People vs.
Mengote offense had been committed and that the accused-
Facts:
The Western Police District received a telephone call
from an informer that there were three suspicious looking
persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay
Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of
plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place.
The patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side,
one of whom holding his abdomen. They approached the
persons and identified themselves as policemen,
whereupon the two tried to run but unable to escape
because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects
were then searched. One of them the accused-appellant
was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it,
while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were
taken from them and they were turned over to the police
headquarters for investigation. An information was filed
before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal
possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the
weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop, which
he reported to the police including the revolver. For his
part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the
fire arm or that he was licensed to possess it but instead,
he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time
of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866
and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he
pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence
against him because it had been illegally seized and
therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Issue: WN the arrest and search valid.
Held:
These requirements have not been established in
the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the
accused-appellant was merely “looking from side to side”
and “holding his abdomen,” according to the arresting
officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that
had just been committed or was being actually committed
or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of
an offense was not necessary as long as Mengote’s acts
“created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the
arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an
appellant had committed it.” The question is, What
offense? What offense could possibly have been
suggested by a person “looking from side to side” and
“holding his abdomen” and in a place not exactly
forsaken?
On the other hand, there could have been a number
of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes were
darting from side to side and he was holding his abdomen.
If they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting
officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless
not been shown what their suspicion was all about. In
fact, the policemen themselves testified that they were
dispatched to that place only because of the telephone call
from the informer that there were “suspicious-looking”
persons in that vicinity who were about to commit a
robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not
explain why he thought the men looked suspicious nor
did he elaborate on the impending crime.
The truth is that they did not know then what
offense, if at all, had been committed and neither were
they aware of the participation therein of the accused-
appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared
at the police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery
in his house and of Mengote’s supposed involvement
therein. As for the illegal possession of the firearm found
on Mengote’s person, the policemen discovered this only
after he had been searched and the investigation
conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor
was he licensed to possess it.
People vs. Evaristo
• While on routine patrol duty, the Philippine
Constabulary officer patrolling heard gunfire
within the vicinity. When they came upon the
source, Rosillo was firing a gun into the air.
• Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house
of appellant Evaristo prompting the lawmen to
pursue him. Upon approaching the house, the
patrol saw appellants, Evaristo and Carillo, who
were drunk. Inquiring as to the whereabouts of
Rosillo, the police patrol were told that he had
already escaped.
 • Vallarta noticed a bulge on Carillo’s waist and
subsequently frisked him revealing .38 caliber
revolver. After ascertaining that Carillo was
neither a member of the military nor had a valid
license to possess the said firearm, the gun was
confiscated and Carillo invited for questioning.
• Romeroso sought the consent of Evaristo for entry
into the latter’s house to search for Rosillo and
Evaristo consented.
• Upon entry they found various firearms,
paraphernalia, and other effects, which became
the basis for the charge of illegal possession of
firearms.
• For their part, the appellants alleged that they
were forcibly taken into custody. They denied
ownership or knowledge of any of the firearms,
contending that these were planted in their
possession by the prosecution witnesses and other
police authorities.
Issue: WN the search was valid.
Held: Yes.
The Court ruled that doctrine of seizure of evidence
in plain view, objects inadvertently falling in the plain
view of an officer, who has a the right to be in the position
to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be
introduced as evidence.
• In this case, Romerosa was granted permission by
the appellant Evaristo to enter his house. The
officer's purpose was to catch Rosillo whom he
saw had sought refuge inside. Therefore, it is clear
that the search for firearms was not Romerosa's
purpose in entering the house, thereby rendering
his discovery of the firearms as accidental. The
plain view doctrine will apply to the seizure of the
firearms and effects because their discovery was
unintentional.
• The Court sustains the validly of the firearm's
seizure and admissibility in evidence, based on
the rule on authorized warrantless arrests. Section
5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:
• Valid warrantless arrests
• chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner.
• (b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
• In this case, the second circumstance “an offense
has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it” is
applicable. The peace officers, while on patrol,
heard bursts of gunfire and this proceeded to
investigate the matter. This incident is considered
an offense and "an offense is committed in the
presence or within the view of an officer, within
the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest
without a warrant, when the officer sees the
offense, although at a distance, or HEARS THE
DISTURBANCES CREATED THEREBY AND
PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE SCENE
THEREOF.”
• As for the existence of personal knowledge, the
gunfire, the bulge in Carillo’s waist, and the peace
officer’s professional instinct are more than
sufficient to grant him personal knowledge of the
facts of the crime that has just been committed.
Consequently, the firearm taken from Carillo can
be said to have been seized incidental to a lawful
and valid arrest.
Malacat vs. CA
Police officer Rodolfu Yu, in response to bomb threats
reported seven days earlier, was on foot patrol with three
other police officers (all of them in uniform) along
Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury
Drug store at Plaza Miranda.
They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men,
with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted
on opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near
the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting
suspiciously with [t]heir eyes moving very fast. Yu and
his companions positioned themselves at strategic points
and observed both groups for about thirty minutes.The
police officers then approached one group of men, who
then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave

Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation
grenade tucked inside petitioners front waistline. Yu’s
companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran,
apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber
revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then
brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an X
mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it
to his commander.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest was valid
HELD:
NO. The warrantless arrest is illegal.
According to the SC, the prosecution failed to establish
petitioners guilt with moral certainty.
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures
are that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the
same. The Constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refer to those
effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to
certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests,
these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances
contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated
as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b)
has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to
the following:
(1) customs searches;
(2) the search of moving vehicles;
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consent searches;
(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
(6) (6) a "stop and frisk."
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the
warrantless search as a stop and frisk with the seizure of
the grenade from the accused as an appropriate incident
to his arrest, hence necessitating a brief discussion on the
nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the
concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental
to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches
differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent
arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the
legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of
these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a
pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search
can be made -- the process cannot be reversed. At bottom,
assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search
the person of the arrestee and the area within which the
latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy,
and seize any money or property found which was used
in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime,
or that which may be used as evidence, or which might
furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or
committing violence.
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto
or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the
lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the
arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of
petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been
committed, was being committed or was going to be
committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest
in this case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner
could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
In the case at bar, at least three (3) reasons why the stop-
and-frisk was invalid:
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yus claim that
petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to
bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is
neither supported by any police report or record nor
corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly
chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility
as a witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that
a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search
petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's
testimony, contrary to his claim that petitioner and his
companions had to be chased before being apprehended,
the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares
otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police
officers, petitioner, and his companions were
"immediately collared."
Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or
conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere
suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast
an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and
his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was
already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and
his companions were merely standing at the corner and
were not creating any commotion or trouble.
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise,
to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the
alleged grenade was discovered inside the front waistline
of the petitioner, and from all indications as to the
distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge,
assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade,
could not have been visible to Yu.
People vs. Lacerna
Facts:
Noriel and Marlon Lacerna were inside a taxi when the
group of Police Officer Carlito Valenzuela of the Western
Police District signaled the taxi driver to park by the side
of the road in lieu of a police checkpoint. P03 Valenzuela
asked permission to search the vehicle. The officers went
about searching the luggages in the vehicle. They found
18 blocks wrapped in newspaper with a distinct smell of
marijuana emanating from it. When the package was
opened, P03 Valenzuela saw dried marijuana leaves.
According to Noriel and Marlon, the bag was a “padala”
of their uncle. Marlon admitted that he was the one who
gave the 18 bundle blocks of marijuana to his cousin
Noriel as the latter seated at rear of the taxi with it. He
however denied knowledge of the contents of the
package.
Marlon was charged before the RTC for “giving
away” marijuana to another. Noriel on the other hand was
acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The court noticed
that Noriel manifested “probinsyano” traits and was, thus,
unlikely to have dealt in prohibited drugs.
Marlon objected on the RTC’s decision, stating
that the lower court erred in saying that the act of “giving
away to another” is not defined under R.A. 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act. He also said that he was not aware
of the contents of the plastic bag given to him by his
uncle. Marlon also raised that his right against warrantless
arrest and seizure was violated.
Issue: WN the search was valid.
Held: the seizure is valid because of consent.
1. Five generally accepted exceptions to the rule against
warrantless arrest have been judicially formulated as
follows:
(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest
(2) search of moving vehicles
(3) seizure in plain view,
(4) customs searches,
(5) waiver by the accused themselves of their
right against unreasonable search and seizure.
2. Search and seizure relevant to moving vehicles are
allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing
a warrant under said circumstances. In such cases,
however, the search and seizure may be made only upon
probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out
of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains an item, article or
object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.
Military or police checkpoints have also been declared to
be not illegal per se as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to body search, and
the inspection of the vehicle is merely visual.
Search of luggage inside a vehicle requires existence
of probable cause
3. In this case, the taxi was validly stopped at the police
checkpoint. Such search however is limited to visual
inspections without occupants being subjected to a
physical or body searches. A search of a luggage inside
the vehicle should require the existence of probable
cause.
4. In several decisions, there was probable cause in the
following instances:
(a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana
emanated from the plastic bag carried by the accused
(b) where an informer positively identified the
accused who was observed to have been acting
suspiciously
(c) where the accused fled when accosted by
policemen
(d) where the accused who were riding a jeepney
were stopped and searched by policemen who had
earlier received confidential reports that said accused
would transport a large quantity of marijuana
(e) where the moving vehicle was stopped and
searched on the basis of intelligence information and
clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy one
who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the
syndicate to which the accused belonged that said
accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country.
5. Probable cause in this case is not evident. The mere act
of slouching in the seat when the taxi passed along P03
Valenzuela’s checkpoint does not constitute probable
cause to justify search and seizure.
Nonetheless, we hold that appellant and his baggage were
validly searched, not because he was caught in flagrante
delicto, but because he freely consented to the search.
True, appellant and his companion were stopped by PO3
Valenzuela on mere suspicion—not probable cause—that
they were engaged in a felonious enterprise. But
Valenzuela expressly sought appellant’s permission for
the search. Only after appellant agreed to have his person
and baggage checked did the actual search commence. It
was his consent which validated the search, waiver being
a generally recognized exception to the rule against
warrantless search.
We are aware that this Court in Aniag, Jr. vs. COMELEC
outlawed a search based on an implied acquiescence,
because such acquiescence was not consent within the
purview of the constitutional guaranty, but was merely
passive conformity to the search given under intimidating
and coercive circumstances. In the case before us,
however, appellant himself who was “urbanized in
mannerism and speech” expressly said that he was
consenting to the search as he allegedly had nothing to
hide and had done nothing wrong. In his brief, appellant
explicitly, even if awkwardly, reiterated this: “Confident
that they [the accused] have not done anything wrong,
they allowed to be searched.” This declaration of
appellant is a confirmation of his intelligent and voluntary
acquiescence to the search. The marijuana bricks were,
therefore, obtained legally through a valid search and
seizure. They were admissible in evidence; there was no
poisonous tree to speak of.
People Vs Malmsteadt
Facts:
Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of
the first regional command (NARCOM) stationed at
camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary
checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles
coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish
a checkpoint was prompted by persistent reports that
vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an information
also was received about a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had in his possession prohibited drugs.
In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding
stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and
announced that they were members of the NARCOM and
that they would conduct an inspection. During the
inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist.
Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the
officer asked for accused’s passport and other
identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the
officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was
bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag
and when accused opened the same bag the officer
noticed four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown
packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of
marijuana.
Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the
bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus
accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer
inspects the bag. It was only after the officers had opened
the bags that the accused finally presented his passport.
The two bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon
inspection the stuff toy contained also hashish.

Issue:
WN the arrest and search legal.
Held: Yes
The constitution states that a peace officer or a
private person may arrest a person without a warrant
when in his presence the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense. Accused was searched and arrested
while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually
being committed by the accused and he was caught in
flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal
effects falls squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing
provision of law, which allows a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest.The offense was recognized
with the warrantless search conducted by NARCOM
prompted by probable cause: (1) the receipt of
information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession and (2)
failure of the accused to immediately present his passport.
People vs. Bagista
On July 4, 1988, at around 8:00 o’clock in the morning,
the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) Detachment Office
located at the Arix Building, Bokawkan Road, Baguio
City, received information from one of its regular
informants that a certain woman, 23 years of age, with
naturally curly hair, and with a height of 5’2″ or 5’3″,
would be transporting marijuana from up north. Acting
upon this piece of information, they established a
checkpoint and flagged down all vehicles, both private
and public, coming from the north to check if any of these
vehicles were carrying marijuana leaves on board.
After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents stopped a
Dangwa Tranco bus with Plate No. AVD 938 and body
number 428, which came from Lepanto, Benguet. Sgts.
Parajas and Fider boarded the bus and thereupon Sgt.
Parajas announced to the passengers that they were
NARCOM agents and that they were going to search their
baggages. At the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with
curly hair seated at the right side (as one is facing the
driver) of the last seat of the bus, with a travelling bag
with black and orange stripes 4 on her lap. Sgt. Parajas
inspected the bag and discovered three (3) bundles of
marijuana leaves covered by assorted clothing. The bag
and the contents thereof were confiscated and the woman
arrested; she was later brought to the NARCOM office in
Baguio City where she was booked and investigated.
Issue:
WON probable cause is present in the conduct of the
warrantless search?
WON the warrantless search is valid?
Held:
The constitutional proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside
from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless
search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and
the seizure of evidence in plain view. With regard to the
search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the
ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it
possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought. This in no way, however, gives the police officers
unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only
as long as the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search
that they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. The
NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable cause
to stop and search all vehicles coming from the north at
Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential
information they received from their regular informant
that a woman having the same appearance as that of
accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up
north. They likewise have probable cause to search
accused-appellant’s belongings since she fits the
description given by the NARCOM informant. Since
there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM
agents, any evidence obtained during the course of said
search is admissible against accused-appellant.

People us. Aminnudin
Facts:
Idel Aminnudin was arrested shortly after
embarking from M/V Wilcon 9 at around 8:30 PM in
Iloilo City on June 25, 1984. After having received a tip
from one of their informers that the accused was on board
a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana,
the PC officers, acting on this tip, waited for him, and
when he arrived, they simply accosted him, inspected his
bag and found articles which look liked marijuana leaves.
They took him to their headquarters for investigation. The
two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him
and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination.
When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was
filed against him. Eventually he was convicted. In his
defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana,
contending that all he had in his bag was his clothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants.
He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked
like and that his business was selling watches and
sometimes cigarettes. He also contended that his bag was
confiscated without a search warrant.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the search and the arrest
conducted to Idel Aminnudin is lawful.
2. Whether or not he is guilty of violating the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
Held:
1. The Court held that the search and the arrest
conducted to Idel Aminnudin is NOT lawful.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides
that the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. In the case, there
was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued
by a judge after personal determination by him of
the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the
averments of the government, the accused-
appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a
crime about to be committed or had just been
committed to justify the warrantless arrest
allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
Regarding the contention that there was no time
to secure a search warrant, it is clear that they had
at least two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V
Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was
identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And
from the information they had received, they
could have persuaded a judge that there was
probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of
a warrant. Yet they did nothing.
2. Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly
seized from Aminnudin, the case of the
prosecution must fall. The evidence cannot be
admitted, and should never have been considered
by the trial court for the simple fact is that the
marijuana was seized illegally. Because the
evidence was illegally seized, it cannot be
admitted. Without the evidence, Idel Aminnudin
must, therefore, be acquitted of the charge.
Caballes vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja
and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in
Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a
passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled
goods, the two police officers flagged down the vehicle.
The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes y Taiño. When
asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but
he appeared pale and nervous. With Caballes' consent, the
police officers checked the cargo and they discovered
bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor
wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation
(NAOCOR).
The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at
P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where the wires came
from and Caballes answered that they came from Cavinti,
a town approximately 8 kilometers away from
Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes and the vehicle with
the highvoltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan
Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of Caballes
and the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned over
to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.
Caballes was charged with the crime of theft in an
information dated 16 October 1989. During the
arraignment, Caballes pleaded not guilty and hence, trial
on the merits ensued. On 27 April 1993, Regional Trial
Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered judgment, finding
Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
theft. In a resolution dated 9 November 1998, the trial
court denied Caballes' motion for reconsideration. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision on 15
September 1998. Caballes appealed the decision by
certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the warrantless search and seizure made by
the police officers, and the admissibility of the evidence
obtained by virtue thereof was valid.
HELD:
Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the
people to be secure in their persons and properties against
unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under
Section 2, Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule under
Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the
admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain
exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2)
seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of moving
vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs
search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and
(7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed
by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court
must be complied with. In the exceptional events where
warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure,
or when the latter cannot be performed except without a
warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances
involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure,
the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched and the character of the articles procured.
It is not controverted that the search and seizure
conducted by the police officers was not authorized by a
search warrant. The mere mobility of these vehicles,
however, does not give the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without
warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in
the absence of probable cause.
Herein, the police officers did not merely conduct a visual
search or visual inspection of Caballes' vehicle. They had
to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and
look inside the sacks before they were able to see the
cable wires. It thus cannot be considered a simple routine
check.
Also, Caballes' vehicle was flagged down because the
police officers who were on routine patrol became
suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was
covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them,
was unusual and uncommon. The fact that the vehicle
looked suspicious simply because it is not common for
such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not
constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct
of a search without a warrant.
In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have
received any confidential report or tipped information
that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his
vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their
suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases
where tipped information has become a sufficient
probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.
Unfortunately, none exists in the present case. Further,
the evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally
surrendered his right against unreasonable searches.
The manner by which the two police officers allegedly
obtained the consent of Caballes for them to conduct the
search leaves much to be desired. When Caballes' vehicle
was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached Caballes and
"told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he
answered in the positive." By uttering those words, it
cannot be said the police officers were asking or
requesting for permission that they be allowed to search
the vehicle of Caballes. For all intents and purposes, they
were informing, nay, imposing upon Caballes that they
will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent
within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In
addition, in cases where the Court upheld the validity of
consented search, it will be noted that the police
authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the
consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of
the accused was established by clear and positive proof.
Neither can Caballes' passive submission be construed as
an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search.
Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining
evidence on record are insufficient to sustain Caballes'
conviction. His guilt can only be established without
violating the constitutional right of the accused against
unreasonable search and seizure.
Obra vs. Court of Appeals
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners (Obra and Dumpit) were
authorized to seize the vehicle in the absence of any
finding of probably cause (PC).
HELD
NO. Although peittioners have authority to order seizure
and confiscation via PD. 1281, Art IV, S3 of the 1973
Constitution merely validated the grant by law to
nonjudicial officers of the power to issue warrants but did
not in any way exempt them from the duty of determining
the existence of probable cause. Petitioner Obra’s letters
to private respondents and Grybos clearly stated that an
investigation was to be held on July 2-5, 1985 to
determine the veracity of the allegations of Grybo’s
complaint. His only basis was an alleged certification
from the BMGS that no mining permit had been issued to
the Sps. However, such certification was not presented in
evidence. The seizure cannot be justified under the
moving vehicle doctrine as there is no existence of
probable cause. The doctrine does not give poblice
officers umliminted discretion to conduct warrantless
searches of automobiles in the absence of PC.

Facts:

Petitioner Benjamin Obra was Regional Director of the

Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMGS) in Baguio.
On jun 26, 1985, Jeannette Grybos wrote him a letter on
behalf of the Gillies heirs complaining that private
respondents (Sps. James and June Brett) had been
conducting illegal mining activities in Bgy. Palasa-an,
Mankayan, Benguet, belonging to Gillies family. On the
same day, Obra wrote Brig. Gen Tomas Dumpit1
requesting assistance in apprehending a truck2 allegedly
used by Sps. Brett in illegal mining. The next day, Obra
wrote Sps Brett and Grybos informing them that BMGS
was going to conduct an ocular inspeciton and field
investigation and requesting them to be present “so that
all… matters… shall be gathered and collated in order for
this Office to take appropriate action.” Elements of RUC
under Maj. Densen seized the truck3 as it was entering
“Mamakar” mining area. It was impounded by the
military and prevented from leaving the area except on
mercy missions4. Private respondents filed a complaint
for injunction and damages with the RTC as the truck was
seized without due provess in violation of their
constitutional rights under Art. 32 of the Civil Code.