RULE 58: PRELIMINARY 


INJUNCTION

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G.R. No. 179665 April 3, 2013
SOLID BUILDERS, INC. and MEDINA FOODS INDUSTRIES, INC.,
vs. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION

FACTS:
China Banking Corporation (CBC) granted several loans to Solid Builders, Inc.
(SBI), which amounted to ₱139,999,234.34, exclusive of interests and other
charges. To secure the loans, Medina Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII)
executed in CBC’s favor several surety agreements and contracts of real
estate mortgage over parcels of land in the Loyola Grand Villas in Quezon
City and New Cubao Central in Cainta, Rizal.
Subsequently, SBI proposed to CBC a scheme through which SBI would sell
the mortgaged properties and share the proceeds with CBC on a 50-50
basis until such time that the whole obligation would be fully paid. SBI
also proposed that there be partial releases of the certificates of title of the
mortgaged properties without the burden of updating interests on all
loans.
SBI requested the restructuring of its loans, a reduction of interests and
penalties and the implementation of a dacion en pago of the New Cubao
Central property.
In response, China Bank affirmed the request to restructure the loan and
suggested to update the obligation to avoid payment of interest and
charges. As to the implementation of dacion en pago, it is still to be
discussed with the Senior Management and suggested to sell the
properties themselves, being a real estate company.
China Bank demanded to settle the outstanding accounts. Thereafter, Solid
Builders was claiming that the interest, penalties and charges were
iniquitous and unconscionable and to enjoin China Bank from initiating
foreclosure proceedings. Solid Builders and Medina Food filed a
complaint “To Compel Execution of the Contract and for Performance
and Damages, With Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Ex-
Parte Temporary Restraining Order”.

TRIAL COURT
After hearing the parties, the trial court issued an Order dated December 14,
2000 granting the application of SBI and MFII for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. The trial court held that SBI and MFII were able to
sufficiently comply with the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive
writ:
It is well-settled that to be entitled to an injunctive writ, a party must show
that: (1) the invasion of right sought to be protected is material and
substantial; (2) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and, (3)
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.

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Aggrieved, CBC filed a Petition for Certiorari

COURT OF APPEALS
the Court of Appeals found that, on its face, the trial court’s Order dated
December 14, 2000 granting the application of SBI and MFII for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction had no basis as there were no
findings of fact or law which would indicate the existence of any of the
requisites for the grant of an injunctive writ. It appeared to the Court of
Appeals that, in ordering the issuance of a writ of injunction, the trial
court simply relied on the imposition by CBC of the interest rates to the
loans obtained by SBI and MFII. According to the Court of Appeals,
however, the records do not reveal a clear and unmistakable right on the
part of SBI and MFII that would entitle them to the protection of a writ of
preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiffs have the right to ask for an injunctive writ in
order to prevent defendant bank from taking over their properties

RULING:
NO. This Court has recently reiterated the general principles in issuing a writ
of preliminary injunction in Palm Tree Estates, Inc. v. Philippine National
Bank:
“A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action
prior to judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to
refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the
protection of a party’s substantive rights or interests pending the final
judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the
existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be
avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as
the party applying for the writ is concerned.
At times referred to as the "Strong Arm of Equity," we have consistently
ruled that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate and which
calls for greater circumspection than the issuance of an injunction. It should
only be extended in cases of great injury where courts of law cannot afford an
adequate or commensurate remedy in damages; "in cases of extreme urgency;
where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience
bear strongly in complainant’s favor; where there is a willful and unlawful
invasion of plaintiff’s right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury
being a continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is
rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between
the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to
establish a new relation."
A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be
granted only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights. The duty
of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary

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 injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant
of an injunction are present in the case before it. In this connection, a writ
of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon
the applicant’s showing of two important requisite conditions, namely: (1)
the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be
enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation
sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injury.
As debtor-mortgagors, however, SBI and MFII do not have a right to prevent
the creditor-mortgagee CBC from foreclosing on the mortgaged
properties simply on the basis of alleged "usurious, exorbitant and
confiscatory rate of interest." First, assuming that the interest rate agreed
upon by the parties is usurious, the nullity of the stipulation of usurious
interest does not affect the lender’s right to recover the principal loan, nor
affect the other terms thereof. Thus, in a usurious loan with mortgage, the
right to foreclose the mortgage subsists, and this right can be exercised by
the creditor upon failure by the debtor to pay the debt due.
Second, even the Order of the trial court, which granted the application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, recognizes that the parties
still have to be heard on the alleged lack of "fairness of the increase in
interests and penalties" during the trial on the merits. Thus, the basis of
the right claimed by SBI and MFII remains to be controversial or
disputable as there is still a need to determine whether or not, upon
consideration of the various circumstances surrounding the agreement of
the parties, the interest rates and penalty charges are unconscionable.
Therefore, such claimed right cannot be considered clear, actual and
subsisting. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the
injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Where the parties stipulated in their credit agreements, mortgage contracts
and promissory notes that the mortgagee is authorized to foreclose the
mortgaged properties in case of default by the mortgagors, the mortgagee
has a clear right to foreclosure in case of default, making the issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction improper.
As SBI is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, so is
MFII. The accessory follows the principal. The accessory obligation of
MFII as accommodation mortgagor and surety is tied to SBI’s principal
obligation to CBC and arises only in the event of SBI’s default.
The En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, Re: Procedure in Extrajudicial
or Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages, further stacks the odds
against SBI and MFII. Issued on February 20, 2007, or some two months
before the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in this case, the
resolution embodies the additional guidelines intended to aid courts in
foreclosure proceedings, specifically limiting the instances, and citing the
conditions, when a writ against foreclosure of a mortgage may be issued,
to wit:
No temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on the

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allegation that the loan secured by the mortgage has been paid or is not
delinquent unless the application is verified and supported by evidence of
payment.
(2) No temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against
the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on the
allegation that the interest on the loan is unconscionable, unless the debtor
pays the mortgagee at least twelve percent per annum interest on the
principal obligation as stated in the application for foreclosure sale, which
shall be updated monthly while the case is pending.
(3) Where a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against a
foreclosure of mortgage, the disposition of the case shall be speedily resolved.
To this end, the court concerned shall submit to the Supreme Court, through
the Office of the Court Administrator, quarterly reports on the progress of the
cases involving ten million pesos and above.
(4) All requirements and restrictions prescribed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction, such as the
posting of a bond, which shall be equal to the amount of the outstanding debt,
and the time limitation for its effectivity, shall apply as well to a status quo
order.

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GAYACAO vs HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:

On January 2, 1962, appellant Gayacao had instituted action in the aforesaid

court against: (1) the Executive Secretary, (2) the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, (3) the Director of Lands, and (4) a private respondent,
Felix Alcarmen, stating that on April 3, 1935 petitioner had acquired the right
to the purchase of residential Lots Nos. 55 and 56 located at Isabela, Basilan
City, through Miscellaneous Sales Application No. 8558, received by the
Bureau of Lands.
And that upon demand she paid the installments then due, and the Bureau
recommended approval of her application to the Department Head on
October 24, 1939, and thereafter Gayacao improved the lots, paid the taxes
thereon, and remained in possession thereof.

After World War II, respondent Alcarmen, a war refugee, secured Gayacao's
permission to temporarily occupy part of the lots, but subsequently filed a
Miscellaneous Sales Application No. V-8113 over Lot 55; that in 1949 the
Director of Lands, without hearing Gayacao and despite her prior rights, gave
due course to Alcarmen's application and excluded Lot 55 from her
application, which action the respondent secretaries on appeal affirmed and
sustained, in violation of section 81 of Commonwealth Act 141, and prayed as
follows:

WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that respondents be ordered to answer this

petition, and, after hearing, to order that the decision of the respondent
Director of Lands, as concurred in with modification by the respondent
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the respondent Executive
Secretary, over Lot No. 55 be annulled or amended so as to grant the whole of
the same to your petitioner and not to the respondent Felixberto Alcarmen;
to order that due course be given to Miscellaneous Sales Application No. 8558
of your petitioner over Lots Nos. 55 and 56 to which she is entitled by law;

to order respondent Felixberto Alcarmen to vacate the premises immediately;

to order respondents Director of Lands and Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to reject the application of respondent Felixberto
Alcarmen;

to declare that all improvements introduced by respondent Felixberto

Alcarmen on the residential lot covered by M.S.A. No. 8558 of your petitioner,
had been introduced in bad faith and subject to all consequences provided for
by law.
The respondent public officials interposed a motion to dismiss, claiming that
the Court of First Instance of Basilan City had no jurisdiction to entertain
petitions for writs of  certiorari  or  mandamus,  nor issue such writs against

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them because the administrative orders and decisions complained of were
promulgated by officers holding office outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the Court. They invoked section 44 (h) of the Judiciary Act (R.A. No. 296, as
amended) and the rulings of this Supreme Court in  Acosta vs. Alvendia,
L-14958, October 31, 1960, and  Samar Mining Co. vs. Arnado, L-17109, June
30, 1961.

CFI’s Decision: Dismissed the petition of Maria Gayacao.

Rationale: The CFI found respondent public officials motion to dismiss

meritorious. Respondent claimed that the CFI had no jurisdiction to entertain
petitions for writs of certiorari or mandamus, nor issue writs against them
(public official respondents) because administrative orders and decisions
complained of were promulgated by officers holding office outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI where the petition was lodged did in fact have the
power to decide on the administrative decision of the Director of Lands and
subsequently affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Executive
Secretary.

HELD:
YES: The doctrines invoked in support of the theory of non-jurisdiction are
inapplicable. There is no cogent reason why this power of judicial review
should be confined to the courts of first instance of the locality where the
offices of respondents are maintained, to the exclusion of the courts of first
instance in those localities where the plaintiffs reside, and where the
questioned decisions are being enforced.

Rationale:
Petitioner's principal complaint was that the decision of the Director of Lands,
as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and the Executive Secretary, was
contrary to law in refusing to apply section 81 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
and in giving retroactive application to Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1.

The remedy sought was the judicial review of the administrative decision in
question and its annulment on account of errors of law allegedly committed.
This power of judicial review arises from the doctrine of supremacy of law,
which lodges in the courts' inherent authority to decide the constitutionality
of legislative enactments, and, therefore, the constitutionality of the exercise
of the power delegated by the legislature to administrative agencies, and to
enforce constitutional rights, in this particular case the guaranty against
deprivation of property without due process.
Here the sole point in issue is whether the decision of the respondent public
officers was legally correct or not, and, without going into the merits of the

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case, we see no cogent reason why this power of judicial review should be
confined to the courts of first instance of the locality where the offices of
respondents are maintained, to the exclusion of the courts of first instance in
those localities where the plaintiffs reside, and where the questioned
decisions are being enforced.

If the contested ruling of the court below is sustained, the same would result
not only in hardship to litigants of limited means, practically amounting to
denial of access to the courts, but would also unnecessarily encumber the
Manila courts whose dockets are already over-burdened. Actually,
since  Ortua vs. Singson, the power of provincial courts of first instance to
review administrative decisions of national officials has been consistently
recognized.

While the petitioner herein also prayed that the land authorities be ordered to
reinstate her original application, such remedy is purely a corollary to the
main relief sought; for, as the allegations now stand, reversal of the
questioned administrative decision would necessarily lead to the same result.

The order of dismissal is reversed and set aside and the records ordered
remanded to the CFI for further proceedings. No costs.

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Federico Decano v. Romeo Edu

The Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications issued to Federico

Decano (Decano) a temporary appointment to the position of janitor in the
Motor Vehicles Office. The appointment having been approved by the
Commissioner of Civil Service, the said appointee assumed office and served
therein for almost four years when Cipriano Posadas (Posadas), as Acting
Registrar, Land Transportation Commission, Dagupan City, received a
telegram from Romeo F. Edu, in his then capacity as Acting Commissioner of
Land Transportation Commission (LTC), terminating his (Decano's) services
effective as of the close of business on that day.

Thereafter, Decano filed before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a

petition for "Mandamus and Injunction" claiming that the aforementioned
officials of the LTC acted without power and in excess of authority in
removing him from the service. A writ of preliminary injunction was issued
by the trial court at the commencement of the proceedings commanding
respondents "to desist and refrain from disturbing, molesting or otherwise
ousting the petitioner from his position as janitor in the Land Transportation
Commission, Dagupan City Agency, and to pay the petitioner his
corresponding salary from the date of notice of said preliminary injunction,
until further orders from the Court."

ISSUE:

1.Whether or not Edu erred in dismissing Decano from service in the Land
Transportation Commission
2.Whether or not the trial court acted without jurisdiction as the petition for
mandamus with injunction was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan while respondent Edu holds office in Quezon City

HELD:

Petition GRANTED.

There is no question that petitioner could be removed from office at any time,
for it has been held repeatedly  that the acceptance of a temporary
appointment divests an appointee of the right to security of tenure against
removal without cause. But this is not to say that petitioner could be removed
by the respondent Commissioner of Land Transportation since the latter was
not the official who appointed him but the Undersecretary acting for the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications nor had said respondent
been granted by law the power of removal. Per section 79(d) of the Revised
Administrative Code, the provision then in force, it is the department head,
upon the recommendation of the chief of the bureau or office concerned, who
has the power to "appoint all subordinate officers and employees whose

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appointment is not expressly vested by the law in the President of the
Philippines;  and it is also the department head who may remove or punish
such employees, except as especially provided otherwise in the Civil Service
Law."

In seeking reversal of the trial court's decision, respondents make capital of

the fact that the petition for mandamus with injunction was filed in the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan while respondent Edu holds office in Quezon
City which, they claim, is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the said court.
Here, petitioner seeks primarily the annulment of the dismissal order issued
by respondent Edu, mandamus and injunction being then merely corollary
remedies to the main relief sought, and what is prayed to be enjoined, as in
fact the trial court did enjoin by preliminary injunction, is the implementation
of the termination order against the petitioner. It is true that the order of
dismissal was issued by respondent Edu, but it was to be implemented in
Dagupan City by his subordinate officer, respondent Acting Registrar of the
LTC stationed at Dagupan City. Insofar, therefore, as respondent Edu is
concerned, the order terminating the services of respondent was a  fait
accompli  and this he had done without authority, as earlier discussed. The
injunction is question, consequently, must be taken only to restrain the
implementation of respondent Edu's order by his co-respondent whose
official station at Dagupan City is within the territorial boundaries of the trial
court's jurisdictional district.

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G.R. No. L-49510 January 28, 1980
DAGUPAN ELECTRIC CORPORATION, ISABELITA L. LLAMES, PRIMO C.
NARVAEZ and JOSE T. APIGO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ERNANI CRUZ PANO, DISTRICT JUDGE OF THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH XVIII and MC ADORE FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT INCORPORATED, respondents.

Topic: Whether of not the CFI of Rizal, Quezon City has jurisdiction over the civil case
where principal office of DECORP is in Quezon City; even if the act of disconnecting the
power to the hotel took place in Dagupan City, outside the Province of Rizal and
Quezon City

FACTS:

1.The petitioner (DECORP) is a legislative franchise holder to operate and maintain for
profit electric services in various towns, including the city of Dagupan and Province of
Pangasinan and and that its generating plant is located in San Miguel, Calasiao,
Pangasinan;

2.The reposndent (MC Adore) is the owner of the MC Adore International Palace Hotel
which is located in the City of Dagupan and is the customer of the DECORP

3.For failure on the part of the respondent to pay its electric bills for 2 months, the
petitioner sent a notice of disconnection and after the expiration of 48 hours, no
payment was made by the respondent, so DECORP disconnected their electrical
services.

4. Respondent MC Adore filed a complaint for damages with writ of preliminary

mandatory injunction against the petitioner corporation in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch XVIII, presided by the respondent judge.

5. The judge, issued ex parte Order for a preliminary mandatory injunction,

commanding the petitioner corporation as well as its agents in Dagupan City to "restore
immediately the electrical power of the MC Adore International Palace Hotel.

6. However, petitioner failed to comply with such order which led the respondent to
file a petition to declare defendant Corporation and its corporate officers in contempt of
court.

7. Acting on the said petition for contempt, the respondent judge finding no valid
justification for the contumacious disobedience of the Defendant Corporation which has
its head offices in Quezon City issued an order of arrest and confinement of the
President and general manager of defendant corporation if the mandatory injunction is
not complied with, and for detention to continue until the order is complied with.

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8. On the date for hearing for preliminary mandatory injunction as was previously set,
DECORP appeared and moved for the reconsideration of the Orders for excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, but such was denied by the respondent judge.

9. In the fear of imminent danger that the petitioners may be unlawfully deprived of
their liberty, as well as their property, without due process of law, to which there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, this
petition was filed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CFI of Rizal, Quezon City has jurisdiction over the civil case where
principal office of DECORP is in Quezon City and even if the act of disconnecting the
power to the hotel took place in Dagupan City, outside the Province of Rizal and
Quezon City?

RULING:

YES. The pertinent provision of the Judiciary Act of 1948 reads:

Sec. 44. Original jurisdiction. — Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Said court and their judges, or any of them, shall have the power to issue writ of
injunction, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus in their
respective provinces and districts, in the manner provided in the Rules of Court.

The Dagupan Electric Corporation has its principal office in Quezon City where the
business of the corporation is managed by the Board of Directors. Decisions of the
said corporation are made in Quezon City. The employees of the Dagupan Electric
Corporation in Dagupan City merely carry out the orders issued by the officials of
said corporation in Quezon City. Hence, the acts sought to be restrained are being
committed in Quezon City. Therefore, the CFI of Rizal, Quezon City has jurisdiction
over the case.

The respondent judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned order directing the Dagupan Electric Corporation to restore the connection
of the electric power to the hotel owned by MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc. The
record shows that the respondent judge conducted hearings and gave the parties full
opportunity to present their evidence before issuing the orders sought to be set aside.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

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A.M. No. RTJ-07-2063, 2064 & 2066 RP v. Caguioa
A judge was dismissed from service for the countless issuance of defective writs of preliminary
injunction; Requisites of preliminary injunction; Writs of preliminary injunction must be issued
within territorial jurisdiction.

FACTS

These are three administrative cases against Judge Ramon S. Caguioa, Presiding Judge
of Branch 74, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City.

I. A.M. No. RTJ-07-2063

Republic of the Philippines represented by Sol Gen charged Judge Ramon S. Caguioa
with gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.

The complaint concerned Civil Case No. 102-0-05 entitled “Indigo Distribution Corp.
Inc. et al vs. The Hon Secretary of Finance et al.” Petitioners therein, Indigo Distribution
Corp. Inc., et al., (Indigo, et al.,), sought to nullify the implementation of Section 6 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9334 as unconstitutional. (On Payment of Excise Taxes on
Imported Articles).

Indigo, et al., are importers and traders licensed to operate inside the Subic Bay
Freeport Zone. They were granted Certificates of Registration and Tax Exemptions by
the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). With the enactment of the provision of
R.A. No. 9334 in 2005, however, they are now subject to sin taxes or excise taxes on
tobacco and alcohol products.

SBMA issued a Memorandum directing the departments concerned to require

importers in the Subic Bay Freeport Zone to pay the corresponding duties and taxes
before they are cleared from the freeport.

Unwilling to pay said duties and taxes, petitioners brought before the RTC of Olongapo
City a special civil action, Civil Case No. 102-0-05 for declaratory relief to have certain
provisions of R.A. No. 9334 declared as unconstitutional. Alleging great and irreparable
loss and injury, they prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and preliminary mandatory injunction to enjoin
the directives issued by the Republic, as represented by the Secretary of Finance,
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Commissioner of Customs, Collector
of Customs of the Port of Subic, and the Administrator of the SBMA.

Respondent judge granted the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. He enjoined the public respondents from implementing the pertinent
provisions of R.A. No. 9344. He also approved the injunction bond amounting to one
million pesos for all petitioners. On May 11, 2005, he issued a writ of preliminary
injunction.

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Republic files petition for certiorari and prohibition before the SC

The Republic led a petition for certiorari and prohibition before this Court to annul said
Order and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction that was issued.

During the pendency of the petition, respondent judge granted various ex parte
motions for intervention of different corporations claiming to be similarly situated with
petitioner Indigo and allowed them to ride on the one million peso injunctive bond
posted by Indigo. Complainant Republic alleged that it was denied due process because
it did not receive a copy of the motions for intervention, which were favorably acted
upon by respondent judge.

Respondent judge immediately implemented said orders despite the subsequent

motions for reconsideration led by complainant Republic.

SC, considering the two other admin cases, resolved to preventively suspend Judge
Caguioa

On July 31, 2007, this Court, upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator, considering the two other administrative cases led against respondent,
resolved to preventively suspend respondent judge without pay, pending the resolution
of said administrative cases.

Oct. 9, 2007 – referred the consolidated administrative cases to an Associate Justice of

the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.

SC Decision: (on the petition for certiorari and prohibition) declared the Order of
respondent judge and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, subject of G.R. No. 168584,
null and void.

We held that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in ordering the issuance of
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

For a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the applicant must establish that:

1.

2.

3.

The rights granted under the Certificates of Registration and Tax Exemption of
petitioners are not absolute and unconditional as to constitute rights in esse. These
certicates granting petitioners a "permit to operate" their respective businesses are in the
nature of licenses, which can be revoked at any time. There is no vested right in a tax
exemption, more so when the latest expression of legislative intent renders its
continuance doubtful. Being a mere statutory privilege, a tax exemption may be
modified or withdrawn at will by the granting authority.

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Further, the feared injurious effects of the imposition of duties, charges and taxes on
imported tobacco and alcohol products on petitioners' businesses cannot possibly
outweigh the dire consequences that the non-collection of taxes would wreak on the
government. With regard to the injunction bond, we also found respondent judge to
have overstepped his discretion when he arbitrarily xed the injunction bond of
petitioners at only P1 million.

II. A.M. No. RTJ-07-2064

The Commissioner of Customs (Commissioner) charged Judge Ramon S. Caguioa with

gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.

The complaint concerned Civil Case No. 153-0-2006 entitled "Andres D. Salvacion Jr. Vs.
Gracia Z. Caringal, et al." a Petition for Mandamus, with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, which is
pending before the sala of respondent judge.

Salvacion was formerly the District Collector of the Port of Subic. Commissioner
reassigned Salvacion to the Offiice of the Commissioner and designated Caringal in his
place as Acting Collector of the Port of Subic. However, the reassignment was held in
abeyance and directed the customs personnel to return to their respective port
assignments.

Allegedly because of the failure of Caringal to vacate the Office of the District Collector
of the Port of Subic, Salvacion filed against her said petition for mandamus.

Respondent judge issued a TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, respectively,

enjoining Caringal from acting as District Collector of Customs in the Port of Subic
during the pendency of the case.

Subsequently, Commissioner reassigned Salvacion to the Port of Cagayan and

designated Zamoranos as Acting District Director of Subic.

Dissatised with his transfer, Salvacion led another motion for the issuance of a TRO and
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin complainant Commissioner and the Secretary
from implementing its reassignment order.

Salvacion amended and/or supplemented his Petition for Mandamus to make

complainant Commissioner and the Secretary not just necessary but indispensable
parties. He prayed that Caringal and/or Zamoranos be enjoined from acting as the
District Collector of Customs of the Port of Subic.

On the other hand, complainant Commissioner, the Secretary, the Acting Deputy
Customs Commissioner for Administration, and Zamoranos moved to dismiss the
petition on the following grounds:

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1.

2.

3.

4.

Respondent judge, however, granted the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in

favor of Salvacion. He reinstalled Salvacion as the duly designated District Collector of
Customs in the Port of Subic during the pendency of the case.

Commissioner files certiorari to CA

Complainant Commissioner, the Secretary, Acting Deputy Customs Commissioner for

Administration, and Acting District Collector of Customs of the Port of Subic Marietta
Zamoranos led with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari.

CA Decision: set aside the order and lifted the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued
pursuant thereto; and ordered the dismissal of Civil Case.

Commissioner now charges Judge Caguioa with gross ignorance

Complainant Commissioner alleges that respondent judge exhibited gross ignorance of

the law, manifest partiality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
committed as follows:

First, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, respondent judge should have dismissed the
case for improper venue, which ground had been timely raised by complainant, the
Secretary and the Acting Deputy Customs Commissioner for Administration. Section 4,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, provides that a petition for mandamus, which relates to
the acts of officers like complainant, et al., must be led in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area covering said officers. Complainant, et
al., all hold ofce in Manila. Accordingly, the petition for mandamus should have been
led with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which has territorial jurisdiction over the
administrative officials whose actions are in question.

Further, respondent judge had no authority to issue a writ of preliminary injunction

enjoining acts performed outside his territorial jurisdiction.

Second, respondent judge should have dismissed the amended/supplemental petition

for mandamus on the ground of Salvacion's failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies. Alleging that his transfer was unjustified, Salvacion's remedy was to appeal
to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

Lastly, the Court of Appeals held that Salvacion failed to establish that he had a clear
and unmistakable right that was violated so as to warrant the issuance of preliminary
injunction. Salvacion could not claim a vested right to his position in the Port of Subic.

Page 16 of 45
There is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold
it.

On March 7, 2007, Solicitor Thomas M. Laragan of the Ofce of the Solicitor General
submitted an afdavit to this Court to show the proclivity of respondent judge to issue
writs of preliminary injunction in the absence of requirements mandated by the rules,
even if the acts complained of were performed outside his territorial jurisdiction, and
even if the venue of the case was improperly laid. He enumerated several cases which
show the acts committed by respondent judge in irregularly issuing writs of
preliminary injunction, to wit:

Civil Case No. 02-0-2002

Respondent judge issued a writ of preliminary injunction. CA set aside writ because of
improper venue.

Civil Case No. 275-0-2003

Respondent judge granted petitioners' application for a writ of preliminary injunction

on the BIR on the implementation of revenue memorandum circulars. The Court of
Appeals, found that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the Writ
because respondent judge had no authority to review the assailed circulars because the
jurisdiction to review rulings, opinions or interpretations of the BIR Commissioner or
the Secretary of Finance is vested by law with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).

Civil Case No. 63-0-04

Respondent judge issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation

of E.O. No. 156. The Court of Appeals, found that respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion in issuing the Writ, through the contentions of the OSG that:

1.

2.

3.

Civil Case No. 279-0-2005

Respondent judge issued an order, granting petitioners' prayer for an injunctive writ.
The OSG sought to nullify the Writ before the Court of Appeals arguing that petitioners
failed to establish a clear legal right to an injunctive writ, and that a preliminary
injunction should not be issued on the basis solely of an alleged nullity of a law,
ordinance or executive issuance. The petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
93298, has not been resolved to date.

III. A.M. No. RTJ-07-2066

Page 17 of 45
(More on Writ of Execution; Not provrem related)

On June 1, 2006, complainant Charles T. Burns, Jr. charged Judge Ramon S. Caguioa and
Sheriff IV Christopher T. Perez, both of Branch 74 of the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City, with Grave Misconduct.

Complainant Charles T. Burns, Jr. is the son of plaintiff Mary Agnes who substituted
the latter in a civil case for recovery of ownership and possession over several parcels of
land, the complaint was filed and tried in the sala of respondent judge.

Respondent judge dismissed the case and issued Writ of Execution. CA ruled that WOE
could not be sustained, since a writ of execution must substantially conform to the
dispositive portion of the promulgated decision. In the instant case, the December 3,
2002 Order of dismissal did not adjudicate any rights of the parties and resolved no
other matter except the dismissal of the case on the ground of "prescription." It does not
justify at all the subsequent execution placing the private respondents in possession,
where no adjudication of even possessory rights over the disputed property was made.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENT JUDGE

In all three administrative cases against him, respondent judge argues that the mistakes
he committed in issuing the questioned orders should be considered as mere errors of
judgment that do not warrant administrative disciplinary action, because his acts were
never proven to be, and were in fact never, motivated by bad faith, ill will, fraud and
corrupt motives.

Respondent judge explains that the rule which proscribes the imposition of
administrative liability on judges for committing mistakes or errors which have not
been shown to be "motivated by fraud, dishonesty, corruption or any other evil motive"
is a rule grounded on public policy, not only that judges cannot be expected to be
infallible, but that the judiciary would be paralyzed if its members are penalized for
each and every single error they, in good faith, commit. Further, he reasons that all his
acts were based on law and jurisprudence.

In moving for the dismissal of the administrative complaints, respondent judge argues
that the acts complained of are judicial in nature; and that the cases involve the same
issues raised by the complainants before this Court 77 and the Court of Appeals. He
also cites the ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 168584, where we held that respondent
judge therein erred in issuing the injunction order, but that the evidence of his alleged
partiality was insufficient to prohibit him from proceeding with the case.

FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING JUSTICE

Found respondent judge guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service.

Page 18 of 45
Justice Dicdican recommends that respondent judge be meted the penalty of suspension
from the service for one year, with a stern warning that the commission of similar or
other offenses in the future shall be dealt with more drastically.

RULING OF THE COURT

SC adopts the findings of the Investigating Justice.

In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2063, respondent judge issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,

enjoining the collection of taxes. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and it is of
public interest that the collection of which should not be restrained. 99 Further, the
applicants for the Writ showed no clear and unmistakable right that was material and
substantial as would warrant the issuance of the Writ. Neither were the applicants able
to demonstrate the urgency and necessity of the Writ. The burden that the applicants'
businesses would sustain because of the imposition of the sin tax on their tobacco and
alcohol products cannot possibly be greater than the heavy government revenue losses
that would result from the non-collection of taxes.

In addition, the improper issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was aggravated
by the inadequate injunctive bond. As Justice Dicdican pointed out, respondent judge
approved the one million-peso bond for the 13 original petitioners and 5 intervenors.
The purpose of an injunctive bond is to protect the opposing party (the government, in
the instant case) against loss or damage by reason of the injunction in case the court
nally decides that the applicants (importers/traders inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone)
are not entitled to it.

In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2064, respondent judge again issued a Writ of Preliminary

Injunction that did not satisfy the legal requisites for its issuance, and which was
enforced outside his territorial jurisdiction. The applicant, in this case, questions his
reassignment as District Collector of the Port of Subic to the Port of Cagayan de Oro.
We uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the applicant failed to establish that
he has a clear and unmistakable right that was violated so as to warrant the issuance of
a preliminary injunction. He could not claim a vested right to his position in the Port of
Subic. A public office is not a private property.

Further, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued to enjoin acts performed outside
the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge. It was directed against government
ofcials whose ofces in Manila are outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City.

The requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are basic and
elementary, and should have been known by respondent judge. More importantly, as
the Investigating Justice points out, respondent judge should have been more cautious
in issuing writs of preliminary injunction. These writs are strong arms of equity which
must be issued with great deliberation. The Affidavit of Solicitor Larangan, which
enumerates cases wherein respondent judge issued injunctive writs which were

Page 19 of 45
subsequently nullied by a higher court, shows his propensity for issuing improvident
writs of injunction.

IN VIEW WHEREOF in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2066, respondent Ramon S. Caguioa,

Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 74 is found of
simple misconduct, and is hereby ordered SUSPENDED from office without pay, for a
period of THREE MONTHS.

In A.M. Nos. RTJ-07-2063 and RTJ-07-2064, respondent Ramon S. Caguioa, Presiding

Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 74 is found GUILTY of
gross ignorance of the law and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and
is hereby ordered DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of retirement
benefits, except leave credits.

Page 20 of 45
G. R. No. 183367 March 14, 2012
AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY, INC., JESUS GARCIA, and
LYDIA MARCIANO, Petitioners,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA BATANGAS PROVINCE,
Respondent.

FACTS:

In 1993, fire razed to the ground the old public market of respondent
Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas. The municipal government,
through its then Municipal Mayor Eugenio Gutierrez, invited petitioner
Australian Professional Realty, Inc. (APRI) to rebuild the public market
and construct a shopping center.
On 19 January 1995, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)2 was executed
between petitioner APRI and respondent, represented by Mayor
Gutierrez and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan. Under the MOA,
APRI undertook to construct a shopping complex in the 5,000-square-
meter area. In return, APRI acquired the exclusive right to operate,
manage, and lease stall spaces for a period of 25 years.
In May 1995, Victor Reyes was elected as municipal mayor of respondent. On
6 February 2003, respondent, through Mayor Reyes, initiated a Complaint
for Declaration of Nullity of Memorandum of Agreement with Damages.

RTC
The RTC issued an Order declaring petitioners in default and allowing
respondent to present evidence ex parte since there was no answer from
the petitioners. A Decision was rendered by the RTC declaring the MOA
null and void. There having been no timely appeal made, respondent
filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment, which was granted by the RTC
After learning of the adverse judgment, petitioners filed a Petition for Relief
from Judgment but it was denied.

Court of Appeals
Petitioners later filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
Petitioners filed before the CA a Motion for the Issuance of Status Quo Order
and Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.4 The motion prayed for an order to restrain the RTC
from "further proceeding and issuing any further Order, Resolution, Writ of
Execution, and any other court processes"5 in the case before it. But it was
denied by the CA.

ISSUE:
Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA

RULING:

Page 21 of 45
In this case, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the CA. It did not
exercise judgment in a capricious and whimsical manner or exercise
power in an arbitrary or despotic manner.
No clear legal right. A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or
granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. In the absence of a
clear legal right, the issuance of the writ constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an
actual existing right is not a ground for injunction.
A perusal of the Motion for Injunction and its accompanying Affidavit filed
before the CA shows that petitioners rely on their alleged right to the full
and faithful execution of the MOA. However, while the enforcement of
the Writ of Execution, which would nullify the implementation of the
MOA, is manifestly prejudicial to petitioners’ interests, they have failed to
establish in their Petition that they possess a clear legal right that merits
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Their rights under the
MOA have already been declared inferior or inexistent in relation to
respondent in the RTC case, under a judgment that has become final and
executory. At the very least, their rights under the MOA are precisely
disputed by respondent. Hence, there can be no "clear and unmistakable"
right in favor of petitioners to warrant the issuance of a writ of injunction.
Where the complainant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction
is not proper.
The general rule is that after a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the
ministerial duty of the court to order its execution. No court should
interfere, by injunction or otherwise, to restrain such execution. The rule,
however, admits of exceptions, such as the following: (1) when facts and
circumstances later transpire that would render execution inequitable or
unjust; or (2) when there is a change in the situation of the parties that
may warrant an injunctive relief. In this case, after the finality of the RTC
Decision, there were no supervening events or changes in the situation of
the parties that would entail the injunction of the Writ of Execution.

Page 22 of 45
A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J, February 19, 2013 Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, et. al. v.
Court of Appeals Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican and
Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr
Doctrine:

Section 4, Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA provides that the requirement of a hearing for
preliminary injunction is satisfied with the issuance of a resolution requiring the party
sought to be enjoined to comment on the application within 10 days from notice; the
Special 14th Division acted collectively and in good faith and their Resolution granting
WPI in the consolidated CA petition enjoys presumption of regularity; The
complainants have no personality to assail the injunctive writ.

Facts:

An RTC order was secured by Ricafort who is a major stockholder of NADECOR. The
said order annuls the stockholder meeting (election of new members of the board
during the meeting) as he was not given the chance to participate since he was not
given notice.

Four separate petitions for certiorari were filed before the CA by some new members of
the Board and NADECOR (note: petitioners here do not include the complainants Fernandez
et. al) to assail the validity of the RTC order. All petitions are with application for TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Relevant to this case is the decision of the 11th
division on one of these petitions which granted the application for TRO to prevent the
implementation and execution of the RTC order. According to the Court, the 3
conditions for the issuance of an injunctive relief were present in this case namely: (a)
the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that
right; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
It then ordered the preceding Board to take over the company in a hold-over capacity
during the effectivity of the TRO. Respondents where then given by the division to
submit a comment to the petitioners’ petition and why a writ of preliminary injunction
should not be issued within 10 days from notice and petitioners would reply 5 days
after the receipt of the comment.

The said petitions were eventually consolidated and forwarded to the 14th Division. The
petitioners then filed 3 urgent motions to resolve their application for the writ of
preliminary injunction. After the lapse of the 60-day TRO but before the Court could
resolve the application for the writ of preliminary injunction, a notice of stockholders
meeting was issued and published on a newspaper. Midway through the meeting, a
facsimile copy of a resolution from the 14th division which granted the injunctive writ

Page 23 of 45
was received by the presider. In that resolution by the Court, the Old Board is enjoined
from acting as a hold-over board thereby contravening that decision of the 11th Division.

The said resolution was the basis of the administrative complaints filed by
complainants of this case against the justices of the 14th Division It is alleged in this
administrative complaint that the respondent Justices are guilty of grave misconduct,
conduct detrimental to the service, gross Ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, and
manifest partiality. They allege that the application for a writ of preliminary injunction
must be set for hearing first before granting the same pursuant to Sec. 5 Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court.

Issues:

Whether or not the requirement for hearing for preliminary injunction was satisfied
with the issuance of a resolution requiring the party sought to be enjoined to comment
on the application within 10 days from notice.

Whether or not the decision of the Division is done in good faith and therefore enjoys
presumption of regularity.

Whether or not the complainants have the legal personality to assail the writ

Ruling:

First Issue:

Yes. Section 4 of Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA provides that “The requirement of a hearing
for preliminary injunction is satisfied with the issuance of a resolution served upon the
party sought to be enjoined requiring him to comment on the said application within
the period of not more than ten (10) days from notice.”

Supreme Court further noted that the CA is justified in dispensing with the requisite
hearing on the application of the writ since the so-called “new and substantial matters”
raised in the third urgent motion and in the supplement thereto were not previously
unknown to respondents Ricafort. And they had already been previously ordered to
comment on the said application, at the time when the said “subsequent” matters were
already obtaining. The allegations of the complainants that the 14th Division acted on
the third motion to resolve the application for the writ of preliminary injunction were
unverified and no hearing was held therein yet, SC notes that the 11th Division has
already took into consideration the matters that are found in the urgent motions in its
decision of granting the writ. The 14th Division therefore needed only to rely on the
TRO resolution of the 11t h Division as well as on the Comment Ad Cautelam of

Page 24 of 45
respondents Ricafort to find a basis to issue its preservative writ of preliminary
injunction.

Second Issue:

Yes. The Division acted in good faith and their resolution granting the writ of
preliminary injunction enjoys a presumption of regularity.

The CA 11th Division conceded that the voiding of the stockholder meeting might
seriously derail any necessary corporate actions needed on the demands of the MOUs
that the company will enter to develop its gold copper mine. This is also the basis of the
resolution made by the 14th Division therefore, no bad faith can be imputed upon them.

The resolution also enjoys a presumption of regularity. The said MOUs are still a point
of contention since one group wants it rescinded and the other wants to retain it.
whoever is proven correct could be anyone’s guess but this does not detract from the
fact that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in the consolidated CA
petitions was discretionary, interlocutory and preservative in nature, and equally
importantly, it was a collective and deliberated action of the former Special 14th
Division upon an urgent application for writ of preliminary injunction.

Third Issue:

No. The complainants have no personality to assail the writ. Sec. 1 of Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court provides that a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to
be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of
the court or of an officer thereof may, with l eave of court, be allowed to intervene in the
action. Conversely, a person who is not a party in the main suit cannot be bound by an
ancillary writ, such as a preliminary injunction. He cannot therefore be affected by a
proceeding over which he is a stranger.

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear that a person not an aggrieved
party in the original proceedings that gave rise to the petition for certiorari, will not be
permitted to bring the said action to annul or stay the injurious writ. In other words, a
person who is not party to the proceedings in the lower court cannot maintain an action
for certiorari before the SC to have the judgement reviewed.

In the case at hand, the complainants never bothered to intervene in any of the petitions
filed before the CA and so, they are not entitled to the service of pleadings and motions
therein. Fernandez was the only one named as defendant in one of the cases before the
lower court however, just the same, he has no personality to assail the writ because he
chose not to join in any of the CA petitions.

Page 25 of 45
Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Association, Inc. (COCLAI) vs CA, G.R.
No. 106043, March 4,1996

Although as a general rule, a court should not, by means of a preliminary injunction,

transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to another, this rule admits of
some exceptions. For example, when there i s a clear finding of ownership and possession of
the land or unless the subject property i s covered by a torrens title pointing to one of the
parties as the undisputed owner.In the case at bench, the l and subject of the suit is covered
by a torrens title under the name of NHA.

Facts:

1.The land subject of the dispute is Lot 1982 consisting of about 12.82 hectares
located at Cagayan de Oro City which was formerly identified as timberland of
the Bureu of forestry which it late on identified as an alienable and disposable
public land.

2.In January 29, 1964, the Bureua of Lands issued a Survey Authority granting
COCLAI to survey the land in question for the purposes of subdivision into
residential lots.

3.On March 31,1964, the Bureau of Lands, after conducting an ocular survey,
required the COCLAI, in behalf of its members Sales Application but this was
held in abeyance by the Bureua of Lands pending the final outcome of the
annulment case for orginal certificated filed by the Republic and City of CDO
against Salcedo, et.al which covered the land in question pending before the SC
(G.R. No. L-4115). In said case, the COCLAI was a party-intervenor.

4.Supreme Court finally annulled the OCT and declared the land as public land.

5.The Solicitor General then furnished the copy of the SC Decision to the Director
of Bureau of Lands which in return transmitted the order to the Regional Director
of Region X. The said regional director informed the Director of lands the
members of COCLAI were occupying portions of the said lot by virtue of the
Survey Authority given to them and that this was already submitted to the
Central Office for verification but that approval was held in abeyance.

6.On May 10,1983, the President of the PH issued Proclamation No.2292

reserving the entire area for the Slum Improvement Resettlement ( SIR) Project to
be implemented by the NCHA.

Page 26 of 45
 7.The Bureau of Lands issued an order rejecting the subdivision survey
previously submitted by the COCLAI.

8.NHA, through its authority, demolished the structures erected by the COCLAI
members which prompted the latter to file a forcible entry and damages case
against the NHA before the MTCC of CDO. (Civil Case No.11204)

9.While the case was pending, the President of the PH issued a Special Patent
giving NHA absolute ownership of the land.

10.MTCC rendered the judgement in favor of COCLAI. RTC affirmed the

decision of the lower court.

11.A day after COCLAI moved for the execution of judgement, NHA filed a
complaint for “Quieting of Title with Application for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against the COCLAI to the RTC.

12.RTC denied said petition. Aggrieved, NHA appealed to the CA which

reversed the decision of the lower court and ordered the lower court to issue a
writ of preliminary injunction to respect the possession of NHA over the land
subject of the dispute.

Issue : Whether or not CA erred in ruling that the NHA is entitled to the injunction
prayer prayed for.

Ruling :

YES, CA IS JUSTIFIED IN RULING THAT NHA WAS ENTITLED TO WRIT OF

INJUNCTION.

While Civil Case No. 11204 for forcible entry was pending on appeal before
the Regional Trial Court, Special Patent No. 3551 was issued by then President
Corazon Aquino which covered the lot subject of the dispute and by virtue thereof,
an Original Certificate of Title in the name of NHA was issued by the Register of
Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City on January 3, 1990. So, when petitioner moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution before the MTCC on July 23, 1990, a certificate of title
had already been issued to NHA.I n view of this intervening development, NHA
filed a complaint for quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de
Oro City. Thus, it was only proper for the Court of Appeals to direct the Regional
Trial Court, where Civil Case No. 90-337 was pending, to grant the writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of the decision of the MTCC i n
Civil Case No. 11204 as there was a material change in the status of the parties with regard

Page 27 of 45
to the said land. Clearly, the government, through the NHA will be prejudiced by the
impending enforcement of the decision i n Civil Case No. 11204 which directs the
said agency to restore the members of petitioner to their respective possession on
portions of Lot No. 1982.

NHA HAS A BETTER RIGHT OVER THE SAID PROPERTY.

1.The Original Certificate serves as a concrete and conlusive evidence of an

indefeasible title to the property.

2.The Certificate of title issued is under a judicial registration proceeding.

3.The said certificate of title was not controverted by petitioner in a proper

proceeding nor did it show that the issuance of the OCT was tainted in bad faith.
Thus, the CT enjoys the presumption of having been issued by the RD in the
regular performance of its official duty.

4.Petitioner’s only basis for claiming the disputed land is lawful entry and
possession for an extended period of time but settled is the rule that such action
only involves mere physical possession not ownership. There has been no
assertion of ownership.

5.Its Miscellaneous Sales Application was also not acted upon nor favourably
considered by the Bureau of Lands.

PETITION IS DISMISSED!

ON PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION :

As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain

the status quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened
acts, until the merits of the case can be heard. As such, injunction i s accepted as the
"strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy" to be used cautiously, as it affects
the respective rights of the parties, and only upon full conviction on the part of the
court of i ts extreme necessity. Its issuance rests entirely within the discretion of the
court taking cognizance of the case and i s generally not interfered with except in
cases of manifest abuse. Moreover, it may only be resorted to by a litigant for the
preservation or protection of his rights or interests and for no other purpose during
the pendency of the principal action.

Before an injunction can be issued, it i s essential that the following requisites

be present:
1. there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected

Page 28 of 45
 2. the act against which the injunction i s to be directed i s a violation of
such right.
Hence, it should only be granted if the party asking for it is clearly entitled
thereto.

Page 29 of 45
Barbieto vs. CA
FACTS: Maj. Gen. Barbieto is the Division Commander of the 4th Infantry Division, PA,
Camp Edilberto Evangelista, Cagayan de Oro City. Several Complaint-Affidavits were
filed before the ODO-MOLEO by various personnel of the 4th Infantry Division, PA,
against Maj. Gen. Barbieto and his alleged bagman Staff Sergeant Roseller A. Echipare
(S/Sgt. Echipare), charging the latter two with grave misconduct and violation of
Republic Act No. 6713. Maj. Gen. Barbieto and S/Sgt. Echipare, for allegedly committed
the following: (a) extortion of amounts ranging from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00 from
applicants in order to guarantee their enlistment in the Philippine Army; (b) extortion of
money from soldiers seeking reinstatement, in exchange for Maj. Gen. Barbieto’s
approval of their reinstatement, despite previous disapproval of said soldiers’ requests
for reinstatement by the 4th Infantry Division Reinstatement Board; and (c) anomalies
in the clearing of payroll of the Balik Baril program fund of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP).
ODO-MOLEO ordered the preventive suspension of Maj. Gen. Barbieto and S/Sgt.
Echipare for six months during the pendency of the case. Maj. Gen. Barbieto filed a
Motion for Reconsideration.
Simultaneous with the proceedings before the ODO-MOLEO, the Army Investigator
General (AIG) was also conducting an investigation on the same charges against Maj.
Gen. Barbieto and S/Sgt. Echipare. The AIG recommended, and Lt. Gen. Yano, as CG-
PA, approved, the indictment of Maj. Gen. Barbieto for violations of Articles 55 (Officer
Making Unlawful Enlistment), 96 (Conduct Unbecoming of an Officer and a
Gentleman), and 97 (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline); and of
S/Sgt. Echipare for violations of Articles 96 and 97, all of the Articles of War.6
Maj. Gen. Barbieto’s 10-day leave of absence took effect to pave the way for an impartial
investigation. On even date, S/Sgt. Echipare was arrested and confined at the
Intelligence and Security Group Compound, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City.
Lt. Gen. Yano subsequently issued on 13 March 2008 an Order for the "Arrest and
Confinement of Major General Barbieto AFP and SSG Echipare PA," directing the
Commander of the Headquarters and Headquarters Support Group (HHSG), PA, "to
arrest and take responsibility of Major General Barbieto and SSG Echipare PA and to
restrict them to quarters pending investigation with the end view of a General Court
Martial Trial." Pursuant to this Order of Arrest, Maj. Gen. Barbieto was arrested and
confined to cluster officer housing, while S/Sgt. Echipare was transferred to and
detained at the Custodial Management Unit (CMU), HHSG, PA, on 18 March 2008.9

Without waiting for the resolution by the ODO-MOLEO of his Motion for
Reconsideration of the preventive suspension order issued against him, Maj. Gen.

Page 30 of 45
Barbieto filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
CA’S RULING: No compelling reason to issue an injunctive writ and/or TRO. The
surrounding facts on Barbieto’s plea for the issuance of an injunctive relief are
intimately related to and inextricably intertwined with the issues raised in the instant
Petition for Certiorari. Moreover, Barbieto failed to demonstrate extreme urgency, as
well as great or irreparable injury that he may suffer while the instant Petition is
pending adjudication.
Maj. Gen. Barbieto moved for reconsideration, but the CA refused to do so. The
appellate court stressed that before there could be a question of whether to grant or
deny the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, Maj. Gen. Barbieto, at the onset,
should have established in his pleadings the existence of the grounds enumerated in
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of a TRO and or a writ of prelimiary injunction in
favor of Barbieto is proper.
RULING:
At the onset, the Court must clarify that Maj. Gen. Barbieto is actually seeking a TRO
and/or a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of two distinct
orders, issued by two different persons, in two separate proceedings: (1) the preventive
suspension order issued by the ODO-MOLEO; and (2) the Order of Arrest issued by Lt.
Gen. Yano as CG-PA in view of the impending General Court Martial Trial.
The preventive suspension order issued by the ODO-MOLEO merely suspended Maj.
Gen. Barbieto from his office for six months, pending the administrative proceedings
against the latter. There is nothing in said preventive suspension order of the ODO-
MOLEO that directed Maj. Gen. Barbieto’s arrest. His arrest and continued confinement
is solely by virtue of Lt. Gen. Yano’s Order.

The Court takes note of the undisputed fact that Maj. Gen. Barbieto’s six-month
suspension, imposed by the ODO-MOLEO, already expired on 28 August 2008. Such an
event necessarily renders this Petition moot and academic, insofar as the latter pertains
to the said preventive suspension order issued by the ODO-MOLEO against Maj. Gen.
Barbieto. Any ruling by this Court, whether affirming or reversing the denial by the
appellate court of Maj. Gen. Barbieto’s prayer for issuance of a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of said preventive suspension
order, will no longer serve any practical purpose, because the act sought to be enjoined
has long been consummated.

Similarly, the Court finds the present Petition, insofar as it concerns Lt. Gen. Yano’s
Order of Arrest against Maj. Gen. Barbieto, dismissible for lack of merit.

Page 31 of 45
Sine dubio, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests
on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment
and evaluation of evidence towards that end involves findings of facts left to the said
court for its conclusive determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a
court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with, except when there is grave
abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals did
not gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to issue a TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the enforcement of Lt. Gen. Yano’s Order of Arrest against Maj.
Gen. Barbieto.
Maj. Gen. Barbieto cannot rely on Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 20-95,
providing special rules for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions.
He overlooked that Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 20-95 pertains to
applications for TROs and/or writs of preliminary injunctions filed before trial courts,
whether multi-sala or single-sala.
The Court of Appeals has its own Internal Rules, to wit:
Section 2, Rule IV of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals provides the
following procedure in the case of a petition involving an urgent matter, such as an
application for a TRO:
Sec. 2. Action by the Presiding Justice. – When a petition involves an urgent matter,
such as an application for writ of habeas corpus or temporary restraining order, and
there is no way of convening the Raffle Committee or calling any of its members, the
Presiding Justice may conduct the raffle or act on the petition, subject to raffle on the
next working day in accordance with Rule III hereof.
Noticeably, the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals may even, by himself, act on
an urgent application for a TRO. There is no mention at all of the requirement that the
Presiding Justice must hold a summary hearing prior to granting or denying such an
application.
As for a preliminary injunction, Section 4, Rule VI of the 2002 Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals lays down the following procedure:
Sec. 4. Hearing on Preliminary Injunction. — The requirement of a hearing on an
application for preliminary injunction is satisfied with the issuance by the Court of a
resolution served upon the party sought to be enjoined requiring him to comment on
said application within a period of not more than ten (10) days from notice. Said party
may attach to his comment documents which may show why the application for
preliminary injunction should be denied. The Court may require the party seeking the
injunctive relief to file his reply to the comment within five (5) days from receipt of the
latter.

Page 32 of 45
If the party sought to be enjoined fails to file his comment as provided for in the
preceding paragraph, the Court may resolve the application on the basis of the petition
and its annexes.
The preceding paragraphs, notwithstanding, the Court may, in its sound discretion, set
the application for a preliminary injunction for hearing during which the parties may
present their respective positions or submit evidence in support thereof.
Based on the foregoing rule, the Court of Appeals clearly satisfied the requirement of a
hearing when it directed respondents to submit their comment on Maj. Gen. Barbieto’s
prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction within ten days
from notice. While it is true that the right to due process safeguards the opportunity to
be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of his claim or defense,
the Court has time and again held that where the opportunity to be heard, either
through verbal arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can "present its side"
or defend its "interest in due course," there is no denial of due process. What the law
proscribes is the lack of opportunity to be heard.
The last paragraph of Section 4, Rule VI of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals also proves false Maj. Gen. Barbieto’s contention that the actual conduct of a
hearing on an application for preliminary injunction is mandatory. Said rule explicitly
states that the setting of a hearing on such an application is left to the sound discretion
of the appellate court. Hence, it is not enough for Maj. Gen. Barbieto to show that no
hearing on his application for TRO and/or preliminary injunction was conducted by
the Court of Appeals, but he must also be able to convince this Court that the appellate
court gravely abused its discretion in choosing not to conduct such a hearing. Maj. Gen.
Barbieto likewise failed in this regard.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to
judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party’s
substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal action. A
plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or
extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a
litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned.
At times referred to as the "Strong Arm of Equity," we have consistently ruled that there
is no power the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for greater
circumspection than the issuance of an injunction. It should only be extended in cases of
great injury where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in
damages; "in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where
considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant’s favor; where
there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff’s right against his protest and
remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one, and where the effect of the mandatory
injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation

Page 33 of 45
between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to
establish a new relation."
For the writ to issue, two requisites must be present, namely, the existence of the right
to be protected, and that the facts against which the injunction is to be directed are
violative of said right.
A writ of preliminary injunction may be granted only upon showing by the applicant of
a clear and unmistakable right that is a right in esse. Maj. Gen. Barbieto claims that his
right in esse that is being violated herein is his right to liberty.
Indeed, Section I, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, guarantees that no person may be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Also, the Republic of
the Philippines, as a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
recognizes that everyone has the right to liberty and security of one’s person. No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty
except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by
law.
Nevertheless, the right to liberty is not absolute. It bears to point out that while both the
1987 Constitution and the UDHR affirm the right of every person to liberty, they do
concede that there are instances when a person must be deprived thereof for as long as
due process of law has been observed.
Thus, Maj. Gen. Barbieto cannot just invoke herein his fundamental right to liberty;
upon him also falls the burden of proving that he is being deprived of such right
without due process.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Page 34 of 45
 10.A. M. No. RTJ-02-1712 (Formerly IPI No. 01-1110-RTJ) December 8, 2003,
Armando M. Mendoza v. Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas, RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo
City

Principle: (From Syllabus) Failure of the respondent judge to observe the procedure under Sec. 5,
Rule 58; disregard of the rules would not just be ignorance of the law, it would be grave abuse of
judicial authority, and an act prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.

Facts:

An administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law, bias and partiality was filed
against Judge Ubiadas of the RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City, in connection with his
issuance in the Civil Case "Alexander Panganiban, et al. v. Angelito Sacro, et al., " of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction.

Plaintiff Panganiban and his co-plaintiffs filed a complaint with the RTC for
"Declaration of Nullity of the Election of the Board of Directors and Committee Officers
of the Olongapo Subic Castillejos San Marcelino Transport Service and Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc.," with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction, against the incumbent members of the Board of Directors, including its
Chairman Mendoza (herein complainant), and other officers of the cooperative.

They claimed that the defendants:

- "were elected members of the Board of Directors of the Cooperative, through the
unlawful interference by [the co-defendants] and other officials of the Cooperative
Development Authority ( CDA), Pampanga Extension Office, in the internal affairs
of the cooperative";
-"the conduct of the elections by and under the direct control and supervision of the
CDA-Pampanga Extension Office violated the provisions of the Cooperative Code of
the Philippines, the order of the CDA Central Office, and other laws; and
-defendants had performed acts prejudicial to the interest of the general
membership of the cooperative.

Respondent judge issued a TRO enjoining the members of the Board of Directors and
officers of the cooperative, including persons acting in their behalf, from performing
any act for and in behalf of the cooperative for a period of twenty (20) days from receipt
of the order.

RTC Decision:
Respondent judge likewise scheduled a hearing on the petition for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction, requiring the defendants to appear and show cause why the
petition should not be granted.

No hearing, however, evidently took place, and all that the records would indicate was
that respondent judge resolved to consider "all the pending incidents, i.e., the plaintiffs'
Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and the defendants'

Page 35 of 45
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss," submitted for resolution. Moreover, Respondent
judge granted the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge Ubiadas is guilty of gross ignorance of the law

HELD:
YES. Rule 58, Section 4 and Section 5, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
incorporating the Court's Administrative Circular No. 20-95 made effective on 1
October 1995 and providing for special rules in the issuance of temporary restraining
orders and writs of preliminary injunction, emphasizes the need for hearing and prior
notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined.

In fine, Section 5 of Rule 58 proscribes the grant of preliminary injunction without

hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. (The original
provision under Section 5 of Rule 58 where the term "ex parte" described the nature of a
judge's issuance of the twenty-day temporary restraining order had been deleted
pursuant to an amendment made by the Court en banc in its resolution in Bar Matter
No. 803 of 17 February 1998.)

The rules, however, authorize the court to which an application for preliminary
injunction is made to issue a temporary restraining order if it should appear from facts
shown by affidavits or by the verified petition that "great or irreparable injury would
result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice." The temporary
restraining order shall be effective for a period of twenty days from notice to the party
or person sought to be enjoined. Within the twenty-day period, the judge must
conduct a hearing to consider the propriety for the issuance of an injunction or a
preliminary injunction. The twenty-day period for the efficacy of a temporary
restraining order is non-extendible; the order automatically terminates at the end of
such period without the need of any judicial declaration to that effect and the courts
have no discretion to extend the same.

In this instance, the complaint, filed on 21 October 1999, sought the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction against herein
complainant and the members of the Board of Directors and officers of the cooperative.
Respondent judge would appear to have issued, on 28 October 1999, the temporary
restraining order in favor of the plaintiffs and while he did so in view of the perceived
urgency of the case involved, he, however, failed to conduct a hearing on the prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction within the time prescribed
therefor. Respondent judge offered no explanation on why the scheduled hearing on
12 November 1999 did not take place before the writ of preliminary injunction was
granted on 17 November 1999, constraining Judge Asdala, to whom the case was re-
raffled following respondent judge's inhibition, to nullify the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by respondent judge for having been effected without prior notice and
hearing.

Page 36 of 45
Sps. Crisologo vs. Judge Omelio
Facts:
(Let’s start with the background)
So Keng Koc owned several properties. So Keng Coc was also a defendant in several
civil cases. Because of those civil cases, a lot of his properties were issued notices of levy
on attachment.
Later, So Keng Koc entered into a compromise agreement with Sy Ben which resulted in
the transfer of some of those same properties to Sy Ben. (BTW Sy Ben is one of the
people So Keng Koc had a case with). Later on, these properties were sold to JEWM
Agro-Industrial Corporation.
Now hold that thought...
Herein complainants Sps. Crisologo are actually one of the people So Keng Koc had a
case with. Now the reason why they matter in this case is because they acquired a
favorable judgement against So Keng Koc. Pursuant to that judgement, a writ of
execution was issued wherein some of the properties of So Keng Koc (which included
those that were already in JEWM’s name) were subjected to an auction sale.
Since the properties are already with JEWM, JEWM filed an Affidavit of Third-Party
Claim and Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam before the RTC. RTC denied ruling that such
affidavits and motions were not the proper mode of action prescribed under the Rules
of Court to seek injunctive relief.
Aggrieved, JEWM filed a complaint for Cancellation of Lien, with application for Writ
of Preliminary Injunction against the Register of Deeds, Sheriff, John and Jane Does.
This case was docketed Civil case no. 33,557-2010.
Thereafter, Sps. Crisologo argued that they are parties-in-interest to 33,557-2010 and
that a Preliminary Injunction would interfere with the proceedings of a co-equal court.
He also posited that there exists no cause for the issuance of the writ as the bond they
posted is substantial enough to cover any damage JEWM might sustain by reason of the
implementation of the Writ of Execution.
In addition, complainant-spouses posited that JEWM failed to present evidence of
damage it would suffer or the amount of damage it would sustain. They stressed that
the subject properties are still encumbered, and whoever buys encumbered property
purchases the same subject to the attachment thereon. They also argued that they are
the John and Jane Does referred to in Civil Case No. 33,557-2010, because the
annotations JEWM sought to cancel include their liens. They insisted that they are
indispensable parties, being John and Jane Does of Civil Case No. 33-557-2016, hence,
intervention is no longer necessary. Nevetheless, the preliminary injunction was still
issued in favor of JEWM.

Page 37 of 45
Issue: Was respondent judge right in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction without
evidentiary hearing?
OCA: Judge Omelio is guilty. Judge Omelio claimed that Sps. Crisologo were not able
to adduce evidence to prove that he was moved by corruption in issuing the injunctive
relief. The Investigating Justice, however, found no merit in this argument because lack
of malicious intent cannot completely free a respondent judge from liability. The
Investigating Justice found that Judge Omelio conducted a summary hearing on 22
September 2010 and issued the writ of preliminary injunction on the same day, despite
the absence of any testimonial or documentary evidence.

Ruling (SC):
SC disagreed with OCA on this particular issue. The general rule is that a sampling of
evidence is required during the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction.
However, there are also instances when said writ can be issued based on the verified
application, provided there is notice and hearing.  
Judge Omelio is given a wide latitude of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction after the hearing, especially when a clear and unmistakable right to the
issuance of the injunctive writ can be gleaned from affidavits or the verified application
and its supporting documents, considering the peculiar circumstances of this case.

This case concerns the cancellation of liens on the transfer certificates of title, involving
issues which can be comprehended by the judge based on a cursory examination of the
verified application and its supporting documents. During the hearing on 22 September
2010 (which is a requirement in the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction), both
counsels were given the opportunity to argue their case before Judge Omelio. Neither
counsel raised the issue of authenticity of the titles, subject of the case. Both counsels
were in agreement with regard to the facts: (a) that there were several liens over the
properties; (b) that the property held by JEWM was a derivative title in satisfaction of
the first lien; and (c) that the Sps. Crisologo were executing JEWMs property based on
the second lien. With no factual issues or disputes, the issues raised by counsels before
Judge Omelio were purely legal in nature, which could be resolved from an
examination of the verified application and its supporting documents. A clear and
unmistakable right to the issuance of the writ of injunction in favor of JEWM could
easily be gathered from examining the submitted pleadings and their supporting
documents.

Page 38 of 45
13. Estares Spouses vs CA
Topic: Preliminary Injuction
Syllabus: Requirements for injunctive relief; existence of a clear and unmistakable
right and an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage;
WPI is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence; essence of due
process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence
one may have in support of one's defense an injunctive remedy may only be resorted
to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot
be

Facts:

Spouses Estares secured a loan of P800,000 from Prominent Lending & Credit
Corporation (PLCC) in 1998. To secure the loan, they mortgaged a parcel of land. They
however only received P637,000. They are now questioning the validity of the loan as
they alleged that they agreed to an 18% per annum interest rate but PLCC is now
charging them 3.5% interest rate per month. The Spouses Estares filed an action to
declare the promissory note and the real estate mortgage null and void and they also
prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin PLCC from taking possession of the mortgaged property and proceeding with
the extrajudicial sale.

PLCC argued that the spouses were properly apprised of the terms of the loan
including the rate of interest, penalties and other charges. On the other hand, the
Estares spouses insist that they firmly established their right to injunctive relief. They
claim that the promissory note, credit application, disbursement voucher, disclosure
statement and real estate mortgage are falsified; the promissory note is not reflective of
the true amount of the loan, as well as the term, interest and charges thereto.

RTC Decision: The RTC denied the Estares spouses’ application for a writ of
preliminary injunction, holding that the latter failed to establish the facts necessary for
an injunction to issue.

This caused them to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals.
The action on the Estares spouses’ application for a TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction was deferred and held in abeyance until after receipt of the comment. And
with no restraining order enjoining him, Sheriff Magat conducted an auction sale.

CA Decision: Dismissed the petition for lack of merit and affirmed RTC decision. That
RTC did not abuse its discretion in denying preliminary injuntion for failure to to prove
the requisites for its issuance.

Issue: Whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction should be granted

Page 39 of 45
Held: Nope

Generally, Injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights or

interests. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct
to a main suit. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the
writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable
injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and
advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to
avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of
compensation.

The application of the writ rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency or of a

special reason for such an order before the case can be regularly heard, and the essential
conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges
facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a cause of action for injunction and that
on the entire showing from both sides, it appears, in view of all the circumstances, that
the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of plaintiff pending the
litigation.

The Estares spouses had the burden in the trial court to establish the following
requirements for them to be entitled to injunctive relief: (a) the existence of their right to
be protected; and (b) that the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are
violative of such right. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner must
show,  inter alia, the existence of a clear and unmistakable right and an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.  Thus, an injunctive
remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation.

In the present case, the Estares spouses failed to establish their right to injunctive relief.
They do not deny that they are indebted to PLCC but only question the amount thereof.
Their property is by their own choice encumbered by a real estate mortgage. Upon the
non-payment of the loan, which was secured by the mortgage, the mortgaged property
is properly subject to a foreclosure sale.

The assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction involve findings of facts ordinarily left to the trial court for its conclusive
determination. As such, a trial court’s decision to grant or to deny injunctive relief will
not be set aside on appeal unless the court abused its discretion.
 

Page 40 of 45
MABAYO FARMS INC. VS CA

Facts:

1. 1. On August 22, 1969, the Bureau of Lands declared Francisco Domingo,

Reynaldo Florida, Cornelio Pilipino and Severino Vistan, lawful possessors of Lot
1379 of the Morong, Bataan Cadastre.

1. 2. Domingo, Florida, Pilipino and Vistan through their forebears and by

themselves had been in open, notorious, and exclusive possession of portions of
Lot 1379 since 1933 in the concept of owners.

1. 3. In October 1970, petitioner bought the respective portions of Domingo,

Florida, Pilipino and Vistan, totaling 69,932 square meters and entered into a
compromise settlement with six other persons occupying the property, whose
applications had been rejected by the Bureau.

1. 4. Petitioner then filed an application for land registration with the then Court
of First Instance of Bataan. On December 20, 1991, the trial court decided the land
registration case in petitioner’s favor. On March 14, 2000, the appellate court
affirmed the lower court’s decision.

1. 5. In June 1997, a group of occupants entered the land, destroyed the fences and
drove away livestock owned by petitioner.


1. 6. On October 9, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for injunction with damages,

with a prayer for a temporary restraining order.

1. 7. The trial court issued the temporary restraining order (TRO) and on January
16, 1998, the sheriff served copies on the defendants. The sheriff accompanied
petitioner’s president to the property where they found five (5) persons cultivating
the land. The latter refused to give their names or receive copies of the TRO. They
claimed that they were only farm workers of a certain Antonio Santos who
allegedly owned the land.

1. 8. On April 14, 1998, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the defendants or persons acting on their behalf from entering and
cultivating the disputed property. The aforementioned writ was also served upon
respondent who was occupying a portion of Lot No. 1379.

1. 9. Private respondent averred that he only learned about the writ of

preliminary injunction on February 16, 1999, when he secured a copy of the order.

Page 41 of 45
 He claimed that he was an innocent purchaser for value of the property from
Francisco, Armando and Conchita Alejandro and the injunction prevented him
from using his property. He alleged that he was not a party to Civil Case and that
it was grave abuse of discretion for the trial court to enforce the injunctive writ
against him since it did not have jurisdiction over him.

1. 10. petitioner contends that the injunctive writ of April 14, 1998 was issued not
only against all named defendants in Civil Case, but also against three unnamed
"Does." It now argues that the "Does" in the complaint are all those who violated
its rights, also against other persons who were seen entering and cultivating
petitioner’s property including private respondent.

1. 11. private respondent counters that he was not legally bound nor required by
law to file his pleadings in Civil Case as he was not a party in said case. Likewise,
he was not required to act on or protest the injunctive writ in the aforementioned
civil case. Private respondent avers that what petitioner wants is to have a
continuing writ in its favor, to include not only the defendants in the Civil Case
but also all those who may subsequently intrude into the land dispute. Private
respondent submits that the court a quo committed no error in describing
petitioner’s posture as a violation of the fundamental rights to notice and hearing.

Issue:

Is private respondent bound by the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the

trial court?

Held:

We have minutely scrutinized the order granting the writ of preliminary

injunction and are unable to say that the writ applied to private Respondent. The
order merely stated “Let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining and
restraining the defendants or any person or persons acting in their place or stead
from further entering and cultivating the said land of the plaintiff subject matter
of this case until further order from the Court." The persons specifically enjoined
in the order were the defendants in the Civil Case or persons acting in their
stead.

Petitioner itself admitted that private respondent was not a defendant in the
Civil Case since "at the institution of the case in 1997, he (private respondent) did
not have a right over any portion of petitioner’s lot." Neither was he a trespasser
then.

Also, nothing in the records indicate that private respondent was acting on
behalf of any of the defendants. Taking all these into consideration, we must

Page 42 of 45
 hold that the writ of preliminary injunction thus cannot be made to apply to
private respondent.

A preliminary injunction is an ancillary or preventive remedy, a writ of

preliminary injunction may therefore be resorted to by a party to protect or
preserve his rights and for no other purpose during the pendency of the
principal action. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional
remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. Thus, a person who is not a party in the main
suit, like private respondent in the instant case, cannot be bound by an ancillary
writ, such as the writ of preliminary injunction issued against the defendants in
Civil Case No. 6695. He cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger.

Valley Trading v. CFI of Isabela

Plaintiff assailed a provision of the Revenue Code of Cauyan, Isabela that imposed a
graduated tax on retailers, independent wholesalers and distributors. The petition
alleged that provision was contrary to PD 426 (Local Tax Code) that prohibits the
imposition of a percentage tax on sales. Plaintiff further prays that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued to defer the collection of the assailed tax provision.

Respondents on the other hand claimed that the provision calls for the collection for an
annual fixed business tax not a percentage tax on sales. As a matter of fact, respondents
presented a letter by the Secretary of Finance affirming the validity of the tax provision.

Page 43 of 45
The trial court denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that
the collection of taxes cannot be enjoined. Hence, petitioner appealed the denial of the
writ to the Court alleging that the denial of the writ was contrary to Section 7 of Rule 58
of the Rules of Court as a hearing on the merit is required before ordering a denial.
Respondents on the other hand replied that a hearing is not mandatory pursuant to
Section 6 of Rule 58.

Issue: Whether a hearing should be required before the denial of the writ

Ruling:

Hearing is not mandatory

Although Section 6 provides for the ground for denial, trial court may opt to dismiss the
application for the writ without hearing especially if the same is on the ground of the
insufficiency of the complaint. The denial without hearing is justified especially if it is
apparent from the complaint itself and preliminary injunction that it may be refused
outright, with or without notice to the adverse party.

It would be different, under Section 7, if there is a prima facie showing on the face of the
motion and/or pleadings that the grant of preliminary injunction may be proper, in
which case notice to the opposing party would be necessary since the grant of such writ
on an ex parte proceeding is now proscribed. 

Issuance of the writ was also invalid

The damage that may be caused to the petitioner will not, of course, be irreparable;
where so indicated by subsequent events favorable to it, whatever it shall have paid is
easily refundable.

Page 44 of 45
PCIB v. CA

Private respondents contracted a loan with petitioner which was evidenced by

promissory notes and secured by several real estate and chattel mortgages. When
respondents defaulted, petitioners sought for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgages, which was to take place on September and October 1991. Before the sale
could proceed, private respondents filed a complaint for damages alleging that the sale
should not proceed. Respondents alleged that the sale was premature as they were
given extensions by petitioner and that the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage was
invalid as the foreclosure only pertains to one chattel mortgage contract not the entirety
of the properties mortgaged and that the same has failed to comply with the Chattel
Mortgage Law. Respondents likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.

The lower courts, after due notice and hearing granted the writ of preliminary
injunction and ordered the posting of a bond.

Thereafter, petitioner again filed a motion to lift the writ alleging that the extension has
lapsed and that the obligation was more than that of the bond posted. The motion to lift
the writ was granted and the court ordered the sale of the properties. Although the sale
ensued, respondents then filed an emergency motion for reconsideration contending
that the lifting of the writ of injunction was void as they were not served with the
notice.

The Court dismissed the emergency motion and instead issued a writ of possession in
favor of petitioners.

Undeterred by the previous denials, respondents again filed another application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction alleging that the foreclosure of the
mortgages was improper. This time the RTC granted the application for the writ of
preliminary injunction that effectively caused the postponement of the auction sale. The
private respondents then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA where the appellate
court nullified the lower court’s decision in lifting the writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether the grant of the writ of injunction in the other RTC was valid.

Ruling:

The private respondents indulged in forum shopping and flagrantly violated the
principle of judicial stability

The Court ruled that it was improper for respondents to have resorted to the filing of
the second writ of injunction at the outset of the denial of the previously applied writ of
preliminary injunction over the same subject properties.

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