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Sacrificing the rights of workers

Ontario rules give balance of power to unions

Keith Godin and to direct pressure from union organizers A new study published by Timo-
Niels Veldhuis and co-workers (Clemens and Godin, thy Bartkiw (2008) in Canadian Public
2008). Union organizers and workers Policy found that the 2005 changes are
Despite maintaining some of the most who want union representation are able already having an impact on the vol-
pro-union labour relations laws in North to go to the homes of other workers or ume of union organizing attempts and
America, changes made by the Ontario approach them in public places to try their success rates. Specifically, these
government in 2005 further tilted the bal- to persuade them to sign union mem- changes have led to an average increase
ance of power towards unions (see Go- bership cards. The use of card-checks of seven new bargaining units certified
din et al., 2006). The then newly-elected also means decisions made in favour or per month. This translates into an over-
McGuinty government claimed that the against union organization will be pub- all increase in certification success rates
changes promoted “greater fairness and licly known. of 10.2 percentage points.
balance” (Ontario, 2005). It’s hard to see In addition, under a card-check The study also found that the in-
how. The government removed secret bal- system, many employers only become crease in the number of new bargain-
lot voting requirements to certify a union aware of unionization campaigns once ing units certified had an effect on the
and restored the ability of the opaque they are virtually complete. As a re- number of workers covered by collective
Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB), sult, the union is often the only source bargaining agreements. That is, the 2005
the organization charged with adminis- of information for workers, hindering changes increased the number of work-
tering labour relations laws, to automati- their ability to make informed decisions. ers covered by an average of about 380
cally certify unions. New evidence shows Workers must have access to a full range per month.
why unions cheered the changes. of information regarding the effects of These results have been corroborated
The McGuinty government made a their decision. by a number of other academic stud-
host of changes to the province’s labour Second, the government expanded ies. The research has consistently shown
relations laws, such as reducing em- the ability of the OLRB to remedially that when workers are afforded the op-
ployees’ ability to access information on (automatically) certify unions. In light portunity to make private, anonymous
decertification, repealing union salary of the fact that the OLRB has been decisions through secret ballot voting,
disclosure, and increasing the OLRB’s found to be one the least transparent la- the result is lower levels of union certi-
power to reinstate fired employees. Two bour relations boards in North America fication (for example, see Johnson, 2002;
of the most significant changes were re- (see Karabegovic et al., 2005), giving the Riddell, 2004; and Slinn, 2004). Had the
lated to certification activities: the pro- board more discretion to decide work- removal of secret-ballot voting been ex-
cess by which unions become the bar- ers’ fate is hardly an improvement in bal- tended from the construction sector to
gaining agent for a group of workers. ance and fairness. Most jurisdictions in all industries, the results would have
First, the requirement for secret ballot North America either do not allow for likely been even more damning.
voting to approve a union was eliminated remedial certification or permit it only The impact that these changes have
for the construction sector and replaced in cases where there is no reasonable had thus far is just the beginning. A
with a card-check system. Under a card- possibility that a free election can be much larger impact should be expected
check system, unions are automatically held (Godin et al., 2006). in the future as the full effect of the
certified if a majority of workers (55%) Of course, measures of this kind are changes is felt.
sign union membership cards. advocated by most unions in Canada The elimination of mandatory votes
The most significant problem with because removing the democratic pro- for the construction industry and the
card-checks is that they are inherently cess in union certification increases the increase in power given to the On-
confrontational and can subject workers success rates of union organizing efforts. tario Labour Relations Board further

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tilted the balance of power in favour of
unions, providing them with greater in-
fluence in organizing drives. While the
Canada’s health care
system—poor value
McGuinty government sold the changes
as improvements that would promote
“fairness and balance,” the changes have

for your tax dollars


clearly taken the province in the oppo-
site direction.

References
Bartkiw, Timothy (2008). Manufacturing Nadeem Esmail systems than Canada did. The other 25
Descent? Labour Law and Union Orga- developed nations who maintain uni-
nizing in the Province of Ontario. Cana- The beginning of May marks the end of versal health insurance programs spent
dian Public Policy 34, 1: 111–131. income tax season in Canada. While the less than we did—as much as 38% less
Clemens, Jason, and Keith Godin (2008). task of completing our personal tax re- (as a percentage of GDP) in the case of
The “Un-Democracy” of Unions. Fraser turns and the size of those tax bills slowly Japan (Esmail and Walker, 2007).
Forum (February): 28–29. fades from our memories, some Canadi- Given this level of expenditure, you
ans may find themselves taking solace in might expect that Canadians receive
Godin, Keith, Milagros Palacios, Jason Cle-
mens, Niels Veldhuis, and Amela Kara- a belief that the taxes they pay—about world-class access to health care. But the
begovic (2006). An Empirical Compari- one-third of which are income taxes evidence demonstrates that this is not so.
son of Labour Relations Laws in Canada (Veldhuis and Palacios, 2008)—at least Consider Canada’s waiting lists. In
and the United States. Studies in Labour purchase a high quality, universal access 2007, waiting lists for access to health
Markets No. 2. Fraser Institute. health care program. Specifically, over care in Canada reached a new all-time
Johnson, Susan (2002). Card-Check or Man-
one-half of the personal income taxes high of 18.3 weeks from general practi-
datory Representation Vote? How the Canadians just paid in aggregate are re- tioner referral to treatment by a special-
Type of Union Recognition Procedure quired to cover the cost of our taxpayer- ist. Despite substantial increases in both
Affects Union Certification Success. The funded health care program (Statistics health spending and federal cash trans-
Economic Journal 112: 344–361. Canada, 2007; calculations by author). fers to the provinces for health care over
Unfortunately, as the following data the last decade or so, this wait time is
Karabegovic, Amela, Milagros Palacios, Ja-
son Clemens, and Niels Veldhuis (2005). clearly shows, Canada’s taxpayers are 54% longer than the overall median wait
The Transparency of Labour Relations not receiving the same sort of value that time of 11.9 weeks back in 1997 (Esmail
Boards in Canada and the United States. their counterparts in other nations are and Walker with Bank, 2007; Esmail et
Studies in Labour Markets No. 1. Fraser when it comes to universally accessible al., 2007).
Institute. health care insurance. Canada’s waiting lists are also, ac-
Ontario, Ministry of Labour (2005). La-
To begin with, Canadians are funding cording to available evidence, among
bour Relations Statute Law Amend- the developed world’s third most expen- the longest in the developed world. For
ment Act, 2005. Backgrounder (June 13). sive universal access health insurance example, a 2007 survey of individuals
<http://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/ system. On an age-adjusted basis (older in seven nations, six of which maintain
news/2005/05-78b.html>. people require more care) in the most universal access health insurance pro-
recent year for which comparable data grams, published in the journal Health
Riddell, Chris (2004). Union Certification
Success Under Voting Versus Card- are available, only Iceland and Switzer- Affairs found that:
Check Procedures: Evidence from Brit- land spent more (as a share of GDP) on ■ Canadians were more likely to expe-
ish Columbia, 1978-1998. Industrial and their universal access health insurance rience waiting times of more than
Labour Relations Review 57, 4: 493–517.

Slinn, Sara (2004). An Empirical Analysis


of the Effects of the Change from Card- How Good is Canadian Health Care?
Check to Mandatory Vote Certification. Further Reading: by Nadeem Esmail and Michael Walker
Canadian Labour and Employment Law Available at www.fraserinstitute.org.
Journal 11: 258–301. 

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