PROVREM - GROUP ACTIVITY
xxx xxx xxx
Case 1
Film Development Council of the Philippines vs SM Prime Holdings Inc
GR No 197937 April 3 2013
Case 2
Same case
Case 3
Teofisto et al vs Consolacion GR No 154270 March 9 2010
Case 4
Spouses Bill and Victoria Hing vs Alezander Choachuy GR No 179376
June 26 2013
Case 5
Segundo Lim vs Court of Appeals GR No 147524 June 20 2006
Case 6
USC vs CA GR No L-79237 October 18 1988 166 SCRA 570
Case 7
Engr Ranulfo vs Nestor Villasin GR No 174929 June 27 2008
Case 8
Valeriana vs Quijano GR No 173606 December 3 2012
Case 9
Cabrera vs Getaruela GR No 164213 April 21 2009
Case 10
No case indicated
Case 1 Film Development Council of the Philippines vs SM Prime
Holdings Inc GR No 197937 April 3 2013
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 197937. April 3, 2013.]
FILM DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:
Petitioner appeals the Orders 1 dated February 21, 2011 and July 25,
2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 166
which granted respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground of litis
pendentia.
The factual antecedents:
Respondent SM Prime Holdings, Inc. is the owner and operator of
cinema houses at SM Cebu in Cebu City. Under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
owners, proprietors and lessees of theaters and cinema houses are
subject to amusement tax as provided in Section 140, Book II, Title
One, which reads:
SECTION 140. Amusement Tax. —
(a) The province may levy an amusement tax to be collected from the
proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls,
circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement at a rate of
not more than thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts from
admission fees.
(b) In the case of theaters or cinemas, the tax shall first be deducted
and withheld by their proprietors, lessees, or operators and paid to the
provincial treasurer before the gross receipts are divided between said
proprietors, lessees, or operators and the distributors of the
cinematographic films.
(d) The sangguniang panlalawigan may prescribe the time, manner,
terms and conditions for the payment of tax. In case of fraud or failure
to pay the tax, the sangguniang panlalawigan may impose such
surcharges, interest and penalties as it may deem appropriate.
On June 21, 1993, the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Cebu City
approved City Tax Ordinance No. LXIX 2 pursuant to Section 140, in
relation to Section 151 3 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Chapter XI of said ordinance provides: ScaEIT
CHAPTER XI
Amusement Tax
SECTION 42. Rate of Tax. — There shall be paid to the Office of the
City Treasurer by the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters,
cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia and other places of
amusement an amusement tax at the rate of thirty percent (30%) of
the gross receipts from admission fees.
SECTION 43. Manner of Payment. — In the case of theaters or
cinemas, the tax shall first be deducted and withheld by their
proprietors, lessee, or operators and paid to the city treasurer before
the gross receipts are divided between said proprietors, lessee,
operators and the distributors of the cinematographic films.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 45. Time of Payment. — The tax shall be due and payable
within the first twenty (20) days of the succeeding month.
On June 7, 2002, Congress approved R.A. No. 9167 4 which created
the Film Development Council of the Philippines, herein petitioner.
Petitioner's mandate includes the development and implementation of
"an incentive and reward system for the producers based on merit to
encourage the production of quality films." 5 The Cinema Evaluation
Board (CEB) was established to review and grade films in accordance
with criteria and standards and procedures it shall formulate subject to
the approval of petitioner.
Films reviewed and graded favorably by the CEB are given the
following privileges: HIaAED
Section 13. Privileges of Graded Films. — Films which have obtained
an "A" or "B" grading from the Council pursuant to Sections 11 and 12
of this Act shall be entitled to the following privileges:
a. Amusement tax reward. — A grade "A" or "B" film shall entitle its
producer to an incentive equivalent to the amusement tax imposed
and collected on the graded films by cities and municipalities in Metro
Manila and other highly urbanized and independent component cities
in the Philippines pursuant to Sections 140 and 151 of Republic Act
No. 7160 at the following rates:
1. For grade "A" films — 100% of the amusement tax collected on
such films; and
2. For grade "B" films. — 65% of the amusement tax collected on such
films. The remaining thirty-five (35%) shall accrue to the funds of the
Council.
For the purpose of implementing the above incentive system, R.A. No.
9167 mandates the remittance of the proceeds of the amusement tax
collected by the local government units (LGUs) to petitioner.
Section 14. Amusement Tax Deduction and Remittances. — All
revenue from the amusement tax on the graded film which may
otherwise accrue to the cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila
and highly urbanized and independent component cities in the
Philippines pursuant to Section 140 of Republic Act No. 7160 during
the period the graded film is exhibited, shall be deducted and withheld
by the proprietors, operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and
Page 1 of 33
remitted within thirty (30) days from the termination of the exhibition to
the Council which shall reward the corresponding amusement tax to
the producers of the graded film within fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof.
Proprietors, operators and lessees of theaters or cinemas who fail to
remit the amusement tax proceeds within the prescribed period shall
be liable to a surcharge equivalent to five percent (5%) of the amount
due for each month of delinquency which shall be paid to the Council.
(Emphasis supplied.)
To ensure enforcement of the above provision, the law empowered
petitioner not only to impose administrative fines and penalties but
also to cause or initiate criminal or administrative prosecution to the
violators. 6
On January 27, 2009, petitioner through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) sent a demand letter to respondent for the payment of
the sum of P76,836,807.08 representing the amusement tax rewards
due to producers of 89 films graded "A" and "B" which were shown at
SM cinemas from September 11, 2003 to November 4, 2008. 7
Sometime in May 2009, the City of Cebu filed in the RTC of Cebu City
(Cebu City RTC) a petition 8 for declaratory relief with application for a
writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioner, docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB-35529. The City of Cebu sought to declare Section 14
of R.A. No. 9167 as invalid and unconstitutional on grounds that: (1) it
violates the basic policy on local autonomy; (2) it constitutes an undue
limitation of the taxing power of LGUs; (3) it unduly deprives LGUs of
the revenue from the amusement tax imposed on theatre owners and
operators; and (4) it amounts to technical malversation since revenue
from the collection of amusement taxes that would otherwise accrue to
and form part of the general fund of the LGU concerned would now be
directly awarded to a private entity — the producers of graded films —
bypassing the budget process of the LGU and without the proper
appropriation ordinance from the sanggunian. 9 IHSTDE
A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued by the Cebu City RTC
enjoining petitioner and its duly constituted agents from collecting the
amusement tax incentive award from the owners, proprietors or
lessees of theaters and cinema houses within the City of Cebu;
imposing surcharge on the unpaid amount; filing any case or suit of
whatever kind or nature due to or arising from the failure to deduct,
withhold and remit the amusement tax incentives award on the graded
films of petitioner; and initiating administrative or criminal prosecution
against the said owners, proprietors or lessees. 10
On October 16, 2009, petitioner sued the respondent for the payment
of P76,836,807.08 representing the unpaid amusement tax incentive
reward (with 5% surcharge for each month of delinquency) due to the
producers of 89 graded films which were shown at SM Cinemas in
Cebu City from September 11, 2003 to November 4, 2008, plus a 5%
surcharge for each month of delinquency until fully paid. Said
collection suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 72238 of the RTC of
Pasig City (Pasig City RTC), Branch 166. 11
Petitioner filed a Comment (In Lieu of Answer) 12 in Civil Case No.
CEB-35529 praying for the dismissal of the petition filed by the City of
Cebu.
Meanwhile, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 13 in Civil Case No.
72238 arguing that petitioner's complaint merits outright dismissal
considering that its claim had already been extinguished by
respondent's prior payment or remittance of the subject amusement
taxes to the City of Cebu. Respondent called attention to Section 26 of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9167 which
directed petitioner to execute a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
with proprietors, operators and lessees of theaters and cinemas as
well as movie producers, on the systems and procedures to be
followed for the collection, remittance and monitoring of the
amusement taxes withheld on graded films. In the apparent absence
of such MOA and the "general procedure/process" duly adopted by all
proprietors, operators and lessees of theaters or cinemas, respondent
has been withholding such taxes and remitting the same to the City of
Cebu pursuant to Cebu City Tax Ordinance No. LXIX, as shown by the
Certification 14 dated February 5, 2009 issued by the Office of the
Treasurer of Cebu City stating that respondent "had religiously
remitted their monthly amusement taxes due to the Cebu City
Government." Respondent pointed out that even the Cebu City
Government recognizes that when it receives the amusement taxes
collected or withheld by the owners, operators and proprietors of
theaters and cinema houses on graded films, it is mandated to forward
the said taxes to petitioner. EcSaHA
In its Comment 15 on the motion to dismiss, petitioner argued that
Section 14 of R.A. No. 9167 is valid and constitutional. As to
respondent's defense of prior payment, petitioner asserted that the
execution of a MOA with the proprietors, owners and lessees of
theaters and cinema houses is not a condition sine qua non for a valid
enforcement of the provisions of R.A. No. 9167. The IRR cited by
respondent cannot prevail over the clear import of the law on which it
is based, and hence respondent cannot invoke it to excuse non-
payment of the amusement tax incentive rewards due to the producers
of graded films which should have been remitted to petitioner in
accordance with Section 14 of R.A. No. 9167. Petitioner pointed out
that from the time R.A. No. 9167 took effect up to the present, all the
cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and highly urbanized
and independent component cities in the Philippines, with the sole
exception of Cebu City and a number of theater establishments
therein, have unanimously acceded to and have faithfully complied
with the mandate of said law notwithstanding the absence of a MOA.
Respondent filed its Reply 16 to petitioner's Comment maintaining that
its remittance of the amusement tax incentive reward to the City of
Cebu extinguished its obligation to petitioner, and arguing that the
case should be dismissed on the additional ground of litis pendentia.
On August 13, 2010, respondent filed in Civil Case No. CEB-35529 a
Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached Comment-in-Intervention.
17 In its Comment-in-Intervention With Interpleader, respondent
prayed that the judgment on the validity and constitutionality of
Sections 13 and 14 of R.A. No. 9167 include a pronouncement on its
rights and duties as a consequence of such judgment, as it clearly has
a legal interest in the success of either party in the case. 18 On
October 21, 2010, the Cebu City RTC granted respondent's motion for
intervention. 19
On February 21, 2011, the Pasig City RTC issued the assailed order
granting the motion to dismiss, holding that the action before the Cebu
City RTC (Civil Case No. CEB-35529) is the appropriate vehicle for
litigating the issues between the parties in Civil Case No. 72238.
Moreover, said court found all the elements of litis pendentia present
and accordingly dismissed the complaint. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. CTSAaH
In a direct recourse to this Court, petitioner advances the following
questions of law:
I
THE RTC, BRANCH 166, OF PASIG CITY UTTERLY IGNORED AND
DISREGARDED THE WELL-SETTLED RULE THAT UNLESS AND
UNTIL A SPECIFIC PROVISION OF LAW IS DECLARED INVALID
AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL, THE SAME IS ENTITLED TO
OBEDIENCE AND RESPECT.
II
THE RTC, BRANCH 166, OF PASIG CITY ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 72238 ON THE GROUND OF
LITIS PENDENTIA. 20
Petitioner reiterates that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and unless and until a specific provision of law is
declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and binding for
all intents and purposes. In dismissing the complaint, the Pasig City
RTC abdicated its solemn duty and jurisdiction to rule on the
constitutional issues raised by respondent in Civil Case No. 72238
upon the mistaken assumption that only the Cebu City RTC in Civil
Case No. CEB-35529 can directly determine the constitutionality of
Page 2 of 33
Sections 13 and 14 of R.A. No. 9167 and the indispensability of a
MOA in the remittance to petitioner of amusement tax rewards due to
the producers of graded films. Petitioner further contends that,
contrary to the ruling of the Pasig City RTC, the principle of judicial
courtesy is not applicable because a judgment in Civil Case No. CEB-
35529 will not result in rendering moot the issues brought before the
Pasig City RTC in Civil Case No. 72238.
The petition has no merit. EHTSCD
We do not subscribe to petitioner's view that the dismissal of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 72238 amounts to an abdication of the
Pasig City RTC's concurrent jurisdiction to settle constitutional
questions involving a statute or its implementing rules. The 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides for specific grounds for the
dismissal of any complaint in civil cases including those where the trial
court has competence and authority to hear and decide the issues
raised and relief sought. One of these grounds is litis pendentia.
Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to
a situation where two actions are pending between the same parties
for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes
unnecessary and vexatious. 21 It is based on the policy against
multiplicity of suits 22 and authorizes a court to dismiss a case motu
proprio. 23
Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, thus provides:
SECTION 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to
dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause[.]
The requisites in order that an action may be dismissed on the ground
of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as
representing the same interest in both actions; (b) the identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts, and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata
in the other. 24 HcTEaA
Petitioner submits that while there is identity of parties in Civil Case
Nos. CEB-35529 and 72238, the second and third requisites are
absent. It points out that in the former, it is not claiming any monetary
award but merely prayed for the dismissal of the declaratory relief
petition. Moreover, since the issues raised in the former case are
purely legal, petitioner is not necessarily called upon to present
testimonial or documentary evidence to prove factual matters.
Petitioner thus concludes that the judgment in former case would not
amount to res judicata in the latter case. Petitioner further notes that
when a judgment dismissing the former case is appealed and the
assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9167 are declared constitutional by this
Court, petitioner will not be automatically awarded the unpaid
amusement taxes it is claiming against respondent in Civil Case No.
72238.
Petitioner's submissions fail to persuade.
The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is
not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject
matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the
public policy that the same subject matter should not be the subject of
controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting
judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and
status of persons, 25 and also to avoid the costs and expenses
incident to numerous suits. 26
Among the several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits
relate to a single or common cause of action are: (1) whether the
same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second
causes of action; and (2) whether the defenses in one case may be
used to substantiate the complaint in the other. 27
The determination of whether there is an identity of causes of action
for purposes of litis pendentia is inextricably linked with that of res
judicata, each constituting an element of the other. In either case, both
relate to the sound practice of including, in a single litigation, the
disposition of all issues relating to a cause of action that is before a
court. 28
In this case, what petitioner failed to take into account is that the Cebu
City RTC allowed respondent to intervene in Civil Case No. CEB-
35529 by way of an interpleader action as to which government entity
— whether petitioner or the Cebu City Government — should have
remitted the amusement taxes it collected from the admission fees of
graded films shown in respondent's cinemas in Cebu City. It must be
noted that since 1993 when City Tax Ordinance No. LXIX was
enforced, respondent had been faithfully remitting amusement taxes to
the City of Cebu and because of the collection suit filed by petitioner,
such defense of prior payment and evidence to prove it which
respondent could have presented at the trial in Civil Case No. 72238
would be the same defense and evidence necessary to sustain
respondent's interpleader action in Civil Case No. CEB-35529 before
the Cebu City RTC. Also, in both cases, respondent had raised the
matter of conflicting provisions of R.A. No. 9167 and Local
Government Code of 1991, while petitioner pleaded and argued the
constitutionality and validity of Sections 13 and 14 of R.A. No. 9167.
TCIDSa
The interpleader action of respondent/intervenor, anchored on its
defense of prior payment, would be considered by the Cebu City RTC
in its final determination of the parties' rights and interests as it
resolves the legal questions. The Pasig City RTC is likewise
confronted with the legal and constitutional issues in the collection suit,
alongside with respondent's defense of prior payment. It is evident that
petitioner's claim against the respondent hinges on the correct
interpretation of the conflicting provisions of the Local Government
Code of 1991 and R.A. No. 9167. There could be no doubt that a
judgment in either case would constitute res judicata to the other.
Sound practice thus dictates that the common factual and legal issues
be resolved in a single proceeding.
We also find no reversible error in the Pasig City RTC's ruling that Civil
Case No. CEB-35529 is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues
raised by petitioner and respondent in Civil Case No. 72238.
Under the established jurisprudence on litis pendentia, the following
considerations predominate in the ascending order of importance in
determining which action should prevail: (1) the date of filing, with
preference generally given to the first action filed to be retained; (2)
whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt
the later action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its
dismissal; and (3) whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for
litigating the issues between the parties. 29
Moreover, considering the predicament of respondent, we also find
relevant the criterion of the consideration of the interest of justice we
enunciated in Roa v. Magsaysay. 30 In applying this standard, what
was asked was which court would be "in a better position to serve the
interests of justice," taking into account (a) the nature of the
controversy, (b) the comparative accessibility of the court to the parties
and (c) other similar factors. 31
In this case, all things considered, there can be no doubt Civil Case
No. CEB-35529 is the appropriate vehicle to determine the rights of
petitioner and respondent. In that declaratory relief case instituted by
the City of Cebu, to which respondent had been remitting the subject
amusement taxes being claimed by petitioner in Civil Case No. 72238,
the issue of validity or constitutionality of Sections 13 and 14 of R.A.
No. 9167 was directly pleaded and argued between petitioner and the
City of Cebu, with subsequent inclusion of respondent as intervenor.
Moreover, the presence of City of Cebu as party plaintiff would afford
proper relief to respondent in the event the Cebu City RTC renders
judgment sustaining the validity of the said provisions. Respondent
had vigorously asserted in both courts that it had remitted the
Page 3 of 33
amusement taxes in good faith to the City of Cebu which had
threatened sanctions for non-compliance with City Tax Ordinance No.
LXIX, and that it should not be made to pay once again the same
taxes to petitioner. As equally dire consequences for non-compliance
with the demand for payment having been made by petitioner, such
defense of good faith is best ventilated in Civil Case No. CEB-35529
where the City of Cebu is a party. ADHaTC
Petitioner's insistence that the Pasig City RTC proceed with trial
notwithstanding the pendency of Civil Case No. CEB-35529 before the
Cebu City RTC is thus untenable. To allow the parties to litigate the
same issues upon the same evidence and defenses will only defeat
the public policy reasons behind litis pendentia, which, like the rule on
forum shopping, aims to prevent the unnecessary burdening of our
courts and undue taxing of the manpower and financial resources of
the judiciary; to avoid the situation where co-equal courts issue
conflicting decisions over the same cause; and to preclude one party
from harassing the other party through the filing of an unnecessary or
vexatious suit. 32
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The
Orders dated February 21, 2011 and July 25, 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 166 are hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin and Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (Film Development Council v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc., G.R. No.
197937, [April 3, 2013], 708 PHIL 169-183)
Case 2
Same case
Case 3 Teofisto et al vs Consolacion GR No 154270 March 9 2010
[G.R. No. 154270. March 9, 2010.]
TEOFISTO OÑO, PRECY O. NAMBATAC,
VICTORIA O. MANUGAS and POLOR O.
CONSOLACION, petitioners, vs. VICENTE N.
LIM, respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
The subject of controversy is Lot No. 943 of the
Balamban Cadastre in Cebu City, covered by Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. RO-9969-(O-20449), over which the
contending parties in this action for quieting of title, initiated by
respondent Vicente N. Lim (Lim) in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Cebu City, assert exclusive ownership, to the exclusion
of the other. In its decision dated July 30, 1996, 1 the RTC
favored Lim, and ordered the cancellation of OCT No. RO-9969-
(O-20449) and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the
name of Luisa Narvios-Lim (Luisa), Lim's deceased mother and
predecessor-in-interest.
On appeal (CA-GR CV No. 57823), the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC on January 28, 2002. 2 It later
denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration through the
resolution dated June 17, 2002. 3
Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari.
Antecedents
On October 23, 1992, Lim filed in the RTC in Cebu City
a petition for the reconstitution of the owner's duplicate copy of
OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), alleging that said OCT had been
lost during World War II by his mother, Luisa; 4 that Lot No. 943
of the Balamban Cadastre in Cebu City covered by said OCT had
been sold in 1937 to Luisa by Spouses Diego Oño and Estefania
Apas (Spouses Oño), the lot's registered owners; and that
although the deed evidencing the sale had been lost without
being registered, Antonio Oño (Antonio), the only legitimate heir
of Spouses Oño, had executed on April 23, 1961 in favor of Luisa
a notarized document denominated as confirmation of
sale, 5 which was duly filed in the Provincial Assessor's Office of
Cebu.
Zosimo Oño and petitioner Teofisto Oño (Oños)
opposed Lim's petition, contending that they had the certificate of
title in their possession as the successors-in-interest of Spouses
Oño.
On account of the Oños' opposition, and upon order of
the RTC, Lim converted the petition for reconstitution into a
complaint for quieting of title, 6 averring additionally that he and
his predecessor-in-interest had been in actual possession of the
property since 1937, cultivating and developing it, enjoying its
fruits, and paying the taxes corresponding to it. He prayed, inter
alia, that the Oños be ordered to surrender the reconstituted
owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), and that
said OCT be cancelled and a new certificate of title be issued in
the name of Luisa in lieu of said OCT.
In their answer, 7 the Oños claimed that their
predecessors-in-interest, Spouses Oño, never sold Lot No. 943
to Luisa; and that the confirmation of sale purportedly executed
by Antonio was fabricated, his signature thereon not being
authentic.
RTC Ruling
On July 30, 1996, after trial, the RTC rendered its
decision, 8 viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered quieting plaintiff's
title to Lot No. 943 of the Balamban (Cebu)
Cadastre, and directing the Register of Deeds
of Cebu —
(1) To register the aforestated April
23, 1961 Confirmation of Sale of Lot No. 943 of
the Balamban, Cebu Cadastre by Antonio Oño
in favor of Luisa Narvios-Lim;
(2) To cancel the original certificate of
title covering the said Lot No. 943 of the
Balamban, Cebu Cadastre; and,
(3) To issue in the name of Luisa
Narvios-Lim, a new duplicate certificate of title
No. RO-9969 (O-20449) of the Register of
Deeds of Cebu, which shall contain a
memorandum of the fact that it is issued in
place of the lost duplicate certificate of title, and
shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and
credit as the original certificate, and shall be
regarded as such for all purposes of this
decree, pursuant to the last paragraph of
Section 109, Presidential Decree No.
1529. AcSIDE
Without special pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED. 9
The RTC found that the Lims had been in peaceful
possession of the land since 1937; that their possession had
never been disturbed by the Oños, except on two occasions in
1993 when the Oños seized the harvested copra from the Lims'
Page 4 of 33
caretaker; that the Lims had since declared the lot in their name
for taxation purposes, and had paid the taxes corresponding to
the lot; that the signature of Antonio on the confirmation of
sale was genuine, thereby giving more weight to the testimony of
the notary public who had notarized the document and
affirmatively testified that Antonio and Luisa had both appeared
before him to acknowledge the instrument as true than to the
testimony of the expert witness who attested that Antonio's
signature was a forgery.
CA Ruling
On appeal, the Oños maintained that the confirmation
of sale was spurious; that the property, being a titled one, could
not be acquired by the Lims through prescription; that their (the
Oños) action to claim the property could not be barred by laches;
and that the action instituted by the Lims constituted a collateral
attack against their registered title.
The CA affirmed the RTC, however, and found that
Spouses Oño had sold Lot No. 943 to Luisa; and that such sale
had been confirmed by their son Antonio. The CA ruled that the
action for quieting of title was not a collateral, but a direct attack
on the title; and that the Lims' undisturbed possession had given
them a continuing right to seek the aid of the courts to determine
the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on
their own title.
Nonetheless, the CA corrected the RTC, by ordering
that the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City issue a new
duplicate certificate of title in the name of Luisa, considering that
the owner's duplicate was still intact in the possession of the
Oños.
The decree of the CA decision was as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. However, the
dispositive portion of the decision appealed
from is CORRECTED as follows:
(1) Within five (5) days from finality of
the decision, defendants-
appellants are directed to
present the owner's
duplicate copy of OCT No.
RO-9969 (O-20449) to the
Register of Deeds who
shall thereupon register the
"Confirmation of Sale" of
Lot No. 943, Balamban
Cadastre, Cebu, executed
on April 23, 1961 by
Antonio Oño in favor of
Luisa Narvios-Lim, and
issue a new transfer
certificate of title to and in
the name of the latter upon
cancellation of the
outstanding original and
owner's duplicate
certificate of title.
(2) In the event defendants-
appellants neglect or
refuse to present the
owner's copy of the title to
the Register of Deeds as
herein directed, the said
title, by force of this
decision, shall be deemed
annulled, and the Register
of Deeds shall make a
memorandum of such fact
in the record and in the
new transfer certificate of
title to be issued to Luisa
Narvios-Lim.
(3) Defendants-appellants shall pay
the costs.
SO ORDERED. 10
The CA denied the Oños' motion for
reconsideration 11 on June 17, 2002. 12
Hence, this appeal. IDCHTE
Issues
The petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not the validity of the OCT could
be collaterally attacked through an
ordinary civil action to quiet title;
2. Whether or not the ownership over
registered land could be lost by
prescription, laches, or adverse
possession;
3. Whether or not there was a deed of sale
executed by Spouses Oño in favor of
Luisa and whether or not said deed
was lost during World War II;
4. Whether or not the confirmation of
sale executed by Antonio in favor of
Luisa existed; and
5. Whether or not the signature purportedly of
Antonio in that confirmation of
sale was genuine.
Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
A.
Action for cancellation of title
is not an attack on the title
The petitioners contend that this action for quieting of
title should be disallowed because it constituted a collateral
attack on OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), citing Section 48
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, viz.:
Section 48. Certificate not subject to
collateral attack. — A certificate of title shall not
be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified, or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.
The petitioners' contention is not well taken.
An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title
when its objective is to nullify the title, thereby challenging the
judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. 13 The attack
is direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such
judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the
attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made
as an incident thereof. 14
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the
removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real
property. 15 Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or
any interest in real property by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or
effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable,
or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action
may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. 16 In
such action, the competent court is tasked to determine the
respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not
Page 5 of 33
only to place things in their proper places, and to make the
claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not
disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that
whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the
property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce
the improvements he may desire, as well as use, and even abuse
the property as he deems fit. 17
Lim's complaint pertinently alleged:
18. If indeed, the genuine original of
the Owner's Duplicate of the Reconstituted
Original Certificate of Title No. RO-9699 (O-
20449) for Lot 943, Balamban Cadastre . . . is
in Defendant's (Oño's) possession, then VNL
submits the following PROPOSITIONS:
xxx xxx xxx
18.2. Therefore, the Original of
Owner's Duplicate Certificate (which
Respondents [Defendants Oños] claim in their
Opposition is in their possession) must be
surrendered to VNL upon order of this Court,
after the Court shall have determined VNL's
mother's acquisition of the attributes of
ownership over said Lot 943, in this action, in
accordance with Section 107, P.D.
1529, Property Registration Decree . . .
xxx xxx xxx
[t]hat OCT 20449 be cancelled and new title for
Lot 943 be issued directly in favor of LUISA
NARVIOS, to complete her title to said Lot; 18
The averments readily show that the action was neither
a direct nor a collateral attack on OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449),
for Lim was asserting only that the existing title registered in the
name of the petitioners' predecessors had become inoperative
due to the conveyance in favor of Lim's mother, and resultantly
should be cancelled. Lim did not thereby assail the validity of
OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), or challenge the judgment by
which the title of the lot involved had been decreed. In other
words, the action sought the removal of a cloud from Lim's title,
and the confirmation of Lim's ownership over the disputed
property as the successor-in-interest of Luisa.
B.
Prescription was not relevant
The petitioners assert that the lot, being titled in the
name of their predecessors-in-interest, could not be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.
The assertion is unwarranted.
Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring or
losing ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in
the manner and under the conditions laid down by
law. 19 However, prescription was not relevant to the
determination of the dispute herein, considering that Lim did not
base his right of ownership on an adverse possession over a
certain period. He insisted herein, instead, that title to the land
had been voluntarily transferred by the registered owners
themselves to Luisa, his predecessor-in-interest.
Lim showed that his mother had derived a just title to
the property by virtue of sale; that from the time Luisa had
acquired the property in 1937, she had taken over its possession
in the concept of an owner, and had performed her obligation by
paying real property taxes on the property, as evidenced by tax
declarations issued in her name; 20 and that in view of the
delivery of the property, coupled with Luisa's actual occupation of
it, all that remained to be done was the issuance of a new
transfer certificate of title in her name. cdrep
C.
Forgery, being a question of fact,
could not be dealt with now
The petitioners submit that Lim's evidence did not
preponderantly show that the ownership of the lot had been
transferred to Luisa; and that both the trial and the appellate
courts disregarded their showing that Antonio's signature on
the confirmation of sale was a forgery.
Clearly, the petitioners hereby seek a review of the
evaluation and appreciation of the evidence presented by the
parties.
The Court cannot anymore review the evaluation and
appreciation of the evidence, because the Court is not a trier of
facts. 21 Although this rule admits of certain exceptions, viz.: (1)
when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjecture; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken; (3) where there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case, and the findings are contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition
as well in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondents; and, (10) when the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record, 22 it
does not appear now that any of the exceptions is present herein.
We thus apply the rule without hesitation, and reject the appeal
for that reason.
It is emphasized, too, that the CA upheld the
conclusion arrived at by the RTC that the signature of Antonio
had not been simulated or forged. The CA ruled that the
testimony of the notary public who had notarized the confirmation
of sale to the effect that Antonio and Luisa had appeared before
him prevailed over that of the petitioners' expert witness. The
concurrence of their conclusion on the genuineness of Antonio's
signature now binds the Court. 23
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side, and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of the
evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence.
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that means, in the last
analysis, probability of the truth. 24 It is evidence that is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.
Lim successfully discharged his burden of proof as the
plaintiff. He established by preponderant evidence that he had a
superior right and title to the property. In contrast, the petitioners
did not present any proof of their better title other than their copy
of the reconstituted certificate of title. Such proof was not enough,
because the registration of a piece of land under the Torrens
system did not create or vest title, such registration not being a
mode of acquiring ownership. The petitioners need to be
reminded that a certificate of title is merely an evidence of
ownership or title over the particular property described therein.
Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons
not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for
another person by the registered owner. 25
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
denied, and the decision dated January 28, 2002 is affirmed.
The petitioners are ordered to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. cCaEDA
Page 6 of 33
 Puno, C.J., Carpio Morales, Leonardo-de
Castro and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.

||| (Oño v. Lim, G.R. No. 154270, [March 9, 2010], 628 PHIL 418-430)

Page 7 of 33
Case 4 Spouses Bill and Victoria Hing vs Alezander Choachuy [respondents] Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy. They are
GR No 179376 June 26 2013 hereby directed to immediately remove the revolving camera that they
installed at the left side of their building overlooking the side of
[petitioners’] lot and to transfer and operate it elsewhere at the back
SECOND DIVISION
where [petitioners’] property can no longer be viewed within a distance
of about 2-3 meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec, facing the
G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013 road.

IT IS SO ORDERED.20
SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners, v. ALEXANDER
CHOACHUY, SR. AND ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents.
Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC denied the
same in its Order22 dated February 6,
DECISION
2006.23 Thus:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

DEL CASTILLO, J.: WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. Issue a [W]rit of [P]reliminary [I]njunction in consonance
“The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise with the Order dated 18 October 2005.
compel respect for [one’s] personality as a unique individual whose
claim to privacy and [non]-interference demands respect.”1 IT IS SO ORDERED.24nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assails the July 10, 2007 Decision3 and the September 11, 2007
Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No.
01473.
Factual Antecedents
On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint5 for
Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against
respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of
land (Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu; 6 that
respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc.
(Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of
petitioners;7 that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building
(Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed
a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-
5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were
constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said
construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to
petitioners’ property;9 that the court, in that case, denied Aldo’s
application for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its
allegations;10 that, in order to get evidence to support the said case,
respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the
building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras
facing petitioners’ property;11 that respondents, through their
employees and without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of
petitioners’ on-going construction;12 and that the acts of respondents
violate petitioners’ right to privacy.13 Thus, petitioners prayed that
respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and
enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.14
In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they did
not install the video surveillance cameras,16 nor did they order their
employees to take pictures of petitioners’ construction. 17 They also
clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere
stockholders.18
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order19 granting the
application for a TRO. The dispositive portion of the said Order
reads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition
for Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for
a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision26 granting the Petition
for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was
issued with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to
show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.27 The CA
explained that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of
the Civil Code was not violated since the property subject of the
controversy is not used as a residence. 28 The CA also said that since
respondents are not the owners of the building, they could not have
installed video surveillance cameras.29 They are mere stockholders of
Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality. 30 Thus, they are not
the proper parties.31 The fallo reads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us GRANTING the petition filed in this case. The assailed
orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, 2006 issued by the
respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.32nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
Issues
Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
I.
THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF THE [RTC] DATED
18 OCTOBER 2005 AND 6 FEBRUARY 2006 HOLDING THAT THEY
WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
II.
THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT PETITIONER SPOUSES HING ARE NOT ENTITLED
TO THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON THE GROUND
THAT THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL AND
CIVIL RIGHT TO PRIVACY DESPITE THE FACTUAL FINDINGS [OF]
THE RTC, WHICH RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY FAILED TO
REFUTE, THAT THE ILLEGALLY INSTALLED SURVEILLANCE
CAMERAS OF RESPONDENTS CHOACH[U]Y WOULD CAPTURE
THE PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF PETITIONER SPOUSES HING,
THEIR CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES.

WHEREFORE, the application for a [T]emporary [R]estraining [O]rder III.

or a [W]rit of [P]reliminary [I]njunction is granted. Upon the filing and
approval of a bond by [petitioners], which the Court sets at THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
P50,000.00, let a [W]rit of [P]reliminary [I]njunction issue against the RULED THAT SINCE THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING IS ALDO

Page 8 of 33
DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES, INC. THEN TO SUE and only certain individuals are allowed
RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY CONSTITUTE[S] A PURPORTEDLY to enter.
UNWARRANTED PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL.
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an
IV. individual’s right to privacy and provides a legal remedy against
abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It
THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT states:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
IGNORED THE SERIOUS FORMAL DEFICIENCIES OF BOTH THE
PETITION AND THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 15 Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
MARCH 2006 OF RESPONDENT[S] CHOACH[U]Y AND GAVE X X X and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following
THEM DUE COURSE AND CONSIDERATION.33 and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense,
shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other
Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation of relief:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
petitioners’ right to privacy, and (2) whether respondents are the
proper parties to this suit. (1) Prying into the privacy of another’s
residence;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioners’ Arguments
xxxx
Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction because respondents’ installation of a stationary This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his
camera directly facing petitioners’ property and a revolving camera right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It
covering a significant portion of the same property constitutes a includes “any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into
violation of petitioners’ right to privacy.34 Petitioners cite Article 26(1) the residence of another without the consent of the latter.” 49 The
of the Civil Code, which enjoins persons from prying into the private phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,” however, does
lives of others.35 Although the said provision pertains to the privacy of not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As elucidated
another’s residence, petitioners opine that it includes business offices, by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
citing Professor Arturo M. Tolentino.36 Thus, even assuming arguendo
that petitioners’ property is used for business, it is still covered by the Our Code specifically mentions “prying into the privacy of another’s
said provision.37 residence.” This does not mean, however, that only the residence is
entitled to privacy, because the law covers also “similar acts.” A
As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in this business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is
case, petitioners claim that respondents and Aldo are one and the excluded therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to
same, and that respondents only want to hide behind Aldo’s corporate enter may come in. x x x50 (Emphasis supplied)
fiction.38 They point out that if respondents are not the real owners of
the building, where the video surveillance cameras were installed, then Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil
they had no business consenting to the ocular inspection conducted Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may
by the court.39 extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny
them access. The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s
Respondents’ Arguments residence,” therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations
which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is
Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to
petitioners cannot invoke their right to privacy since the property privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article
involved is not used as a residence.40 Respondents maintain that they 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.
had nothing to do with the installation of the video surveillance
cameras as these were installed by Aldo, the registered owner of the The “reasonable expectation of privacy”
building,41 as additional security for its building. 42 Hence, they were test is used to determine whether there
wrongfully impleaded in this case.43 is a violation of the right to privacy.

Our Ruling In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy,

courts use the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. This test
The Petition is meritorious. determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
and whether the expectation has been violated.51 In Ople v.
The right to privacy is the right to be let alone. Torres,52 we enunciated that “the reasonableness of a person’s
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his
44
The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and in our conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2)
laws. It is defined as “the right to be free from unwarranted this expectation is one that society recognizes as
exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private reasonable.” Customs, community norms, and practices may,
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary therefore, limit or extend an individual’s “reasonable expectation of
sensibilities.”45 It is the right of an individual “to be free from privacy.”53 Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of
unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends
the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.54
concerned.”46 Simply put, the right to privacy is “the right to be let
alone.”47 In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed
practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The
The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where
them against the State’s abuse of power. In this regard, the State there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the
recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was
one, not even the State, except “in case of overriding social need and obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of
then only under the stringent procedural safeguards,” can disturb them another’s residence or business office as it would be no different from
in the privacy of their homes.48 eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the
Anti-Wiretapping Law.
The right to privacy under Article 26(1)
of the Civil Code covers business offices In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary
where the public are excluded therefrom Injunction, ruled that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Page 9 of 33
After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a
temporary restraining order. The operation by [respondents] of a
revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated
the right of privacy of [petitioners], who are the owners of the adjacent
lot. The camera does not only focus on [respondents’] property or the
roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.)
but it actually spans through a good portion of [the] land of
[petitioners].
Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why [petitioner]
Hing was so unyielding in asserting that the revolving camera was set
up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction in his
property. The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory
of [Aldo]. If the purpose of [respondents] in setting up a camera at the
back is to secure the building and factory premises, then the camera
should revolve only towards their properties at the back.
[Respondents’] camera cannot be made to extend the view to
[petitioners’] lot. To allow the [respondents] to do that over the
objection of the [petitioners] would violate the right of [petitioners] as
property owners. “The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in
such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person.”55
The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” in their property, whether they use it as a
business office or as a residence and that the installation of video
surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners’ property or covering a
significant portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of
their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a preliminary
injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the issuance of a
preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the court taking
cognizance of the case and should not be interfered with, unless there
is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court. 56 Here, there is
no indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in
finding that petitioners are not entitled to an injunctive writ.
boundaries of their respective properties.62 With these factual
circumstances in mind, we believe that respondents are the proper
parties to be impleaded.
Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and
distinct from its stockholders, records show that it is a family-owned
corporation managed by the Choachuy family.63
Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their
claim that they are not owners of the building, allowed the court to
enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The
counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside
the building and answered all her questions regarding the set-up and
installation of the video surveillance cameras.64 And when
respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order dated October 18,
2005 of the RTC, one of the arguments they raised is that Aldo would
suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras are removed and
transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of
respondents and Aldo seem to merge.
All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that
respondents are merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield
to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we find
that respondents are the proper parties to this suit.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated
July 10, 2007 and the Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18,
2005 and February 6, 200[6] of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court
of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are
hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
proper parties to this suit.

A real party defendant is one who has a

correlative legal obligation to redress
a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason
of the defendant's act or omission which
had violated the legal right of the former.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court

provides:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who

stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by
law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest.

A real party defendant is “one who has a correlative legal obligation to

redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act
or omission which had violated the legal right of the former.”57

In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned
that since they do not own the building, they could not have installed
the video surveillance cameras.58 Such reasoning, however, is
erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the registered owners of
the building does not automatically mean that they did not cause the
installation of the video surveillance cameras.

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the

video surveillance cameras in order to fish for evidence, which could
be used against petitioners in another case. 59 During the hearing of
the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that
when respondents installed the video surveillance cameras, he
immediately broached his concerns but they did not seem to
care,60 and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation,
and eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents before the
RTC.61 He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has already been
a dispute between his family and the Choachuy family concerning the

Page 10 of 33

Case 5 Segundo Lim vs Court of Appeals GR No 147524 June 20
2006
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 147524 June 20, 2006
SEGUNDO S. LIM, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR., Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City, THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, and CIRSE "CHOY"
TORRALBA, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In Criminal Case No. CBU-26582, petitioner Segundo S. Lim, together
with Boy "BG" Guingguing, were found guilty of libel by the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, in a Decision dated May 17, 1994,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused, SEGUNDO LIM and BOY
"BG" GUINGGUING, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, as principals
of the crime of Libel as charged in the Information, defined and
penalized in Art. 353 in relation to Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code,
and hereby sentences the said accused to a prison term of, ranging
from, One (1) year, Eight (8) months and Twenty-one (21) days as
minimum, to Two (2) years, Eleven (11) months and Eleven (11) days
of prision correccional, as maximum; to indemnify the complainant,
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.1
The criminal case for libel was filed by private respondent Cirse
"Choy" Torralba after petitioner caused the publication of records of
criminal cases filed against Torralba, including photographs of his
arrest, through a one-page advertisement paid for by petitioner in the
Sunday Post, a weekly publication edited and published by petitioner’s
co-accused, Boy "BG" Guingguing.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction in a
Decision dated July 29, 1996, although the penalty was modified. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-appellants are
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE
(1) DAY of arresto mayor, as minimum to ONE (1) YEAR, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS and TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS of prision correccional, as
maximum. Except as thus MODIFIED, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED en [sic] toto, with costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court docketed as G.R.
No. 126701 but this was denied in a Resolution dated December 4,
1996 due to petitioner’s failure to comply with Revised Circular No. 1-
88 in that the petition did not contain a certified true copy of the
resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 3 Said
resolution became final and executory and entry of judgment was
made on March 20, 1997.4
Meanwhile, petitioner’s co-accused, Boy "BG" Guingguing, filed with
the Court a petition for review dated April 4, 1997, docketed as G.R.
No. 128959, and entitled Ciriaco "Boy" Guingguing v. The Honorable
Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines.
Thereafter, in an Order dated May 26, 2000, the trial court granted a
motion filed by the private prosecutor praying for the promulgation of
the judgment of conviction against petitioner. Promulgation was set on
June 6, 2000.5 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was
denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated September 18, 2000. 6
Thus, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60952. On February 5,
2001, the CA promulgated its decision in the above-mentioned case,
denying due course and dismissing the petition. The dispositive
portion of the decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the petition is denied due
course and is hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order
issued on 03 October 2000 became functus oficio after the expiration
of 60 days from its issuance.
SO ORDERED.7
Consequently, in an Order dated March 19, 2001, the trial court, upon
motion of the State and the private prosecutor, set the promulgation of
the judgment of conviction of petitioner on April 26, 2001.8
In the meantime, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the
CA but the same was denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 2001 for
lack of merit.9
The foregoing antecedents constrained petitioner to file the present
petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.
In a Resolution dated April 27, 2001, the Court granted petitioner’s
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining the
trial court from enforcing its Order dated March 19, 2001. In the same
resolution, respondents were required to file their comment to the
petition.10
Petitioner asserts that his co-accused Guingguing’s petition before the
Court (G.R. No. 128959) is still pending resolution and considering
that their respective liabilities are interwoven, prudence dictates that a
final decision by the Court in G.R. No. 128959 should be
awaited.11 Notably, these are the same arguments that petitioner
raised in his petition with the CA and opposition to the private
prosecution’s motion for promulgation of judgment before the trial
court.
Instead of filing a comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
submitted a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment (With Recommendation
for the Reversal of the Assailed Order/Ruling), wherein it agrees with
petitioner that promulgation of the judgment of conviction should be
stayed pending resolution of G.R. No. 128959 by the Court. Citing
Rule 122, Section 11 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the OSG
opines that the petitioner’s conviction is not yet final and executory
despite entry of judgment, and that in case the Court renders a
judgment of acquittal in favor of Guingguing, then petitioner should
benefit from it. There would be an inconsistency, according to the
OSG, if petitioner were held guilty of libel while Guingguing is not
despite that the charge arose from the same written article. 12 Reasons
of justice and equity also dictate the stay of the promulgation and
execution of judgment, the OSG states.13
On September 5, 2005, the Court required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda.14
In what seems to be providential for petitioner, the Court rendered a
decision15 in G.R. No. 128959 on September 30, 2005, acquitting
Page 11 of 33
Guingguing of the charge of libel. The Court quotes the pertinent
portions of the Decision, viz.:
As it has been established that complainant was a public figure, it was
incumbent upon the prosecution to prove actual malice on the part of
Lim and petitioner when the latter published the article subject matter
of the complaint. Set otherwise, the prosecution must have established
beyond reasonable doubt that the defendants knew the statements in
the advertisement was false or nonetheless proceeded with reckless
disregard as to publish it whether or not it was true.
It should thus proceed that if the statements made against the public
figure are essentially true, then no conviction for libel can be had. Any
statement that does not contain a provably false factual connotation
will receive full constitutional protection. An examination of the records
of this case showed that the précis of information contained in the
questioned publication were actually true. Thus, complainant himself
testified:
xxx
From the foregoing, it is clear that there was nothing untruthful about
what was published in the Sunday Post. The criminal cases listed in
the advertisement as pending against the complainant had indeed
been filed. It may have been inconvenient for the complainant that
these matters may have been divulged, yet such information hardly
falls within any realm of privacy complainant could invoke, since the
pendency of these criminal charges are actually matters of public
record.
The information, moreover, went into the very character and integrity
of complainant to which his listening public has a very legitimate
interest. Complainant hosts a public affairs program, one which he
himself claimed was imbued with public character since it deals with
"corruptions in government, corruptions by public officials, irregularities
in government in comrades." By entering into this line of work,
complainant in effect gave the public a legitimate interest in his life. He
likewise gave them a stake in finding out if he himself had the integrity
and character to have the right to criticize others for their conduct.
In convicting the defendants, the lower courts paid particular heed to
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if
no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown…". We
hold that this provision, as applied to public figures complaining of
criminal libel, must be construed in light of the constitutional guarantee
of free expression, and this Court’s precedents upholding the standard
of actual malice with the necessary implication that a statement
regarding a public figure if true is not libelous. The provision itself
allows for such leeway, accepting as a defense "good intention and
justifiable motive." The exercise of free expression, and its concordant
assurance of commentary on public affairs and public figures, certainly
qualify as "justifiable motive," if not "good intention."
xxx
To this end, the publication of the subject advertisement by
petitioner and Lim cannot be deemed by this Court to have been
done with actual malice. Aside from the fact that the information
contained in said publication was true, the intention to let the public
know the character of their radio commentator can at best be
subsumed under the mantle of having been done with good motives
and for justifiable ends. The advertisement in question falls squarely
within the bounds of constitutionally protected expression under
Section 4, Article III, and thus, acquittal is mandated. 16 (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondent then filed his Memorandum on December 12,
2005,17 praying for the denial of the petition and for the Court to direct
the trial court to promulgate the CA Decision dated July 29, 1996 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 16413, sentencing petitioner and Guingguing with an
indeterminate penalty of 2 months and 1 day of arresto mayor, as
minimum to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of prision correccional, as
maximum.
The OSG filed its Memorandum on March 2, 2006,18 reiterating its
recommendation that the trial court’s Order dated March 19, 2001 in
Criminal Case No. CEB-26582 and the CA Decision dated February 5,
2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 60952 be reversed and set aside. Petitioner,
meanwhile, filed an "Adoption/Manifestation/Memorandum" on March
28, 2006, adopting completely the OSG’s Memorandum.19
Initially, the issue in this case was whether the promulgation and
execution of petitioner’s judgment of conviction should be stayed
pending resolution of G.R. No. 128959. However, with the subsequent
rendition of judgment of acquittal in favor of Guingguing in G.R. No.
128959, the initial issue became moot and academic, and the question
that now arises is whether petitioner should benefit from Guingguing’s
acquittal.
As earlier stated, both petitioner and the OSG laterally argue that in
the event of Guingguing’s acquittal, petitioner should likewise be
acquitted, based on Rule 122, Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended, which states:
SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.—
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect
those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the
appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
Private respondent however, contends that said provision is not
applicable to petitioner inasmuch as he appealed from his conviction,
and the provision states that a favorable judgment shall be applicable
only to those who did not appeal.
A literal interpretation of the phrase "did not appeal," as espoused by
private respondent, will not give justice to the purpose of the provision.
It should be read in its entirety and should not be myopically construed
so as to defeat its reason, i.e., to benefit an accused who did not join
in the appeal of his co-accused in case where the appellate judgment
is favorable. In fact, several cases rendered by the Court applied the
foregoing provision without regard as to the filing or non-filing of an
appeal by a co-accused, so long as the judgment was favorable to
him.
In People v. Artellero,20 the Court extended the acquittal of
Rodriguez’s co-accused to him despite the withdrawal of his appeal,
applying the Rule 122, Section 11(a), and considering that the
evidence against both are inextricably linked, to wit:
Although it is only appellant who persisted with the present appeal, the
well-established rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws
the whole case open for review of all its aspects, including those not
raised by the parties. The records show that Rodriguez had withdrawn
his appeal due to financial reasons. However, Section 11 (a) of Rule
122 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a]n appeal taken by one or
more [of] several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellant court is favorable and
applicable to the latter." As we have elucidated, the evidence against
and the conviction of both appellant and Rodriguez are inextricably
linked. Hence, appellant’s acquittal, which is favorable and applicable
to Rodriguez, should benefit the latter.
In People v. Arondain,21 the Court found accused Arondain guilty only
of homicide. Such verdict was applied to his co-accused, Jose
Precioso, who was previously found guilty by the trial court of robbery
with homicide, despite the fact that Precioso appealed but failed to file
an appellant’s brief. The Court also modified Precioso’s civil liability
although the additional monetary award imposed on Arondain was not
Page 12 of 33
extended to Precioso since it was not favorable to him and he did not
pursue the appeal before the Court.

In People v. De Lara,22 Eduardo Villas, together with several co-

accused, were found by the trial court guilty of forcible abduction.
During pendency of the review before the Court, Villas withdrew his
appeal, hence his conviction became final and executory. Thereafter,
the Court found Villas’ co-accused guilty only of grave coercion.
Applying Rule 122, Section 11(a), the Court also found Villas guilty of
the lesser offense of grave coercion since it is beneficial to him.

In People v. Escaño,23 the Court granted a motion filed by accused

Julian Deen Escaño, praying that the Court’s Decision dated January
28, 2000, acquitting his co-accused Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C.
Lopez in Criminal Case No. 95-936 for violation of Section 4, Article II
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, be applied to him. Escaño
originally filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court but later withdrew
the same.

In the foregoing cases, all the accused appealed from their judgments
of conviction but for one reason or another, the conviction became
final and executory. Nevertheless, the Court still applied to them the
favorable judgment in favor of their co-accused. The Court notes that
the Decision dated September 30, 2005 in G.R. No. 128959 stated,
"the verdict of guilt with respect to Lim [herein petitioner] had already
become final and executory." In any event, the Court cannot see why
a different treatment should be given to petitioner, given that the
judgment is favorable to him and considering further that the Court’s
finding in its Decision dated September 30, 2005 specifically stated
that "the publication of the subject advertisement by petitioner and Lim
cannot be deemed by this Court to have been done with actual
malice."

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED.

The Decision dated July 29, 1996 and Resolution dated October 3
1996, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 16413
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 17, 1994
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, in
Criminal Case No. CBU-26582 is also REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Segundo S. Lim is hereby ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 13 of 33

Case 6 USC vs CA GR No L-79237 October 18 1988 166 SCRA 570
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 79237 October 18, 1988
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS and VICTORIA A.
SATORRE petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JENNIFER C. LEE, respondents.
J.P. Garcia & Associates for petitioners.
Florido & Associates for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The principal issue raised in this petition is whether or not mandamus
is the proper remedy to compel a university to confer a degree with
honors. The secondary question is whether or not the refusal of that
university to confer honors would constitute bad faith so as to make it
liable for damages.
Private respondent Jennifer C. Lee filed an action for mandamus with
damages against petitioners University of San Carlos and Victoria A.
Satorre, docketed as Civil Case No. R22022 in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XVIII, Cebu, asking that petitioners be compelled to
confer upon her the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce,
major in Accounting, cum laude, retroactive to March 28, 1982, to
execute and deliver to her all necessary credentials evidencing her
graduation with honors, and to pay her moral damages in the amount
of P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00,
and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00.
After trial, the lower court rendered its Decision dated January 29,
1986, 1 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff, and accordingly, defendants
University of San Carlos and Dean Victoria A.
Satorre are ordered to confer upon plaintiff,
Jennifer C. Lee, the degree of Bachelor of
Science in Commerce, major in accounting,
with cum laude honors (sic), retroactive to March
28, 1982, and to execute and deliver to plaintiff all
the necessary school credentials evidencing her
graduation with such honors; and said defendants
are ordered to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the
sum of P75,000 as moral damages, the sum of
P20,000 as exemplary damages, with interest
thereon at 12% per annum beginning July 22,
1982, until said amounts are fully paid: and the
sum of P15,000 as attorney's fees. The
counterclaim is ordered dismissed. Costs against
defendants. 2
Petitioners appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals where the
case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-09368. In a decision dated
May 28, 1987, the appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the
trial court. 3
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied in a
Resolution of the appellate court dated July 7, 1987. 4
Hence, this petition where petitioners allege as grounds thereof-
(a) A university may not be compelled by
mandamus to grant graduation honors to any
student who, according to the university's
standards, rules and regulations, does not qualify
for such honors; and
(b) The decision penalizing petitioners to pay
excessive moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees is not justified by the facts and
circumstances of this case and disregards the
many decisions of this Honorable Court setting
reasonable standards and limits in the award of
such damages. (P. 2, petition; p. 12, rollo)
Private respondent enrolled in the College of Architecture, University
of San Carlos (USC), during the first semester of school year 1978-79.
At the end of the second semester of that school year, she obtained a
grade of "I.C." (Incomplete) in Architecture 121, and grades of "5's"
(failures) in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123.
The following school year, 1979-1980, she shifted to the College of
Commerce of the USC. Some of the units she had completed when
she was still an architecture student were then carried over and
credited in her new course. As a commerce student, she obtained
good grades. However, she was aware of her earlier failing grades in
the College of Architecture and that the same would be taken into
consideration in the evaluation of her overall academic performance to
determine if she could graduate with honors.
So, on December 10, 1981, she wrote 5 the Council of Deans of the
USC, requesting that her grades of 5s in Architecture 121 and
Architecture 122 be disregarded in the computation of her grade
average. She wrote a similar letter to the Ministry of Education, Culture
and Sports MECS in Region VII on January 5, 1982 6 and this letter
was referred to the President of the USC for comment and return to
the MECS.
In the 3rd Indorsement dated February 4, 1982, the President of the
USC informed the MECS that the university policy was that any failing
grade obtained by a student in any course would disqualify the student
for honors; that to deviate from that policy would mean injustice to
students similarly situated before who were not allowed to graduate
with honors; that the bad grades given to her were justified and could
not be deleted or removed because her subjects were not "dropped"
as required; that she had two failures and one incomplete grade which
became a failure upon her inaction to attend to the incomplete grade
within one year; and that while her three failures did not affect her
graduation from the College of Commerce, they nonetheless caused
her disqualification from graduating with honors. She was furnished a
copy of said indorsement but she did not ask for a reconsideration.
On March 17, 1982, when the USC President was out of town, private
respondent wrote to the USC Registrar' requesting that her failing
grades be changed. The USC Registrar 7 referred her letter to the
MECS and the request for change of grades was approved in a 4th
indorsement of March 22, 1982. 8 Thus, her grade of IC in Architecture
121 was changed to "1.9" by Professor Victor Leves Jr. and the
grades of "5" in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123 were changed
to "W" (Withdrawn).
On March 24, 1982, Mr. Marcelo Bacalso of MECS' Higher Education
Division discovered that the change of the grade of private respondent
from "IC" to "1.9" did not have the supporting class record required, so
he wrote to MECS Supervisor Mr. Ortiz requesting the submission of
the class record. 9
Page 14 of 33
On March 28, 1982, the USC held its graduation exercises, and the
private respondent graduated with the degree of Bachelor of Science
in Commerce, major in Accounting, without honors.
On March 31, 1982, the private respondent, assisted by counsel,
demanded from Dean Victoria A. Satorre that she be allowed to
graduate, cum laude. 10 Dean Satorre explained that the matter was
held in abeyance pending compliance with certain requirements of the
MECS through the memo of Mr. Bacalso. 11
The change of grades of private respondent is thus open to question.
Obviously, private respondent employed undue and improper pressure
on the MECS authorities to approve the change of her grades to
remove all obstacle to her graduation with honors. Petitioners' claim
that the change of grades of the private respondent was attended with
fraud is not entirely misplaced. Petitioners cannot be faulted for
refusing to vest the honors demanded of them by the private
respondent. One failure would have been sufficient to disqualify her
but she had one incomplete and two failures. Her only change was to
reverse her failing grades. This she accomplished thru the back door.

On May 24, 1982, Arch. Leves Jr., the teacher required to produce the
Nevertheless, even if she succeeded in removing her failing grades, it
class records, reported he could not produce the same. 12 Thus, on
was still within the sound discretion of the petitioners to determine
May 27, 1982, Dean Satorre wrote to the MECS Regional Director
whether private respondent was entitled to graduate with honors. The
Aurelio Tiro asking for the revocation of the change of grades of
Court finds that petitioners did not commit a grave abuse of discretion
private respondent. 13 The request was denied as there was no
in denying the honors sought by private respondent under the
positive proof of fraud. 14
circumstances. Indeed, the aforesaid change of grades did not
automatically entitle her to the award of honors.
It is an accepted principle that schools of teaming are given ample
discretion to formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors
Private respondent not having demonstrated that she has a clear legal
for purposes of graduation. This is part of academic freedom. Within
right to the honors sought, her claim for damages must necessarily
the parameters of these rules, it is within the competence of
fail.
universities and colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant of
honors among the graduating students. Its discretion on this academic
matter may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts unless WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the subject decision of
there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise. the respondent court of May 28, 1987 and its resolution of July 7,
1987, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment
is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint without
In this case, the petitioner's bulletin of information provides all students
pronouncement as to costs.
and all other interested parties advise on the University policies and
rules on enrollment and academic achievements. Therein it is
provided, among others, that a student may not officially withdraw from SO ORDERED.
subjects in the curriculum if he does not have the written permission of
his parents or guardian. 15 For an incomplete grade, there must be an
application for completion or removal within the period announced by
the school calendar and when not removed within one (1) year, it
automatically becomes final. 16 A "DR" (Dropped) subject which is in
the same category, as a "5" disqualifies a student from receiving
honors. 17 A candidate for honors should have earned no less than 18
units per semester but a working student should earn no less that 12
units. A failure in any subject disqualifies a student from
honors. 18 Good moral character and exemplary conduct are as
important criteria for honors as academic achievements. 19

Private respondent should know and is presumed to know those

University policies and is bound to comply therewith.

It is precisely because she knew of these rules that she exerted all
efforts to have her final grades of "5's" in Architecture 122 and
Architecture 123 be disregarded in the computation of honors. When
her request was denied by the university, she did not ask for a
reconsideration thereof. Instead, in the middle part of March 1982
when the USC President was out of town, she wrote another letter to
the USC registrar asking her failing grades be changed as above
related. The matter was referred to the MECS and the request was
approved on March 22,1982.

However, when it was discovered thereafter that the change of private

respondent's grades from "IC" TO "1.9" was not supported by the
corresponding class records and its production was required the same
could not be produced. There is thus no justification for said change of
grade. Moreover, the request for the change of the grade of
incomplete was not made by private respondent within one (1) year so
that it became final according to the rules.

By the same token, the change of the grades of private respondent

from "5" to "W" (Withdrawn) in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123
was without the written permission of her parents or guardian. Indeed,
it is unusual that a student who got a "5" in a subject, as in this case,
should still be allowed to withdraw from such subject. Withdrawal from
subjects is not ordinarily allowed after mid-term examination 20 much
less after a failing grade in the subject has been received.

Page 15 of 33

Case 7 Engr Ranulfo vs Nestor Villasin GR No 174929 June 27
2008
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 174929. June 27, 2008.]
ENGR. RANULFO C.
FELICIANO, petitioner, vs. NESTOR P.
VILLASIN, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court assailing the following: (1) the
Order 1 dated 28 July 2006 of Branch 6 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Leyte, dismissing petitioner
Ranulfo C. Feliciano's Petition for Quo Warranto against
respondent Nestor P. Villasin in Civil Case No. 2006-03-29; and
(2) the Order 2 dated 8 September 2006 of the same court
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. CTSHDI
The following are the antecedent facts of this case:
Petitioner Feliciano was appointed General Manager
(GM) of Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD) on 11 June
1975 by the LMWD Board of Directors through Resolution No.
14, Series of 1975. 3
On 6 March 1990, the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA) took over the management and policy-
making functions of LMWD owing to LMWD's default on the
payment of its obligations to LWUA. Said move was made
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 198, otherwise known
as THE PROVINCIAL WATER UTILITIES ACT OF
1973, 4 issued on 25 May 1973. The LWUA appointed an Interim
General Manager and Chairman of the Board of Directors, as
well as its members.
After the LWUA took over the management and policy-
making functions of the LMWD in March 1990, Engineer (Engr.)
Cayo U. Emnas was appointed as take-over General Manager.
Emnas thereafter filed administrative charges against Feliciano
for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty and Conduct Unbecoming an
LMWD Official, docketed as Administrative Case No. LMWD-
OGCC-01-01. 5 Feliciano was accused of authorizing payment of
his backwages amounting to P134,721.64, for the period 6 March
1990 up to 23 October 1990, although he did not report for work
during said period. TIaCHA
The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC) handled the investigation of the charges against
Feliciano. In a Resolution dated 16 September 1991, the OGCC
found Feliciano guilty as charged and recommended the penalty
of dismissal. Pertinent portions of the OGCC Resolution reads:
The action of respondent in
authorizing, causing and receiving the
aforesaid disbursement of P134,721.64 in
payment obstensibly of his backwages for
the period starting 6 March 1990 up to and
until 23 October 1990, knowing that during
the said period he did not report for work nor
rendered service to LMWD as testified to by
complainants witnesses, is not only irregular
but unlawful. Worse, respondent being the
General Manager, necessarily had taken
advantage of his position and abused the
confidence reposed in his office in the
perpetration of the said rank dishonesty. As
a consequence thereof, LMWD was
defrauded and suffered damage in the sum
of P134,721.64.
Accordingly, undersigned finds
respondent Ranulfo C. Feliciano guilty, as
charged, of GRAVE MISCONDUCT,
DISHONESTY, AND CONDUCT
UNBECOMING OF AN LMWD
OFFICIAL. EIAHcC
In view of the grave nature of the
offense committed by respondent, the large
sum which LMWD has been defrauded of,
and the existence of aggravating
circumstances occasioned by respondent's
taking undue advantage of his position and
abusing the confidence of his office,
undersigned recommends the imposition of
the penalty of DISMISSAL on respondent. 6
On 11 November 1991, the Interim LMWD Board of
Directors approved in toto the findings of the OGCC including its
recommendation to dismiss Feliciano. 7
On 1 October 1993, the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) issued Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1993,
directing Board Chairpersons and GMs of water districts to
submit personnel appointments for approval by the CSC.
On 20 July 1998, the take-over of the management and
operations of the LMWD by the LWUA was lifted by the LWUA
Board of Trustees in its Resolution No. 138, Series of
1998. 8 TEIHDa
On 25 September 1998, the new regular LMWD Board
of Directors unanimously approved Resolution No. 98-002
ordering Feliciano to re-assume 9 the post he had vacated as
GM of LMWD. The position was accepted by Feliciano on 27
September 1998. 10
As GM, Feliciano appointed Edgar R. Nedruda,
Milagros A. Majadillas and Edgar B. Ortega as Division Manager,
Quality Control Assurance Officer and Plant Equipment Operator
E, respectively, at the LMWD. 11 In compliance with CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1993, Feliciano
submitted the same to the CSC Regional Office (CSCRO) for
approval. The CSCRO, however, disapproved Feliciano's LMWD
personnel appointments in its Order issued on 8 June 1999 since
GM Feliciano did not possess the required CSC-approved
appointment pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 41, S.
1993. 12 Feliciano appealed the Order to the CSC.
On 8 September 2000, the CSC through its
Chairperson Corazon Alma G. de Leon, issued CSC Resolution
No. 002107 denying Feliciano's appeal of his disapproved LMWD
personnel appointments on the ground that he was only a de
facto officer. 13 It found that Feliciano had no authority to make
appointments since he himself lacked the required CSC-
approved appointment pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 40, Series of 1998, and Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series
of 1993. 14 The CSC thus resolved: TCIEcH
WHEREFORE, the Order issued
by the Civil Service Commission (CSCRO)
Regional Office No. VIII, Palo, Leyte,
disapproving the appointments of Nedruda,
Majadillas and Ortega on the ground that
Ranulfo Feliciano lacks the authority to
appoint, is hereby affirmed.
Accordingly, the Human Resource
Management Officer/Personnel Officer of the
Page 16 of 33
 Leyte Metro Water District (LMWD) may re-
submit the appointment of Ranulfo
Feliciano to the position of General Manager
of the LMWD, to the CSC Leyte Field Office
for attestation.
Feliciano may likewise re-appoint
Nedruda, Majadillas and Ortega to the
same positions. (Emphases ours).
Feliciano filed a Motion for Reconsideration citing as
main argument the fact that the LMWD was not a government-
owned and controlled corporation, but a special type of non-
stock, non-profit private corporation imbued with public interest,
and therefore, not covered by the civil service rules.
The CSC denied Feliciano's Motion for
Reconsideration in its Resolution No. 010218, issued on 22
January 2001, which reiterated that Feliciano's argument on the
private character of water districts had long been put to rest
in Davao City Water District v. Civil Service Commission, which
declared water districts to be government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charter, falling under the jurisdiction of
the CSC and Commission on Audit (COA). TaCDcE
Not satisfied, Feliciano appealed CSC Resolutions No.
002107 and 010218 to the Court of Appeals via Petition
for Certiorari. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 63325. On
1 September 2005, the Court of Appeals in Cebu City, through
Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., denied the
petition. 15 Feliciano filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the
same was denied per Resolution dated 15 August
2006. 16 Feliciano thereafter appealed to this Court on 15 August
2006 via petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 174178. In
an en banc Decision issued on 17 October 2006, this Court
denied the petition for its failure to sufficiently show that the CSC
committed any reversible error in issuing the challenged decision
and resolution. Feliciano's Motion for Reconsideration thereof
was denied on 23 January 2007.
On 12 January 2005, the CSC issued a Memorandum
directing its Regional Director (for Region 8) Rodolfo Encajonado
(RD Encajonado) to submit an update on the status of Feliciano's
appointment as GM of LMWD.
In his Memorandum submitted to the CSC on 14
January 2005, RD Encajonado reported that the LMWD Board of
Directors had not yet submitted the required appointment of
Feliciano as GM of LMWD for attestation, as required by CSC
Resolutions No. 002107 and No. 010218. On account thereof,
the CSC, through its Chairperson Karina Constantino-David,
issued on 28 February 2005 CSC Resolution No. 050307,
declaring Feliciano to be a mere de facto officer of LMWD and
ordering him to vacate the position of GM, to wit: aATEDS
With the promulgation on
September 13, 1991 of the above-mentioned
Supreme Court decision, 17 the issuance on
October 1, 1993 of the aforestated CSC
Memorandum Circular, and the adoption on
January 22, 2001 of CSC Resolution No. 01-
2018 denying Feliciano's motion for
reconsideration, Feliciano is under legal
obligation to comply by submitting his
appointment to the Commission for
attestation/approval. This, he did not do. He
instead stubbornly maintained his personal
stand that water districts are private
corporations, not government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charter.
For all legal intents and purposes, effective
upon his receipt on February 6, 2001 of CSC
Resolution No. 01-0218 denying his motion
for reconsideration, Feliciano is a mere
usurper or intruder who has no right or title
whatsoever to the position/office of General
Manager. His further occupancy of the
position after said date holds him criminally
liable for usurpation of authority.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the Commission
resolves as follows:
1. Between June 8, 1999 (the date when the
Civil Service Commission Regional
Office No. VIII issued an Order
disapproving the appointments of
Edgar R. Nedruda, Milagros A.
Majadillas and Edgar B. Ortega on
the ground that Ranulfo C. Feliciano
does not possess a CSC-approved
appointment) and February 6, 2001
(the date when Feliciano received a
copy of CSC Resolution No. 01-0218
denying his motion for
reconsideration and affirming CSC
Resolution No. 00-2107), Feliciano
shall be treated as a de facto officer
whose acts are valid and binding only
as regards innocent third persons.
Insofar as Feliciano himself is
concerned, his acts are void, hence,
he is not entitled to the emoluments
of the office. Regarding the three (3)
issued appointments, the same are
all void, since Feliciano has no
authority to issue the same. EaHDcS
2. Starting February 6, 2001, Feliciano is a
mere usurper or intruder without any
right or title to the office/position of
General Manager of the Leyte
Metropolitan Water District (LMWD).
His further occupancy of the position
of General Manager after February 6,
2001 holds him criminally liable for
usurpation of authority. Effective
upon receipt of this Resolution, he is
ordered to vacate the position of
LMWD General Manager. 18
On 22 March 2005, Feliciano again sought recourse at
the Court of Appeals where he filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with application for Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and Writ of Injunction, seeking to enjoin the
implementation of CSC Resolution No. 050307, Series of 2005.
The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00489. 19
On 30 March 2005, while CA-G.R. SP No. 00489 was
still pending with the Court of Appeals, with no injunction having
been issued by the appellate court, the LMWD Board of Directors
declared the GM position occupied by Feliciano vacant by virtue
of LMWD Resolution No. 050307. 20 AaIDCS
The Court of Appeals subsequently issued on 12 April
2005 a Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 00489 granting a TRO
effective for sixty days. After the lapse of the TRO, the LMWD
Board of Directors appointed Villasin as the new GM of LMWD on
14 June 2005. On 16 September 2005, the Court of Appeals
dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 00489 which reached this
Court via petition for review in G.R. No. 172141. This was
eventually denied by this Court and entry of judgment was made
on 14 November 2006. On 28 December 2005, the LMWD Board
of Directors unanimously approved LMWD Resolution No. 05-145
certifying that Villasin was the GM of LMWD pursuant to the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 198 and the CSC Rules
and Regulations.
On 28 March 2006, Feliciano thus filed with the RTC a
Petition for Quo Warranto against Villasin under Rule 66 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as Civil Case No. 2006-
03-29.
Page 17 of 33
 Feliciano asked the RTC to restore him to his position
as GM of LMWD, and to remove Villasin therefrom. In particular,
he prayed for the following in his Petition for Quo
Warranto: AaEcHC
1. To order [Villasin] to vacate the Office of
General Manager of LMWD and for
[Feliciano] to be seated to such
office;
2. To mandate [Villasin] to pay the salaries and
other emoluments of [Feliciano]
which as of this date amounts to
more than One Million Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000.00);
3. To direct [Villasin] to pay [Feliciano]
attorney's fees comprised of Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00) as acceptance fees
and Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) appearance per hearing;
4. To command [Villasin] to pay the cost of
herein Petition for Quo Warranto.
[Feliciano] also prays for such
other reliefs as may be necessary under the
circumstances. 21
Citing the Court's ruling in Villaluz v.
Zaldivar, 22 Feliciano argued that since the LWUA had no power
to remove a GM appointed by a regular Board of Directors, it
should follow then that an interim Board of Directors neither had
the power to discipline or remove a regular GM of
LMWD. aETDIc
Villasin countered by filing a Comment/Answer with
Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Quo Warranto, on the following
grounds:
(a) Forum shopping;
(b) Feliciano is disqualified from government
service due to his dismissal from
office on 11 November 1991;
(c) Petitioner's claim that LMWD is a private
entity defeats his petition since quo
warranto is a remedy of a person
claiming a public office;
(d) Quo warranto case was filed more than a
year from the time the cause of
action arose or beyond the
reglementary period;
(e) The Court of Appeals had already denied
his petition for Review
on Certiorari on CSC Resolution No.
050307.
A hearing with notice to the parties was set for 2 June
2006 but Feliciano failed to attend the same. 23 The RTC then
ordered Civil Case No. 2006-03-29 submitted for
Resolution. acIASE
On 28 July 2006, the RTC issued an Order dismissing
Feliciano's Petition for Quo Warranto, finding that:
The scope of the remedy of quo
warranto instituted by an individual is that he,
the petitioner, has prior right to the position
or office held by the respondent. Where
there is no legal ground or where the
fundamental basis of the petition is none or
destroyed, it becomes unnecessary to pass
upon the right of the respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the
aforegoing (sic), for lack of cause of action
amounting to want of jurisdiction, this petition
shall be, as it is hereby ordered, dismissed. 24
Feliciano filed his Motion for Reconsideration alleging
that the Order issued by the RTC was conjectural, presumptuous
and specious. However, the Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by the RTC in an Order dated 8 September 2006.
According to the RTC, the Quo Warranto Petition was
prematurely filed considering that Feliciano's Petition for Review
on Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, involving CSC
Resolutions No. 002107 and No. 010218, was still pending with
the Court of Appeals. Hence, the issue of whether Feliciano is
holding the GM position in a de facto or a de jure capacity is yet
to be resolved. The RTC therefore decreed: HDTSIE
WHEREFORE, with prematurity in
the institution of the present petition as duly
admitted by herein petitioner-movant coupled
with the fact that the rest of the arguments
raised in the motion have already been
considered and rejected by this court in the
order dated, July 28, 2006, the motion for
reconsideration is hereby denied. 25
On 14 October 2006, Feliciano went directly to this
Court via the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, raising the following arguments:
I.
RESPONDENT COURT HAS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AS ITS DISMISSAL OF THE
PETITION IS SO WHIMSICAL,
CAPRICIOUS AND ARBITRARY
AMOUNTING THEREFORE TO A PATENT
AND GROSS EVASION OF A POSITIVE
DUTY OR VIRTUAL REFUSAL TO
PERFORM JUDICIAL DUTY. TAHIED
II.
RESPONDENT COURT HAS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AS ITS
DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION, BASED ON
GROUNDS NOT SOUGHT AND PRAYED
FOR IN THE MOTION TO DISMISS,
CONSTITUTES A DENIAL OF DUE
PROCESS.
As hereinbefore stated, CA-G.R. SP No. 00489,
Feliciano's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to enjoin
the implementation of CSC Resolution No. 050307, was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals in a Decision dated 16
September 2005. Feliciano appealed said Court of Appeals
Decision before this Court through a Petition for Review
on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 172141. This Court,
however, in an En Banc Resolution dated 6 June 2006, ruled to:
b) DENY the petition for failure
thereof to sufficiently show that the Court of
Appeals committed any reversible error in
issuing the challenged decision and
resolution as to warrant the exercise by this
Court of its discretionary appellate
jurisdiction. 26 TEHDIA
The Court En Banc denied with finality Feliciano's
Motion for Reconsideration on 22 August 2006, and entry of
judgment was made in G.R. No. 172141 on 14 November 2006.
In the instant Petition, which actually arose from the
appointment by the LMWD Board of Directors of Villasin as the
Page 18 of 33
new GM of LMWD after the CSC ordered Feliciano to vacate the April 2004, vested him with security of tenure. Feliciano adds that
same in its Resolution No. 050307, Feliciano prays that this Court the Interim LMWD Board of Directors, in fact, had no power to
set aside and declare null and void the Orders dated 28 July dismiss him when he was dismissed on 11 November 1991.
2006 and 8 September 2006 of the RTC dismissing his Petition
for Quo Warranto in Civil Case No. 2006-03-29. It is well-established that Quo Warranto proceedings
determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a
Petitioner raises several issues in this Petition, which franchise or an office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if
all boil down to the sole question of whether the RTC committed the latter's claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of to enjoy the privilege. According to the Rules of Procedure:
jurisdiction in dismissing Feliciano's Petition for Quo Warranto.
The action may be commenced for
Worthy to note is the failure of Feliciano to implead the Government by the Solicitor General or
herein the RTC, the tribunal that rendered the assailed Orders, the fiscal against a person who usurps,
as a nominal party (public respondent) in the instant Petition intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
for Certiorari. One of the requisites of an independent civil action exercises a public office, position or
for Certiorari is that it must be directed against a tribunal, a franchise; a public officer whose acts
board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial constitute a ground for the forfeiture of his
functions. Feliciano failed to comply with said requirement and office; or against an association which acts
this failure is sufficient to dismiss this Petition. TaDIHc as a corporation without being legally
incorporated or without lawful authority to so
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, failure to comply act. 31 TDcAIH
with any of the aforesaid requirements for filing an independent
civil action for Certiorari is sufficient ground for the dismissal of The action may also be instituted
the petition. This rule accords sufficient discretion to the court by an individual in his own name who
hearing the special civil action whether or not to dismiss the claims to be entitled to the public office or
petition outright for failure to comply with said requirement. position usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another. 32 (Emphasis
Evidently, the function of this Court is merely to check supplied).
whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Feliciano's Petition The possible outcome of a Petition for Quo
for Quo Warranto before it. Warranto can be any of the following:
In a petition for certiorari under Section 1, Rule 65 of If the court finds for the
the Rules of Court, the following essential requisites must be respondent, the judgment should simply
present, to wit: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, state that the respondent is entitled to the
or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) office. If, however, the court finds for the
such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of petitioner and declares the respondent guilty
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, holding or exercising the office, judgment
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 27 may be rendered as follows:
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and "Sec. 10. Judgment where
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of usurpation found. — When the
jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an defendant is found guilty of usurping,
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal intruding into, or unlawfully holding or
hostility, 28 and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to exercising an office, position, right,
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the privilege, or franchise, judgment shall
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 29 CSIHDA be rendered that such defendant be
ousted and altogether excluded
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of therefrom, and that the plaintiff or
Court will prosper only if there is a showing of grave abuse of relator, as the case may be, recover
discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part his costs. Such further judgment may
of respondent tribunal. In the absence of such a showing, there is be rendered determining the
no reason for this Court to annul the decision of the respondent respective rights in and to the office,
tribunal or to substitute it with its own judgment, for the simple position, right, privilege, or franchise
reason that it is not the office of a petition for Certiorari to inquire of all the parties to the action as
into the correctness of the assailed decision. justice requires." EcHTDI
Nonetheless, even as this Court delves into the merits
If it is found that the respondent or
of the present Petition, it still must fail.
defendant is usurping or intruding into the
Feliciano's Petition for Quo Warranto centers on his office, or unlawfully holding the same, the
alleged right as the one legally entitled to occupy the position of court may order:
GM of LMWD. He presented two main issues therein:
(1) The ouster and
(1) Whether or not the LMWD Board of exclusion of the defendant from
Directors, through Resolution No. 05- office;
037, legally and validly ousted him;
and (2) The recovery of costs
by plaintiff or relator;
(2) Whether or not the LMWD Board of
Directors legally and validly (3) The determination of
appointed Villasin. ASTIED the respective rights in and to the
office, position, right, privilege or
Contending that his appointment as GM on 11 June 1975 by the franchise of all the parties to the
LMWD Board of Directors and subsequent assumption of office action as justice requires. 33
bestowed on him a legal right to the said position, Feliciano
argues that Republic Act No. 9286, 30 which further In the instance in which the Petition for Quo
amended Presidential Decree No. 198, and was approved on 2 Warranto is filed by an individual in his own name, he must be

Page 19 of 33
able to prove that he is entitled to the controverted public office,
position, or franchise; otherwise, the holder of the same has a
right to the undisturbed possession thereof. In actions for Quo
Warranto to determine title to a public office, the complaint, to be
sufficient in form, must show that the plaintiff is entitled to the
office. 34 In Garcia v. Perez, 35 this Court ruled that the person
instituting Quo Warranto proceedings on his own behalf, under
Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, must aver and be able
to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute. Without such
averment or evidence of such right, the action may be
dismissed at any stage. 36 DSacAE
Due to the recent turn of events, Feliciano lost any
legal standing to pursue via Quo Warranto proceedings his claim
to the position of GM of LMWD considering this Court's En
Banc Resolutions dated 6 June 2006 and 22 August 2006 in G.R.
No. 172141 which denied with finality his Petition for Review
on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals Decision dated 16
September 2005 and Resolution dated 31 March 2006 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 00489 upholding the legality of CSC Resolution No.
050307. To recall, CSC Resolution No. 050307 treated Feliciano
as a de facto officer with regard to his acts as GM of LMWD; and
declared him to be a usurper of or an intruder to the said position
beginning 6 February 2001, and thus ordered him to vacate the
same.
Considering that entry of judgment was already made
in G.R. No. 172141 as of 14 November 2006, there is therefore
no more obstacle to the appointment by the LMWD Board of
Directors of Villasin as the new GM of LMWD.
Feliciano imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the RTC for allegedly failing to afford him due process, since
his Petition for Quo Warranto was dismissed based on its face
and without having been heard. In granting Villasin's Motion to
Dismiss the Petition for Quo Warranto, the RTC
ratiocinated: caHASI
Inferred, in the year 1999,
petitioner herein already knew that his
appointment as General Manager of LMWD
was placed in doubt and declared ineffective.
So his acts as such since then were void.
Petitioner, in fact was ordered by the Civil
Service Commission to vacate the position of
LMWD General Manager since he assumed
the position without completed appointment
(General Manager, Philippine Ports
Authority, et al. vs. Julieta Monserat, 381
SCRA 200.)
. . . As of the moment, without the
CSC approved appointment, he is, the law
points, a de facto officer. He held the position
of General Manager of LMWD without the
completed appointment. Over this, but for the
creed petitioner avows, the court believes
that while the necessary intent is there, the
sporting idea of fair play, is not sufficient for
the petition to succeed. Petitioner surely is a
de facto officer. 37
The Court emphasizes that an action for Quo
Warranto may be dismissed at any stage when it becomes
apparent that the plaintiff is not entitled to the disputed public
office, position or franchise. 38 Hence, the RTC is not compelled
to still proceed with the trial when it is already apparent on the
face of the Petition for Quo Warranto that it is insufficient. The
RTC may already dismiss said petition at this point. aSTcCE
Feliciano presents as an alternative argument the fact
that as GM of LMWD, he is not part of the personnel of the water
district, arguing that his appointment does not need CSC
attestation. He explains that:
[E]ven granting that the CSC can
declare him a de facto officer and usurper,
the same has already prescribed, since as
early as September 8, 2000 in its Resolution
No. 002107 or four (4) years before its
Resolution No. 050307, it has already known
about petitioner being a de facto officer, that
being the GM of LMWD, he is not part of the
personnel of LMWD, thus, his appointment is
not subject to attestation under CSC
Resolution No. 41, S. 1993 . . . . 39
We find his argument untenable.
To determine whether personnel of the LMWD,
particularly the GM, are subject to CSC Rules and Regulations,
we must delve into the pertinent laws affecting the management
and policy-making functions of the LMWD.
The provisions of Presidential Decree No.
198 read: HaTISE
Chapter VI
Officers and Employees
Section 23. Additional Officers. — At
the first meeting of the board, or as soon
thereafter as practicable, the board shall
appoint, by a majority vote, a general
manager, an auditor, and an attorney, and shall
define their duties and fix their compensation.
Said officers shall service at the pleasure of the
board.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 25. Exemption from
Civil Service. — The district and its
employees, being engaged in a proprietary
function, are hereby exempt from the
provisions of the Civil Service Law. . . . .
On 15 August 1975, Presidential Decree No.
768 amended Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 198 to read:
SEC. 23. The General Manager.
— At the first meeting of the board, or as
soon thereafter as practicable, the board
shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general
manager and shall define his duties and fix
his compensation. Said officer shall serve at
the pleasure of the board. STcEaI
On 11 June 1978, Presidential Decree No.
1479 40 amended Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 768, removing Section 25 of the
latter, which had exempted the district and its employees from
the coverage of the Civil Service. Thus, with such amendment,
officers and employees of water districts were put under the
mantle of Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
On 2 April 2004, Republic Act No. 9286 further
amended Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 198, to read:
Sec. 23. The General Manager. —
At the first meeting of the Board, or as soon
thereafter as practicable, the Board shall
appoint, by a majority vote, a general
manager and shall define his duties and fix
his compensation. Said officer shall not be
removed from office, except for cause
and after due process.
From the foregoing, as early as the issuance
of Presidential Decree No. 1479 on 11 June 1978, it is clear that
the LMWD GM is covered by Civil Service Rules and
Regulations. DEAaIS
As we have held in Tanjay Water District v.
Gabaton, 41 Davao City Water District v. Civil Service
Commission, 42 and Hagonoy Water District v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 43 water districts are government
Page 20 of 33
instrumentalities 44 whose officers and employees belong to the
civil service. These rulings are in consonance with the provisions
of Article IX-B, Section 2 of the Constitution, whose provisions
read:
The civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
The position of General Manager being unequivocally
part of the personnel of the water district whose officers and
employees are covered under the civil service, an appointment
thereto requires the attestation of the CSC for it to be valid.
Moreover, this Court cannot ignore the fact that
petitioner Feliciano violated the rule on forum shopping 45 in his
quest for a favorable opinion on his cause of action. IHCSET
Forum shopping exists when a party repetitively avails
himself of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the
same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues
either pending in, or already resolved adversely by, some other
court. 46
The following elements of forum shopping have been
established:
(a) identity of parties, or at least
such parties as represent the same interests
in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same set of facts; and
(c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration. 47
The prohibition on forum shopping is embodied in Rule
7 of the Rules of Court, which provides, viz.: aASDTE
Sec. 5. Certification against forum
shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party
shall certify under oath in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced
any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and
(c) if he should thereafter learn that the same
or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five
(5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has
been filed.
Failure to comply with the
foregoing requirements shall not be curable
by mere amendment of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading but shall be cause
for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. The submission of
a false certification or non-compliance with
any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative
and criminal actions. If the acts of the party
or his counsel clearly constitute willful and
deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice
and shall constitute direct contempt, as well
as a cause for administrative
sanctions. cTCEIS
What is pivotal to consider in determining whether
forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused to courts and
the parties-litigants by a party who asks appellate courts and/or
administrative entities to rule on the same or related causes
and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the
process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered by the different courts upon the same issues. 48
Feliciano has evidently trifled with the courts and
abused their processes in improperly instituting several cases
and filing multiple petitions, cases or proceedings, and splitting
causes of action — all of which focused on the legality of his
termination as LMWD GM. While a party may avail himself of the
remedies prescribed by the Rules of Court for the myriad reliefs
from the court, such party is not free to resort to them
simultaneously or at his pleasure or caprice.
It is pertinent to note that at the time Feliciano filed
G.R. No. 174929 on 14 October 2006, the legality of his
termination as LMWD GM has, in fact, been resolved with finality
with the entry of judgment in G.R. No. 172141. To recall, this
Court En Banc denied G.R. No. 172141 and affirmed CA-G.R.
SP No. 00489 which upheld CSC Resolution No. 050307. With
the denial of G.R. No. 172141, the validity of CSC Resolution No.
050307 declaring Feliciano to be a de facto officer from 8 June
1999 to 6 February 2001, and a mere usurper thereafter, has
been laid to rest. TcSAaH
Feliciano, however, insisted on pursuing this petition
for certiorari, being fully aware of the finality of G.R. No. 172141
and the consequences resulting therefrom.
This Court reiterates the raison d'etre for the
proscription against forum shopping. The grave evil sought to be
avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by
two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory
decisions — unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage of a
variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in
several fora until a favorable result is reached. 49
IN ALL, we find that the RTC committed no grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing Feliciano's Petition for Quo
Warranto.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition
for Certiorari is DISMISSED, and the Orders dated 8 July 2006
and 8 September 2006 issued by Branch 6 of the Regional Trial
Court in Tacloban, Leyte, in Civil Case No. 2006-03-29,
dismissing petitioner Ranulfo C. Feliciano's Petition for Quo
Warranto, are hereby AFFIRMED. caCTHI
Feliciano and his counsel are hereby REPRIMANDED
for FORUM SHOPPING, with a WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga,
Velasco, Jr., Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro and Brion JJ., concur.
Nachura, J., took no part.
||| (Feliciano v. Villasin, G.R. No. 174929, [June 27, 2008], 578 PHIL
889-914)
Page 21 of 33

Case 8 Valeriana vs Quijano GR No 173606 December 3 2012
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 173606. December 3, 2012.]
VALERIANA VILLONDO, petitioner, vs.
CARMEN QUIJANO, ARDIANO
ALCANTARA, and MARCELINO
EBENA, respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J p:
"In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and
detainer[,] the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact
has actual possession; and in case of controverted right, it requires the
parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees
fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the
question of ownership. It is obviously just the person who has first
acquired possession [who] should remain in possession pending this
decision . . . ." 1
In a legal battle for forcible entry, two parties assert their
alleged right to possess a 2.66-hectare government timberland in
Udlom, Sinsin, Cebu City. One of the parties, Valeriana Villondo
(Valeriana), prevailed in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) but
later lost her case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) after it
rejected her standing as the real party-in-interest. And since the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's ruling, Valeriana now comes to
this Court to assail the March 31, 2005 Decision 2 and July 10, 2006
Resolution 3 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 70734.
Factual Antecedents
In her Complaint 4 for forcible entry with preliminary
mandatory injunction before the MTCC in Cebu City, Valeriana
claimed that in the morning of August 14, 1999, respondent Carmen
Quijano (Carmen) and her farm laborers, respondents Adriano
Alcantara and Marcelino Ebena, intruded into her land with the help of
three policemen and other barangay officials. They destroyed the
plants therein, harvested the root crops, corn, and banana, built a hut,
fenced off the area, and posted a "NO TRESPASSING" sign, thus
preventing Valeriana and her family from entering the premises where
they have always resided and depriving them of their harvest. cEHITA
Valeriana argued that Carmen can never assert ownership
over the property because it is a government land. She claimed that
Carmen's parents, Rufo and Constancia Bacalla, were themselves
aware that an ownership claim is worthless. Thus, they ceded their
plantations on the subject land to her husband Daniel Villondo (Daniel)
for P2,000.00 as declared in a "Kasabutan". 5
Valeriana based her and her family's right of possession on
Certificate of Stewardship No. 146099 in the name of 'Daniel T.
Villondo', 6 which she claimed to have been awarded to her now-
deceased husband whose actual name is 'Daniel P. Villondo.' Said
Certificate was issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources on February 14, 1994. Valeriana averred that her family
had prior possession of the land as her husband started tilling the
same even before the war. When she married him in 1948, they
continued to occupy and cultivate the land together with their five
children. To further support her claim of prior possession and
Carmen's alleged intrusion, she submitted, inter alia, Carmen's letters
that sought police and barangay assistance in fencing the subject
property, 7 her (Carmen) counsel's demand letter for Valeriana's son
Esteban Villondo (Esteban) to leave the property, 8 pictures of a
collapsed house on the subject land that Valeriana claims to belong to
one of her sons, 9 and an affidavit of Regino Habasa (Regino), a
Bureau of Forestry employee and a Barangay Sinsin resident, who
attested that the Villondo family had been tilling the land since
1951. 10
On the other hand, Carmen interposed that the
alleged "Kasabutan" was never brought to her attention by her
parents. In any case, she asserted that such allegation of Valeriana
even supports her claim of prior possession. CHTAIc
Carmen tacked her possessory right to that of her parents
Rufo and Constancia Bacalla who in 1948 purchased 11 from Liberato
and Vicente Abellanosa a 4.51 hectare land in Taop, Pardo, Cebu City
covered by Tax Declaration No. 92638. According to her, said 4.51
hectare land includes the disputed area which her parents also
cultivated and developed. Carmen submitted to the court her tax
declarations over the land. 12
The respondents also questioned Valeriana's legal
personality to sue, contending that "Daniel T. Villondo," 13 the named
tiller in the Certificate of Stewardship No. 146099, is the real party-in-
interest and thus should be the plaintiff in the suit and not Valeriana.
They claimed that "Daniel T. Villondo" is actually Valeriana's son
Romualdo Villondo (Romualdo), a construction worker who had never
even cultivated the subject land. Respondents refuted Valeriana's
claim that the named tiller in the Certificate refers to her husband
"Daniel P. Villondo," 14 who was awarded by the government a
Certificate of Stewardship over another parcel of land in
1983. 15 Because of this, they asserted that Valeriana is misleading
the court by making it appear that she has successional rights from
her husband as steward. To support this, respondents submitted the
respective stewardship applications 16 as well as other
documents 17 indicating that Daniel P. Villondo and Daniel T. Villondo
are different persons. Notably, Regino's Affidavit admits that Daniel T.
Villondo refers to Romualdo. 18
Incidentally, Carmen's attempt to have the land surveyed in
June 1997 resulted in the filing before the MTCC of Cebu of criminal
cases for grave threats and grave coercion docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. R-55788-55789 19 against Valeriana, her two children Esteban
and Trinidad, and a daughter-in-law. Carmen alleged that the four
were armed with scythe, bolo, and pieces of wood when they
prevented her from entering and surveying the property, and even
threatened to kill her if she proceeds with the land survey. 20
Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
After weighing the parties' respective evidence, the MTCC
adjudged that the Daniel T. Villondo under whose name the Certificate
of Stewardship was issued, is actually Valeriana's son, Romualdo. The
MTCC pointed out that the boundaries of the lot as reflected in
Romualdo's Certificate of Stewardship are way different from the
boundaries mentioned in Tax Declaration No. 92638 that Carmen has
been relying upon. In fact, the land covered by Romualdo's Certificate
of Stewardship made no mention that it is bounded by Carmen's land
or the land of her predecessors-in-interest. 21 This thus disproved
respondents' claim that Certificate of Stewardship No. 146099 was
issued over a land that constitutes a portion of Carmen's
property. aCHDAE
Noting that the ejectment case delves on possession de
facto, the MTCC also concluded that respondents indeed deprived
Valeriana and her family of the possession of the land. It reasoned that
Carmen herself alleged in the pending criminal cases for grave threats
and grave coercion that she was prevented by the Villondos from
entering the property and this presupposes that Valeriana and her
family were in prior possession and occupation of the land in question.
Thus, in its March 2, 2001 Decision, 22 the MTCC ruled:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of [Valeriana] and against the
[respondents] ordering the latter to vacate and
move out from the premises of the subject land
and to restore [Valeriana] to the peaceful
Page 22 of 33
 possession and occupation thereof and
condemning them to pay [Valeriana], jointly and
severally, the following:
(a) Actual Damages in the amount of
Twenty-Five Thousand (PhP25,000.00) Pesos;
(b) Attorney's fees in the amount of
Fifteen Thousand (PhP15,000.00) Pesos; and
(c) Litigation expenses in the amount
of Ten Thousand (PhP10,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED. 23
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Dismayed with the judgment, respondents appealed to the
RTC of Cebu City and reiterated their claim of prior possession of the
property. They also put in issue therein lack of cause of action since
Valeriana is not the real party-in-interest. A supersedeas bond was
likewise posted. 24 cADEHI
In its February 11, 2001 Resolution, 25 the RTC found
Valeriana's Complaint dismissible for lack of cause of action, viz.:
Based on the foregoing findings of
the court a quo, the complaint should have
been initiated by Romualdo Villondo, who is
using the name of Daniel T. Villondo, because
he is the real party-in-interest and not by his
mother, the herein appellee Valeriana Villondo.
There is also no showing that Romualdo
Villondo is a minor or an incompetent who
needs the assistance of his mother as
guardian ad litem. Because of this fatal defect,
this case is dismissible under Section 1, Rule
16 of the Rules of Court because the herein
appellee Valeriana Villondo is not the real
party-in-interest but Romualdo Villondo, and
therefore the complaint does not state a cause
of action. 26
In any event, the RTC gave more credence to Carmen's tax
declarations over Valeriana's assertion of long-time possession which
to it, was never established.
The dispositive portion of the said Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Decision appealed from is
hereby reversed in favor of the [respondents]
since the [petitioner] Valeriana Villondo is not a
real party-in-interest or beneficiary of the
Certificate of Stewardship . . . but her son
Romualdo Villondo, who used the name of
Daniel T. Villondo, Jr. Hence, the court a
quo should have dismissed the complaint since
it does not state a cause of action.
Cost [de] officio.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 27
Valeriana filed a Motion for Reconsideration 28 but the
same was denied in an Order 29 dated March 12, 2002. caEIDA
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
When Valeriana elevated the case to the CA, 30 she
proffered that the only issue that the courts should consider in forcible
entry cases is actual possession. She highlighted the fact that the RTC
did not overturn the MTCC's factual finding of her actual possession of
the disputed property. She therefore claimed that the RTC erred in
dismissing her Complaint for the sole reason that she is not a real
party-in-interest and likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of
execution/possession.
The CA however was not convinced. In its March 31, 2005
Decision, 31 it ruled:
[Valeriana's] allegation that she and
her family were deprived of their possession,
cultivation and enjoyment of the subject land
may be true; however, it is equally important, in
order for her case to prosper, to show that she
has the right or interest to protect. One who has
no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an
action for it is jurisprudentially ordained that
every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest. A "real
party in interest" is one who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. We
agree with the RTC that petitioner is not the
real party in interest in the case at bench.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED. The assailed February 11, 2002
Resolution and the March 12, 2002 Order of
Branch 5, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, are
hereby AFFIRMED. 32
In her Motion for Reconsideration, 33 Valeriana maintained
that she is a real party-in-interest since she was one of those
dispossessed of the property. However, the CA, in its July 10, 2006
Resolution, 34 ignored her plea for a reconsideration. AEcTaS
The Sole Issue
Pleading before us for a review of the CA ruling, Valeriana
underscores her rightful personality as plaintiff and stressed that the
CA erred in affirming the RTC when it ruled that only Romualdo can be
the plaintiff in the forcible entry case.
Hence, the central issue to be resolved is: Whether
Valeriana is a real party-in-interest in the forcible entry case she filed.
Our Ruling
Notably, even public lands can be the subject of forcible
entry cases as it has already been held that ejectment proceedings
may involve all kinds of land. 35 Thus, in the case at bench, while the
parties are fighting over the possession of a government land, the
courts below are not deprived of jurisdiction to render judgment
thereon. 36 Courts must resolve the issue of possession even if the
parties to the ejectment suit are mere informal settlers. 37
For a court to restore possession, two things must be
proven in a forcible entry case: prior physical possession of the
property and deprivation of the property by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. 38 "Possession de facto, [i.e.,
the physical possession of a property,] and not possession de jure is
the only issue in a forcible entry case. This rule holds true regardless
of the character of a party's possession, provided that he has in his
favor priority in time. . . ." 39 As used in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases, 'possession' refers to "physical possession, not legal
possession in the sense contemplated in civil law." 40
Here, Valeriana is one of those in prior physical possession
of the land who was eventually dispossessed. EADCHS
Carmen failed to present evidence that she was in actual
physical possession of the land she claims. Her "[t]ax declarations are
not conclusive proofs of ownership, or even of possession." 41 They
only constitute proofs of a claim of title over the declared
property. 42 Her acts betray her claim of prior possession. Her counsel
wrote Valeriana's son Esteban and demanded that the subject land be
vacated. Carmen had to seek help from the authorities in order to
fence the lot. Furthermore, by filing criminal cases for grave threats
and grave coercion, she herself acknowledged that Valeriana, together
with Esteban, another son and daughter-in-law, were the ones
occupying the subject property and who allegedly prevented her from
Page 23 of 33
conducting a land survey. These circumstances are indicative of the strong hand, violence, or terror. Neither is
Villondo family's possession of the premises. the unlawful withholding of property allowed.
Courts will always uphold respect for prior
With this in mind, is Valeriana the appropriate party to file a possession. 46
forcible entry case against the respondents? We rule that the CA has
no reason to withhold the relief she prays for on the ground of a lack of WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
cause of action. The assailed March 31, 2005 Decision and July 10, 2006 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70734 are hereby ANNULED
"A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities in
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to Cebu, Branch 5, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
the avails of the suit." 43 As we have explained:
SO ORDERED
'Interest' within the meaning of the
rules means material interest, an interest in ||| (Villondo v. Quijano, G.R. No. 173606, [December 3, 2012], 700
issue and to be affected by the decree as PHIL 18-31)
distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. A real
party-in-interest is one who has a legal right. . .
. The action must be brought by the person
who, by substantive law, possesses the right
sought to be enforced. . . . 44

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court specifies who may

be the plaintiff in an action for forcible entry, viz.:

Section 1. Who may institute

proceedings, and when. — . . . a person
deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of
the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any
time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring
an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court
against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or
any person or persons claiming under them,
for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Sans the presence of the awardee of the Certificate of

Stewardship, the provision clearly allows Valeriana to institute the
action for the recovery of the physical possession of the property
against the alleged usurper. She has a right or interest to protect as
she was the one dispossessed and thus, she can file the action for
forcible entry. Any judgment rendered by the courts below in the
forcible entry action will bind and definitely affect her claim to possess
the subject property. The fact that Valeriana is not the holder of the
Certificate of Stewardship is not in issue in a forcible entry case. This
matter already delves into the character of her possession. We
emphasize that in ejectment suits, it does not even matter if the party's
title to the property is questionable. 45 TAcSaC

The MTCC correctly considered Valeriana as a real party-in-

interest and correctly delved strictly with the issue of physical
possession. Notably, the CA, other than dismissing the case for lack of
cause of action, did not seem to dispute the MTCC's factual finding of
Valeriana's prior physical possession. Absent any evidence of
respondents' prior physical possession, Valeriana, who has cogently
convinced us that she was dispossessed of the land by force, is
entitled to stay on the property until she is lawfully ejected by others
who can prove in a separate proceeding that they have a better right.

We then end by highlighting the principle behind ejectment

proceedings:

. . . Regardless of the actual condition of the

title to the property, the party in peaceable
quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a

Page 24 of 33
Case 9 Cabrera vs Getaruela GR No 164213 April 21 2009
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 164213. April 21, 2009.]
VALENTIN CABRERA, MANUEL CABRERA,
and REBECCA LESLIE
CABRAS, petitioners, vs. ELIZABETH
GETARUELA, EULOGIO ABABON, LEONIDA
LIGAN, MARIETTO ABABON, GLORIA
PANAL, LEONORA OCARIZA, SOTERO
ABABON, JR., and JOSEPH
ABABON, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the
22 January 2004 Decision 2 and 3 May 2004 Resolution 3 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80062. CcaDHT
The Antecedent Facts
Lot Nos. 3635-CC and 3635-Y, located in Inayawan,
Pardo, Cebu City were covered by Tax Declaration Nos. GR2K-
12-078-02409 and GR2K-12-078-02431 in the name of Arcadio
Jaca (Arcadio). The heirs of Arcadio executed a notarized
document known as "Kasabutan nga Hinigala" dated 25 July
1951 which stipulated that all the inherited properties of Arcadio,
including Lot No. 3635, would go to Peregrina Jaca Cabrera
(Peregrina). However, in a Repartition Project approved on 21
November 1956 by Judge Jose M. Mendoza of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu City, Branch 6 in Special Proceedings No. 211-
V, Lot Nos. 3635-CC and 3635-Y were given to Urbana Jaca
Ababon (Urbana), mother of Elizabeth Getaruela, Eulogio
Ababon, Leonida Ligan, Marietto Ababon, Gloria Panal, Leonora
Ocariza, Sotero Ababon, Jr., and Joseph Ababon (respondents).
Upon Urbana's death in 1997, respondents inherited the lots.
Valentin Cabrera (Valentin), Manuel Cabrera (Manuel),
and Rebecca Leslie Cabras (Cabras), Peregrina's adopted
daughter, occupied the lots with the knowledge and consent of
respondents.
Respondents alleged that Valentin, Manuel, and
Cabras (collectively, petitioners) were occupying portions of the
lots without paying any rentals, but with an agreement that they
would vacate the premises and demolish their houses at their
expense should respondents need the property. In 2001,
respondents personally notified petitioners that they would
repossess the property. Respondents asked petitioners to vacate
the premises and remove the houses they built on the lots.
However, despite repeated demands, petitioners refused to
vacate the premises. The matter was referred to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay Inayawan, Cebu for possible
amicable settlement but petitioners still refused to vacate the
premises. Thus, respondents filed an action for ejectment against
petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. R-45280.
Petitioners assailed the Project of Partition as
incredible because its first page was missing and it lacked the
signatures of the parties who executed it. Petitioners asserted the
validity of the "Kasabutan nga Hinigala". Cabras alleged that as
owner of Lot No. 3635 upon Peregrina's death, she could not be
ejected from the premises. Valentin and Manuel alleged that they
could not be ejected because they built their houses with
Peregrina's knowledge and consent. cTSHaE
The Rulings of the MTCC and RTC
In its Decision 4 dated 4 April 2002, the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 7, Cebu City (MTCC) ruled in favor of
respondents, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants, ordering the latter to vacate the
premises in question and to demolish whatever
improvements introduced thereon and
surrender complete control and possession
thereof to the plaintiffs, and to jointly and
severally pay the latter:
1) the amount of P15,000.00 for and
as attorney's fees;
2) litigation expenses in the sum of
P5,000.00; and cost of suit.
SO ORDERED. 5
The MTCC ruled that the "Kasabutan nga
Hinigala" was superseded by the court-approved Repartition
Project. The MTCC noted that in the Repartition Project, Lot Nos.
3635-CC and 3635-Y were given to Urbana, respondents'
predecessor-in-interest. The MTCC ruled that while the lots were
still in Urbana's name, respondents were not barred from
judicially ejecting petitioners from the premises.
Petitioners appealed from the MTCC's Decision.
In its 19 May 2003 Decision, 6 the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 7 (RTC) reversed the MTCC's Decision.
The RTC ruled that the Project of Partition showed that Lot No.
3635-Y was co-owned by Urbana (251 sq. m.), Peregrina (863
sq. m.), and Andres Jaca (251 sq. m.). The RTC ruled that as
Peregrina's heir, Cabras became a co-owner of Lot No. 3635-Y
and she could not be ejected from the property. The RTC ruled
that Valentin and Manuel could not likewise be ejected from the
property as they were allowed by Cabras to occupy the lot.
The RTC ruled that the Project of Partition also showed
that Urbana's total share of 1,499 sq. m., covering 1,248 sq. m. of
Lot No. 3635-CC and 251 sq. m. of Lot No. 3635-Y, was sold to
one Josefina Asas (Asas). As such, respondents had no cause of
action against petitioners.
The dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision reads:
Wherefore, the judgment in the
Decision dated April 4, 2002, of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 7, Cebu City, in
Civil Case No. R-45280, is REVERSED, and
another one is entered DISMISSING the case
against defendants-appellants. cHTCaI
Plaintiffs-appellees are directed to
compensate defendants-appellants attorney's
fees in the amount of P15,000.00, and litigation
expenses in the amount of P5,000.00, as well
as to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 7
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. In its
29 July 2003 Order, the RTC partially granted respondents'
motion. The RTC ruled that it erred in finding that Urbana sold
her share to Asas. The RTC ruled that the Project of Partition
showed that it was Panfilo Jaca who sold his share to Asas. The
RTC modified its 19 May 2003 Decision as follows:
Wherefore, the judgment in the
Decision dated April 4, 2002, of the Municipal
Page 25 of 33
 Trial Court in Cities, Branch 7, Cebu City, in
Civil Case No. R-45280, is MODIFIED, as
follows:
1) Dismissing the complaint as
regards Lot 3655-Y; and
2) Ordering defendants-appellants to
vacate Lot No. 3655-CC,
demolish whatever
improvements they may
have introduced thereon
and surrender complete
control and possession
thereof to plaintiffs-
appellees.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the RTC's 29
July 2003 Order, assailing the Project of Partition. In its 3
September 2003 Order, 9 the RTC denied petitioners' motion.
The RTC ruled that petitioners failed to present any evidence
supporting the purported falsity of the Project of Partition. The
RTC upheld the jurisdiction of the MTCC and further ruled that
respondents' action was an ejectment case.
Petitioners filed a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 22 January 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the 29 July 2003 and 3 September 2003 Orders of the
RTC.
The Court of Appeals held that the jurisdiction of the
court is determined by the allegations in the complaint. The Court
of Appeals held that a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient
if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to
vacate is unlawful. The Court of Appeals ruled that prior physical
possession is indispensable only in actions for forcible entry but
not in unlawful detainer. The Court of Appeals further ruled that
occupation of the premises must be tolerated by the owners right
from the start of the possession of the property sought to be
recovered. AScHCD
The Court of Appeals found that in this case,
petitioners were occupying the lots without rentals upon
agreement with respondents that they would relinquish
possession once respondents need the property. However,
petitioners refused to vacate the premises despite demands by
respondents. The Court of Appeals ruled that the allegations
were sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the MTCC where the
ejectment suit was instituted and tried.
The Court of Appeals noted that petitioners challenged
respondents' claim of ownership of the property. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the only issue involved in an ejectment case is
possession de facto. However, when the issue of possession
could not be resolved without resolving the issue of ownership,
the court may receive evidence upon the question of title to the
property but solely for the purpose of determining the issue of
possession. Hence, the MTCC acted correctly when it received
evidence on the issue of ownership. The Court of Appeals further
noted that the RTC upheld the MTCC's finding that the Project of
Partition superseded the "Kasabutan nga Hinigala". The Court of
Appeals sustained the RTC in refusing to admit documents
submitted by petitioners which they failed to present before the
MTCC. The Court of Appeals stressed that the MTCC's finding on
the issue of ownership was merely provisional. Thus, petitioners
were not legally barred from filing the proper action to settle the
question of title.
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED. The
assailed Orders dated July 29, 2003 and
September 3, 2003 of the court a quo are
hereby both AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 10
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 3
May 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
The Court of Appeals ruled that a complaint for
unlawful detainer must be filed within one year from demand and
not from the start of possession as claimed by petitioners. The
Court of Appeals reiterated that in cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, the issue is pure physical or de
facto possession and pronouncements made on the question of
ownership are provisional in nature. The Court of Appeals further
ruled that all cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer shall be
filed before the proper Municipal Trial Court, there being no
jurisdictional amount involved, even with respect to damages or
unpaid rentals sought. HCTAEc
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues in their
Memorandum: 11
1. Whether the MTCC had jurisdiction to
entertain the ejectment case
considering the absence of a
contract, written or oral, entered into
by respondents and petitioners as
lessors and lessees, respectively;
2. Whether tolerance as a ground for ejectment
is tenable in this case; and
3. Whether the Project of Partition superseded
the "Kasabutan nga Hinigala".
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Petitioners insist that the MTCC had no jurisdiction to
entertain respondents' complaint because there was no contract,
oral or written, between the parties. Petitioners allege that the
proper action should have been one for recovery of possession
and not for unlawful detainer.
We do not agree.
It is settled that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause
of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the
defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal
upon notice by plaintiff to defendant
of the termination of the latter's right
of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment
thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on
defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment. 12 cEITCA
Page 26 of 33
 In this case, the complaint alleged that petitioners were
occupying the property, with agreement that should respondents
need the property, petitioners would relinquish possession of the
lots and demolish their houses at their expense. Respondents
personally notified petitioners to vacate the premises and to
demolish their houses but petitioners refused to vacate the lots.
The complaint established that petitioners' possession was by
tolerance of respondents, and their possession became illegal
when they refused to vacate the premises upon demand by
respondents. Here, the possession became illegal not from the
time petitioners started occupying the property but from the time
demand was made for them to vacate the premises. In short, the
complaint sufficiently established a case for unlawful detainer.
Contrary to petitioners' contention, the issue in this
case is not the ownership of the lots. It should be stressed that
the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought determine the nature of the action and the court with
jurisdiction over it. 13 The defenses set up in an answer are not
determinative of jurisdiction. 14 The jurisdiction of the court
cannot be made to depend on the exclusive characterization of
the case by one of the parties. 15 Thus:
In an unlawful detainer case, the sole
issue for resolution is physical or material
possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any
of the parties. However, where the issue of
ownership is raised, the courts may pass upon
the issue of ownership in order to determine
who has the right to possess the property. We
stress, however, that this adjudication is only
an initial determination of ownership for the
purpose of settling the issue of possession, the
issue of ownership being inseparably linked
thereto. The lower court's adjudication of
ownership in the ejectment case is merely
provisional and would not bar or prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title
to the property. It is, therefore, not conclusive
as to the issue of ownership . . . . 16

The MTCC, the RTC, and the Court of Appeals all held
that the Repartition Project superseded the "Kasabutan nga
Hinigala". We sustain their factual finding as this Court gives
substantial weight to the factual finding of the trial court,
particularly if this factual finding is sustained by appellate courts.
However, we also reiterate that this resolution on the issue of
ownership is only provisional for the purpose of settling the issue
of possession.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the
22 January 2004 Decision and 3 May 2004 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80062. ASHECD
SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Corona, Leonardo-de Castro and Bersamin,

JJ., concur.

||| (Cabrera v. Getaruela, G.R. No. 164213, [April 21, 2009], 604 PHIL
59-68)

Page 27 of 33
Case 10 Ceniza v. Wistehuff, GR No. 165734 exemplary damages, attorney's fees of not less
than P100,000.00 and litigation expenses of not
less than P10,000.00, plus appearance fees
amounting to P2,000.00 per hour. . . . 5

Petitioner thereafter amended his complaint, alleging therein

FIRST DIVISION that it had been filed by way of a derivative suit against the
defendants. He prayed for an accounting of income and expenses of
the IMPI, declaration of dividends, enforcement of his right to financial
[G.R. No. 165734. June 16, 2006.] statements, attorney's fees, and damages. 6 In the course of the
proceedings, the RTC issued an Order on October 10, 2001 denying
his plea for the appointment of a receiver or management
ATTY. RAMON B. CENIZA, petitioner, vs. committee pendente lite. 7
DANIEL WISTEHUFF, SR., DANIEL
WISTEHUFF III, MARITES GONZALES- On March 27, 2003, however, the court rendered judgment
WISTEHUFF, BRYAN K. WISTEHUFF, ATTY. in favor of petitioner. The fallo of the decision reads:
FRANCIS M. ZOSA, and GEMALYN
PETEROS, respondents. WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants ordering the latter as follows:
DECISION 1. to make a true and correct
accounting of the earnings
of the corporation which
will be the basis of the
CALLEJO, SR., J p: declaration of
dividends; DECSIT
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 2. to enjoin defendant Inmark
45, Rules of Court, of the Order 1 dated April 15, 2004 of the Regional Marketing Philippines, Inc.
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-29783 and the individual
dismissing the Petition for Indirect Contempt of petitioner Atty. Ramon defendants to comply with
B. Ceniza against respondents Daniel Wistehuff, Sr., Daniel Wistehuff the terms and conditions of
III, Marites Gonzales-Wistehuff, Bryan K. Wistehuff, Atty. Francis M. plaintiff Ceniza's Retainer
Zosa, and Gemalyn Peteros. Also assailed in this petition is the Contract;
Order 2 denying the motion for reconsideration of said decision.
Petitioner prays, inter alia, that the court enjoin the Court of Appeals 3. to order the individual defendants
(CA) from enforcing its Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 85301 granting to whom services were
the plea of Inmark Marketing Philippines, Inc. (IMPI) for a temporary rendered to pay attorney's
restraining order, as well as the Resolution dated October 14, 2004 fees of P200,000.00;
which granted IMPI's plea for a writ of preliminary injunction on a
P50,000.00 bond. 4. to order defendants Daniel
Wistehuff III and Daniel
Petitioner and his client Daniel Wistehuff, Sr. organized and Wistehuff, Sr., jointly and
established IMPI. 3 Petitioner owns 5% of the shares of stocks of the severally, to pay plaintiff
IMPI, and the other stockholders are respondents Daniel Wistehuff III, the sum of P500,000.00 in
Marites Gonzales-Wistehuff, and Bryan K. Wistehuff. 4 moral damages and
P25,000.00 in exemplary
Petitioner, as plaintiff, filed a Complaint against IMPI and the damages;
Wistehuffs with the RTC of Cebu City for accounting, declaration of
dividends, specific performance, damages and attorney's fees with a 5. to order defendants Daniel
plea for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The case was Wistehuff III and Daniel
raffled to Branch 11 of the court and docketed as Civil Case No. CEB- Wistehuff, Sr. to pay, jointly
26274-SRC. The complaint contained the following prayer: and severally, attorney's
fees of P100,000.00 and
. . . [That a] writ of preliminary litigation expenses of
mandatory injunction be issued ordering P10,000.00.
defendant corporation, its President Daniel
Wistehuff III and its former President Daniel SO ORDERED. 8
Wistehuff, Sr. to: a) produce all financial
documents of the corporation from 1996 up to Petitioner moved for the execution of the decision pending
the present and deposit the same with the appeal. On August 14, 2003, the RTC issued an Omnibus
Court; b) faithfully comply with the terms of the Order, 9 partially granting the motion. The dispositive portion of the
Retainership Contract to pay his retainer fee of Order reads:
P35,000.00 per month and the extra legal
services rendered; a Management Committee WHEREFORE, in view of [the]
of a Receiver be constituted; ordering foregoing premises, the Court hereby does the
defendants to make full accounting; ordering following:
the declaration of stock and cash dividends;
ordering the individual defendants to whom (a) Orders the issuance of a writ of
legal services were rendered to pay attorney's execution to enforce the portion of the
fees of not less than P200,000.00; ordering judgment rendered in this case on March 27,
defendants Daniel Wistehuff III and Daniel 2003 ordering the defendants to make a true
Wistehuff, Sr., jointly and severally, to pay and correct accounting of the earnings of
plaintiff not less than P500,000.00 in moral Inmark Marketing Philippines, Inc. which will be
damages and not less than P250,000.00 in the basis of declaration of dividends;

Page 28 of 33
 (b) Denies the plaintiff's motion for occupied by defendant
immediate execution of the portions of the Daniel Wistehuff, Sr.
judgment relating to awards for damages, located at Northtown
attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation; and Homes (Decision, p. 6);

(c) Orders the release to Judge Jose 2) P14,000,000.00 was paid for the
P. Burgos of the receiver's cash bond in the residential lot and building
sum of P25,000.00. occupied by defendant
Daniel Wistehuff III located
SO ORDERED. 10 at Ma. Luisa Subdivision
(Ibid);
Consequently, a Writ of Execution 11 was issued by the
court on September 11, 2003, a copy of which was served on the 9. Other hidden or misappropriated
defendants on the same day. On September 15, 2003, the IMPI, earnings of defendant corporation were:
through Atty. Francis M. Zosa of the law firm of Zosa and Quijano,
submitted the following documents to the sheriff in compliance with the 1) Dollar deposits of Inmark's fund
writ issued by the court: (a) Report of Sta. Ana Rivera & Co.; (b) deposited with UCPB,
Balance Sheet; (3) Statements of Operation; (4) Statements of Makati Branch, under
Changes in Equity; (5) Statements of Cash Flows; and (6) Notes to Dollar Account No. 01-317-
Financial Statements pertaining to the corporation. 12 300307-0 from which are
sourced funds transferred
Believing that the defendants-stockholders and their counsel to 317-000429-1 UCPB,
acted in conspiracy with each other and willfully and deliberately Banilad Branch, which is
refused to comply with the writ of execution issued by the court, an Inmark account, per
petitioner filed against them a petition for indirect contempt under Rule CPA Celso Inocente's
39, Section 11, in relation to Rule 71, Section 3(d) of the Rules of report dated July 5, 2002
Court, in the RTC of Cebu City. Petitioner alleged therein that: (Annex "E", etc. Urgent
Omnibus Motion) who at
6. Following the willful, deliberate and one time was engaged as
contumacious refusal of respondents, this time a member of the staff of
with the participation of, and in collusion with, the former Receiver;
respondent Atty. Francis M. Zosa, their counsel
in the intracorporate case before Branch 23, 2) $75,000.00 deposited by
when said counsel acting for and in behalf of defendant Daniel Wistehuff
respondents willfully, deliberately, insultingly III with a bank designated
and contumaciously submitted the 2002 by the Philippine
Financial Statement of Inmark (Annexes "E", Retirement Authority in
"F", and "F-1" hereto attached) which he very support of his application
well knew fraudulently and incorrectly reported for retiree's visa;
a loss and, having been marked and presented
by him in evidence, is not, and cannot possibly 3) The amounts used for the
be, in compliance with the Writ of Execution purchases of several
served upon him and his client, which directed cars/motor vehicles of the
"the defendants to make a true and correct individual defendants with
accounting of the earnings of Inmark the collective value
Marketing Philippines, Inc. which shall be conservatively estimated at
the basis of declaration of dividends." P3,000,000.00;

Plaintiff (now petitioner) then moved
the Court for a show cause order against the
same respondents herein but the Honorable
Court, thru Judge Generosa A. Labra, in its
Order dated 10 December 2003 ruled that
indirect contempt must be initiated by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and certified
true copies of documents or papers involved in
accordance with the provisions of Sec. 4, Rule
71 of the 1997 Rules, hence, the instant
petition;
7. Pursuant to the above-cited Sec. 4
of Rule 71, it is within the discretion of the
Honorable Presiding Judge of Branch 23 to
order the consolidation of the present petition
which is a Special Civil Action and Civil Case
No. CEB-26274-SRC which is the principal
action pending before Branch 23 for joint
hearing and resolution/decision.
respondents, as follows:
8. The 2002 Financial Statement is
incorrect and fraudulent based on the judgment
of this Honorable Court in Civil Case No. CEB-
26274-SRC which found that:
1) P28,000,000.00 was paid for the
residential lot and building
4) Funds utilized for the purchase of
furnitures and fixtures of
the residences located at
Northtown Homes and at
the Ma. Luisa Subdivision;
5) And other hidden earnings/funds
which are yet to be
discovered.
9. The present contempt charges
arose out of or are related to Civil Case No.
CEB-26274-SRC before Branch 23 of this
Honorable Court which rendered the judgment
which[,] being in a nature of special judgment[,]
may be enforced by contempt proceedings if
the same should be disobeyed pursuant to Sec.
11, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules. 13
Petitioner prayed that judgment be rendered against
1. To require the respondents to
comment on the petition within such period as
may be fixed by the Court (Sec. 3, Rule 71) and
thereafter to set the date for hearing on the
contempt charge requiring all respondents to
appear in person at such hearing. (But nothing
in this section shall be so construed as to

Page 29 of 33
 prevent the court from issuing process to bring
the respondent into court, or from holding him
in custody pending such proceedings.) [Sec. 3];
2. If the hearing is not ordered to be
had forthwith, to allow the release of the
respondents from custody upon filing bonds in
amounts fixed by the Court for their
appearance at the next hearing of the charge
(Sec. 6);
3. When respondents, released on
bail, fail to appear on the date set under item 2
of the reliefs herein prayed, for this Honorable
Court to issue another order of arrest as well as
to declare the bonds of respondents to be
forfeited and confiscated, or both, such bonds
being understood to answer for the measure of
damages to the extent of the loss or injury
sustained by petitioner by reason of misconduct
for which the contempt charge was prosecuted,
with costs of the proceedings and that such
recovery shall be ordered by the Court for the
benefit of the petitioner (Sec. 9);
4. After hearing, to SENTENCE to
the maximum, in view of aggravating
circumstances attendant to the commission of
the offenses, the respondents guilty of indirect
contempt according to the penalties prescribed
in Sec. 7, Rule 71 which consists of a fine not
exceeding P30,000.00 or imprisonment not
exceeding 6 months or both, without prejudice
to the provisions of Sec. 8 which calls for an
indefinite imprisonment should respondents
refuse or omit to do an act which are yet in their
power to perform.
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs
and remedies just and equitable in the
premises. 14
The case was docketed as CEB-29783 and raffled to
Branch 23 of the RTC of Cebu. However, the case was re-raffled to
Branch 16 of said court.
In their answer to the petition, respondents averred that only
the dispositive portion of the decision on the subject execution may be
enforced by the sheriff, and that they complied with the writ issued by
the court and submitted a true and correct accounting of the earnings
of the IMPI which will be the basis of the computation of dividends. 15
On April 15, 2004, the RTC issued an Order 16 dismissing
the petition for indirect contempt proceedings based on the Answer of
the respondents. The court ruled that the petition for indirect contempt
was criminal in nature; hence, Ceniza, as petitioner, had to prove the
guilt of the respondents beyond reasonable doubt. It declared that
petitioner had not overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of
respondents, who had sufficiently complied with the writ of execution
by submitting the 2002 Financial Statement containing all the data
required of an accounting. 17
On May 3, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the RTC Order on the ground that his petition for
indirect contempt was civil in nature; he adduced the requisite
quantum of evidence to prove respondents' guilt for indirect contempt;
and that they failed to present the auditor who prepared the 1992
Financial Statement of IMPI. He also alleged that he was denied his
right to due process when the court dismissed his petition without
conducting any hearing. He pointed out that the auditor who prepared
the 2002 Financial Statement of IMPI was not presented and
consequently could not be cross-examined by him. He cited the ruling
of this Court in Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 18 as precedent,
and prayed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court
(preferably through another Presiding Judge in
view of the requested voluntary inhibition of
Hon. Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr.), to
RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the order of
this Honorable Court thru Judge Hontanosas
dated 15 April 2004 and for this Honorable
Court (preferably through another Presiding
Judge) to ACT on petitioner's OMNIBUS
MOTION (dated 15 January 2004):
1) TO SET CONTEMPT CHARGE
FOR HEARING AND TO
REQUIRE
RESPONDENTS TO
APPEAR IN PERSON;
2) FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A HOLD
DEPARTURE ORDER;
3) TO EXPUNGE
COUNTERCLAIM. 19
On May 19, 2004, petitioner also filed a Motion for the
appointment of a commissioner.
On July 7, 2004, the RTC issued an Order 20 denying his
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Court on the ground
that respondents' acquittal is not appealable, or cannot be the subject
of a motion for reconsideration as such a motion amounted to an
appeal. The court ruled that, as in criminal proceedings, an appeal
would not lie from the order of dismissal of, or exoneration from, a
charge of contempt of court. 21 The registry return receipt showed that
petitioner received a copy of the Order on July 13, 2004.
On July 15, 2004, the court issued an Order 22 in Civil Case
No. CEB-26274-SRC granting petitioner's Motion for the Appointment
of Atty. Bayani Atup as Commissioner to receive and report evidence
to the court on the following issue of fact — the true and correct
accounting of the earnings of IMPI since the start of its operations in
1996 up to the present. The Commissioner was ordered to file a report
within ten (10) days after completion of proceedings, and to attach all
exhibits, affidavits, depositions, papers and transcripts of the
testimonial evidence presented before him.
Petitioner filed a "Notice of Appeal with Alternative Motion to
Squarely Rule" 23 on July 19, 2004. In his alternative motion, he
prayed that the court resolve the issues raised in his motion for
reconsideration premised on the following grounds: (1) this being a
case for civil indirect contempt, an appeal lies from the order finding
respondents guilty or absolving them of the charge; and (2) even in
criminal proceedings, an appeal lies in instances where there has
been lack of due process or lack of jurisdiction.
During the hearing of the motion, the petitioner offered in
evidence Exhibits "A" to "F" and their sub-markings in support of his
motion. 24
On September 30, 2004, the RTC issued an
Order 25 denying the Alternative Motion of petitioner and declining to
give due course to his Notice of Appeal. It ruled that, as gleaned from
the relief prayed for in the Petition for Indirect Contempt, petitioner's
purpose was primarily punishment and, only incidentally,
compensatory or remedial. The acquittal of the respondents was not
subject to a motion for reconsideration or appeal.
Petitioner received a copy of the September 30, 2004 Order
on October 5, 2004. On November 10, 2004, he filed with this Court a
Motion for Extension of time to file a petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. On December 1, 2004, the Court issued a
Resolution 26 granting the motion and gave him an extension of 30
days counted from the expiration of the reglementary period and
conditioned upon the timeliness of the motion.
The IMPI filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with the Court of Appeals for the nullification of the
Page 30 of 33
July 14, 2004 Order of the trial court in Civil Case No. CEB-26274-
SRC (which granted petitioner's Motion for the Appointment of a
Commissioner to receive evidence of the parties, and report on the
true and correct accounting of the earnings of IMPI from 1996 up to
the present). The case was docketed in the appellate court as CA-
G.R. SP No. 85301. On August 4, 2004, the CA issued a
Resolution 27 granting the motion of IMPI for a temporary restraining
order, and thereafter, a Resolution 28 dated October 14, 2004 granting
the plea of IMPI for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari with
this Court, seeking to nullify the April 15, 2004 and September 30,
2004 Orders of the RTC in Case No. CEB-29783, as well as the
August 4, 2004 and October 14, 2004 Resolutions of the appellate
court in CA-G.R. SP No. 85301. He alleged the following therein:
I. The Court a quo seriously erred in not holding
that Civil Case No. CEB-29783 for
Indirect Contempt being civil in
nature, a Motion for Reconsideration
and an appeal from a judgment
exonerating the respondents is not
barred by double jeopardy.
II. The Court a quo seriously erred in not finding
respondents-appellees guilty as a
matter of law of Indirect Civil
Contempt and sentencing them
accordingly. 29
Petitioner avers that contempt proceedings may actually be
either civil or criminal: it is criminal when the purpose is to vindicate
the authority of the court and protect its outraged dignity; it is civil
when there is failure to do something ordered by a court to be done for
the benefit of a party. He asserts that his petition for indirect contempt
below is civil in nature for the reason that the accounting ordered by
the trial court was for the benefit of one party and the purpose of the
contempt proceeding below was not to vindicate the authority of the
court and to protect its outraged dignity. He maintains that while
criminal contempt proceedings should be conducted according to the
principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, this is not so in civil
contempt proceedings. Accordingly, an appeal from the decision
dismissing the same is not barred by double jeopardy. 30
Petitioner further posits that respondents should be found
guilty of indirect contempt for willfully and deliberately refusing to
submit a full and correct accounting of the earnings of the corporation.
He posits that the 2001 Financial Statements submitted by the
corporation do not constitute compliance with the Order to render a
true and correct accounting as they do not merit faith and credence
but show documented fraud, wrongdoing and deception. 31 Petitioner
prays that:
1. The challenged order of the
Court a quo dated 15 April 2004 issued by ex-
judge Agapito Hontanosas, Jr. (formerly of
Branch 16 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu)
dismissing on the merits the petition for
contempt in Civil Case No. CEB-29783 and the
other challenged order of the Court a
quo issued by Judge Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr.
of Branch 7 of the same Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration on grounds of double
jeopardy, be REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
2. Pending final outcome of this
petition, and in view of the continued,
deliberate, willful and intransigent refusal of
respondents to render a true and correct, full
and complete accounting of the earnings of the
corporation for over 1 year and 6 months now
since the judgment dated 27 March 2003 in
Civil Case No. CEB-26274-SRC, to HOLD
respondents in the CUSTODY of the Court
(Sec. 6, Rule 71) to be released only upon their
filing the commensurate bonds the amounts of
which shall be fixed corresponding to the
measure of damages which shall be to the
extent of the loss or injury sustained, and
[continues] to be sustained, by petitioner
Ramon B. Ceniza (Sec. 9);
3. To render a judgment FINDING
respondents Daniel Wistehuff, Sr., Daniel
Wistehuff, Jr., Bryan K. Wistehuff, Atty. Francis
M. Zosa and Gemalyn Peteros (except
respondent Marites Gonzales-Wistehuff) guilty
of civil contempt in said case and
SENTENCING them accordingly by ordering
the continued detention of respondents (Sec. 8,
Rule 71) until they shall have fully complied
with the true and correct, full and complete
accounting of the earnings of Inmark Marketing
Phils., Inc. which shall be the basis of the
declaration of dividends as decreed by the
Court a quo in its judgment dated 27 March
2003 in Civil Case No. CEB-26274-SRC;
4. In the interest of justice and equity,
and on account of extreme urgency, pending
final outcome of this petition, that the Special
18th Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. [SP] No. 85301, be TEMPORARILY
RESTRAINED, and later PERMANENTLY
RESTRAINED, from enforcing its October 14,
2004 Resolution and the writ of preliminary
injunction issued pursuant thereto stopping the
implementation of the July 15, 2004 Order of
Judge Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr. in Civil Case
No. CEB-26274-SRC appointing a
commissioner tasked to conduct an accounting
of the true and correct earnings of Inmark
Marketing Phils., Inc. which shall be the basis
for the declaration of dividends;
5. Pending final action on this
Petition, to further ISSUE a Hold-[D]eparture
Order to the Commissioner of Immigration to
prevent the respondents from avoiding the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and thereby
preserve its authority and dignity which should
be respected even by foreigners, especially in
the light of the fact that respondent Daniel
Wistehuff, Sr. has already fled from the
jurisdiction of Philippine Courts; and ATCaDE
6. In regard to respondent Atty.
Francis M. Zosa, to require him to EXPLAIN
why he should not be disbarred.
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs
and remedies just and equitable in the
premises. 32
For their part, respondents aver that the proper remedy of
petitioner to question an order denying due course to a notice of
appeal is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court and not a petition for review under Rule 45. They assert that the
RTC correctly denied the Notice of Appeal of petitioner since the
Petition for Indirect Contempt filed by him below was criminal in
nature; hence, the decision of the trial court dismissing the charge was
not appealable. Moreover, the RTC correctly dismissed petitioner's
contempt charge because they submitted the report of the
independent auditor together with the other documents, which,
according to them, serve as a true and correct accounting of the
earnings of the corporation. 33
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether the petition states
a cause of action for the nullification of the assailed Resolutions in CA-
Page 31 of 33
G.R. SP No. 85301; (b) whether the petition for indirect contempt filed
by the petitioner below is criminal in nature; (c) whether the assailed
Orders of the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-29783 are appealable; and
(d) whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is the proper remedy in seeking to nullify the assailed Orders of
the RTC.
On the first issue, we find that the petition fails to state a
cause of action for petition for review on certiorari. The assailed
Resolutions of the CA are interlocutory in nature and not appealable;
to nullify the same, the proper remedy of the petitioner was to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, on the allegation that the CA acted
with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction. Consequently, the petition for review on certiorari of the
petitioner for the nullification of the assailed resolutions of the
appellate court should be as it is hereby denied. It must be stressed
that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is a mode of appealing a judgment or final order of the CA.
Considering that the rest of the issues are interrelated, the
Court shall delve into and resolve them simultaneously.
The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court is Section 3,
Rule 71, which provides:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be
punished after charge and hearing. — After a
charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be
fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or
counsel, a person guilty of any of the following
acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a
court in the performance of his official
duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of, or resistance to,
a lawful writ, process, order, or
judgment of a court, including the act
of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any
real property by the judgment or
process of any court of competent
jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon
such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or
possession, or in any manner
disturbs the possession given to the
person adjudged to be entitled
thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful
interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under
Section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending,
directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an
officer of a court, and acting as such
without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly
served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue,
of a person or property in the custody
of an officer by virtue of an order or
process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so
construed as to prevent the court from issuing
process to bring the respondent into court, or
from holding him in custody pending such
proceedings.
Section 7 of the same Rule provides for the punishment of
indirect contempt, thus:
SEC. 7. Punishment for indirect
contempt. — If the respondent is adjudged
guilty of indirect contempt committed against a
Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or
higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not
exceeding thirty thousand (P30,000) pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or
both. If he is adjudged guilty of contempt
committed against a lower court, he may be
punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand
(P5,000) pesos or imprisonment not exceeding
one (1) month, or both. If the contempt consists
in the violation of a writ of injunction, temporary
restraining order or status quo order, he may
also be ordered to make complete restitution to
the party injured by such violation of the
property involved or such amount as may be
alleged and proved.
The writ of execution as in ordinary
civil action shall issue for the enforcement of a
judgment imposing a fine, unless the court
otherwise provides.
Section 8 of the same Rule further states:
SEC. 8 Imprisonment until order
obeyed. — When the contempt consists in the
refusal or omission to do an act which is yet in
the power of the respondent to perform, he may
be imprisoned by order of the court concerned
until he performs it.
In the recent case of Montenegro v. Montenegro, 34 the
Court distinguished criminal contempt from civil contempt, as follows:
Contempt, whether direct or indirect,
may be civil or criminal depending on the
nature and effect of the contemptuous act.
Criminal contempt is "conduct directed against
the authority and dignity of the court or a judge
acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring
the court to disrepute or disrespect." On the
other hand, civil contempt is the failure to do
something ordered to be done by a court or a
judge for the benefit of the opposing party
therein and is therefore, an offense against the
party in whose behalf the violated order was
made. If the purpose is to punish, then it is
criminal in nature; but if to compensate, then it
is civil. 35
Thus, contempt proceedings has a dual function: (1)
vindication of public interest by punishment of contemptuous conduct;
(2) coercion to compel the contemnor to do what the law requires him
to uphold the power of the Court, and also to secure the rights of the
parties to a suit awarded by the Court. 36
Contempt proceedings are neither wholly civil nor altogether
criminal. It may not always be easy to classify a particular act as
belonging to one of those two classes. It may partake of the
characteristics of both. 37 If it is remedial and coercive in nature, it is
civil; the parties are the individuals whose private rights and remedies
they were instituted to protect or enforce. The absence of willfulness
does not release one from civil contempt. 38 It is civil if it is instituted
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to preserve and enforce the rights and administer the remedies of the
parties to which the court has to force them to obey.
Proceedings for contempt are criminal in nature if presented
to preserve the power of the courts and to punish for disobedience to
their orders. Criminal contempt involves no element of personal injury;
it is directed against the power and dignity of the court and the private
parties have little, if any interest in the proceedings for its
punishment. 39
therefore, no motion for reconsideration or appeal could be filed, since
respondents would thereby be placed in double jeopardy. Such
disallowance by the trial court of petitioner's appeal cannot be the
subject of an appeal as provided for in Section 1(d) of Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court. Under Section 3, Rule 65, the remedy from an
Order disallowing an appeal is to file a petition for mandamus with the
CA. 45 However, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45; patently then, the remedy resorted to by
petitioner is inappropriate.

Anent the issue of whether or not respondents are liable for

The Rules of Court provides for the following punishment for
the contemnor: fine or imprisonment, or both.
It is not the fact of punishment, but rather its character and
purpose, that often serve to distinguish between the two classes of
contempt. If it is for civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for
the benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt the
sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court. But if the
contempt consists in the refusal of a party or a person to do an act
which the court has ordered him to do for the benefit or the advantage
of a party to a suit or action pending before it, and he is committed
until he complies with the order, the commitment is in the nature of an
execution to enforce the judgment of the court, and the party in whose
favor that judgment was rendered is the real party-in-interest in the
proceedings. 40
indirect contempt, we need not resolve the same in this case for the
reason that the trial court had already granted petitioner's plea for the
appointment of a commissioner to receive the evidence of the parties.
The Order of the trial court appointing a commissioner is now the
subject of the petition filed by respondents in CA-G.R. SP No.
85301. CEASaT
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Ceniza v. Wistehuff, Sr., G.R. No. 165734, [June 16, 2006], 524
PHIL 462-483)

It is true that punishment by imprisonment may be remedial

as well as punitive, and many civil contempt proceedings have
resulted not only in the imposition of a fine, payable to the
complainant, but also in committing the defendant to prison. But
imprisonment for civil contempt is ordered where the defendant has
refused to do an affirmative act required by the provisions of an order
which, either in form or substance, is mandatory in its character.
Imprisonment in such cases is not inflicted as a punishment, but is
intended to be remedial by coercing the defendant to do what he had
refused to do. The order in such cases is that the defendant stand
committed unless and until he performs the affirmative act required by
the court's order. 41 The defendant can end his imprisonment and
discharge himself at any moment by doing what he had previously
refused to do. In fine, the defendant carries the keys of his prison in
his own pocket. 42

It may happen that, in proceedings for criminal contempt,

where the imprisonment is solely punitive to vindicate the authority of
the courts, the complainant may also derive some incidental benefits
from the fact that such punishment tends to prevent a repetition of the
disobedience. However, such indirect consequences will not change
imprisonment which is merely coercive and remedial into that which is
solely punitive in character or vice-versa. 43

We agree with the contention of petitioner that, as gleaned

from the averments of his petition and the relief prayed for, the indirect
contempt charge filed by him below was civil in nature. He submits
that respondents willfully and deliberately refused to comply with the
decision of the court requiring them to submit a true and correct
accounting of the earnings of IMPI which could be the basis of the
declaration of dividends and that the 2002 Financial Statement
submitted by them did not comply with such decision. Petitioner
maintains that said financial statement is fraudulent, and the purpose
of the petition was to have the respondents punished for their alleged
recalcitrance and to compel them to comply with the court's decision.
Indeed, the petitioner's prayer, that respondents be incarcerated and
remain in detention until they comply with the decision of the court
conformably with Rule 71, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, is in the
nature of an execution to enforce the judgment. Thus, the punishment
sought by petitioner for the respondents is not punitive in nature, but
designed for his own benefit and advantage, and not for the purpose
of vindicating the dignity of the court and preserving its power.

Since the proceedings below is civil in nature, petitioner had

the right to file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC's April 15, 2004
Order and to appeal therefrom within the period therefor after its
denial. 44 However, the RTC disallowed the appeal on its perception
that the petition for indirect contempt was criminal in nature and that,

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