1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduc-
tion………………………………………………………………………...….3

Chapter I – Theoretical Aspects regarding Speech Acts

Speech acts and meaning. ……………………………………...……………….….4

Classification of speech acts………………………………………………..……...5

Chapter II. The use of speech acts in humans’ life. Apologies

The use of speech act in humans’ life ………………………………………..…...6

Apologies ………………………………....……………………………………….....6

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………..............8

References…………………………………………………………………….….…....9

2
 Introduction

In a typical speech situation involving a speaker, a hearer, and an utterance by the

speak-
er, there are many kinds of acts associated with the speaker’s utterance. The speaker will
characteristical-
ly have moved his jaw and tongue and made noises. In addition, he will characteristically
have performed some acts within the class which includes in-
form-
ing or irritating or boring his hearers, and he will also have performed acts within the cla
ss which includes making statements, asking questions, issuing commands, giving reports
, greeting, and warning.
A speech act in linguistics and the philosophy of language is an utterance that has
performative function in language and communication. According to Kent Bach, "almost
any speech act is really the performance of several acts at once, distinguished by differ-
ent aspects of the speaker's intention: there is the act of saying something, what one does
in saying it, such as requesting or promising, and how one is trying to affect one's au-
di-
ence." The contemporary use of the term goes back to J. L. Austin's development of perfo
rma-
tive utterances and his theory of locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts. Spee
ch acts are commonly taken to include such acts as promising, ordering, greeting, warnin
g, inviting and congratulating.
At one time or another, we have all heard someone speaking and have wondered
if there are hidden messages behind what they are saying. Whether you know it or not, so
me-
times the intent of what we are trying to say is just as important as or more important tha
n what we are saying. It's establishing that relationship between the person who is speaki
ng and the one who is listening.
The earliest ideas of speech act theory were defined by British philosopher John
L. Austin in his 1959 book, 'How to Do Things with Words'. It's a simple title but it's tr

3
ue. We are always using words to get things done. Sometimes it's to convey emotion or ot
her times it's to get others to perform a task.
However we use words, at the basis of it all, we are trying to get something ac-
com-
plished. American philosopher John Searle further advanced the idea and research of spe
ech acts theory. Simply, he believed that each time that a word or phrase was spoken it
was a speech or illocutionary act that could be placed in several different categories.
Alt-
hough Searle extensively researched this theory, his hypothesis was based on the work an
d ideas of several other thinkers. Searle also used the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, G
. C. J. Midgley, H. Paul Grice, P.F. Strawson, John Rawls, and William P. Alston to furth
er expand on his theories. Philosophers like Austin (1962), Grice (1957), and Searle (19
65, 1969, 1975) offered basic insight into this new theory of linguistic com-
munica-
tion based on the assumption that the minimal units of human communication are not ling
uis-
tic expressions, but rather the performance of certain kinds of acts, such as making state
ments, asking questions, giving directions, apologizing, thanking, and so on”. Austin defi
nes the performance of uttering words with a consequential purpose as “the per-
for-
mance of a locutionary act, and the study of utterances thus far and in these respects the s
tudy of locutions, or of the full units of speech” . These units of speech are not to-
kens of the symbol or word or sentence but rather units of linguistic communication and i
t is the production of the token in the performance of the speech act that constitutes the b
asic unit of linguistic communication”.According to Austin’s theory, these functional uni
ts of communication have prepositional or locutionary meaning, illocutionary meaning, a
nd perlocutionary force.

Chapter I. Theoretical aspects regarding speech acts.

Speech acts and meaning
Mak-

4
ing a statement may be the paradigmatic use of language, but there are all sorts of other things we ca
n do with words. We can make requests, ask questions, give orders, make promises, give thanks, off
er apologies, and so on. Moreover, almost any speech act is really the performance of several acts at
once, distinguished by different aspects of the speaker's intention: there is the act of say-
ing something, what one does in saying it, such as requesting or promising, and how one is trying to
affect one's audience.
The theory of speech acts is partly taxonomic and partly explanatory. It must systematically clas-
sisfy types of speech acts and the ways in which they can succeed or fail. It must reckon with the fac
t that the relationship between the words being used and the force of their utterance is often oblique.
For example, the sentence 'This is a pig sty' might be used nonliterally to state that a certain room is
messy and filthy and, further, to demand indirectly that it be straightened out and cleaned up. Even
when this sentence is used literally and directly, say to describe a certain area of a barnyard, the cont
ent of its utterance is not fully determined by its linguistic meaning--
in particular, the meaning of the word 'this' does not determine which area is being referred to. A ma
jor task for the theory of speech acts is to account for how speakers can succeed in what they do de-
spite the various ways in which linguistic meaning underdetermines use.
In general, speech acts are acts of communication. To communicate is to express a certain attitude,
and the type of speech act being performed corresponds to the type of attitude being expressed. For
example, a statement expresses a belief, a request expresses a desire, and an apology expresses a re-
gret. As an act of communication, a speech act succeeds if the audience identifies, in accordance wit
h the speaker's intention, the attitude being expressed.
Some speech acts, however, are not primarily acts of communication and have the function not of
communicating but of affecting institutional states of affairs. The examples considered thus far sug-
gest that performing a speech act, in particular an illocutionary act, is a matter of having a certain co
mmunica-
tive intention in uttering certain words. Such an act succeeds, the intention with which it is performe
d is fulfilled, if the audience recognizes that intention. This is not by magic, of course. One must cho
ose one's words in such a way that their utterance makes one's intention recognizable under the circu
mstanc-
es. However, as illustrated above, the utterance need not encode one's intention. So, in general, unde
rstanding an utterance is not merely a matter of decoding it.

5
 A specifically communicative intention is a reflexive intention, of the sort characterized by H. P.
Grice. This is an intention part of whose content is that it be recognized, indeed be recognized partly
on the basis that this is intended. Accordingly, it is an intention whose fulfillment consists in its rec
ogni-
tion. This feature distinguishes acts of communication from most sorts of acts, whose success does n
ot depend on anyone's recognizing the intention with which they are performed. One cannot succeed
in running a marathon just by virtue of someone's recognizing one's intention to do so, but one can s
ucceed in stating something, requesting something, etc., by virtue of one's addressee recogniz-
ing that one is stating it, requesting it, etc. This is success at the illocutionary level. It is a further ma
tter, a condition on the success of perlocutionary act, whether the addressee believes what one states
or does what one requests.

Classification of speech acts

Speech acts can be analyzed on three levels:
1.A locutionary act, the performance of an utterance: the actual utterance and its ostens
i-
ble meaning, comprising phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts corresponding to the verbal, syn
tactic and semantic aspects of any meaningful utterance;
2.an illocutionary act: the pragmatic 'illocutionary force' of the utterance, thus its in-
tended significance as a socially valid verbal action;
3.and in certain cases a further perlocutionary act: its actual effect, such as persuading
, convincing, scaring, enlightening, inspiring, or otherwise getting someone to do or reali
ze something, whether intended or not (Austin 1962)

Illocutionary acts
The concept of an illocutionary act is central to the concept of a speech act. Although th
ere are numerous opinions regarding how to define 'illocutionary acts', there are some kin
ds of acts which are widely accepted as illocutionary, as for example promising, ordering
some-
one, and bequeathing.Following the usage of, for example, John R. Searle, "speech act" i
s often meant to refer just to the same thing as the term illocutionary act, which John L.

6
 Austin had originally introduced in How to Do Things with Words (published posthu-
mous-
ly in 1962). Searle's work on speech acts is also commonly understood to refine Austin's
concep-
tion. However, some philosophers have pointed out a significant difference between the t
wo conceptions: whereas Austin emphasized the conventional interpretation of speech act
s, Searle emphasized a psychological interpretation (based on beliefs, intentions, etc.)
Accord-
ing to Austin's preliminary informal description, the idea of an "illocutionary act" can be
cap-
tured by emphasizing that "by saying something, we do something", as when someone iss
ues an order to someone to go by saying "Go!", or when a minister joins two people in m
ar-
riage saying, "I now pronounce you husband and wife." (Austin would eventually define t
he "illocutionary act" in a more exact manner.)
An interesting type of illocutionary speech act is that performed in the utterance of wha
t Austin calls performatives, typical instances of which are "I nominate John to be Presi-
dent", "I sentence you to ten years' imprisonment", or "I promise to pay you back." In the
se typical, rather explicit cases of performative sentences, the action that the sentence de
scribes (nominating, sentencing, promising) is performed by the utterance of the sentence
itself.
Classifying illocutionary speech acts
Searle (1975) has set up the following classification of illocutionary speech acts:

 Asser-
tives = speech acts that commit a speaker to believing the expressed proposition, e.g. reci
ting a creed
 Directives = speech acts that are to cause the hearer to take a particular action, e.g. re-
quests, commands and advice

7
 Commis-
sives = speech acts that commit a speaker to doing some future action, e.g. prom-
ises and oaths
 Expres-
sives = speech acts that express the speaker's attitudes and emotions towards the proposit
ion, e.g. congratulations, excuses and thanks
 Declara-
tions = speech acts that change the social sphere in accord with the proposition of the de
claration, e.g. baptisms or pronouncing someone husband and wife

Chapter II. The use of speech acts in humans’ life. Apologies

The use of speech act in humans’ life.
Speech acts are difficult to perform in a second language because learners may not kno
w the idiomatic expressions or cultural norms in the second language or they may trans-
fer their first language rules and conventions into the second language, assuming that suc
h rules are universal. Because the natural tendency for language learners is to fall back o
n what they know to be appropriate in their first language, it is important that these learn
ers understand exactly what they do in that first language in order to be able to recognize
what is transferable to other languages. Something that works in English might not trans
fer in meaning when translated into the second language. For example, the following re-
mark as uttered by a native English speaker could easily be misinterpreted by a native Ch
inese hearer:
Sarah: "I couldn’t agree with you more. "
Cheng: "Hmmm…." (Thinking: "She couldn’t agree with me? I thought she liked my ide
a!") .
An example of potential misunderstanding for an American learner of Japanese would b
e what is said by a dinner guest in Japan to thank the host. For the invitation and the mea
l the guests may well apologize a number of times in addition to using an expression of g
ratitude (arigatou gosaimasu) --
for instance, for the intrusion into the private home (sumimasen ojama shimasu), the co

8
mmo-
tion that they are causing by getting up from the table (shitsurei shimasu), and also for th
e fact that they put their host out since they had to cook the meal, serve it, and will have t
o do the dishes once the guests have left (sumimasen). American guests might think this t
o be rude or inappropriate and choose to compliment the host on the wonderful food and
festive atmosphere, or thank the host for inviting them, unaware of the social con-
ventions involved in performing such a speech act in Japanese. Although such compli-
ments or expression of thanks are also appropriate in Japanese, they are hardly enough fo
r native speakers of Japanese - not without a few apologies!

Apologies.

Apology(Merriam Webster; online dictionary)

1.a formal justification : defense, excuse
2.an admission of error or discourtesy accompanied by an expression of regret <a pub-
lic apology

1. The Empty Apology. “I’m sorry. I said I’m sorry.” The empty apology is all form but
no substance. It’s what you say to someone when you know you need to apologize, but a
re so annoyed or frustrated that you can’t muster even a modicum of real feeling to put b
ehind it. So you go through the motions, literally saying the words, but not meaning it. A
nd that ends up being pretty clear to the person receiving the message.
2. The Excessive Apology. “I’m so sorry! I feel so bad. I’m so sorry. Is there anything I
can do? I feel so bad about this…” In theory, apologizing is meant to rectify a wrong and
re-
build a damaged relationship. But with excessive apologies, you do no such thing. This ta
ctic, instead, has the perverse effect of drawing the attention to your own feelings, ra-
ther than to what you’ve done to another person. The excessive apology can come across
in a couple different ways. One type is when you insert so much emotion it seems over-
the-
top for the situation. You forget to distribute copies in advance of a meeting, and you’re
on the ground begging for forgiveness. Another form is when you apologize too many ti
9
mes for the transgression you’ve committed. You don’t grovel, but you do apologize four
, five, six times — indi-
rectly begging the other person to tell you it’s OK. In either case, your apology is ulti-
mately more focused on you, rather than the person you’ve harmed or repairing the rela-
tionship, which defeats the original purpose of an apology.
3. The Incomplete Apology. “I’m sorry that this happened.” Sometimes your apology is
edg-
ing toward effective and appropriate, but it just doesn’t quite hit the mark. Those who stu
dy apologizing for a living suggest that an effective apology has three key compo-
nents: taking responsibility for your role in a situation or event, and expressing regret; as
king forgiveness; and promising it won’t happen again (or that you’ll at least try to pre-
vent it in the future). The incomplete apology touches on a few of these elements, but not
all. For example, you might take partial responsibility for your role, but not express re-
gret or ask forgiveness. Or you might express some regret for the circumstances of the ot
her person, but not admit your role. (“I’m sorry that you feel this way.”) Either way, the
apology is incomplete — and so too is its likely effectiveness.
4. The Denial. “This simply wasn’t my fault.” Finally, sometimes, your ego gets the best
of you and you simply don’t apologize at all. Perhaps you’re so frustrated or angry that i
nstead of apologizing, you defend, deny, or self-pro-
tect. You grit your teeth, dig into your own worldview, and deny culpability. Because of
how hard it is to admit guilt, for some of us, this is as far as we’ll ever get. But as much
as it might feel strong in the moment, denial does little to repair a fractured relationship
and, if anything, likely exacerbates it.
In order to apologize effectively, you need to develop the capacity to control your emo-
tions and stay humble and focused on the experience of the other person, even when you
might be seething inside or unsettled with guilt. It’s not easy to do, especially when emot
ions are hot. If you feel like emotion might get the best of you, you should take a break.
You only get one chance to make an apology without coming across as excessive, so mak
e it count.
If it’s still hard to calm your emotions, step outside your own experience and consider t
he other person’s perspective. Work to understand it, and in doing so, you might find it’s

10
easi-
er to ultimately deliver that heartfelt apology. Stay focused as much as possible on the re
ason you’re doing this hard work of apologizing in the first place: presumably be-
cause you care about the other person and the relationship.
Final-
ly, apologizing also typically requires some commitment to personal change. If you’re tru
ly apologetic about what you did, you’ll want to commit to improvement –
and that may be outside your comfort zone. If you’ve failed to support your workers by
providing them with adequate resources for them to do their jobs, take concrete steps to-
ward rectifying the wrong. Keep it in the forefront of your mind. Make the new behavior
part of your routine. Even commit to change publicly to encourage accountability. In this
way, apologizing can not only repair a relationship, but it can also become a powerful ca
talyst for your own personal growth.

11
 Conclusion

All things considered, it can be said that there is no doubt that speech acts are an i
mportant marker of the communicative competence because they represent key moments
of linguistic and non-ver-
bal expression when the speaker’s intention must be communicated properly within a cult
ural context. Pragmatic failure in intercultural communication may result in embarrass-
ment, laughter, misunderstandings, or even outrage. The good news is that speech acts ar
e now being presented explicitly in many of the text-
books of dominant languages like English and Spanish. To conclude, the existing report I
must say that speech acts have convinced me that they must be integrated into our curri-
cu-
lum. Although I believe in the value of learning speech acts, we all agreed that it would b
e better to have them taught in all of the language classes, rather than condense them into
just one advanced language class. I often remark that I feel rushed and find it diffi-
cult to integrate the linguistic, strategic, and socio-cul-
tu-

12
ral information of one speech act before the class moved on to the next. In fact, most stud
ents need more time to understand and process the variables involved in speech acts, so t
hey can feel confident in both their linguistic competence and their performances.
Why apologizing is a good idea? If something you've done has caused pain for another pe
rson, it's a good idea to apologize, even if whatever you did was unintentional. This is be
cause apologizing opens up the doors to communication, which allows you to reconnect
with the person who was hurt. It also allows you to express regret that they have been hur
t, which lets them know you really care about their feelings; this can help them feel safer
with you again. Also, apologizing allows you to discuss what the "rules" should be in the
fu-
tu-
re, especially if a new one needs to be made, which is often the case when you didn't hurt
the other person intentionally. (Creating new rules for the relationship can help you be p
rotect-
ed from getting hurt in the future as well.) Basically, if you care about the other person a
nd the relationship, and you can avoid the offending behavior in the future, an apology is
usually a good idea.
This doesn't mean that you need to take responsibility for things that were not you
r fault. For example, you can express regret at unintentionally hurting someone's feelings
, but you don't have to say you "should have known better" if you truly feel there is no w
ay you could have known they would be hurt by your actions --
this is where creating a new rule can help. (For example, "I'm sorry I woke you! Now tha
t I know you don't want people to call you after 8 p.m., I will be careful not to do so.")
Tak-
ing responsibility also means specifying what you did that you believe was wrong, but ca
n entail gently mentioning what you believe was not wrong on your part. In this way, you
pro-
tect yourself from the feeling that if you are the first to apologize, you are taking respons
ibility for the whole conflict, or for the bulk of it.

13
 References

Austin, J. L. (1962). How to do things with words. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brown, P., & Levinson, S. (1978). Universals in language usage: Politeness phenomena. I
n E. N. Goody (Ed.), Questions and politeness: Strategies in social interactions (pp. 56-
289). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cohen, A. (1996) Speech Acts. In S.L. McKay, & N.H. Hornberger (Eds.), Sociolinguis-
tics and language teaching (pp. 383 – 420). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Grice, H.P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In A. Jaworski, & N. Coupland (Eds.), The d
iscourse reader (pp. 76-87). New York: Routledge.

Meechan, M., & Rees-Mil-

ler, J. (2001). Language in social sontexts. In W. O’Grady, J.Archibald, M. Aronoff, & J.
Rees-Mil-
ler (Eds.), Contemporary linguistics: An introduciotn. (Fourth edition). (pp. 537-
590). New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s.

Robin-
son, M. (1991). Introspective methodology in interlanguage pragmatics research. In G. K
asper (Ed.), Pragmatics of Japanese as native and target language (pp. 29-
84). (Technical Report; Vol 3). Honolulu: Second Language Teaching and Curriculum Ce
nter, University of Hawaii.

Scarcella, R. C. (1990). Communication difficulties in second language production, de-

velop-

14
ment, and instruction. In R. C. Scarcella, E.S. Andersen, & S. D. Krashen (Eds.), Develo
ping communicative competence in a second language: Series on issues in second langua
ge research. Boston: Heinle & Heinle Publishers.

Searle, J. (1965). What is a speech act? In P. P. Giglioli (Ed.), Language and social con-
text (pp.136–154). Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books.

Searle, J. (1969). Speech acts: Am essay in the philosophy of language. Cambridge: Cam
bridge University Press.

Searle, J. (1975). Indirect speech acts. In P. Cole and J. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and se-
mantics, vol. 3: Speech Acts (pp. 59–82). New York.

15