[G.R. No. 128576. August 13, 2002.
] 1/5 share; Jacoba Radaza, 1/5 share; Ramona Radaza,
MARIANO A. VELEZ, SR. (deceased), ATTY. PURO M.
VELEZ, ATTY. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, ENGR.
PLUTARCO M. VELEZ and SARAH VDA. DE VELEZ
(for herself and her children by the late HOMER M.
VELEZ, namely PATRICIA, HAYDEE, HOMER, JR.,
RUBY, FE VAL and HANAH, all surnamed
VELEZ), Petitioners, v. REV. FRANCISCO DEMETRIO
(deceased), CELERINA DEMETRIO FIANZA,
TARCILO DEMETRIO, LEVITA FERNANDEZ
DEMETRIO JUAN (for herself and her children),
ANGELA, VALDEHUEZA RADAZA, FELECITO RADAZA
and JOSE RADAZA, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review of decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 22, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 30381,
reversing and setting aside the decision of the then Court
of First Instance of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 17.chanrobles .com : virtual law lib rary
The spouses Felix Radaza and Estefania Abrogar were the
owners of a ten-hectare agricultural land situated in
Puntod, Macasandig, Cagayan de Oro City. Upon their
death, ownership of the land passed by intestate
succession to their surviving children namely — Ramona,
Severo, Filomeno and Jacoba, — and grandchildren by
their son, Jose, Sr. namely — Vicente, Felicito, Rosario
and Jose, Jr. On March 12, 1938, the land was registered
under Original Certificate of Title No. 7678 1 in the
names of Severo Radaza, 1/5 share; Filomeno Radaza,
1/5 share; Vicente Radaza, 1/20 share; Felicito Radaza,
1/20 share; Rosario Radaza, 1/20 share; and Jose
Radaza, Jr., 1/20 share. chanro b1es vi rt ua1 1aw 1i bra ry
On April 14, 1975, Respondents, the surviving children of
Ramona Radaza-Demetrio and Jose Radaza, Sr.,
instituted a complaint for Partition of Real Estate with
Damages against petitioners, the heirs of the late
Mariano Velez, Sr., docketed as Civil Case No. 4686 of
the Court of First Instance of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 17. They alleged that sometime in 1947, they
discovered that the property had been claimed and
fenced in by Mariano Velez, Sr., and that they were
denied entry thereto. Due to financial reasons, it took
them several years before instituting the complaint. In
the meantime, they tried earnestly to recover ownership
and possession of the land through extra-legal means. 2
On the other hand, petitioners averred that the property
had been partitioned among the heirs of Felix Radaza
and Estefania Abrogar; that Mariano Velez, Sr. purchased
the shares of Severo Radaza and Jacoba Radaza in 1936;
that on May 30, 1947, Filomeno sold his share as well as
Ramona’s share to Mariano Velez, Sr.; that the share of
Jose was likewise sold to Mariano Velez, Sr. by his wife
Ciriaca Bacarro Radaza; and that since his acquisition of
the property, Mariano Velez, Sr., by himself and through
his heirs, has been in open, notorious, public and
uninterrupted possession of the same in the concept of
owners, and have exercised fully the attributes of its
ownership. 3
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment as
follows:
chanrob1es vi rt ua1 1aw 1i bra ry
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants
and against the plaintiffs and the Court hereby: chanrob 1es vi rtual 1aw lib rary
1. Orders the dismissal of the complaint filed by the
plaintiffs;
2. Declares the defendants as the absolute owners of the
property in litigation;
3. Declares the plaintiffs never again to molest nor
disturb the defendants in their lawful, peaceful and
rightful ownership, possession and enjoyment of the
property in litigation;
4. On the counterclaim, orders the plaintiffs, jointly and
severally, to pay the defendants the amount of
P20,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as
attorney’s fee; and
5. Orders the plaintiffs to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 4
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed and set aside the lower court’s decision, to wit:
virtua l 1aw lib rary
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered
directing the partition of the property covered by OCT
No. 7678 in the portion of 2/5 to the plaintiffs-appellants
and 3/5 to the defendants-appellees. Costs against the
appellees. 5
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was
denied by the appellate court. 6
Hence, the instant petition for review.
The issues raised by petitioners are: whether the shares
of Ramona Radaza and Jose Radaza were sold to Mariano
Velez, Sr. and whether respondents are guilty of laches.
As regards the first issue, the findings of facts by the trial
court conflict with those of the Court of Appeals. The trial
court was morally convinced that the shares of Ramona
Radaza and Jose Radaza, Sr. were sold to Mariano Velez,
Sr. on two different transactions and occasions. On the
other hand, the Court of Appeals held that the alleged
sale made by Ramona Radaza to Filomeno of her 1/5
share and the subsequent sale made by Filomeno to
Mariano Velez, Sr. of his share and that of Ramona’s and
the sale made by Ciriaca Radaza to Mariano Velez of the
shares of the heirs of Jose Radaza, Sr., were of no force
and effect 7 for there was no evidence presented in
support thereof. The testimonies offered by petitioners to
establish the alleged transactions were pure hearsay.
To prove the alleged sale of Ramona’s share to Filomeno,
petitioners capitalized on the affidavit and testimony of
Francisco, who stated that in the middle 1930s, Ramona
chanrob1e s sold her share to his father, Filomeno, who paid Ramona
three cows in consideration thereof; and that since then
they had been in exclusive possession of the said
property up to the time the same was sold to Mariano
Velez, Sr. by his father. On the witness stand, Francisco
testified that he returned to the disputed land sometime
in 1936 and that his father built a house inside the lot. 8
However, the Court of Appeals ruled that it is improbable
that he witnessed or could have had personal knowledge
of the alleged sale because he started residing on the
land in question from 1930 up to 1935 and that for three
years thereafter, or up to February 28, 1938, he was
enlisted in the Philippine Constabulary at Camp Kethly in
Lanao. Such facts do not directly and convincingly
establish the alleged sale of the portion of Ramona
Radaza to Filomeno Radaza, hence, the same cannot be
logically inferred.
As regards the shares of Jose Radaza, Sr.’s children
which were allegedly sold by their mother, the Court of
Appeals found nothing in the record to indicate that
Ciriaca was authorized by Vicente, Felicito, Rosario and
Jose, Jr. to make the alleged sale to Mariano Velez, Sr.
Petitioners insist that Ciriaca sold her children’s shares
but the pertinent documents were lost during the war. To
prove this alleged sale, petitioners again invoke Francisco
Radaza’s statement that the wife and heirs of Jose
Radaza, Sr. sold their respective shares to the spouses
Mariano Velez, Sr. and Patricia Mercado. However, the
Court of Appeals observed that even Felicito, the son of
Ciriaca, had no knowledge of the sale. With more reason,
Francisco Radaza, who is a stranger to such alleged sale,
cannot have any basis in making this statement.
Another piece of evidence petitioners offered to prove the
alleged sale was the testimony of Isabelo Tabian, a
former tenant of Ciriaca Radaza, who testified that
Ciriaca told him, "Beloy I am going to take the land from
you because there is difficulty in coming over this place
and I am afraid I might get drown(ed). I might as well
sell the land to Etoy (Mariano Velez, Sr)." Tabian further
testified that he delivered the land to Ciriaca. Thereafter,
Sario Echem, a tenant of Mariano Velez, Sr., approached
him asking for help in plowing the land which he was
formerly cultivating. 9 While the Court of Appeals did not
squarely rule on the weight of Tabian’s testimony, the
same was likewise hearsay and cannot serve as proof of
the alleged sale.
Anent the second issue, the principle of laches finds no
application in this case.
Laches is the failure of or neglect for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier, or to assert a right within reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto
has either abandoned it or declined to assert it. 10
Fundamentally, laches is an equitable doctrine, its
application is controlled by equitable considerations. 11
Concomitantly, it is a better rule that courts, under the
principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by
the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when
to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result. 12
Petitioners invoke laches against the respondents for
their failure to protest their occupation of the subject
land since 1947. They allege that respondents slept on
their rights because it took them twenty eight (28) years
before they instituted this case.
The Court of Appeals held that laches could not have set
in because the specific act of repudiation of the co-
ownership was made only on March 27, 1974, when
petitioners registered the affidavit of adverse claim
executed by Mariano Velez and had the same annotated
on respondents’ title with respect to the 3/5 portion of
the land. It held that only then did the period of
prescription start to run. However, since this case was
filed on April 14, 1975 and only for a 3/5 portion thereof,
then no prescription can be counted in favor of
petitioners for the remaining 2/5. 13
 DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
We agree with the Court of Appeals. March 22, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 30381 is AFFIRMED.
1ibra ry
chanrob1e s virtua1 1aw

The land involved was registered under the Torrens SO ORDERED.

system in the name of respondents and their
predecessor-in-interest in 1938. The evidence shows that Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
only 3/5 of the land was sold to Mariano Velez, Sr. and
the 2/5 thereof remains in the name of respondents. The
land being undivided, only the rights of the co-owners
were transferred, thereby making the buyer another co-
owner of the property. It is noteworthy that petitioners
did not transfer the title of the land in their name.
Instead, they merely annotated their claim over the 3/5
portion of the land. This leads to no other conclusion but
a tacit recognition that ownership over the 2/5 share of
the land does not belong to them. Article 494 of the Civil
Code provides that prescription does not run against a
co-owner "so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership." chanrob1es vi rt ua1 1aw 1i bra ry

Moreover, laches may not prevail against specific

provision of law, since equity, which has been defined as
"justice outside legality" is applied in the absence of and
not against statutory law or rules of procedure. 14 Under
the Property Registration Decree, no title to registered
land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. 15 It
is well-settled that prescription and laches can not apply
to registered land covered by the Torrens system. 16
Applying the above principles, respondents being the
registered owner of the land can rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting
in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of
losing his land. 17

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is

G.R. No. 101041 November 13, 1991
HON. JUDGE ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE BERNARDO LL. SALAS and GEORGE
CARLOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 101296 November 13, 1991
HON. JUDGE ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO T. GUERRERO and HON. PEARY G. ALEONAR,
Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 21, Region VII, Cebu
City, respondents.
Ramon Ve Salazar for petitioner.
Antonio T. Guerrero for private respondent.
Henry R. Savellon for respondent.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
In 1977, Civil Case No. B-398 (Gloria Naval vs. George Carlos)
for recovery of ownership of a parcel of coconut land was filed
and subsequently raffled to the sala of the petitioner, Judge
Adriano Villamor. While the civil case was pending there,
respondent Carlos filed Criminal Cases Nos. N-989, N-990, N-
991, N-992 and N-993 for qualified theft against Gloria Naval and
her helpers. The criminal cases were also assigned to the sala of
Judge Villamor.
Due to the pendency of Civil Case No. B-398, the criminal cases
were temporarily archived.
After trial in Civil Case No. B-398, a decision was rendered in
favor of Naval who was declared the lawful owner and possessor
of the disputed land. Carlos was ordered to vacate the land.
Thereafter, respondent Carlos, through counsel, moved to
activate the archived criminal cases. Having declared Naval the
lawful owner and possessor of the contested land in Civil Case
No. B-398, Judge Villamor dismissed the criminal cases against
her and her co-accused.
Judge Villamor likewise granted execution pending appeal of his
decision in Civil Case No. B-398. This order was challenged by
Carlos in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, both without
success.
Afterwards, Carlos filed an administrative case, A.M. No. RTJ-87-
105, against Judge Villamor, charging him with having issued
illegal orders and an unjust decision in Civil Case No. B-398. On
November 21, 1988, this Court, in an En Banc resolution,
summarily dismissed the administrative case.
Dissatisfied with the outcome of the administrative case,
respondent Carlos filed a civil action for damages (Civil Case No.
CEB-6478) against Judge Villamor for knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment when he dismissed the five (5) criminal cases
against Naval, et al.
The summons in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 was served upon
Judge Villamor on December 10, 1987. The next day (December
11, 1987), instead of answering the complaint, Judge Villamor
issued in Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989 to 0993 an order of direct
contempt against Carlos and his lawyer. Attorney Antonio T.
Guerrero, "for degrading the respect and dignity of the court
through the use of derogatory and contemptous language before
the court," and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P500.
Carlos immediately filed in this Court a petition for certiorari with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against
the Judge (G.R. Nos. 82238-42). We promptly restrained Judge
Villamor from enforcing his Order of Contempt against Carlos and
Attorney Guerrero. On November 13, 1989, we annulled the
contempt order. (See pp. 26-34, Rollo of G.R. No. 101041.)
Back to Civil Case No. CEB-6478; Judge Villamor filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court
granted the motion. The order of dismissal was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 20657, June 26, 1990). Carlos
appealed to this Court which also denied the petition. (p.
125, Rollo of G.R. No. 101296.)
Unfazed by these setbacks, Carlos and his counsel, Attorney
Antonio Guerrero, filed separate complaints for damages against
Judge Villamor for knowingly rendering an unjust order of
contempt.
Attorney Guerrero's complaint for damages (Civil Case No. CEB-
8802) was raffled to Branch 21, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City,
presided over by Judge Peary G. Aleonar. Carlos' complaint for
damages was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-8823 and raffled
to Branch 8, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City presided over by
Judge Bernardo LL. Salas.
On March 30, 1990, Judge Villamor filed a motion to dismiss Civil
Case No. CEB-8802 but it was denied by Judge Aleonar (p.
33, Rollo of G.R. No. 101296).
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition with restraining
order docketed as G.R. No. 101296.
On September 19, 1991, this Court issued a temporary
restraining order against Judge Aleonar to stop him from
proceeding in Civil Case No. CEB-8802 (pp. 45-46, Rollo of G.R.
No. 101296).
On May 20, 1991, a Manifestation was filed by Judge Villamor
praying Judge Salas to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-8823 but the
motion was denied by respondent Judge on July 2, 1991 (pp. 13-
16, Rollo of G.R. No. 101041).
Hence, this second petition for certiorari and prohibition with
restraining order (G.R. No. 101041).
On August 21, 1991, a Resolution was issued by this Court: 1)
temporarily restraining Judge Salas from further proceeding in
Civil Case No. CEB-8823; and 2) granting the petitioner's prayer
that this case be consolidated with G.R. No. 101296 (pp. 37-
39, Rollo of G.R. No. 101041).
The sole issue here is: whether or not Judges Aleonar and Salas
may take cognizance of the actions for damages against Judge
Villamor for allegedly having rendered an unjust order of direct
contempt against Carlos and Attorney Guerrero which this Court
subsequently annulled.
The answer is no.
As very aptly held by this Court in a Resolution it issued in
connection with a previous case filed by respondent Carlos
against Judge Villamor, over a similar action for "Damages and
Attorney's Fees Arising From Rendering an Unjust Judgment," in
dismissing the five (5) criminal cases for qualified theft which he
(respondent Carlos) had filed against Gloria P. Naval and others
—
Indeed, no Regional Trial Court can pass upon and
scrutinize, and much less declare as unjust a judgment of
another Regional Trial Court and sentence the judge
thereof liable for damages without running afoul with the
principle that only the higher appellate courts, namely, the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, are vested with
authority to review and correct errors of the trial courts.
 (George D. Carlos vs. CA, G.R. No. 95560, November 5,
1990; p. 125, Rollo of G.R No. 101296.)
To allow respondent Judges Aleonar and Salas to proceed with
the trial of the actions for damages against the petitioner, a co-
equal judge of a co-equal court, would in effect permit a court to
review and interfere with the judgment of a co-equal court over
which it has no appellate jurisdiction or power of review. The
various branches of a Court of First Instance (now the Regional
Trial Court) being co-equal, may not interfere with each other's
cases, judgments and orders (Parco vs. Court of Appeals, 111
SCRA 262).
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for certiorari are
GRANTED, Civil Cases Nos. CEB-8802 and CEB-8823,
respectively, pending in the salas of respondents Judge Peary G.
Aleonar and Judge Bernardo LL. Salas, are hereby dismissed.
The temporary restraining orders issued by this Court in these
cases are hereby made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, CJ., Cruz, Feliciano and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

This Court has already ruled that only after the Appellate Court, in
a final judgment, has found that a trial judge's errors were
committed deliberately and in bad faith may a charge of
knowingly rendering an unjust decision be levelled against the
latter (Garcia vs. Alconcel, 111 SCRA 178; Sta. Maria vs. Ubay,
87 SCRA 179; Gahol vs. Riodique, 64 SCRA 494).

Nowhere in this Court's decision annulling Judge Villamor's order

of direct contempt (G.R. Nos. 82238-42, November 13, 1989) can
there be found a declaration that the erroneous order was
rendered maliciously or with conscious and deliberate intent to
commit an injustice. In fact, a previous order of direct contempt
issued by Judge Villamor against Carlos' former counsel was
sustained by this Court (Jaynes C. Abarrientos, et al. vs. Judge
Villamor, G.R. No. 82237, June 1, 1988).

At most, the order of direct contempt which we nullified may only

be considered an error of judgment for which Judge Villamor may
not be held criminally or civilly liable to the respondents.

A judge is not liable for an erroneous decision in the absence of

malice or wrongful conduct in rendering it (Barroso vs. Arche, 67
SCRA 161).