay. This does not make the employees liability
subsidiary. It only means that if the judgment for damages is satisfied by the common carrier, the latter
has a right to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which
gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Hence, the spouses Rosales have the option of enforcing the
judgment against either MMTC or Musa.
o From another point of view, Art. 2194 provides that the responsibility of two or more persons who are
liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
 Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their employees within the scope of their
assigned tasks only if they can show that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage, as in the selection and supervision of their employees.
o MMTC sought to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family with respect to the
selection of employees by presenting mainly testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure. According to
MMTC, applicants are required to submit professional driving licenses, certifications of work experience,
and clearances from the National Bureau of Investigation; to undergo tests of their driving skills,
concentration, reflexes, and vision; and, to complete training programs on traffic rules, vehicle
maintenance, and standard operating procedures during emergency cases.
o HOWEVER, the evidence consisted mostly of testimonial evidence from its transport supervisors and
maintenance department.
o The failure of the defendant company to produce in court any record or other documentary proof tending
to establish that it had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
 supervision of its drivers and buses, notwithstanding the calls therefor by both the trial court and the
opposing counsel, argues strongly against its pretensions.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in absolving Tolentino, Celebrado, and GSIS from liability.

RULING: NO
 Spouses allege that CA erred in absolving Tolentino, Celebrado, of vicarious liability under Art. 2180. With respect
to GSIS, they contend that it was the insurer in a contract for third party liability it had with the MMTC.
 Although the fourth paragraph of Art. 2180 mentions managers among those made responsible for the negligent
acts of others, it is settled that this term is used in the said provision in the sense of employers.Thus, Tolentino
and Celebrado cannot be held liable for the tort of Pedro Musa.
 With regard to GSIS, an insurer in an indemnity contract for third party liability is directly liable to the injured party
up to the extent specified in the agreement, but it cannot be held solidarily liable beyond that amount. Spouses
Rosales may claim from GSIS, subject to the reimbursement of MMTC and Musa to GSIS.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and another one is RENDERED holding the Metro Manila
Transit Corporation and Pedro Musa jointly and severally liable for the death of Liza Rosalie R. Rosales and ORDERING
them as such to pay to the spouses Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily R. Rosales the following amounts:
1) death indemnity in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00);
2) actual damages in the amount of sixty thousand two hundred twenty six pesos and sixty five centavos (P60,226.65);
3) moral damages in the amount of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00);
4) exemplary damages in the amount of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00);
5) attorneys fees in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00);
6) compensation for loss of earning capacity in the amount of three hundred twenty-one thousand eight hundred seventy
pesos and twelve centavos (P321,870.12); and
7) the costs of suit.

NOTES:
 Art. 2206 provides for the payment of indemnity for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict. Initially fixed in said
article of the Civil Code at P3,000.00, the amount of the indemnity has through the years been gradually increased
based on the value of the peso. At present, it is fixed at P50,000.00.
 Art. 2199 provides that except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. The spouses Rosales are claiming actual
damages in the amount of P239,245.40. However, during the trial, they submitted receipts showing that
expenses for the funeral, wake, and interment of Liza Rosalie amounted only to P60,226.65

Valenzuela v CA (Vicarious Liability: Employers) G.R. No. 115024; February 7, 1996 KAPUNAN, J.: These two petitions
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court stem from an action to recover damages by
petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for injuries sustained by her in a vehicular
accident in the early morning of June 24, 1990.

FACTS:
 This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical injuries sustained in a vehicular
accident.
 Plaintiff's version of the accident is as follows:
o At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue
Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue.
o Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place
where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed.
o Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her
home in that car's condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency
lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of
the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly
bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of
defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc.
o Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which was
destroyed, and then fell to the ground.
o She was pulled out from under defendant's car.
o Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to
the rest of the body.
 Defendant’s version of the accident:
o Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent.
o He was on his way home, travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was raining, visibility was affected and
the road was wet.
o He testified that he was driving along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the
direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San Juan,
with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with "full bright lights".
o Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle,
and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking
lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly lighted.
o He alleged in his defense that the left rear portion of plaintiff's car was protruding as it was then "at a
standstill diagonally" on the outer portion of the right lane towards Araneta Avenue (par. 18, Answer).
o He confirmed the testimony of plaintiff's witness that after being bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved
to the right and hit another car parked on the sidewalk.
o Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she was not
a licensed driver.
 After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross
negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
o The trial court likewise held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally liable for
damages pursuant to Article 2180.
o It ordered the defendants to jointly and severally to pay.
 As a result of the trial court's decision, defendants filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and for Reconsideration,
citing testimony in Criminal Case O.C. No. 804367 (People vs. Richard Li), tending to show that the point of impact,
as depicted by the pieces of glass/debris from the parties' cars, appeared to be at the center of the right lane of
Aurora Blvd.
 The trial court denied the motion.
 Defendants forthwith filed an appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals.
o In a Decision rendered March 30, 1994, the Court of Appeals found that there was "ample basis from the
evidence of record for the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's car was properly parked at the right,
beside the sidewalk when it was bumped by defendant's car."
o Dismissing the defendants' argument that the plaintiff's car was improperly parked, almost at the center
of the road, the respondent court noted that evidence which was supposed to prove that the car was at
or near center of the right lane was never presented during the trial of the case.
o Defendant Li's testimony that he was driving at a safe speed of 55 km./hour is self serving; it was not
corroborated.
  In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the Court
of Appeals, in its decision, however, absolved the Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. from any liability
towards petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela and reduced the amount of moral damages to P500,000.00.
 Consequently, both parties assail the respondent court's decision by filing two separate petitions before this
Court.
o Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944, contends that he should not be held liable for damages because the
proximate cause of the accident was Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela's own negligence.
 Alternatively, he argues that in the event that this Court finds him negligent, such
negligence ought to be mitigated by the contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
o On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela assails the respondent court's decision
insofar as it absolves Alexander Commercial, Inc. from liability as the owner of the car driven by Richard
Li and insofar as it reduces the amount of the actual and moral damages awarded by the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alexander Commercial Inc. is liable for the damages sustained by Valenzuela based on pater
familias for failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his
employees?
RULING:
 Yes, Alexander Commercial Inc. is liable for the damages sustained by Valenzuela based on pater familias for
failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees.
 The employer’s primary liability under the concept of pater familias embodied by Art. 2180 (in relation to Art.
2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or tortious in character.
 His liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection
and supervision of its employees.
o Once evidence is introduced showing that the employer exercised the required amount of care in selecting
its employees, half of the employer’s burden is overcome.
o The question of diligent supervision, however, depends on the circumstances of employment.
 Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of its employee during
the performance of the latter’s assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article
2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
 The employer is not expected to exercise supervision over either the employee’s private activities or during the
performance of tasks either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the employee’s tasks.
 The case at bench presents a situation of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large companies
with either their employees of managerial rank or their representatives.
o Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide cars under the first plan, require rigorous
tests of road worthiness from their agents prior to turning over the car (subject of company maintenance)
to their representatives.
o In other words, like a good father of a family, they entrust the company vehicle only after they are
satisfied that the employee to whom the car has been given full use of the said company car for
company or private purposes will not be a threat or menace to himself, the company or to others.
o When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to its employee, it in effect guarantees
that it is, like every good father, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege reasonably and
responsively.
 Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all
kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the business and
goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car, the
managerial employee or company sales agent.
 As such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of furthering the company’s
image, a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to
whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and
responsibly.
 In fine, Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care aand
diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li.
  No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain
the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car.
 Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for
entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be
jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the
accident.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is modified with the effect of REINSTATING the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court. SO ORDERED.

National Power Corp vs CA (Employer, labor only contracting)

G.R. No. 119121. August 14, 1998
ROMERO, J.:

FACTS:
 On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four (4) dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi
city bound for Iligan city.
 Unfortunately, enroute to its destination, one of the trucks with plate no. RFT-9-6-673 driven by a certain Gavino
Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw.
o The incident resulted in the death of three (3) persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical
injuries to seventeen other passengers.
 On June 10, 1980, the heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against National Power Corporation
(NPC) and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO) before the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Marawi
City.
 When defendant PHESCO filed its answer to the complaint it contended that it was not the owner of the dump
truck which collided with the Toyota Tamaraw but NPC.
o Moreover, it asserted that it was merely a contractor of NPC with the main duty of supplyingworkers
and technicians for the latters projects.
 On the other hand, NPC denied any liability and countered that the driver of the dump truck was the employee
of PHESCO.
 After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision dated July 25, 1988 absolving NPC of any liability.
 Dissatisfied, PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on November 10, 1994 reversed the trial courts
judgment.
o A labor only contractor is considered merely as an agent of the employer.
o A finding that a contractor is a labor only contractor is equivalent to a finding that there is an employer-
employee relationship between the owner of the project and the employees of the labor only contractor
(Industrial Timer Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 202 SCRA 465).
 NPC filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision which was, however, denied on February 9, 1995.
o Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not NPC is liable to pay the tort committed by the truck driver?
RULING:
 Yes, NPC is liable for the tortious act of the truck driver.
 However, NPC maintains that even assuming that a “labor only” contract exists between it and PHESCO, its
liability will not extend to third persons who are injured due to the tortious acts of the employee of the “labor
only” contractor.
  Stated otherwise, its liability shall only be limited to violations of the Labor Code and not quasi delicts.
 The reliance is misplaced.
 It bears stressing that the action was premised on the recovery of damages as a result of quasi delict against
both NPC and PHESCO, hence, it is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code which is the applicable law in resolving
this case.
 Given the above considerations, it is apparent that Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code will
determine the liability of NPC in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person for any negligent act of
the employees of the “labor only” contractor.
 This is consistent with the ruling that a finding that a contractor was a “labor only” contractor is equivalent to a
finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the
“labor only” contractor, including the latter’s workers.
 NPC, even if it truly believed that it was not the employer of the driver, could still have disclaimed any liability
had it raised the defense of due diligence in the selection or supervision of PHESCO and Ilumba.
 However, for some reason or another, NPC did not invoke said defense.
 Hence, by opting not to present any evidence that it exercised due diligence in the supervision of the activities of
PHESCO and Ilumba, NPC has foreclosed its right to interpose the same on appeal in conformity with the rule
that points of law, theories, issues of facts and arguments not raised in the proceedings below cannot be
ventilated for the first time on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the truck driver is an employee of NPC or PHESCO?
RULING:
 Since PHESCO is only a “labor only” contractor, the workers it supplied to NPC, including the driver of the ill-
fated truck, should be considered as employees of NPC.
 Under this factual milieu, there is no doubt that PHESCO was engaged in “labor only” contracting visàvis NPC
and as such, it is considered merely an agent of the latter.
 In labor only contracting, an employer-employee relationship between the principal employer and the
employees of the “labor only” contractor is created.
 Accordingly, the principal employer is responsible to the employees of the “labor only” contractor as if such
employees had been directly employed by the principal employer.
 After all, it is axiomatic that any person (the principal employer) who enters into an agreement with a job
contractor, either for the performance of a specified work or for the supply of manpower, assumes
responsibility over the employees of the latter.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 10, 1994 and its
accompanying resolution dated February 9, 1995 are AFFIRMED without prejudice to the right of NPC to demand from
PHESCO and Ilumba reimbursement of the damages it would be adjudged to pay to complainants. No costs. SO ORDERED.

DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF EMPLOYEES (EMPLOYERS)

CANG vs CULLEN
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Nachura, J.
FACTS:
 The claim for damages was precipitated by a vehicular accident involving a taxicab owned by petitioner Stephen
Cang and driven by petitioner George Nardo, and a motorcycle owned by respondent Herminia Cullen and driven
by Guillermo Saycon.
 Saycon veered into the lane of and bump Nardo who was operating a taxi.
o Saycon was occupying the middle portion of the outer lane.
o Nardo was traveling on the inner lane and slightly behind, but to the left of, the motorcycle.
 It was found that Saycon did not have any license but only had a student’s driver’s permit.
  He was also driving without wearing the proper protective headgear.
 After the impact, Nardo drove back to help Saycon.
 Two traffic enforcers ordered Nardo to take Saycon to the hospital.
 No sketch of the accident was done by the enforcers.
 Respondent alleged that between Sikatuna and D. Jakosalem Streets, the taxi veered to the right and sideswiped
the motorcycle, then attempted to speed away.
 Peace officers near the scene flagged down the taxi. As a result of the collision, Saycon was seriously injured.
 Petitioners, meanwhile, claimed that it was the motorcycle that bumped into the taxi.
o Nardo narrated that he was driving the taxi on the inner lane (near the center island) along P. del Rosario
St., moving towards the intersection of D. Jakosalem St.
o When the “caution” signal of the traffic light flashed, he immediately slowed down. It was at that point
that the motorcycle bumped into the taxi’s rear.
 Cullen, as employer, out of compassion, paid all of Saycon’s hospital and medical expenses and is claiming
damages from Nardo and Cang, the owner of the taxi.
 The RTC dismissed the case stating that Cullen is not entitled to damages.
 CA reversed the decision claiming that the RTC did not gave credit to a witness’ account of the accident.
 Hence this petition
 Petitioners argue that:
o the CA erred in reversing the judgment rendered by the trial court;
o in giving credence to the eyewitness’ testimony of Ike Aldemita, that petitioner Nardo had overtaken the
motorcycle driven by Saycon and, therefore, was the negligent party;
o and in awarding damages to respondent
MAIN ISSUE: Was the employer negligent in the selection and supervision of her employee?
RULING: YES
 Article 2180 of the Civil Code states: “Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under
their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed
or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not
when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is
provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The
responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.”
 When an employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the
juris tantum presumption that his employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence
of a good father of a family. Thus, in the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine
them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. With respect to the supervision of employees,
employers must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for breaches thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
 APPLICATION: The fact that Saycon was driving alone with only a student’s permit is, to our minds, proof enough
that Cullen was negligent—either she did not know that he only had a student’s permit or she allowed him to
drive alone knowing this deficiency. Whichever way we look at it, we arrive at the same conclusion: that she failed
to exercise the due diligence required of her as an employer in supervising her employee. Thus, the trial court
properly denied her claim for damages. One who seeks equity and justice must come to this Court with clean
hands
 In sum, we hold that the trial court correctly found that it was Saycon who caused the accident and, as such, he
cannot recover indemnity for his injury. On the other hand, respondent, as Saycon’s employer, was also negligent
 and failed to exercise the degree of diligence required in supervising her employee. Consequently, she cannot
recover from petitioners what she had paid for the treatment of her employee’s injuries.
ISSUE: Was Saycon negligent?
RULING: YES
 Corollarily, Article 2185 of the Civil Code states: “Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed
that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation.”
 The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of that diligence required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. Negligence, as it is commonly
understood, is conduct that creates an undue risk of harm to others. It is the failure to observe that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand. It is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by considerations that ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
doing something that a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
 To determine whether there is negligence in a given situation, this Court laid down this TEST: Did defendant, in
doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation? If not, the person is guilty of negligence.
 APPLICATION: Based on the foregoing test, we can conclude that Saycon was negligent. In the first place, he
should not have been driving alone. The law clearly requires that the holder of a student­driver’s permit should
be accompanied by a duly licensed driver when operating a motor vehicle. Further, there is the matter of not
wearing a helmet and the fact that he was speeding. All these prove that he was negligent.
 Considering that Saycon was the negligent party, he would not have been entitled to recover damages from
petitioners had he instituted his own action. Consequently, respondent, as his employer, would likewise not be
entitled to claim for damages.
ISSUE: Should the testimony of the eyewitness be disregarded?
RULING: YES
 We note that the present Petition raises questions of fact. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of
fact which we cannot ordinarily pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing errors of law.
 However, although findings of fact of the CA are generally conclusive on this Court, this rule admits of the
exceptions. x x x Thus, when there are conflicting findings of fact by the CA on one hand and by the trial court on
the other, as in this case, the Court may give due course to petitions raising factual issues by way of exception and
only in the presence of extremely meritorious circumstances.
 APPLICATION: Contrary to the CA’s ruling, we find that the RTC correctly disregarded Aldemita’s testimony.
Between the RTC and the CA, it is the former’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility that should control. The
court cannot help but find Aldemita’s testimony as uncertain and filled with so many inconsistencies. They
contradicted with each other at many instances. The court believes in either of the two possibilities—Aldemita
did not really actually and exactly see the whole incident or he was lying through his teeth. Thus, the court cannot
give so much weight to his testimony.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 2,
2002 and the Resolution dated February 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69841 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20504 is hereby REINSTATED. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
NOTES:
 Under Article 2179 of the Civil Code, “When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause
of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded.”

b. Safeguard Security v. Tangco, G.R. No. 165732(Diligence in Selection and Supervision of Employee)
FACTS:
  On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan
Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the banks cashier as she would sign a specimen
card.
 Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence,
approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her
bag to deposit the same for safekeeping.
 Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her
death.
 Lauro Tangco, Evangelines husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo.
 Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City
subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide.
 On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a Decision.
 Respondents filed with RTC, a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and
against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage
committed by its security guard.
 Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
 The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillos claim that he merely acted in self-
defense.
 The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo.
 Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied

ISSUE: Whether or not Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline

RULING: YES
 The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact, which, as a
general rule, we cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
errors of law.
 Generally, factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal.
 The established exceptions are:
o (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
o (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
o (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
o (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts;
o (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
o (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
o (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;
o (8) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and
o (9) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by
the evidence on record.
 A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent reason for us to deviate from the factual
finding of the trial court and affirmed by the CA that petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence in shooting
Evangeline.
  Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is absent, Pajarillos claim of self-defense cannot
be accepted specially when such claim was uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence other than his
testimony which was even doubtful.
 Pajarillos apprehension that Evangeline will shoot him to stage a bank robbery has no basis at all.
 It is therefore clear that the alleged threat of bank robbery was just a figment of Pajarillos imagination which
caused such unfounded unlawful aggression on his part.

ISSUE: Whether or not Safeguard should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to respondents.
RULING: YES
 The nature of the respondents’ cause of action is determined in the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer
for relief. In the complaint, the respondents are invoking their right to recover damages against Safeguard for
their indirect responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillo’s act of shooting and killing Evangeline under Article
2176.
 Thus, the civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo but one based
on culpa aquiliana or quasi delict which is a separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from crime.
 As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by
Pajarillo and is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law.
 The Court agrees with the RTC’s finding that Safeguard had exercised diligence in the selection of Pajarillo since
records show that he underwent psychological and neuropsychiatric evaluation, pre-licensing training course for
security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances.
 However, Safeguard was not diligent in providing trainings, classroom instructions and continuous evaluation of
the security guard’s performance.
 Thus, the SC affirms with modification that the civil liability of Safeguard Security Agency Inc. is solidary and
primary under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

DISPOSITION : WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY and
PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Registered owner of vehicle

2. J. H. CHAPMAN vs. JAMES M. UNDERWOOD(owner of the car driven by his driver)

G.R. No. L-9010 March 28, 1914

At the time the accident occurred, (which is the basis of this action) there was a single-track street-car line running along
Calle Herran (old street name of Manila), with occasional switches to allow cars to meet and pass each other. One of these
switches was located at the scene of the accident.

FACTS:

• Chapman (plaintiff) had been visiting his friend, (a man named) Creveling, in front of whose house the accident
happened.

• He desired to board/ride a certain "San Marcelino" car coming from Santa Ana and bound for Manila.

• When Creveling told Chapman that the car was already approaching, he immediately and somewhat hurriedly,
passed from the gate into the street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car.
 • The car was a closed one, the entrance being from the front or the rear platform.

• Chapman s attempted to board the front platform but, seeing that he could not reach it without extra exertion,
he stopped beside the car, facing toward the rear platform, and waited for it to come abreast of him in order to board.

• While in this position he was struck from behind and run over by the defendant's (James Underwood)
automobile.

• Details of accident:

• The defendant entered Calle Herran (old street name of Manila) at Calle Peñafrancia in his automobile driven by
his chauffeur, a competent driver.

• There was a street car also bound from Manila to Santa Ana being immediately in front of him which he followed
along behind it. Just before reaching the scene of the accident, the street car which he was following took the
switch — that is, it went off the main line and turned left (onto another swtich). Thereupon the defendant no
longer followed it nor went to the left, but kept straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to the right. (
in short, he was not on the right lane)

• The car which Chapman intended to board was on the main line and bound in an opposite direction to that in
which the defendant was going. (In short, magtagbo sila)

• When the front of the "San Marcelino" car (the one that Chapppman attempted to board) was almost in front of
the defendant's automobile, defendant's driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over Chapman.

ISSUE: Whether or not James Underwood, the registered owner of the vehicle, is liable for the negligent act of his
chauffeur.

RULING: No. James Underwood is not responsible for the negligence of his driver, under the facts and circumstances of
this case.

• A careful examination of the record leads us to the conclusion that the defendant's driver was guilty of
negligence in running upon and over the James. He was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side.

• The plaintiff, in common out to board the car, was not obliged, for his own protection, to observe whether a
car was coming upon him from his left hand. He had only to guard against those coming from the right. He knew that,
according to the law of the road, no automobile or other vehicle coming from his left should pass upon his side of the
car. He needed only to watch for cars coming from his right, as they were the only ones under the law permitted to pass
upon that side of the street car.

• As we have said in the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the driver does not fall within the list of
persons in article 1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant would be responsible.

• Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not present at the time the alleged negligent acts
were committed by the driver, the same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent act of the
driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and
to direct his driver to desist therefrom.
 • An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of
the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to
direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts.

• The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up to Escolta, for example, at a speed of
60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes
himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the results produced by the acts of his chauffeur.

• On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable
opportunity to prevent the acts or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the
automobile, although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or
criminally, therefor.

• The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length a time that the
owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.

APPLICATION:

• In the case before us it does not appear from the record that, from the time the automobile took the wrong
side of the road to the commission of the injury, sufficient time intervened to give the defendant an opportunity to
correct the act of his driver.

• Instead, it appears with fair clearness that the interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car
and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the
driver.

• Whether or not the owner of an automobile driven by a competent driver, would be responsible, whether present
or not, for the negligent acts of his driver when the automobile was a part of a business enterprise, and was being
driven at the time of the accident in furtherance of the owner's business, we do not now decide.

Disposition: The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Erezo vs Jepte
Facts:
 Defendantappellant is the registered owner of a six by six truck bearing plate No. TC1253.
 On August 9, 1949, while the same was being driven by Rodolfo Espino y Garcia, it collided with a taxicab at the
intersection of San Andres and Dakota Streets, Manila.
 As the truck went off the street, it hit Ernesto Erezo and another, and the former suffered injuries, as a result of
which he died.
 The driver was prosecuted for homicide through reckless negligence in criminal case No. 10663 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila.
 The accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay the heirs of Ernesto Erezo the
sum of P3,000.
 As the amount of the judgment could not be enforced against him, plaintiff brought this action against the
registered owner of the truck, the defendantappellant.
 The circumstances material to the case are stated by the court in its decision:
o "The defendant does not deny that at the time of the fatal accident the cargo truck driven by Rodolfo
Espino y Garcia was registered in his name.
 o He, however, claims that the vehicle belonged to the Port Brokerage, of which he was the broker at the
time of the accident.
o He explained, and his explanation was corroborated by Policarpio Franco, the manager of the corporation,
that the trucks of the corporation were registered in his name as a convenient arrangement so as to
enable the corporation to pay the registration fee with his backpay as a prewar government employee.
o Franco, however, admitted that the arrangement was not known to the Motor Vehicles Office."
 The trial court held that as the defendantappellant represented himself to be the owner of the truck and the
Motor Vehicles Office, relying on his representation, registered the vehicles in his name, the Government and all
persons affected by the representation had the right to rely on his declaration of ownership and registration.
 It, therefore, held that defendantappellant is liable because he cannot be permitted to repudiate his own
declaration.
 Against the judgment, the defendant has prosecuted this appeal claiming that at the time of the accident the
relation of employer and employee between the driver and defendantappellant was not established, it having
been proved at the trial that the owner of the truck was the Port Brokerage, of which defendantappellant was
merely a broker

Issue:
Is Jepte liable?
Ruling:
 YES
 The registered owner of a certificate of public convenience is liable to the public for the injuries or damages
suffered by passengers or third persons caused by the operation of said vehicle, even though the same had been
transferred to a third person. (
 The principle upon which this doctrine is based is that in dealing with vehicles registered under the Public Service
Law, the public has the right to assume or presume that the registered owner is the actual owner thereof, for it
would be difficult for the public to enforce the actions that they may have for injuries caused to them by the
vehicles being negligently operated if the public should be required to prove who the actual owner is.
 How would the public or third persons know against whom to enforce their rights in case of subsequent transfers
of the vehicles?
 We do not imply by this doctrine, however, that the registered owner may not recover whatever amount he had
paid by virtue of his liability to third persons from the person to whom he had actually sold, assigned or conveyed
the vehicle.
 Under the same principle the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for a public service, should primarily
be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle is being driven on
the highways or streets.
 The Revised Motor Vehicles Law (Act No. 3992, as amended) provides that no vehicle may be used or operated
upon any public highway unless the same is properly registered. It has been stated that the system of licensing
and the requirement that each machine must carry a registration number, conspicuously displayed, is one of the
precautions taken to reduce the danger of injury to pedestrians and other travellers from the careless
management of automobiles, and to furnish a means of ascertaining the identity of persons violating the laws and
ordinances, regulating the speed and operation of machines upon the highways (2 R. C. L. 1176).
 Not only are vehicles to be registered and that no motor vehicles are to be used or operated without being
properly registered for the current year, but that dealers in motor vehicles shall furnish the Motor Vehicles Office
a report showing the name and address of each purchaser of motor vehicle during the previous month and the
manufacturer's serial number and motor number.
 Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by which ownership in vehicles is
transferred, as in land registration cases, because the administrative proceeding of registration does not bear any
essential relation to the contract of sale between the parties
o but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public highway
  The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any
damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite
individual, the registered owner.
 No responsible person or corporation could be held liable for the most outrageous acts of negligence, if they
should be allowed to place a "middleman' between them and the public, and escape liability by the manner in
which they recompense their servants
Application:
 Defendantappellant should be held liable to plaintiffappellee for the injuries occasioned to the latter because of
the negligence of the driver, even if the defendantappellant was no longer the owner of the vehicle at the time of
the damage because he had previously sold it to another.
 There is a presumption that the owner of the guilty vehicle is the defendantappellant as he is the registered owner
in the Motor Vehicles Office.

Issue 2:
Should the registered owner be allowed at the trial to prove who the actual and real owner is, and in accordance with
such proof escape or evade responsibility and lay the same on the person actually owning the vehicle?

Ruling:
 NO
 We hold with the trial court that the law does not allow him to do so; the law, with its aim and policy in mind,
does not relieve him directly of the responsibility that the law fixes and places upon him as an incident or
consequence of registration.
 Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner is, it
would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same
to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or
injury done.
 A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover or identify the person actually
causing the injury or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles
Office to determine who is the owner.
 The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the registered owner given the
opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership. If the policy of the law is to be enforced and carried
out, the registered owner should not be allowed to prove the contrary to the prejudice of the person injured, that
is, to prove that a third person or another has become the owner, so that he may thereby be relieved of the
responsibility to the injured person.
 However, a registered owner who has already sold or transferred a vehicle has the recourse to a thirdparty
complaint, in the same action brought against him to recover for the damage or injury done, against the vendee
or transferee of the vehicle.
o The inconvenience of the suit is no justification for relieving him of liability; said inconvenience is the price
he pays for failure to comply with the registration that the law demands and requires.

Conclusion:
 In synthesis, we hold that the registered owner, the defendantappellant herein, is primarily responsible for the
damage caused to the vehicle of the plaintiffappellee,
 But he (defendantappellant) has a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that he may
be required to pay as damage for the injury caused to the plaintiffappellant.

VI. The Tortfeasor

b. Vicarious Liability
 vi. Registered owner of vehicle

4. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc., G.R No. 162267, July 4, 2008
Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.
Nature of the Case: This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC, which ordered petitioner PCI Leasing and Renato Gonzaga
(Gonzaga) to pay, jointly and severally, the respondent.

FACTS:
 On October 19, 1990 at about 10:30 pm, a Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by United Coconut Planters Bank was
traversing the Laurel Highway, Barangay Balintawak, Lipa City
o The car was insured with respondent [UCPB General Insurance Inc.]
 It was then driven by Flaviano Isaac with Conrado Geronimo, the Asst. Manager of said bank
 It was hit and bumped by an 18wheeler Fuso Tanker Truck, owned by petitioner PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc.
o This was allegedly leased to and operated by Superior Gas & Equitable Co., Inc. (SUGECO) and driven by
its employee, defendant appellant Renato Gonzaga
 The impact caused heavy damage to the Mitsubishi Lancer car resulting in an explosion of the rear part of the
car.
 The driver and passenger suffered physical injuries.
 However, the driver Gonzaga continued on his way to his destination and did not bother to bring his victims to
the hospital.
 Respondent UCPB General Insurance paid the assured UCPB the amount of P244,500 representing the
insurance coverage of the damaged car
 As the 18wheeler truck is registered under the name of PCI Leasing, repeated demands were made by the
respondent for the payment of the aforesaid amounts
 However, no payment was made.
 Thus, respondent filed a case.

Petitioner PCI’s defense:

 That it could not be held liable for the collision, since the driver of the truck, Gonzaga, was not its employee, but
that of Superior Gas & Equitable Co., Inc. (SUGECO)
 In fact, it was SUGECO, and not petitioner, that was the actual operator of the truck, pursuant to a Contract of
Lease signed by petitioner and SUGECO.
 It, however, admitted that it was the owner of the truck in question.
RTC Ruling:
 Ruled in favor of respondent UCPB General Insurance, ordering petition PCI Leasing and Gonzaga to pay jointly
and severally the respondent.
CA Ruling: (PCI appealed to the CA)
 Affirmed RTC’s decision with modification
 CA also denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE 1: May the petitioner, as registered owner of a motor vehicle that figured in a quasidelict be held liable, jointly and
severally, with the driver thereof, for the damages caused to third parties?

RULING 1:
  Yes. The petitioner, as registered owner of a motor vehicle that figured in a quasidelict may be held liable,
jointly and severally, with the driver thereof, for the damages caused to third parties.
 The principle of holding the registered owner of a vehicle liable for quasidelicts resulting from its use is well
established in jurisprudence.
o In Erezo v. Jepte, with Justice Labrador as ponente, wisely explained the reason behind this principle,
thus:
 xxx The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident
happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefore can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner
 xxx the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of
persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways
 For damage or injuries arising out of negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, the registered owner may
be held civilly liable with the negligent driver either
1) Subsidiarily, if the aggrieved party seeks relief based on a delict or crime under Articles 100 and 103 of
the Revised Penal Code; or
2) Solidarily, if the complainant seeks relief based on a quasidelict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the
Civil Code.
 It is the option of the plaintiff whether to waive completely the filing of the civil action, or institute it with the
criminal action, or file it separately or independently of a criminal action;
o His only limitation is that he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant
 In case a separate civil action is filed, the longstanding principle is that the registered owner of a motor vehicle
is primarily and directly responsible for the consequences of its operation, including the negligence of the
driver, with respect to the public and all third persons.
 In contemplation of law, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is the employer of its driver, with the actual
operator and employer, such as a lessee, being considered as merely the owner’s agent.
o This being the case, even if a sale has been executed before a tortious incident, the sale, if unregistered,
has no effect as to the right of the public and third persons to recover from the registered owner.
 The public has the right to conclusively presume that the registered owner is the real owner, and may sue
accordingly.
Application:
 In this case, there is not even a sale of the vehicle involved, but a mere lease, which remained unregistered up
to the time of the occurrence of the quasi delict that gave rise to the case.
 Since a lease, unlike a sale, does not even involve a transfer of title or ownership, but the mere use or
enjoyment of property, there is more reason, therefore, in this instance to uphold the policy behind the law,
which is to protect the unwitting public and provide it with a definite person to make accountable for losses or
injuries suffered in vehicular accidents.
 This is and has always been the rationale behind compulsory motor vehicle registration under the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code and similar laws, which, as early as Erezo, has been guiding the courts in their
disposition of cases involving motor vehicular incidents.
o It is also important to emphasize that such principles apply to all vehicles in general, not just those
offered for public service or utility

OTHER ISSUE: Is the petitioner, as a financing company, absolved from liability by the enactment of R.A. No. 8556, or the
Financing Company Act of 1998?

RULING:
 No. The petitioner is not absolved from liability by the enactment of R.A. No. 8556.
 The Court recognizes that the business of financing companies has a legitimate and commendable purpose.
 o In earlier cases, it considered a financial lease or financing lease a legal contract, though subject to the
restrictions of the socalled Recto Law or Articles 1484 and 1485 of the Civil Code
 The enactment of R.A. No. 8556, especially its addition of the new Sec. 12 [refer to Notes below] to the old law,
indeed, point to a seeming emancipation of financing companies from the obligation to compensate claimants
for losses suffered from the operation of vehicles covered by their lease.
o Such, however, are not applicable to petitioner and do not exonerate it from liability in the present
case.
 The new law (R.A. No. 8556) notwithstanding developments in foreign jurisdictions, do not supersede or repeal
the law on compulsory motor vehicle registration.
 No part of the law expressly repeals Section 5(a) and (e) of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code
 Neither is there an implied repeal of R.A. No. 4136.
o As a rule, repeal by implication is frowned upon, unless there is clear showing that the later statute is so
irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to the existing law that they cannot be reconciled and made
to stand together.
o There is nothing in R.A. No. 4136 that is inconsistent and incapable of reconciliation

 Thus, the rule remains the same: a sale, lease, or financial lease, for that matter, that is not registered with the
Land Transportation Office, still does not bind third persons who are aggrieved in tortious incidents, for the
latter need only to rely on the public registration of a motor vehicle as conclusive evidence of ownership.
 A lease such as the one involved in the instant case is an encumbrance in contemplation of law, which needs to
be registered in order for it to bind third parties.
 Under this policy, the evil sought to be avoided is the exacerbation of the suffering of victims of tragic vehicular
accidents in not being able to identify a guilty party.
 A contrary ruling will not serve the ends of justice.
 The failure to register a lease, sale, transfer or encumbrance, should not benefit the parties responsible, to the
prejudice of innocent victims.
 The nonregistration of the lease contract between petitioner and its lessee precludes the former from
enjoying the benefits under Section 12 of R.A. No. 8556.
 The burden of registration of the lease contract is minuscule compared to the chaos that may result if
registered owners or operators of vehicles are freed from such responsibility.
o Petitioner pays the price for its failure to obey the law on compulsory registration of motor vehicles for
registration is a prerequisite for any person to even enjoy the privilege of putting a vehicle on public
roads.

Disposition: Petition is denied.

____________________
NOTES:
Section 12 of RA 8556
 “Section 12. Liability of lessors.— Financing companies shall not be liable for loss, damage or injury caused by a
motor vehicle, aircraft, vessel, equipment, machinery or other property leased to a third person or entity except
when the motor vehicle, aircraft, vessel, equipment or other property is operated by the financing company, its
employees or agents at the time of the loss, damage or injury.”
Duavit vs CA (Registered Owner of Vehicles)

FACTS:
 On July 28, 1971 plaintiffs Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. and Virgilio Catuar were aboard a jeep with plate number
7799F1Manila, 1971, owned by plaintiff, Ruperto Catuar was driving the said jeep on Ortigas Avenue, San Juan,
Rizal; that plaintiff’s jeep, at the time, was running moderately at 20 to 35 kilometers per hour ___ and while
approaching Roosevelt Avenue, Virgilio Catuar slowed down; that suddenly, another jeep with plate number
9997FJ, Manila 1971 driven by defendant Oscar Sabiniano hit and bumped plaintiff’s jeep on the portion near
the left rear wheel, and as a result of the impact plaintiff’s jeep fell on its right and skidded by about 30 yards;
that as a result plaintiff’s jeep was damaged, particularly the windshield, the differential, the part near the left
rear wheel and the top cover of the jeep; that plaintiff Virgilio Catuar was thrown to the middle of the road; his
wrist was broken and he sustained contusions on the head; that likewise plaintiff Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. was
trapped inside the fallen jeep, and one of his legs was fractured.

 “The plaintiffs have filed this case both against Oscar Sabiniano as driver, and against Gualberto Duavit as owner
of the jeep.
 “Defendant Gualberto Duavit, while admitting ownership of the other jeep (Plate No. 9907FJ Manila, 1971),
denied that the other defendant (Oscar Sabiniano) was his employee.
o Duavit claimed that he has not been an employer of defendant Oscar Sabiniano at anytime up to the
present.
 “On the other hand documentary and testimonial evidence show that defendant Oscar Sabiniano was an
employee of the Board of Liquidators.
 “Defendant Sabiniano, in his testimony, categorically admitted that he took the jeep from the garage of
defendant Duavit without the consent or authority of the latter.
o He testified further, that Duavit even filed charges against him for theft of the jeep, but which Duavit did
not push through as his (Sabiniano’s) parents apologized to Duavit on his behalf.
 The trial court found Oscar Sabiniano negligent in driving the vehicle but found no employment relationship
between him and the petitioner because the latter was then a government employee and he took the vehicle
without the authority and consent of the owner.
o The petitioner was, thus, absolved from liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
 The private respondents appealed the case.
 The Court of Appeals rendered the questioned decision holding the petitioner jointly and severally liable with
Sabiniano.

ISSUE: Whether or not the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an accident can be held liable under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code when the said vehicle was neither driven by an employee of the owner nor taken with the consent of the
latter.

RULING: NO
 As early as in 1939, we have ruled that an owner of a Vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident involving the
said vehicle if the same was driven without his consent or knowledge and by a person not employed by him.
Thus, in Duquillo v. Bayot we said:
“Under the facts established, the defendant cannot be held liable for anything. At the time of the
accident, James McGurk was driving the truck, and he was not an employee of the defendant, nor did he
have anything to do with the latter’s business; neither the defendant nor Father Ayson, who was in charge
of her business, consented to have any of her trucks driven on the day of the accident, as it was a holy
day, and much less by a chauffeur who was not in charge of driving it; the use of the defendant’s truck in
the circumstances indicated was done without her consent or knowledge; it may, therefore, be said, that
there was not the remotest contractual relation between the deceased Pio Duquillo and the defendant.
It necessarily follows from all this that articles 1101 and following of the Civil Code, cited by the appellant,
have no application in this case, and, therefore, the errors attributed to the inferior court are without
basis.”
  The Court upholds the above ruling as still relevant and better applicable to present day circumstances.
 The respondent court’s misplaced reliance on the cases of Erezo v. Jepte (102 Phil. 103 [1957] and Vargas v.
Langcay (6 SCRA 174 [1962]) cannot be sustained. In the Erezo case, Jepte, the registered owner of the truck
which collided with a taxicab, and which resulted in the killing of Erezo, claimed that at the time of the accident,
the truck belonged to the Port Brokerage in an arrangement with the corporation but the same was not known
to the Motor Vehicles Office.
o This Court sustained the trial court’s ruling that since Jepte represented himself to be the owner of the
truck and the Motor Vehicles Office, relying on his representation, registered the vehicle in his name,
the Government and all persons affected by the representation had the right to rely on his declaration
of ownership and registration.
o Thus, even if Jepte were not the owner of the truck at the time of the accident, he was still held liable
for the death of Erezo. Significantly, the driver of the truck was fully authorized to drive it.
 Likewise, in the Vargas case, just before the accident occurred, Vargas had sold her jeepney to a third person, so
that at the time of the accident she was no longer the owner of the jeepney.
o This court, nevertheless, affirmed Vargas’ liability since she failed to surrender to the Motor Vehicles
Office the corresponding AC plates in violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law and Commonwealth
Act No. 146. We further ruled that the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle in
contemplation of law, as regards the public and third persons, and as such is responsible for the
consequences incident to its operator.
o The vehicle involved was a public utility jeepney for hire. In such cases, the law does not only require the
surrender of the AC plates but orders the vendor operator to stop the operation of the jeepney as a
form of public transportation until the matter is reported to the authorities.
APPLICATION:
 As can be seen, the circumstances of the above cases are entirely different from those in the present case.
Herein petitioner does not deny ownership of the vehicle involved in the mishap but completely denies having
employed the driver Sabiniano or even having authorized the latter to drive his jeep.
 The jeep was virtually stolen from the petitioner’s garage. To hold, therefore, the petitioner liable for the
accident caused by the negligence of Sabiniano who was neither his driver nor employee would be absurd as it
would be like holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an accident caused by the person who stole such
vehicle.
 In this regard, we cannot ignore the many cases of vehicles forcibly taken from their owners at gunpoint or
stolen from garages and parking areas and the instances of service station attendants or mechanics of auto
repair shops using, without the owner’s consent, vehicles entrusted to them for servicing or repair.
 We cannot blindly apply absolute rules based on precedents whose facts do not jibe four square with pending
cases. Every case must be determined on its own peculiar factual circumstances. Where, as in this case, the
records of the petition fail to indicate the slightest indicia of an employeremployee relationship between the
owner and the erring driver or any consent given by the owner for the vehicle’s use, we cannot hold the owner
liable.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision and resolution appealed from are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The decision of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna, 8th Judicial District, Branch 6,
dated July 30, 1981 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Lim vs CA (Vicarious Liability: Kabit System)

Facts:
When a passenger jeepney covered by a certificate of public convenience is sold to another who continues to operate it
under the same certificate of public convenience under the so-called “kabit system,” and in the course thereof the vehicle
meets an accident through the fault of another vehicle, may the new owner sue for damages against the erring vehicle?
Otherwise stated, does the new owner have any legal personality to bring the action, or is he the real party-in-interest in
the suit, despite the fact that he is not the registered owner under the certificate of public convenience?

 private respondent Donato Gonzales purchased an Isuzu passenger jeepney from Gomercino Vallarta, holder of a
certificate of public convenience for the operation of public utility vehicles plying the Monumento-Bulacan route.
 While private respondent Gonzales continued offering the jeepney for public transport services, he did not have
the registration of the vehicle transferred in his name nor did he secure for himself a certificate of public
convenience for its operation, Thus Vallarta remained on record as its registered owner and operator.
 while the jeepney was running northbound along the North Diversion Road somewhere in Meycauayan, Bulacan,
it collided with a ten-wheeler truck owned by petitioner Abelardo Lim and driven by his co-petitioner Esmadito
Gunnaban.
 Gunnaban owned responsibility for the accident, explaining that while he was traveling towards Manila the truck
suddenly lost its brakes. To avoid colliding with another vehicle, he swerved to the left until he reached the center
island.
 However, as the center island eventually came to an end, he veered farther to the left until he smashed into a
Ferroza automobile, and later, into private respondent’s passenger jeepney driven by one Virgilio Gonzales. The
impact caused severe damage to both the Ferroza and the passenger jeepney and left 1 passenger dead and many
others wounded.
 Petitioner Lim shouldered the costs for hospitalization of the wounded, compensated the heirs of the deceased
passenger, and had the Ferroza restored to good condition.
 He also negotiated with private respondent and offered to have the passenger jeepney repaired at his shop.
Private respondent did not accept the offer so Lim offered him P20,000.00, the assessment of the damage as
estimated by his chief mechanic. Again, petitioner Lim’s proposition was rejected; instead, private respondent
demanded a brand-new jeep or the amount of P236,000. Lim increased his bid to P40,000.00 but private
respondent was unyielding.
 negotiations had to be abandoned; hence, the filing of the complaint for damages by private respondent against
petitioners.
 Lim denied liability by contending that he exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of his
employees. He further asserted that as the jeepney was registered in Vallarta’s name, it was Vallarta and not
private respondent who was the real party-in-interest.
 petitioner Gunnaban averred that the accident was a fortuitous event which was beyond his control.
 Trial court upheld private respondent’s claim
o As vendee and current owner of the jeep, priv. respondent stood for all intents and purposes as the real
party
o Gunnaban was found to have caused the accident since he panicked in the face of an emergency
o Petitioner Lim’s liability for Gunnaban’s negligence was premised on his want of diligence in supervising
his employees
o It was admitted during trial that Gunnaban doubled as mechanic of the ill-fated truck despite the fact that
he was neither tutored nor trained to handle such task
 Petitioners Appealed to CA but Ca affirmed
o while an operator under the kabit system could not sue without joining the registered owner of the vehicle
as his principal, equity demanded that the present case be made an exception.
 Hence this petition.

Issue: WoN Donato Gonzales was the real-party in interest despite the fact that he is not the registered owner under the
certificate of public convenience?

Ruling: Yes.
Petitioners contention:
 that the CA erred in sustaining the decision of the trial court despite their opposition to the well-established
doctrine that an operator of a vehicle continues to be its operator as long as he remains the operator of record.
 to recognize an operator under the kabit system as the real party-in-interest and to countenance his claim for
damages is utterly subversive of public policy.

Court:
 Petitioners’ attempt to illustrate that an affirmance of the appealed decision could be supportive of the
pernicious kabit system does not persuade. Their labored efforts to demonstrate how the questioned rulings of
the courts a quo are diametrically opposed to the policy of the law requiring operators of PUVs to secure a
certificate of public convenience for their operation is quite unavailing.

 The kabit system is an arrangement whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of public convenience
allows other persons who own motor vehicles to operate them under his license, sometimes for a fee or
percentage of the earnings.
 Although the parties to such an agreement are not outrightly penalized by law, the kabit system is invariably
recognized as being contrary to public policy and void and inexistent under Art 1409 of the NCC.

 Dizon v. Octavio, the Court explained that one of the primary factors considered in the granting of a certificate of
public convenience for the business of public transportation is the financial capacity of the holder of the license,
so that liabilities arising from accidents may be duly compensated.
 The kabit system renders illusory such purpose and, worse, may still be availed of by the grantee to escape civil
liability caused by a negligent use of a vehicle owned by another and operated under his license. If a registered
owner is allowed to escape liability by proving who the supposed owner of the vehicle is, it would be easy for him
to transfer the subject vehicle to another who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the
damage done.
 Thus, for the safety of passengers and the public who may have been wronged and deceived through the baneful
kabit system, the registered owner of the vehicle is not allowed to prove that another person has become the
owner so that he may be thereby relieved of responsibility.
 It would seem then that the thrust of the law in enjoining the kabit system is not so much as to penalize the parties
but to identify the person upon whom responsibility may be fixed in case of an accident with the end view of
protecting the riding public. The policy, therefore, loses its force if the public at large is not deceived, much less
involved.

Application:

 In the present case it is at once apparent that the evil sought to be prevented in enjoining the kabit system does
not exist.
o First, neither of the parties to the pernicious kabit system is being held liable for damages.
o Second, the case arose from the negligence of another vehicle in using the public road to whom no
representation, or misrepresentation, as regards the ownership and operation of the passenger jeepney
was made and to whom no such representation, or misrepresentation, was necessary. Thus it cannot be
said that private respondent Gonzales and the registered owner of the jeepney were in estoppel for
leading the public to believe that the jeepney belonged to the registered owner.
o Third, the riding public was not bothered nor inconvenienced at the very least by the illegal arrangement.
 On the contrary, it was private respondent himself who had been wronged and was seeking compensation for the
damage done to him. Certainly, it would be the height of inequity to deny him his right.
 it is evident that private respondent has the right to proceed against petitioners for the damage caused on his
passenger jeepney as well as on his business.
Other court rulings:
 In awarding damages for tortuous injury, it becomes the sole design of the courts to provide for adequate
compensation by putting the plaintiff in the same financial position he was in prior to the tort. It is a fundamental
principle in the law on damages that a defendant cannot be held liable in damages for more than the actual loss
which he has inflicted and that a plaintiff is entitled to no more than the just and adequate compensation for the
injury suffered. His recovery is, in the absence of circumstances giving rise to an allowance of punitive damages,
limited to a fair compensation for the harm done.

 indemnification for damages is not limited to damnum emergens or actual loss but extends to lucrum cessans or
the amount of profit lost.

 We have observed that private respondent left his passenger jeepney by the roadside at the mercy of the
elements. Article 2203 of the Civil Code exhorts parties suffering from loss or injury to exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question. One who is injured
then by the wrongful or negligent act of another should exercise reasonable care and diligence to minimize the
resulting damage. Anyway, he can recover from the wrongdoer money lost in reasonable efforts to preserve the
property injured and for injuries incurred in attempting to prevent damage to it.
o However, we sadly note that in the present case petitioners failed to offer in evidence the estimated
amount of the damage caused by private respondent’s unconcern towards the damaged vehicle. It is the
burden of petitioners to show satisfactorily not only that the injured party could have mitigated his
damages but also the amount thereof; failing in this regard, the amount of damages awarded cannot be
proportionately reduced.

WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision awarding private respondent Donato Gonzales P236,000.00 with legal interest from
22 July 1990 as compensatory damages and P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees is MODIFIED

Merrit v. Government (The State)

G.R. No. L-11154, March 21, 1916
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff
for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause
FACTS:
 plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour.
 Upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets:
 The General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing
the center thereof turned suddenly and unexpectedly without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which
movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post place
there.
 By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby:
o He was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region.
o The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain was
had suffered material injury.
o At ten o'clock of the night in question, which was the time set for performing the operation, his pulse was
so weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was little hope that he would live.
o His right leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to the outer skin in such manner that it
might be regarded as double and the would be exposed to infection, for which reason it was of the most
serious nature.
  At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby noticed that the plaintiff's leg showed a
contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the
fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves.
 The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition.
 This latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor, especially when
he attempted to use his money for mathematical calculations.
 According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses,
o the plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to the accident was excellent.
o And after having received the injuries that have been discussed, his physical condition had undergone a
noticeable depreciation,
 for he had lost the agility, energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident
as one of the best constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the
income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency.
o As a contractor, he could no longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach the
highest parts of the building.
 As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor, he had to dissolved
the partnership he had formed with the engineer.

ISSUE: whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages caused by its agent or employee?
RULING:
 No, the government is not liable.
 The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the federal and state governments of the
United States" the decisions of the high courts of that country may be used in determining the scope and purpose
of a special statute.
 The state not being liable to suit except by its express consent, an Act abrogating that immunity will be strictly
construed.
 An act permitting a suit against the state gives rise to no liability not previously existing unless it is clearly
expressed in the act.
 The Government of the Philippine Islands its only liable for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees
when they are acting as special agents within.
 The meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code, and a chauffeur of the General Hospital is not such
a special agent.

 the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a
special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of
the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
 This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on
his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which
are regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the
Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has
sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient
funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
PHIL NATIONAL RAILWAY vs IAC
PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Melo, J.
FACTS:
 The Philippine National Railways, purely government owned, regularly passes along the intersection of Barrio
Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan, in going to San Fernando, La Union from Manila.
 The plaintiff was passing thru the town of Calumpit Bulacan, temporarily while the bridge at Hagonoy, Bulacan
was under construction.
 On August 10, 1974, at about 1:30 PM, Passenger train No. 73 hit and bumped the right mid portion of the
plaintiff’s passenger bus No. 1066, while the rear portion of the bus was at the railroad track and its direction was
towards Hagonoy, Bulacan.
 The Baliuag Transit Bus No. 1066 was driven by Romeo Hughes.
 Honorio Cirbado was the locomotive engineer of PNR.
 During the collision, there was a slight rainfall in the vicinity of the scene of the accident.
 Plaintiff alleges that the collision was due to the negligence and imprudence of PNR and Cirbado who operated its
passenger train in a busy intersection without any bars, semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman to warn
the public of approaching train that would pass through the crossing.
 The bus was damaged.
 18 of its passengers died.
 More than 53 passengers suffered physical injuries.
ISSUE: Is PNR immune from suit?
RULING: NO
 The correct rule is that “not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune from
suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized.” (Nat.
Airports Corp. vs. Teodoro and Phil. Airlines, Inc., 91 Phil. 203, 206; Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 285; Harry
Lyons, Inc. vs. USA, 104 Phil. 593).
o ‘Suits against State agencies with respect to matters in which they have assumed to act in a private or
nongovernmental capacity are not suits against the State’ (81 C.J.S. 1319).
o ‘Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in a private or
nongovernmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the State for public
purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than
functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the State.
o ‘The latter is true, although the State may own the stock or property of such a corporation, for by engaging
in business operations through a corporation the State divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and
by implicating consents to suits against the corporation.’
 The point is that when the government enters into a commercial business it abandons its sovereign capacity and
is to be treated like any other private corporation (Bank of the U.S. vs. Planters’ Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 6 L. ed. 244,
cited in Manila Hotel Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel Company, et al., 73 Phil. 374, 388).
 APPLICATION: It would be unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged negligence of the PNR employees could
not sue the PNR for damages. Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject to the obligations of persons
engaged in that private enterprise. It is not performing any governmental function.
 ADDITIONAL RULING: The bone of contention for exculpation is premised on the familiar maxim in political law
that the State, by virtue of its sovereign nature and as reaffirmed by constitutional precept, is insulated from
suits without its consent (Article 16, Section 3, 1987 Constitution). However, equally conceded is the legal
proposition that the acquiescence of the State to be sued can be manifested expressly through a general or
special law, or indicated implicitly, as when the State commences litigation for the purpose of asserting an
affirmative relief or when it enters into a contract (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1991 edition, page 33; Sinco,
Philippine Political Law, Eleventh Edition, 1962, page 34). When the State participates in a covenant, it is deemed
to have descended from its superior position to the level of an ordinary citizen and thus virtually opens itself to
judicial process. Of course, We realize that this Court qualified this form of consent only to those contracts
concluded in a proprietary capacity and therefore immunity will attach for those contracts entered into in a
governmental capacity, following the ruling in the 1985 case of United States of America vs. Ruiz (136 SCRA 487
[1985]; cited by Cruz, supra at page 36­37). But the restrictive interpretation laid down therein is of no practical
 worth nor can it give rise to herein petitioner PNR’s exoneration since the case of Malong vs. Philippine National
Railways (138 SCRA 63 [1985]); 3 Padilla, 1987 Constitution with Comments and Cases, 1991 edition, page 644),
decided three months after Ruiz was promulgated, was categorical enough to specify that the Philippine National
Railways “is not performing any governmental function” (supra, at page 68).
ISSUE: Was the train engineer negligent?
RULING: YES
 It was demonstrated beyond cavil in the course of the pre-trial hearings held for the purpose of stipulating on
crucial facts that the bus was hit on the rear portion thereof after it crossed the railroad tracks. Then, too the train
engineer was frank enough to say that he saw the jeep maneuvering into a parking area near the crossing which
caused the obstruction in the flow of traffic such that the gravel and sand truck including the bus of herein private
respondent were not able to move forward or to take the opposite lane due to other vehicles. The unmindful
demeanor of the train engineer in surging forward despite the obstruction before him is definitely anathema to
the conduct of a prudent person placed under the same set of perceived danger.
 Likewise, it was established that the weather condition was characterized with intermittent rain which should
have prompted the train engineer to exercise extra precaution. Also, the train reached Calumpit, Bulacan ahead
of scheduled arrival thereat, indicating that the train was travelling more than the normal speed of 30 kilometers
per hour. If the train were really running at 30 kilometers per hour when it was approaching the intersection, it
would probably not have travelled 190 meters more from the place of the accident (page 10, Brief for Petitioners).
 APPLICATION: All of these factors, taken collectively, engendered the concrete and yes, correct conclusion that
the train engineer was negligent who, moreover, despite the last opportunity within his hands vis-a-vis the
weather condition including the presence of people near the intersection, could have obviated the impending
collision had he slackened his speed and applied the brakes (Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 [1918]). withal, these
considerations were addressed to the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, was in a better position to
assign weight on factual questions.
 Having resolved the question of negligence between the train engineer and the bus driver after collating the mass
of evidence, the conclusion reached thereafter thus commands great respect especially so in this case where
respondent court gave its nod of approval to the findings of the court of origin (Co vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA
198; 206 [1991]); Amigo vs. Teves, 50 O.G. 5799; Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Fifth edition, page 353).
 What exacerbates against petitioners’ contention is the authority in this jurisdiction to the effect that the failure
of a railroad company to install a semaphore or at the very least, to post a flagman or watchman to warn the
public of the passing train amounts to negligence (Lilius vs. Manila Railroad Company, 59 Phil. 758 [1934]).
RE NEGLIGENCE OF THE BUS DRIVER
 It was shown by plaintiff that the bus driver Romeo Hughes took the necessary precautions in traversing the track.
 Contributory negligence may not be ascribed to the bus driver; it was evident that he had taken the necessary
precautions before passing over the railway track; if the bus was hit, it was for reasons beyond the control of the
bus driver because he had no place to go; there were vehicles to his left which prevented him in swerving towards
that direction; his bus stalled in view of the obstructions in his front where a sand and gravel truck stopped
because of a jeep maneuvering into a garage up front. All the wheels at the bus have already passed the rail
portion of the track and only the rear portion of the bus’ body occupied or covered the railtrack. This was evident
because the part of the bus hit by the train was the rear since the bus fell on a nearby ditch. Otherwise, if the bus
was really hit in mid-body, the bus could have been halved into two because of the force of the impact.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of respondent court AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
JANUARY 19 ( From Local Government Units to Professional (Malpractice)

FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO vs.

CITY OF DAGUPAN, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

In a civil action 1 for recovery of damages filed by the petitioner Florentina A. Guilatco, the following judgment was
rendered against the respondent City of Dagupan:

xxx

(1) Ordering defendant City of Dagupan to pay plaintiff actual damages in the amount of P 15,924 (namely P8,054.00 as
hospital, medical and other expenses [Exhs. H to H-60], P 7,420.00 as lost income for one (1) year [Exh. F] and P 450.00 as
bonus). P 150,000.00 as moral damages, P 50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P 3,000.00 as attorney's fees, and
litigation expenses, plus costs and to appropriate through its Sangguniang Panglunsod (City Council) said amounts for said
purpose;

(2) Dismissing plaintiffs complaint as against defendant City Engr. Alfredo G. Tangco; and

(3) Dismissing the counterclaims of defendant City of Dagupan and defendant City Engr. Alfredo G. Tangco, for lack of
merit.

FACTS:

• On July 25, 1978,Guilatico, (a Court Interpreter of Branch III, CFI--Dagupan City), while she was about to board a
motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under the control and supervision of the City of
Dagupan) accidentally fell into a manhole located on said sidewalk, thereby causing her right leg to be fractured.

• As a result thereof, she had to be hospitalized, operated on, confined, for a period of 16 days at first at the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital. (from July 25 to August 3, 1978).

• She also incurred hospitalization, medication and other expenses to the tune of P 8,053.65 or a total of P 10,000.00 in
all, as other receipts were either lost or misplaced;

• During the period of her confinement in said two hospitals, plaintiff suffered severe or excruciating pain not only on her
right leg which was fractured but also on all parts of her body; the pain has persisted even after her discharge from the
Medical City General Hospital on October 9, 1978, to the present.

• Despite her discharge from the Hospital plaintiff is presently still wearing crutches and the Court has actually observed
that she has difficulty in locomotion.

• From the time of the mishap on July 25, 1978 up to the present, plaintiff has not yet reported for duty as court
interpreter, as she has difficulty of locomotion in going up the stairs of her office, located near the city hall in Dagupan
City.

• She earns at least P 720.00 a month consisting of her monthly salary and other means of income, but since July 25, 1978
up to the present she has been deprived of said income as she has already consumed her accrued leaves in the
government service. She has lost several pounds as a result of the accident and she is no longer her former jovial self,
she has been unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities which she used to do prior to the incident.
• Dr. Norberto Felix and Dr. Dominado Manzano of the Provincial Hospital, as well as Dr. Antonio Sison of the Medical City
General Hospital in Mandaluyong Rizal have confirmed beyond shadow of any doubt the extent of the fracture and
injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the mishap.

• On the other hand, Patrolman Claveria, De Asis and Cerezo corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff regarding the
mishap and they have confirmed the existence of the manhole on the sidewalk along Perez Blvd., at the time of the
incident on July 25, 1978 which was partially covered by a concrete flower pot by leaving gaping hole about 2 ft. long by
1 1/2 feet wide or 42 cms. wide by 75 cms. long by 150 cms. deep.

• Defendant Alfredo Tangco, City Engineer of Dagupan City and admittedly ex-officio Highway Engineer, City Engineer of
the Public Works and Building Official for Dagupan City, admitted the existence of said manhole along the sidewalk in
Perez Blvd., admittedly a National Road in front of the Luzon Colleges.

• He also admitted that said manhole (there are at least 11 in all in Perez Blvd.) is owned by the National Government and
the sidewalk on which they are found along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the National Government. But as City Engineer
of Dagupan City, he supervises the maintenance of said manholes or drainage system and sees to it that they are
properly covered, and the job is specifically done by his subordinates, Mr. Santiago de Vera (Maintenance Foreman) and
Engr. Ernesto Solermo also a maintenance Engineer.

• In his answer defendant Tangco expressly admitted that in his capacity as ex-officio Highway Engineer for Dagupan City
he exercises supervision and control over National roads, including the Perez Blvd. where the incident happened.

• On appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan, the appellate court reversed the lower court findings on the ground that
no evidence was presented by the plaintiff- appellee to prove that the City of Dagupan had "control or supervision" over
Perez Boulevard.

• The city contends that Perez Boulevard, where the fatal drainage hole is located, is a national road that is not under the
control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city. It submits that it is actually
the Ministry of Public Highways that has control or supervision through the Highway Engineer which, by mere
coincidence, is held concurrently by the same person who is also the City Engineer of Dagupan.

• After examination of the findings and conclusions of the trial court and those of the appellate court, as well as the
arguments presented by the parties, we agree with those of the trial court and of the petitioner.

• Hence, we grant the petition.

(In this review on certiorari)

ISSUE: Whether or not control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city
to answer for damages in accordance with article 2189 of the Civil Code.

YES. City of Dagupan is Liable.

• The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition
of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows:

Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other
public works under their control or supervision.
• It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to
attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.

• In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City
Engineer. Who has the following duties:

Sec. 22. The City Engineer--His powers, duties and compensation-There shall be a city engineer,
who shall be in charge of the department of Engineering and Public Works. He shall receive a salary of not exceeding three
thousand pesos per annum. He shall have the following duties:

xxx

(j) He shall have the care and custody of the public system of waterworks and sewers, and all sources of water supply, and
shall control, maintain and regulate the use of the same, in accordance with the ordinance relating thereto; shall inspect
and regulate the use of all private systems for supplying water to the city and its inhabitants, and all private sewers, and
their connection with the public sewer system.

xxx

• The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out, construction and improvement of streets, avenues and
alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board .

• Thus the charter clearly indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open
drainage hole is located.

• The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injuries sustained by persons or
property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of the charter, can not be used to exempt the
city, as in the case at bar.

• The charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability of the city. On the other hand article 2189 applies in
particular to the liability arising from "defective streets, public buildings and other public works."

• The City Engineer, Mr. Alfredo G. Tangco, admits that he exercises control or supervision over the said road. But the city
can not be excused from liability by the argument that the duty of the City Engineer to supervise or control the said
provincial road belongs more to his functions as an ex-officio Highway Engineer of the Ministry of Public Highway than
as a city officer. This is because while he is entitled to an honorarium from the Ministry of Public Highways, his salary
from the city government substantially exceeds the honorarium.We do not agree.

• Alfredo G. Tangco "(i)n his official capacity as City Engineer of Dagupan, as Ex- Officio Highway Engineer, as Ex-Officio
City Engineer of the Bureau of Public Works, and, last but not the least, as Building Official for Dagupan City, receives
the following monthly compensation: P 1,810.66 from Dagupan City; P 200.00 from the Ministry of Public Highways; P
100.00 from the Bureau of Public Works and P 500.00 by virtue of P.D. 1096, respectively." This function of supervision
over streets, public buildings, and other public works pertaining to the City Engineer is coursed through a Maintenance
Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer.Although these last two officials are employees of the National Government, they
are detailed with the City of Dagupan and hence receive instruction and supervision from the city through the City
Engineer.

• There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision over the public works in question.
Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner under article 2198 of the Civil Code is clear.
• Be all that as it may, the actual damages awarded to the petitioner in the amount of P 10,000.00 should be reduced to
the proven expenses of P 8,053.65 only. The trial court should not have rounded off the amount. In determining actual
damages, the court can not rely on "speculation, conjecture or guess work" as to the amount. Without the actual proof
of loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous.

• On the other hand, moral damages may be awarded even without proof of pecuniary loss, inasmuch as the
determination of the amount is discretionary on the court.Though incapable of pecuniary estimation, moral damages
are in the nature of an award to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered but which for some reason can not
be proven. However, in awarding moral damages, the following should be taken into consideration:

(1) First, the proximate cause of the injury must be the claimee's acts.

(2) Second, there must be compensatory or actual damages as satisfactory proof of the factual basis for damages.

(3) Third, the award of moral damages must be predicated on any of the cases enumerated in the Civil Code.

APPLICATION:

• In the case at bar, the physical suffering and mental anguish suffered by the petitioner were proven. Witnesses from the
petitioner's place of work testified to the degeneration in her disposition-from being jovial to depressed. She refrained
from attending social and civic activities.

• Nevertheless the award of moral damages at P 150,000.00 is excessive. Her handicap was not permanent and disabled
her only during her treatment which lasted for one year. Though evidence of moral loss and anguish existed to warrant
the award of damages, the moderating hand of the law is called for. The Court has time and again called attention to
the reprehensible propensity of trial judges to award damages without basis, resulting in exhorbitant amounts.

Although the assessment of the amount is better left to the discretion of the trial court under preceding jurisprudence,
the amount of moral damages should be reduced to P 20,000.00.

• As for the award of exemplary damages, the trial court correctly pointed out the basis:

• To serve as an example for the public good, it is high time that the Court, through this case, should serve warning to the
city or cities concerned to be more conscious of their duty and responsibility to their constituents, especially when they
are engaged in construction work or when there are manholes on their sidewalks or streets which are uncovered, to
immediately cover the same, in order to minimize or prevent accidents to the poor pedestrians.

• Too often in the zeal to put up "public impact" projects such as beautification drives, the end is more important than
the manner in which the work is carried out. Because of this obsession for showing off, such trivial details as misplaced
flower pots betray the careless execution of the projects, causing public inconvenience and inviting accidents.

• Pending appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan from the trial court to the appellate court, the petitioner was able
to secure an order for garnishment of the funds of the City deposited with the Philippine National Bank, from the then
presiding judge, Hon. Willelmo Fortun. This order for garnishment was revoked subsequently by the succeeding
presiding judge, Hon. Romeo D. Magat, and became the basis for the petitioner's motion for reconsideration which was
also denied.

• We rule that the execution of the judgment of the trial court pending appeal was premature. We do not find any good
reason to justify the issuance of an order of execution even before the expiration of the time to appeal .
DISPOSITIVE: the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial court, dated March 12, 1979 and amended on March 13, 1979, is
hereby REINSTATED with the indicated modifications as regards the amounts awarded:

(1) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan to pay the plaintiff actual damages in the amount of P 15,924 (namely P
8,054.00 as hospital, medical and other expenses; P 7,420.00 as lost income for one (1) year and P 450.00 as
bonus); P 20,000.00 as moral damages and P 10,000.00 as exemplary damages.The attorney's fees of P 3,000.00
remain the same.SO ORDERED.

Quezon City VS Dacara

Facts:

 Sometime on February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M., Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and
owner of 87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St.,
Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. As a result, Dacarra (sic), Jr. allegedly
sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.
 Indemnification was sought from the city government ,which however, yielded negative results.
 Consequently, Fulgencio P. Dacara (hereinafter referred to as FULGENCIO), for and in behalf of his minor son, Jr.,
filed a Complaint for damages against the Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon, as defendants,
 .FULGENCIO prayed that the amount of not less than P20,000.00 actual or compensatory damages, P150,000.00
moral damages, P30,000.00 exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 attorneys fees and costs of the suit be awarded
to him.
 In an Answer with Affirmative and/or Special Defenses ,defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident but
alleged that the subject diggings was provided with a moun[d] of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic
paint with sticks placed before or after it which was visible during the incident on February 28, 1988 at 1:00 A.M.
 In short, defendants claimed that they exercised due care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary
measures to avoid accident. Hence, the reason why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings was precisely
because of the latters negligence and failure to exercise due care
 After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) according to the RTC the evidence proffered by the
complainant (herein respondent) was found to be sufficient proof of the negligence of herein petitioners. Under
Article 2189 of the Civil Code.
 The CA agreed with the RTCs finding that petitioners negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered
by respondent
 Hence this petition

ISSUE: Whether or not Engr Ramir Thompson and the Quezon City Government be held liable for damages due to the
injuries suffered by Dacara Jr.
RULING: Yes
 Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise.
 Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common
sense, policy and precedent.
 What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is a factual issue that this Court cannot pass upon, absent any
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment by the lower courts or an ample showing that they lacked any basis
for their conclusions.
 The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that petitioners negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident bars us from supplanting their findings and substituting these with our own.
 The function of this Court is limited to the review of the appellate courts alleged errors of law.
  It is not required to weigh all over again the factual evidence already considered in the proceedings below.
Petitioners have not shown that they are entitled to an exception to this rule.
 They have not sufficiently demonstrated any special circumstances to justify a factual review.
 That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the accident was aptly discussed in the lower courts
finding, which we quote:
o Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February 28, 1988 which caused almost
the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth
from a digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized
barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an adequate warning to motorist especially during
the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive.
o Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs, gasera which was buried
so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress the
point that sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed at Matahimik Street. If indeed signs
were placed thereat, how then could it be explained that according to the report even of the policeman
which for clarity is quoted again, none was found at the scene of the accident.
o Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a particular set of events is transfixed by the
attending circumstances so that the greater the danger known or reasonably anticipated, the greater is
the degree of care required to be observed.
o The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government
relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the
same. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision found in the subject-article is
tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City government liable. Harsh application of the law
ensues as a result thereof but the state assumed the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of
the roads and bridges and neither exception nor exculpation from liability would deem just and
equitable
 Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts findings, which are amply substantiated by the evidence on record,
clearly point to petitioners negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by respondents car. No
adequate reason has been given to overturn this factual conclusion.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED,
with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is DELETED. No costs.

NOTES:
On Moral Damages:
 To award moral damages, a court must be satisfied with proof of the following requisites:
1. an injury -- whether physical, mental, or psychological -- clearly sustained by the claimant;
2. a culpable act or omission factually established;
3. a wrongful act or omission of the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and
4. the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219
 Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury unjustly inflicted on a person.
 Intended for the restoration of the psychological or emotional status quo ante, the award of moral damages is
designed to compensate emotional injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
 For the court to arrive upon a judicious approximation of emotional or moral injury, competent and substantial
proof of the suffering experienced must be laid before it. Essential to this approximation are definite findings as
to what the supposed moral damages suffered consisted of; otherwise, such damages would become a penalty
rather than a compensation for actual injury suffered.
 Furthermore, well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be awarded -- whether in a civil or a criminal
case-- in the absence of proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or similar injury.
  The award of moral damages must be solidly anchored on a definite showing that respondent actually experienced
emotional and mental sufferings. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and
convincing proof.
On Exemplary Damages:
 Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction
for the public good.
 The award of these damages is meant to be a deterrent to socially deleterious actions.
 Public policy requires such imposition to suppress wanton acts of an offender. It must be emphasized that local
governments and their employees should be responsible not only for the maintenance of roads and streets, but
also for the safety of the public. Thus, they must secure construction areas with adequate precautionary
measures.
 Not only is the work of petitioners impressed with public interest; their very existence is justified only by public
service. Hence, local governments have the paramount responsibility of keeping the interests of the public
foremost in their agenda.
 For these reasons, it is most disturbing to note that the present petitioners are the very parties responsible for
endangering the public through such a rash and reckless act.

JOINT TORTFEASORS
1. WORCESTER vs OCAMPO et al.
Johnson, J.
NATURE: APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Jenkins, J.
FACTS:
 Plaintiff Dean Worcester is a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior in
the Government of the Philippines.
 Defendants Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G.
Liquete, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel José, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit
were the owners, directors, writers (redactores), editors (editores) and administrators of a certain daily
newspaper known as 'El Renacimiento' and 'Muling Pagsilang,'.
 Published and circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog languages in the city of Manila
 Circulated throughout the Philippine Islands.
 For a long time, defendants have been maliciously persecuting and attacking the plaintiff in said newspaper.
 They attacked the honesty and reviled the fame of the plaintiff, not only as a private person but also as an official
of the Government of the Philippine Islands
 The editorial “Birds of Prey” was alleged to have incited the Filipino people into believing that the plaintiff was a
vile despot and a corrupt person, unworthy of the position which he held.
 The said editorial alluded to him as an eagle that surprises and devours, a vulture that gorges himself on
dead and rotten meat, an owl that affects a petulant omniscience, and a vampire that sucks the blood of
the victim until he leaves it bloodless.
 Said defamation and libel were published by the defendants under a heading in large and showy type, and
every effort made by said defendants to see that said defamation and libel should attract the attention of
the public and be read by all the subscribers to said newspaper and the readers of the same.
 Worcester filed an action against defendants for the purpose of recovering damages resulting from an alleged
libellous publication.
 Worcester alleges that he has been damaged and is entitled to an indemnity for the additional work to which he
has been put, by the said defendants, in the compliance of his duties, both in the past and the future, as well as
for the injuries to his reputation and feelings, in the sum of P50,000, and besides this said amount he is entitled
to collect from the defendants the additional sum P50,000 in the way of punitive damages, as a warning to the
defendants.
  The judge of the CFI rendered judgment in favour of the petitioner, holding all defendants (except for Reyes,
Aguilar and Liquete who were found to be editors but in a subordinate position and found to have merely acted
under the direction of their seperiors) liable jointly and severally for sustained damages on account of petitioner’s
wounded feelings and mental suffering and injuries to his standing and reputation in the sum of P35,000 as well
as P25, 000 as punitive damages.
 Defendants appealed to the SC claiming that the CFI committed an error in rendering a judgment jointly and
severally against the defendants.
MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not defendants may be held jointly and severally liable as joint tort feasor.
RULING: YES
 The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that the basis of the present action
is a tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is not only individually liable for
the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors.
 The defendants might have been sued separately for the commission of the tort. They might have been
sued jointly and severally, as they were. (Nicoll vs. Glennie, 1 M. & S. (English Common Law Reports), 588.)
 If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured, has his election to sue all or some
of the parties jointly, or one of them separately, because the tort is in its nature a separate act of each
individual. (1 Chiddey, Common Law Pleadings, 86,) It is not necessary that the cooperation should be a
direct, corporeal act, for, to give an example, in a case of assault and battery committed by various
persons, under the common law all are principals. So also is the person who counsels, aids or assists in
any way the commission of a wrong. Under the common law, he who aided or assisted or counseled, in
any way, the commission of a crime, was as much a principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual
tort. (Page vs. Freeman, 19 Mo., 421.)
 Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The person injured may sue all
of them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damage caused by all, and all together are liable
for the whole damage. It is not defense, for one sued alone, that the others, who participated in the "wrongful
act, are not joint with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was
insignificant as compared with that of the others. (Forebrother vs. Ansley, 1 Campbell (Eng.), 343; Pitcher vs. Bailey,
8 East 171; Booth vs. Hodgson, 6 Term Reps., 405; Vose vs. Grant, 15 Mass., 505; Acheson vs. Miller, 18 Ohio, 1;
Wallace vs. Miller, 15 La. Ann., 449; Murphy vs. Wilson, 44 Mo., 313; Bishop vs. Ealey, 9 Johnson (N. Y.), 294.)
 Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be apportioned among them, except by themselves.
They can not insist upon apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and
severally liable for the whole amount. (Pardridge vs. Brady, 7 111. App., 639; Carney vs. Read, 11 Ind., 417; Lee vs.
Black, 27 Ark., 337; Bevins vs. McElroy, 52 Am. Dec., 258.)
 A payment in full, by one of the joint tort feasors, of all the damage done, satisfies any claim which may exist
against the others. There can be but one satisfaction. The release of one of the joint tort feasors, by agreement,
generally operates to discharge all. (Wright vs. Lathrop, 2 Ohio, 33; Livingston vs. Bishop, 1 Johnson (N. Y.), 290;
Brown vs. Marsh, 7 Vt., 327; Ayer vs. Ashmead, 31 Conn., 447; Eastman vs. Grant, 34 Vt, 387; Turner vs. Hitchcock,
20 lowa, 310; Ellis vs. Esson, 50 Wis., 149.)
 As a general rule, the term "joint tort feasors" includes all persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage,
advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it, after it is done, if
done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they
had performed the wrongful act themselves. (Cooley on Torts, 133; Moir vs. Hopkins, 16 111., 313; 63 Am. Dec.,
312, and note; Berry vs. Fletch, 1 Dill. (C. C. Reps.), 67; Smithwick vs. Ward, 7 Jones L. (N. C.), 64; Smith vs. Felt, 6
Barb. (N. Y.), 612; Shepard vs. McQuilkin, 2 W. Va., 90; Lewis vs. Johns., 34 Cal., 369.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the damages for wounded feelings, mental suffering and injuries was correct.
RULING: YES, but the amount should be modified.
 The amount of damages resulting from a libelous publication to a man's good name and reputation is difficult of
ascertainment. It is not difficult to realize that the damage thus done is great and almost immeasurable. The
 specific amount of damages to be awarded must depend upon the facts in each case and the sound discretion
of the court. No fixed or precise rules can be laid down governing the amount of damages in cases of libel. It is
difficult to include all of the facts and conditions which enter into the measure of such damages. A man's good
name and reputation are worth more to him than all the wealth which he can accumulate during a lifetime of
industrious labor. To have them destroyed may be eminently of more damage to him personally than the
destruction of his physical wealth. The loss is immeasurable. No amount of money can compensate him f or his
loss. Notwithstanding the great loss which he, from his standpoint, sustains, the courts must have some tangible
basis upon which to estimate such damages.
 (Hon. James C. Jenkins) The enjoyment of a private reputation is as much a constitutional right as the possession
of life, liberty or property. It is one of those rights necessary to human society that underlie the whole scheme of
civilization.
 The law recognizes the value of such reputation and imposes upon him who attacks it, by slanderous
words or libelous publication, the liability to make full compensation for the damage done.
 The law goes further. If the words are spoken or the publication is made with the intent to injure the
victim or with criminal indifference to civil obligation, it imposes such damages as the jury, in view of all
the circumstances of the particular case, adjudge that the wrongdoer ought to pay as an example to the
public and to deter others from doing likewise, and for punishment for the infliction of the injury.
 After a careful examination, we are of the opinion that that part of the judgment of the lower court relating to
the damages suffered by the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, should be modified, and that a judgment should be
rendered in favor of Mr. Dean C. Worcester and against the defendants, jointly and severally, for the sum of
P15,000, with interest at 6 per cent from the 23d of January, 1909.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in granting punitive damages to the plaintiff and damages for wounded
feelings, mental suffering and injuries.
RULING: YES
 After a careful examination of the evidence, and in view of all of the facts and circumstances and the malice
connected with the publication of said editorial and the subsequent publications with relation to said editorial,
that the lower court, by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 277 of the Philippine Commission, was justified in
imposing punitive damages upon the defendants.
 Exemplary damages for libel may be recovered in civil actions if the defendant or defendants were actuated by
malice. Section 11 of Act No. 277 allows the court, in an action for libel, to render judgment for punitive damages
in an amount which the court thinks will be a just punishment to the libeler and an example to others.
 In the present case there was not the slightest effort on the part of the defendants to show the existence of
probable cause or foundation whatever for the facts contained in said editorial. Malice, hatred, and ill will against
the plaintiff are seen throughout the record. The said editorial not only attempted to paint the plaintiff as a villain,
but upon every occasion, the defendants resorted to ridicule of the severest kind.
 Taking into consideration the fact that some of the defendants have been prosecuted criminally and have been
sentenced, and considering that fact as a part of the punitive damages, we have arrived at the conclusion that the
judgment of the lower court should be modified, and that a judgment should be rendered against the defendants,
jointly and severally, and in favor of the plaintiff, the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, in the sum of P10,000, as
punitive damages, with interest at 6 per cent from the 23d day of January, 1909.
DISPOSITIVE: Judgment modified. Ocampo, Kalaw, Palma, Arellano, Jose, Lichauco, Barretto, and Cansipit held jointly and
severally liable for the sum of P25,000 with interest at 6%. Santos absolved from any liability.
NOTES:
RELLANO, C.J. and MAPA, J. (Concurring)
 We concur, except with reference to the liability imposed upon Galo Lichauco. The real owner and founder,
Ocampo, explicitly stated that the other so-called founders subscribed and paid sums of money to aid the paper
but as to Lichauco, he offered to contribute, but did not carry out his offer and in fact paid nothing.
  It is incomprehensible how one could claim the right or title to share the earnings or profits of a company when
he had put no capital into it, neither is it comprehensible how one could share the losses thereof, and still less
incur liability for damages on account of some act of the said company, an unrestricted liability to the extent of
all his property, as though he were a regular general partner when he was not such.
TORRES (Dissenting)
 I concur in regard to the defendants Ocampo and Kalaw, but dissent as regardd to Palma, Arellano, Jose, Lichauco,
Barretto, and Cansipit for they had neither direct nor indirect participation in the act that give rise to the present
suit for damages, nor were they owners or proprietors of the newspaper, its press or other equipment. They were
donors who merely contributed a sum of money, as a genuine gift, for the purpose of founding, editing, and issuing
the said newspaper, it is improper to deduce that the contributors formed a company of either a civil or
commercial nature.
 After Ocampo had accepted the various amounts proffered, the donors ceased to be the owners of and
surrendered all right to the money donated and to the objects that were acquired therewith. Therefor they cannot
incur, jointly and severally with the director and manager.

LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC., vs. GLODEL BROKERAGE CORPORATION and R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION,
(JOINT TORTFEASORS)
G.R. No. 179446. January 10, 2011
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the August 24, 2007
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82822, entitled R&B Insurance Corporation v. Glodel
Brokerage Corporation and Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc., which held petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services,
Inc. (Loadmasters) liable to respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation (Glodel) in the amount of P1,896,789.62
representing the insurance indemnity which R&B Insurance Corporation (R&B Insurance) paid to the insured-consignee,
Columbia Wire and Cable Corporation (Columbia).

FACTS:
 On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in favor of Columbia to insure the
shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes against All Risks.
 On August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped on board the vessel Richard Rey from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier
10, North Harbor, Manila.
o They arrived on the same date.
 Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the
subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants.
 Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes
to Columbias warehouses/plants in Bulacan and ValenzuelaCity.
 The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and
accompanied by its employed truck helpers.
 Six (6) truckloads of copper cathodes were to be delivered to Balagtas, Bulacan, while the other six (6)
truckloads were destined for Lawang Bato, Valenzuela City.
 The cargoes in six truckloads for Lawang Bato were duly delivered in Columbias warehouses there.
 Of the six (6) trucks en route to Balagtas, Bulacan, however, only five (5) reached the destination.
o One (1) truck, loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its cargo.
 Later on, the said truck, an Isuzu with Plate No. NSD-117, was recovered but without the copper cathodes.
  Because of this incident, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount
of P1,903,335.39.
 After the requisite investigation and adjustment, R&B Insurance paid Columbia the amount of P1,896,789.62 as
insurance indemnity.
 R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both Loadmasters and Glodel before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Manila (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 02-103040.
o It sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to Columbia for the loss of the subject cargo.
o It claimed that it had been subrogated to the right of the consignee to recover from the party/parties
who may be held legally liable for the loss.
 On November 19, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision holding Glodel liable for damages for the loss of the subject
cargo and dismissing Loadmasters counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees against R&B Insurance.
 Both R&B Insurance and Glodel appealed the RTC decision to the CA.
 On August 24, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed decision:
o WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED in that the appellee
Loadmasters is likewise held liable to appellant Glodel in the amount of P1,896,789.62 representing the
insurance indemnity appellant Glodel has been held liable to appellant R&B Insurance Corporation.
o Appellant Glodels appeal to absolve it from any liability is herein DISMISSED.
 Hence, Loadmasters filed the present petition for review on certiorari before this Court.

MAIN ISSUE: WON Loadmaster and Glodel are jointly and severally liable?

RULING:
 YES. Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally
liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo.
 Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, “the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
quasidelict is solidary.”
 What then is the extent of the respective liabilities of Loadmasters and Glodel?
 Each wrongdoer is liable for the total damage suffered by R&B Insurance.
 Where there are several causes for the resulting damages, a party is not relieved from liability, even partially.
 It is sufficient that the negligence of a party is an efficient cause without which the damage would not have
resulted.
 It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the damage would not have resulted from his
negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor.
 As stated in the case of Far Eastern Shipping v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 30 (1998), x x x.
o Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which
the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and
recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of
the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the
injured person was not the same.
o No actor’s negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence
of other actors.
 Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the
injury.
 There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for
the total damage.
 Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for
the whole injury.
  Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors
and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: WON Loadmaster should be made answerable for the damages caused by its employees?
RULING:
 YES. It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of Loadmasters whose
 employees (truck driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment.
 As employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable for the damages caused by its employees who acted
within the scope of their assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse.
 Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption
juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo)
or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees.
 To avoid liability for a quasidelict committed by its employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by
presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of his employee.
 In this regard, Loadmasters failed.
ISSUE: WON Loadmasters and Glodel are common carriers in order to determine liability?
RULING:
 YES. At the outset, it is well to resolve the issue of whether Loadmasters and Glodel are common carriers to
determine their liability for the loss of the subject cargo.
 Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged
in the business of carrying or transporting passenger or goods, or both by land, water or air for compensation,
offering their services to the public.
 Based on the aforecited definition, Loadmasters is a common carrier because it is engaged in the business of
transporting goods by land, through its trucking service.
 It is a common carrier as distinguished from a private carrier wherein the carriage is generally undertaken by
special agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for the general public.
 The distinction is significant in the sense that “the rights and obligations of the parties to a contract of private
carriage are governed principally by their stipulations, not by the law on common carriers.”
 In the same vein, Glodel is also considered a Common carrier within the context of Article 1732.
 In its Memorandum, it states that it “is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic
of the Philippines and is engaged in the business of customs brokering.”
 It cannot be considered otherwise because as held by this Court in Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation
v. Transport Venture, Inc., 456 SCRA 557 (2005), a customs broker is also regarded as a common carrier, the
transportation of goods being an integral part of its business.
ISSUE: Whether or not Glodel and Loadmasters are required to exercise extraordinary diligence?
RULING:
 Yes. Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the nature of their business and
for reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported
by them according to all the circumstances of such case, as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code.
 When the Court speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is that extreme measure of care and caution which
persons of unusual prudence and circumspection observe for securing and preserving their own property or
rights.
 This exacting standard imposed on common carriers in a contract of carriage of goods is intended to tilt the
scales in favor of the shipper who is at the mercy of the common carrier once the goods have been lodged for
shipment.
 Thus, in case of loss of the goods, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently.
 This presumption of fault or negligence, however, may be rebutted by proof that the common carrier has
observed extraordinary diligence over the goods.
ISSUE: WON Glodel has a definite cause of acgion against Loadmasters?
RULING:
 YES. Undoubtedly, Glodel has a definite cause of action against Loadmasters for breach of contract of service as
the latter is primarily liable for the loss of the subject cargo.
 In this case, however, it cannot succeed in seeking judicial sanction against Loadmasters because the records
disclose that it did not properly interpose a crossclaim against the latter.
 Glodel did not even pray that Loadmasters be liable for any and all claims that it may be adjudged liable in favor
of R&B Insurance.
 Under the Rules, a compulsory counterclaim, or a crossclaim, not set up shall be barred.
 Thus, a crossclaim cannot be set up for the first time on appeal.
 For the consequence, Glodel has no one to blame but itself.
 The Court cannot come to its aid on equitable grounds.
 “Equity, which has been aptly described as ‘a justice outside legality,’ is applied only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.”
 The Court cannot be a lawyer and take the cudgels for a party who has been at fault or negligent.
ISSUE: WON a principal-agent relationship exists between Glodel and Loadmasters?
RULING:
 No. At this juncture, the Court clarifies that there exists no principal-agent relationship between Glodel and
Loadmasters, as erroneously found by the CA.
 Article 1868 of the Civil Code provides: “By the contract of agency a person binds himself to render some service
or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.”
 The elements of a contract of agency are: (1) consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the
relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as a
representative and not for himself; (4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority.
 Accordingly, there can be no contract of agency between the parties. Loadmasters never represented Glodel.
 Neither was it ever authorized to make such representation.
 It is a settled rule that the basis for agency is representation, that is, the agent acts for and on behalf of the
principal on matters within the scope of his authority and said acts have the same legal effect as if they were
personally executed by the principal.
 On the part of the principal, there must be an actual intention to appoint or an intention naturally inferable from
his words or actions, while on the part of the agent, there must be an intention to accept the appointment and
act on it. Such mutual intent is not obtaining in this case.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The August 24, 2007Decision of the Court of
Appeals is MODIFIED to read as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring petitioner Loadmasters Customs
Services, Inc. and respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation jointly and severally liable to respondent R&B Insurance
Corporation for the insurance indemnity it paid to consignee Columbia Wire & Cable Corporation and ordering both
parties to pay, jointly and severally, R&B Insurance Corporation a] the amount of P1,896,789.62 representing the
insurance indemnity; b] the amount equivalent to ten (10%) percent thereof for attorneys fees; and c] the amount
of P22,427.18 for litigation expenses. The cross-claim belatedly prayed for by respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation
against petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

Mendoza v. Casumpang, G.R. No. 197987, March 19, 2012 Standard of Care

Facts:
 Josephine Casumpang, substituted by her respondent husband Adriano and their children Jennifer Adriane and
John Andre, filed an action for damages against petitioner Dr. Mariter Mendoza in 1993 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Iloilo City
  On February 13, 1993 Josephine underwent hysterectomy and myomectomy that Dr. Mendoza performed on her
at the Iloilo Doctors’ Hospital.
 After her operation, Josephine experienced recurring fever, nausea, and vomiting.
 Three months after the operation, she noticed while taking a bath something protruding from her genital.
 She tried calling Dr. Mendoza to report it but the latter was unavailable.
 Josephine instead went to see another physician, Dr. Edna Jamandre Gumban, who extracted a foul smelling,
partially expelled rolled gauze from her cervix
 The discovery of the gauze and the illness she went through prompted Josephine to file a damage suit against Dr.
Mendoza before the RTC of Iloilo City.
 Because Josephine died before trial could end, her husband and their children substituted her in the case.
 She was a housewife and 40 years old when she died.
 On March 7, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Dr. Mendoza guilty of neglect that caused Josephine’s
illness and eventual death and ordering her to pay plaintiff’s heirs actual damages of P50,000.00, moral damages
of P200,000.00, and attorney’s fees of P20,000.00 plus costs of suit.
 On motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC reversed itself and dismissed the complaint in an order dated
June 23, 2005.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a decision on March 18, 2011,1 reinstating the RTC’s original
decision.
o The CA held that Dr. Mendoza committed a breach of her duty as a physician when a gauze remained in
her patient’s body after surgery.
o The CA denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file the present petition.
 Petitioner claims that no gauze or surgical material was left in Josephine’s body after her surgery as evidenced by
the surgical sponge count in the hospital record.

Issue 1:
Was the petitioner doctor negligent?

Ruling:
 As the RTC pointed out, Josephine did not undergo any other surgical operation. And it would be much unlikely
for her or for any woman to inject a roll of gauze into her cervix. As the Court held in Professional Services, Inc. v
Agana:
o “An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not complete until the sponges are
properly removed, and it is settled that the leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound
after the incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. To put it
simply, such act is considered so inconsistent with due care as to raise an inference of negligence. There
are even legions of authorities to the effect that such act is negligence per se.”

Issue 2:
Should exemplary damages be imposed?

Ruling:
 YES
 The Court notes, however, that neither the CA nor the RTC awarded exemplary damages against Dr. Mendoza
when, under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to moral damages.
 Exemplary damages may also be awarded in cases of gross negligence.
 A surgical operation is the responsibility of the surgeon performing it. He must personally ascertain that the counts
of instruments and materials used before the surgery and prior to sewing the patient up have been correctly done.
 To provide an example to the medical profession and to stress the need for constant vigilance in attending to a
patient’s health, the award of exemplary damages in this case is in order.

Issue:
Should civil indemnity be awarded?

Ruling:
 YES
 Further, in view of Josephine’s death resulting from petitioner’s negligence, civil indemnity under Article 22065 of
the Civil Code should be given to respondents as heirs.
 The amount of P50,000.00 is fixed by prevailing jurisprudence for this kind.

Notes:
 The Court also deems it just and equitable under Article of the Civil Code to increase the award of attorney’s fees
from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Court entirely AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 18, 2011 with the
MODIFICATION ordering petitioner Mariter Mendoza to pay respondents Adriano, Jennifer Adriane and John
Andre, all surnamed Casumpang, an additional P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, additional P30,000.00 as attorney’s
fees and civil indemnity arising from death in the amount of P50,000.00.

Li vs Soliman (Informed Consent)

FACTS

 Respondents’ 11-year old daughter, Angelica Soliman, underwent a biopsy at the St. Luke’s Medical Center
(SLMC).
o Results showed that Angelica was suffering from a cancer of the bone which usually afflicts teenage
children.
o Following this diagnosis and as primary intervention, Angelica’s right leg was amputated by Dr. Jaime
Tamayo in order to remove the tumor.
o To avoid further infection, chemotherapy was suggested by Dr. Tamayo. Dr. Tamayo referred Angelica
to another doctor at SLMC, herein petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist.
 On August 18, 1993, Angelica was admitted to SLMC. However, she died on a few days after her first chemotherapy
session.
o Because SLMC refused to release a death certificate without full payment of their hospital bill,
respondents brought the cadaver of Angelica to the (PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for post-
mortem examination.
o The Medico-Legal Report issued by said institution indicated the cause of death as "Hypovolemic shock
secondary to multiple organ hemorrhages and Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation."
 The respondents filed charges against the SLMC and physicians involve for negligence and failure to observe the
essential precautions in to prevent Angelica’s untimely death.
 o Petitioner denied the allegation for damages as she observed best known procedures, highest skill and
knowledge in the administration of chemotherapy drugs despite all efforts the patient died.
 In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that petitioner was not liable for damages as she observed the
best known procedures and employed her highest skill and knowledge in the administration of chemotherapy
drugs on Angelica but despite all efforts said patient died.
o It cited the testimony of Dr. Tamayo who testified that he considered petitioner one of the most proficient
in the treatment of cancer and that the patient in this case was afflicted with a very aggressive type of
cancer necessitating chemotherapy as adjuvant treatment. Using the standard of negligence laid down in
Picart v. Smith, the trial court declared that petitioner has taken the necessary precaution against the
adverse effect of chemotherapy on the patient, adding that a wrong decision is not by itself negligence.
 Respondents appealed to the CA which, while concurring with the trial court’s finding that there was no negligence
committed by the petitioner in the administration of chemotherapy treatment to Angelica, found that petitioner
as her attending physician failed to fully explain to the respondents all the known side effects of chemotherapy.
o The appellate court stressed that since the respondents have been told of only three side effects of
chemotherapy, they readily consented thereto. Had petitioner made known to respondents those other
side effects which gravely affected their child—such as carpopedal spasm, sepsis, decrease in the blood
platelet count, bleeding, infections and eventual death—respondents could have decided differently or
adopted a different course of action which could have delayed or prevented the early death of their child.
 Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration which the appellate court denied.
 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dr. Li can be held liable for failure to fully disclose serious side effects to the parents of the child
patient who died while undergoing chemotherapy, despite the absence of finding that petitioner was negligent in
administering the said treatment.

RULING: NO
 The doctrine of informed consent within the context of physician-patient relationships goes far back into English
common law.
 As early as 1767, doctors were charged with the tort of “battery” (i.e., an unauthorized physical contact with a
patient) if they had not gained the consent of their patients prior to performing a surgery or procedure.
o In the United States, the seminal case was Schoendorff v. Society of New York Hospital which involved
unwanted treatment performed by a doctor.
o Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s oftquoted opinion upheld the basic right of a patient to give consent to any
medical procedure or treatment: “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient’s consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”
o From a purely ethical norm, informed consent evolved into a general principle of law that a physician
has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of
reasonable care would disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred from
a proposed course of treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and
faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all, may
intelligently exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against the probable
benefits.
 The scope of disclosure is premised on the fact that patients ordinarily are persons unlearned in the medical
sciences.
o Proficiency in diagnosis and therapy is not the full measure of a physician’s responsibility. It is also his
duty to warn of the dangers lurking in the proposed treatment and to impart information which the
patient has every right to expect.
o Indeed, the patient’s reliance upon the physician is a trust of the kind which traditionally has exacted
obligations beyond those associated with arms length transactions.
 o The physician is not expected to give the patient a short medical education, the disclosure rule only
requires of him a reasonable explanation, which means generally informing the patient in nontechnical
terms as to what is at stake; the therapy alternatives open to him, the goals expectably to be achieved,
and the risks that may ensue from particular treatment or no treatment.
o As to the issue of demonstrating what risks are considered material necessitating disclosure, it was held
that experts are unnecessary to a showing of the materiality of a risk to a patient’s decision on
treatment, or to the reasonably, expectable effect of risk disclosure on the decision.
o Such unrevealed risk that should have been made known must further materialize, for otherwise the
omission, however unpardonable, is without legal consequence.
o And, as in malpractice actions generally, there must be a causal relationship between the physician’s
failure to divulge and damage to the patient.
 There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine of
informed consent:
o “(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks;
o (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks;
o (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she
otherwise would not have consented to;
o and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment.”
o The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to “point to significant undisclosed
information relating to the treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it.
APPLICATION:
 Examining the evidence on record, we hold that there was adequate disclosure of material risks inherent in the
chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of Angelica’s parents.
 Respondents could not have been unaware in the course of initial treatment and amputation of Angelica’s lower
extremity, that her immune system was already weak on account of the malignant tumor in her knee.
 When petitioner informed the respondents beforehand of the side effects of chemotherapy which includes
lowered counts of white and red blood cells, decrease in blood platelets, possible kidney or heart damage and
skin darkening, there is reasonable expectation on the part of the doctor that the respondents understood very
well that the severity of these side effects will not be the same for all patients undergoing the procedure. In
other words, by the nature of the disease itself, each patient’s reaction to the chemical agents even with
pretreatment laboratory tests cannot be precisely determined by the physician.
 That death can possibly result from complications of the treatment or the underlying cancer itself, immediately
or sometime after the administration of chemotherapy drugs, is a risk that cannot be ruled out, as with most
other major medical procedures, but such conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the general side effects of
chemotherapy already disclosed.

 As a physician, petitioner can reasonably expect the respondents to have considered the variables in the
recommended treatment for their daughter afflicted with a life threatening illness.
o On the other hand, it is difficult to give credence to respondents’ claim that petitioner told them of 95%
chance of recovery for their daughter, as it was unlikely for doctors like petitioner who were dealing with
grave conditions such as cancer to have falsely assured patients of chemotherapy’s success rate.
o Besides, informed consent laws in other countries generally require only a reasonable explanation of
potential harms, so specific disclosures such as statistical data, may not be legally necessary.

 The element of ethical duty to disclose material risks in the proposed medical treatment cannot thus be reduced
to one simplistic formula applicable in all instances.
 Further, in a medical malpractice action based on lack of informed consent, “the plaintiff must prove both the
duty and the breach of that duty through expert testimony.
 Such expert testimony must show the customary standard of care of physicians in the same practice as that of
the defendant doctor. In this case, the testimony of Dr. Balmaceda who is not an oncologist but a Medical
Specialist of the DOH’s Operational and Management Services charged with receiving complaints against
 hospitals, does not qualify as expert testimony to establish the standard of care in obtaining consent for
chemotherapy treatment.
 In the absence of expert testimony in this regard, the Court feels hesitant in defining the scope of mandatory
disclosure in cases of malpractice based on lack of informed consent, much less set a standard of disclosure that,
even in foreign jurisdictions, has been noted to be an evolving one.
 “As society has grappled with the juxtaposition between personal autonomy and the medical profession’s
intrinsic impetus to cure, the law defining “adequate” disclosure has undergone a dynamic evolution. A standard
once guided solely by the ruminations of physicians is now dependent on what a reasonable person in the
patient’s position regards as significant. This change in perspective is especially important as medical
breakthroughs move practitioners to the cutting edge of technology, ever encountering new and heretofore
unimagined treatments for currently incurable diseases or ailments. An adaptable standard is needed to account
for this constant progression. Reasonableness analyses permeate our legal system for the very reason that they
are determined by social norms, expanding and contracting with the ebb and flow of societal evolution.
 As we progress toward the twentyfirst century, we now realize that the legal standard of disclosure is not
subject to construction as a categorical imperative. Whatever formulae or processes we adopt are only useful as
a foundational starting point; the particular quality or quantity of disclosure will remain inextricably bound by
the facts of each case. Nevertheless, juries that ultimately determine whether a physician properly informed a
patient are inevitably guided by what they perceive as the construction as a categorical imperative. Whatever
formulae or processes we adopt are only useful as a foundational starting point; the particular quality or
quantity of disclosure will remain inextricably bound by the facts of each case. Nevertheless, juries that
ultimately determine whether a physician properly informed a patient are inevitably guided by what they
perceive as the common expectation of the medical consumer—“a reasonable person in the patient’s position
when deciding to accept or reject a recommended medical procedure.”

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 15, 2004 and the
Resolution dated September 1, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. CV No. 58013 are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
September 5, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 8904 is REINSTATED and UPHELD.
No costs. SO ORDERED.

NOTES:
 The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is
that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical
professional which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove
that a health care provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent
health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent provider
would not have done; and that that failure or action caused injury to the patient.

 This Court has recognized that medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of expert witnesses
belonging in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice as defendant physician or
surgeon. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from the former’s
realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of
intelligently evaluating, hence the indispensability of expert testimonies.

Dr Cantre vs Sps Go (captain of the ship doctrine)

Facts:
 Petitioner Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is a specialist in Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Dr. Jesus Delgado Memorial
Hospital. She was the attending physician of respondent Nora S. Go, who was admitted on April 19, 1992.
  At 1:30 a.m. of April 20, 1992, Nora gave birth to her fourth child, a baby boy. However, at around 3:30 a.m., Nora
suffered profuse bleeding inside her womb due to some parts of the placenta which were not completely expelled
from her womb after delivery. Consequently, Nora suffered hypovolemic shock, resulting in a drop in her blood
pressure to “40” over “0.”
 Petitioner and the assisting resident physician performed various medical procedures to stop the bleeding and to
restore Nora’s blood pressure. Her blood pressure was frequently monitored with the use of a
sphygmomanometer. While petitioner was massaging Nora’s uterus for it to contract and stop bleeding, she
ordered a droplight to warm Nora and her baby. Nora remained unconscious until she recovered.
 While in the recovery room, respondent John David Z. Go (husband) noticed a fresh gaping wound 2 1/2 by 3 1/2
inches in the inner portion of her left arm, close to the armpit. He asked the nurses what caused the injury and he
was informed it was a burn.
 on April 22, 1992, John David filed a request for investigation. In response, Dr. Rainerio S. Abad, the medical
director of the hospital, called petitioner and the assisting resident physician to explain what happened.
 Petitioner said the blood pressure cuff caused the injury.
 Husband brought Nora to the NBI for a physical examination, which was conducted by medicolegal officer Dr.
Floresto Arizala, Jr. The medicolegal officer later testified that Nora’s injury appeared to be a burn and that a
droplight when placed near the skin for about 10 minutes could cause such burn. He dismissed the likelihood that
the wound was caused by a blood pressure cuff as the scar was not around the arm, but just on one side of the
arm.
 Nora’s injury was referred to a plastic surgeon at the same hospital for skin grafting. Her wound was covered with
skin sourced from her abdomen, which bore a scar
 About a year after, scar revision had to be performed at the same hospital. The surgical operation left a healed
linear scar in Nora’s left arm about 3 inches in length, the thickest portion rising about 1/4 of an inch from the
surface of the skin. The costs of the skin grafting, and the scar revision were shouldered by the hospital
 Unfortunately, Nora’s arm would never be the same. Aside from the unsightly mark, the pain in her left arm
remains. When sleeping, she has to cradle her wounded arm. Her movements now are also restricted. Her children
cannot play with the left side of her body as they might accidentally bump the injured arm, which aches at the
slightest touch.
 Thus, respondent spouses filed a complaint for damages against petitioner, Dr. Abad, and the hospital
 Trial court ruled in favor of respondents Sps.
 CA affirmed trial court decision

Petitioner’s contentions:
 the droplight could not have touched Nora’s body. She maintains the injury was due to the constant taking of
Nora’s blood pressure.
 Petitioner also insinuates the CA was misled by the testimony of the medicolegal officer who never saw the original
injury before plastic surgery was performed.
 Finally, petitioner stresses that plastic surgery was not intended to restore respondent’s injury to its original state
but rather to prevent further complication.

Respondent sps’s contentions:

 Respondents point out that petitioner’s blood pressure cuff theory is highly improbable, being unprecedented in
medical history and that the injury was definitely caused by the droplight.
 At any rate, they argue, even if the injury was brought about by the blood pressure cuff, petitioner was still
negligent in her duties as Nora’s attending physician

Issue: Is petitioner liable for the injury suffered by Respondent?

Ruling: YES.
 The Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give primordial consideration to the well-being of their patients. If
a doctor fails to live up to this precept, he is accountable for his acts. This notwithstanding, courts face a unique
restraint in adjudicating medical negligence cases because physicians are not guarantors of care, and they never
set out to intentionally cause injury to their patients. However, intent is immaterial in negligence cases because
where negligence exists and is proven, it automatically gives the injured a right to reparation for the damage
caused.

 In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to
justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury,
provided that the following requisites concur:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.

 first requirement, the gaping wound on Nora’s arm is certainly not an ordinary occurrence in the act of delivering
a baby, far removed as the arm is from the organs involved in the process of giving birth. Such injury could not
have happened unless negligence had set in somewhere.

 Second, whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by the blood pressure cuff is of no moment. Both
instruments are deemed within the exclusive control of the physician in charge under the “captain of the ship”
doctrine.
o This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an operation liable for the negligence of his assistants
during the time when those assistants are under the surgeon’s control.
o Application: In this particular case, it can be logically inferred that petitioner, the senior consultant in
charge during the delivery of Nora’s baby, exercised control over the assistants assigned to both the use
of the droplight and the taking of Nora’s blood pressure. Hence, the use of the droplight and the blood
pressure cuff is also within petitioner’s exclusive control.

 Third, the gaping wound on Nora’s left arm, by its very nature and considering her condition, could only be caused
by something external to her and outside her control as she was unconscious while in hypovolemic shock. Hence,
Nora could not, by any stretch of the imagination, have contributed to her own injury.

 Petitioner’s defense that Nora’s wound was caused not by the droplight but by the constant taking of her blood
pressure, even if the latter was necessary given her condition, does not absolve her from liability.
 As testified to by the medicolegal officer, Dr. Arizala, Jr., the medical practice is to deflate the blood pressure
cuff immediately after each use. Otherwise, the inflated band can cause injury to the patient similar to what
could have happened in this case.
 Thus, if Nora’s wound was caused by the blood pressure cuff, then the taking of Nora’s blood pressure must
have been done so negligently as to have inflicted a gaping wound on her arm, for which petitioner cannot
escape liability under the “captain of the ship” doctrine.

 Further, petitioner’s argument that the failed plastic surgery was not intended as a cosmetic procedure, but
rather as a measure to prevent complication does not help her case. It does not negate negligence on her part.
Based on the foregoing, the presumption that petitioner was negligent in the exercise of her profession stands
unrebutted.

 Clearly, under the law, petitioner is obliged to pay Nora for moral damages suffered by the latter as a proximate
result of petitioner’s negligence.
  The Court noted that petitioner has served well as Nora’s obstetrician for her past three successful deliveries.
This is the first time petitioner is being held liable for damages due to negligence in the practice of her
profession.
 The fact that petitioner promptly took care of Nora’s wound before infection and other complications set in is
also indicative of petitioner’s good intentions.
 The court also noted the fact that Nora was suffering from a critical condition when the injury happened, such
that saving her life became petitioner’s elemental concern. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that all these
could not justify negligence on the part of petitioner.

Petition is denied

MANILA DOCTORS HOSPITAL, vs. SO UN CHUA and VICKY TY

• Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 questioning the Decision1 dated October 2, 2001
promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the Decision dated September 30, 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 159, Pasig City, but which reduced the award of damages.

• This case originated from an action for damages filed with the RTC by respondents So Un Chua and Vicky Ty against
petitioner Manila Doctors Hospital. The complaint is premised on the alleged unwarranted actuations of the petitioner
towards its patient, respondent So Un Chua (Chua), who was confined for hypertension, diabetes, and related illnesses.

FACTS:

• On October 30, 1990, So Un Chua, the mother of Vicky Ty, was admitted in petitioner's hospital for hypertension and
diabetes

• While Chua was confined, Judith Chua, the sister of Vicky Ty, had been likewise confined for injuries suffered in a
vehicular accident. That partial payments of the hospital bills were made, totaling P435,800.00;

• After the discharge of Judith Chua, So Un Chua remained in confinement and the hospital bills for both patients
accumulated.

• respondent Chua was pressured by the petitioner, through its Credit and Collection Department, to settle the unpaid
bills.

• Respondent Ty represented that she will settle the bills as soon as the funds become available.

• Respondent Ty pleaded to the management that in view of the physical condition of her mother, the correspondences
relating to the settlement of the unpaid hospital bills should be relayed to the former.

• These pleas were unheeded by the petitioner. Petitioner threatened to implement unpleasant measures unless
respondent Ty undertakes her mother's obligation as well as the obligation of her sister, Judith Chua, to pay the
hospitalization expenses.

• Petitioner made good its threat and employed unethical, unpleasant and unlawful methods which allegedly worsened
the condition of respondent Chua, particularly by (i) cutting off the telephone line in her room and removing the air-
conditioning unit, television set, and refrigerator, (ii) refusing to render medical attendance and to change the hospital
gown and bed sheets, and (iii) barring the private nurses or midwives from assisting the patient.
• Respondents thus prayed for the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

• The Petitioner’s Counterclaim:

• They denied the material averments of the respondents and argued that as early as one week after respondent
Chua had been admitted to its hospital, Dr. Rody Sy, her attending physician, had already given instructions for
her to be discharged, but respondents insisted that Chua remain in confinement.

• That, through its staff, petitioner accordingly administered medical examinations, all of which yielded negative
results.

• That respondent Ty voluntarily undertook, jointly and severally, to pay the hospital bills for both patients; that
although respondent Ty paid up to P435,000.00, more or less, she reneged on her commitment to pay the balance
in violation of the Contract for Admission and Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment dated October 30,
1990 which she voluntarily executed;

• That she signed a Promissory Note on June 5, 1992 for the unpaid balance of P1,075,592.95 and issued postdated
checks to cover the same;

• That no such undue pressure had been imposed upon respondent Chua to settle the bills, the truth being that, as
a matter of standard procedure, the reminders to settle the bills were transmitted not to the patients but to their
relatives who usually undertook to pay the same.

• That respondent Ty deliberately evaded the staff of the Credit and Collection Department;

• That the cutting-off of the telephone line and removal of the air-conditioning unit, television set, and refrigerator
cannot constitute unwarranted actuations, for the same were resorted to as cost-cutting measures and to
minimize respondents' charges that were already piling up, especially after respondent Ty refused to settle the
balance notwithstanding frequent demands; (The Supreme Court agreed on this, based on evidence presented
stated, they also ruled that afterall these aren’t necessities)

• That respondent Ty evaded the staff when the latter attempted to inform her that the room facilities will be cut
off to minimize the rising charges. The respondents did not even read one of the many notices that the hospital
had sent them regarding this.

• And that respondents instituted the present civil case purposely as leverage against the petitioner after the latter
had filed criminal charges for violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 against respondent Ty for issuing checks,
later dishonored, totaling P1,075,592.95, the amount referring to the unpaid hospital bills.

• Petitioner also prayed, among other items, for the award of no less than P1,000,000.00 as compensatory damages
due to the filing of a malicious and unfounded suit, and, in its permissive counterclaim, petitioner prayed for
respondents to pay P1,075,592.95, the amount representing the due and demandable obligation under the
Promissory Note dated June 5, 1992, including the stipulated interest therein and the 25 percent of the total
amount due as attorney's fees.

• the RTC ruled in favor of petitioners and averred that the removal of the facilities of the room triggered the hypertension
of respondent Chua;

• that the petitioner acted in bad faith in removing the facilities without prior notice;
 • that her condition was aggravated by the pressure employed by the administration upon her to pay the hospital
bills; that the food always came late as compared to the other patients;

• that the beddings and clothes of respondent Chua were no longer changed and, as a result, bed sores emerged
on her body; that there was an utter lack of medical attendance;

• that, because of these, respondent Chua suffered from self-pity and depression;

• that petitioner clearly discriminated against the respondents;

• that respondent Ty had no choice but to sign the promissory notes in order to secure the release of her mother,
respondent Chua; that the foregoing actuations constitute an abuse of rights; that petitioner failed to establish
the pecuniary loss it suffered and, hence, it is not entitled to compensatory damages; and that, since the
promissory note is a contract of adhesion, the petitioner is not entitled to the award of attorney's fees as
stipulated thereon.

( all these RTC rulings were not agreed by the SC)

it must be noted:

At this juncture, it must be noted that there is testimony, though to a degree disputable, to the effect that the execution
of the promissory note and the issuance of postdated checks were conditions imposed not by the petitioner but voluntarily
offered by the counsel for respondents.

ISSUE1: Whether or not the hospital is liable for Damages:

Ruling: No. The Hospital is not liable.

• The operation of private pay hospitals and medical clinics is impressed with public interest and imbued with a heavy
social responsibility. But the hospital is also a business, and, as a business, it has a right to institute all measures of
efficiency commensurate to the ends for which it is designed, especially to ensure its economic viability and survival.

• Authorities are of the view that, ordinarily, a hospital, especially if it is a private pay hospital, 113 is entitled to be
compensated for its services, by either an express or an implied contract, and if no express contract exists, there is
generally an implied agreement that the patient will pay the reasonable value of the services rendered;114 when a
hospital treats a patient's injuries, it has an enforceable claim for full payment for its services, regardless of the patient's
financial status.115

• And in the legitimate pursuit of economic considerations, the extent to which the public may be served and cured is
expanded, the pulse and life of the medical sector quickens, and the regeneration of the people as a whole becomes
more visibly attainable.

• In the institution of cost-cutting measures, the hospital has a right to reduce the facilities and services that are deemed
to be non-essential, such that their reduction or removal would not be detrimental to the medical condition of the
patient.
 • For the moment, the question to be considered is whether the subject facilities are indeed non-essential – the
air-conditioner, telephone, television, and refrigerator – the removal of which would cause the adverse health
effects and emotional trauma the respondents so claimed.

• Corollary to this question is whether the petitioner observed the diligence of a good father of the famil in the
course of ascertaining the possible repercussions of the removal of the facilities prior to the removal itself and
for a reasonable time thereafter, with a view to prevent damage.

• There were *paragrah stated (mao naka taas sa kaso)* evidences made by the hospital which, in short,
overwhelmingly demonstrates that respondent Chua had been adequately attended to, and this Court cannot
understand why the courts a quo had declared that there was an "utter lack of medical attendance," or that her
health suffered during the period after the removal of the facilities. The Court finds that the facilities in question
are non-essential for the care of respondent Chua and, hence, they may be lessened or removed by the petitioner
for the sake of economic necessity and survival.

• The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that
breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely
because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering.

• At any rate, however, this Court holds, in view of the foregoing authorities, that the requirement to have the relative
of respondent Chua to execute a promissory note as part of the arrangement to settle the unpaid obligations is a
formality that converts any implied contract into written form and, moreover, amounts to a reasonable condition, the
non-fulfillment of which, in itself, however, as discussed, cannot allow the hospital to detain the patient.

• It must also be stressed, contrary to the findings of the courts a quo, that such an agreement embodied in a promissory
note, as well as the Contract for Admission and Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment dated October 30, 1990,
do not become contracts of adhesion simply because the person signing it was under stress that was not the result of
the actions of the hospital,117 especially taking into account that there is testimony to the effect that respondent Ty
signed the Promissory Note dated June 5, 1992 in the presence of counsel and acting under his advise.118

• In Re to petitioners filing criminal charges for violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 against respondent Ty for
issuing checks, later dishonored, totaling P1,075,592.95, the amount referring to the unpaid hospital bills.

• The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt the actor from liability under this paragraph: (1) that the
evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it; (3) that there
be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

• In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is
merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable. Ty could have taken
advantage of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry
or other forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.

• Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have been brought
about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the issuance of the
bounced checks was brought about by Ty's own failure to pay her mother's hospital bills.
• The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear and the
justifying circumstance of state of necessity to absolve her of liability. It would not have been half as bizarre had Ty been
able to prove that the issuance of the bounced checks was done without her full volition. Under the circumstances,
however, it is quite clear that neither uncontrollable fear nor avoidance of a greater evil or injury prompted the issuance
of the bounced checks.

• Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the Decision of the trial court in the Civil Case for damages filed by Ty's mother
against the hospital is wholly irrelevant for purposes of disposing the case at bench. While the findings therein may
establish a claim for damages which, we may add, need only be supported by a preponderance of evidence, it does not
necessarily engender reasonable doubt as to free Ty from liability.120

• In view of the foregoing, the Court therefore holds that the courts a quo committed serious errors in finding that the
petitioner was "biased,"121 "discriminated" against the respondents,122 and "purposely intended to irritate"123 or
"harass"124 them; that it "acted in bad faith in removing the facilities without prior notice;"125 and that its acts were "anti-
social."126 The aforequoted declarations of the witnesses, significant portions of which this Court considers as expert
testimony, are reliable and remain considerably trustworthy to controvert respondents' assertions as well as to reverse
the conclusions of fact and law of the CA and the RTC that respondent Chua suffered the physical and emotional anguish
so claimed, and so, for these reasons, the Court holds that the petitioner inflicted no actionable wrong.

• This Court observes that the courts a quo awarded both respondents moral damages. But it is well-settled that in case
of physical injuries, with some exceptions,127 moral damages are recoverable only by the party injured and not by her
spouse, next of kin, or relative who happened to sympathize with the injured party.128 Hence, even if the courts a
quo were correct in their basis for damages, they should have declined to award damages to respondent Ty.

ISSUE 2: whether the counterclaims of the petitioner are supported by a preponderance of evidence.

Yes.

• First, for failure without justifiable cause of respondents' counsel to comment on the Partial Formal Offer of Evidence
dated February 14, 1996129 filed by the petitioner, the RTC issued an order during the course of the trial, which counsel
for respondents neither contested nor raised on appeal, admitting Exhibits "1" to "16", together with their submarkings
and the purposes for which the same were offered,130 all of which had also been previously authenticated and their
contents verified by the witnesses for the petitioner.131

• These documents include the Contract for Admission of respondent Chua dated October 30, 1990, duly executed by
respondent Ty, incorporating therein the rules and regulations of the hospital, including the duty to understand the
same132 as well as the undertaking of respondent Ty to be jointly and severally liable for the payment of the hospital
bills of respondent Chua;133 the Promissory Note dated June 5, 1992 in the amount of P1,075,592.95 duly executed by
respondent Ty in favor of the petitioner agreeing to be jointly and severally liable to pay the unpaid obligations of
respondent Chua and Judith Chua, including interest and attorney's fees in case of default; 134 the Undertakings signed
by respondent Ty dated March 3, 1992 and April 7, 1992 to maintain regular deposits; 135 and the credit memos and
statements of account that support the amount referring to the unpaid obligation.136

• Second, the parties stipulated during pre-trial that respondents failed to pay the balance despite repeated reminders.137

• And third, respondent Ty in open court identified and admitted that she signed the Contract of Admission dated October
30, 1990 as well as the Undertakings dated March 3, 1992 and April 7, 1992 but which, for no justifiable reason, she "did
not bother to read,"138 and, what is more, she repeatedly admitted during the course of the trial that she failed to fully
settle the foregoing hospital bills.139 In fact, while the Ty case cannot control the incidents of the instant case as
heretofore stated, it is still worth mentioning, at least for informative purposes, the findings of this Court in Ty with
respect to respondents' obligations to the petitioner:
• As a final word, the Court takes judicial notice of the pending Senate Bill No. 337, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the
Detention of Patients in Hospitals and Medical Clinics on Grounds of Non-Payment of Hospital Bills or Medical Expenses,"
which declares, among others, that it shall be unlawful for any hospital or medical clinic to cause directly or indirectly
the detention of patients for non-payment, in part or in full, of their hospital bills,144 and, furthermore, requires patients
who have fully recovered and are financially incapable to settle the hospitalization expenses to execute a promissory
note, co-signed by another individual, to the extent of the unpaid obligation before leaving the hospital.145 While this
Court may have touched upon these matters in the adjudication of the instant case, it must be stated that this decision
should in no way preempt any constitutional challenge to the provisions of Senate Bill No. 337 if passed into law, bearing
in mind the standards for the exercise of the power of judicial review146 as well as the recognition that the tenor of the
bill may adjust with the times, or that the bill itself may fail to pass, according to the dynamism of the legislative process,
especially in light of the objections interposed by interest groups to date.147

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 2, 2001, together with the
Decision dated September 30, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 63958, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Another judgment is entered dismissing the Complaint and ordering respondents, jointly and severally, to pay the
petitioner the amount of P865,592.95, with stipulated interest of 12 percent reckoned from the date of extrajudicial
demand until full payment, and 12 percent of the total amount due as attorney's fees.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Mercury Drug v. De Leon ( Pharmacists)

Facts:

 Respondent Raul T. De Leon was the presiding judge of Branch 258, Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Paraaque.
 On October 17, 1999, he noticed that his left eye was reddish.He also had difficulty reading.
 On the same evening, he met a friend for dinner at the Foohyui Restaurant. The same friend happened to be a
doctor, Dr. Charles Milla, and had just arrived from abroad.
 De Leon consulted Dr. Milla about his irritated left eye. The latter prescribed the drugs Cortisporin Opthalmic and
Ceftin to relieve his eye problems.
 The following morning De Leon went to the Betterliving, Paraaque, branch of Mercury Drug Store Corporation to
buy the prescribed medicines. He showed his prescription to petitioner Aurmela Ganzon, a pharmacist
assistant. Subsequently, he paid for and took the medicine handed over by Ganzon.
 At his chambers, De Leon requested his sheriff to assist him in using the eye drops. Instead of relieving his
irritation, respondent felt searing pain. He immediately rinsed the affected eye with water, but the pain did not
subside. Only then did he discover that he was given the wrong medicine, Cortisporin Otic Solution.
 De Leon returned to the same Mercury Drug branch, with his left eye still red and teary.
 When he confronted Ganzon why he was given ear drops, instead of the prescribed eye drops, she did not
apologize and instead brazenly replied that she was unable to fully read the prescription.
 In fact, it was her supervisor who apologized and informed De Leon that they do not have stock of the needed
Cortisporin Opthalmic.
  De Leon wrote Mercury Drug, through its president, Ms. Vivian K. Askuna, about the days incident. It did not merit
any response. Instead, two sales persons went to his office and informed him that their supervisor was busy with
other matters.
 Having been denied his simple desire for a written apology and explanation, De Leon filed a complaint for
damages against Mercury Drug.
 Mercury Drug denied that it was negligent and therefore liable for damages.
o It pointed out that the proximate cause of De Leons unfortunate experience was his own negligence.
o He should have first read and checked to see if he had the right eye solution before he used any on his
eye. He could have also requested his sheriff to do the same before the latter applied the medicine on
such a delicate part of his body.
o Also, Mercury Drug explained that there is no available medicine known as Cortisporin Opthalmic in the
Philippine market.
o Furthermore, what was written on the piece of paper De Leon presented to Ganzon was Cortisporin
Solution. Accordingly, she gave him the only available Cortisporin Solution in the market.
o Moreover, even the piece of paper De Leon presented upon buying the medicine can not be considered
as proper prescription.
o It lacked the required information concerning the attending doctors name and license number. According
to Ganzon, she entertained De Leons purchase request only because he was a regular customer of their
branch.
 RTC ruled in favor of De Leon. They ruled that although De Leon may have been negligent by failing to read the
medicines label or to instruct his sheriff to do so, Mercury Drug was first to be negligent. Ganzon dispensed a drug
without the requisite prescription.
 Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, Mercury Drug and Ganzon elevated the matter to the CA
 The CA issued a resolution which granted De Leons motion and dismissed the appeal
ISSUE: Whether or not Mercury Drug and Ganzon are liable

RULING: YES

 Mercury Drug and Ganzon can not exculpate themselves from any liability. As active players in the field of
dispensing medicines to the public, the highest degree of care and diligence is expected of them.
 Likewise, numerous decisions, both here and abroad, have laid salutary rules for the protection of human life and
human health.
 In the United States case of Tombari v. Conners, it was ruled that the profession of pharmacy demands care and
skill, and druggists must exercise care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to practical
men. In other words, druggists must exercise the highest practicable degree of prudence and vigilance, and the
most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, so that human life
may not constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless
medicines.
 This Court once more reiterated that the profession of pharmacy demands great care and skill. It reminded
druggists to exercise the highest degree of care known to practical men.
  In cases where an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection or supervision of ones
employees. This presumption may be rebutted by a clear showing that the employer has exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of the family. Mercury Drug failed to overcome such presumption
 The award of damages is proper and shall only be reduced considering the peculiar facts of the case. Moral
damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of defendants wrongful act or omission
 It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with public interest. This can not be more real for
Mercury Drug, the countrys biggest drugstore chain. This Court can not tolerate any form of negligence which can
jeopardize the health and safety of its loyal patrons. Moreover, this Court will not countenance the cavalier
manner it treated De Leon. Not only does a pharmacy owe a customer the duty of reasonable care, but it is also
duty-bound to accord one with respect.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decisions of the CA and the RTC in Paraaque City are
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION, in that the award of moral and exemplary damages is reduced to P50,000.00 and
P25,000.00, respectively.

ADARNE vs ALDABA
Concepcion, Jr., J.
NATURE: ADMINSTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.
FACTS:
 Sometime in 1958, Raymunda Cumpio and her husband, Rufo Cumpio, filed an action for forcible entry against
herein complainant Cesario Adarne, Aning Arante, and Miguel Inokando with the Justice of the Peace of Alang-
alang, Leyte.
 Atty. Isauro Marmita represented the defendants who raised the issue of ownership of the land in question.
 After hearing the parties, the Justice of the Peace dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
 The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of First Instance of Leyte.
 The Judge of the Court of First Instance found that the Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction over the case
and returned the same to the lower court for trial on the merits.
 After trial on the merits, the Justice of the Peace again dismissed the case and the plaintiffs again appealed to the
Court of First Instance of Leyte.
 Attys. Arturo Mirales and Generoso Casimpan filed the answer for the defendants.
 At the hearing of the case on August 7, 1961, the herein complainant Cesario Adarne, noting that his attorneys
had not yet arrived, prevailed upon the respondent Atty. Damian Aldaba, who was then present in court to attend
the trial of an electoral case, to appear as counsel for them and ask for the postponement of the trial.
 The respondent, who is a thirddegree cousin of the complainant, agreed, and entered a special appearance. Upon
noticing that the plaintiffs and their counsel were not also present in court, the respondent, instead of asking for
a postponement, moved for the dismissal of the case. His motion was granted and the case was again dismissed.
 The plaintiffs filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order, to which the respondent filed an opposition in
behalf of the defendants, and the motion was denied.
  The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals which set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case to
the lower court for further proceedings.
 On October 23, 1964, the respondent was again prevailed upon by the complainant to appear in his behalf.
 The respondent entered a “special appearance” for the complainant and thereafter argued that the interest of
justice would best be served if the defendants were allowed to file an action for quieting of title and the case
heard jointly with the pending action for forcible entry.
 Court ordered Adarne to file an action for quieting of title within one (1) week and the plaintiffs to answer the
same within the reglementary period, after which both cases would be tried jointly. The hearing was deferred
until after the filing of the action for quieting of title.
 On June 17, 1965, the court declared the defendants in default for their failure to appear at the hearing set for
that day and directed the plaintiffs to present evidence to support their claim.
 Adarne filed a complaint against Atty. Aldaba for malpractice.
 Respondent denied that he agreed to handle the case except for the “special appearance” he entered in view of
the non-availability of the complainant’s lawyers on said dates.
 The case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
ISSUE: Is Atty. Aldaba guilty for such misconduct?
RULING: NO
 The judgment by default rendered against the complainant cannot be attributed to the respondent attorney. The
blame lies with the complainant for having engaged the services of several lawyers to handle his case without
formally withdrawing the authority he had given to them to appear in his behalf as to place the responsibility
upon the respondent. To add to the confusion, the complainant had also requested the clerk of court of the Court
of First Instance of Leyte that he (complainant) be furnished with summons and subpoena accorded to him. He
also filed a motion by himself, thus implying that he was handling his case personally.
 It appears that there have been three changes made of the attorneys for the complainant in the forcible
entry case. The complainant was originally represented by Atty. Isauro Marmita who, upon his
appointment to the Department of Labor, engaged Atty. de Veyra to take his place.12 Then came Atty.
Arturo Mirales and later, Atty. Generoso Casimpan. However, no formalities whatever were observed in
those changes such that the respondent entered a “special appearance” for the complainant in order that
he could ask for the dismissal of the case for the failure of the adverse party to prosecute.
 The rule followed on matters of substitution of attorneys as laid down by this Court is that no substitution of
attorneys will be allowed unless there be filed; (1) a written application for such substitution; (2) the written
consent of the client; (3) the written consent of the attorney substituted; and (4) in case such written consent
cannot be secured, there must be filed with the application proof of service of notice of such motion upon the
attorney to be substituted, in the manner prescribed by the rules. Unless the foregoing formalities are complied
with, substitution will not be permitted, and the attorney who properly appeared last in the cause, before such
application for substitution, will be regarded as the attorney of record and will be held responsible for the proper
conduct of the cause.
 APPLICATION: Besides, the respondent honestly believed that he had appeared for the complainant only for a
special purpose and that the complainant had agreed to contact his attorney of record to handle his case after the
hearing of October 23, 1964, so that he did nothing more about it. It was neither gross negligence nor omission
to have entertained such belief.
 An attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and skill,
having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do. Prone to err like any other human being,
he is not answerable for every error or mistake, and will be protected as long as he acts honestly and in good faith
to the best of his skill and knowledge.
 It is well settled that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant and for the
Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent attorney must be established by
convincing proof. In the instant case, there is no sufficient proof to warrant the disbarment of the respondent
attorney. Neither is there culpable malpractice to justify his suspension.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the present administrative complaint is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
NOTES:
 Barredo, J., concurs in the results since respondent made only a special appearance on Oct. 23, 1964, when he
made a creditably showing for complainant, the counsel of record of complainant should have been the one to
take the corresponding subsequent steps.

Atienza v. Evangelista, AM No. 1517, November 29, 1977; FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
 In a complaint filed with this Court by Maria Luz Atienza, respondent Vicente Evangelista, a member of the
Philippine Bar, was charged with unprofessional conduct unbecoming a member of the bar.
o It was alleged that he was remiss in attending to her case with the Manila City Fiscal’s Office
notwithstanding his having been retained and paid for his services.
 He was required to answer.
o There was an admission on his part of his having been retained, but he denied any imputation of lack of
due diligence in performing the legal services required of him.
o He asserted that he had always conducted himself in a manner expected of a lawyer.
 This notwithstanding, there was a recommendation by the investigating fiscal that the case be dropped for
insufficiency of evidence.
 Then and there, complainant dispensed with his services and shortly thereafter took from him all the papers
connected with such a case.
 It was his assumption therefore that he “was no longer under obligation to participate in any proceeding in
connection with said case.
 That duty had been shifted to the new lawyer of Mrs. Atienza in the case involving her husband.”
 Therafter, this Court, on December 5, 1975, resolved to refer the administrative complaint to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report, and recommendation.
 There was such an investigation, with the report being submitted to this Court on March 17, 1977.
 The recommendation was for the dismissal of the complaint against respondent.
o it was stated that respondent was retained to assist complainant in the prosecution of the persons
allegedly responsible for her husband’s death.
o It was agreed that she should pay him the sum of P8,000.00 as attorney’s fees with P3,000.00 as down
payment and P100.00 to be paid her appearance.
o A complaint was duly filed by respondent with the City Fiscal’s Office in Manila.
o It was assigned to Assistant Fiscal Fernando Agdamag for preliminary investigation.
o Respondent presented the complainant and her witnesses.
o Two of them refused to submit themselves to crossexamination.
o That prompted the fiscal to recommend that the case be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
o Such recommendation was concurred in by another fiscal, Roberto D. Cabrera, and the then City Fiscal,
Jose Gamboa.
ISSUE: whether or not the respondent was wilfully negligent in the performance of his duties as counsel to the
complainant to the damage and prejudice of the latter?
RULING:
 No. Atty. Vicente Evagelista was not negligent in the performance of his duties as counsel in the case.
 As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges until the contrary is
proved, and, as an officer of the court, he has performed his duty in accordance with his oath.
 Thus, in every case of disbarment, the burden of proof lies with the complainant to show that the respondent is
guilty of the acts charged.
  It would be to place an intolerable burden on a member of the bar if, just because a client failed to obtain what
is sought by her after due exertion of the required effort on his part, he would be held accountable.
 Success in a litigation is certainly not the test of whether or not a lawyer had lived up to his duties to a client.
 It is enough that with the thorough preparation of the case handled by him, he had taken all the steps to
prosecute his suit.
 If thereafter the result would be the frustration of his client’s hopes, that is a cause for disappointment, no
doubt for him no less than for his client, but not for disciplinary action.
 He is more to be sympathized with than condemned—on the assumption of course that he did what was
expected of him.
 DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the complaint against Attorney Vicente Evangelista is dismissed. Let a copy
of this resolution be spread on his record.

b. Professionals (Malpractice)
v. Lawyers

3. Roque vs. Gunigundo, Adm. Case No. 1664, March 30, 1979
Ponente: Aquino, J.

FACTS:
 Magtanggol C. Gunigundo (respondent) was admitted to the bar in 1960, and now 43 years old
o He was the counsel of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3826M of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
entitled “Dionisio Roque, et al. vs. Julita V. Adriano, et al.”
 That case was an action to recover Lot No. 4672 of the Malolos, Bulacan cadastre with an area of around five
hectares and for an accounting of the fruits thereof
 On July 23, 1974, respondent Gunigundo received a copy of the order in the said case dismissing it on the
grounds of laches and prior judgment.

FIRST motion for extension:

 On August 22 or the last day of the reglementary period within which to appeal or file a motion for new trial, he
filed, through an associate, a motion for an extension of fifteen days or up to September 6 within which to file a
motion for reconsideration.
o The motion was granted but Gunigundo was not able to file the motion for reconsideration.

SECOND motion for extension:

 Instead, on the last day, September 6, he sent by registered mail a motion for a second extension of ten days.

THIRD motion for extension:

 On September 16, the last day of the second extension sought by him, he filed a motion for a third extension of
fortyeight hours.
 The motion for reconsideration was mailed on September 18, 1974, the last day of the third extension.
 The trial court denied the second and third motions for extension on the ground that the order of dismissal
was already final.
 It also denied Gunigundo’s motion for reconsideration of the orders denying his motions for extension.
In Court of Appeals:
 Gunigundo then filed in CA a petition for certiorari and mandamus wherein he assailed the orders denying his
motions for extension.
o He prayed that the lower court be directed to resolve his motion for reconsideration.
 CA dismissed his petition
o It applied the ruling that the filing of a motion for extension of the period to file the record on appeal
does not suspend the period for appeal
 SC did not give due course to the appeal of respondent’s clients from that decision of CA

 On September 6, 1976, the spouses Dominga Roque and Jose G. Zaplan, two of the eight plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 3826M, filed in the Supreme Court a joint affidavit charging Atty. Gunigundo with gross negligence in not
seasonably filing the motion for reconsideration and in not perfecting an appeal from the trial court’s order of
dismissal.
 After the submission of respondent’s answer, the case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation.
 In June 1978 or during the pendency of the case in the Solicitor General’s office, the complaining spouses made
a volteface
o They executed an affidavit of desistance before Atty. Rosario R. Rapanut, a senior attorney in the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office.
o They alleged that their complaint for disbarment was due to a misunderstanding.
o They affirmed that respondent Gunigundo was not negligent in handling their case

Respondent’s defense – Explaining why he filed a motion for reconsideration instead of appealing immediately from
the order of dismissal:
 He testified that there was vacillation among the eight plaintiffs as to whether they would appeal
 There were no available funds to defray the expenses of an appeal since not all of the plaintiffs were inclined to
appeal
 Some of the plaintiffs wanted to hire another lawyer
 When the period was about to expire, the plaintiffs changed their mind and decided to continue with the
respondent’s services
 The eldest plaintiff died and plaintiffs’ desire to appeal was communicated to the respondent only after the
funeral.

ISSUE 1: Was the counsel (respondent) negligent?

RULING 1:
 Yes. The counsel (respondent) was negligent.
 The explanation of the respondent is not entirely satisfactory.
 It is not sufficient to exculpate the respondent from the charge of negligence.
 His filing of motions for extension on the last day and sending them by registered mail (thus giving the court
insufficient time to act before the extension sought had expired) and his omission to verify whether his second
motion for extension was granted are indicative of lack of competence, diligence and fidelity in the dispatch of
his clients’ business.
 If his clients were wavering on whether to appeal the order of dismissal, he could have in the meantime, but
within the thirtyday period, filed his motion for reconsideration
 The truth is that a motion to extend the reglementary period for filing the motion for reconsideration is not
authorized or is not in order.
  So, it has been held that “a motion for extension to file a petition for new trial does not stop the running of the
reglementary period for perfecting the appeal” which is also the period for filing the motion for new trial or
reconsideration
 The period for filing pleadings and submitting the record on appeal (not notice of appeal and appeal bond) may
be extended but the thirtyday period for appealing may not be extended for the purpose of filing the motion for
new trial or reconsideration.
o The reason for not allowing such an extension is that it is assumed that the preparation of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration would not consume much time since the case had already been tried and
the movant is supposed to be familiar with the case.
o On the other hand, the thirtyday period may be extended for the purpose of filing the record on appeal
because, where the record is voluminous or the appellant has other pressing matters to attend to, it
may not be practicable to submit the record on appeal within the reglementary period.

Application:
 In this case, had the respondent been more conscientious or experienced, he could have easily avoided the loss
of his clients’ right, to appeal by filing the motion for reconsideration within the thirtyday period.
 He could have even withdrawn from the case with his clients’ consent and required them to get another lawyer
to perfect their appeal.

RE: claim for damages

ISSUE 2: Was the counsel (respondent) liable for damages in this case?
RULING 2:
 No. The counsel was not liable for damages because no damage was established.
 The fact that the complainants and their six co-plaintiffs lost the right to appeal would not necessarily mean
that they were damaged.
 The lower court’s order of dismissal has in its favor the presumption of validity or correctness.
 Indeed, an examination of that order discloses that the trial court painstakingly studied the motion to dismiss
and carefully rationalized its order.
 It found that the action was filed more than forty years after the disputed land was registered in the name of
defendants’ predecessorin-interest.
 Where a judgment became final through the fault of the lawyer who did not appeal therefrom, that fact alone is
not a sufficient ground for the losing party to recover damages from his lawyer since the action for damages
rests “on the unsubstantiated and arbitrary supposition of the injustice of the decision which became final
through the fault and negligence” of the lawyer (Heridia vs. Salinas, 10 Phil. 157, 162. See Ventanilla vs.
Centeno, 110 Phil. 811, where the lawyer who failed to perfect an appeal was ordered to pay his client two
hundred pesos as nominal damages)

 In view of the foregoing and considering the complainants’ affidavit of desistance in this case, drastic
disciplinary action against the respondent is not warranted.
 But he is ADMONISHED to exercise care and circumspection in attending to the affairs of his clients.
 A repetition of the same irregularity will be treated with more severity.

Disposition: Respondent admonished.

Note: In this case, the Supreme Court admonished the lawyer but the Court refused to impose liability for damages because
no damage was established.