The Past and Present Society

The Seventeenth-Century Crisis in New Spain: Myth or Reality?: A Rejoinder

Author(s): John J. TePaske and Herbert S. Klein
Source: Past & Present, No. 97 (Nov., 1982), pp. 156-161
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/650634
Accessed: 29-09-2019 21:21 UTC

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156 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 97
Mexican depression in 1645 Viceroy Salvatierra at
traction to a variety of causes, including the new c
tions placed on Mexico by the Spanish crown in the
ceaseless Dutch raiding in the Caribbean, and
present-day historians, it seems to me, has invalida
It is true that there was an unmistakeable easing of
the Mexican economy following the Dutch-Spani
and an increased vitality in the ports of the Gulf o
the second half of the century.22 But there was no
fiscal pressure on the viceroyalty, the great bulk of
revenues continued to be shipped to Spain, the P
Caribbean garrisons, and the Spanish crown con
Mexican trade with Peru and the Philippines in the in
and Cadiz. Thus, as the figures show, the depress
after the end of the War of the Spanish Successi
introduced an era of peace in Europe and decisively
pressures in the New World.

University College, London J. I. Israel

21 Israel, Race, Class and Politics in Colonial Mexico, pp. 99-1o2
22 B. H. Slicher van Bath, Bevolking en economie in Nieuw S
(Amsterdam, 1981), p. 209.

A REJOINDER
WE APPRECIATE THE THOUGHTFUL CRITIQUES OF OUR ARTICLE ON THE
seventeenth-century crisis in New Spain' by Henry Kamen and Jon-
athan Israel and welcome this opportunity to respond to their criti-
cisms. The interchange gives us the chance to provide a clearer picture
of our assumptions and a more systematic description of our approach
to the royal account data used in the article.
Initially we must restate some of our positions so as to point out
basic areas of agreement and disagreement. Our first aim was to dis-
pel once and for all the myth of declining silver production in
seventeenth-century Mexico, a thesis suggested by Earl J. Hamilton's
figures on silver shipments to Castile up to I66o, reaffirmed by Wood-
row W. Borah in his New Spain's Century of Depression, and accepted
by Jonathan Israel in his book on seventeenth-century Mexico, albeit
with a bow to the revisionism of Peter J. Bakewell in his work on the
1 John J. TePaske and Herbert S. Klein, "The Seventeenth-Century Crisis in New
Spain: Myth or Reality?", Past and Present, no. 90o (Feb. 1981), pp. II6-35.

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 THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS IN NEW SPAIN I57

mines of Zacatecas.2 Using the data for silver taxes from all the minin
treasuries of Mexico - Durango, Guadalajara, Guanajuato, Mexico
City, Pachuca, San Luis Potosi, Sombrerete and Zacatecas - we
demonstrated that silver production rose in Mexico up to 1630,
dropped a bit between 1630 and 1670, and increased again in the last
three decades of the seventeenth century. Over the century the secular
trend for silver production was upwards. Israel suggests that our
conclusion may be "rather dubious" because of the gaps in our
figures.3 This is particularly perplexing because he accepts Bakewell's
findings on Zacatecas silver production based on the same data. W
would gladly accept a challenge to our analysis based on firmer, more
reliable evidence, but in lieu of such evidence we reaffirm our initial
view: silver production increased in New Spain during the seven-
teenth century; it did not decline as generally supposed.
A more fundamental disagreement arises over the utility of th
royal accounts as an indicator of economic conditions in New Spain,
or any region of Spanish America for that matter. Quite rightly Ka-
men and Israel point out that tax data have certain deficiencies an
that the figures or entries are often not what they seem.4 Without
detailed listings of exemptions, changing rates, and knowledge of the
conformation of tax districts, and with some crucial taxes in the hands
of tax-farmers, it is virtually impossible to postulate much from the
accounts, particularly an exact relationship between annual output
and annual taxes. On this point Kamen cites evidence from the book
on pulque in New Spain by Jose Jestis Hernandez Palomo to show
that tax collections bore no relationships to consumption of the bev-
erage.5 If one looks more closely at Hernindez's analysis, however
one will note the use of fiscal data as a broad gauge of long-term trend
in production and consumption in different regions of Mexico.6 De-
spite the problems posed by net amounts of revenue being reported
to the royal treasury and by the fact that the pulque tax was often
farmed out to asentistas, Hernindez uses fiscal data as a rough long-
term indicator of production and consumption. We have attempte
to do the same, recognizing full well that account entries will not
reflect immediate or exact economic realities; they must be used over
the long range to demonstrate trends.
2 Earl J. Hamilton, American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501-165
(Cambridge, Mass., 1934); Woodrow W. Borah, New Spain's Century of Depression
(Ibero-Americana, xxxv, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951); J. I. Israel, Race, Clas
and Politics in Colonial Mexico, 161o-i670 (Oxford, 1975); J. I. Israel, "Mexico an
the 'General Crisis' of the Seventeenth Century", Past and Present, no. 63 (May 1974)
PP. 33-57; Peter J. Bakewell, Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico: Zacatecas
1546-1700oo (Cambridge, 197I).
3 See p. 153 above.
4 See pp. 149-50, 152-3 above.
e Jos6 Jestis Hernandez Palomo, La renta del pulque en Nueva Espahia, 1663-1810o
(Seville, 1979), p. 237.
6 Ibid., pp. 234, 244, 304-5 (23 graphs).

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 158 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 97
More specifically, do the taxes collected in the Me
tell us anything at all about the economy of Mexico
century? Kamen argues that only taxes on mining
or commercial activity - sales taxes (alcabalas), ti
import-export taxes (almojarifazgos) - are valid i
omic conditions, and these constitute only 37 per c
For some reason he chooses to exclude income from
a tax on production, despite the fact that mine
mercury to amalgamate silver, whatever the source
and whatever profit it derived for the crown.8 We a
should be included as an indicator as well, whic
basis for our estimates to 50 per cent or more of
excluding royal monopolies and tribute which may
related to production as well. But what then were o
the state of the Mexican economy in the seventeen
on the analysis of revenues from sales taxes, tithes
taxes? We stated cautiously that the figures "are no
to provide a full picture of conditions in other sect
economy, such as the production of foodstuffs, tex
pulque, cacao, indigo and other commodities. If t
any trend, they suggest stagnation".9 On the other
our figures for mining production, they sugges
weight of mining in the total economic picture f
relatively small role in total employment, playin
petroleum in some Latin American nations tod
majority of Mexicans worked in agriculture, but ag
less productive than mining and was dependent
economy for its long-term economic rhythm.
What then about the other taxes not directly relat
those taxes which Kamen claims are worthless indicators of the econ-
omy, which represent some mythical world of "fiscality"? Does in-
come from such taxes as the sale of indulgences, tribute, donations,
extraordinary revenues, royal monopolies, exactions on clerical and
civil office-holders, and a host of other sources reveal anything about
the economy, or are they valueless as Kamen charges? Our analysis
shows conclusively that income from these taxes is very highly cor-
related with those on mining, agricultural and commercial activity,
also with total revenue into the various cajas (treasuries) of Mexico.
The assumption by both Israel and Kamen that revenues collected in
a pre-industrial economy such as New Spain in no way reflect the
general state of the economy simply does not hold up under close
7 See p. 146 above.
8 See p. 146 above.
9 TePaske and Klein, "Seventeenth-Century Crisis in New Spain", p. 134.

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 THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS IN NEW SPAIN 159

scrutiny. 10 In the productive sectors, miners who produced no silv

and farmers who produced no food paid no taxes. In Mexican por
merchants who bought or sold little or nothing paid little or nothin
to the crown in almojarifazgos. The same was true for sales taxes, eve
when these were farmed out. Marcello Carmagnani has pointed o
also that, even when tax-farmers collected tithes and sales taxes, con
tracts between royal officials and the tax-farmer usually reflected th
state of the economy. Used over the long term, incomes from these
taxes are reliable indicators of economic conditions.11 As for oth
taxes not related directly to production, we argue that Indians w
had no money or corn paid no tribute. Pious church-goers who wish
to buy indulgences but had no funds could not purchase bulas de san
cruzada or bulas cuadragesimales.12 Churches and clerical orders fall
ing on bad times could not contribute much for subsidies, donations
or subventions to the crown. Without money, those aspiring to col-
onial offices could not purchase them. In fact no amount of arm
wrenching by royal treasury officials or the imposition of "non-doc
trinal puritanism" in tax affairs could for long extract additional mo
ies in Spanish colonial society. As Israel suggests for the Spani
Netherlands, Naples and Portugal,13 this could be done for a sho
period, but not indefinitely.
Seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century Peru is a good case
point. The economy of Peru began to languish after i66o, particular
because of the decline in silver production in Potosi and other parts
of Upper Peru. Remission of surplus revenues from Upper Peru
prop up the viceregal government in Lima thus diminished, and less
bullion and specie were available for use throughout the viceroyalty
of Peru. At first, royal treasury officials in Lima met the challenge b
pursuing a policy which Israel indicates was used in other parts of t
Spanish empire in the seventeenth century: they extracted new
come for the royal treasury by selling more land titles and bon
(juros) and exacting more loans, donations and subsidies from th
church and the populace.14 In the short run this kept revenues u

1o See pp. 144-5, 152-3 above. As part of our analysis of the account data for th
seventeenth century, we correlated every category of royal revenue with every oth
category and with total revenue. In all cases the correlations between production tax
non-production taxes and total revenues were exceedingly high.
11 Marcello Carmagnani, "La producci6n agropecuaria chilena, I68o-I 830", Cahier
des Am'rique Latine, iii (1969), pp. 3-21.
12 Bulas de santa cruzada were indulgences, called bulls of the holy crusade. Bul
cuadragesimales were indulgences which granted exemptions from the prohibit
against eating meat on certain days during Lent, bulls which were sold in the
eighteenth century. Sales of both types of indulgences created considerable income
the crown.
13 See p. 152 above.
14 Kenneth J. Andrien, "The Sale of Fiscal Offices and the Decline of Royal Auth-
ority in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1633-17oo", Hispanic Amer. Hist. Rev., lxii (1982),
pp. 70-I.

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 60o PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 97
but after ten years these sources dried up. As econom
worsened in Peru, royal revenues suffered as well, an
lag, the drop in revenues in all sectors of the royal trea
the crisis in the Peruvian economy. 15
Still another aim of our analysis of seventeeth-centur
was to determine whether greater portions of public
being retained in the Indies, a thesis propounded by Joh
Our royal account data demonstrated that at the beg
seventeenth century about 50 per cent of all surplus rev
the treasuries of Mexico was going to Castile and the Ph
the end of the century these amounted to less than 25 pe
income. On this point there seems little disagreement. I
and Israel help to inform our analysis by explaining the
surplus funds in New Spain and the Caribbean - mili
(situados), fortifications, fitting out fleets, and military
plies and salaries of all sorts17 - supporting our basic ar
increasingly large sums were being kept in the Indies and
Kamen has quite correctly called into question our use
the accounts to determine amounts "shipped" to Spai
out that monies originally intended for Castile and acco
such were often diverted for military and naval purpos
or left behind in Havana for the military subsidies
Santiago. We are chided for using the "remissions to Ca
without pointing out that a portion of these funds often
Spain. We clearly recognize that monies listed in the
Mexico accounts as remissions to Spain never found
Seville,19 but use of this account category was exceedin
determining the actual amounts of surplus revenue avai
ment to Europe, the relationship of these sums to t
produced, and the estimated percentages of surplus
shared by Castile and the Philippines. The category also
with a consistent source for establishing and measuring
trends. We are perplexed, however, by Kamen's view
tion of shipments of Mexican silver to Spain in the seve
15 As pointed out in our original article, the graph showing the annu
the cajas of Mexico and Peru from 1580 to 1816 (p. 122) demonstrate
Neither curve has been adjusted for deposits, loans, monies carried o
years, and the like. The graphs do, however, demonstrate the trends w
to establish.
16 John Lynch, Spain under the Habsburgs, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1965-9), ii, pp. 160-228.
17 See pp. 149-50, 154-5 above.
18 See p. 149 above.
19 In his "Spanish Caribbean Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century"
(paper delivered at a conference at La Ribida, Sept. 1981) TePaske demonstrated the
increasingly larger sums being spent from Mexican revenues for Caribbean defence in
both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The last half of the seventeenth century
was a real watershed because of growing French power in Saint Domingue and English
power in Jamaica and the increasing threat to Spanish control over the Gulf of Mexico.

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 THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS IN NEW SPAIN 161

ury.20 Our account data shows that 2.75 million pesos were destined
for Castile from Mexico in the 169Os, and less probably reached Se-
ville. Elsewhere Kamen has pointed to "indisputable evidence" th
at least 70 million American pesos reached Spain in the 169os,
million pesos on the galeones of 1691 and 30 million on the flota
1697.21 Given the drain of public funds for military purposes in Vera
cruz and Havana, the implications of the immense sums being r
mitted from the private sector to Spain are so large as to be wellnig
incredible. In fact imports in these two convoys alone constitute abou
two-thirds of the total silver production of Mexico and Upper Peru
in the 169os - and there were other ships reaching Spain from t
Indies besides these two fleets.
On balance, therefore, we see little reason to revise our original
findings. We cannot defend each and every tax, nor can we deny that
Spaniards engaged in accounting fraud and used archaic accounting
methods. We are convinced, however, that future detailed studies
will unravel such questions as the various components of the im-
portant extraordinario category and of those taxes which most closely
reflected actual output or consumption. But such studies should not
change our recent findings for seventeenth-century New Spain. While
a bit tentative about either a boom or depression in the agricultural
and commercial sectors, we have demonstrated conclusively that
there was no sustained crisis in the mining sector and have called into
question the widely held belief of a seventeenth-century depression
in New Spain.
Duke University John J. TePaske
Columbia University Herbert S. Klein

20 See p. 149 above.

21 Henry Kamen, "The Decline of Spain: A Historical M
no. 81 (Nov. 1978), p. 39.

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