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Jack W. Meiland
To cite this article: Jack W. Meiland (1976) Psychologism in logic: Husserl's critique, Inquiry,
19:1-4, 325-339, DOI: 10.1080/00201747608601795
Article views: 47
Psychologism in Logic:
Husserl's Critique
Jack W. Meiland
University of Michigan
I. Introduction
Many philosophers have held that the laws of logic - such as the Prin-
ciple of Non-Contradiction (that no proposition can be both true and
false at the same time) - are laws descriptive of the intrinsic logical
structure of reality. These philosophers believe that reality has a logical
structure independently of the mind and that this structure is represented
by the structure of logic. Those who hold this view may differ as to
whether reality has this intrinsic structure contingently or necessarily.
If it is maintained that reality has this structure contingently, then it is
also natural to maintain that we learn the laws of logic (and the cor-
responding structure of reality) through experience rather than in an
a priori manner. Perhaps this was one of John Stuart Mill's motivations
for holding that the laws of logic were generalizations from experience:
The idea behind this view would be, on my suggestion, that if logical laws
describe the intrinsic (mind-independent) structure of reality and if this
particular structure is one among many possible structures that reality
could have, then we simply have to observe the nature of things to find
out which of the many possible structures reality does in fact have.
Someone might criticize this view by saying that it is not true that
reality could have had other logical structures instead of the one it does
have. One argument supporting this objection might run as follows: if
reality could have had other logical structures, then those other structures
would be described by other systems of logic; but other systems of logic
- systems which, for example, do not contain or conform with the Prin-
ciple of Non-Contradiction - are inconceivable; therefore it is not
possible for reality to have had a different logical structure than it does
have. Notice that the objector agrees with the view that reality has an
intrinsic logical structure; he simply does not agree that reality has this
structure contingently. Instead he believes that reality has this structure
necessarily, that reality could have had no other structure than it does
have.
But there are other philosophers who believe that reality has no in-
herent logical structure and that logical structure is imposed on experience
by the mind in one way or another. Some of those who take this view
believe that logical laws are conventions either freely and consciously
adopted or else (perhaps unconsciously) developed through time by the
society or community employing those laws. These philosophers would
explain the inconceivability of other systems of laws in the following
way: what is possible or conceivable is determined by the logical laws
that we do employ; we have no other standard or criterion of possibility
than this; so of course all other laws of logic which are incompatible with
our present laws are going to be judged impossible or inconceivable on the
basis of our present laws. But an objector might then argue that this
renders the conventionalist view incoherent: the conventionalist view
holds that the laws of logic are conventions; but there are many alterna-
Psychotogism in Logic 327
tive conventions available; we might have adopted some other conven-
tions instead of the ones we now have; this is, at any rate, a possibility;
but then it follows from the conventionalist position that we might have
had other laws of logic than we now have; so the conventionalist cannot
even maintain that other systems of logic are inconceivable. Moreover,
conventionalism has the following further consequence: in order to ex-
plain the inconceivability of other systems of logic, the conventionalist
would have to say that they are inconceivable given the laws of logic
which we do use; but he would also have to say that in some larger sense
they are not inconceivable since they are alternative conventions which
we might possibly have adopted; yet, he can say this only if he has some
criterion of possibility according to which these alternative conventions
are possible conventions for us to use; this criterion of possibility cannot
be the conventions we do use, since once we have adopted the conventions
we do use, certain alternative conventions are thereby rendered inconceiv-
able; and there is no other criterion of possibility available to us now.
So it is not clear that the conventionalist can even express his own view
that other conventions are possible. The conventionalist may well reply
that other systems of logic are not inconceivable and in fact he conceives
of them by conceiving of different conventions which we might have
adopted. But then conventionalism cannot explain the apparent necessity
of the laws of logic. And if it tries to explain this necessity by saying that
it is a necessity relative to the conventions we do use, then it has no way
- no criterion of possibility, as shown above - to explain how alterna-
tive conventions are themselves possible.
At this point we are in the following situation. Any theory which holds
that the laws of logic are contingent - either mind-independent but
nevertheless contingent structures of reality, or else arbitrary conventions
employed by the mind - encounters the objection that they cannot be
merely contingent because alternatives to them are inconceivable. This
objection cannot be raised to the view that the laws of logic describe a
necessary structure of reality. But this view is open to a different objec-
tion, namely that it is not explained by this view why this structure is
necessary. To say that this structure is necessary is perhaps only to say
that any other structure is inconceivable; it is not to explain why other
structures are inconceivable.
These seeming deficiencies of the theories already described help to
make the psychologistic theory of logic attractive. The psychologistic
theory holds roughly that logic is a branch of psychology. Psychology
328 JackW.Meiland
attempts to describe the workings of the mind; and as a branch of psy-
chology, so does logic. But logic does not attempt to describe or explain
how we do think in particular cases; it does not try to explain why a par-
ticular person first has one thought and then has another thought. In-
stead it is concerned with the parameters within which thinking takes
place. It is concerned with the limits of thinking. It specifies what can be
thought and what cannot be thought. In other words, it tells us what is
conceivable by us. For example, the Principle of Non-Contradiction tells
us that we cannot conceive of a proposition which is both true and false
at the same time and in the same respect. So one major virtue of the psy-
chologistic theory is that while it does not thoroughly explain* why
alternative systems of logic are inconceivable, it at least indicates the area
in which such an explanation is to be found. It is to be found in the nature
of the mind. Thus, on the psychologistic theory, logic does not deal with
mind-independent properties of reality; for it does not deal with proper-
ties of reality at all. It deals with properties of the mind. And the theory
implies, if not explicitly states, that since the mind could have been con-
stituted other than it is, we could have had different laws of logic than
we do have. (We will examine this latter feature of the theory more
closely later.)
I have tried to explain what makes the psychologistic theory of logic
attractive. It is attractive because it offers an outline of an explanation
of why our present laws of logic seem necessary to us and why alternative
laws seen inconceivable, an explanation in terms of the nature of the
mind rather than the nature of reality. Now I want to examine the psy-
chologistic theory further by discussing the most penetrating and pro-
found critique of that theory known to me, the critique to be found in the
first volume of Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations.2 I think that
we can learn a great deal about the nature of the theory itself and of the
underlying issues through such a discussion. Husserl discusses both the
general psychologistic theory and particular versions of psychologism put
forward by various philosophers. I want to focus on his consideration of
the views of B. Erdmann. It may be true, as John Passmore claims, that
'Mill, in particular, is the villain of the piece; it is his psychological
approach to logic which Husserl especially attacks'.3 But I find that
Husserl's discussion of Erdmann contains many of the points he makes
against other psychologistic theories, including Mill's, and in addition
(and more importantly) gets much further into the issues due to the (in
my opinion) much greater sophistication of Erdmann's views. I will
Psychologism in Logic 329
attempt to defend Erdmann against many of Husserl's criticisms. Then
I will add several of my own criticisms of Erdmann.
One need only consider the genuine sense of the laws of logic to see
that they do not do this [make an assertion about the real]. Even
where they speak of judgments, they do not refer to what psychological
laws seek to indicate by this word, i.e., judgments as real experiences,
but they mean judgments in the sense of statement-meanings in specie,
meanings which retain their identity whether serving to found actual
acts of assertion or not, and without regard as to who asserts them.
(157)
Here Husserl invites us to examine the laws of logic and to see that they
are about concepts (they state 'what those concepts contain') rather than
about human psychology. Perhaps he thinks that if the laws of logic
were about the mind, they would mention the mind (or at least the human
being). For example, if the Principle of Non-Contradiction were a law
about human psychology, it might be stated in the following form: 'No
human bemg can conceive a proposition as bemg both true and not true
at the same time'. Here, at least, human beings are mentioned, and so the
law is a law of human psychology. But in fact the correct statement of the
Principle of Non-Contradiction does not mention human beings. Hence
it is not about human beings and therefore not about their psychology.
One determines this merely by just looking to see what the laws of logic
are about.
If this is what Husserl is saying, then I think that his objection is less
than convincing. It is true that the laws of logic do not mention beings
or their psychology. But we must distinguish between what a statement
is explicitly about and what it is true in virtue of. The Principle of Non-
Contradiction is normally stated without reference to human beings. But
it is true for human beings in virtue of their nature, if the psychologists
theory is correct. Perhaps an analogy will help. Kepler's first two laws
Psychologism in Logic 335
of planetary motion - the law of elliptical movement and the law of
equal areas - are true in virtue of the presence and nature of gravity.
But Kepler's laws do not, of course, refer to or mention gravity. If
gravity were different, as it might well have been - if, for example,
gravity had varied with the cube of the distance instead of the square -
then planetary motions would have been described by different laws.
Just as the laws of planetary motion are not about gravity but are true in
virtue of gravity, so too Erdmann could claim that the laws of logic are
not about the mind or about standard psychological properties but in-
stead are true in virtue of psychological properties or of the nature of the
mind. The laws of logic are consequences of the nature of the mind. Hus-
serl shows that he misconstrues the psychologistic theory by comparing
the laws of logic on the psychologistic theory to associationist laws of
psychology (156). The difference in status between these is immense.
Associationist psychology attempts to construct a physics or mechanics
of thought by describing the way in which the mind actually works and
in particular how one mental state leads to another. But the laws of logic
describe the limits of understanding; they describe consequences of the
way the mind works rather than the way the mind works. So the laws of
logic are psychological laws in this extended sense. But they are nonethe-
less contingent and dependent on the nature of the mind.
Using this theory, Durkheim can account for the various properties of
concepts which lead others to take the Platonic view that concepts are
independent of human beings. For example, the impersonality and ob-
jectivity of concepts is due to their being social, rather than individual,
creations. Their apparent immutability is accounted for in the same gen-
eral way (see 481-2). Now, I think that the availability of the Durk-
heimian theory of concepts considerably strengthens our reply to Husserl.
For we can agree with Husserl that the laws of logic are about concepts
and at the same time maintain that the laws of logic are consequences of
human psychology. For on this theory of concepts, concepts themselves
can be regarded, at least in part, as consequences of the nature of the
mind.
In the actual thought of normal persons the actual belief of a law of thought
does not usually occur, but it can scarcely be said that it cannot thus occur,
since philosophers like Epicurus and Hegel have denied the law of contradic-
tion . . . One should also reflect that it is in the same sense impossible to think
the negation of the consequences of primitive logical principles as the negation
of these principles themselves. It is well-known, however, that we can be mis-
taken regarding complicated syllogistic or arithmetical theorems . . . (158)